

MINDFULNESS IN EARLY BUDDHISM

**New approaches through
psychology and textual analysis
of Pali, Chinese and Sanskrit
sources**

Tse-fu Kuan



Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

MINDFULNESS IN EARLY BUDDHISM

This book identifies what is meant by *sati* (*smṛti*), usually translated as “mindfulness,” in early Buddhism, and examines its soteriological functions and its central role in the early Buddhist practice and philosophy. Using textual analysis and criticism, it takes new approaches to the subject through a comparative study of Buddhist texts in Pali, Chinese and Sanskrit. It also furnishes new perspectives on the ancient teaching by applying the findings in modern psychology. In contemporary Buddhism, the practice of mindfulness is zealously advocated by the Theravāda tradition, which is the only early Buddhist school that still exists today. Through detailed analysis of Theravāda’s Pali Canon and the four Chinese *Āgamas*—which correspond to the four main *Nikāyas* in Pali and belong to some early schools that no longer exist—this book shows that mindfulness is not only limited to the role as a method of insight (*vipassanā*) meditation, as presented by many Theravāda advocates, but it also has a key role in serenity (*samatha*) meditation. It elucidates how mindfulness functions in the path to liberation from a psychological perspective, that is, how it helps to achieve an optimal cognitive capability and emotional state, and thereby enables one to attain the ultimate religious goal. Furthermore, the author argues that the well-known formula of *ekāyano maggo*, which is often interpreted as “the only way,” implies that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* (establishments of mindfulness) constitute a comprehensive path to liberation, and refer to the same as *kāyagatā sati*, which has long been understood as “mindfulness of the body” by the tradition. The study shows that *kāyagatā sati* and the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are two different ways of formulating the teaching on mindfulness according to different schemes of classification of phenomena.

Tse-fu Kuan is an assistant professor at the General Education Centre, National University of Kaohsiung, Taiwan. He is interested in Indian Buddhism and is the author of *An Introduction to Śamatha and Vipāśyanā of the Mahāyāna* (co-authored with Ven. Dr Huimin Bhikkhu, Taipei: Dharma Drum Culture, 1997) and several articles in leading journals including the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*.

ROUTLEDGE CRITICAL STUDIES IN BUDDHISM

Founding Editors:

Charles S. Prebish and Damien Keown

Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism is a comprehensive study of the Buddhist tradition. The series explores this complex and extensive tradition from a variety of perspectives, using a range of different methodologies.

The Series is diverse in its focus, including historical studies, textual translations and commentaries, sociological investigations, bibliographic studies, and considerations of religious practice as an expression of Buddhism integral religiosity. It also presents materials on modern intellectual historical studies, including the role of Buddhist thought and scholarship in a contemporary, critical context and in the light of current social issues. The series is expansive and imaginative in scope, spanning more than two and a half millennia of Buddhist history. It is receptive to all research works that inform and advance our knowledge and understanding of the Buddhist tradition.

A SURVEY OF VINAYA LITERATURE

Charles S. Prebish

THE REFLEXIVE NATURE OF AWARENESS

Paul Williams

ALTRUISM AND REALITY

Paul Williams

BUDDHISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

*Edited by Damien Keown, Charles Prebish
and Wayne Husted*

WOMEN IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THE BUDDHA

Kathryn R. Blackstone

THE RESONANCE OF EMPTINESS

Gay Watson

AMERICAN BUDDHISM

*Edited by Duncan Ryuken Williams
and Christopher Queen*

IMAGING WISDOM

Jacob N. Kinnard

PAIN AND ITS ENDING

Carol S. Anderson

EMPTINESS APPRAISED

David F. Burton

THE SOUND OF LIBERATING TRUTH

Edited by Sallie B. King and Paul O. Ingram

BUDDHIST THEOLOGY

*Edited by Roger R. Jackson and
John J. Makransky*

THE GLORIOUS DEEDS OF PURNA

Joel Tatelman

EARLY BUDDHISM – A NEW APPROACH

Sue Hamilton

CONTEMPORARY BUDDHIST ETHICS

Edited by Damien Keown

INNOVATIVE BUDDHIST WOMEN

Edited by Karma Lekshe Tsomo

TEACHING BUDDHISM IN THE WEST

*Edited by V. S. Hori, R. P. Hayes
and J. M. Shields*

EMPTY VISION

David L. McMahan

SELF, REALITY AND REASON IN TIBETAN PHILOSOPHY

Thupten Jinpa

IN DEFENSE OF DHARMA

Tessa J. Bartholomeusz

- BUDDHIST PHENOMENOLOGY
Dan Lusthaus
- RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION AND
THE ORIGINS OF BUDDHISM
Torkel Brekke
- DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN
BUDDHISM
Michelle Spuler
- ZEN WAR STORIES
Brian Victoria
- THE BUDDHIST UNCONSCIOUS
William S. Waldron
- INDIAN BUDDHIST THEORIES
OF PERSONS
James Duerlinger
- ACTION DHARMA
*Edited by Christopher Queen,
Charles Prebish and Damien Keown*
- TIBETAN AND ZEN BUDDHISM
IN BRITAIN
David N. Kay
- THE CONCEPT OF THE BUDDHA
Guang Xing
- THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESIRE IN
THE BUDDHIST PALI CANON
David Webster
- THE NOTION OF *DITTHI* IN
THERAVADA BUDDHISM
Paul Fuller
- THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF
SELF-COGNITION
Zhihua Yao
- MORAL THEORY IN ŚĀNTIDEVA'S
ŚIKṢĀSAMUCCAYA
Barbra R. Clayton
- BUDDHIST STUDIES FROM INDIA
TO AMERICA
Edited by Damien Keown
- DISCOURSE AND IDEOLOGY IN
MEDIEVAL JAPANESE BUDDHISM
*Edited by Richard K. Payne and
Taigen Dan Leighton*
- BUDDHIST THOUGHT AND APPLIED
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
*Edited by D. K. Nauriyal,
Michael S. Drummond and Y. B. Lal*
- BUDDHISM IN CANADA
Edited by Bruce Matthews
- BUDDHISM, CONFLICT AND
VIOLENCE IN MODERN SRI LANKA
Edited by Mahinda Deegalle
- THERAVĀDA BUDDHISM AND
THE BRITISH ENCOUNTER
Religious, missionary and colonial
experience in nineteenth century Sri Lanka
Elizabeth Harris
- BEYOND ENLIGHTENMENT
Buddhism, religion, modernity
Richard Cohen
- BUDDHISM IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE
Reorienting global interdependence
Peter D. Herschok
- BRITISH BUDDHISM
Teachings, practice and development
Robert Bluck
- BUDDHIST NUNS IN TAIWAN
AND SRI LANKA
A critique of the feminist perspective
Wei-Yi Cheng
- NEW BUDDHIST MOVEMENTS
IN THAILAND
Toward an understanding of Wat Phra
Dhammakāya and Santi Asoke
Rory Mackenzie
- BUDDHIST RITUALS OF DEATH
AND REBIRTH
Contemporary Sri Lankan practice and
its origins
Rita Langer
- BUDDHISM, POWER AND
POLITICAL ORDER
Edited by Ian Harris
- ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
IN BUDDHISM
A virtues approach
Pragati Sahni
- THE CULTURAL PRACTICES OF
MODERN CHINESE BUDDHISM
Attuning the Dharma
Francesca Tarocco
- MINDFULNESS IN EARLY BUDDHISM
New approaches through psychology and
textual analysis of Pali, Chinese and
Sanskrit sources
Tse-fu Kuan

The following titles are published in association with the *Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies*



Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies

a project of The Society for the Wider Understanding of the Buddhist Tradition

The *Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies* conducts and promotes rigorous teaching and research into all forms of the Buddhist tradition.

EARLY BUDDHIST METAPHYSICS

Noa Ronkin

MIPHAM DIALECTICS AND THE DEBATES ON EMPTINESS

Karma Phuntsho

HOW BUDDHISM BEGAN

The conditioned genesis of the early teachings

Richard F. Gombrich

BUDDHIST MEDITATION

An anthology of texts from the Pāli Canon

Sarah Shaw

REMAKING BUDDHISM FOR MEDIEVAL NEPAL

The fifteenth-century reformation of Newar Buddhism

Will Tuladhar-Douglas

METAPHOR AND LITERALISM IN BUDDHISM

The doctrinal history of nirvana

Soonil Hwang

THE BIOGRAPHIES OF RECHUNGPA

The evolution of a Tibetan hagiography

Peter Alan Roberts

THE ORIGIN OF BUDDHIST MEDITATION

Alexander Wynne

MINDFULNESS IN EARLY BUDDHISM

New approaches through psychology and
textual analysis of Pali, Chinese and
Sanskrit sources

Tse-fu Kuan

First published 2008
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2008 Tse-fu Kuan

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any
form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Kuan, Tse-fu, 1965–
Mindfulness in early Buddhism : new approaches through psychology and textual
analysis of Pali, Chinese, and Sanskrit sources / Tse-fu Kuan.
p. cm. – (Routledge critical studies in Buddhism series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-415-43737-0 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Satipatthana (Buddhism)
2. Buddhism–Doctrines–History. 3. Buddhism–Psychology–History. 4. Buddhist
literature, Pali–History and criticism. 5. Buddhist literature, Chinese–History and criticism.
6. Buddhist literature, Sanskrit–History and criticism. I. Title.

BQ5630.S2K83 2007
294.3'443–dc22
2007021590

ISBN 0-203-93614-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-43737-7 (hbk)
ISBN10: 0-203-93614-0 (ebk)

ISBN13: 978-0-415-43737-0 (hbk)
ISBN13: 978-0-203-93614-6 (ebk)

TO VEN. HUIMIN AND
MR YUWEN YANG

CONTENTS

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xi
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xiii
<i>Map</i>	xvii
 Introduction	 1
1 Mindfulness in soteriology: Transformation of cognition and emotion	13
1. <i>Mindfulness and saññā</i>	13
2. <i>Mindfulness and cognition</i>	17
3. <i>Mindfulness and emotion</i>	24
4. <i>Mindfulness and the Path to Liberation</i>	33
2 Types and functions of mindfulness	41
1. <i>Simple awareness</i>	41
2. <i>Protective awareness</i>	42
3. <i>Introspective awareness</i>	51
4. <i>Deliberately forming conceptions</i>	52
3 Mindfulness in methodical meditation	57
1. <i>Mindfulness and insight (vipassanā) meditation</i>	58
2. <i>Mindfulness and serenity (samatha) meditation</i>	59
3. <i>Mindfulness of breathing—an example of samatha and vipassanā yoked together</i>	70
4 <i>Kāyagatā sati</i> : Mindfulness directed to the experiencer	81
1. <i>The origins of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta</i>	81
2. <i>The meaning of kāyagatā sati</i>	97

CONTENTS

5	The four <i>satipaṭṭhānas</i> : Mindfulness as a comprehensive path	104
1.	<i>Investigating the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and its authenticity</i>	105
2.	<i>Essential teachings on the four satipaṭṭhānas</i>	112
3.	<i>The four satipaṭṭhānas and kāyagatā sati</i>	131
4.	<i>The four satipaṭṭhānas emphasized as the Buddha's final teaching</i>	132
Conclusion		139
Appendix 1	An annotated translation of the Sarvāstivāda version of the <i>Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta</i>	145
Appendix 2	An annotated translation of the Sarvāstivāda version of the <i>Kāyagatāsati Sutta</i>	155
Appendix 3	A tabular comparison of the Pali and the two Chinese versions of the <i>Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta</i>	166
<i>Glossary</i>		170
<i>Notes</i>		172
<i>Bibliography</i>		215
<i>Index</i>		227

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The present book is a revised version of my doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Oxford in 2004. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Professor R.F. Gombrich, my supervisor. From 1999 to 2004, while I worked on my thesis, his invaluable guidance and inspirational teaching hugely broadened my horizons on Buddhist studies, and his patient correction of the English in my work was also very helpful to me. I owe a great deal to Mr L.S. Cousins, who read my thesis carefully, provided constructive criticisms and suggestions, and generously directed me to many useful sources. Dr Alexander Wynne also read through my thesis and made valuable criticisms and gave me helpful advice, for which I am very grateful. I am greatly indebted to Dr William Pruitt for proofreading my work, for his many valuable suggestions and for helping me to polish my English. I would also like to thank the following people for their help: Dr Sarah Shaw and Mr Yuwen Yang kindly offered a number of useful suggestions. In the three examinations during the course of my D.Phil. studies, Professor Peter Harvey, Dr R.M.L. Gethin, Professor Brian Bocking, Dr Sue Hamilton and Dr Eivind Kahrs provided helpful comments and advice. Mr Moez Cherif and Mrs Ratiba Cherif translated part of a French book into English. My special thanks are due to Professor Peter Harvey for recommending my thesis to Routledge for publication. I am also grateful to Ven. Anālayo, Professor Paul Harrison, Professor Kin-tung Yit, Ms Georgia Vale, Ms Dorothea Schaefer and Mr Tom Bates for varied help. I would like to express my indebtedness to the Chung-hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies, Fakuang Institute of Buddhist Studies and Seeland Education Foundation for their financial support for my studies at Oxford, and to National Cheng Kung University for giving me the grant to revise my thesis for publication as part of my post-doctoral research. Thanks are also due to the *Satyābhisamaya: A Buddhist Studies Quarterly*, Springer Science and Business Media, which controls the copyright of my article published in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* (vol. 33 no. 3, 2005), and the BJK Institute of Buddhist and Asian Studies, which controls the copyright of my article published in the *Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies* (no. 8, 2007), for granting me permission to

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

re-use parts of my articles published therein. Finally, but not least, I would like to thank my mother, Pi-yun Huang, whose care and support were never attenuated even when I studied in England over six thousand miles away from home.

ABBREVIATIONS

Included here are primary sources, dictionaries and other works of reference. References to Pali texts are to the Pali Text Society editions, unless otherwise noted.

- Ak-P *Abhidharma-kośabhāṣya*, ed. P. Pradhan, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.
- Ak-S *Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*, ed. Swāmī Dwārikādās Śāstrī, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1987.
- Akvy *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* by Yaśomitra, ed. Unrai Wogihara, Tokyo: The Publishing Association of Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, 1932–1936.
- AN *Aṅguttara Nikāya*.
- Ap *Apadāna*.
- As *Atthasālinī*.
- Avs *The Arthaviniścaya-sūtra and Its Commentary (Nibandhana)*, ed. N.H. Santati, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1971.
- BDJ *Bukkyōgo Dai Jiten* 佛教語大辞典 (*A Great Dictionary of Buddhist Terminology*), ed. Hajime Nakamura 中村元, Tokyo: 東京書籍株式會社, 1981.
- BJT *Buddha Jayanti Tripitaka Series* (electronic version).
- BU *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (references are to Patrick Olivelle, 1998).
- Bv *Buddhavaṃsa*.
- Bv-a *Buddhavaṃsa-aṭṭhakathā*.
- CBETA *CBETA Chinese Electronic Tripitaka Collection* (CD-ROM), Taipei: Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association.
- CDIL *A Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages*, ed. R.L. Turner, London: Oxford University Press, 1966.
- ChS *Chaṭṭha Saṅgīti Piṭakaṃ*, Rangoon, 1955.
- CPED *Concise Pali-English Dictionary*, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta Mahāthera, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994. (First published 1957, Colombo).


- CSCD *Chaṭṭha Sangāyana* CD-ROM Version 3, Igatpuri: Vipassana Research Institute.
- CU *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (references are to Patrick Olivelle, 1998).
- DĀ *Dīrgha Āgama*.
- Dhp *Dhammapada* (by verse).
- Dhp-a *Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā*.
- Dhs *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*.
- Dīp *The Dīpavaṃsa: An Ancient Buddhist Historical Record*, ed. and tr. by Hermann Oldenberg, London: Williams and Norgate, 1879.
- DN *Dīgha Nikāya*.
- DOP *A Dictionary of Pali*, ed. Margaret Cone, Oxford: Pali Text Society, 2001.
- DPPN *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*, ed. G.P. Malalasekera, London: John Murray, 1937.
- EDC *The Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Chinese Language* 中文大辭典, ed. Yin Lin 林尹 and Ming Gao 高明, Taipei: Chinese Culture University, 1973.
- Ee European edition (i.e. Pali Text Society edition).
- FDC *Foguang Da Cidian* 佛光大辭典, ed. Ci-yi 慈怡, Kaohsiung: 佛光出版社, 1988.
- HDC *Hanyu Da Cidian* 漢語大詞典 (A Great Dictionary of the Chinese Language), ed. Zhufeng Luo 羅竹風, Hong Kong: 三聯書店, 1988–1994.
- HDZ *Hanyu Da Zidian* 漢語大字典 (A Great Dictionary [for single characters] of the Chinese Language), ed. Zhongshu Xu 徐中舒, Wuhan: 湖北辭書出版社, 1986.
- It *Itivuttaka*.
- J Jin Edition 金藏, included in *Zhonghua Dazangjing* (*Hanwen bufen*) 中華大藏經 (漢文部分), Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984–1996.
- Khp *Khuddakapāṭha*.
- Kv *Kathāvatthu*.
- Kv-a *Kathāvatthu* Commentary (included in the *Paramatthadīpanī*).
- LSC personal communication with L.S. Cousins.
- M Ming Edition 明本, referred to in T.
- MĀ *Madhyama Āgama*.
- Mhv *Mahāvamsa*.
- Mil *The Milindapañho*, ed. V. Trenckner, London: Williams & Norgate, 1880.
- MN *Majjhima Nikāya*.
- Mp *Manorathapūraṇī* (commentary on the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*).
- MPS *Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra: Text in Sanskrit und Tibetisch, verglichen mit dem Pali nebst einer Übersetzung der Chinesischen Entsprechung im Vinaya der Mūlasarvāstivādins*, ed. Ernst Waldschmidt, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1951.

ABBREVIATIONS

MSA	<i>Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra</i> , ed. Sylvain Lévi, Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, Éditeur, 1907.
MW	<i>A Sanskrit-English Dictionary</i> , ed. Monier Monier-Williams, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899.
Nidd I	<i>Mahāniddesa</i> .
Paṭis	<i>Paṭisambhidāmagga</i> .
Paṭis-a	<i>Saddhammappakāsinī</i> (commentary on the <i>Paṭisambhidāmagga</i>).
PED	<i>The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary</i> , ed. T.W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, London: Pali Text Society, reprinted 1986. (First published 1921–1925).
Peṭ	<i>Peṭakopadesa</i> , revised edition, 1982.
Ps	<i>Papañcasūdanī</i> (commentary on the <i>Majjhima Nikāya</i>).
PTC	<i>Pali Tipiṭakaṃ Concordance</i> , ed. E.M. Hare <i>et al.</i> , London: Pali Text Society, 1956–1973.
Pv	<i>Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā</i> , ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, London: Luzac & Co., 1934.
Q	Qisha Edition 磧砂藏, included in <i>Zhonghua Dazangjing</i> First Division 中華大藏經 第一輯, Taoyuan Taiwan: 修訂中華大藏經會, 1974.
RFG	personal communication with R.F. Gombrich.
S	Song Edition 宋本, referred to in T.
SĀ	<i>Samyukta Āgama</i> .
ŚA	<i>Śāriputrābhidharma</i> (舍利弗阿毘曇論 Taishō Vol. 28, No. 1548).
Saun	<i>The Saundarananda of Aśvaghōṣa</i> , ed. E.H. Johnston, London: Humphrey Milford, 1928.
SJD	漢訳対照 梵和大辞典 (A Sanskrit-Japanese Dictionary with Equivalents in Chinese Translation), ed. Unrai Wogihara 荻原雲來, revised edition, Tokyo: 講談社, 1986.
Skt	Sanskrit.
SN	<i>Samyutta Nikāya</i> .
Sn	<i>Sutta-nipāta</i> (by verse).
Śp	<i>Śatasāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā</i> , ed. Pratāpacandra Ghoṣa, Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1905.
Spk	<i>Sāratthappakāsinī</i> (commentary on the <i>Samyutta Nikāya</i>).
ŚrBh	<i>Śrāvaka bhūmi</i> , ed. K. Shukla, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1973.
SRTD	長阿含十報法經 (<i>Sūtra on the Ten Repeated Dharmas of the Dīrgha Āgama</i> , T 1, 233b–241c).
Sv	<i>Sumaṅgalavilāsinī</i> (commentary on the <i>Dīrgha Nikāya</i>).
T	<i>Taishō Shinshu Daizōkyō</i> 大正新脩大藏經 (Taishō Edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka), Tokyo, reprinted: 1978 (referred to by volume number and page number).
Th	<i>Theragāthā</i> (by verse).
Th-a	<i>Theragāthā-aṭṭhakathā</i> (included in the <i>Paramatthadīpanī</i>).

MINDFULNESS IN EARLY BUDDHISM

Thī	<i>Therīgāthā</i> (by verse).
Ud	<i>Udāna</i> .
VH	<i>The Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya</i> , ed. Henry Clarke Warren, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1950.
Vin	<i>The Vinaya Piṭakam</i> , ed. Hermann Oldenberg, Edinburgh: Williams & Norgate, 1879.
Vism	<i>Visuddhimagga</i> .
Y	Yuan Edition 元本, referred to in T.



MAP The Cradle of Buddhism

[Adapted from Gethin (1998: Map 1), Lamotte (1988: map 1) and E. Zürcher, *Buddhism: Its Origin and Spread in Words, Maps and Pictures*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, map. 2/3]

INTRODUCTION

1. The scope of the research

Mindfulness (Pali *sati*, Skt *smṛti*) plays an important role in Buddhist practice and philosophy. Many contemporary Buddhist teachers, especially those following the Theravāda tradition, are advocates of mindfulness.¹ Mindfulness is a function or quality of mind, but it is often described as something to be practiced or cultivated. Right mindfulness is one component of the Noble Eightfold Path that leads to the final religious goal. One text even states that those who have undertaken the four establishments of mindfulness have undertaken the noble path.² Therefore mindfulness (*sati*) can be considered to be a practice.

Etymologically the Pali term *sati*, which derives from *smṛti* in Sanskrit, means memory, but it was given new connotations in early Buddhism, and thus the rendering of *sati* as memory is inadequate in most contexts. As pointed out by T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1910: 323–324), *sati* has been translated by different people in different ways, such as “conscience,” “attention,” “meditation,” “contemplation,” “insight.” Gyatso (1992: 4) also holds that *smṛ*-derivatives can have two basic meanings: “recollective memory (or more generally, memory of the past), and what is most often rendered as “mindfulness”. I will translate *sati* as “mindfulness” in this book, following many other people, but in many cases, I will leave it untranslated. The meaning of *sati* will be discussed in Chapter 1. The practice of *anussati* (*anusmṛti*), an idea interchangeable with *sati* as Harrison (1992: 228) suggests, will also be dealt with in this book.

As Jaini (1992: 47) points out, in the Theravādin Abhidhamma the word *sati* (*smṛti*) appears as a conditioning factor that occurs only in good consciousness and hence is invariably called “right mindfulness” (*sammā-sati*), whereas in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma literature *smṛti* is enumerated in the list of the factors invariably found in every mental event. Even though “wrong mindfulness” (*micchā-sati*) is found in the earliest Buddhist texts, it only occurs in contexts (almost exclusively in a description of what is the opposite of the Noble Eightfold Path) where no further explanation is given;³ on the other hand, *sati* widely appears in the texts as a positive mental state that should

be developed. Therefore this book will deal with *sati* only in the sense of right mindfulness.

Buddhism underwent a long history of doctrinal development. The doctrine of *sati* is no exception. This study aims to trace the original concepts concerning *sati*, to elucidate implicit but important notions about *sati* in early Buddhism, and to find out its soteriological functions and its position in the early Buddhist teaching. I will also attempt to identify some later opinions that are probably mistaken and that have crept into the early texts. I will try to suggest emendations to them.

The focus of this book is on the doctrine of *sati* in early Buddhism. Griffiths (1983: 56) defines early Buddhism as “pre-Aśokan Indian Buddhism.” Similarly, Collins (1990: 89) divides Theravāda Buddhist history into three periods: the “early” period lasts from the time of the Buddha to that of Aśoka. It is largely agreed that King Aśoka reigned around 270–230 BC.⁴ Scholars have not reached an agreement with regard to the dating of the Buddha. The Buddha’s death has been dated from the fifth century to early fourth century BC.⁵ Therefore, according to the above definition, “early Buddhism” covers roughly the first one or two centuries of Buddhist history. What I mean by early Buddhism may coincide with this definition. By “early Buddhism,” I refer to what is described by Schmithausen (1987: 1): “the canonical period prior to the development of different schools with their different positions.” This is possibly the earliest period of Buddhist teaching that we can discern in the texts available to us. However, the dating of the schisms is problematic.

Hirakawa (1991: 278) indicates that the development of the various Buddhist sects as related in the Sinhalese histories⁶ and the **Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (異部宗輪論)⁷ of the Sarvāstivādin tradition agree that the original schism occurred between the Theravāda (or Sthavira) and the Mahāsāṃghika, and that this schism occurred about one hundred years after the Buddha’s death. On the other hand, there is an important disagreement as follows: The **Samayabhedoparacanacakra* says that this original schism occurred in Aśoka’s reign,⁸ whereas the Sinhalese histories claim that Aśoka ascended the throne 218 years after the Buddha’s death,⁹ and thus date the original schism about one hundred years before Aśoka. In his research into such divergences, Hirakawa (1991: 282) concludes that the Sarvāstivāda version in the **Samayabhedoparacanacakra* rather than the Theravāda version in the Sinhalese histories is probably closer to the actual historical development of the Saṅgha. Lamotte (1988: 518) also holds that the scission of the original Saṅgha into the Sthaviras and the Mahāsāṃghikas took place in Aśoka’s reign. Accordingly, I accept the Sarvāstivādins’ account that the schism began at the time of Aśoka.

The materials found in the scriptures of the early schools—which are preserved in Pali, Chinese, and some fragmentary texts in Sanskrit and Tibetan—that agree with each other can be regarded as going back to the

time before the schisms, which first started during the time of Aśoka. Wynne (2005: 65) says,

The corresponding pieces of textual material found in the canons of the different sects . . . probably go back to pre-sectarian times. It is unlikely that these correspondences could have been produced by the joint endeavour of different Buddhist sects, for such an undertaking would have required organisation on a scale which was simply inconceivable in the ancient world.

It is such materials that are the main concern of my study. In other words, what I shall deal with is the earliest stratum of the Canons (which will be explained later) of various schools, which mostly agree with each other on doctrinal issues.¹⁰ As Cousins (1983: 5) indicates, divergences in different versions of the four *Nikāyas* are very rarely founded on doctrinal or sectarian differences. In this book, divergences in doctrines will be scrutinized and, whenever possible, attempts will be made to decide which versions could be the earlier or original ones.

2 Primary sources

2.1 The earliest stratum of the Canon

For most Buddhist schools, the Buddhist Canon is composed of “the three baskets” (Pali *ti-piṭaka*, Skt *tri-piṭaka*): (1) The *Vinaya-piṭaka*, which is concerned with monastic discipline, (2) the *Sutta-piṭaka* (*Sūtra*-), which provides the doctrinal teachings ascribed to the Buddha or very rarely to his disciples, and (3) the *Abhidhamma-piṭaka* (*Abhidharma*-), which is composed of later works of further exposition to systematize early teachings. The Theravāda Canon in the language of Pali will be taken as the basic source of this research in that it is the only complete Buddhist Canon preserved by one of the early schools in an Indian language probably very close to the languages used by the Buddha and his disciples. Since my research is mainly concerned with the doctrines of early Buddhism, investigation will be focused on the earliest scriptures in the *Sutta-piṭaka*, including the four main *Nikāyas* and some texts in the *Khuddaka Nikāya*. This is what I mean by “the earliest stratum of the Canon,” or “the earliest (Buddhist) texts.” C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1937: 653) counted the following nine texts as the earliest compilations in the *Khuddaka Nikāya*: *Khuddakapāṭha*, *Dhammapada*, *Udāna*, *Itivuttaka*, *Sutta-nipāta*, *Peta-vatthu*, *Vimāna-vatthu*, *Thera-gāthā* and *Therī-gāthā*. Most texts in her list will be referred to in this study, except for the *Peta*- and *Vimāna-vatthu*, which have little to do with the subject of this study. The four main *Nikāyas* and those texts in the *Khuddaka Nikāya* are mostly attributed by the tradition to the Buddha

himself or his immediate disciples with some degree of certainty. I agree with the following statement by Hamilton (1995: 46): “I share the view of most scholars of early Buddhism that the earliest stratum of this material [Pāli Canon] contains the nearest we can get to the teachings of the Buddha himself.”

The four *Āgamas* translated from Sanskrit or some Middle Indic languages (or Prakrits)¹¹ into Chinese in the fourth and fifth centuries correspond to the four main *Nikāyas* and also represent the earliest stratum of the Canon. The *Āgamas* preserved in Chinese translation are just as important as the Pali *Nikāyas* in understanding early Buddhism. Prasad (1993: 55) says, “[T]he *Āgamas* were rendered into Chinese and the translations were checked and rechecked in all seriousness. Even in their present form, they present the teachings of the Buddha as authentically as the *Nikāyas* do.” Through comparison between the Pali and Chinese versions I will demonstrate that some *Āgama* passages could be even earlier or doctrinally more plausible than their Pali counterparts where divergences occur. In some cases, comparison with canonical counterparts preserved in the later Sanskrit literature is also useful to my attempt to solve the problems in the earliest texts.

The *Āgamas* preserved in Chinese translation belong to different schools. Widespread agreement has been reached in attributing the *Madhyama Āgama* to the Sarvāstivāda school.¹² The *Samyukta Āgama* is also widely ascribed to the Sarvāstivāda¹³ or Mūla-sarvāstivāda tradition.¹⁴ The *Dirgha Āgama* belongs to the Dharmaguptakas according to many scholars.¹⁵ The sectarian affiliation of the *Ekottara Āgama* or *Ekottarika Āgama* is very controversial. It is ascribed to the Mahāsāṅghikas by Lü (1963: 242), Kumoi (1963: 248), Ui (1965: 137–138), and Bronkhorst (1985: 312–314), but to the Dharmaguptakas by Matsumoto (1914: 349). On the other hand, both Hirakawa (1960: 48–49) and Nakamura (1980a: 39) maintain that the sectarian affiliation of the *Ekottara Āgama* is not clear. This *Āgama* is distinct from the other three in that it contains numerous Mahāyāna elements.¹⁶

2.2 Later Buddhist literature

The *Abhidharma-piṭaka* provides systematization of early teachings as well as detailed interpretation and clarification of doctrinal points. Although it is included in the Canon by many schools, some schools such as the Sautrāntikas do not recognize this *piṭaka*, as pointed out by Lamotte (1988: 181). Cox (1995: 8) indicates that there are two explanations for the formation of *Abhidharma*:

First, most Western scholars contend that Abhidharma treatises evolved from the practice of formulating matrices, or categorizing lists, (*mātrkā*) of all topics of the teaching arranged according to both numeric and qualitative criteria. As the second option, most Japanese scholars suggest that the origin of Abhidharma is to be

found in dialogues concerning the doctrine (*abhidharmakathā*), or monastic discussions in catechetical style characterized by an exchange of questions and interpretative answers intended to clarify complex or obscure points of doctrine.

Both explanations are supported by accounts in the later Buddhist literature and the traces of the incipient form of the *Abhidharma* found in the *Sūtra-piṭaka*. In any case, the *Abhidharma-piṭaka* represents a later development in Buddhism, and was composed between 200 BC and AD 200 according to Frauwallner (1971: 106).¹⁷ Different schools have different *Abhidhamma* works which contain sectarian developments. My study will take these facts into account and recognize the divergences in doctrines between the earliest texts and the *Abhidhamma*.

Commentaries on the Pali Canon, called *Aṭṭhakathā*, will also be used for understanding the earliest scriptures. The commentaries on the first four *Nikāyas* were composed or rather edited by Buddhaghosa, who is thought to have lived between approximately AD 370 and 450 (von Hinüber, 1997: 103). The commentaries on the *Khuddaka Nikāya* were written by different people. The commentaries are the result of a long development based on sources which date back several centuries earlier.¹⁸ Apart from the commentaries, this book will also refer to the *Visuddhimagga* by Buddhaghosa, which is closely connected to the *Nikāya* commentaries, and “seems to quote from the old *Aṭṭhakathā* more extensively than the extant commentaries do” as Von Hinüber (1997: 125) notes. The values of the commentaries are pointed out by Norman (2004: 69):

One of the best aids available for anyone trying to understand and translate a Pali canonical text is the commentarial tradition. The commentaries which are available to us represent the accumulated wisdom of the commentarial tradition at the time of their composition, as well as containing in the lemmata the forms of the canonical texts which were current at the time the commentaries were compiled.

On the other hand, in the same article he also suggests that the commentarial tradition sometimes does not agree with philology, and is not always correct in interpreting the *Nikāyas*. T.W. Rhys Davids and William Stede (PED 620, s.v. *vitakka*) also caution us: “The explanations of Commentators are mostly of an edifying nature and based more on popular etymology than on natural psychological grounds.”

3. Approaches

In this book I approach my subject from philological, historical and psychological perspectives. My basic approach is to elucidate the earliest texts

through those texts themselves, trying to uncover what may have been the earliest Buddhist teaching on the practice of *sati* and the theoretical underpinnings on which it is based. The commentaries and the *Abhidhamma* will be utilized as aids in understanding the earliest texts, but wherever there is a contradiction between what can be attested by the earliest texts and the interpretation in the later literature, I will take up the former and abandon the latter. Sometimes Mahāyāna texts are also consulted in order to elucidate some difficult passages in the earliest texts. Although Mahāyāna Buddhism is a relatively late and innovative development, some Mahāyāna texts nevertheless contain very early teachings as well as possibly intact citations from the earliest texts, and may shed light on some problems in early Buddhism.

The Buddha is well-known for his skill in means in his teachings. He often explained the same thing in different ways. Some of the doctrines were standardized probably by himself in his later years, while others may have been standardized by the later tradition. Standard statements or formulae can be compared with some difficult passages in order to make sense of those passages. On the other hand, the same discourses given by the Buddha may have been memorized by different disciples in different ways, and then recorded in different words or arrangements by the compilers. During this process deviations and errors could have occurred. Therefore, comparing passages of different versions with standard statements or formulae may sometimes help to clarify the meanings of these passages, or can help to identify possible mistakes and rectify them.

Before the Buddhist texts were committed to writing in the first or second century BC,¹⁹ they had been transmitted orally for several centuries. During the period of oral tradition the Canon was not fixed. The accounts of several Buddhist councils (*saṅgīti*) to rehearse the scriptures reflect the fact that the Canon underwent several editorial revisions.²⁰ Pande (1957: 24) says, "To explain this 'identity-in-difference' we must resort to the hypothesis that the Nikāyas are frequently 'edited' texts embodying doctrines deriving from a common source." Scholars have put forward several possible reasons for the modifications of the texts, especially considering the divergences between parallel versions of the same texts. Both Cousins (1983: 9–10) and Gethin (1992: 157–158) attribute such divergences mainly to the possibility that early texts were preached in an improvisatory way, with the help of mnemonic lists. Gombrich (1990b: 26) suggests that changes to the Canon may have occurred due to lapses of memory and to the contamination of texts as someone's memory slipped from one text to another. Compilers' new ideas may also affect the redaction of the texts. Schmithausen (1981: 201) states:

[D]ivergencies are caused . . . also by the intentions of the instructor. There must have been, certainly, not only chanters simply choosing and combining elements from a given stock of tradition,

but also preachers personally engaged in practice and theory, and it is hardly conceivable that such persons did not develop new ideas—even though they themselves need not have taken these ideas to be new in substance—and that they did not try to incorporate them into tradition by means of modification, supplementation, etc., of the already existing material.

On the other hand, Lamotte (1988: 156) suggests that such modifications may not have occurred only during the period of oral tradition: “[T]he question remains as to whether the divergences which contrast the Pāli tradition with that of the Sanskrit can be explained solely through variations in the oral transmission of the texts, or through intentional modifications based on the written compilations.” These views will be taken into account in my study. In Chapter 1 (Section 4) a case even suggests an intentional modification of one passage (in *Sutta* 29 of the *Vedanā Saṃyutta*) influenced by another mistaken passage (in the *Uppaṭipāṭika Sutta*), which may have been caused by a lapse of memory.

Owing to contamination between early Buddhist texts in the long period of oral transmission, it is very difficult to distinguish between earlier and later texts, and which texts have influenced others. In this book, however, attempts will be made to stratify some texts in chronological order. Although these arguments may not be decisive, they do seem to help to clarify some doctrinal issues. One significant feature in contamination of texts is the frequent use in the Canon of what scholars have dubbed “pericopes,” an idea in New Testament criticism applied to the early period of transmission of the Buddhist traditions.²¹ As Gombrich (1987: 77) explains, they are “passages of scripture which were standardized and used as units to compose longer texts.” Pericopes can be put in different contexts, sometimes in wrong contexts.²² My study involves discerning heterogeneous components in the texts and identifying the original or right contexts in which certain pericopes occur in order to find out which texts may have influenced others.

Gombrich (1996: 12) has indicated that “the earliest Buddhism” has some features which the later Buddhist tradition had forgotten about but which we can uncover through our knowledge of the religious milieu at the Buddha’s time. In a number of cases, I will try to provide a more plausible interpretation of some difficult passages in “the earliest Buddhism” by showing their allusions to Brahmanism and asceticism of which the later tradition apparently was unaware. This book will consult the two earliest *Upaniṣads*, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya*, which are pre-Buddhist and which date from the seventh to sixth centuries BC.²³

The trend to explore the interface between psychology and Buddhism is growing over the last half-century. I will also attempt to conduct research between the two disciplines. Padmal de Silva (2001: 70) points out that some modern psychological concepts and techniques can be found in Buddhism,

which is due to the fact that Buddhism is essentially empiricist/experientialist in its basic stance. This book will compare some Buddhist concepts with notions and recent findings in the field of psychology. This is by no means to reduce a profound religion and philosophy to a discipline of modern science, but rather it helps us understand the Buddha's insights into the nature of the mind that are still true and significant from the perspective of a modern discipline, and it helps us understand how Buddhist doctrine transcends the knowledge of psychology and uses it as a base for the spiritual quest.

As Dudley-Grant *et al* (2003: 1) say, Buddhism and psychology "are ultimately profoundly optimistic about the universal human capacity to move beyond suffering." In contemporary psychology mindfulness has been adopted as an approach to enhance mental health through preventing or reducing emotional distress and cognitive vulnerability to such distress. Segal *et al* (2002) have developed a treatment program called "mindfulness-based cognitive therapy" (MBCT). As Padmasiri de Silva (2005: 9) indicates, within the context of modern psychology the word "therapy" often refers to techniques for treating mental illness. With more profound concern, Buddhism is meant to cure the ills of the world. Gombrich (1988: 2, 59) says that the medical metaphor is central to Buddhism. The Buddha describes himself as the supreme surgeon (*sallakatto anuttaro*, Sn 560). Being an outline of the whole Buddhist doctrine, the Four Noble Truths are associated by scholars²⁴ with a medical model: the physician diagnoses the symptoms (First Noble Truth, *dukkha*), finds the cause of the illness (Second Noble Truth, *dukkhasamudaya*), sees clearly that it can be cured (Third Noble Truth, *dukkhanirodha*), and administers a course of treatment (Fourth Noble Truth, *dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā*). This book will examine the role of mindfulness in Buddhist soteriology, which is based on the medical metaphor, in comparison with principles of psychology, which is concerned with therapy.

4. Main issues

As mentioned above, *sati* is a function of mind. What kind of function is it? How does it function? I will try to answer such questions. The Buddha often explains human experiences by way of five aggregates (*khandha*): material form (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saññā*), volitional formations (*saṅkhārā*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*). It would be helpful to find out how *sati* works in relation to the five aggregates. The *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, the first book of the Theravāda *Abhidhamma*, classifies *sati* under the *saṅkhārakkhandha* (Dhs § 62), but this finds little support in the earliest texts. As Gethin (1998: 204) says, the *Abhidhamma* texts "attempt to give a systematic and exhaustive account of the world by breaking it down into its constituent physical and mental events (*dharmadhamma*).²⁵ Therefore, it is inevitable for the *Abhidhamma* to take the five *khandhas* as including everything pertaining to

a being, and thus it has to use *saṅkhārakkhandha* as an umbrella category for classifying all the incorporeal (*arūpin*) factors, including *sati*, that cannot fall into the aggregates of *vedanā*, *saññā* and *viññāṇa*.²⁵

Hamilton (1996: XXIX) points out that an analysis of the human being into five *khandhas* “is given not in terms of what he or she consists of but in terms of how he or she operates.” This analysis is not meant to be exhaustive. An individual is not composed of just the five *khandhas*. There is probably no need to classify *sati* as any *khandha*, and perhaps it does not belong to any *khandha* according to early Buddhism. On the other hand, my study will demonstrate that *sati* is closely linked to the aggregate of *saññā*. On the basis of this discussion, I shall further explore how *sati* effects the realization of the soteriological goal and investigate various functions of *sati* in different states of mind as found in the earliest texts.

A special concern of this study is the relationship between *sati* and the two main categories of Buddhist meditation: serenity (*samatha*) and insight (*vipassanā*). It seems to be a widely held opinion in Theravāda Buddhism that serenity meditation is not essential for the realization of Nirvana, but the *sine qua non* of liberation is insight meditation, for which *sati* is a paradigm practice. Ven. Rahula (1980: 271) says,

This is called *vipassanā-bhāvanā* “insight-meditation”. This is the true Buddhist meditation. It is taught by the Buddha in many discourses, but the *Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta*, “Discourse on the Presence of Mindfulness”, is undoubtedly the most complete and most important of them all.²⁶

Sati is thus regarded as *vipassanā* meditation, the authentic Buddhist meditative practice, and is even interpreted as the “only way” to liberation.²⁷ I will try to answer the question: Does *sati* represent the only path to liberation, a path of *vipassanā* without the need of *samatha*?

The scheme of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, establishments of mindfulness, is often used as the paradigm for the practice of *sati*. It consists of contemplations of four subjects: the body, feelings, mind, and *dhammas*. This book will devote a whole chapter to it. *Kāyagatā sati* is traditionally understood as mindfulness of the body, and is considered to be the first *satipaṭṭhāna*, contemplation of the body. My study will examine the validity of this understanding, and will clarify the original meaning of *kāyagatā sati* and the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, and thereby give a new perspective on the relationship between the four *satipaṭṭhānas* and *kāyagatā sati* as well as their connection with Buddhist philosophy. Since comparison between the Pali and Chinese versions of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* and the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* is indispensable for understanding the original meanings of *kāyagatā sati* and the four *satipaṭṭhānas* and how these two texts have evolved, this book will provide English translations of the Chinese versions of these two texts. As for

English translations of the Pali versions, I have consulted the excellent translations by Ven. Ñāṇamoli and Ven. Bodhi (1995: 145–155, 949–958).

5. Chapter outline

Chapter 1 discusses the role of mindfulness (Pali *sati*) in Buddhist soteriology from a psychological perspective. This chapter demonstrates that the practice of mindfulness consists in conducting the wholesome functioning of *saññā* (apperception/conception), one of the five components of personality according to Buddhism. It also shows that *saññā* is linked with cognition and also emotion, which includes the secondary feeling (*vedanā*) as a subjective reaction to the mere reception and registration of sensation. Avoiding cognitive problems, mindfulness prevents *saññā* from going astray to conceptual proliferation (*papañca*), which is obstructive to the insight that leads one to liberation. On the other hand, mindfulness prevents feelings from developing into emotional disturbances; through transformation of *saññā* it conduces to the surmounting of emotional agitation and hence the attainment of the best emotional state, equanimity (*upekkhā*). This practice helps to achieve an optimal cognitive capability and emotional state, and thereby enables one to attain the ultimate religious goal. This point is illustrated by a research on the path to liberation centered on the four *jhānas* (meditative attainments) frequently found in the Buddhist texts.

Chapter 2 includes my effort to formulate a classification of mindfulness on the basis of the discussion in Chapter 1, although this classification is not meant to be exhaustive. Chapter 1 shows the general principle underlying the practice of mindfulness, that is, to direct *saññā* in a proper way. This involves interaction between the mind and its objects. Chapter 2 discusses the various types and functions of mindfulness in terms of such interaction in different states of mind ranging from normal consciousness to several kinds of meditation. These different functions of mindfulness are not always distinctively separate or incompatible. They sometimes work together. On the other hand, the same function of mindfulness can be found in different states of consciousness. The different types and functions of mindfulness fall into the following categories:

1. Simple awareness
2. Protective awareness
3. Introspective awareness
4. Deliberately forming conceptions

Chapter 3: Serenity (*samatha*) meditation and insight (*vipassanā*) meditation are usually regarded as the two main categories of Buddhist meditation. The practice of mindfulness is widely considered to be the core of insight meditation by practitioners and scholars alike. However, there seems to have been

no work that explains how mindfulness relates to insight meditation according to the earliest Buddhist texts. In this chapter I will explore this issue by resorting to the earliest texts. While mindfulness is often seen as a method of insight meditation, little attention has been drawn to the relationship between mindfulness and serenity meditation. A large part of this chapter is devoted to probing the role of mindfulness in serenity meditation, and demonstrates how mindfulness contributes to the creation of signs (*nimitta*) or conceptual images in serenity meditation, and how it functions in relation to other mental factors in different *jhānas*. I show that mindfulness of breathing in the form of the sixteen exercises exemplifies how the four establishments of mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhāna*) conjoin serenity and insight meditation, and that the sixteen exercises represent four groups of exercises, part of which are simultaneous, rather than one sequence of sixteen stages as some scholars suggest.

Chapter 4 clarifies what is referred to by the term *kāyagatā sati* or *kāyasati* (念身 in Chinese), which is usually rendered as mindfulness of the body and is equated to the first of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* in the Theravāda tradition. Taking into account the oral tradition of Buddhist texts, an investigation into the Pali and Chinese versions of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* and other early texts leads to the suggestion about how the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* may have evolved from three other texts which are internally much more coherent, and proposes a partial reconstruction of an antecedent version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* from which the Pali and Chinese versions derived. According to this antecedent version, *kāyagatā sati* did not refer to mindfulness of the physical body only, as the Pali version of this text and the later tradition suggest, but rather, a further examination of the canonical contexts in which *kāyagatā sati* and *kāyasati* occur shows that *kāya* here refers to an individual that can experience through his senses. *Kāyagatā sati* or *kāyasati* is mindfulness directed to *kāya*, the locus of our subjective experience based on the senses. It can transform our subjective experience, and thereby enable us to achieve liberation. It is a general guideline or fundamental principle applied to the path to liberation, and is not restricted to those specific exercises given in different versions of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*.

Chapter 5: The (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, a discourse on the four establishments of mindfulness, is highly venerated in the Theravāda tradition. Through a comparative analysis of various versions of this text and other canonical passages in Pali, Chinese and Sanskrit, this chapter suggests that the different versions of this text are later amalgams of material from different sources, especially the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, which in turn drew a large amount of its material from three other sets of teachings. As the authenticity of the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* is questionable, this chapter adopts a new approach based on examining passages on the four *satipaṭṭhānas* that are common to different *Nikāyas* in order to identify the essential teachings on this subject. From a comparison between a passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and passages on *kāyagatā sati* and the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, it can

be inferred that the term *ekāyano maggo*, which has been translated in different ways, refers to a comprehensive path, whereby the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are characterized as a general instruction applicable to various Buddhist practices, just like *kāyagatā sati*. All the above discussions lead to the conclusion that *kāyagatā sati* and the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are two different ways of formulating the teaching on mindfulness according to different schemes of classification of phenomena, which cover the individual and the external world perceived. Both *kāyagatā sati* and the four *satipaṭṭhānas* concern subject-object interaction, where lies the crux of *saṃsāra* as well as nirvana.

Chapter 1

MINDFULNESS IN SOTERIOLOGY: TRANSFORMATION OF COGNITION AND EMOTION

This chapter discusses the role of *sati* in Buddhist soteriology from a psychological perspective. As Griffiths (1983: 55) says, for both Western Buddhologists and Buddhist apologists it has become a truism that methods of transforming the cognitive, perceptual and affective experience of the practitioner are of central importance to Buddhist soteriology. I shall start with an investigation of the relationship between *sati* and *saññā*, one of the five aggregates (*khandha*). Then I will explore how *sati* conduces to liberation through the transformation of cognition and emotion, which are both linked with *saññā*.

1. Mindfulness and *saññā*¹

This chapter proposes that the development of *sati* is to direct *saññā* in a proper way. Before dealing with this topic, let us examine what *saññā* and *sati* refer to.

The earliest texts do not seem to have given a very clear explanation of what *saññā* means. As Hamilton (1996: 53ff.) demonstrates, according to many passages in the *Nikāyas*, *saññā* has a function of recognition or identification. She suggests (57–58):

[P]erhaps the most satisfactory translation of *saññā* would be ‘apperception’, which implies both that its function is discriminatory, and also that it incorporates a function of assimilation or comprehension of what has been perceived so that identification can take place.

Gómez (1976: 141ff.) and Ruegg (1998: 138) also opt for the rendering of *saññā* (Skt *saṃjñā*) as apperception.² On the other hand, Hamilton (1996: 58–59) points out that *saññā* can also be thought of as the faculty of conception. When its functioning is dependent on the co-temporal input of sensory data, it is apperception; otherwise, it is conception. Wayman (1976: 326–332) also demonstrates that in many cases *saññā* (Skt *saṃjñā*) has to be translated as “conception”, “notion,” or “idea.”

Now let us look at how the *Abhidhamma* literature interprets it. The *Atthasālinī* says that *saññā* has noting as its characteristic and recognition as its property.³ This explanation conforms to the modern interpretation of *saññā* in the *Sutta-piṭaka* as “apperception.” From another angle, the *Atthasālinī* describes the property of *saññā* as “making a sign as a condition for noting again.”⁴ According to this description, as Nyanaponika Thera (1998: 121) has pointed out, “remembering” is a function of *saññā*. Gethin (2001: 41), commenting on the “formal Abhidhamma definition of *saññā*,” also says,

[I]n its capacity of labelling or marking (which seems to be intended here) *saññā* must be understood as playing a major role in the psychology of memory, at least as far as this is conceived of as a simple matter of recognition and recall.

Following up the above Abhidhammic explanation of *saññā*, Gethin (2001: 41–42) says,

From the point of view of Abhidhamma analysis it is apparent that many of one’s so called ‘memories’ are simply conceptions or ideas based on a particular perspective of what occurred in the past. In short, they are misconceptions, the product of *saññā* associated with unskillful consciousness. The point is that as far as Abhidhamma is concerned our ‘remembering’ fails to reflect properly the way things truly are.

I would like to add one more point. While *saññā* associated with unskillful/unwholesome (*akusala*) consciousness produces “memories” as misconceptions, the misconceptions will in turn bring about “recognition” or “apperception” of incoming sensory data in a misleading way. This is a vicious cycle. A similar point is made by Nyanaponika Thera (1962: 32–33):

For instance, the normal visual perception if it is of any interest to the observer will rarely present the visual object pure and simple, but the object will appear in the light of added subjective judgements. . . . [T]he perception will sink into the store house of memory. When recalled, by associative thinking, it will exert its distorting influence also on future perceptions of similar objects.

In contrast, as Gethin (2001: 42) indicates, *sati* is seen as a “particular kind of ‘remembering’—when developed it ‘remembers’, as it were, properly.” The Sanskrit root of the word *sati*, *smṛ*, can mean “to remember” and “be mindful of” (MW 1271). C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1936: 255) suggests that *sati* is a Pali equivalent for *smara* (derived also from *smṛ*) in Sanskrit as found in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. Neither word is wholly covered by “memory.” This

Upaniṣad states (tr. Olivelle, 1996: 163): “When they do remember (*smareyuh*), then they would be able to hear, consider, and recognize. Clearly, it is through memory (*smara*) that one recognizes one’s children and cattle.”⁵ Here we find that *smara* is related to recognition.⁶ Similarly, the *Indriya Saṃyutta* gives the following definition of the faculty of *sati*:

And monks, what is the faculty of *sati*? Here, monks, a noble disciple is possessed of *sati*, endowed with supreme “mindfulness and discrimination” (*satinepakka*), is one who remembers, who recollects what was done and said long ago. He dwells contemplating the body as a body . . . feelings . . . mind . . . He dwells contemplating *dhammas* as *dhammas*, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world.⁷

It is noteworthy that in this definition the passage “He dwells contemplating the body as a body . . . concerning the world” is a standard description of the four establishments of mindfulness (*cattāro satipaṭṭhānā*), or “the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula” as will be discussed in Chapter 5.⁸ This definition involves not only memory or recollection, but also discrimination or identification. Here the term “mindfulness and discrimination” (*sati-nepakka*) denotes recognition rather than just remembering. This can be inferred from a *sutta* in the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*, which says, “Monks, five knowledges arise separately in those who, being discriminating (*nipaka*) and mindful (*patissata*), develop immeasurable concentration.”⁹ The two words *nipaka* and *patissata* may correspond respectively to *nepakka*, which is derived from *nipaka* (PED s.v. *nepakka*), and to *sati* in the above compound *satinepakka* in the definition of the faculty of *sati*. In support of this, the commentary glosses *nipaka* and *patissata* as “possessing *nepakka* (discrimination) and *sati* (mindfulness).”¹⁰ Therefore it is reasonable to associate *satinepakka* in the definition of *sati* with the two words in the foregoing *sutta* of the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*. According to this *sutta*, those who are discriminating (*nipaka*) and mindful (*patissata*) are able to obtain the five knowledges, which refer to identification of the characteristics of immeasurable concentration, such as being pleasant, being unworldly, etc. (AN III 24) From this it can be inferred that in the definition of *sati* faculty *satinepakka* is related to the function of identification or recognition. It is also conceivable that proper remembering requires properly identifying or recognizing incoming sensory data or experiences. This must be implied in the definition of the faculty of *sati*.

Included in this definition, the four *satipaṭṭhānas* also involve both recognition and memory. The basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula¹¹ says “contemplating the body as a body,” “contemplating feelings as feelings,” etc. (e.g. SN V 141: *kāye kāyānupassī*; the same applies to *vedanā*, *citta* and *dhammas*). A formula which recurs in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* and the *Satipaṭṭhāna*

Samyutta runs as follows: “He dwells contemplating the nature of arising (*samudaya-dhamma*) in the body; he dwells contemplating the nature of vanishing (*vaya-dhamma*)¹² in the body; he dwells contemplating the nature of arising and vanishing in the body.” (The same is said of *vedanā*, *citta* and *dhammas*).¹³ This is to form conceptions in accordance with the Buddha’s teaching on impermanence. The *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* describes many practices as: “he understands” (*pajānāti*) the experiences or objects in the way they are.¹⁴ These statements imply that the *satipaṭṭhāna* practice is to develop accurate identification of the true nature of experiences or objects observed. On the other hand, this practice can counteract unwholesome memories. In the *Dantabhūmi Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are said to be the bindings for the mind of the noble disciple in order to subdue his memories (*sara*)¹⁵ and thoughts (*saṃkappa*)¹⁶ based on household life.¹⁷ Accordingly the faculty of *sati* and the practice of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* involve both proper recollection and proper identification. The two functions support each other reciprocally, and provide the cure for the foregoing vicious cycle caused by *saññā* associated with unskillful consciousness.

From the above discussion we can conclude that *sati* plays a role similar to *saññā* in cognition, including memory (or recollection) and recognition (or conception).¹⁸ In the following cases, *saññā* and *sati* seem to refer to the same thing. A *sutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (V 108–112) gives an exposition of ten *saññās*, among which *asubhasaññā* is the same as one of the practices in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, namely seeing the body as full of many kinds of impurity.¹⁹ Following the description of *asubhasaññā* is the sentence: *iti imasmim kāye asubhānupassī viharati* (AN V 109, “Thus one dwells contemplating this body as ugly”), which is very similar in form to *kāye kāyānupassī viharati* (“One dwells contemplating the body as a body”) in the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula. In this formula the word *anupassin* is used to describe how to practice the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, while in several instances *anupassin* is virtually synonymous with *saññin*, the adjective form of *saññā*; for example, *ekacco puggalo sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccānupassī viharati aniccasaññī aniccapañisaṃvedī*²⁰ at AN IV 13.²¹ The practice of *ānāpānasati* is one of the foregoing ten *saññās*.²² Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1914, note 119) says that the *marāṇasaññā* at SN V 132 is usually called “mindfulness of death” (*marāṇasati*) as found at AN III 304–308.

In these cases, the notions of *sati* and *saññā* seem to be interchangeable. The implication is that *sati* is a decisive factor in the proper functioning of *saññā*, and the practice of *sati* consists in developing correct and wholesome cognition, a perfect and undistorted form of *saññā*. I will elucidate this point according to the earliest texts, and show that overcoming cognitive problems is crucial to liberation and *sati* plays a major role in this respect. Before we return to this point, it would be helpful to look at the relationship between *sati* and *saññā* according to later Buddhist literature. Gethin (2001: 40) says,

According to the system of Abhidhamma embodied in the Pali *Abhidhamma-piṭaka* and commentaries, *sati* is only ever present as a mental factor (*cetasika*) in skilful states of mind (*kusala-citta*): if there is *sati*, there is skilful consciousness; and since *sati* is in fact always present in skilful states of mind, if there is skilful consciousness, there is *sati*.²³

Saññā, however, exists in wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate states of mind.²⁴ The *Atthasālinī* says that *sati* has firm *saññā* as its immediate cause.²⁵ Accordingly, only when *saññā* exists can *sati* function. *Sati* has to work together with *saññā*. As long as *sati* is present, *saññā* must be associated with a wholesome mental state, and the manner in which *saññā* recognizes or memorizes must be wholesome.²⁶ I will show that such a relationship between *sati* and *saññā* is explained in different ways in the earliest texts.

2. Mindfulness and cognition

2.1 *Saññā and conceptual proliferation (papañca)*

The penultimate chapter of the *Sutta-nipāta*, the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, emphatically advocates the practice of *sati*²⁷ and dissociation from *saññā*.²⁸ I will argue that *saññā* here refers to unwholesome *saññā* rather than *saññā* in general. The *Aṭṭhakavagga* is closely related to the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* in respect of wording and topics. This *sutta* starts with Daṇḍapāṇi's question about what the Buddha preaches and proclaims. The Buddha answers as follows:

Friend, I preach and proclaim such [a doctrine] that one does not dispute with anyone in the world with its gods, *māras* and *brahmās*, anyone in this generation with its ascetics, Brahmins, gods and human beings, and so that *saññās* do not lie latent in that Brahmin who dwells detached from sensual desires, without doubt, with worry cut off, free from craving for existence and non-existence.²⁹

Similarly, a great deal of the *Aṭṭhakavagga* consists of exhortations not to engage in disputes. The *Duṭṭhaṭṭhaka Sutta*, *Pasūra Sutta* and *Kalahavivāda Sutta* are good examples. Even the very wording used in the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta*, i.e. *viggayha* (dispute), also occurs in verses 844, 878 and 883 of the *Aṭṭhakavagga*. The term *bhavābhavē vītataṇham* ("free from craving for existence and non-existence") in the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* is strikingly similar to *avītataṇhāse bhavābhavesu* ("not free from craving for existence and non-existence") found in verses 776 and 901.³⁰ The most significant is the statement "*Saññās* do not lie latent in that Brahmin who dwells detached from sensual desires, . . ." This agrees with the purport of the

Aṭṭhakavagga that the problem of *saññā* should be overcome. For example, verse 847 contrasts a liberated person with ordinary people by comparing their connections with *saññā*:

One who is detached from *saññā* has no ties. One who is liberated through wisdom has no illusions. Those who have grasped *saññā* and view wander clashing in the world.³¹

It should be noted that *saññā* in these two texts does not refer to the aggregate of *saññā* in general, but rather to some particular type of *saññā*. In the sentence “*Saññās* do not lie latent (*saññā nānuseti*) in that Brahmin . . .” the verb *anuseti* often goes with underlying tendencies (*anusaya*) in the *Nikāyas*.³² This *sutta* also mentions several underlying tendencies in the passage that I cite below. Therefore *anuseti* may indicate that *saññās* here refer to those connected with underlying tendencies, probably underlying tendencies to views (*diṭṭhānusaya*) mentioned in this *sutta* (see the quotation below).

In the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta*, after the Buddha answered Daṇḍapāṇi’s question, a certain monk requested the Buddha to explain his answer. The Buddha replied:

Monk, if there is nothing to be delighted in, to be welcomed, [or] to be clung to in that source from which apperception and naming [associated with] conceptual proliferation assail a person, then this is the end of the underlying tendencies to passion, this is the end of the underlying tendencies to aversion, this is the end of the underlying tendencies to views, . . . this is the end of taking up cudgels, of taking up swords, of quarrels, disputes, argument, strife, slander and false speech.³³

Here again we find that many words are the same as or similar to those in the *Aṭṭhakavagga*: “taking up cudgels” (*daṇḍādāna* = *attadaṇḍa* in verse 935, where *atta* is the past passive participle of *ā-dā*), “quarrel” (*kalaha*, verses 862, 863), “argument” (*vivāda*, verses 862, 863), and “slander” (*pesuṇṇa* = *pesuṇa* in verse 863). Unfortunately, the Buddha’s answer was too brief to be intelligible, so after he left, the monks went to Mahā Kaccāna and asked him to expound in detail. Then he elaborated:

Friends, depending on the eye³⁴ and visible forms, eye-consciousness arises. The combination of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [arises]. What one feels, one apperceives. What one apperceives, one thinks about. What one thinks about, one conceptually proliferates. With what one conceptually proliferates as the source, apperception and naming [associated with] conceptual proliferation assail a person with regard to past, future and present

visible forms cognized by the eye. [The same is said of the other five senses, namely ear, nose, tongue, body, mind-organ.]³⁵

This passage represents a formula of the cognitive process in unskillful consciousness. Here the term “apperception and naming [associated with] conceptual proliferation” (*papañca-saññā-saṅkhā*) is similar to *papañca-saṅkhā* in verses 874 and 916 of the *Aṭṭhakavagga*. Both terms denote a harmful factor that causes suffering in *samsāra*. In the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta*, the origin of *papañca-saññā-saṅkhā* can be traced back to *saññā*. Likewise, verse 874 of the *Aṭṭhakavagga* says that *papañca-saṅkhā* has its source (*nidāna*) in *saññā*.³⁶ This is why both texts say that one should stay away from *saññā* in order to achieve liberation.

2.2 Problems of *saññā* in terms of the senses

Now I shall discuss the *Aṭṭhakavagga* and other parts of the Canon in relation to the formula of cognition in the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* mentioned above. Verse 790 of the *Aṭṭhakavagga* says, “The Brahmin does not say that purity is from something else, or is in what is seen (*diṭṭhe*), in what is heard (*sute*), in rules and observances, or in what is thought of (*mute*).”³⁷ The same idea is found in many other verses. This is the Buddha’s criticism of the soteriology of contemporary religions. “Purity” (*suddhi*) here refers to the religious goal, or liberation. The meaning of *suddhi* is implied in the first *sutta* of the *Māra Saṃyutta* (SN I 103), which records that when the Buddha just attained enlightenment, he thought: “I am freed from that severe asceticism!”; then Māra said to him: “You have missed the path to purity (*suddhi*).” Therefore, “purity” (*suddhi*) here refers to the religious goal, or liberation. “Rules and observances” (*sīlavata*) could refer to the practices of such ascetics as ox-observance ascetics (*govatika*) and dog-observance ascetics (*kukkuravatika*) as stated in the *Kukkuravatika Sutta*, where the Buddha criticizes a dog-observance ascetic thus: “If he has such a view: ‘By this rule (*sīlena*) or observance (*vatena*) or asceticism or holy life I will become a god or some god’, this is his wrong view.”³⁸

Here is a clue to the Buddha’s refutation of *ātman*, the “Self,” in the *Upaniṣads*. As Olivelle (1996: lv–lvi) explains, *ātman* has many usages in the Upaniṣadic vocabulary; one such usage refers to the “Self,” the ultimate essence of a human being, which is equated to Brahman, the ultimate real. Jayatilke (1963: 60–61) points out that seeing, hearing, thinking, etc. are already regarded as ways of knowing the *ātman* in the early *Upaniṣads*, and the same terminology is employed by Buddhist texts in contexts which criticize the Upaniṣadic doctrines of the *ātman*. He refers to as examples MN I 135 and verses 793, 798, 802, 813, 901 in the *Sutta-nipāta*. Gombrich (1990a: 15) also says that *diṭṭhaṃ*, *sutaṃ*, *mutaṃ*, *viññātaṃ* in the *Alagaddūpama Sutta* (MN I 135f.) is alluding to a passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.6,

which reads: “When the Self (*ātman*) is seen, heard, thought of and cognized, the whole is known.” (*ātmani khalv are dṛṣṭe śrute mate vijñāta idaṃ sarvaṃ vīditam*). In our verse (Sn 790) “what is seen, heard, or thought of” (*diṭṭhe, sute, mute vā*) may also be an allusion to the same passage, although *viññāta* is missing, which could be due to the restriction of meter.

As Gombrich (2002: 22) points out, the closest verbal parallel of all is in verse 797: “Grasping the benefit which he sees in the Self that is seen, heard, and thought of, or in rules and observances, he sees anything else as inferior.” (*yad attanī passati ānisaṃsaṃ diṭṭhe sute sīlavate mute vā tad eva so tattha samuggahāya, nihīnato passati sabbam aññaṃ.*) Here *attanī* (“the Self,” with the final lengthening for metrical reason) agrees with the three past passive participles, *diṭṭhe sute mute*, and apparently refers to the *ātman* in the *Upaniṣads*. Therefore this verse also expresses the same criticism of Brahmanism.

As discussed above, *saññā* criticized in the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* refers to some particular type of *saññā*. This is also the case with verse 802 in the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, which describes a liberated person thus: “By him, not even a minute *saññā* is conceptualized here with regard to what is seen, heard, or thought of.”³⁹ This means that he does not conceptualize the “Self” rather than that he has no *saññā* at all. Likewise, *na saññasaññī na visaññasaññī no pi asaññī na vibhūtasaññī* in verse 874, which has been translated in different ways by the commentary⁴⁰ and different scholars,⁴¹ may mean that one should avoid any erroneous way of apperceiving/conceiving (*saññin*) and still keep the proper function of *saññā*.

According to *sutta* 95 of the *Salāyatana Saṃyutta*, “What is seen, heard, or thought of” (*diṭṭha suta muta vā*) refers to what is experienced through any of the six senses. In this *sutta* the Buddha exhorts Mālunkeyaputta (or Mālukyaputta) to practice thus:

Regarding things seen, heard, thought of, and cognized (*diṭṭha-suta-muta-viññātabbesu dhammesu*) by you: in the seen there will be merely the seen; in the heard there will be merely the heard; in what is thought of there will be merely what is thought of; in the cognized there will be merely the cognized (*viññāta*).⁴²

Then Mālunkeyaputta says,

I understand in detail, venerable sir, the meaning of what the Blessed One said in brief:

(Verse 1) Mindfulness is neglected by one who *pays attention to the agreeable sign* on seeing a visible form. One feels it with infatuated mind and clings to it. Many feelings arising from the visible form grow in one. One’s mind is impaired by covetousness and annoyance. For one who accumulates suffering thus, Nibbāna is said to

be far away . . . [The same is said of the other five senses in the next five verses respectively.]

(Verse 7) On seeing a visible form, being *mindful*, one is not attached to visible forms. One feels it with a detached mind and does not cling to it. One lives *mindfully* in such a way that when one sees a visible form and even experiences a feeling, [suffering] is exhausted, not accumulated.⁴³ For one who diminishes suffering thus, Nibbāna is said to be near . . . [The same is said of the other five senses in the next five verses respectively.]⁴⁴

The above verses are repeated by the Buddha in this *sutta*. According to the foregoing passage, it is evident that “things seen, heard, thought of, and cognized” (*diṭṭha-suta-muta-viññātabbā dhammā*) refer to what is perceived through the six senses. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya (1980: 11) says that this is the starting point of the traditional interpretation. According to the *Visuddhimagga*, *diṭṭha* refers to the sphere of visible form that is seen, *suta* the sphere of sound that is heard, *viññātabba* or *viññāta*⁴⁵ the sphere of consciousness (*viññāṇa*), and surprisingly, *muta* (thought of) refers to the spheres of smell, taste and tangible data.⁴⁶ I am not sure if the Buddha intended these terms to be understood in this way, but he may have changed the original meaning of the expression in the *Upaniṣads* to fit his teaching. This may apply to the verses cited above in the *Aṭṭhakavagga*. A pun is probably implied in “what is seen, heard, or thought of.” On the one hand, this phrase refers to what is perceived through the six senses. On the other hand, it alludes to the “Self.” The *Aṭṭhakavagga* may intend to say that one should not form the *saññā* of the “Self” with regard to anything perceived through the six senses.

Likewise, “paying attention to (*manasikaroto*) the agreeable sign (*nimitta*)” in the first six verses in *sutta* 95 of the *Salāyatana Saṃyutta* is probably meant to criticize *saññā* operating in an unwholesome way when one perceives through the six senses. In contrast, the last six verses recommend being mindful with regard to incoming sensory data. This is parallel to some verses in the *Vaṅgīsaṭṭha Saṃyutta*: “Your mind is on fire due to the perversion of *saññā*. You should avoid the beautiful sign (*subhaṃ nimittaṃ*) which is provocative of lust . . . You should have *kāyagatā sati*⁴⁷ . . .”⁴⁸ Skilling (1997: 480) points out that *saṃjñā* (*saññā* in Pali) is connected with *nimitta* in most definitions. Here *subhaṃ nimittaṃ* is related to the perversion of *saññā*, and *kāyagatā sati* is apparently prescribed as a remedy for the perversion of *saññā*.

2.3 Sati prevents saññā from developing into conceptual proliferation

The above-mentioned cognitive process in the *Madhupīṇḍika* formula can be summarized as Figure 1.1.




Figure 1.1

The sequence of the formula remains ethically neutral until the link of feeling (*vedanā*).⁴⁹ The sequence from *sañjānāti* (*saññā*) onwards is liable to criticism. Here arise two questions. Firstly, what kind of *saññā* should be avoided? Secondly, what is the relationship between *sati* and *saññā*? For the first question, it may refer to the *saññā* that brings about various views and can cause disputes among ascetics and Brahmins, which is a matter repeatedly criticized in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* and the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta*. *Saññā* regarding the Self as implied in the foregoing verse 802 is an example. In other words, what should be avoided is the type of *saññā* that leads to *papañcasaññāsaṅkhā* and leads people astray from the ultimate truth.

As for the second question, we may say that *sati* is a factor that plays a crucial role in proper cognition, and it prevents *saññā* from going astray to conceptual proliferation (*papañca*). In his research on the philosophy of the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, Premasiri (1972: 12) has a comment on the nature of *saññā* in relation to incoming sensory data:

The word *saññā* occurs in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* mostly in the sense of ideas of sensory origin . . . *Saññā* stands for the purely subjective, and subjective experiences can easily be erroneously described, when they are verbally formulated, as views and elevated to the position of objective truths.

All the views and speculations that cause disputes in the world result from such subjective experiences based on sensory contacts, including the contact between mind and mental objects. These experiences bring about various ways of conceptualization among different beings, which leads to naming associated with conceptual proliferation (*papañca-saṅkhā*, or *papañcasaññāsaṅkhā*), and hence diverse views and arguments among people.

Such conceptual proliferation based on subjective experiences stems from a deep-rooted sense of ego, as stated in verse 916 of the *Aṭṭhakavagga*: The Blessed One said, “The sage should completely stop [the thought] ‘I am,’ which is the root of naming associated with conceptual proliferation.”⁵⁰ As Ven. Ñāṇananda (1971: 5–6) has pointed out, the *Madhupiṇḍika* formula of cognition begins on an impersonal note, which is sustained only up to the point of *vedanā*. Then the mode of description changes to a personal tone presented by the third-person verbs, which imply deliberate activity: *yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi, yaṃ vitakketi taṃ papañceti*. Kalupahana (1975: 122) further argues:

[I]mmediately after feeling (*vedanā*), the process of perception becomes one between subject and object. . . . This marks the intrusion of the ego-consciousness, which thereafter shapes the entire process of perception.

This seems plausible. In the case of an ordinary person, *sañjānāti* (or its nominal form, *saññā*) involves the duality of subject and object, and therefore ego-consciousness, or the thought “I am” in the *Aṭṭhakavagga*’s terminology. How can one stop the thought “I am,” which is the root of conceptual proliferation? The second half of the foregoing verse 916 might be the answer: “He should train himself to dispel whatever craving is in himself, always being mindful.”⁵¹ Here conceptual proliferation is associated with craving (*taṇhā*). This is reflected in a *sutta* of the *Anguttara Nikāya*, where the unexplained questions are described as “connected with craving” (*taṇhāgata*) as well as conceptually proliferated (*papañcita*).⁵² *Sati* is to rectify such problems concerning cognition. I will further elucidate this point by invoking other texts.

The *Pāsādika Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* also teaches something similar to what we have seen in the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, and by comparing these two texts we can identify *sati* in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* with the four *satipaṭṭhānas* in the *Pāsādika Sutta*, and *saññā* in the former text with *saññin* in the latter. In the *Pāsādika Sutta* the Buddha criticizes various views concerning ontology or metaphysics. They are classified into two groups: (1) the bases of view connected with the past, such as “The self and the world are eternal/not eternal”,⁵³ (2) the bases of view connected with the future, such as “The self is material and healthy after death,” “The self does not exist after death.”⁵⁴ The ascetics and Brahmins who hold these different views say, “Only this is true and any other [view] is foolish.” The Buddha says that he does not accept them. The reason is that some beings conceive/apperceive (*saññin*) in different ways (*aññathā*) in this respect.⁵⁵ Similarly, the *Aṭṭhakavagga* has the following verses (indicated by verse numbers):

786: The purified one does not form a view anywhere in the world in regard to existence and non-existence.

832: Those who, having taken up a view, dispute and say, “Only this is truth.” . . .

882: . . . They take their own view to be true. Therefore they regard their opponent as foolish.

885: Why do they proclaim various truths? . . .

886: Without *saññā* there are not many and various truths that are eternal in the world . . .

887: One shows contempt depending on these, namely what is seen, what is heard, rules and observances, or what is thought of. Having stood firm in one’s decision, being complacent, one says, “My opponent is foolish, unskilled.”

There are several parallels between the *Pāsādikā Sutta* and the *Aṭṭhakavagga*. They both criticize the views involving ontological speculation which have nothing to do with liberation.⁵⁶ In these two texts people hold different views and consider their own to be the only truth and others' to be foolish. Both texts point out that the reason for such divergence in views is *saññā* (or *saññin*, the adjective form of *saññā*). It should be noted that in the passage quoted above from the *Pāsādikā Sutta*, “in this respect” (*ettha*) is qualifying the objects or contents one conceives/apperceives (*saññin*), which probably refer to the meta-physical matters that cause disputes among ascetics and Brahmins as described in the *Pāsādikā Sutta* and the *Aṭṭhakavagga*. It is this type of *saññā* that should be overcome, but not *saññā* in general. A connection between *saññā* and “what is seen, heard, or thought of” can be found in verses 886 and 887, as we have seen in 802 discussed above. As mentioned above a theme in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* repeated several times is to overcome the problem of *saññā* and to practice *sati*. A clearer connection between the two can be found in the *Pāsādikā Sutta*, where the four *satipaṭṭhānas* (establishments of mindfulness) are recommended for the abandoning of all such views.⁵⁷ Although this text does not mention overcoming problem of *saññā*, this must be implied since it confirms that people hold different views because they have different *saññās*. In other words, *saññā* is the origin of forming such views. Therefore, when the *sutta* says that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* can conduce to the abandoning of all such views, it implies that this practice also solves the problem of *saññā*.

To sum up, the unwholesome functioning of *saññā* can lead to conceptual proliferation (*papañca*), which is obstructive to the insight that effects liberation. The four *satipaṭṭhānas* are practiced to rectify this faulty functioning of *saññā* by focusing on empirical objects without any conceptual proliferation—contemplating the body, etc., as they are. In other words, “in the seen there will be merely the seen; in the heard there will be merely the heard . . .” as stated in *sutta* 95 of the *Salāyatana Saṃyutta* mentioned above. As Goleman (1975: 219) puts it, the practice of mindfulness is to break through the natural tendency “to substitute abstract cognitive patterns or perceptual preconceptions for the raw sensory experience.” In the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* a refrain appended to each of the practices includes the following words: “His mindfulness that ‘there is a body (or feeling, etc.)’ is established to an extent sufficient for knowledge and recollection.” This could imply that mindfulness is established to such an extent that one apprehends the bare objects of sensory experience without stimulating the mind into cognitive chains of reaction.

3. Mindfulness and emotion

3.1 Emotions: Secondary feelings conditioned by *saññā*

The *Salāyatanaṅkavibhaṅga Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* appears to refer to *satipaṭṭhāna* as a practice that deals with emotion by overcoming cognitive

problems. Near the end of the *sutta* is an explanation of the three *satipaṭṭhānas*, which is preceded by an exposition of the thirty-six states of beings (*sattapada*). The thirty-six states of beings refer to six types of joy (*somanassa*), of dejection (*domanassa*) and of equanimity (*upekkhā*) based on the household life and the same number based on absence of desire, each experienced according to the six sense-bases (*āyatana*). These thirty-six states of beings also occur in *sutta* 22 of the *Vedanā Saṃyutta*, where they are called “the thirty-six feelings.”⁵⁸ In this *sutta*, *somanassa*, *domanassa* and *upekkhā* are also included in the set of five feelings (SN IV 232). These three terms appear to be emotions in the context of the *Salāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta*. As Padmasiri de Silva (2005: 40) indicates: “While feeling (*vedanā*) comes under the standard psychological categories of Buddhism, there is no generic term for emotion.” I shall elucidate that what modern psychology calls emotions fall into the categories of feeling (*vedanā*) and volitional formations (*saṅkhārā*) in Buddhism. Let us first examine the thirty-six states of beings. Here is a summary of these feelings:⁵⁹

1. Six kinds of joy based on the household life: Joy arises when one regards as acquisition the acquisition of visible forms cognized by the eye that are wished for, desired, agreeable, gratifying, and associated with worldliness, or when one recalls what was formerly acquired that has passed, ceased, and changed.⁶⁰ [The same is said of the other five sense-bases.]
2. Six kinds of joy based on absence of desire (*nekkhamma*):⁶¹ Joy arises when, by knowing the impermanence, change, fading away, and cessation of visible forms, one sees as it actually is with proper wisdom that visible forms both formerly and now are all impermanent, unsatisfactory, and subject to change.⁶² [The same is said of the other five sense-bases.]
3. Six kinds of dejection based on the household life: Dejection arises when one regards as non-acquisition the non-acquisition of visible forms cognized by the eye that are wished for, desired, agreeable, gratifying, and associated with worldliness, or when one recalls what was formerly not acquired that has passed, ceased, and changed.⁶³ [The same is said of the other five sense-bases.]
4. Six kinds of dejection based on absence of desire: Having seen . . . that visible forms both formerly and now are all impermanent, unsatisfactory, and subject to change, one generates a longing for the supreme liberations thus: “When shall I enter upon and dwell in that sphere which the noble ones now enter upon and dwell in?” In one who generates thus a longing for the supreme liberations, dejection arises with that longing as condition.⁶⁴ [The same is said of the other five sense-bases.]
5. Six kinds of equanimity based on the household life: Equanimity arises in a foolish muddled ordinary person, in an uninstructed ordinary

person who, on seeing a visible form with the eye, does not know the limits or know the results⁶⁵ and who is blind to danger.⁶⁶ [The same is said of the other five sense-bases.]

6. Six kinds of equanimity based on absence of desire: Equanimity arises when . . . one sees as it actually is with proper wisdom that visible forms both formerly and now are all impermanent, unsatisfactory, and subject to change.⁶⁷ [The same is said of the other five sense-bases.]

A scrutiny of the description of these feelings can show that their arising is actually a result of cognition, i.e. *saññā*. Take the six kinds of joy based on the household life as an example. The statement that “one regards as acquisition the acquisition of visible forms cognized by the eye that are wished for . . .” denotes labeling or identification, while the statement that “one recalls what was formerly acquired” refers to recollection. Both functions belong to *saññā* as discussed earlier in this chapter. After the exposition of the six types of feeling, the Buddha exhorts the monks

1. to abandon the six kinds of joy based on the household life by depending on the six kinds of joy based on absence of desire,
2. to abandon the six kinds of dejection based on the household life by depending on the six kinds of dejection based on absence of desire,
3. to abandon the six kinds of equanimity based on the household life by depending on the six kinds of equanimity based on absence of desire,
4. to abandon the six kinds of dejection based on absence of desire by depending on the six kinds of joy based on absence of desire,
5. to abandon the six kinds of joy based on absence of desire by depending on the six kinds of equanimity based on absence of desire.⁶⁸

Accordingly, the feelings that are most highly recommended are the six kinds of equanimity based on absence of desire.

I will argue that all these feelings can be considered to be emotions. With regard to *vedanā*, Johansson (1979: 88) notes that a distinction between the mere reception and registration of sensation and the subjective reaction to it was made in Buddhism. In my view, this point is illustrated very well in *sutta* 6 of the *Vedanā Saṃyutta*, in which the Buddha says: “Monks, when an uninstructed ordinary person comes into contact with a painful feeling, he sorrows, distresses himself, laments, weeps beating his chest, and becomes bewildered. He feels two feelings: a bodily one and a mental one.”⁶⁹ The bodily feeling is compared to a stab by a dart, while the mental feeling is compared to a further stab by a second dart.⁷⁰ In this *sutta* the bodily feeling refers to the original painful feeling he experiences, which is the mere reception of sensory data, while the mental feeling refers to the subsequent subjective reaction to the original feeling, which may be expressed in this *sutta* by the words “he sorrows, distresses himself.”

Johansson (1979: 89) points out that from many formulations one gets the impression that the pleasant and unpleasant qualities are inherent in the objects. This may apply to the first dart in this case. This *sutta* says that the instructed noble disciple only feels the bodily feeling, not the mental one.⁷¹ This is meant to teach the overcoming of the subsequent “secondary feeling,” the mental one, which is a subjective reaction to the original feeling, the bodily one. The original feeling may be intrinsic, as it were, in the sensory data, just like the pain felt when a man is struck by a dart. If he sorrows, distresses himself, then he feels a secondary painful feeling. In this case, while the original feeling is inevitable, the secondary feeling can be avoided. The three types of feeling, namely *somanassa*, *domanassa* and *upekkhā*, in the *Saḷāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta* should be regarded as such secondary feelings since they do not necessarily arise as a result of sensory contact according to this *sutta*. This can be supported by the commentary on the foregoing *sutta* of the *Vedanā Saṃyutta*, which refers to the secondary feeling as a feeling of *domanassa*.⁷² In the *Nikāyas* the terms *somanassa* and *domanassa* refer to mental pleasant feeling and mental painful feeling respectively.⁷³ This also suggests that *somanassa* and *domanassa* belong to the secondary feelings, which are mental, according to the foregoing *sutta* of the *Vedanā Saṃyutta*.

In my opinion, the secondary feelings such as *somanassa*, *domanassa* and *upekkhā* can be counted as emotions for the following reasons. In the field of psychology, Gross (2001: 133) notes: “Wundt (1897) . . . believed that emotional experience can be described in terms of combinations of three dimensions—pleasantness/unpleasantness, calm/excitement, and relaxation/tension.” *Somanassa* and *domanassa* belong to the dimension of pleasantness/unpleasantness, while *upekkhā* seems equivalent to calm as it is translated as “equanimity” by many scholars.⁷⁴

Although psychologists have disagreed in their definitions of emotion as indicated by Paul Ekman, W.V. Friesen and P. Ellsworth (Ekman, 1982: 9), emotion as defined by many psychologists seems to cover part of *vedanā* (feeling) and part of *saṅkhārā* (volitional formations) in Buddhism. Gross (2001: 133) states: “Ekman *et al.* (1972) and Ekman & Friesen (1975) identified six primary emotions: surprise, fear, disgust, anger, happiness and sadness.”⁷⁵ The last two emotions correspond to the feelings of *somanassa* and *domanassa* in our case, while anger might belong to *saṅkhārā*. Vetter (2000: 38) argues that *rāga* (“lust”), *dosa* (“anger” or “hatred”) and *moha* (“delusion”) should be counted as *saṅkhārā* according to *sutta* 11 of the *Vedanā Saṃyutta*. The *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the first book of the Theravāda *Abhidhamma*, classes *lobha* (similar to *rāga*), *dosa* and *moha* in the *saṅkhārakkhandha*.⁷⁶ Hamilton (1996: 46) says that the *saṅkhārakkhandha* is where the emotions Westerners associate with feelings come from. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the secondary feelings discussed above can be regarded as emotions. In my view, emotion can be the transition from the original feeling to *saṅkhārā* (volitional formation),⁷⁷ as is implied in the foregoing *sutta* 6 of




Figure 1.2

the *Vedanā Samyutta*, where the secondary feeling is said to lead to underlying tendencies (*anusaya*), which fall into the category of the *sañkhārakkhandha* as indicated by Hamilton (1996: 76). The relationship between emotion, *vedanā* and *sañkhāra* can be represented in Figure 1.2.

There are various theories of emotion, among which the “cognitive labeling theory” that Schachter and Singer (1962) propose to explain emotion seems to be in line with the texts discussed above. They say (p. 380):

[I]t is suggested that one labels, interprets, and identifies this stirred-up state in terms of the characteristics of the precipitating situation and one’s *apperceptive*⁷⁸ mass. This suggests, then, that an emotional state may be considered a function of a state of physiological arousal and of a *cognition* appropriate to this state of arousal. . . . Cognitions arising from the immediate situation as interpreted by *past experience* provide the framework within which one understands and *labels his feelings*. It is the *cognition* which determines whether the state of physiological arousal will be labeled as “anger,” “joy,” “fear,” or whatever.

This statement is analogous to the foregoing *sutta* 6, where the arising of the secondary feeling, or emotion, depends on the subjective reaction of the person who experiences the original feeling. This subjective reaction comes from one’s cognitive labeling associated with memory, or apperception (*saññā*). Likewise, the feelings discussed in the *Salāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta* can arise due to one’s recognition or labeling of certain characteristics, or can be surmounted by spiritually superior emotions through transforming the ways of cognition.

Spiro (1982: 48) considers *upekkhā* to be “the only emotional state ultimately valued by nibbanic Buddhism.” Griffiths (1983: 61) describes *upekkhā* as “a psychological condition opposed to any kind of extreme emotional reaction, either pleasant or unpleasant.” Likewise, C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1931: 166) translates *upekkhā* as “emotional indifference” or “emotional neutrality” (1931: 35) in the context of the *jhānas*. She indicates that the *indriyappabheda-upekkhā*, or *upekkhā* dividing the (ethically) regulative forces of *somanassa*

and *domanassa*, is emotional (Aung, 1910: 230). Equanimity based on absence of desire is a state in which one remains emotionally undisturbed and detached from any objects experienced through the six senses. This is achieved by contemplating the nature of objects such as impermanence and unsatisfactoriness, and dissociating oneself from labeling objects as agreeable or disagreeable and counting anything as gain or loss. Equanimity based on absence of desire is not apathy or insensitivity due to ignorance, but is brought about by penetration of the true nature of the things experienced.

3.2 *The three satipaṭṭhānas and the supreme state of emotion, equanimity*

Near the end of the *Salāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta* are the “three *satipaṭṭhānas*, practicing which the Noble Teacher is fit to instruct a group.”⁷⁹ These three can be summarized in brief as follows:

1. The first *satipaṭṭhāna*: When the Teacher teaches the Dhamma out of compassion [thinking]: “This is for your welfare . . . ,” the disciples do not wish to hear. With that the Tathāgata is not satisfied, and does not feel satisfaction; he dwells free from defilement, mindful and fully aware.
2. The second *satipaṭṭhāna*: When the Teacher teaches the Dhamma out of compassion [thinking]: “This is for your welfare . . . ,” some disciples wish to hear, while others do not. With that the Tathāgata is not satisfied, and does not feel satisfaction; he is not dissatisfied, and does not feel dissatisfaction; having avoided both satisfaction and dissatisfaction, he dwells equanimously, mindful and fully aware.
3. The third *satipaṭṭhāna*: When the Teacher teaches the Dhamma out of compassion [thinking]: “This is for your welfare . . . ,” the disciples wish to hear. With that the Tathāgata is satisfied, and feels satisfaction; he dwells free from defilement, mindful and fully aware.⁸⁰

These three “*satipaṭṭhānas*” refer to how the Buddha practices the establishment of mindfulness in three different circumstances. This section should be consistent with the topic expounded earlier in the same *sutta*, that is, cultivating *upekkhā* and abandoning other emotions. But according to this section the first and the third *satipaṭṭhānas* include certain kinds of emotion other than *upekkhā*. Only in the second situation does the Buddha achieve *upekkhā* and abandon other emotions. This seems rather incoherent. This paragraph might be corrupt as the CSCD has a different version of the first *satipaṭṭhāna*, which reads: “The Tathāgata is not dissatisfied, and does not feel dissatisfaction” (for Pali see the above note).⁸¹ This section also disagrees with a verse in a *sutta* of the *Samyutta Nikāya*, which reads: “Compassionate for their welfare, the Perfectly Enlightened One teaches realization. The Tathāgata is released from satisfaction and repulsion.”⁸² The

counterpart of this section in the Chinese translation of the *Madhyama Āgama* is quite different from the Pali version, and could provide a solution to this problem. The three *satipaṭṭhānas* can be summed up as follows:

1. The first *satipaṭṭhāna*: When the Tathāgata preaches the Dharma to the disciples out of compassion, they do not accept the true Dharma and go against the Blessed One's teaching. The Blessed One is not sad with this, but he is equanimous without doing anything,⁸³ constantly mindful and constantly aware.
2. The second *satipaṭṭhāna*: When the Tathāgata preaches the Dharma to the disciples out of compassion, they accept the true Dharma and do not go against the Blessed One's teaching. The Blessed One is not delighted at this, but he is equanimous without doing anything, constantly mindful and constantly aware.
3. The third *satipaṭṭhāna*: When the Tathāgata preaches the Dharma to the disciples out of compassion, some of them do not accept the true Dharma and go against the Blessed One's teaching, while others accept the true Dharma and do not go against the Blessed One's teaching. The Blessed One is not sad at this, nor is he delighted, but he is equanimous without doing anything, constantly mindful and constantly aware.⁸⁴

A Sanskrit version of these three *satipaṭṭhānas* (Skt *smṛtyupasthāna*) said to be quoted from an unspecified *sūtra* by Yaśomitra in his *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* agrees largely with the Chinese version, although the first two *smṛtyupasthānas* are inverted and some words are apparently missing in the third *smṛtyupasthāna*.⁸⁵ Much earlier than Yaśomitra, virtually the same version of the three items in the same order is also quoted in the **Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* (or **Mahāvibhāṣā*, [阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論], a Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharma* work.⁸⁶ Similar statements are also found in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* (大智度論),⁸⁷ a commentary on the Mahāyāna text called **Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, and the **Tattvasiddhi* (or **Satyasiddhiśāstra*, 成實論)⁸⁸ composed by Harivarman, who belonged to the Dārṣāntikas according to Lü (1982: 172) or to the Sautrāntika-Dārṣāntikas according to Ven. Yinshun (1968: 574), but to the Bāhuśrutīyas according to Buswell and Jaini (1996: 94).

The account of the three *satipaṭṭhānas* preserved in different traditions in Chinese translation as well as in Sanskrit appears more consistent with the preceding topic on the various types of emotion in the *Salāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta*, and the whole context looks more coherent than that in the Pali version. In this context the establishments of mindfulness refer to establishing a stable mental state in which one constantly remains equanimous and free from various disturbing emotional elements which ordinary people are subject to in reaction to what they experience through their senses. In the context of this *sutta*, mindfulness (*satī/smṛti*) is established in order to

overcome such commotion of emotion and achieve the supreme state of emotion, equanimity, through transformation of the cognitive process based on the six senses. Ven. Bodhi says, “*Satipaṭṭhāna* here obviously has a different meaning than usual.” (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 1343, note 1246). In my opinion, however, the three *satipaṭṭhānas* and the usual four *satipaṭṭhānas* are not really different in the sense that both are based on the same principle, namely developing *sati* for conducting the wholesome functioning of *saññā*. This point will be further illustrated in the following discussion of another text.

3.3 *The four satipaṭṭhānas and the supreme state of emotion, equanimity*

Another exposition of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* shows how *saññā* can be directed to counteract unwholesome cognition, and thereby help to achieve the optimal emotional state, equanimity. The *Indriyabhāvanā Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* states:

(A) And how, Ānanda, does one become a noble one with developed faculties? Here, Ānanda, when a monk sees a visible form with the eye, in him there arises what is pleasant, there arises what is unpleasant, there arises what is both pleasant and unpleasant.

(B) (1) If he wishes: “May I dwell conceiving the agreeable in the repulsive,” he dwells conceiving the agreeable therein. (2) If he wishes: “May I dwell conceiving the repulsive in the agreeable,” he dwells conceiving the repulsive therein. (3) If he wishes: “May I dwell conceiving the agreeable in the repulsive and in the agreeable,” he dwells conceiving the agreeable therein. (4) If he wishes: “May I dwell conceiving the repulsive in the agreeable and in the repulsive,” he dwells conceiving the repulsive therein. (5) If he wishes: “Avoiding both the agreeable and repulsive, may I dwell equanimously, mindful and fully aware,” he dwells therein equanimously, mindful and fully aware. [The same is said of the other five senses.]⁸⁹

Here we have a process of cognition similar to that stated in the *Madhupīṇḍika Sutta*. In passage A “What is pleasant,” “what is unpleasant,” and “what is both pleasant and unpleasant” refer to feelings, especially emotions. This can be inferred from an earlier paragraph in this *sutta*, which runs as follows in brief:

When a monk sees a visible form with the eye, in him there arises what is pleasant, there arises what is unpleasant, there arises what is both pleasant and unpleasant. He understands thus: “There has

arisen in me what is pleasant, what is unpleasant [or] what is both pleasant and unpleasant. And that is conditioned, gross and dependently originated, [whereas] this is peaceful, this is sublime, namely equanimity.” Thus what is pleasant, etc. ceases in him, and equanimity is established.⁹⁰

It is very clear that “what is pleasant,” etc. refers to emotions. They can be surmounted by the wholesome functioning of *saññā*—proper identification of their true nature and of the state opposite to them, and thereby equanimity can be attained.

Passage B moves on to the operation of *saññā*, and it is noteworthy that this passage is quoted in the first *sutta* of the *Anuruddha Saṃyutta* as a practice of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.⁹¹ “Repulsive” (*paṭikkūla*) and “agreeable” (*appaṭikkūla*) are descriptions of the object, and result from how one apperceives/conceives the object. Subsequent to the arising of feelings (passage A), one with developed faculties is said to deliberately conceptualize with regard to what he apperceives in four ways (passage B). Take the first one as an example: When he dwells conceiving (*saññī*) the agreeable in the repulsive, “the repulsive” must refer to what he apperceives or conceives originally, while “the agreeable” should be a conception deliberately formed.⁹² The deliberately formed *saññā* is probably intended to counteract the habitual *saññā* for the sake of overcoming the emotion caused by the habitual *saññā*. But the deliberately formed *saññā* may cause another type of emotion. Therefore, following the stage of deliberate use of *saññā*, one has to avoid both *saññās*, the agreeable and the repulsive. Then “he dwells equanimously (*upekkhako*), mindful and fully aware.” This suggests that *saññās* of the agreeable and the repulsive can arouse such emotions as “what is pleasant,” etc. stated in passage A, and have to be abandoned in order to surmount those emotions and achieve *upekkhā*. Hecker describes this practice as “perfect control of emotive reactions” (Nyanaponika and Hecker, 1997: 193).

To sum up, the transformation of *saññā* conduces to the overcoming of disturbing emotional elements and the attainment of the best emotional state, *upekkhā*. As the foregoing *sutta* in the *Anuruddha Saṃyutta* concludes, it is to this extent that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are undertaken by a monk.⁹³ This shows that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* were considered to be a practice concerning the exercise of *saññā* and conducive to the establishing of the supreme emotional state.

3.4 Sati breaks the link between feelings and underlying tendencies

Why is it so important to eliminate those emotions and achieve *upekkhā*? Because it is integral to the Buddhist theory of liberation. According to *sutta* 6 of the *Vedanā Saṃyutta* mentioned above, when an instructed noble disciple comes into contact with a painful feeling, he does not feel the

secondary mental feeling, i.e. emotion. Therefore, the underlying tendencies (*anusaya*) to aversion, lust, and ignorance do not lie latent in him. Then he is detached from birth, ageing, death, sorrow, lamentation, suffering, dejection and distress. In other words, he has achieved liberation (SN IV 209). Accordingly, surmounting the disturbing emotions paves the way to liberation. The following *sutta* 7 of the *Vedanā Saṃyutta* echoes *sutta* 6, and prescribes *sati* as a preventive against disturbing emotions and the ensuing underlying tendencies. Here the Buddha starts his instruction with how to be mindful (*sata*) and fully aware (*sampajāna*). The former is explained by the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula (see Chapter 5, Section 2.1), and the latter by the *sati-sampajañña* formula (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2) found in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* and other places. Then he says,⁹⁴

Monks, while a monk dwells thus, mindful and fully aware, vigilant, ardent, and resolute, if there arises in him a pleasant feeling, he understands thus: “There has arisen in me a pleasant feeling. Now that is dependent, not independent. Dependent on what? Dependent on this very body. But this body is impermanent, conditioned, dependently originated. So when the pleasant feeling has arisen in dependence on a body that is impermanent, conditioned, dependently originated, how could it be permanent?” He dwells contemplating impermanence, vanishing, fading away, cessation and relinquishment in the body and in pleasant feeling. As he dwells thus, the underlying tendency to lust in regard to the body and in regard to pleasant feeling is abandoned by him. [The same is said of painful feeling and neither-painful-nor-pleasant-feeling, with the corresponding underlying tendencies to aversion and ignorance.]⁹⁵

The feeling here is said to be dependent on the body. This apparently refers to the original bodily feeling in the previous *sutta*. The secondary mental feeling, i.e. emotion, is not mentioned here presumably because it is prevented by the practice of mindfulness and full awareness, which involves contemplating the true nature of the body and feeling, namely impermanence and dependent origination. The Buddha goes on to teach that such contemplation leads to the abandoning of underlying tendencies, which implies liberation. Here again the practice of *sati* involves proper identification of reality, which consists in the wholesome functioning of *saññā*.

4. Mindfulness and the Path to Liberation

As discussed above, according to the *Salāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta* and the first *sutta* of the *Anuruddha Saṃyutta*, the *satipaṭṭhānas* enable one to surmount emotional agitation and achieve equanimity (*upekkhā*) through transforming *saññā*. Conversely, the problems of *saññā* are said in another text to be

overcome by the development of wholesome emotions. In the *Sakkapañha Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, when Sakka, lord of the gods, asked the Buddha about the path leading to the cessation of “apperception and naming [associated with] conceptual proliferation” (*papañca-saññā-saṅkhā*), his reply can be summed up as follows: There are two kinds of joy (*somanassa*), the kind to be developed and the kind not to be developed. The kind not to be developed causes the unwholesome states to increase and the wholesome states to decrease. The kind to be developed causes the unwholesome states to decrease and the wholesome states to increase. The same is said of dejection (*domanassa*) and equanimity (*upekkhā*).⁹⁶ This reply does not seem to give a clear answer to Sakka’s question, but it apparently suggests that cultivating the joy to be developed, the dejection to be developed, and the equanimity to be developed will lead to the cessation of *papañca-saññā-saṅkhā*. It is very likely that these three emotions to be developed are equivalent to the emotions based on absence of desire expounded in the *Salāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta*, while the three emotions not to be developed are equivalent to the emotions based on the household life. In any case, this is a training for improving emotions, and this training is prescribed as a solution to the problems related to cognition. Similarly, some psychologists argue that emotions can affect cognitions, including memories, as Balota and Marsh (2004: 206) and Hayes (2000: 90) point out.

Therefore we find an interesting reciprocal relationship between cognition and emotion. They affect each other, and solving the problems on one side will be conducive to solving the problems on the other side. According to Buddhism emotion and cognition seem to be actually entangled with each other. The following remark by Gombrich (1988: 65–66) may support this point:

[T]wo rival analyses of life’s problems were already on offer. I have dubbed them the intellectualist—which locates the nub of the problem in our lack of true understanding—and the emotionalist—which blames our lack of self-control. The Buddha wonderfully combined the two. You cannot see things straight because you are blinded by passion, and you allow your emotions to run you because you do not see things as they are.

Thus we can see why *sati* is so vital to enlightenment. It enables one to overcome both cognitive and emotional problems, providing the basic principles underlying the whole edifice of Buddhist soteriology so as to satisfy both the intellectualist and the emotionalist.

There are various schemes of the path to liberation found in the Canon. The most prominent scheme is probably the one that is centered on the four *jhānas*, a series of meditative attainments, and culminates in the liberating insight. The relationship between *sati* and the *jhānas* will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Here we may gain an understanding of how *sati* effects

the *jhānas* by viewing this issue from a particular perspective. The sequence of the four *jhānas* shows a reduction in emotional and even sensory agitation as well as in cognitive disturbance. According to the usual *jhāna* formula, rapture (*pīti*) and pleasure (*sukha*) are present in the first and the second *jhānas*; rapture fades away in the third *jhāna*; in the fourth *jhāna* even pleasure and pain (*dukkha*) are abandoned, together with the disappearance of joy (*somanassa*) and dejection (*domanassa*) in the past (*pubbe va*).⁹⁷ It is not clear when *somanassa* and *domanassa* disappear. The discussion below of the *Uppaṭipāṭika Sutta* in the *Indriya Saṃyutta* could provide an answer.⁹⁸

This text says that the arisen pain faculty (*dukkhindriya*) ceases without remainder in the first *jhāna*; the arisen dejection faculty (*domanassindriya*) ceases without remainder in the second *jhāna*; the arisen pleasure faculty (*sukhindriya*) ceases without remainder in the third *jhāna*; the arisen joy faculty (*somanassindriya*) ceases without remainder in the fourth *jhāna*; the arisen equanimity faculty (*upekkhindriya*) ceases without remainder in the *saññāvedayitanirodha*.⁹⁹ All the above mental factors belong to the aggregate of feeling. In the later literature a distinction is made between *upekkhā* as a feeling (*vedanupekkhā*) and *upekkhā* as specific neutrality (*tatramajjhattupekkhā*);¹⁰⁰ specific neutrality includes *upekkhā* of the third and fourth *jhānas*¹⁰¹ and is placed under the aggregate of volitional formations, *saṅkhārakkhandha*.¹⁰² It is nevertheless clear that according to this text *upekkhā* in the *jhānas* is among the five *indriyas*, which are unequivocally referred to as feelings (*vedanā*) in the *Nikāyas*.¹⁰³

Unfortunately, many *sūtras* of the *Indriya Saṃyutta*, including the counterpart of the *Uppaṭipāṭika Sutta*, are missing in the Chinese translation of the *Saṃyutta Āgama*, but the foregoing account in this *sutta* is quoted in several later texts of various traditions in Chinese translation. For example, the **Abhidharmāmṛta(rasa)-śāstra* (阿毘曇甘露味論), which is attributed to the Sarvāstivādins by Takakusu (1905: 139), states: “The dejection faculty ceases without remainder in the first *jhāna*. The pain faculty ceases without remainder in the second *jhāna*. The joy faculty ceases without remainder in the third *jhāna*. The pleasure faculty ceases without remainder in the fourth *jhāna*.”¹⁰⁴ The same account is found in the **Tattvasiddhi* (or **Satyasiddhi-śāstra*, 成實論)¹⁰⁵ of the Dārṣṭāntikas or the Bāhuśrutīyas, and also in the *Yogācārabhūmi* of the Yogācāra school.¹⁰⁶ The **Tattvasiddhi* indicates that it is said in the “*Sūtra*,” and the *Yogācārabhūmi* quotes it from the *Aviparīṭaka Sūtra* (無倒經).¹⁰⁷ Part of the passage in question in the *Aviparīṭaka Sūtra* is also cited in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: “*uktam hi bhagavatā Aviparīṭakasūtre tṛtīyaṃ dhyānam uktvā ‘atrāsyotpannam saumanasyendriyaṃ aparīṣeṣaṃ nirudhyata iti; caturthe ca dhyāne sukhendriyaṃ nirudhyata’ ity uktam.*” (Ak-P 440) The order in which various feelings cease according to these texts does not agree with the order found in the *Uppaṭipāṭika Sutta*.

As I have demonstrated in an article,¹⁰⁸ the foregoing passage of the *Aviparītaka Sūtra* preserved in the Sanskrit and Chinese literature provides a plausible account of the order in which specific feelings cease in different *jhānas*, which fits in quite well with the usual *jhāna* formula. Its Pali counterpart in the *Uppaṭipāṭika Sutta*, however, contradicts the usual *jhāna* formula in three respects and has caused difficulties to Theravāda exegesis.

In *sutta* 29 of the *Vedanā Saṃyutta*, *pīti*, *sukha* and *upekkhā* that arise in dependence on sensual pleasure are called worldly (*sāmisā*) *pīti*, worldly *sukha*, and worldly *upekkhā*, which must refer to those in the ordinary state. According to this *sutta*, *pīti* in the first and second *jhānas* is unworldly (*nirāmisā*) *pīti*, and *sukha* in the first, second and third *jhānas* is unworldly (*nirāmisā*) *sukha* (SN IV 235–236).

Pīti, along with *sukha* and *upekkhā*, is apparently regarded as a feeling since these three are discussed in the same manner in this text included in the *Vedanā Saṃyutta*, a chapter of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* devoted to the exposition of feeling.¹⁰⁹ When the sixteen exercises of the *ānāpānasati* are correlated to the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, the exercise “He trains thus: ‘I will breathe in perceiving *pīti*’; he trains thus: ‘I will breathe out perceiving *pīti*’” is assigned to contemplation of feelings (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2). The Sarvāstivāda **Abhidharmavibhāṣā-śāstra* (阿毘曇毘婆沙論) explicitly states that *pīti* (Pali *pīti*) belongs to the aggregate of feeling (**vedanā-skandha*).¹¹⁰ However, *pīti* is classified under the aggregate of volitional formations (*saṅkhārakkhandha*) in the Theravāda *Abhidhamma*, e.g. Dhs §§62, 148, etc. The fact that *pīti* is seen as a feeling in the *Sutta-piṭaka*, but classed under the aggregate of volitional formations by the Theravādins could support my argument that the secondary feelings, or emotions, can be the transition from the original feelings to *saṅkhāras*. Commenting on *pīti*, C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1974: 9, note 6) also says, “It connotes emotion, as distinct from bare feeling.” Similarly, Guenther (1974: 124) translates *pīti* as “ecstatic emotivity.”

In the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* §§160, 161 and 163, *upekkhā* is not included in the mental factors of the first, second, and even third *jhānas*, presumably because in these sections *somanassa* is said to be present in the first three *jhānas*, while *upekkhā* is incompatible with *somanassa*. The inclusion of *somanassa* in the first three *jhānas* could be influenced by the *Uppaṭipāṭika Sutta*, which says that *somanassa* ceases in the fourth *jhāna* and therefore implies that it exists in the first three *jhānas*. The *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*’s omission of *upekkhā* in the third *jhāna* contradicts the usual *jhāna* formula, which states that one dwells equanimous (*upekkhako*) in the third *jhāna*. Similar omission of *upekkhā* is found in *Sutta* 29 of the *Vedanā Saṃyutta* (S IV 237), which explains unworldly *upekkhā* as the *upekkhā* in the fourth *jhāna* without mention of the third *jhāna*. But according to the *Saṃyukta Āgama* preserved in Chinese translation, “unworldly (無食, literally “non-food,” **nirāmisā*) *upekkhā*” refers to the *upekkhā* in the third *jhāna*, while that in the fourth *jhāna* is called “unworldly unworldly¹¹¹ *upekkhā*.”¹¹² The omission of

unworldly *upekkhā* in the third *jhāna* in the Pali version is perhaps also influenced by the *Uppaṭipāṭika Sutta*, according to which the third *jhāna* still has *somanassa*, which is incompatible with *upekkhā*.

Let us now return to the topic of *sati* and refer back to the five points given in the *Salāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta* (see Section 3.1):

1. to abandon *somanassa* based on the household life by depending on *somanassa* based on absence of desire,
2. to abandon *domanassa* based on the household life by depending on *domanassa* based on absence of desire,
3. to abandon *upekkhā* based on the household life by depending on *upekkhā* based on absence of desire,
4. to abandon *domanassa* based on absence of desire by depending on *somanassa* based on absence of desire,
5. to abandon *somanassa* based on absence of desire by depending on *upekkhā* based on absence of desire.

This passage can provide an explanation for the purpose of *jhāna* meditation with regard to feelings. When one attains the first *jhāna*, one has developed unworldly *somanassa* based on absence of desire, which counteracts worldly *somanassa* based on the household life in an ordinary state of mind (point 1). This unworldly *somanassa* of the first *jhāna* also counteracts unworldly *domanassa* (point 4), which has counteracted worldly *domanassa* (point 2). In the third *jhāna*, unworldly *somanassa* is abandoned due to unworldly *upekkhā* (point 5).

The above discussions, especially those concerned with the usual *jhāna* formula and the *Aviparīṭaka Sūtra* account, can be summed up in Table 1 (factors in bold type are to be surmounted in the next *jhāna*).

In the course of *jhāna* meditation, one first develops unworldly pleasant feelings and abandons worldly pleasant feelings as well as unpleasant feelings. As one proceeds to higher levels of *jhāna*, even unworldly pleasant feelings, from emotions to bodily feelings, are gradually abandoned. When the emotional elements, unworldly *pīti* and *somanassa*, are abandoned in the third *jhāna*, the practitioner achieves the supreme affective state, *upekkhā*. In the

Table 1

ordinary state	<i>domanassa</i> (worldly and unworldly), worldly <i>somanassa</i> , worldly <i>pīti</i> , worldly <i>sukha</i> , worldly <i>upekkhā</i> , <i>dukkha</i>
first <i>jhāna</i>	<i>dukkha</i> , unworldly <i>somanassa</i> , unworldly <i>pīti</i> , unworldly <i>sukha</i>
second <i>jhāna</i>	unworldly <i>somanassa</i> , unworldly <i>pīti</i> , unworldly <i>sukha</i>
third <i>jhāna</i>	unworldly <i>sukha</i> , unworldly <i>upekkhā</i> (mental)
fourth <i>jhāna</i>	unworldly unworldly <i>upekkhā</i> (both mental and bodily)

usual *jhāna* formula, the fourth *jhāna* is described as *upekkhāsati**pārisuddhi*, “purity of equanimity and of mindfulness,”¹¹³ presumably because even unworldly *sukha* is eliminated, and therefore *upekkhā* is even “purer,” as it is free not only from emotional disturbance, but also from the disturbance of bodily feelings.¹¹⁴ Thus proceeding through the four *jhānas* involves a reduction in emotional and sensory experiences to a state of equanimity, *upekkhā*. Heiler (1922: 26) has indicated that the *jhānas* have a certain emotional quality about them and are concerned with the reduction of feelings to a state of indifference (i.e. *upekkhā*), or a state of religious equanimity before the world.¹¹⁵ As discussed in Section 3, it is *sati* that enables one to overcome emotional disturbances and attain equanimity. This also applies to the reduction of feelings to *upekkhā* in the *jhānas*. Chapter 3 (Section 2.2.2) will elucidate how *sati* functions in each of the four *jhānas*.

As for the cognitive aspect, the first *jhāna* is described as accompanied by *vitakka* and *vicāra*. In the second *jhāna*, *vitakka* and *vicāra* are eliminated. These two terms are virtually synonymous (PED s.v. *vitakka*). As Stuart-Fox (1989: 86) notes, “the term *vicāra* was used only to reinforce the meaning of *vitakka*.” However, as Cousins (1992: 138–147) shows, the *Abhidhamma* and the later Buddhist literature make a clear distinction between *vitakka* and *vicāra*, but different traditions have given different interpretations of these two terms. Such a distinction between the two terms is implied on some occasions in the *Nikāyas*, but they are apparently later additions. In the *Mahāvedalla Sutta* (MN I 294), *vitakka* and *vicāra* are among the five factors of the first *jhāna*. This seems to imply that they are different things. But this passage is not found in the Chinese counterpart of the *Mahāvedalla Sutta* (T 1, 790b–792b), and hence it could be an interpolation under the influence of early Abhidhammic analysis as Stuart-Fox (1989: 89–90) contends. He (p. 92) also points out that although there are five references in the *Nikāyas* to the three kinds of *samādhi*: (1) with *vitakka* and *vicāra*, (2) without *vitakka* but with *vicāra*, and (3) without *vitakka* and *vicāra*, they are either not found in the Chinese counterparts or replaced in the Chinese counterparts by a reference to three kinds of *samādhi* characterized by emptiness, signlessness and desirelessness.

The *Madhupiṇḍika* formula discussed above contains the following sequence:

sañjānāti(*saññā*)→*vitakketi*→*papañceti*→*papañcasaññāsaṅkhā*

The link of *vitakketi* in this sequence may apply to *vitakka* and *vicāra* in the first *jhāna*, and the elimination of *vitakka* and *vicāra* must denote the abandoning of the ensuing *papañcasaññāsaṅkhā*, but *saññā* is still functioning.

According to the *Poṭṭhapāda Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, *saññā* is gradually refined through the progress of the *jhānas*. In this *sutta* the Buddha says that some *saññās* arise through training while others cease through training in the following way (DN I 182–183): When a monk enters and dwells in the

first *jhāna*, his previous conception of sensual pleasures (*kāma-saññā*) ceases, and at that time there arises a subtle and true conception of rapture and pleasure born of seclusion (*vivekaja-pīti-sukha-sukhuma-sacca-saññā*). Afterwards, when he enters and dwells in the second *jhāna*, his previous subtle and true conception of rapture and pleasure born of seclusion ceases, and there arises a subtle and true conception of rapture and pleasure born of concentration (*samādhija-pīti-sukha-sukhuma-sacca-saññā*). In the third *jhāna*, his previous subtle and true conception of rapture and pleasure born of concentration ceases, and there arises a subtle and true conception of equanimity and pleasure (*upekkhā-sukha-sukhuma-sacca-saññā*). In the fourth *jhāna*, his previous subtle and true conception of equanimity and pleasure ceases, and there arises a subtle and true conception of neither-pain-nor-pleasure (*adukkham-asukha-sukhuma-sacca-saññā*). These *saññās* are linked with different levels of feelings or emotions. As grosser, or lower, levels of sensations or emotions are gradually abandoned when one proceeds to higher levels of *jhāna*, the *saññās* of corresponding sensations or emotions cease accordingly. This also demonstrates a strong connection between emotion and cognition.

As will be discussed in Chapter 3, *jhāna* meditation involves the cultivation of *sati*, which steers and regulates cognition (*saññā*) as well as sensations and emotions (*vedanā*) in a proper way so that one can achieve different levels of *jhāna*. This practice culminates in the fourth *jhāna*, which is characterized as *upekkhā-sati-pārisuddhi*, a state of pure equanimity and mindfulness. The fourth *jhāna* provides an optimal emotional state and cognitive capability, which prepare the mind for the ultimate spiritual goal, and thereby enable one to attain liberation through developing the three gnoses (*vijjā*) or knowledges (*ñāṇa*), as stated in many texts.¹¹⁶ The *Poṭṭhapāda Sutta* says that the arising of *ñāṇa* comes from the arising of *saññā*.¹¹⁷ A *sutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* also states: “As far as the attainment with *saññā* [extends], there is penetration to perfect knowledge (*aññā*).”¹¹⁸ The word *aññā*, like *vijjā* and *ñāṇa*, represents the final knowledge obtained on reaching liberation.¹¹⁹ The improvement and perfection of *saññā* resulting from the enhancement of *sati* during *jhāna* meditation are conducive to the realization of perfect knowledge which effects liberation.

This path to liberation, from the attainment of the *jhānas* to the development of the perfect knowledge, involves both cognitive/intellectual and emotional transformations. The ultimate religious goal is often described as the “taintless liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom” (*anāsavaṃ cetovimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ*, all accusatives).¹²⁰ Although “liberation of mind” and “liberation by wisdom” can refer to the same thing,¹²¹ they have different emphases according to some early texts. A passage in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* reads thus:

O monks, these two things are conducive to gnosis (*vijjā*). What two? Serenity (*samatha*) and insight (*vipassanā*). When serenity is developed, what benefit does it bring? The mind is developed. When

the mind is developed, what benefit does it bring? Lust (*rāga*) is abandoned. When insight is developed, what benefit does it bring? Wisdom is developed. When wisdom is developed, what benefit does it bring? Ignorance (*avijjā*) is abandoned. . . . Thus, monks, through the fading away of lust there is liberation of mind; through the fading away of ignorance there is liberation by wisdom.¹²²

This passage shows that serenity (*samatha*) and insight (*vipassanā*) are equally important. Serenity aims to calm the mind and eradicate lust (*rāga*). The *Vibhaṅga* (p. 145) uses the word *rāga* to explain craving (*taṇhā*) in the dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) formula, which says that *taṇhā* is conditioned by feeling (*vedanā*). Therefore serenity has to deal with feeling in order to eradicate *rāga*, i.e. *taṇhā*, which leads to renewed existence according to the Four Noble Truths.¹²³ This is the emotionalist approach to the problem, and brings about “liberation of mind.” Insight aims to develop wisdom and hence eradicate ignorance (*avijjā*), which is the first link in the chain of dependent origination explaining the round of rebirths.¹²⁴ This is the intellectualist approach to the problem, and leads to “liberation by wisdom.” Serenity concerns emotion/feeling (*vedanā*) and corresponds to the practice of the *jhānas*, while insight concerns cognition (*saññā*) and corresponds to the development of perfect knowledge.¹²⁵ How *sati* operates in serenity and insight will be elaborated in Chapter 3.

Chapter 2

TYPES AND FUNCTIONS OF MINDFULNESS

Sati has been explained or described in very diverse ways and contexts in the Buddhist Canon. It seems that *sati* has different functions on different occasions for different purposes. In this chapter I will attempt to formulate a classification of *sati* on the basis of our discussion in the last chapter, although this classification is not meant to be exhaustive. In that chapter we looked at the general principle underlying the practice of *sati*, that is, to direct *saññā* in a proper way. This involves interaction between the mind and its objects. In this chapter I shall discuss the various functions of *sati* in terms of such interaction in different states of mind ranging from normal consciousness to several kinds of meditation. As will be shown below, these different functions of *sati* are not always distinctively separate or incompatible. They sometimes work together. On the other hand, the same function of *sati* can be found in different states of consciousness.

1. Simple awareness

In the practice of simple awareness, *sati* is the conscious registering of the presence of objects, which can be any incoming sensory data or experiences, whether in normal daily activities or during meditation. The *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* contains the following examples, to each of which is appended a refrain indicating one of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*:

- (i) A monk, when taking a long in-breath, knows: “I am taking a long in-breath”; or, when taking a long out-breath, he knows: “I am taking a long out-breath.” When taking a short in-breath, he knows: “I am taking a short in-breath”; or, when taking a short out-breath, he knows: “I am taking a short out-breath.” . . . Thus, monks, a monk dwells contemplating the body as a body.¹
- (ii) When walking (standing, sitting or lying down, or however one’s body is disposed), one knows: “I am walking (standing, etc.).” . . . Thus, monks, a monk dwells contemplating the body as a body.²

- (iii) When feeling a pleasant feeling, a monk knows: “I feel a pleasant feeling”; when feeling a painful feeling, he knows: “I feel a painful feeling”; when feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he knows: “I feel a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.” . . . Thus, monks, a monk dwells contemplating feelings as feelings.³

These practices consist of non-judgmental observation and recognition. The mind is simply aware of an object objectively without evaluating the object, the subject (i.e. the observer or the mind) or the interaction between the two. Mindfulness is often understood or employed in this sense by psychologists. For example, Kabat-Zinn (1994: 4) defines mindfulness as “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally.” Following this definition, Teasdale (2004: 277) says, “the non-judgmental characteristic of mindfulness means that pleasant and unpleasant experiences are treated simply as that, as experiences.”

2. Protective awareness

While one is perceiving incoming sensory data, one is further aware of how the mind reacts to the objects. In this instance, *sati* is related to the restraint of the senses and requires moral judgment. This function is impossible unless preceded by simple awareness (RFG).

2.1 Kāyasati/kāyagatā sati and satipaṭṭhāna

In the *Dukkhadhamma Sutta* of the *Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta*, the Buddha gives instruction on how to behave in daily life (translation based on Bodhi, 2000: 1249):

And how, monks, has a monk comprehended a mode of conduct and way of living in such a way that as he conducts himself thus and as he lives thus, evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection do not flow into him? Suppose a man should enter a thorny forest. There would be thorns in front of him, thorns behind him, thorns to his left, thorns to his right, thorns below him, thorns above him. He would go forward, being mindful (*sata*),⁴ he would go back, being mindful, thinking: “May no thorn [prick] me!” So too, monks, whatever in the world has an agreeable and pleasing nature is called a thorn in the Noble One’s Discipline.⁵

This simile implies that a monk should constantly practice mindfulness in every movement so as to protect himself from evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection, which result from contact with attractive objects. Then the Buddha says that having understood the above discourse,

one should understand restraint and non-restraint. Below is his explanation of restraint (*saṃvara*) (non-restraint (*asaṃvara*) is explained in the converse way):

On seeing a visible form with the eye, a monk is not intent on it in the case of an agreeable visible form, and is not upset at it in the case of a disagreeable visible form. He dwells with *kāyasati* established (*upaṭṭhitakāyasatī*) . . . [and so on through all the six senses].⁶

It is evident that what the Buddha means by “restraint” is the restraint of the senses. Therefore this passage links *sati* with the “restraint of the senses,” which is often expressed by the following formula (hereafter passage D):

On seeing a form with the eye, he does not grasp at its signs or details (*na nimittaggāhī hoti nānubyañjanaggāhī*). Since evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection might flow into him if he dwelt leaving the eye faculty unguarded, so he works for its restraint, guards the eye faculty, and achieves the restraint of the eye faculty . . . [and so on through all the six sense faculties].⁷

We can find a striking analogy between this formula and the above two passages in the *Dukkhadhamma Sutta*. Both are aimed at preventing evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection from “flowing into”⁸ the practitioner. In the formula, the method used is to guard or restrain the senses, while in the *Dukkhadhamma Sutta*, the method used is *sati*, which is connected to the restraint of the senses and is apparently rephrased as *kāyasati*. *Kāyasati* and *kāyagatā sati* are usually rendered as “mindfulness of the body” and “mindfulness concerning the body” respectively. Chapter 4 will show that *kāya* here refers to the “individual” rather than the “body.” I will leave the two terms untranslated. This function of *sati* is elucidated in the *Kimsuka Sutta*, which follows the *Dukkhadhamma Sutta*. Here the Buddha makes a simile as follows: A king has a frontier city with six gates. The gatekeeper keeps out strangers and admits acquaintances. The Buddha explains that, in this simile, “the city” is a designation for *kāya*; “the six gates” stand for the six internal sense bases; “the gatekeeper” represents *sati* (SN IV 194). From these texts we can infer that this function of *sati* is to guard or restrain the six senses when one perceives any incoming sensory data so that, to put it figuratively as the texts do, evil unwholesome states will not flow into one’s mind through the sense-doors. This function of *sati* is recognized by Buddhaghosa in his *Atthasālinī*: “[*Sati*] should be seen as like a gatekeeper in the sense of guarding the eye-door, etc.”⁹

It is noteworthy that *kāyasati*, or *kāyagatā sati*, is often associated with restraining the senses. The *Chapāṇa Sutta* in the *Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta* has the same exposition of restraint and non-restraint as that in the

Dukkhadhamma Sutta cited above: “On seeing a visible form with the eye, a monk is not intent on it . . . He dwells with *kāyasati* established.” After this exposition this text gives a further explanation with a simile that we can summarize as follows:

Six animals with different domains are tied to a firm post or pillar. Each animal would pull in the direction of its own domain, but in the end they would be tired and stay near the post or pillar. So too, for a monk whose *kāyagatā sati* is developed, the eye does not pull in the direction of agreeable forms, nor are disagreeable forms repulsive. The same applies to the other five senses. Thus there is restraint. A firm post or pillar is a designation for *kāyagatā sati*.¹⁰

This passage appears to be a supplementary explanation for restraint and non-restraint as expounded earlier, and *kāyasati* in the earlier exposition of restraint and non-restraint is rephrased as *kāyagatā sati* in this supplementary explanation. According to this passage, *kāyagatā sati* functions as a post or pillar that restrains the six senses. It stops the senses from their habitual unwholesome reactions to their corresponding objects. The same passage as that found in the exposition of restraint and non-restraint in the *Dukkhadhamma Sutta* and *Chapāna Sutta* is also found in other *suttas* in the *Śaḷāyatana Saṃyutta*.¹¹ There are other instances in the *Nikāyas* where *kāyasati* or *kāyagatā sati* occurs in the context of guarding the senses. This is important to our understanding of *kāyasati* as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

This type of *sati* is particularly emphasized with reference to coming into contact with enticing or distracting objects. In *sutta* 20 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta*, the Buddha makes the following simile: Suppose a great crowd were to assemble to see the most beautiful girl of the land singing and dancing. A man would be ordered to carry around a bowl of oil full to the brim between the crowd and the girl, and he would be killed if he spilled even a little oil. The Buddha explains that “the bowl of oil full to the brim” represents *kāyagatā sati* (SN V 170). This simile is very similar to that of the thorny forest in the *Dukkhadhamma Sutta*. In both cases one has to be mindful of every movement he makes at every moment in order either to avoid death (the result of being distracted by the girl) or to avoid being hurt by thorns (which refers to agreeable objects). Both are related to the restraint of the senses. It is clear that *kāyagatā sati* in *sutta* 20 also refers to mindfulness that guards the senses.

In *sutta* 6 and *sutta* 7 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* (SN V 146–149) the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, explained by the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula, are said to be a monk’s resort, his own paternal domain, while the five cords of sensual pleasure (*pañca kāmaguṇā*) are said to be the domain of others. Māra will get a hold on those who stray outside their own resort into the domain of

others; he will not get a hold on those who move in their own resort, in their own paternal domain. Thus the four *satipaṭṭhānas* serve the purpose of protection. The five cords of sensual pleasure refer to the agreeable objects cognized by the first five senses.¹² The sixth sense, *manas*, is not included perhaps because, as Hamilton (1996: 32) suggests, “though *manodhātu* would be involved in the process of the arising of visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile pleasure it would not in itself be the basis for a specific type of pleasure in its own right.” A monk’s own paternal domain, namely the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, serves as the restraint of the senses. The basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula may imply that one should contemplate the body “as a body” (or feelings “as feelings,” etc.) without further grasping at its signs or details such as attractive or repulsive features.¹³ According to the formula on the restraint of the senses, not grasping at the signs or details is to protect one from evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection.

How does *sati* relate to the restraint of the senses? The answer lies in its function of steering *saññā* in the cognitive process. Our daily activities involve contact between the six senses and their corresponding objects. To put it in a figurative way, *sati* as the gatekeeper prevents unwholesome cognition of objects and any ensuing troubles from entering the individual through the sense-doors, and only admits proper cognition of the objects. Such unwholesome cognition of objects is implied in the formula on the restraint of the senses quoted above: “grasping at its signs and details” (*nimittaggāhī hoti anubyañjanaggāhī*), which is the function of *saññā*, and *sati* can rectify the unwholesome functioning of *saññā*. As discussed in Chapter 1, in the *Vaṅgīsaṭṭha Saṃyutta*, the beautiful sign (*subhaṃ nimittaṃ*) is related to perversion of *saññā*, and *kāyagatā sati* is apparently prescribed here as a remedy for the perversion of *saññā*. This function of *sati* is to avoid forming any *saññā* that may lead to evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection. This is how the senses are restrained.

2.2 The *sati-sampajañña* formula

The term *sampajāna* (“being fully aware”) is included in the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula (see Chapter 5, Section 2.1), and is sometimes explained by the following formula:

He acts in full awareness when going forward and going back; he acts in full awareness when looking ahead and looking behind; he acts in full awareness when bending back and stretching out [his limbs]; he acts in full awareness when wearing his upper robe (*saṅghāṭī*) [and other] robes [and carrying his] bowl;¹⁴ he acts in full awareness when eating, drinking, chewing and tasting; he acts in full awareness when defecating and urinating; he acts in full awareness when walking, standing, sitting, falling asleep, waking up, speaking and keeping silent.¹⁵

Since this passage is referred to as “mindfulness and full awareness” (*sati-sampajañña*) in the *Nikāyas*,¹⁶ I will call it the “*sati-sampajañña* formula.” This formula is given in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* and *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* under the first *satipaṭṭhāna*, i.e. contemplation of the body. Buddhaghosa in his commentary on the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* interprets full awareness (*sampajañña*) in this formula as fourfold: full awareness of purpose, full awareness of suitability, full awareness of the domain [of meditation], and full awareness of non-delusion (Ps I 253–270). But his interpretation finds little canonical support.

On the other hand, Rahula (2000: 71) takes this practice to mean being aware of the act one is performing at the moment. Even the Chinese translation of this formula in the Chinese version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* seems to mean that (See Appendix 1). If this is the case, this practice would be almost identical with the preceding practice under contemplations of the body in the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*: “When walking (standing, sitting and lying down, or however one’s body is disposed), one knows: ‘I am walking (standing, etc.)’.” Therefore, Schmithausen (1976: 251) regards this practice as just a repetition of what precedes it. Similarly, Ven. Anālayo (2003: 136) also takes these two practices as being “both concerned with directing mindfulness to the body in activity.” A similar view is also found in the *Saundarananda* by Aśvaghōṣa¹⁷ in a section on mindfulness and full awareness¹⁸: “Then being fully aware of all your acts, you should fix your mindfulness on sitting, walking, standing, looking, speaking, and so on.”¹⁹ It may be right that the practice represented by the *sati-sampajañña* formula involves mindfulness of physical activities.²⁰ But I will show that, according to the earliest stratum of the Canon, this practice is more importantly concerned with mental states, and is also meant to protect the mind.

This formula is very similar to the last one of the six subjects of mindfulness (*anussatiṭṭhāna*) expounded in the *Udāyī Sutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*:

Here, Ānanda, being mindful (*sato*), a monk goes forward; being mindful, he goes back; being mindful, he stands; being mindful, he sits; being mindful, he lies down; being mindful, he undertakes walking up and down²¹. This subject of mindfulness, Ānanda, thus developed, thus cultivated, leads to mindfulness and full awareness.²²

It is noteworthy that this practice is said to lead to “mindfulness and full awareness” (*sati-sampajañña*). The parallel of wording in this passage to the *sati-sampajañña* formula is obvious and shows the close relationship of these two. Almost all the actions in this passage are included in the *sati-sampajañña* formula. It is very likely that this passage describes the same practice as the *sati-sampajañña* formula, and that “mindful” (*sato*) in this passage means the same thing as “acting in full awareness” (*sampajāna-kārī*) in the formula. This probably reflects that the Buddha’s skill in means makes it possible to

express the same teaching in different ways, or that the same teaching may have been memorized by different disciples in different ways. Moreover, virtually identical words in this passage are also found in the aforementioned *Dukkhadhamma Sutta*: “He would go forward, being mindful; he would go back, being mindful.” “Mindful” (*sato*) in these two texts must refer to the same thing. As discussed above, the passage in the *Dukkhadhamma Sutta* implies that one should practice mindfulness in every movement so as to protect oneself from evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection. By analogy such may also be the case in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* passage and the *sati-sampajañña* formula, where *sampajāna-kārī* means the same as *sato*.

Even more solid evidence can be found elsewhere. A passage in the *Mahāsuññata Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* runs thus (hereafter passage A):

When a monk dwells in this way, if his mind inclines to walk, he walks, thinking: “While I am walking thus, no evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection will flow into me.” Thus he is fully aware (*sampajāna*) of that. [The same applies to standing, sitting, and lying down.]²³

Similarly, the *Nanda Sutta* in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* reads (hereafter passage B):

If, monks, Nanda has to look to the eastern direction, focusing his mind thoroughly he looks to the eastern direction, thinking: “While I am thus looking to the eastern direction, no evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection will flow into [me].” Thus he is fully aware (*sampajāna*) of that. . . . [The same applies to the other three directions.]²⁴

These two passages are very similar to the *sati-sampajañña* formula. Just like this formula, both passages contain the word *sampajāna* following an activity. The word describing the activity in passage B, looking (*āloketi*), also occurs in the formula in the form of a past participle, *ālokite*. The activities in passage A, walking, standing and sitting, also occur in the formula, although the wording for “walking” is different. The expression “no evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection will flow into [me]” is reminiscent of the passage on mindfulness quoted above from the *Dukkhadhamma Sutta* and the phrase “in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world” in the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula (see Chapter 5, Section 2.1). Passage B in the *Nanda Sutta* is given as an explanation of how Nanda guards the doors of his sense-faculties, whereas the Chinese counterpart of passage B in the *Saṃyukta Āgama* (T 2, 73b) belongs to the practice called “mindfulness and full awareness.” I will further illustrate that the Chinese version is more plausible. It is necessary here to compare the structure of the *Nanda Sutta* and its Chinese counterpart. Both texts deal with the four virtues Nanda has:

1. Guarding (or “closing” [*sic*] in Chinese) the doors of the sense-faculties
2. Being moderate in eating
3. Being devoted to vigilance (“diligent in practice in the first and last watches of the night” in Chinese)
4. Mindfulness and full awareness (*sati-sampajañña*)

In the *Nanda Sutta* “guarding the doors of the sense-faculties” is explained by passage B, and “mindfulness and full awareness” is explained as (hereafter passage C):

Feelings (*vedanā*) are understood by Nanda as they arise, understood as they remain present, understood as they vanish. Apperceptions/conceptions (*saññā*) are understood . . . Thoughts (*vitakkā*) are understood as they arise, understood as they remain present, understood as they vanish.²⁵

This is a definition of *sampajāna* given in *sutta* 35 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* (SN V 180–181). In the Chinese version of the *Nanda Sutta*, however, the explanation of “mindfulness and full awareness” is composed of both passage B and passage C,²⁶ while “closing the doors of the sense-faculties” is explained thus:

If the eye sees a visible form, it does not grasp at the visible form’s sign (**nimitta*), nor does it grasp at its details (**anuvyañjana*) . . . Evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection do not flow into his mind, and the restraints arise. [He] guards the sense-faculties of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind, and the restraints arise.²⁷

I shall show that the Chinese version, rather than the Pali, agrees with the standard accounts in the Canon. “Guarding the doors of the sense-faculties” (which is also called “the restraint of the sense-faculties”) and “mindfulness and full awareness” are among the preliminaries to the *jhānas* at many places in the *Nikāyas*.²⁸ In the *Mahā-Assapura Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I 273–274) all the four virtues of Nanda are given prior to the four *jhānas*. In these texts the description of “guarding the doors of the sense-faculties”²⁹ is identical to passage D on the restraint of the senses quoted earlier (p. 43), which is virtually the same as the description of “closing the doors of the sense-faculties” in the Chinese version quoted above, whereas it is replaced by passage B in the Pali version. In the standard formulation “mindfulness and full awareness” is explained by the *sati-sampajañña* formula,³⁰ which is similar to passage B as discussed above. Passage B and passage C are both given as the explanation for “mindfulness and full awareness” in the Chinese version. These can be shown in Table 2.

Table 2

	Pali version of the <i>Nanda Sutta</i>	Chinese version of the <i>Nanda</i> <i>Sutta</i>	standard account of the preliminaries to the <i>jhānas</i>
guarding the doors of the sense-faculties	passage B	passage D	passage D
mindfulness and full awareness	passage C	passage B + passage C	<i>sati-sampajañña</i> formula (similar to passage B)

It is clear that the Chinese version of the *Nanda Sutta* is very close to the standard account, and could be the more authentic one.³¹ Although passage C is not found in the standard account, it is the definition of *sampajañña* in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* as mentioned above. The Pali version takes passage B to mean guarding the doors of the sense-faculties perhaps because “looking” in the passage involves the eye-faculty. However, if we compare this passage with passage A, we will find that both passages have the same pattern, and that this pattern applies to different activities in the *sati-sampajañña* formula rather than to the sense-faculties. Even Buddhaghosa cited passage B to interpret “looking ahead and looking behind” in the *sati-sampajañña* formula in his commentary on the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (Ps I 261). Passages A and B are in effect paraphrasing part of the *sati-sampajañña* formula, and they make clear that one’s mental state is what one should be fully aware of while acting (*sampajānakārin*).

The facts that (1) passage C is in the place of “mindfulness and full awareness” (*sati-sampajañña*) in both versions of the *Nanda Sutta*, and that (2) passage C and the *sati-sampajañña* formula are both given as an explanation of the term *sampajāna*³² in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* suggest a close relationship between the *sati-sampajañña* formula and passage C, which denotes full awareness of the cognitive process. This process of cognition is included in the *Madhupiṇḍika* formula discussed in Chapter 1 (see Figure 2).

Passage C represents observation of the decisive point in the process of cognition. As discussed in Chapter 1, *saññā* (*sañjānāti*) can be either wholesome or unwholesome, or indeterminate. When it is unwholesome, *vitakka* (*vitakketi*) will also be unwholesome and lead to *papañceti* and




Figure 2

papañcasaññāsāṅkhā, which bring about the “evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection.”³³ It is possible that the *sati-sampajañña* formula implies that while performing daily activities, which inevitably involve perceiving through the senses, one should be fully aware of the cognitive process and thereby prevent the evil unwholesome states.

To conclude, in the light of passages A and B, the *sati-sampajañña* formula indicates that one is not just “fully aware” of what one is doing at the moment, but more importantly one is fully aware with the purpose of avoiding unwholesome mental states. In other words, while undertaking any activities, one reminds oneself to keep the evil unwholesome states away from one’s mind. This is what is meant by “acting in full awareness” (*sampajānakārin*) in the *sati-sampajañña* formula. The *sati-sampajañña* formula is not just contemplation of the body, the first *satipaṭṭhāna*, but rather it serves as a general guideline for practice in daily life, probably including meditation as well.

Frauwallner (1973: 206) associates the five-fold wariness (*samiti*) in Jainism with “mindfulness and full awareness” (*smṛti-saṃprajanya*) in Buddhism, by which he probably refers to the *sati-sampajañña* formula. Schmithausen (1976: 254) points out that the Prakrit term *samii*, which later theorists would have us believe to be *samiti* in Sanskrit, is actually equivalent to *smṛti*.³⁴ He says that the practice of the *sati-sampajañña* formula could be an exercise of pre-Buddhist origin. This is possible since there are similarities between *samii* and *sati-sampajañña* as will be shown below, and Jainism was founded earlier than Buddhism, probably centuries before Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, the Buddha’s contemporary often too simply called the founder of Jainism.³⁵

Both *samii* and *sati-sampajañña* are to be practiced in daily life. The fivefold *samii* concerns five major activities of a monk in daily life, that is (1) walking, (2) speaking, (3) accepting alms, (4) picking up things and putting them down, (5) answering the call of nature. Among them (1), (2) and (5) are included in the *sati-sampajañña* formula. In Jainism, *samii* involves detailed and strict rules with regard to these daily activities for the sake of stopping the influx of karma, especially the karma of harming life.³⁶ In Buddhism, however, *sati-sampajañña* is mainly a mental exercise, which aims at preventing the influx of unwholesome states into the mind. For Jains *samii* means to be mindful of one’s behavior, whereas for Buddhists *sati* is much more than that. They put emphasis on mindfulness of mental states. If *sati-sampajañña* derived from the Jain idea of *samii*, Buddhism shifted the focus from physical activities to mental ones. This divergence in their concerns of mindfulness reflects their different opinions about karma. The Buddha says, “It is intention that I call karma,”³⁷ while for Jainism, as Dundas (2002: 97) notes, karma is regarded as being a physical substance. A striking contrast in their notions of karma is also found in the *Upāli Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, where Vardhamāna Mahāvīra (called Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto by Buddhists) is said to regard bodily karma as the most

reprehensible in the performance of evil action (karma), but the Buddha regards mental karma as the most reprehensible.³⁸

3. Introspective awareness

While one is in contact with incoming sensory data, one's mindfulness can have an introspective function with regard to one's own mind. This function serves as a remedial measure when "protective awareness" fails to act. In case evil unwholesome states arise in one's mind, one should be able to activate the faculty of mindfulness so as to notice and recognize them and get rid of them in time.

The *Sunakkhatta Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* provides a simile which describes this function of *sati*:

Suppose, Sunakkhatta, a man were wounded by an arrow thickly smeared with poison. . . . A surgeon would cut around the opening of the wound with a knife, then he would probe for the arrow with a probe, then he would pull out the arrow and would expel the poisonous humour without leaving a trace of it behind.³⁹

Here, "wound" is a designation for the six internal bases, i.e. the six senses. "Poisonous humour" and "arrow" stand for ignorance and craving respectively. "Probe" is a designation for *sati*.⁴⁰ Again we find that *sati* functions in the context of the six senses, but here it acts as an antidote to the unwholesome states that have invaded an individual rather than a preventive or a guard against them.

The effective functioning of both protective awareness and introspective awareness requires the practitioner to remind himself to examine his own mental states, whether wholesome or unwholesome. This is elaborated in the *Milindapañha*, a paracanonical text:

(1) When *sati* arises, sire, it reminds one of the states together with their counterparts that are wholesome and unwholesome, blamable and blameless, inferior and lofty, dark and bright, thus: "These are the four establishments of mindfulness; these are the four right strivings; these are the four bases of supernatural powers; these are the five faculties; these are the five powers; these are the seven enlightenment factors; these are the noble eightfold path; this is serenity; this is insight; this is gnosis; this is liberation." Then the one who practices yoga resorts to the states that should be resorted to and does not resort to the states that should not be resorted to; he follows the states that should be followed and does not follow the states that should not be followed. Thus, sire, *sati* has reminding (*apilāpana*)⁴¹ as its characteristic. . . . (2) When *sati* arises, sire, it

examines the courses of the beneficial and unbeneficial states thus: “These states are beneficial; these states are unbeneficial; these states are helpful; these states are unhelpful.” Then the one who practices yoga removes the unbeneficial states and takes hold of the beneficial states; he removes the unhelpful states and takes hold of the helpful states. Thus, sire, *sati* has taking hold as its characteristic.⁴²

According to this passage, *sati* reminds a practitioner of various mental states and enables one to recognize them, and in a more active sense, it helps one take hold of the beneficial and helpful states and remove the opposite states. This involves the proper function of recollection, recognition and discrimination, which belong to the field of *saññā*. Such proper functioning of *saññā* forms the basis for freeing the mind from unwholesome states.

4. Deliberately forming conceptions

This function of *sati* is not contemporaneous with sense perceptions. It consists in the wholesome functioning of *saññā* in the sense of conception rather than apperception. It is based on constructive memories.

4.1 Anussati—Forming inspiring conceptions

In the *Nikāyas* there are threefold, sixfold and tenfold series of *anussati*.⁴³ The sixfold series is probably the most commonly found.⁴⁴ It consists of *buddhānussati*, *dhammānussati*, *saṅghānussati*, *sīlānussati*, *cāgānussati*, *devatānussati* (“recollection or mindfulness of the Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha, morality, generosity and deities”). The first three form the threefold series. The tenfold classification could be a later accretion in that it is rarely found in the *Nikāyas*,⁴⁵ and it seems heterogeneous as the last four kinds of *anussati*, namely mindfulness of breathing, mindfulness of death, mindfulness concerning *kāya* and recollection of peace (*ānāpānasati*, *marāṇasati*, *kāyagatā sati*, *upasamānussati*), are apparently different in nature to the former six.⁴⁶ Therefore my discussion will be confined to the sixfold *anussati*, especially the first three *anussatis*. These three are also referred to as *buddhagatā sati*, *dhammagatā sati* and *saṅhagatā sati* in the *Dhammapada* (296–298), and as *bhagavantam ārabha sati*, *dhammam ārabha sati* and *saṅgham ārabha sati* (mindfulness regarding the Blessed One, mindfulness regarding the Dhamma and mindfulness regarding the Saṅgha) at SN V 369. Accordingly it is reasonable to deal with at least the first three kinds of *anussati* as part of our discussion of *sati*.

The term *anussati* (Skt *anusmṛti*) derives from the verb *anussarati* (*anu-√smṛ*), which means “to remember,” “to recollect” or “to call to mind” (DOP s.v. *anussarati* and *anussati*). As Shaw (2006: 109) explains, the first six *anussatis* are “things to be thought about or brought to mind again and again.”

Harrison (1992: 228) says: “[I]f we look at the traditional subjects of *anusmṛti*, we can see quite clearly that personal recollection of past experience is not involved.” He further contends: “The general interchangeability of *smṛti* and *anusmṛti* also suggests that we are dealing with a ‘calling to mind’ rather than recollection in the strict sense.” (Harrison, 1992: 228) When one practices *anussati* for some time, however, one may recollect one’s previous experience of the practice, such as a strong religious sentiment that arose in one’s mind before (LSC). Such inspiring memories can provide a support for the practice of *anussati*. *Anussati* may be regarded as a practice of reminding oneself of the subjects by deliberately forming conceptions. It is similar to a function of *saññā* called “constructive imagination” by Hamilton (1996: 61), which refers to a process of good/positive or constructive conditioning of one’s *saññā* by means of deliberate conceptualizing. In our case, *anussati* is to deliberately conceptualize what is accounted spiritually wholesome and beneficial according to a set of credal statements or formulae. The *Dhammapada* says that the Buddha’s disciples day and night constantly practice *buddhagatā sati*, *dharmagatā sati* and *saṅghagatā sati*, i.e. the first three kinds of *anussati*, as well as *kāyagatā sati*. This means that the subjects of *anussati* are to be remembered by Buddhists in their daily life.

An important benefit of this practice is overcoming an emotion, that is fear. For example, *sutta* 3 of the *Sakka Saṃyutta* relates how the Buddha prescribes the practice of the first three *anussatis* to his disciples as a remedy against fear when staying in wild and solitary places. As the Buddha points out himself, the reason why this practice can have such an effect is “Because the Tathāgata, the Arahata, the Perfectly Enlightened one is devoid of lust, devoid of hatred, devoid of delusion; he is brave, courageous, bold, ready to stand his ground.”⁴⁷ This practice is to identify with the positive qualities of the Buddha so as to alter one’s consciousness by using constructive conceptualization. This is another example, apart from those discussed in the previous chapter, of overcoming emotional disturbance by transforming *saññā*. *Devatānussati* (literally “recollection of deities”) also has a similar function. The practitioner reminds himself that the faith, morality, learning, generosity, and wisdom that bring about rebirth as a deity are also found in himself.⁴⁸ Such identification with the good qualities of deities makes one feel secure and positive about one’s afterlife, and thus may appease anxiety in regard to death.

The practice of *anussati* can also be related to serenity (*samatha*) meditation, or concentration (*saṃādhi*). This will be discussed in the next chapter.

4.2 Forming conceptions of objects of a negative nature

4.2.1 Conception of ugliness

Two practices stated in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* belong to this kind of *sati*, that is, seeing the body as full of impure bodily parts, and contemplating

a corpse in different stages of putrefaction and disintegration.⁴⁹ The first practice is called “conception of ugliness” (*asubhasaññā*) at AN V 109. The second one is also called “absorption through ugliness” (*asubhajhāna*) in the *Dhammasaṅgani* (§§ 263–264), and “ugliness as meditation subject” (*asubhakammaṭṭhāna*) in the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 178). Both practices are taken to explain “meditation on ugliness” (*asubhabhāvanā*) at SN V 320 by the commentary⁵⁰ and Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1773 and 1951, note 300). They both require deliberately forming *saññā* of the repulsive or transient nature of the body in order to develop a sense of detachment from the body. As Andō (1981: 146–147) points out, the *Vijaya Sutta* in the *Sutta-nipāta* is closely analogous with the section on contemplation of the body in the *Satipatṭhāna Sutta*. It teaches contemplation on eighteen bodily parts (Sn 194–196), which are all included in the thirty-one impure bodily parts stated in the foregoing first practice, and it also describes the decomposition of a corpse (Sn 200–201) in basically the same way as the first two stages stated in the foregoing second practice. The purpose of such a practice is given in verse 203 thus: “One would discard desire for the body, both of oneself and of others.”⁵¹

Examples of discarding desire for someone else’s body by this type of *sati* recur in the *Nikāyas*. In the *Mahādukkhakkhandha Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I 88–89), the above practice of contemplating a corpse is prescribed by the Buddha as a means of removing desire and lust for material form (*rūpa*), which in the context refers to a body of the opposite sex. Similarly, at SN IV 110–111 the Buddha explains to King Udena the methods by which young monks overcome lust for women. One of the methods is seeing the body as full of impure bodily parts as stated above. As to discarding desire for one’s own body, an extreme example is found in the *Vesālī Sutta* of the *Ānāpāna Saṃyutta*, where dozens of monks, after practicing meditation on ugliness (*asubhabhāvanā*), became so disgusted with their own bodies that they committed suicide. As mentioned above, *asubhabhāvanā* refers to the foregoing two practices according to the commentary. They did not realize that such practices are intended to remove desire for the body, not the body itself.

This function of *sati* is based on, in Hamilton’s (1996: 177) words, a “healthily negative” attitude towards the body. As she (pp. 177–178) indicates, we tend to identify with our bodies. Even the Buddha says that it would be better to take this body as the Self because of its apparently greater permanence (SN II 94–95). To deliberately think of the repulsive or transitory nature of the body is a countermeasure against the habitual tendency to identify with the body, and can probably further disillusion one with the concept of the “Self.” In this sense, it is related to insight (*vipassanā*) meditation, as will be discussed in the next chapter. Perhaps it can serve as a preliminary to insight meditation. On the other hand, it can also be applied to serenity (*samatha*) meditation. This will also be discussed later. Therefore this type of *sati* can operate in different states of consciousness.

4.2.2 *Mindfulness of death*

Mindfulness of death (*maraṇasati*) also falls into the class of *sati* as forming a conception of objects of a negative nature. It is the last one of the ten *anussatis*, and is also called conception of death (*maraṇasaññā*).⁵² Below is a summary of an exposition of this practice found in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*:

When day has passed and night has commenced, a monk reflects thus: “Many things can cause my death. A snake or a scorpion or a centipede may bite me. I may die from it. That would be a hindrance to me. I may stumble and fall; the food I have eaten may harm me; . . . I may die from it. That would be a hindrance to me.” The monk should reflect thus: “Are there any evil unwholesome states in me that have not been abandoned and would be a hindrance to me if I die tonight?” If the monk on reflection realizes that there are these states, he should arouse extraordinary desire . . . and exercise mindfulness and full awareness in order to abandon these states.⁵³

This practice is to remind oneself that there are many chances of death and that one may die at any time, so that one has to prepare right now for one’s afterlife or liberation, which is dependent on one’s mental state. Therefore one should examine if there are any evil unwholesome states in one’s mind and exercise mindfulness and full awareness in order to abandon those states. Accordingly, mindfulness of death serves as a means to motivate introspective awareness and protective awareness. This is another example of different functions of *sati* working together.

4.3 *Developing loving-kindness (mettā) towards all beings*

The well-known *Metta Sutta* in the *Khuddakapāṭha* and *Sutta-nipāta* describes the development of loving-kindness (*mettā*) as *sati* that should be practiced virtually all the time:

Just as a mother would protect her own son, her only son, with her life, so one should develop the immeasurable mind towards all beings and loving-kindness towards the whole world. One should develop the immeasurable mind, upwards, downwards and across, without obstruction, without hatred and hostility. Standing, walking, sitting, or lying down, as long as one is free from drowsiness, one should practise this mindfulness. They say, “This is a divine dwelling in this world.”⁵⁴

To cultivate loving-kindness towards all sentient beings and conceive of them as being one’s own son involves “constructive imagination.” This is a

process of morally constructive transformation of one's *saññā* by means of deliberate conceptualizing. In this *sutta* the scope of such deliberate conceptualizing is extended to the maximum, covering creatures that are seen and unseen, and those who have already come to be and those about to come to be.⁵⁵ Loving-kindness is among the four immeasurable states (*appamaññā*) or divine dwellings (*brahmavihāra*): loving-kindness (*mettā*), compassion (*karuṇā*), altruistic joy (*muditā*) and equanimity (*upekkhā*). Just like *upekkhā* discussed in Chapter 1, loving-kindness may also be counted as a type of emotion produced by deliberately transforming *saññā*, which is the job of *sati*. While the *Metta Sutta* mentions "this mindfulness" (*etaṃ satim*), it probably does not mean that loving-kindness itself is a kind of *sati*, but it implies that the process of developing loving-kindness involves *sati*. The development of loving-kindness is unique for its altruistic aspect which seems to be lacking in other types of *sati* discussed above.

Sutta 19 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* also implies that *sati* can have a dimension of social ethics. In this *sutta* the Buddha gives a parable of an acrobat and his apprentice Medakathālikā. The Buddha says,

Just as the apprentice Medakathālikā said to the teacher: "I shall protect myself," monks, thus should *satipaṭṭhāna* (establishment of mindfulness) be practised. "I shall protect others," thus should *satipaṭṭhāna* be practised. One who protects oneself protects others. One who protects others protects oneself. And, monks, how does one who protects oneself protect others? By practicing, developing and cultivation. Thus one who protects oneself protects others. And, monks, how does one who protects others protect oneself? By forbearance, harmlessness, loving-kindness and compassion.⁵⁶

It should be noted that *satipaṭṭhāna* (establishment of mindfulness) here is singular, different from the plural form in the context of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. This passage apparently connects *satipaṭṭhāna* with forbearance, harmlessness, loving-kindness and compassion, and therefore applies *sati* to some ethical attitudes in regard to interpersonal relations. In similar fashion, Chappell (2003: 264) introduces the concept of "social mindfulness" as a dimension of Buddhist mindfulness practice. He (p. 264) holds that mindfulness training is a way to find sympathy and compassion with others, and that balanced meditation must involve "recognizing the interconnectedness and impermanence of experience that naturally leads to . . . an increased awareness of the common ground shared with others."

Chapter 3

MINDFULNESS IN METHODICAL MEDITATION

In the simile in the *Kimsuka Sutta* mentioned in the previous chapter, a swift pair of messengers would ask the gatekeeper: “Where is the lord of this city?” and deliver a message of truth to the lord of the city. As mentioned before, “gatekeeper” stands for mindfulness and the “city” stands for the individual (*kāya*) according to the Buddha. He also explains that “the swift pair of messengers” is a designation for serenity (*samatha*) and insight (*vipassanā*); “the lord of the city” is a designation for consciousness; “a message of truth” is a designation for Nibbāna.¹ Similarly, the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* and a *sutta* in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* say, “Whoever has developed and cultivated *kāyagatā sati*, for him whatever wholesome states are conducive to gnosis (*vijjābhāgiya*) are included.”² And at AN I 61 *samatha* and *vipassanā* are said to be two wholesome states conducive to gnosis (*vijjābhāgiya*).³ *Samatha* and *vipassanā* are regarded as the two main categories of Buddhist meditation. According to the foregoing *suttas*, these two can bring about Nibbāna or gnosis (i.e. liberating insight) in one’s consciousness and are regulated or developed by *sati*, the gatekeeper in the simile. I will discuss the role of *sati* in these two types of meditation. Let us first investigate what these two terms refer to.

There seems to be no clear explanation of *samatha* or *vipassanā* in the earliest stratum of the Canon although they occur quite frequently.⁴ At DN III 54 *samatha* is used to rephrase *santa*, calm or serene, which has the same root *śam* as *samatha*.⁵ Cousins (1984: 59) indicates that the identification of *samatha* and *vipassanā* with *saṁādhi* (concentration) and *paññā* (wisdom) is standard in the *Abhidhamma* texts. This can be traced back to earlier texts in the *Nikāyas*. For example, as Cousins (1984: 59) points out, at AN III 373 the five faculties (*indriya*) are given as: *saddhā* (faith), *sati*, *virīya* (energy), *samatha* and *vipassanā*, whereas the usual list is: *saddhā*, *virīya*, *sati*, *saṁādhi* and *paññā*. Another example is at AN I 61, where development of *samatha* is said to result in development of states of mind (*citta*), while development of *vipassanā* is said to result in development of wisdom. Here development of states of mind and of wisdom comprise the last two of the three principal divisions of Buddhist practice: morality (*sīla*), concentration

(*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*), as concentration is also referred to as the achievement in states of mind (*cittasampadā*)⁶ or training in higher states of mind (*adhicittasikkhā*).⁷ A list of four qualities at AN IV 360 also suggests that *samatha* and *vipassanā* occupy the position of concentration and wisdom: having faith (*saddho*), endowed with morality (*sīlavā*), possessing serenity of mental states within (*lābhī ajiḥhattaṃ ceto-samathassa*), and possessing insight into things by higher wisdom (*lābhī adhipaññā-dhamma-vipassanāya*). Although *samatha* and *vipassanā* may not have quite the same meaning as concentration and wisdom, there is hardly any doubt that they refer to concentration and wisdom respectively.

1. Mindfulness and insight (*vipassanā*) meditation

The practice of mindfulness, especially *satipaṭṭhāna*, is widely considered to be the core of insight (*vipassanā*) meditation by practitioners and scholars alike. For example, Ven. Gunaratana (2002: 31) says, “Vipassana is the oldest of Buddhist meditation practices. The method comes directly from the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, . . .,” and (p. 145) “Mindfulness is the center of vipassana meditation and the key to the whole process.” Griffiths (1981: 611 and 614) says, “We may take *vipassanā* (insight) and *paññā* (wisdom) as equivalent terms . . . Perhaps the simplest and most effective way of developing *paññā* described in the Pāli canon is that of *satipaṭṭhāna*.” Harvey (1990: 254) also says, “The basic framework for developing Insight practice is known as ‘the four foundations of mindfulness’, the *sati-paṭṭhāna*’s.”⁸ Curiously, there seems to have been no work that explains how *sati* relates to *vipassanā* in the earliest stratum of the Canon. I shall explore this issue by resorting to the *Nikāyas*.

As mentioned above, development of *vipassanā* is said to result in development of wisdom (*paññā*). Anālayo (2006a: 244–245) has illustrated that, according to several similes in the *Nikāyas*, mindfulness plays a preparatory role for the development of wisdom. Looking from another angle, I will show that mindfulness serves as the method for the development of wisdom according to canonical passages that explain wisdom or *vipassanā*. In *sutta* 10 of the *Indriya Saṃyutta* (SN V 199), the faculty of wisdom is explained as “wisdom directed to rise and fall” (*udayathagāminiyā paññāya*). Similarly, part of the refrain in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, which also occurs in *sutta* 40 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta*, is about contemplation of rise and fall:

He dwells contemplating the nature of arising in the body, or he dwells contemplating the nature of vanishing in the body, or he dwells contemplating the nature of arising and vanishing in the body. [The same applies to feelings, mind and *dhammas*.]⁹

This passage matches the explanation of *paññā* quite well. The mechanism may be that *sati* directs *saññā* in a way conformable to Buddhist doctrine

so that one can recognize the rise and fall in the four aspects, and thus *paññā* is developed.

As interpreted in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (II 93ff.), a rather late text included in the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, *vipassanā* is contemplation of things as impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self, which are the three aspects of the nature of phenomena in Buddhist metaphysics. In the chapter on *vipassanā*, as a basis for interpretation it quotes three *suttas* from the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (III 441f.), which say that it is impossible to realize the fruits of arahantship, etc. without seeing all conditioned things (*saṅkhāra*) as impermanent, unsatisfactory, and all things (*dhammā*) as not-self.¹⁰ This is in accord with a discourse in the *Nikāyas* and the *Vinaya* concerning seeing the five aggregates by wisdom (*paññā*), which apparently denotes *vipassanā*: reviewing the five aggregates as impermanent, and therefore unsatisfactory, and consequently not-self, one sees with proper wisdom the reality of not-self with regard to the five aggregates, whether past, future, or present, internally (*ajjhataṃ*) or externally (*bahiddhā*), etc.¹¹ This is parallel to the practice of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the four subjects of *satipaṭṭhāna* and the five aggregates both represent classifications of human experience. Therefore contemplation of the body, feelings, mind and *dhammas* amounts to contemplating the aggregates. Just like the foregoing discourse on seeing the five aggregates by wisdom, contemplation of these four objects of *satipaṭṭhāna* is also often said to be carried out internally (*ajjhataṃ*) and externally (*bahiddhā*) in the *Nikāyas*.¹² Contemplation of rise and fall in these four objects as stated in *sutta* 40 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* corresponds to seeing the aggregates as impermanent, and hence their being unsatisfactory and not-self is also implied. Therefore it is plausible to regard the practice of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* as *vipassanā*.

Another definition of the faculty of wisdom is understanding the four noble truths (SN V 199). In the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, understanding the four noble truths is also included in the section dealing with contemplation of *dhammas*.¹³ However, it is not found in the two Chinese versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*.

2. Mindfulness and serenity (*samatha*) meditation

While *sati* or *satipaṭṭhāna* is often referred to as *vipassanā*, little attention has been drawn to the relationship between *sati* and *samatha*, serenity meditation. I shall examine this issue. As mentioned above, *samatha* refers to the same thing as concentration (*samādhi*). An interesting statement about the relationship between *sati* and concentration recurs in the *Nikāyas*: One who develops right concentration or immeasurable concentration has the knowledge: “Being mindful, I attain this concentration; being mindful, I emerge from it.”¹⁴

Right concentration (*sammāsamādhi*) is defined as the four *jhānas* in the *Nikāyas* (MN III 252, SN V 10). The faculty of concentration (*samādhindriya*)

is also defined in terms of the four *jhānas* (SN V 198). Although I have not found in the *Nikāyas* that the four formless (*ārūpa*) attainments and the “cessation of apperception and feeling” (*saññāvedayitanirodha*) are classified under *samādhi* or *samatha*, this is implied in *sutta* 8 of the *Ānāpāna Saṃyutta* (SN V 318–319), which says that if a monk wishes to enter and dwell in these five meditative attainments along with the four *jhānas*, he should attend to “concentration by mindfulness of breathing” (*ānāpāna-sati-samādhi*). These nine are often listed in a series of meditative attainments which are sometimes called the “nine successive stages” (*nava anupubbavīhārā*).¹⁵ As Griffiths (1981: 610) states, this nine-fold structure “describes a series of states of consciousness of increasing abstraction.” All these meditative states will be involved in my discussion below.

Aggregate of concentration

In the *Cūlavedalla Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, a nun called Dhammadinnā explains to a lay follower named Visākha the relationship between the Noble Eightfold Path and the three aggregates of morality, concentration and wisdom. She says that right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration are subsumed in the aggregate of concentration (*samādhikkhandha*).¹⁶ Moreover, in reply to his question, she says: “The four *satipaṭṭhānas* are the *nimittas* of concentration (*samādhi*).”¹⁷ *Nimitta* can mean cause or sign (PED, s.v. *nimitta*). I will show that as causes the four *satipaṭṭhānas* can lead to various meditative attainments, and as signs the four *satipaṭṭhānas* provide meditation subjects and other essential aspects involved in the meditative attainments.

What does the aggregate of concentration refer to? The answer can be found in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, where a three-part scheme of the path to liberation recurs. The three parts are called “the aggregate of morality, the aggregate of concentration, and the aggregate of wisdom” (*sīlakkhanda*, *samādhikkhandha*, *paññākkhandha*) in the *Subha Sutta* (DN I 206–208). According to some passages in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, the aggregate of concentration is composed of the four *jhānas* and a set of preliminaries to them. The preliminaries are as follows in brief (hereafter set A):

1. guarding the doors of the sense-faculties
2. mindfulness and full awareness
3. being contented
4. starting meditation in a sitting posture
5. abandoning the five hindrances¹⁸

Two other sets of preliminaries to the *jhānas*, with a few differences, are found in the *Majjhima Nikāya*.

Set B:

1. restraint of the senses
2. mindfulness and full awareness
3. starting meditation in a sitting posture
4. abandoning the five hindrances¹⁹

Set C:

1. guarding the doors of the sense-faculties
2. being moderate in eating
3. being devoted to vigilance
4. mindfulness and full awareness
5. starting meditation in a sitting posture
6. abandoning the five hindrances²⁰

Among these three sets, the description of “guarding the doors of the sense-faculties” is virtually the same as that of “restraint of the senses.” Set B has the four items common to all the three sets. All these four items and “being devoted to vigilance” in set C are related to *sati*. This will be elucidated below. It should be noted that some of these preliminaries are to be practised in daily activities, and the first two of these four items have been discussed in Chapter 2.

2.1 *Sati and the preliminaries to the jhānas*

(1) Restraint of the senses

This practice is quoted as passage D and discussed in Section 2 on “protective awareness” in Chapter 2, where *sati* is shown to have the function of restraining the senses.

(2) Mindfulness and full awareness

This has also been discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2. There is no doubt that it is a practice of *sati*.

(3) Being devoted to vigilance

This practice is to remind oneself to purify one’s mind of obstructive states during the day and in the first and third watches of the night when one is still awake; in the middle watch of the night one lies down, mindful (*sata*) and fully aware (*sampajāna*), having attended to (*manasikaritvā*) the conception (*saññā*) of rising.²¹ This practice agrees with a function of *sati* discussed in Chapter 2, that is, to remind oneself to keep unwholesome states away from one’s own mind. The phrase “mindful and fully aware” is also an evident indication of *sati*.

(4) Starting meditation in a sitting posture

At this stage a monk resorts to a solitary place, and “on returning from his almsround, after his meal he sits down, folding his legs crosswise, setting

his body erect, and establishing mindfulness (*satīṃ upaṭṭhapetvā*) before him” (tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi, 1995: 274–275).²² Therefore mindfulness is also involved in this phase.

(5) Abandoning the five hindrances

The five hindrances refer to covetousness (*abhiññhā*), ill will (*byāpāda*), sloth and drowsiness (*thīnamiddha*), restlessness and remorse (*uddhaccakukkucca*) and doubt (*vicikicchā*). As Ven. Anālayo (2006b) points out, a *sutta* in the *Āṅguttara Nikāya* (IV 458) briefly states that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* should be developed in order to abandon the five hindrances. Below is an elucidation of how mindfulness helps to overcome the five hindrances.

(i) conception of light (*ālokaśāñṇā*)

In the account of *samādhikkhandha* (aggregate of concentration) the description of abandoning one of the five hindrances reads: “Having abandoned sloth and drowsiness (*thīnamiddha*), he dwells free from sloth and drowsiness, conceiving light (*ālokaśāñṇin*), mindful and fully aware.”²³ Walshe (1995: 545, note 120) points out: “Cultivation of the perception of light is given as a standard way of overcoming the hindrance of sloth-and-torpor.”²⁴ Similarly, at AN IV 85–87 the Buddha gave Mahāmoggallāna several pieces of advice on how to abandon drowsiness (*middha*), one of which is “Attend to the conception of light (*ālokaśāñṇā*), concentrate on the conception of day: as by day, so at night; as at night, so by day. Thus, with your mind uncovered and unenveloped, develop a bright mind.”²⁵ This practice is referred to as one of the five or six subjects of mindfulness (*anussatiṭṭhāna*) at AN III 323, and is also included in the Chinese version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* and the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* in the *Madhyama Āgama*.²⁶

(ii) *anussati*

In two *suttas* of the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*, an exposition concerning the sixfold *anussati* (see Chapter 2, Section 4.1) implies the removing of the hindrances as a preliminary to the *jhānas*. Here, the standard description of each *anussati* is followed by a passage like this:

(P1) At the time when the noble disciple reminds himself of the Tathāgata, his mind is not possessed by lust, his mind is not possessed by anger, his mind is not possessed by delusion. At that time his mind becomes upright with the Tathāgata as object. With upright mind a noble disciple obtains inspiration in the meaning, obtains inspiration in the Dhamma, obtains gladness connected with the Dhamma.

(P2) When he is gladdened, rapture is born. When the mind is uplifted by rapture, the body becomes tranquil. One whose body is

tranquil feels pleasure. The mind of one who feels pleasure becomes concentrated.²⁷

This passage is about *anussati* of the Tathāgata, i.e. the Buddha. The same is said of the other five subjects of *anussati*. Similarly, the paragraph on abandoning the five hindrances is sometimes followed by the following passage in the account of *samādhikkhandha*:

(L2) When he sees these five hindrances being abandoned in himself, gladness is born. When he is gladdened, rapture is born. When the mind is uplifted by rapture, the body becomes tranquil. One whose body is tranquil feels pleasure. The mind of one who feels pleasure becomes concentrated.

(L3) Being secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, he enters and dwells in the first *jhāna*, which is accompanied by *vitakka* and *vicāra*, with rapture and pleasure born of seclusion . . . the second *jhāna* . . . the third *jhāna* . . . the fourth *jhāna*. . .²⁸

Paragraph P2 is very similar to paragraph L2, while P1 may correspond to the stage of abandoning the hindrances. This is suggested by Buddhaghosa. In the *Visuddhimagga* he explains P1 thus: “When he has thus suppressed the hindrances through the absence of being possessed by lust, etc. . . .”²⁹ and explains P2 as the arising of the *jhāna* factors.³⁰ Therefore the practice of *anussati* can clear the mind of the hindrances, and prepare for the *jhāna* meditation. Buddhaghosa holds that in this case the *jhāna* does not reach absorption (*appanā*), but only access [concentration] (*upacāra*).³¹ In other words, *anussati* cannot lead to the *jhāna* proper, but can be practiced as a transition from normal consciousness to absorption. *Anussati* is very much like conceiving light (*ālokasaññin*) in the sense that it is only a means of abandoning the hindrance rather than a meditation subject for the *jhānas*.

The practice of *anussati* as a method of abandoning the hindrances is probably implied in a difficult passage in *sutta* 10 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta*:

(K1) When he dwells contemplating the body as a body, there arises in him either a fever in the body based on the body or sluggishness (*līnatta*) of mind, or his mind is distracted outwardly. That monk should then direct his mind towards some inspiring sign (*pasādanīya nimitta*).

(K2) When he directs his mind towards some inspiring sign, gladness is born. When he is gladdened, rapture is born. When the mind is uplifted by rapture, the body becomes tranquil. One whose body

is tranquil feels pleasure. The mind of one who feels pleasure becomes concentrated.

(K3) He reviews thus: “The purpose for which I directed my mind has been accomplished. Now let me withdraw [my mind].” He withdraws [his mind] and does not think (*vitakketi*) or ponder (*vicāreti*). He understands: “Without *vitakka* and *vicāra*, internally mindful, I am pleased.” [This passage is about contemplating the body, the first of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. The same is said of feelings, mind and *dhammas*.]³²

In his commentary on paragraph K1, Buddhaghosa glosses “some inspiring (*pasādaniya*) sign” as “a certain object that inspires confidence (*pasāda*), such as the Buddha, etc.”³³ “The Buddha, etc.” probably refers to at least the first four subjects of *anussati*, viz the Buddha, Dhamma, Saṅgha and morality (*sīla*), in that they are often said to be the objects of confirmed confidence (*aveccappasāda*), and the exposition of confirmed confidence in these four objects is almost identical with the standard description of the first four *anussatis*.³⁴ In the *Vatthūpama Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* the exposition of confirmed confidence in the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha even includes part of paragraph P1, and the whole of P2.³⁵ Therefore, “some inspiring sign” in *sutta* 10 could be the subjects of *anussati*. We should note that *nimitta*, “sign,” is often connected with *saññā*, as discussed in Chapter 1. Therefore “directing his mind towards some inspiring *nimitta*” can mean directing *saññā* in a wholesome way, which is a function of *sati*.

Comparing passage K and passage L, we find that K2 is very similar to L2. As Bodhi (2000: 1922, note 147) suggests, “without *vitakka* and *vicāra*” in K3 seems to imply the second *jhāna*, while L3 contains the usual *jhāna* formula. This indicates a rough correspondence between K3 and L3. In K1 “sluggishness of mind” (*cetaso līnatta*) is related to the hindrance of sloth and drowsiness, as suggested in a passage of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*: “Monks, in one whose mind is sluggish (*līnacitta*), unarisen sloth and drowsiness arise, and arisen sloth and drowsiness is liable to increase and expansion.”³⁶ Similarly, sloth and drowsiness is attributed to sluggishness of mind in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*.³⁷ Likewise, “a fever in the body based on the body” and “his mind being distracted outwardly” in K1 could refer to other hindrances. In this paragraph “directing the mind towards some inspiring sign” is meant to abandon such hindrances and prepare for *jhāna*. Therefore, K1 corresponds to the process of abandoning the hindrances preceding L2 in the account of *samādhikkhandha*.

K3 implies that when the purpose of abandoning the hindrances has been achieved, the method of directing the mind towards some inspiring sign should also be set aside. Since “without *vitakka* and *vicāra*” refers to the second *jhāna*, this method is to be discarded before one reaches the second

jhāna, probably even prior to the first *jhāna*, for Buddhaghosa says that *anusati* can only lead to access concentration.

2.2 Sati and the jhānas

2.2.1 Sati and nimitta of the jhānas

As mentioned above, the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are called “the *nimittas* of concentration (*samādhi*)” in the *Cūḷavedalla Sutta*. In the *Saṅgīti Sutta* (DN III 226), *samādhi-nimitta* is illustrated by a list of terms: *aṭṭhika-saññā* (contemplation³⁸ of a skeleton), *puḷavaka-saññā* (contemplation of a worm[-infested corpse]), *vinīlaka-saññā* (contemplation of a livid [corpse]), *vicchiddaka-saññā* (contemplation of [a corpse] full of holes), and *uddhumātaka-saññā* (contemplation of a bloated [corpse]). Contemplation of a corpse in different stages of decomposition is included in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, a text devoted to mindfulness. Even some of the above terms, namely *aṭṭhika*, *vinīlaka* and *uddhumātaka*, occur in this text. As discussed in Chapter 2, such contemplation belongs to a function of mindfulness, that is, deliberately forming conceptions (*saññā*). Therefore the foregoing *saññās* refer to the practice of *sati*, and thus this passage in the *Saṅgīti Sutta* implies that mindfulness is the *nimitta* of concentration.

Here *nimitta* can be interpreted as “sign” or “object” since the object of mindfulness is also the object of concentration. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as “cause.” As the commentary glosses, through these *saññās* one can achieve *samādhi*.³⁹ This means that these contemplations serve as the causes or basis of concentration. A verse in the *Visuddhimagga* says that the ten *asubhas*, which refer to contemplations on a corpse in different stages of decomposition, are called “causes of this and that *jhāna*” by the Buddha.⁴⁰ It should be noted that the *Visuddhimagga* holds that this practice can only lead to the attainment of the first *jhāna*, not the second and the rest.⁴¹ This idea might be based on the *Abhidhamma* as the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (§§ 263–264) only mentions the first *jhāna* in its exposition of *asubhajhāna*, which refers to the ten *asubhas*.

Sutta 8 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* states that while a foolish monk is contemplating the body as a body (feelings, mind, *dhammas*), his mind does not become concentrated, his defilements (*upakkilesa*) are not abandoned, he does not grasp that sign (*nimitta*), and thus he gains neither pleasant dwellings in this very life nor mindfulness and full awareness because he does not grasp the sign of his own mind. A wise monk is the opposite and gains pleasant dwellings in this very life and mindfulness and full awareness because he grasps the sign of his own mind.⁴² Since “pleasant dwellings in this very life” refer to the four *jhānas*,⁴³ the foregoing implies that the practice of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* may lead to the attainment of the *jhānas*. Thus “mindfulness and full awareness” here must also refer to the mindful state

present in the *jhānas* rather than mindfulness and full awareness as a preliminary to the *jhānas*. The key to the attainment of the *jhānas* is to grasp the sign of one's own mind. What does "grasping the sign of one's own mind" mean? This seems to be puzzling, and the *sutta* itself gives no explanation. An account in the *Upakkilesa Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* may shed some light on this problem.

In this text the Buddha asks Anuruddha whether he and his fellow monks have attained a comfortable dwelling which is a distinction in knowledge and vision worthy of the noble ones and beyond human states. In the *Cūḷagosiṅga Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, also in the context of a dialogue between the Buddha and Anuruddha, the term "comfortable dwelling which is a distinction in knowledge and vision worthy of the noble ones and beyond human states" (*uttariṃ manussadhammā alamariyaññadassanaviseso phāsuvihāro*) refers to any of the nine meditative attainments from the first *jhāna* to the cessation of apperception and feeling.⁴⁴ In the *Upakkilesa Sutta*, however, the comfortable dwelling characterized by conceiving the radiance and the vision of forms (*rūpa*) can only apply to the four *jhānas* since the meditative attainments higher than the *jhānas* surmount conceptions of forms (*rūpasaññā*) according to the *Nikāyas*.

In reply to the Buddha's foregoing question, Anuruddha says, "We conceive (*sañjānāma*) radiance and a vision of forms. But soon afterwards the radiance and the vision of forms disappear, and we do not master that *nimitta*."⁴⁵ The word *nimitta* can mean either cause or sign. Choosing the former meaning, Ven. Ñāṇamoli and Ven. Bodhi (1995: 1012) translate: "Soon afterwards the light and the vision of forms disappear, but we have not discovered the cause for that (*tañ ca nimittaṃ na paṭivijjhāmā*)." However, the Chinese translation of this text in the *Madhyama Āgama* renders *nimitta* as "sign." No words equivalent to *tañ ca nimittaṃ na paṭivijjhāmā* are found in the Chinese counterpart, but a similar expression is attributed to the Buddha: "You (plural) do not master this sign."⁴⁶ Moreover, in the later part of this text recur these two terms: *rūpa-nimitta* ("the sign of forms") and *obhāsa-nimitta* ("the sign of radiance").⁴⁷ Accordingly, *nimitta* here must mean the "sign," which refers to the radiance and the vision of forms as objects of concentration.

Following Anuruddha's reply, the Buddha says that before he was enlightened, he also had the same experience. He realized that when mental defilements (*cittassa upakkilesa*) such as doubt, etc. arose in him, his concentration fell away, and when concentration fell away, the radiance and the vision of forms disappeared.⁴⁸ This description is strikingly analogous to the foregoing statement in *sutta* 8 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta*: His mind does not become concentrated, his defilements (*upakkilesa*) are not abandoned, he does not grasp that sign. Both cases imply that concentration, the abandoning of defilements, and grasping the sign (or conceiving the radiance and the vision of forms) are synchronic or interdependent in some way.

Mastering the sign, or the radiance and the vision of forms, is crucial to attaining a “comfortable dwelling,” which refers to the four *jhānas* in the *Upakkilesa Sutta*. This amounts to the foregoing that grasping the sign of one’s own mind is essential for gaining “pleasant dwellings in this very life,” i.e. the four *jhānas*.

In *sutta* 8 the method employed to achieve the four *jhānas* is the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. As Takei (1983: 162) indicates, in the four *Nikāyas* and the four *Āgamas*, as far as the prose is concerned, there are more than forty *suttas* in which Anuruddha preaches or carries on a dialogue; in over eighty per cent of them he either practices the four *satipaṭṭhānas* himself or encourages others to practice them.⁴⁹ Since Anuruddha is so devoted to the practice of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, it can be inferred that in the *Upakkilesa Sutta* it is also by means of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* that he reaches the meditative attainments called “comfortable dwellings.” In addition, in *suttas* 12, 13, 14, 22, 23 and 24 of the *Anuruddha Saṃyutta* (SN V 303–306), Anuruddha claims that it is through the cultivation of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* that he acquires the three gnoses (*vijjā*) and three other achievements, which constitute the well-known six supernormal knowledges (*abhiññā*) as found in the *Nikāyas*.⁵⁰ Since the acquisition of these special faculties is based on the attainment of the fourth *jhāna* according to the *Nikāyas*,⁵¹ it is very likely that Anuruddha’s cultivation of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* conduces to the *jhānas*.

The “sign” (*nimitta*) in the above two texts could be what later Buddhist literature calls “counterpart sign.” According to the *Visuddhimagga*, in the course of meditation leading to *jhāna*, two “signs”⁵² successively arise as the object of meditation: the “acquired sign” (*uggaha-nimitta*) and the “counterpart sign” (*paṭibhāga-nimitta*). They are described with reference to the earth *kaṣiṇa*, meditation on a disc made of earth, in the *Visuddhimagga* (pp. 125–126). Gethin (1998: 183) interprets the text: “Whereas the acquired sign is a mental visualization of the physical object exactly as it appears—an eidetic image—the counterpart sign is a purified conceptual image free of any marks or blemishes.”

Although the term “counterpart sign” is not found in early Buddhist texts, the concept might have existed in very early times and seems to fit in quite well with the contexts of the *Upakkilesa Sutta* and of *sutta* 8 in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* discussed above. Cousins (1973: 119) says that the most striking evidence for the antiquity of this concept is to be found in the *Upakkilesa Sutta*. I shall elucidate this point. In this text the “sign,” which refers to the radiance and the vision of forms, could be a precursor of the counterpart sign. We can find some analogy between the passage in *sutta* 8 and the following passage in the *Visuddhimagga*:

When he is doing so, gradually the hindrances withdraw, the defilements subside, the mind becomes concentrated with access concentration, and the counterpart sign arises.⁵³

In this passage, “the defilements subside, the mind becomes concentrated with access concentration, and the counterpart sign arises” corresponds to “his mind becomes concentrated, his defilements are abandoned, he grasps that sign” in the case of a wise monk stated in *sutta* 8. Therefore “grasping that sign” may mean grasping the counterpart sign. The arising of the counterpart sign is crucial to the attainment of the *jhānas* because it characterizes access concentration and also absorption (*appanā*),⁵⁴ i.e. the *jhāna* proper. According to the *Visuddhimagga* the counterpart sign is born of *saññā*, and is not to be cognized by the eye.⁵⁵ Anuruddha’s reply that “We conceive (*sañjānāma*) radiance and a vision of forms” cited above also implies that this sign is born of *saññā* (derived from *sañ-*√*ñā* as *sañjānāma*). This suggests that such an object is purely created in one’s own mind without being connected to the external object that was originally taken as a meditation subject. In other words, it cannot be an “acquired sign.” This state of consciousness is freed from its normal preoccupation with the objects of the five senses.⁵⁶ Accordingly we may interpret the passage in question thus: When a wise monk is contemplating the body as a body (or feelings, etc.), if he grasps a meditation object that is formed by conception (*saññā*) in his own mind and transcending the original object outside his mind, he breaks the bondage to the objects of the five senses, and thereby escapes from “the sphere of sensual desire” (*kāmadhātu*) to “the sphere of form” (*rūpadhātu*), i.e. the *jhānas*.

2.2.2 *Sati in different jhānas*

The *Dantabhūmi Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* integrates the four *satipaṭṭhānas* into the first two *jhānas* thus:

(A) Having abandoned these five hindrances, defilements of the mind and weakeners of wisdom, he dwells contemplating the body as a body, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. . . . feelings . . . mind . . . He dwells contemplating *dharmas* as *dharmas*, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world.

(B) Just as, Aggivessana, the elephant tamer plants a large post in the earth and binds the forest elephant to it by the neck in order to subdue his forest habits, to subdue his forest memories and thoughts, to subdue his forest distress, fatigue and fever, to make him delight in the village, and to inculcate in him habits congenial to human beings, so these four *satipaṭṭhānas* are the bindings for the mind of the noble disciple in order to subdue his habits based on the household life, to subdue his memories and thoughts based on the household life, to subdue his distress, fatigue and fever based

on the household life, and in order that he may attain the method and realize Nibbāna.

(C) Then the Tathāgata disciplines him further: “Come, monk, dwell contemplating the body as a body, but do not think thoughts connected with the body; dwell contemplating feelings as feelings, but do not think thoughts connected with feelings; dwell contemplating mind as mind, but do not think thoughts connected with mind; dwell contemplating *dhammas* as *dhammas*, but do not think thoughts connected with *dhammas*.”

(D) With the stilling of *vitakka* and *vicāra*, he enters and dwells in the second *jhāna*, which has internal tranquility and singleness of mind, without *vitakka* and *vicāra*, with rapture and pleasure born of concentration . . . the third *jhāna* . . . the fourth *jhāna*.⁵⁷

Ven. Bodhi points out that the above passage on the four *satipaṭṭhānas* prior to the exposition of the second *jhāna* must have implicitly covered the first *jhāna* (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 1333, note 1177). In my opinion, paragraphs A and B belong to the first *jhāna*, while paragraph C is a description of the second *jhāna*. The expression “having abandoned these five hindrances, defilements of the mind and weakeners of wisdom” in paragraph A is a standard account preceding the usual *jhāna* formula,⁵⁸ and marks the moment of entering the first *jhāna*. Paragraph B shows that just as the post binding the elephant tames him and makes him delight in the village, away from the forest, so the four *satipaṭṭhānas* make one enjoy being away from the household life. This is related to one of the first *jhāna*’s characteristics: rapture and pleasure born of seclusion—being secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states (see paragraph L3 in Section 2.1). In paragraph C “not thinking (*vitakketi*) thoughts (*vitakka*) connected with the body, etc.” seems to indicate one of the second *jhāna*’s characteristics, “without *vitakka* and *vicāra*,” since the two terms are virtually synonymous as discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 4). This paragraph represents a function of *sati* discussed in Chapter 1, that is, to stop the mind proceeding from *sañjānāti* (*saññā*) to *vitakketi*, *papañceti*, and *papañcasaññāsaṅkhā*. In other words, when a practitioner contemplates (*anupassin*) the body (or feelings, etc.), he only forms *saññā*⁵⁹ of the body without further generating *vitakka* and the ensuing cognitive proliferation. This cognitive transformation is to be credited to *sati*.

This *sutta* explains how the four *satipaṭṭhānas* can be employed for the attainment of the first two *jhānas*. On the other hand, the fact that *sato sampajāno* occurs in the third *jhāna* formula⁶⁰ also suggests that *sati* is integral to the third *jhāna*. Likewise, the occurrence of *sati* in the fourth *jhāna* formula⁶¹ shows that *sati* characterizes the fourth *jhāna*. What type of *sati* is it? Commenting on the mention of mindfulness in the third and the fourth *jhānas*, Griffiths (1983: 61) says that *sato ca sampajāno* refers to “a kind of

non-judgemental awareness,” and that such awareness is “a simple noting of things as they occur.” Thus it belongs to the category of simple awareness as discussed in Chapter 2. The four *satipaṭṭhānas* in conjunction with the first two *jhānas* also belong to simple awareness in the light of the description of the practice: contemplating the body (feelings, etc.) as a body (feelings, etc.).

2.2.3 Sati and singleness of mind

In Chapter 1 we examined the relationship between *sati* and *vitakka-vicāra* as well as emotions like *domanassa*, *somanassa*, *pīti* and *upekkhā* in various *jhānas*. How does mindfulness relate to singleness of mind (*cetaso ekodibhāva*), probably the essence of concentration (*samādhi*)? What is one mindful of in the *jhānas*? A Theravāda monk, Ven. Gunaratana (2002: 149), holds that ideally mindfulness and concentration work together as a team, and says, “Mindfulness picks the objects of attention, and notices when the attention has gone astray. Concentration does the actual work of holding the attention steady on that chosen object.” A Mahāyāna text, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, answers the above questions in a similar way: “Mindfulness and full awareness are [the means (*upāya*) of] tying (*aupanibandhaka*), for through one [of the two] the mind is not separated from the object (*ālambana*) and through the other separation [of the mind from the object] is perceived.”⁶² Accordingly, one is mindful of the meditation object⁶³ that one tries to focus on. In other words, the object of concentration is also the object of mindfulness as mentioned above. On the other hand, it is mindfulness and full awareness that tie the mind to the meditation object and prevent the mind from being distracted from the object. A similar idea is found in Mahānāma’s commentary on the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*: “It ties the mind to this [meditation] object (*ārammaṇa*). Thus mindfulness is indeed tying (*upanibandhana*).”⁶⁴ Here “this object” refers to the tip of the nose or the upper lip that has become the sign (*nimitta*) and the cause (*kāraṇa*) for concentration by mindfulness of breathing,⁶⁵ which will be discussed in the next section.

This mechanism is well illustrated by the sixteen exercises of mindfulness of breathing, according to which one is not only mindful of the meditation objects but also aware of what one experiences in four aspects, both physical and mental, during the course of meditation. The exposition of mindfulness of breathing also exemplifies how *sati* yokes *samatha* and *vipassanā* together. Below is a detailed discussion of this practice.

3. Mindfulness of breathing—an example of *samatha* and *vipassanā* yoked together

Mindfulness of breathing (*ānāpānasati*) is often elaborated in terms of sixteen exercises, which are sometimes divided into four tetrads and are

correlated with the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.⁶⁶ Matsuda (1983: 56–60) contends that the original form of *ānāpānasati* may have consisted of the first two exercises only and had nothing to do with the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. He suggests that it was expanded to comprise the first four exercises, so that it came to be one of the practices under the first *satipaṭṭhāna*; later on the list of sixteen exercises was completed in the form of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.⁶⁷ Such a long list must be a synthesis of previous, simpler teachings (RFG). Nevertheless, the development of this practice could have been done by the Buddha himself during his teaching career of forty-five years as held by the tradition. This practice in the form of the sixteen exercises must have become an essential Buddhist teaching in very early days since it is the main subject of the *Ānāpāna Saṃyutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* and the *Ānāpānasati Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* and also occurs in other parts of the *Nikāyas* and even the *Vinaya*.⁶⁸ Mindfulness of breathing in the form of the sixteen exercises exemplifies how the four *satipaṭṭhānas* conjoin *samatha* and *vipassanā*, and the relationship between *sati* and various meditative attainments, including all the nine successive stages (*anupubbavihāra*) mentioned above.

3.1 Contemplation of the body

The first tetrad, which is connected with contemplation of the body, is among the practices of the first *satipaṭṭhāna* in different versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*⁶⁹ and the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*.⁷⁰ This tetrad consists of the following four practices:

- (1) A monk, when taking a long in-breath, knows: “I am taking a long in-breath”; or, when taking a long out-breath, he knows: “I am taking a long out-breath.”
- (2) When taking a short in-breath, he knows: “I am taking a short in-breath”; or, when taking a short out-breath, he knows: “I am taking a short out-breath.”
- (3) He trains thus: “I will breathe in perceiving⁷¹ the whole body”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out perceiving the whole body.”
- (4) He trains thus: “I will breathe in calming the bodily formation”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out calming the bodily formation.”⁷²

The first two exercises belong to simple awareness, as discussed in Chapter 2. For the third exercise, the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda traditions give different explanations. The **Mahāvibhāṣā* of the Sarvāstivādins states: “Question: As one observes the wind of breath as entering by the nose and getting out by the nose, why is it said that ‘I breathe in and out perceiving the whole body’? Answer: When mindfulness of breathing is not yet accomplished, one observes in-and-out-breath as entering and getting out by the

nose. When mindfulness of breathing is accomplished, one observes breath as entering and going out through all the pores of the body, which is like a lotus root.” (T 27, 136a–b) Therefore, taking the word “body” literally, the Sarvāstivādins interpret “the whole body” as the entire physical body, which has pores everywhere, so the whole body can be involved in breathing. As to the Theravādins, the *Visuddhimagga* explains as follows (tr. Ñāṇamoli, 1975: 294–295): “He trains thus: ‘I shall breathe in making known, making plain, the beginning, middle and end of the entire in-breath body. I shall breathe out making known, making plain, the beginning, middle and end of the entire out-breath body’, thus he trains.” (Vism 273) According to the Theravādins, who understand the word “body” in a figurative sense, “the whole body” refers to the entire process of breathing, perhaps just through the nose as people normally do. As Ven. Anālayo (2003: 131) points out, this interpretation can claim support from the *Ānāpānasati Sutta* since the Buddha here identifies in-breathing and out-breathing as a certain body among bodies (MN III 83).

In the fourth exercise the bodily formation (*kāyasaṅkhāra*) refers to breathing in and breathing out, according to the *Nikāyas*⁷³ and the *Samyukta Āgama*.⁷⁴ The Chinese counterpart of the fourth exercise in the Sarvāstivāda version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* is “He learns to breathe in stopping the bodily formation; he learns to breathe out stopping the verbal formation.”⁷⁵ Here “verbal” must be a wrong reading for “bodily” because the Pali has *kāya* (bodily) instead of “verbal” (MN I 56), and the statement “He trains thus: ‘I will breathe in calming bodily formation;’ he trains thus: ‘I will breathe out calming bodily formation.’” is a stock phrase found at many places in both the Pali canon and the canon in Chinese translation.⁷⁶ It is notable that the Chinese version has “stopping” (止), whereas the Pali has “calming” (*passambhayaṃ*). I will show that these two expressions refer to the same idea and this sentence implies the achievement of the fourth *jhāna*.

Sutta 11 of the *Vedanā Samyutta* states: “For one who has attained the fourth *jhāna*, breathing in and breathing out have ceased (*niruddha*),”⁷⁷ and this is rephrased in the same *sutta* as “For one who has attained the fourth *jhāna*, breathing in and breathing out have been calmed (*paṭippassadha*),”⁷⁸ which is among the six kinds of calming (*passadhi*). The three words *passambhayaṃ*, *paṭippassadha* and *passadhi* are all composed of (or contain) the same verbal root *śrambh* and prefix *pra*. Since the bodily formation refers to breathing in and breathing out as mentioned above, “calming” (*passambhayaṃ*, or 止 “stopping” in the Chinese) the bodily formation” in the fourth exercise refers to the foregoing state where breathing in and breathing out have ceased (*niruddha*) or been calmed (*paṭippassadha*), a state which is attained in the fourth *jhāna*. This is explicitly pointed out by the **Mahāvibhāṣā* of the Sarvāstivādins, where a passage expounding mindfulness of breathing as found in the Sarvāstivāda version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna*

Sutta reads: “Stopping the bodily formation refers to the fourth *jhāna*.”⁷⁹ Therefore, mindfulness of breathing can lead to the attainment of the *jhānas*.

It seems that “calming/stopping the bodily formation” in both versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* means stopping breathing. This is confirmed in the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, which says, “Stopping the bodily formation refers to making the wind of breath gradually become subtle and arrive at cessation.”⁸⁰ Similarly, Buddhaghosa in his *Visuddhimagga* indicates that the *Dīgha* and *Samyutta* reciters (*bhāṇaka*) held that “in the fourth *jhāna* [the bodily formation] is extremely subtle and even reaches cessation.”⁸¹ Therefore both traditions hold that “calming/stopping the bodily formation” means gradually stilling breath, up to and including its ceasing.⁸² If so, there would arise an absurd contradiction—How can one practice mindfulness of breathing when one stops breathing? This problem has been noticed in the *Paṭisambhidā-magga*, which has a passage discussing this issue as follows:

[Objection:] As they say (*iti kira*), “He trains thus: ‘I will breathe in calming (*passambhayaṃ*) the bodily formation’; he trains thus: ‘I will breathe out calming the bodily formation’.”; that being so, there is no arising of perception (*upaladdhi*) of wind, and there is no arising of in-breaths and out-breaths, and there is no arising of mindfulness of breathing . . .⁸³

[Clarification:] . . . at first gross in-breaths and out-breaths occur. Because the sign of the gross in-breaths and out-breaths is well grasped, well attended to, well reflected on, even when the gross in-breaths and out-breaths have ceased, subtle in-breaths and out-breaths occur afterwards. Because the sign of the subtle in-breaths and out-breaths is well grasped, well attended to, well reflected on, even when the subtle in-breaths and out-breaths have ceased, afterwards his mind does not become distracted since [it takes as its] object the sign of the subtle in-breaths and out-breaths. That being so, there is arising of perception of wind . . .⁸⁴

This statement asserts that “calming the bodily formation” means “stopping in-breaths and out-breaths,” and that one can still practice mindfulness of breathing even when breathing has stopped since one can still contemplate the sign of breathing taken from one’s past experience. In the paragraph of clarification, the expression “the sign . . . is well attended to” (. . . *nimittam sumanasikatatta*) is reminiscent of *saññā* as discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 2.2). In this context, the functioning of *sati* consists in forming *saññā* of breathing, which is an accurate and subtle identification of the experience. At first *saññā* functions in the sense of apperception, which is dependent on the co-temporal input of sensory data of tangible objects, the in-breaths and out-breaths. Afterwards, even when breathing has ceased in the fourth *jhāna*, this *saññā* of breathing can be recalled and serves as a meditation object. This is

recollection, which is also a definition of *sati* as discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1). Put differently, in this case the practitioner forms *saññā* of breathing, which is in the sense of conception as it has nothing to do with co-temporal sensory data.

3.2 *Contemplation of feelings*

The second tetrad in the sixteen exercises of *ānāpānasati* is as follows:

- (5) He trains thus: “I will breathe in perceiving rapture (*pīti*)”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out perceiving rapture.”
- (6) He trains thus: “I will breathe in perceiving pleasure (*sukha*)”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out perceiving pleasure.”
- (7) He trains thus: “I will breathe in perceiving the mental formation”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out perceiving the mental formation.”
- (8) He trains thus: “I will breathe in calming the mental formation”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out calming the mental formation.”⁸⁵

This tetrad belongs to contemplation of feelings in the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. The first two exercises may be related to the *jhānas*, since rapture (*pīti*) is a factor in the first two *jhānas* and pleasure (*sukha*) is a factor in the first three *jhānas*. This is how the *Visuddhimagga* interprets it.⁸⁶ However, as mentioned in Chapter 1 (Section 4), *sutta* 29 of the *Vedanā Saṃyutta* says that there are worldly *pīti* and *sukha* that arise in dependence on sensual pleasure as opposed to unworldly *pīti* and *sukha* in the *jhānas*. Therefore it is also possible that the first two exercises can be practiced in an ordinary state of mind.

In the latter two exercises, the mental formation (*cittasaṅkhāra*) refers to apperception/conception (*saññā*) and feeling (*vedanā*) according to the *Nikāyas*.⁸⁷ Just as “calming the bodily formation” in the first tetrad means gradually stopping the bodily formation, “calming the mental formation” in Exercise 8 of this tetrad must mean gradually stopping the mental formation. In other words, this exercise includes the cessation of apperception and feeling, which is the highest meditative attainment, transcending the four *jhānas* and the four formless attainments. This is in accordance with a statement in *sutta* 11 of the *Vedanā Saṃyutta*: “For one who has attained the cessation of apperception and feeling, apperception and feeling have been *calmed*.”⁸⁸ Similarly, the commentary on the *Arthaviniścaya Sūtra*⁸⁹ glosses “calming the mental formations” (*cittasaṃskārān*, plural) in the section on the sixteen exercises as “leading to subtlety step by step by progressing through formless attainments, abandoning all [the mental formations] in the attainment of cessation.”⁹⁰ The attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) is a synonym for the cessation of apperception and feeling. Mindfulness of breathing as a method

of achieving the attainment of cessation is clearly stated in *sutta* 8 of the *Ānāpāna Saṃyutta*: If a monk wishes to enter and dwell in the cessation of apperception and feeling, he should attend to concentration by mindfulness of breathing.⁹¹

Here arises a paradox: Exercise 8 probably does not mean that one can practice *ānāpānasati* in the attainment of cessation, since this attainment is without *saññā*, upon which the function of *sati* is dependent as discussed in Chapter 1. The *Anupada Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* seems to imply that *sati* is not present in the attainment of cessation in that it gives a list of mental states, including *sati*, in the description of each of the four *jhānas* and the first three formless attainments, but not in the fourth formless attainment and the attainment of cessation. As illustrated by Griffiths (1986: 5ff, 58ff.), both the Theravāda and the Vaibhāṣika traditions held that neither mind nor any mental events endure in this meditative attainment, while some later Buddhist theoreticians like Vasumitra and the Yogācārins proposed certain types of consciousness. According to those earlier traditions, *sati* must cease to exist in this attainment. Exercise 8 probably only means that the practice of *ānāpānasati* can effect the attainment of cessation, rather than meaning that one still practices mindfulness in the state of cessation. This is just like the case when the Buddha says that he falls asleep mindful and fully aware,⁹² and the case of the *sati-sampajañña* formula, which states that one acts in full awareness (*sampajānakārin*) when falling asleep. These cases do not mean that one can be mindful and fully aware even in sleep, but only describe the mental state just before the moment when one falls asleep. And such a mindful state can have effects on the quality of sleep as indicated in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* and the *Vinaya*, where one who has established mindfulness and is fully aware is said to enjoy the benefits of being free from evil dreams, etc.⁹³ Likewise, Exercise 8 may imply that this practice provides a mindful state that leads to the attainment of cessation.

3.3 Contemplation of mind

The third tetrad of the sixteen exercises of mindfulness of breathing reads:

- (9) He trains thus: “I will breathe in perceiving the mind”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out perceiving the mind.”
- (10) He trains thus: “I will breathe in gladdening the mind”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out gladdening the mind.”
- (11) He trains thus: “I will breathe in concentrating the mind”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out concentrating the mind.”
- (12) He trains thus: “I will breathe in liberating the mind”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out liberating the mind.”⁹⁴

This tetrad is about the third *satipaṭṭhāna*, contemplation of mind. The first exercise is quite straightforward. The others will be elucidated below. A statement preceding the *jhāna* formula that recurs in the *Dīgha Nikāya* runs thus:

When he sees these five hindrances being abandoned in himself, gladness is born. When he is gladdened, rapture is born. When the mind is uplifted by rapture, the body becomes tranquil. One whose body is tranquil feels pleasure. The mind of one who feels pleasure becomes concentrated.⁹⁵

Although this passage precedes the *jhāna* formula, it may not refer to a stage prior to the first *jhāna*; rather it seems to be outlining the *jhānas* in that it contains three important factors of the *jhānas*, i.e. rapture (*pīṭi*), pleasure (*sukha*), and “becomes concentrated” (*samādhīyati* = *samādhi*). Thus this passage is closely related to the *jhānas*.⁹⁶ Two expressions in this passage, “gladdened” (*pamudita* < *pra-√mud*) and “concentrated” (*samādhīyati* < *sam-ā-√dhā*), are semantically and etymologically the same as “gladdening” (*abhippamodayaṃ* < *abhi-pra-√mud*) and “concentrating” (*samādahāṃ* < *sam-ā-√dhā*) in Exercise 10 and Exercise 11 of this tetrad. Therefore it is most likely that “gladdening the mind” and “concentrating the mind” in mindfulness of breathing refer to the experiences of the *jhānas* in the respect of mental states.

As Gombrich (1998: 21) indicates, there are two grades of “liberation of mind” (*ceto-vimutti*): one is permanent, definitive liberation, and the other is temporary and can be a meditative state. As he argues, the second one is a secondary development, just like the sixteen forms of *ānāpānasati*. A good example is found in the *Mahāvedalla Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, where the fourth *jhāna* and one of the four formless attainments, the sphere of nothingness, are respectively referred to as “neither-painful-nor-pleasant liberation of mind” (*adukkhamasukhā cetovimutti*) and “liberation of mind associated with nothingness” (*ākāśañña cetovimutti*).⁹⁷ Moreover, the formless attainments in general are called liberations (*vimokkha*) in the *Nikāyas*.⁹⁸ The *Mahāsuññata Sutta* (MN III 110) mentions temporary liberation of mind (*samāyikā cetovimutti*). The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* defines temporary liberation (*samāyiko vimokkho*) as “the four *jhānas* and the four formless attainments.”⁹⁹ From the foregoing it is plausible to infer that “liberating the mind” in Exercise 12 of the third tetrad denotes such a temporary mental state of liberation by means of meditative attainments.

According to the second and third tetrads, while absorbed in various levels of meditative attainment, the practitioner is not only aware of the meditation subject, but also of his feelings and mental states. This is implied in the *Poṭṭhapāda Sutta* discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 4). It talks about different kinds of *saññā* at different levels of meditative attainment, where the

contents of *saññā* include feelings like *pīti*, *sukha* and *upekkhā*, and mental states like *viveka* and *samādhi*.

3.4 Contemplation of dhammas

Below is the fourth tetrad, which is correlated to the fourth *satipaṭṭhāna*, i.e. contemplation of *dhammas*:

- (13) He trains thus: “I will breathe in contemplating impermanence”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out contemplating impermanence.”
- (14) He trains thus: “I will breathe in contemplating dispassion”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out contemplating dispassion.”
- (15) He trains thus: “I will breathe in contemplating cessation”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out contemplating cessation.”
- (16) He trains thus: “I will breathe in contemplating relinquishment”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out contemplating relinquishment.”¹⁰⁰

These four exercises represent the way in which a Buddhist practitioner contemplates the nature of phenomena or mental objects. The first three tetrads concern the meditative attainments. I will show that the contemplations given in the fourth tetrad are to be understood in relation to these meditative attainments. Such a relation is parallel to what is stated in the *Mahāmālūkyaputta Sutta* (MN I 432–437), which expounds a certain scheme of contemplation based on various meditative attainments. Following the description of each of the four *jhānas*, this text says that a monk sees the five aggregates in each attainment as impermanent (*anicca*), as unsatisfactory, as not-self, etc. Then he focuses his mind on the deathless element thus: “This is peaceful, this is excellent, that is, the tranquilization of all formations, the relinquishment (*paṭinissagga*) of all clinging, the destruction of craving, dispassion (*virāga*), cessation (*nirodha*), Nibbāna.”¹⁰¹ Similarly, following each of the first three formless attainments, he sees the four aggregates (excluding *rūpa*, material form) in each attainment as impermanent, as unsatisfactory, as not-self, etc. Then he contemplates the deathless element in the same way as he does after each of the four *jhānas*.¹⁰² We can find that the contents of contemplation following each of the foregoing meditative attainments cover all the objects of contemplation in the fourth tetrad. This is not a mere coincidence, but gives a significant indication of the practice this tetrad represents.

The close connection between the fourth tetrad and the *Mahāmālūkyaputta Sutta* can also be inferred from the following comparison between the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda versions. In the Chinese *Saṃyukta Āgama*, which is attributed to the Sarvāstivādins,¹⁰³ the objects of contemplation in the fourth tetrad are impermanence (無常), abandonment (斷), dispassion (無欲) and

cessation (滅) (T 2, 206). In other words, relinquishment (*paṭinissagga*) in the Pali version is replaced by abandonment in the Chinese version. In its exposition of the sixteen exercises of mindfulness of breathing, the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, which is influenced by the Sarvāstivādins,¹⁰⁴ also has the same four objects of contemplation as those in the *Samyukta Āgama*: impermanence (*anitya*), abandonment (*prahāṇa*), dispassion (*virāga*) and cessation (*nirodha*).¹⁰⁵ The Chinese version of the *Mahāmāluṅkyaputta Sutta* in the *Madhyama Āgama*, which is also attributed to the Sarvāstivādins,¹⁰⁶ states: “He contemplates this feeling as *impermanent*, contemplates rise and decline, contemplates *dispassion*, contemplates *cessation*, contemplates *abandonment*, and contemplates *relinquishment*.”¹⁰⁷ It is noteworthy that “abandonment” (*prahāṇa*, 斷) occurs in the Sarvāstivāda version of the fourth tetrad but not in the Theravāda version, and this word is likewise found in the Sarvāstivāda version of the *Mahāmāluṅkyaputta Sutta* but not in the Theravāda version. This suggests that the fourth tetrad is closely associated with the *Mahāmāluṅkyaputta Sutta*.

The whole practice of *ānāpānasati* embodied by the sixteen exercises can be understood by way of the practice expounded in the *Mahāmāluṅkyaputta Sutta*. In order to compare these two contexts, let us first investigate the practice in the *Mahāmāluṅkyaputta Sutta*. As discussed in Chapter 2, contemplation on impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, and not-self belongs to the development of wisdom, i.e. *vipassanā* meditation. Similarly, a statement almost identical to the above description of the deathless element is given as the content of wisdom (*paññā*) at SN V 226.¹⁰⁸ In his end note on the *Mahāmāluṅkyaputta* passage about contemplating impermanence, etc. and the deathless element following the first *jhāna*, Ven. Bodhi says, “This passage shows the development of insight (*vipassanā*) upon a basis of serenity (*samatha*), using the *jhāna* on which the practice of insight is based as the object of insight contemplation.” (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 1266, note 655) Actually this applies also to the other *jhānas* and the first three formless attainments. According to the *Mahāmāluṅkyaputta Sutta*, in the three formless attainments only the four immaterial aggregates of the five are made the objects of insight meditation, presumably because conceptions of material form (*rūpasaññā*) are already surmounted on entering the first formless attainments, the sphere of infinite space.¹⁰⁹

The text does not mention the attainment of cessation, nor does it mention the fourth formless attainment, base of neither-conception-nor-nonconception (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*). The reason is found in a *sutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, which contains an exposition almost identical to the foregoing *Mahāmāluṅkyaputta* account of developing insight on the basis of the seven meditative attainments. Following this exposition, this *sutta* says, “As far as the attainment with *saññā* [extends], there is penetration to perfect knowledge (*aññā*)”¹¹⁰.”¹¹¹ The *Paṭṭhapāda Sutta* also says that the arising of knowledge (*ñāṇa*) comes from the arising of *saññā*.¹¹² This implies that

knowledge, including perfect knowledge, presupposes *saññā*, which functions in the seven lower meditative attainments but not in the higher two. The attainment of cessation has no *saññā* to be the basis for developing insight.¹¹³ In the *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*, apparently *saññā* is too tenuous to be the base for developing insight.¹¹⁴

As discussed above, the first three tetrads deal with the meditative attainments, i.e. *samatha*. Just like the foregoing in the *Mahāmālunkyaṇṇa Sutta*, the fourth tetrad represents the development of wisdom (*paññā*) or insight (*vipassanā*) on the basis of the meditative attainments stated in the first three tetrads. This may be implied in a statement following the fourth tetrad in the *Ānāpānasati Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*: “Having seen with wisdom (*paññā*) the abandoning of covetousness and dejection, he views closely with equanimity.”¹¹⁵ The *Visuddhimagga* also says that the fourth tetrad is stated by way of pure insight (*vipassanā*) only.¹¹⁶

In conclusion, the sixteen exercises of *ānāpānasati* cover different factors involved in the progress of *samatha* meditative attainments, and are classified into four tetrads according to the four subjects of *satipaṭṭhāna*. The last subject, contemplation of *dhammas*, is *vipassanā* meditation on the basis of *samatha* meditation. In the context of these sixteen exercises, the four *satipaṭṭhānas* refer to being mindful of or recognizing what one experiences in four aspects, i.e. the body, feelings, mind, and *dhammas*, while practicing mindfulness of breathing. The above discussions can be summarized diagrammatically in Figure 3.

Exercise 4 (calming the bodily formation) can lead to the attainment of the fourth *jhāna*. Exercise 5 (perceiving rapture) and Exercise 6 (perceiving pleasure) denote the first three *jhānas*, which include these mental factors. Exercise 8 (calming the mental formation) progresses through formless attainments up to the attainment of cessation, which is devoid of mindfulness. Exercise 12 (liberating the mind) implies the four *jhānas* and four formless attainments, which are temporary liberations of mind. Exercises 13–16




Figure 3

represent insight meditation based on the previous meditative attainments up to the third formless attainment. Accordingly, contemplations of all the four aspects can be practiced in the four *jhānas*. In the first three formless attainments there are only contemplations of feelings, mind and *dharmas*, for conceptions of material form (*rūpasaiṇṇā*), to which the body (the first *satipaṭṭhāna*) belongs, are surpassed. In the fourth formless attainment even contemplation of *dharmas* is no longer possible as *saiṇṇā* is too tenuous there. It is clear that the sixteen exercises are not a series of stages or steps that a practitioner passes through one by one as some scholars suggest.¹¹⁷

This diagram shows the relationship between the sixteen exercises and various meditative attainments. This, however, does not mean that mindfulness of breathing can only be practiced in the context of *samatha*. The first three exercises of the first tetrad, Exercises 5, 6, 7 of the second tetrad and Exercises 9, 10 of the third tetrad are not necessarily practiced in *samatha* meditative states. Moreover, Buddhaghosa interprets the first three tetrads not only in terms of *samatha*, but also in terms of *vipassanā* (Vism 275–289).¹¹⁸

The sixteen exercises could be seen as exemplifying the four *satipaṭṭhānas* in general. The four aspects are integral parts of the whole practice. Apart from mindfulness of breathing, meditation using other techniques may also involve contemplations on these four aspects. Therefore the four *satipaṭṭhānas* may form the general guidelines for various practices. The first three *satipaṭṭhānas* are concerned with the subjective experiences themselves, while the last one involves the objective reflection on those experiences and contemplation of the ultimate truth on the basis of them. In other words, the first three *satipaṭṭhānas* focus on one's personal physical and psychological conditions, while the last one is contemplating phenomena (*dharmā*), including those personal conditions, in accordance with the Buddha's teachings (Dhamma).

Chapter 4

KĀYAGATĀ SATI: MINDFULNESS DIRECTED TO THE EXPERIENCER

Of the various categories of teaching on mindfulness, the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, *ānāpānasati* and *kāyagatā sati* gain particular attention in the Canon. *Suttas* 10, 118 and 119 in the *Majjhima Nikāya* are devoted to them respectively. There are also *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* and *Ānāpāna Saṃyutta* in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*. A division¹ in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* is devoted to *kāyagatā sati* (AN I 43–46). Chapter 3 has discussed *ānāpānasati* in terms of the sixteen exercises, which are the major subjects in the *Ānāpānasati Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* and the *Ānāpāna Saṃyutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*. This and the next chapters will deal with the other two categories of teaching on mindfulness.

1. The origins of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*

Kāyagatā sati, or *kāyasati*, has been discussed in the section on protective awareness in Chapter 2, especially in the contexts of restraining the senses, but its meaning remains obscure. That chapter shows that these two terms are virtually synonyms. *Kāyagatā sati* is commonly understood as “mindfulness concerning the body,” or “mindfulness of the body”, and is usually considered to be the first *satipaṭṭhāna*, contemplation of the body, for the practices given in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* are identical to those outlined in the first *satipaṭṭhāna* of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. For example, Nyanaponika Thera and Ven. Bodhi (2000: 279, note 24) say, “‘Mindfulness directed to the body’ (*kāyagatā-sati*) comprises all fourteen exercises described under contemplation of the body in the *Kāyagatā-sati Sutta* (MN 119) and the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (DN 22, MN 10).” Karunaratne (1999: 168) says, “[M]indfulness in regard to the body’ is a name for fourteen kinds of meditation having various aspects of the body as its topics. . . . This group of fourteen meditations is identical with the first of the fourfold application of mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhāna*) called contemplation of the body.” This view can be traced back to Buddhaghosa. In his commentary on the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, he very briefly summarizes all the practices listed in this text by saying that they refer to contemplation of the body in the

fourteen ways in *satipaṭṭhāna*.² “*Satipaṭṭhāna*” here apparently refers to the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, where contemplation of the body is explained by the following six ways (which can be expanded into fourteen by counting the nine states in the sixth way):

1. mindfulness of breathing
2. understanding the four postures
3. acting in full awareness in daily life (the *sati-sampajañña* formula)
4. reviewing the body as full of various kinds of impurity
5. reviewing the body by way of the four elements
6. contemplating a corpse in nine different states of decomposition

In his exposition of *kāyagatā sati* in the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa also quotes a passage from the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*³ and the above fourteen practices (or six ways).⁴ The formulae on the four *jhānas* are not mentioned here, although they are also included in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* along with the foregoing fourteen practices, and are treated in the same way, each of the four *jhānas* being followed by the same refrain as that following those fourteen. The four *jhānas* are excluded by Buddhaghosa perhaps because they do not look so much like contemplation of the body as those fourteen practices, even though the simile-accompanied glosses following the *jhāna* formulae do contain the word *kāya*.⁵ In his exposition of the ten *anussatis* in his *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa explicitly glosses *kāyagatā sati* as mindfulness directed to the “material body” that is analyzed into hair of the head, etc.⁶

As far as I know, the Pali version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* is the only text in the earliest stratum of the Canon that can support the interpretation of *kāyagatā sati* as mindfulness directed to the physical body: all the practices it gives are related to the body. This text, however, differs significantly from its Chinese counterpart, the *Sūtra on Mindfulness of the Body* (念身經) in the *Madhyama Āgama*, which is attributed to the Sarvāstivāda school.⁷ For apart from the foregoing six kinds of practice and the four *jhānas*, it also includes several practices which do not look like mindfulness of the body. The whole list of practices is in brief as follows:⁸

1. understanding the four postures and the states of being asleep [and/or] awake
2. full awareness of daily activities
3. extinguishing evil unwholesome thoughts with wholesome *dharma* thoughts
4. with teeth clenched and the tongue pressed against the palate, restraining one mental state with [another] mental state
5. mindfulness of breathing
6. the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion pervading the body (the first *jhāna*)

7. the rapture and pleasure born of concentration pervading the body (the second *jhāna*)
8. the pleasure born of the absence of rapture pervading the body (the third *jhāna*)
9. pervading the body with the pure state of mind (the fourth *jhāna*)
10. attending to the conception of light, and developing a bright mind
11. grasping the reviewing-sign and recollecting what he attends to
12. reviewing the body as full of various kinds of impurity
13. reviewing the body by way of the six elements
14. contemplating a corpse in different states of decomposition

Among these fourteen practices, numbers 3, 4, 10 and 11 cannot be counted as mindfulness of the body. Numbers 6, 7, 8 and 9 are the simile-accompanied glosses on the *jhānas*, which are not regarded as *kāyagatā sati* by Buddhaghosa as mentioned above. Although these glosses contain the term *kāya*, the whole expression is likely to be figurative, and *kāya* here probably refers to the experiencer of sensation and feeling both physically and mentally as some scholars suggest.⁹ Since so many practices which are not mindfulness of the physical body are included in the Chinese version, it is impossible that *kāyagatā sati* was regarded as mindfulness of the physical body when this Sarvāstivāda text, which is preserved in Chinese translation, was compiled. One may argue that those practices which cannot be counted as mindfulness of the body in the Chinese version are later interpolations, and even the four *jhānas* in the Pali version are later insertions because they are not *kāyagatā sati* as Buddhaghosa suggests. But I will show that, as far as the list of practices are concerned, the Sarvāstivāda version could be closer to the antecedent or even original version, which drew a large amount of material from three other sets of teachings, and the Theravāda version removed those practices that do not look like mindfulness of the body.

Here I shall explain what I mean by “the antecedent version” of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*. According to the **Samyabhedoparacanacakra* (異部宗輪論; T 49, 15a–b) by Vasumitra of the Sarvāstivādins, at the time of King Aśoka (ca. 270–230 BC) the original Buddhist Order first split into two sects, the Mahāsāṅghika and the Sthavira (or Sthaviravāda in Sanskrit, Theravāda in Pali); later on the Sarvāstivāda school split off from the Sthaviras. As to the Pali source, the commentary on the *Kathāvatthu* (Kv-a 2–3), a Theravāda *Abhidhamma* work, states that after the first schism between the Mahāsāṅghikas and the Theravādins,¹⁰ the Mahimsāsakas and the Vajjiputtakas further seceded from the Theravādins; then the Sarvāstivāda (Pali Sabbatthivāda) school split off from the Mahimsāsakas. According to Lamotte (1988: 529–536), several other sources from different schools agree with the Sarvāstivāda account. In any case, there was a close tie between the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins. In his comparative study

of the Chinese *Madhyama Āgama* and the Pali *Majjhima Nikāya*, Ven. Thich Minh Chau (1991: 14) makes the following comment:

The high percentage of similarities between the Chinese and the Pali versions and the presence of many literally identical passages show that there existed a basic stock, not only of doctrines, but also of texts, agreeing in all essentials with both the Chinese and the Pali versions. . . . All this proves the existence of an ancient Canon, probably the lost Magadhi Canon referred to by WINTERNITZ in his HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE.¹¹

We can therefore assume that before these two schools split there was an antecedent Canon from which the Canons of both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda schools originated, and that the Pali and Chinese versions of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* which have come down to us derived from an earlier version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* in that antecedent Canon. It is this earlier version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* that I refer to as “the antecedent version” in this chapter.

The oral tradition of Buddhist texts should be taken into account. During the period of oral transmission the Canon was not fixed. Norman (1983: 31) suggests:

[T]here was in early times a large collection of *suttas* which were remembered by heart, and the task of allocating them to the various *nikāyas/āgamas* had not been finished, or the allocation completely agreed, by the time the schools began to separate. The reference in the Vinaya-piṭaka to an *upāsaka* inviting the *bhikkhus* to come and learn a *sutta* from him before it is lost would seem to indicate that the collection of *suttas* had not yet been completed.

We cannot be sure about whether the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* had already been composed and included in the collection of *suttas* when the *sutta-piṭaka* was first compiled, but it is almost certain that this *sutta* already existed before the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins had drifted apart, for both schools have this *sutta*. It will be demonstrated that some components of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* are borrowed from other texts and do not fit the contexts in this *sutta*, but instead fit the contexts in those other texts. I will suggest that three other texts provide the materials that make up most part of this *sutta*. Part of the discussion below is summarized in Table 4.

1.1 The Udāyī Sutta

In the *Udāyī Sutta*¹² of the *Āṅguttara Nikāya* (III 322–325), the Buddha asks Udāyī a question three times: “How many subjects (*ṭhāna*)¹³ of *anussati* are

Table 4

	Theravāda version	Sarvāstivāda version
<Udāyī Sutta>		
Conception of light		✓
Seeing the body as full of impurities	✓	✓
Contemplating a decomposing corpse	✓	✓
<i>Anussatiṭṭhāna</i> leading to <i>sati-sampajañña</i>	✓ similar	✓ similar
<Vitakkasanthāna Sutta>		
Refrain	✓	✓ similar
Attending to a wholesome sign to stop evil unwholesome thoughts		✓ similar
Rectifying one mental state with [another] mental state		✓
<Pañcaṅgika Sutta>		
The four <i>jhānas</i> with simile-accompanied glosses	✓	✓ only four simile-accompanied glosses
Reviewing-sign		✓
Developing <i>abhiññā</i> (as in passage X)	✓ (as in passage A)	

there?” but Udāyī remains silent. When pressed by Ānanda, he finally answers: “A monk recollects many of his former abodes [i.e. former lives], . . .” (*bhikkhu anekavihiṭaṃ pubbenivāsaṃ anussarati . . .*), which is quoted from the standard account of the first of the three gnoses (*viññā*). But he was reproached by the Buddha for this answer. Then Ānanda answers the question, giving five items. They are as follows in brief:

1. The first three *jhānas*, which lead to pleasant dwelling in this very life
2. “A monk attends to the conception of light (*ālokaśaññā*) and concentrates on the conception of day: as by day, so at night; as at night, so by day. Thus, with his mind uncovered and unenveloped, he develops a bright mind,” which leads to the acquisition of knowledge and vision
3. Reviewing the body as full of various kinds of impurity (identical to the fourth practice in the Pali *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*), which leads to the abandoning of desire for sensual pleasures
4. Contemplating a corpse in nine different states of decomposition (identical to the sixth practice in the Pali *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*), which leads to the uprooting of the conceit “I am”

5. The fourth *jhāna*, which leads to the penetration of the various elements

To these five the Buddha adds a sixth:

6. “Being mindful, a monk goes forward; being mindful, he goes back; being mindful, he stands; being mindful, he sits; being mindful, he lies down; being mindful, he undertakes walking up and down. This subject of *amussati*, Ānanda, thus developed, thus cultivated, leads to mindfulness and full awareness.”¹⁴

The foregoing account implies that it is wrong to take *amussati* in the compound *anussatiṭṭhāna* to mean recollection as in the case of recollecting one’s past lives, but rather it means mindfulness.¹⁵ Among the above six subjects of mindfulness, the third and fourth are included in both the Pali and Chinese versions of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*.¹⁶ Chapter 2 (Section 2.2) has shown that the sixth is similar to the *sati-sampajañña* formula, which is also included in the two versions of the text. It is noteworthy that the second subject of mindfulness about the conception of light closely resembles the tenth practice in the Chinese version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* (see Appendix 2). Apart from the six subjects of mindfulness, the passage on the conception of light is only found at DN III 223 = AN II 45, where this passage is in the context of developing concentration (*samādhi*) rather than mindfulness. Therefore the passage on the conception of light in the Chinese version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* is probably related to the six subjects of mindfulness rather than to the other context. It is possible that, among the six subjects of mindfulness, the conception of light (2) and three other items (3, 4, 6) were originally included in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, and the Sarvāstivādins preserved all the four items while the Theravādins left out the conception of light presumably because it cannot be counted as mindfulness of the physical body. (see Table 4) This possibility will be reinforced by the following discussions concerning other practices and statements in the two versions of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*.

1.2 The Vitakkasanthāna Sutta/*Adhicitta Sūtra

The *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta* in the *Majjhima Nikāya* has three passages in common with the Chinese version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, and one of the three is also found in the Pali version. This text expounds the five methods that a monk pursuing the higher states of mind (*adhicitta*) should practice in order to abandon evil unwholesome thoughts, and thereby concentrate the mind. The refrain following each of the five methods is as follows (tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi, 1995: 211):

With the abandoning of them his mind becomes steadied internally, quieted, brought to singleness, and concentrated.¹⁷

The refrain following each of the practices in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* is as follows (tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi, 1995: 950):

As he abides thus diligent, ardent, and resolute, his memories and intentions based on the household life are abandoned; with their abandoning his mind becomes steadied internally, quieted, brought to singleness, and concentrated. That is how a bhikkhu develops mindfulness of the body.¹⁸

This refrain contains exactly the same words as the refrain in the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta* (although the wording in the translation of *tesaṃ pahānā* is slightly different). These words fit the context of the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta* quite well as each of the five methods is about abandoning evil unwholesome thoughts. Besides, these words are concerned with concentration (*samādhi*) and thus conform to the topic of the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta*, the higher states of mind (*adhicitta*), which refers to concentration as mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 3. In the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, however, the sentence “As he abides thus diligent, ardent, and resolute, his memories and thoughts based on the household life are abandoned” needs to be inserted after each of the practices in order to fit the *Vitakkasanthāna* refrain into the context. The *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta* refrain is the passage closest to the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* refrain I can find in the earliest stratum of the Canon.¹⁹ The only other similar passage is found in the *Mahāsuññata Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*:

If a monk should wish: “Let me enter and dwell in emptiness internally,” Ānanda, that monk should steady his mind internally, quiet it, bring it to singleness and concentrate it. And, Ānanda, how does a monk steady his mind internally, quiet it, bring it to singleness and concentrate it?²⁰

But this passage makes no mention of abandoning something, and the verbs are future past participles in their first occurrence in this passage and then mostly causatives in their second occurrence, whereas the verbs in the refrains of both the *Vitakkasanthāna* and *Kāyagatāsati Suttas* are all present indicatives. Therefore, the *Mahāsuññata* passage is more distant from the refrains in the *Vitakkasanthāna* and *Kāyagatāsati Suttas*. From the foregoing we can deduce that the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* refrain either comes from the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta* refrain, or these two come from a common source in the earlier Canon.

The refrain in the Sarvāstivāda version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* preserved in Chinese translation is:

Thus, however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements (患)²¹ in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”²²

Although this is somewhat different from the Pali version, the purport is very similar. In addition to the refrain, even the third and fourth practices in the Sarvāstivāda *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* are parallel to the first and the fifth methods in the Chinese **Adhicitta Sūtra* (增上心經),²³ equivalent to the Pali *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta*. The first method is as follows:

A monk attends to²⁴ a sign connected with the wholesome. If unwholesome thoughts²⁵ arise, on the basis of this sign he further attends to a different sign connected with the wholesome, causing the evil unwholesome thoughts to stop arising. On the basis of this sign he further attends to that different sign connected with the wholesome, and thus the arisen unwholesome thoughts disappear. When the unwholesome thoughts have disappeared, his mind becomes constantly steadied, still internally, and he becomes single-minded and attains concentration. Just as a carpenter or a carpenter’s apprentice holds an inked string and applies it to the wood, and then chops the wood with a sharp axe to straighten it, so on the basis of this sign a monk further attends to a different sign connected with the wholesome, causing the evil unwholesome thoughts to stop arising. . . .²⁶

Although the description of this method is much longer than that of the third practice in the Sarvāstivāda *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* (see Appendix 2), it means basically the same, that is, counteracting unwholesome thoughts with the wholesome. The simile for the first method in the **Adhicitta Sūtra* is even identical to that for the third practice in the Sarvāstivāda *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*. Here is the Pali version of this method:

When a monk, owing to a sign, attends to that sign, and there arise evil unwholesome thoughts connected with desire, with hate, and with delusion, then he should attend to another sign connected with the wholesome. When he attends to another sign connected with the wholesome, those evil unwholesome thoughts connected with desire, with hate, and with delusion are abandoned and disappear. With the abandoning of them his mind becomes steadied internally,

quieted, brought to singleness, and concentrated. Monks, just as a skilled mason or a mason's apprentice might remove, take out, and get rid of a coarse peg with a fine peg, so when a monk, owing to a sign, attends to that sign . . .²⁷

The description of this method is largely the same as the Chinese version although the simile is different.

The description of the fourth practice with a simile in the Chinese version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* (see Appendix 2) is almost identical to part of the fifth method in the **Adhicitta Sūtra* as follows:

With his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the palate, that monk rectifies one mental state with [another] mental state, grasps and subdues [that mental state] . . . Just as two strong men seize a feeble man, grasp and subdue [him]. . . .²⁸

Its Pali counterpart in the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta* is also very similar:

Monks, with his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the palate, the monk should restrain, crush and torment one mental state with [another] mental state. . . . Monks, just as a strong man, having grasped a weaker man by the head or a shoulder, might restrain, crush and torment [him]. . . .²⁹

The passage on the fifth method in the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta*/**Adhicitta Sūtra* is also found in the *Mahāsaccaka Sutta* (MN I 242), *Bodhirājakumāra Sutta* (MN II 93) and *Saṅgārava Sutta* (MN II 212). In these three texts, however, the same passage is given as one of the practices which the Buddha tried out before his enlightenment. The only context in which both the foregoing two practices (the third and fourth) in the Chinese version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* are found is the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta*/**Adhicitta Sūtra*.³⁰ This suggests a close connection between these two practices and the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta*/**Adhicitta Sūtra*. Padmal de Silva (2001) has examined the five methods in the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta* and found that four of them (including the two practices in the Chinese *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*) have striking parallels in contemporary clinical psychology and psychiatry. This shows the homogeneity and coherence of the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta*/**Adhicitta Sūtra*, which seem to be lacking in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*. If we consider this point together with the fact that the same refrain fits in the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta* far better than in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, we can infer that those two practices peculiar to the Chinese version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* probably come from the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta*/**Adhicitta Sūtra*, rather than the other way round. Likewise, the refrain in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* probably also comes from the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta*/**Adhicitta Sūtra*, rather than the other way round.

According to the above discussion, it may be concluded that the refrain in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* and the third and fourth practices in the Chinese version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* come from the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta***Adhicitta Sūtra*. This strongly suggests that those two practices in the Sarvāstivāda version along with the refrain were originally included in the antecedent version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*. It is very unlikely that those two practices were interpolated by the Sarvāstivādins, and that these “interpolations” and the refrain of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* come from the same source simply by accident. There are over five thousand *suttas* in the extant four main *Nikāyas*.³¹ Considering the large number of different texts or contexts in the Canon, the probability of these “interpolations” and the refrain coming from the same text or context by chance is extremely slim. The most plausible explanation for this coincidence is perhaps that they were all parts of the antecedent version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, from which the extant Pali and Chinese versions derive, but those two practices which do not look like mindfulness of the body were omitted by the Theravādins. (see Table 4)

1.3 The Pañcaṅgika Sutta

The *Pañcaṅgika Sutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* expounds the “noble fivefold right concentration” (*ariya-pañcaṅgika-sammāsamādhī*),³² which consists of the four *jhāna* formulae followed by the simile-accompanied glosses on them and a description of the reviewing-sign (*paccavekkhanā-nimitta*) with a simile.³³ The four *jhāna* formulae and the following simile-accompanied glosses in this text are identical to those in the Pali version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, while the Chinese version only has the simile-accompanied glosses on the four *jhānas*. The passage on the reviewing-sign³⁴ reads thus:

Again, monks, a monk well grasps the reviewing-sign, well attends to, well reflects on, and well penetrates [it] with wisdom. Monks, just as one might review another, or someone standing might contemplate another sitting, or someone sitting might contemplate another lying down; so monks, a monk well grasps the reviewing-sign, well attends to, well reflects on, and well penetrates [it] with wisdom.³⁵

This passage, including the simile, is parallel to the eleventh practice in the Chinese version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* (see Appendix 2). The same set of five practices in the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta* is also found in the Chinese translation of a text called the *Sūtra on the Ten Repeated*³⁶ *Dharmas of the Dīrgha Āgama* (長阿含十報法經, hereafter SRTD),³⁷ which is equivalent to the Pali *Dasuttara Sutta* in the *Dīgha Nikāya*. The counterpart of the “noble fivefold right concentration” in this Chinese text is called the “five kinds of concentration” (五種定),³⁸ which comprise the simile-accompanied glosses on the four *jhānas* and a passage similar to the foregoing description of the reviewing-sign:

Again, a disciple on the path grasps the reviewing-truth (*sic*) of the body, having carefully attended to, carefully discriminated, carefully grasped [it]; just as a person standing contemplates a person sitting, a person sitting contemplates a person lying down.³⁹

This text is considered to belong to the Sarvāstivādins by Chizen Akanuma⁴⁰ and de Jong (1979: 253). The only references to the reviewing sign (or “reviewing-truth”) in the earliest stratum of the Canon, including both the Pali and Chinese, are in the foregoing *Pañcaṅgika Sutta*, the “five kinds of concentration” in SRTD, and the Chinese versions of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* and the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*.⁴¹ As will be discussed in the next chapter, the section on contemplating the body in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* derives from the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*. It is most likely that the reviewing-sign in these two Sarvāstivāda texts comes from the “five kinds of concentration” in SRTD, equivalent to the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta*. The four *jhānas* with the simile-accompanied glosses in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* may also come from the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta*. This will be elucidated below.

The foregoing discussion covers most of the practices listed in the two versions of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* and the refrain appended to those practices. Following this main discourse on *kāyagatā sati* are an exposition with similes and a list of benefits of practising *kāyagatā sati*. This latter part also has a portion in common with the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta*. The *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* has the following words (hereafter passage A):

[The Buddha says,] “Monks, anyone whose *kāyagatā sati* has been developed and cultivated directs his mind towards realizing by **supernormal knowledge** (*abhiññā*) whatever (*yassa yassa*) state is realizable by **supernormal knowledge**, and acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] (*tatra tatr’ eva*) whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] (*āyatana*) exists. Monks, suppose a water pot, full of water to the brim so that a crow could drink from it, were set on a stand. Whenever a strong man tilts it, would water come out?” “Yes, venerable sir.” “So too, monks, anyone whose *kāyagatā sati* has been developed and cultivated directs his mind towards realizing by supernormal knowledge whatever state is realizable by supernormal knowledge, and acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.

Suppose a rectangular pond on level ground were surrounded by an embankment and full of water to the brim so that a crow could drink from it. Whenever a strong man loosens the embankment, would water come out?” “Yes, venerable sir.” “So too, monks, anyone whose *kāyagatā sati* has been developed . . . (repeat as above).

Monks, suppose a chariot harnessed to thoroughbreds were standing on level (lit. good) ground at a crossroads, with a goad lying

ready. Then a skilled groom, a trainer of horses, would mount it, grasp the reins in his left hand and the goad in his right hand, and drive it on or back as he wishes. So too, monks, anyone whose *kāyagatā sati* has been developed . . . (repeat as above).⁴²

The *Pañcaṅgika Sutta* has a passage containing almost identical words (hereafter passage X):

[The Buddha says,] “Monks, when the noble fivefold right concentration has been thus developed and thus cultivated, he directs his mind towards realizing by **supernormal knowledge** (*abhiññā*) whatever state is realizable by **supernormal knowledge**, and acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists. Monks, suppose a water pot, set on a stand, were full of water to the brim so that a crow could drink from it. Whenever a strong man tilts it, would water come out?” “Yes, venerable sir.” “So too, monks, when the noble fivefold right concentration has been thus developed and thus cultivated, he directs his mind towards realizing by supernormal knowledge whatever state is realizable by supernormal knowledge, and acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.

Monks, suppose a rectangular pond on level ground were surrounded by an embankment and full of water to the brim so that a crow could drink from it. Whenever a strong man loosens the embankment, would water come out?” “Yes, venerable sir.” “So too, monks, when the noble fivefold right concentration has been thus developed and thus cultivated . . . (repeat as above).

Monks, suppose a chariot harnessed to thoroughbreds were standing on level (lit. good) ground at a crossroads, with a goad lying ready. Then a skilled groom, a trainer of horses, would mount it, grasp the reins in his left hand and the goad in his right hand, and drive it on or back as he wishes. So too, monks, when the noble fivefold right concentration has been thus developed and thus cultivated . . . (repeat as above).⁴³

According to these two passages, what a monk practices when he has developed *kāyagatā sati* (passage A) is the same as what he does when he has developed the noble fivefold right concentration (passage X). Even the similes in the two cases are identical⁴⁴ although the word order in the first two similes is slightly different. Passage X in the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta* is the only passage in the earliest stratum of the Canon that is almost identical with passage A in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*,⁴⁵ both passages containing the description of realizing supernormal knowledge on the basis of a certain “level”

illustrated by the three similes. Is one passage modeled on the other? Which represents the original context? I shall demonstrate that the original context is about developing the six kinds of supernormal knowledge on the basis of various meditative attainments.

Following passage X, the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta* reads (hereafter passage Y):

- (1) If he wishes: “Let me experience many kinds of supernatural power: having been one, let me become many. . . . Let me travel with the body as far as the Brahmā world,” he acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.
- (2) If he wishes: “With the divine ear element that is purified . . . those far and near . . .,” he acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.
- (3) If he wishes: “Let me understand the minds of other beings, of other persons, having encompassed them with my own mind. . . . Let me understand a mind with lust as a mind with lust. . . . Let me understand an unliberated mind as an unliberated mind,” he acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.
- (4) If he wishes: “Let me recollect many of my former abodes, that is, one birth, two births. . . . Thus let me recollect many of my former abodes with their modes and details,” he acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.
- (5) If he wishes: “With the divine eye that is purified and surpasses mankind . . . Let me understand how beings transmigrate according to their karma,” he acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.
- (6) If he wishes: “Through the destruction of the taints, let me understand, realize, enter and dwell in the taintless liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom myself in this very life,” he acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.⁴⁶

After the description of the four *jhānas* and the reviewing-sign (fivefold right concentration), passages X and Y prescribe the further practice which one can do on the basis of such meditative attainments. This practice is centered on *abhiññā*, “supernormal knowledge.” In the *Nikāyas* the term *abhiññā* is sometimes used to refer to the six special faculties as given in passage Y.⁴⁷ *Abhiññā*, “supernormal knowledge,” in passage X must also refer to the six special faculties in the ensuing passage Y. The expression “he directs his mind towards (*cittaṃ abhinimāmeti*) realizing by **supernormal knowledge** (*abhiññā*) whatever state is realizable by **supernormal knowledge**” in passages

X and A is also reminiscent of the standard formula on developing the six *abhiññās*, which states that “he applies and directs his mind towards” (*cittaṃ abhinīharati abhininnāmeti*) supernatural power, the divine ear element, etc.⁴⁸

In passages A, X and Y the following sentence recurs: “He acquires the ability to witness (*sakkhibhavyatam*)⁴⁹ this or that very [state] (*tatra tatr’ ev*) whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.” *Tatra tatr’ eva*, the equivalent of a locative, apparently goes with *sakkhibhavyatam* since *sakkhin* (Skt *sākṣin*), “be witness of,” can have an object in the locative case (MW s.v. *sākṣin*). *Tatra tatr’ eva* must be a correlative referring back to “whatever state is realizable by supernormal knowledge” (*yassa yassa abhiññā-sacchikaraṇīyassa dhammassa*). Therefore this sentence is saying that he acquires the ability to witness, or experience, the states that are to be realized by the six types of supernormal knowledge. In the foregoing sentence, “whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists” (*sati sati āyatane*) probably can be understood as “on the basis of a suitable meditative attainment” for the following reasons. Firstly, the names of the four formless attainments all contain the word *āyatana*. Secondly, in the *Kāyasakkhī Sutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (IV 451f.) each of the nine meditative attainments are referred to as a “level” (*āyatana*). Similarly, *āyatana* in our sentence may also refer to a meditative attainment. Therefore, our sentence means that when there is a certain meditative attainment as a base, a practitioner is able to witness, or experience, the states realizable by the six types of supernormal knowledge.⁵⁰ This is apparently the purport of passages X and Y in the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta*.

Both the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta* (passage X) and the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* (passage A) have the statement “He directs his mind towards realizing by supernormal knowledge whatever state is realizable by supernormal knowledge, and acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.” This statement, however, makes good sense only in the context of concentration like that in the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta*, but not in the context of *kāyagatā sati*. Even though *kāyagatā sati* may lead to the *jhānas*,⁵¹ it is not *jhāna* or any other meditative attainment as such, especially if it is rendered in a very narrow sense as mindfulness of the physical body. The idea about developing supernormal knowledge on the basis of various “levels [of concentration]” in passage A of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* is apparently borrowed from such a context as that in the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta* and then superimposed on the context in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*.

Let us consider the following three points: (1) As mentioned above, passage X in the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta* is the only passage in the earliest stratum of the Canon that is almost identical with passage A in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, and the latter is apparently modeled on the former. (2) As mentioned above, apart from the Chinese versions of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* and *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, the only reference to the reviewing-sign (or “reviewing-truth”) in

the earliest stratum of the Canon is in the foregoing *Pañcaṅgika Sutta*, roughly equivalent to the “five kinds of concentration” in SRTD. (3) The *Pañcaṅgika Sutta* appears to have coherent contents and a simple structure. It describes different levels of concentration with similes, and then expounds also with similes what to practice on the basis of different levels of concentration, and lastly gives the fruits brought about by this practice. It could be among the earliest texts which were subject to very little contamination. From these three points, we may conclude that the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta* provides the Pali *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* with passage A, and provides the Chinese version with the passage on the reviewing-sign. The four *jhānas* with simile-accompanied glosses in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* could also have been borrowed from the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta* along with passage A and the passage on the reviewing-sign. Therefore, the antecedent version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* probably drew the following material from the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta*: (1) the passages on the four *jhānas* and the reviewing-sign, which comprise the fivefold right concentration, (2) passage A about developing supernormal knowledge on the basis of concentration. Later on the passage on the reviewing-sign was omitted by the Theravādins, presumably because it cannot be regarded as mindfulness of the body, while passage A was omitted by the Sarvāstivādins for some reason which I still cannot fathom. (see Table 4)

One may argue that the passage on the reviewing-sign, which is not mindfulness of the body, is a Sarvāstivāda interpolation, and that it is a mere coincidence that this “interpolation” and passage A in the Pali *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* come from the same source. Considering that there are so many different texts or contexts in the Canon, the probability of this Sarvāstivāda “interpolation” and passage A in the Theravāda version coming from the same text or context by chance is extremely slim.

1.4 An earlier version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*

According to the previous sections, we should probably discard the hypothesis that the practices peculiar to the Sarvāstivāda version which do not look like mindfulness of the body are later additions, but rather we should accept that these practices were already included in the antecedent version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* together with those practices directly concerning the physical body found in both the Pali and Chinese recensions we have today. We should consider this issue in the light of textual compilation and transmission.

In view of the above discussions, we can assume that the antecedent version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* drew a large amount of material from the three texts discussed above. One significant feature in contamination of texts is the frequent use in the Canon of what scholars have dubbed “pericopes,” an idea in New Testament criticism applied to the early period of transmission of the Buddhist traditions.⁵² As Gombrich (1987) shows, pericopes only make perfect sense in the original contexts. Likewise, several

passages do not make good sense in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, but they fit into other *suttas* very well.

In the course of the textual transmission, both schools omitted or modified some parts of the earlier version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, and the Theravādins particularly excluded those not directly related to the body, probably when *kāyagatā sati* came to be understood as mindfulness of the physical body. The influence of reciters' ideas on the redaction of the texts in oral tradition is suggested by Schmithausen (1981: 201):

There must have been . . . preachers personally engaged in practice and theory, and it is hardly conceivable that such persons did not develop new ideas—even though they themselves need not have taken these ideas to be new in substance—and that they did not try to incorporate them into tradition by means of modification, supplementation, etc., of the already existing material.

It is conceivable that such modifications, supplementations, etc. were normally done by addition rather than subtraction, since no one would want to risk losing any of the Buddha's words (RFG). Our case, however, is a rare, but not the only, example of modification by subtraction. In the *Samyukta Āgama* preserved in Chinese, the third *jhāna* is referred to as unworldly *upekkhā*,⁵³ but this is omitted in the Pali version (SN IV 237) because the third *jhāna* still has *soṃanassa* according to the Pali *Uppaṭṭipāṭika Sutta* (SN V 215), and *soṃanassa* is incompatible with *upekkhā*.⁵⁴ Another example is provided by Ray (1994: 162 and 176, note 32), who shows that the list of eleven saints in the *Udāna* (p. 3) is more likely to be original than the list of ten in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (III 78–79), which has removed Devadatta as his positive side was increasingly hidden under a covering of vitriolic condemnation. The practice of modification by subtraction even continued to the re-editing of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* in the Theravāda school, which further removed the four *jhānas* from the list of the first *satipaṭṭhāna*, mindfulness of the body, presumably because the Theravāda tradition came to emphasize the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* as a discourse on insight (*vipassanā*) meditation rather than serenity (*samatha*) meditation. Being serenity meditation, the four *jhānas* had to be left out.⁵⁵

Moreover, it is inconceivable that the Sarvāstivāda compilers would have borrowed passages not really about mindfulness of the body⁵⁶ and added them to a text if this text had been supposed to be devoted to mindfulness of the body. The only plausible explanation is that those four passages peculiar to the Sarvāstivāda version formed parts of an earlier, probably original, version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, but were later on eliminated by the Theravādins, who may have considered them to be interpolations.

It would be helpful to consider another point here. The fifth practice in the Pali *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* is reviewing *kāya* as being divided into four

elements in the way a cow is being divided into pieces, whereas the Chinese version speaks of six elements,⁵⁷ with the addition of space and consciousness elements.⁵⁸ It is very unlikely that the Sarvāstivādins would have interpolated consciousness into a description of the components of *kāya* if *kāya* had been regarded as the physical body at that time.

From the above discussions it follows that when the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* was first composed, *kāyagatā sati* was not considered to be mindfulness of the physical body alone, and *kāya* obviously had a much broader sense than the physical body. Since the antecedent, or even the original, version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* probably contained all the practices given in the Chinese version and passage A in the Pali version, *kāyagatā sati* covers different types of mindfulness as discussed in Chapter 2 and is closely connected to the meditative attainments which effect supernormal knowledge, including liberating insight. Therefore *kāyagatā sati* seems to be a general guideline or a basic principle that applies to a wide range of practices. But what exactly *kāyagatā sati* and *kāya* in this context mean is still not clear since the word *kāya* can have many meanings. Below is an attempt to solve this problem.

2. The meaning of *kāyagatā sati*

Apart from the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, the only explanation of *kāyagatā satilkāyasati* in the earliest stratum of the Canon, including both Pali and Chinese, is found in a *sūtra* in the *Ekottara Āgama*,⁵⁹ which reads:

What is meant by mindfulness of the body [refers to] head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, gall bladder, liver, lungs, heart, spleen, kidneys, large intestines, small intestines, white and sticky (*sic*) bladder, feces, urine, omasum (*sic*), dark green bowels,⁶⁰ stomach, bladder,⁶¹ urine,⁶² tears, spittle, snot, pus, blood, fat, saliva, skull, brain. What is the body? It is the earth element, the water element, the fire element, the wind element. It is made by the father element and the mother element.⁶³ Where does it come from? By whom is it made? The eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body, and the mind. Where will this arise in the end? Thus, monks, is called mindfulness of the body.⁶⁴

This text seems to give the answers before their corresponding questions. Therefore, the list of the bodily parts is the answer to “What is the body?”; the four elements to “Where does it come from?”; “made by the father element and the mother element” to “By whom is it made?” etc. It is self-evident that the body consists of the bodily parts. “Composed of the four great elements, born from father and mother” is a stock description of the body.⁶⁵ In contrast, the mention of the six senses in this context appears puzzling and out of place. This occurrence, however, can be a significant indication of what *kāyagatā*

sati actually refers to. Unfortunately, this passage seems rather corrupt and does not suffice to help us fully understand the issue. I shall resort to another approach as a complement that will shed more light on this problem.

Here is an attempt to find out what *kāyagatā sati* or *kāyasati* refers to from the contexts in which it occurs. Below are the references to *kāyagatā sati* and *kāyasati* that I have found in the earliest stratum of the Pali Canon (to avoid repetitions, repeated occurrences of *kāyagatā sati* and *kāyasati* in one text in a similar context are counted as one reference):⁶⁶

kāyagatā sati:

DN III 272

MN III 88–99

SN I 188; II 220; IV **199–200**, 359, 373; V 170

AN I 30, 42, 43–46; IV 374–377

Sn **340**

Dhp 293, 299

Ud **28**, 77

Th 6, 468, 636, 1035, 1225

kāyasati:

MN I **266–270**

SN IV **119–120, 184–186, 189, 198–199**

In this list, eight (shown in bold type) of the twenty-seven (nearly 30 per cent) references to *kāyagatā satilkāyasati* occur in the context of restraining the senses. This is a significant indication of how it is employed in Buddhist practice and what it may refer to. Five of these eight references are found in the *Salāyatana Saṃyutta*, which are devoted to the six senses. I will examine several important passages in this part of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*.

2.1 *Kāyagatā sati/kāyasati as found in the Salāyatana Saṃyutta*

As discussed in Chapter 2, in the *Chapāṇa Sutta* of the *Salāyatana Saṃyutta*, *kāyagatā sati* functions as a post or pillar that restrains the six senses. In the *Kimsuka Sutta* of the *Salāyatana Saṃyutta* (SN IV 194–195) the Buddha makes a simile about a frontier city with six gates. In this simile, as he explains, “the city” represents *kāya*; “the six gates” represents the six internal sense bases; “the gatekeeper” represents mindfulness. It is very clear that what mindfulness is concerned with is what is going on at the six gates. This is perhaps the import of *kāyagatā sati* or *kāyasati* in the *Salāyatana Saṃyutta*, and *kāya* in *kāyagatā satilkāyasati* probably refers to the same as *kāya* in the above simile, where the city with six gates implies that *kāya* has six senses. In his discussion of this simile, Harvey (1995: 116–117) says, “[T]he ‘town’ of the body has ‘six gates’, which thus means that it includes the mind-organ . . . ‘Body’, then, can include mental processes.”⁶⁷

In the simile “the lord of the city” stands for consciousness. Commenting on this, Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1429, note 209) says, “I see the point to be simply that consciousness is the functional centre of personal experience.” Thus he seems to regard *kāya* represented by the “city” as personal experience. The six senses form the basis of our personal experience, whether physical or mental. According to the simile, *kāya* has the six senses. Thus *kāya* probably refers to a living organism that can experience through his senses. There are other cases in the early texts in which *kāya* refers to the individual, or the experiencer of both physical and mental aspects.⁶⁸ In our case, *kāyasati* or *kāyagatā sati* may refer to mindfulness applying to an individual that is able to perceive through his senses and is endowed with consciousness as the functional center of his experience. This could be why the six senses are mentioned in the *sūtra* of the *Ekottara Āgama* cited above.

In the *Avassuta Sutta* of the *Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta*, the Buddha asks Mahāmoggallāna to preach on his behalf. Then Mahāmoggallāna says,

How, friends, is one *avassuta*? Here, friends, on seeing a visible form with the eye, a monk is intent on it in the case of an agreeable visible form, and is upset at it in the case of a disagreeable visible form. He dwells with mindfulness of *kāya* unestablished (*anupaṭṭhitakāyasatī*), with a limited mind, and does not understand as it really is that liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, where those evil unwholesome states that have arisen in him cease without remainder. [The same is said of the other five senses.]⁶⁹

He then explains *avassuta* in the converse way. One who dwells with *kāyasati* unestablished is called *avassuta*, while one who dwells with *kāyasati* established is called *anavassuta*. What do these two terms mean and how are they related to *kāyasati*, mindfulness of *kāya*? The theme of this discourse involves imagery shared by some other *suttas* in the *Nikāyas*. The *Dukkhadhamma Sutta* explains how a monk should live so that “evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection do not flow into (*amusavanti*) him,” and the answer is to practice mindfulness (SN IV 189). The *Cūlahatthipadopama Sutta* reads: “Evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection might flow into (*anvāssaveyyuṃ*) him if he dwelt leaving the eye faculty unguarded” (MN I 180). The words *amusavati* and *anvāssavati* can mean “flow in” or “flow upon.”⁷⁰ Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1426, note 194) points out that these two words and *avassuta* in Mahāmoggallāna’s sermon are all based on the same root *su*, “to flow.” What Mahāmoggallāna means by *avassuta* is apparently the same as these two words. *Avassuta* refers to the flowing in of evil unwholesome states, and *anavassuta* refers to cessation of the flowing in of evil unwholesome states.⁷¹

Waldschmidt (1978: 25) interprets the purport of Mahāmoggallāna’s sermon as “letting in and not letting in of sensitive influences through the eye and the other organs of sense.” The six senses are seen as the inlets through

which evil unwholesome states enter an individual. To achieve liberation where no evil unwholesome states exist, one has to stop letting them in through the six sense-doors, and *kāyasati* is mentioned here presumably as the method to guard the sense-doors. This is very similar to the imagery in the *Kimśuka Sutta*, where the senses are likened to the gates and mindfulness (*sati*) is likened to the gatekeeper. *Kāya* in *kāyasati* here probably also refers to the same as *kāya* in the *Kimśuka Sutta*, that is an individual who experiences through the six senses.

2.2 *Kāyagatā sati/kāyasati and the individual possessed of consciousness*

Kāya used in the sense of an individual is also found in the *Bālappaṇḍita Sutta*⁷² of the *Nidāna Saṃyutta* (tr. Bodhi, 2000: 549):

Bhikkhus, for the fool, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has thereby originated. So there is this body (*kāya*) and external name-and-form (*bahiddhā nāmarūpa*): thus this dyad. Dependent on the dyad there is contact. There are just six sense bases, contacted through which—or through a certain one among them—the fool experiences pleasure and pain.⁷³

The commentary explains “this body (*kāya*)” as his own body possessed of consciousness, and “external name-and-form” (*bahiddhā nāmarūpa*) as others’ body possessed of consciousness, and says that the meaning should be elucidated in terms of the five aggregates and the six sense bases of oneself and another.⁷⁴ According to the commentary, *kāya* here includes both physical and mental aspects of an individual, and involves the six senses. Ven. Bodhi (2000: 740, note 48) does not agree with the commentary’s interpretation of external name-and-form, and suggests: “We may have here, rather, a rare example of the term *nāmarūpa* being employed to represent the entire field of experience available to consciousness, ‘external name’ being the concepts used to designate the objects cognized.” He also disagrees with the commentary’s interpretation of “the dyad” (not “this dyad,” *etaṃ dvayaṃ*, but the *dvayaṃ* preceding *paṭicca*) as the internal and external sense bases,⁷⁵ and suggests: “It seems that here the text intends the term dyad to denote one’s own conscious body and ‘external name-and-form.’” In other words, the dyad refers back to *kāya* and external name-and-form.

His suggestions are plausible. Accordingly, in this passage “Dependent on the dyad there is contact” means that contact (*phassa*) depends on *kāya* and external name-and-form. The statement “There are just six sense bases, contacted through which . . .” is apparently a paraphrase of the previous sentence. This is perhaps why the commentary regards the dyad as the internal and external sense bases. *Kāya* and external name-and-form (*bahiddhā*

nāmarūpa) appear to correspond to the internal and external sense bases respectively, and thus constitute the conditions for contact. Suggesting that *nāmarūpa* (name-and-form) here represents the entire field of experience available to consciousness, Ven. Bodhi seems to regard external name-and-form as the external sense bases since all the experience available to consciousness refers to the six sense objects. Then how does *kāya*, the other member of the dyad, relate to the six internal sense bases, i.e. the six senses?

Let us first examine what *kāya* means in this text. The passage “hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this *kāya* has thereby originated” is an explanation of how a sentient being is reborn, or how the round of rebirths (*saṃsāra*) is going on. Thus rather than a physical body, *kāya* here must refer to a sentient being of a certain existence in the round of rebirth. The commentary glosses *kāya* as *kāya* possessed of consciousness (*saviññāṇako kāyo*), or “conscious body” as translated by Ven. Bodhi (2000: 740, note 48). Likewise, in the Chinese translation of this text in the *Samyukta Āgama*, the equivalent to *kāya* is “consciousness-body (**kāya*)” (識身 T 2, 83c). In these two cases *kāya* is likely to mean something covering consciousness (*viññāṇa*). Just as the expression *sadevake loke samārake sabrahmake* (“in the world with its gods, *māras* and *brahmās*”) implies that the world includes gods (*deva*), etc.,⁷⁶ so too *saviññāṇako kāyo* implies that *kāya* includes consciousness. Since the physical body cannot include consciousness as the two things belong to different aggregates (*rūpa* “material form” and *viññāṇa* “consciousness”), *kāya* here cannot be the physical body, and *saviññāṇako kāyo* probably refers to a sentient being that includes or possesses consciousness. The commentary’s gloss of *kāya* as *saviññāṇako kāyo* and the Chinese translation of “consciousness-body” may imply equation between *kāya* and sentient being. This interpretation of *kāya* squares quite well with the meaning of *kāya* in the context of the *Bālappaṇḍita Sutta*.

In his discussion of the dyad, Ven. Bodhi (2000: 740, note 48) draws our attention to the common expression “in regard to this *kāya* possessed of consciousness and all external *nimittas*” (*imasmiñ ca saviññāṇake kāye bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu*), which recurs in the *Nikāyas*.⁷⁷ He probably implies that *kāya* possessed of consciousness and all external *nimittas* correspond respectively to *kāya* and external name-and-form in our text. As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 2.2.1), in meditation *nimitta* refers to an object of concentration. It can also refer to the six sense objects.⁷⁸ These two dyads both represent the subject and the six sense objects in the field of experience. As Kalupahana (1992: 37) indicates, consciousness often implies a relationship between subject and object. *Kāya* in the former dyad and “*kāya* possessed of consciousness” in the latter dyad both refer to the subject that perceives objects, while “external name-and-form” and “all external *nimittas*” refer to the sense objects perceived by the subject.

C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1937: 407, 409, 410) contends that in some texts of the *Khandha Saṃyutta*⁷⁹ the older dual division of *kāya* and *viññāṇa*, i.e.

saviññāṇako kāyo in these texts, is cluttered up with the newer division of the five *khandhas*. Disagreeing with my understanding of *saviññāṇako kāya*, she regards it as a duality of mind, *viññāṇa*, and body, *kāya*. There are several contexts in the *Nikāyas* where *viññāṇa* is described in opposition to body, *kāya*.⁸⁰ Such descriptions of duality, however, are not found in any of the contexts in the *Nikāyas* where *saviññāṇako kāyo* is referred to.⁸¹ No matter whether *kāya* in this expression refers to the body as opposed to mind, *viññāṇa*, there is no doubt that *saviññāṇako kāyo* represents the human being as a whole, and it is most likely that *kāya* in *kāyagatā sati* is derived from this concept. Moreover, the category expressed by “this *kāya* possessed of consciousness and all external *nimittas*” (*imasmiñ ca saviññāṇake kāye bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu*) probably furnishes the basis of *kāyagatā sati*, which concerns the way an individual acts while being conscious of (*saviññāṇako*) whatever objects (*nimitta*) are perceived by his senses. Similarly, another more elaborate category parallel in some way to the aggregates (*khandha*)—*kāya*, *vedanā*, *citta*, and *dhammas*—forms the four objects of *satipaṭṭhāna*. These two different formulations of *sati* are based on alternative schemes of phenomenological classification, which cover the individual and the external world perceived. This will be further discussed in the next chapter.

To sum up, the explanation of *kāyasati* in the *Ekottara Āgama* supplies a clue to the connection between *kāyagatā satikāyasati* and the six senses. This practice may be associated with the idea of *kāya* in the classification of our experienced world into the individual possessed of consciousness and all the objects external to him (*imasmiñ ca saviññāṇake kāye bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu*). This classification accords with the dyad in the *Bālappaṇḍita Sutta*, “*kāya* and external name-and-form,” where *kāya* clearly refers to a sentient being as a certain existence in *saṃsāra* that provides the internal sense bases, and *bahiddhā nāmarūpa* corresponds to the external sense bases, i.e. sense objects. In other words, *kāya* is able to experience through its six senses, and so is said to possess consciousness. These points are embodied by the simile in the *Kiṃsuka Sutta*, where the city, i.e. *kāya*, has six gates, i.e. the senses, and just as the city has its lord, *kāya* has consciousness (*viññāṇa*) as “the functional centre of personal experience.”⁸² *Kāyagatā sati* is mindfulness directed to the individual (*kāya*) being conscious of sense objects, and such mindfulness protects the individual by guarding his cognitive process based on the six senses, just as the gatekeeper protects the city by guarding the gates.

Kāyagatā sati or *kāyasati* concerns adjusting one’s cognitive apparatus in order to achieve the soteriological goal. *Kāyasati* is often found in the following formula:

On seeing a visible form with the eye, a monk is not intent on it in the case of an agreeable visible form, and is not upset at it in the

case of a disagreeable visible form. He dwells with mindfulness of *kāya* established (*upaṭṭhitakāyasatī*), with an immeasurable mind, and understands as it really is that liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, where those evil unwholesome states that have arisen in him cease without remainder. [The same is said of the other five senses.]⁸³

The implication is that liberating insight results from proper recognition and even reorientation of one's experience conditioned by the six senses. In the *Sabba Sutta* (SN IV 15) the Buddha says that the six senses and their objects are "the all." This implies that our subjective experience is our "world." Liberation consists in transformation of our "world" into a soteriological experience. Hamilton (2000: 107) says,

What really matters is understanding one's experience: it is this, no more and no less, that brings liberating insight. And in focussing his teachings solely on the means to achieving that insight, the Buddha metaphorically relates the different aspects of what we think of as the world around us to one's subjective experience.

Similarly, *kāyagatā sati* or *kāyasati* is mindfulness directed to *kāya*, the locus of our subjective experience through the senses. Such mindfulness can transform our subjective experience, i.e. our "world," and thereby enable us to achieve liberation by properly steering the cognitive process so that evil unwholesome states can be prevented from entering our "world." *Kāyagatā sati* or *kāyasati* is a general guideline or fundamental principle applied to the path to liberation, and is not restricted to those specific exercises, including those related to the physical body, given in different versions of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*.

Chapter 5

THE FOUR *SATIPAṬṬHĀNAS*: MINDFULNESS AS A COMPREHENSIVE PATH

The four *satipaṭṭhānas* are widely mentioned or expounded in the Canon. Especially, the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, the *Mahāsati-paṭṭhāna Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* and the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* are devoted to them. The basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula, which will be discussed in Section 2.1, can be seen as a definition of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. According to this formula, the four *satipaṭṭhānas* refer to contemplations of the body, feelings, mind and *dhammas*. The etymology and meanings of the term *satipaṭṭhāna* have been discussed very thoroughly by Gethin (2001: 30–36). C.A.F. Rhys Davids (Woodward, 1930: xv.) says that the verb for *sati* is always *upaṭṭhāpeti* (derived from *upa-√sthā*) in the *Piṭakas*, but “the Commentaries agree in treating the word, never as *satyupaṭṭhāna*, as in the reading in Buddhist Sanskrit texts, but always as *sati plus ‘paṭṭhāna’*, a word which has no independent existence, save in that very late appendix to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka: the seventh Book.” I would like to suggest that a good way of understanding the etymology of *satipaṭṭhāna* is found in a passage at AN II 218: *attanā ca upaṭṭhitasati hoti, parañ ca satipaṭṭhāne samādapeti*, “He is himself one whose mindfulness is present/established, and he rouses another to establishment of mindfulness.” Here *satipaṭṭhāna* is evidently rephrasing *upaṭṭhitasati*, and so there is no doubt that *satipaṭṭhāna* is composed of *sati* and a word derived from *upa-√sthā*.

As for the meaning of *satipaṭṭhāna*, there are two possibilities. In the *Vanapattha Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I 104–107), *sati* is associated with the verb *upaṭṭhāti* (< *upa-√sthā*), which means “stands near,” “is present,” “appears,” etc. (DOP, s.v. *upaṭṭhāti*, p. 448). If we take *satipaṭṭhāna* to represent a combination of *sati* and a noun deriving from *upaṭṭhāti*, *satipaṭṭhāna* can mean “the standing near of *sati*” or “the presence of *sati*.” However, the *Vanapattha Sutta* seems to be the only place where *sati* is found to be associated with *upaṭṭhāti*,¹ whereas *sati* is very frequently associated with derivatives from the causative of *upaṭṭhāti* (*upaṭṭhāpeti* or *upaṭṭhāpeti*),² which means “brings near,” “causes to appear,” “brings about,” etc. (DOP, s.v. *upaṭṭhāti*, p. 450). Therefore, *satipaṭṭhāna* can mean “bringing about of mindfulness” or “establishment of mindfulness.”

1. Investigating the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* and its authenticity

The *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (MN I 55–63) and the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (DN II 290–315) appear identical except for the addition in the latter of a more detailed exposition of the four noble truths. Ishikawa (1939: 28) suggests that this addition was probably borrowed from the *Dhammacakkapavattana Vagga* in the *Samyutta Nikāya* (V 420–424) and the *Saccavibhaṅga Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (III 248–252).³ On the other hand, T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1910: 337) say, “The Dīgha addition is interesting as containing a fragment of Old Commentary (as old as the texts) of which other fragments are found in the Nikāyas, and also in the Vinaya.” Norman (1983: 40) states: “The addition uses a style of definition which is similar to that found in the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, and its unusually detailed character has led to the suggestion that it is perhaps a fragment from an early commentary which has crept into the canon” (referring to Rhys Davids’ statement cited above). I take the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* and the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta* as two versions of the very same text.

The (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* is highly venerated in the Theravāda tradition,⁴ and seems to have attracted more attention of scholars than the *Satipaṭṭhāna Samyutta* and other relevant discourses do. The preamble of the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* comprises the setting of the scene, the *ekāyana* formula,⁵ and the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula.⁶ The main discourse can be summed up as follows:

- I. Contemplation of the body
 1. Mindfulness of breathing
 2. Understanding the four postures
 3. Acting in full awareness in daily life (the *sati-sampajañña* formula)
 4. Reviewing the body as full of various kinds of impurity
 5. Reviewing the body by way of the four elements
 6. Contemplating a corpse in nine different states of decomposition
- II. Contemplation of feelings
- III. Contemplation of mind
- IV. Contemplation of *dhammas*
 1. The five hindrances
 2. The five aggregates
 3. The six internal and six external sense bases
 4. The seven enlightenment factors
 5. The four noble truths

It is notable that the practices grouped under contemplation of the body are the same as those given in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*. Shimoda (1985: 545–546) shows that several passages in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* are found in other

suttas in the *Nikāyas* and argues that the accounts in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* are not necessarily related to the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. He also indicates that they are common in early Buddhist texts. Similarly, Gethin (2001: 45) says,

These fourteen practices⁷ that can form the basis of *kāyānupassanā* draw on themes and stock passages that are found scattered throughout the *Nikāyas*. In effect, then, the various *Nikāya* elements that might constitute *kāyānupassanā* are brought together to give something of a summary account.

Things appear even more complicated if we take into account the other two versions of this text with considerable variations: the *Nianchu Jing* (念處經, which is equivalent to the Pali title “*Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*” and will be referred to as the “Sarvāstivāda version”) in the *Madhyama Āgama*⁸, widely attributed to the Sarvāstivādins,⁹ and the first *sūtra* in the twelfth chapter (**Ekāyana-mārga Varga*) of the *Ekottara Āgama*,¹⁰ whose sectarian affiliation is controversial.¹¹ For a comparison between the Pali and the two Chinese versions, see Appendix 3. Attempts have been made by scholars to find out the original form of this text and thereby the original meaning of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.

The first important work on this was by Schmithausen (1976). He takes the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula, which he calls “the short definition of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*,” as a standard for judging the authenticity of other parts of these two texts. He assumes that the detailed description of contemplation of feelings and of contemplation of mind have been passed down relatively unaltered in the Pali and other versions¹² because they agree best with the short definition of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* and because in these two cases the divergences among different versions are limited to inessential details. Then he proposes two criteria for deciding to what extent the components of the detailed description of contemplation of the body and of contemplation of *dhammas* are authentic: one is the extent to which individual components have parallel versions in the teaching passed down through other schools; the other is the extent to which individual components fit in with the short definition and the detailed description of contemplation of feelings and of contemplation of mind. Accordingly he argues that [I. 2]¹³ understanding the four postures in the detailed description of contemplation of the body, and [IV. 1] the five hindrances, [IV. 3] the six internal and external sense bases and [IV. 4] the seven enlightenment factors in the detailed description of contemplation of *dhammas* are authentic. He (1976: 251–252) points out that the remaining five sections under contemplation of the body are either found elsewhere in the Canon as an independent exercise or as a component of another particular set of teachings [I. 1, 3, 6], or can be reworkings of older materials [I. 4, 5].

These arguments are not beyond question. The short definition, which he uses as a criterion for judging the authenticity of the detailed descriptions

of the four types of contemplation, is not found in either of the Chinese versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. Moreover, the authenticity of the detailed description of contemplation of mind is doubtful. This will be discussed later.

Taking a different approach, Bronkhorst (1985: 309–312) reaches a different conclusion on this issue. He contends that the earliest recognizable description of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* only contains [I. 4] observation of the impure bodily parts under *satipaṭṭhāna* on the body, and [IV. 4] observation of the seven enlightenment factors under *satipaṭṭhāna* on *dharmas*. His arguments are briefly summed up as follows:

(A) The *Vibhaṅga*, which preserves very old *māṭṛkās* (older than those of the *Dharmaskandha*) and “cited parts of Sūtras that introduced or explained items occurring in the Māṭṛkās,” only gives [I. 4] observation of the impure bodily parts under *satipaṭṭhāna* on the body, and gives [IV. 1] observation of the five hindrances and [IV. 4] observation of the seven enlightenment factors under *satipaṭṭhāna* on *dharmas*.

(B) The Chinese version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* in the *Ekottara Āgama* specifies *satipaṭṭhāna* on *dharmas* as only containing [IV. 4] the seven enlightenment factors, and the four *jhānas*. Since the *Ekottara Āgama* is assumed to belong to the Mahāsāṅghikas, which emerged as a separate sect around 116 or 137 years after the Buddha’s death, the *sūtras* of this sect “should preserve some early features where the texts of other sects show in common a further development.” This passage “may also be an independent development from a description of the four *smṛtyupasthāna* even older than the one surviving in the *Vibhaṅga*.” Observation of the five hindrances, which is not found in the *Ekottara Āgama*, was added under *satipaṭṭhāna* on *dharmas* in the *Vibhaṅga*.

Regarding the first point, even if the *māṭṛkās* of the *Vibhaṅga* are very old and the parts of the *suttas* cited by the *Vibhaṅga* are also as old, the composers of the *Vibhaṅga* may not necessarily have cited the whole passages or *suttas* available to them to explain the *māṭṛkā* items. They may have selected only some parts as illustrations. As to the second point, he does not explain why the practice of the four *jhānas* under *satipaṭṭhāna* on *dharmas* and the other two practices under *satipaṭṭhāna* on the body¹⁴ specified in the *Ekottara Āgama* are not as old as the seven enlightenment factors in the same text.

Ven. Sujato (2006: 264–273) postulates a reconstruction of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* on the basis of the three extant versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (one Pali and two Chinese) and similar expositions found in three *Abhidhamma* works (*Vibh*, *ŚA*, *Dharmaskandha*) and a Mahāyāna text (*Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*). The basic principle in reconstructing the text is “Generally, then, the **Satipaṭṭhāna Mūla* will include only material found in all texts, but will occasionally allow phrases found only in four or five.” (p. 267) Therefore, the result is a much shorter version than the three extant versions of the *sutta*, which includes only [I. 4] reviewing the bodily parts in contemplation of the body,

and only [IV. 1] the five hindrances and [IV. 4] the seven enlightenment factors in contemplation of *dhammas*.

It is beyond my ability to restore the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* to its original form, but below is my attempt to explore how this text came into being. As mentioned above, Shimoda, Gethin, and Schmithausen all agree that the practices under contemplation of the body are found in other parts of the *Nikāyas*; Shimoda and Schmithausen even suggest that some of the practices can belong to teachings other than the first *satipaṭṭhāna*. It is noteworthy that the practices under the first *satipaṭṭhāna* in the Pali (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* are identical to those in the Pali *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* except for the addition of the four *jhānas* in the latter, while the Chinese version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* has exactly the same practices as those given in the section on the body in the Sarvāstivāda version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (See Appendix 1). As discussed in Chapter 4, the earlier version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* from which both the Pali and Chinese versions derived was composed when *kāyagatā sati* was still not understood as mindfulness of the physical body. It is likely that later on when *kāyagatā sati* came to be regarded as mindfulness of the physical body, it was taken to be equivalent to the first *satipaṭṭhāna*, contemplation of the body. Therefore the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* was employed as a basis for composing the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. Lin (1949: 127) has suggested that the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* is an expansion of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*.¹⁵ In my opinion, this explains why the first *satipaṭṭhāna* in the Sarvāstivāda version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* contains so many practices irrelevant to the body, which have been considered later additions by some scholars.¹⁶

Several signs indicate that the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* is a rather late composite of extracts from other contexts, sometimes arranged in an incoherent way. Let us first examine the section on contemplation of mind. Shimoda (1985: 545) indicates that the passage in this section is found in other *suttas*,¹⁷ and that in these *suttas* it is a description of how an enlightened person understands the minds of other beings, while only the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* takes it as contemplation of one's own mind. I would like to point out that this passage itself does not specify whose mind is being contemplated; it runs as follows: "A monk understands a mind with lust as a mind with lust. He understands a mind without lust as a mind without lust . . . with hatred . . . without hatred. . . ."¹⁸ (The same is said of other mental states.) In the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, this passage is meant to describe a method of practice, whereas in many other *suttas*¹⁹ the same passage refers to a special power as an achievement, and it is always among a list of achievements.²⁰ As far as I am aware, in all contexts except for the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, this passage is preceded by the sentence "He understands (or 'May I understand' or 'I understand' or 'You understand') the minds of other beings, of other persons, having encompassed them with [his (my, your) own] mind,"²¹ which makes it clear that this passage denotes the ability to understand

others' minds. Without this sentence the meaning of this passage would be very vague in that we cannot tell whose mind it refers to.

The frequent occurrence of this passage preceded by the above sentence²² suggests that the complete stock passage must include this sentence. Since different *Nikāyas* were handed down orally, and probably redacted, by different *bhāṇakas* ("reciters" or "preachers") who were independent of each other,²³ the fact that this "complete stock passage" is found at so many places in all the four primary *Nikāyas* suggests that this "complete stock passage" could belong to a very early stratum, or at least that it was accepted as essential by the *bhāṇakas* of all these four *Nikāyas*. Therefore, the passage in the section on contemplation of the mind must originally refer to a special power as found at many other places, where it is always preceded by the sentence "He understands (or 'I understand,' etc.) the minds of other beings, of other persons, having encompassed them with [his (my, your) own] mind." The compilers of the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* must have borrowed this passage from the "complete stock passage" in older texts, using it as an exposition of contemplation of mind.

Another indication that the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* is relatively late can be found in the fact that the following refrain is appended to each of the practices:

In this way he dwells contemplating the body as a body internally, or he dwells contemplating the body as a body externally, or he dwells contemplating the body as a body internally and externally. He dwells contemplating the nature of arising in the body, or he dwells contemplating the nature of vanishing in the body, or he dwells contemplating the nature of arising and vanishing in the body. Or his mindfulness that "there is a body" is established to an extent sufficient for knowledge and recollection. And he dwells independent, and does not grasp anything in the world. Thus, monks, a monk dwells contemplating the body as a body.²⁴ [The same is said of feelings, mind and *dhammas*.]

Ven. Bodhi refers to this as "the refrain on insight" and contrasts it with the refrain emphasizing concentration in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*.²⁵ As discussed in Chapter 3, the expression "contemplating the body (feelings, etc.) as a body internally, or he dwells contemplating the body as a body externally" in the refrain appears to be parallel to the stock formula on seeing with wisdom the five aggregates internally or externally as not-self, which is related to insight meditation. Chapter 3 shows that the passage on contemplating the nature of arising and vanishing in the body is also connected with insight meditation. It raises no problem when such expressions of insight meditation in the refrain occur alone in the *Nikāyas*,²⁶ but they inevitably cause difficulties when applied to some practices in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* that are not

in the same line. This is also probably why the four *jhānas*, which belong to concentration rather than insight meditation, are removed from contemplation of the body in the Pali (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*—in order to avoid an obvious inconsistency, while the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* still preserves the four *jhānas* along with all the practices under contemplation of the body in the Pali (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*.

As will be discussed later, “internally” and “externally” refer to “of oneself” and “of another” respectively. Gethin (2001: 53–54) points out the difficulties in making sense of the refrain when applied to many of the practices in the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*: “The idea of watching another’s body is no doubt clear enough if we are talking of the parts of a body or a corpse, but when we are talking of the breath the idea is perhaps a little harder to grasp. . . . The idea of watching another’s feelings, mind and *dharmas* is perhaps even more curious.” By inferring from some passages in the *Nikāyas*, Ven. Anālayo (2003: 96) contends that it is not impossible to develop awareness of another’s feelings and states of mind. Part of the problem suggested by Gethin is reflected in the exposition of *smṛtyupasthāna* in two *Prajñāpāramitā* texts. “Contemplating the body as a body internally” (*adhyātmam kāye kāyānupaśyin*)²⁷ in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* or “contemplating the internal body as a body” (*adhyātmakāye kāyānudarśin*)²⁸ in the *Śatasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* refers to understanding the four postures, acting in full awareness in daily life, mindfulness of breathing, reviewing the body in terms of elements, and reviewing the bodily parts. On the other hand, each of the nine charnel ground contemplations²⁹ is referred to as “contemplating the body as a body externally” (*bahirdhā kāye kāyānupaśyin*)³⁰ or “contemplating the external body as a body” (*bahirdhākāye*³¹ *kāyānudarśin*)³². The authors of these texts seem to suggest that contemplating another’s body is only practicable in the case of contemplating a corpse in the charnel ground, while other practices can only apply to oneself. Most of this suggestion is quite understandable although reviewing the body in terms of elements and reviewing the bodily parts seem to me to be equally applicable to another’s body as well.

Gethin (2001: 54) comments: “[T]he way the *sutta* formulation includes the progression *ajjhattam/bahiddhālajjhatta-bahiddhā* for all four *satipaṭṭhānas* is simply mechanical.” This comment holds true for at least the long lists of practices in the section on the body in different versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. The facts that the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* has a different refrain following the same practices concerning the body as those in the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* and that the refrain in the Sarvāstivāda version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*³³ is to a great extent different from the Theravāda version suggest that application of the refrains to those practices in various versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* and the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* can be quite arbitrary and that these texts are later amalgams of material from different sources.

From the above discussion, it is unlikely that the extant versions of the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* can represent the authentic or original Buddha's teaching on the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. The possibility cannot be excluded that the Buddha may have illustrated the four *satipaṭṭhānas* by using various concrete methods of practice and detailed instructions like those found in the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. It is however almost impossible to restore such a discourse, if it did exist, to its "original," considering the complexity and obscurity of the way in which early Buddhist literature was formed and transmitted. Cousins (1983: 9–10) suggests that consideration of the oral nature of the *Nikāyas* affords the possibility of a strong improvisatory element, which can be confirmed by comparison between the surviving versions derived from different sects. Commenting on divergence found between the Pali *Dasuttara Sutta* and the corresponding versions of the *Daśottara Sūtra* that survive in Buddhist Sanskrit and Chinese translation, Gethin (1992: 157–158) says,

This seems to me a very good illustration of why we should not think in terms of an "original" or "correct" version of such a text. Rather, what we have here is a mnemonic technique and system of arrangement . . . ; this technique and system . . . , yielding a structure within which, provided one knows what one is doing, it is perfectly legitimate to improvise as one feels appropriate.

A similar principle may be applied to the case of different versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. As will be shown below, the four *satipaṭṭhānas* occupy an important position in the Buddhist teaching, and so compilers of the Canon may have thought it necessary to compose a *sutta* (*sūtra*) devoted to this teaching. Therefore, it is possible that the compilers of the Canon, within the basic framework of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, improvised as they felt appropriate the detailed descriptions for each of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, drawing materials from other contexts, and thereby formed an independent *sutta*. Consequently, even descriptions that are originally irrelevant to the four *satipaṭṭhānas* could have been included in such a *sutta*.

However, Allon (1997: 367) says,

[A]ccounts of what the Buddha is supposed to have said and discourses on his teaching would have been given by the monks and nuns after the Buddha's death in an improvisatory manner. . . . But these accounts and discourses were fundamentally different from the essentially fixed, memorised texts transmitted by the community.

He contends: "[T]he early Buddhist *sutta* texts were, in the words of R. Gombrich, 'deliberate compositions which were then committed to memory'."³⁴ I agree with his argument, and consider it possible that the Buddhist discourses went through a period of improvisation before they were formally

“composed” or rather compiled, committed to memory, and transmitted orally by the community. As discussed in the Introduction, texts during the period of oral tradition were liable to modification. Since during this period schisms occurred, different schools may have modified the texts, including the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, in different ways. Therefore, considerable divergences exist between the Pali and Chinese versions of the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* that have come down to us. The two versions of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* may have also undergone the same process. It is probably before the Sarvāstivādins split from the Theravādins that many parts of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* had already been taken to form the detailed instructions on contemplation of the body in the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, and part of the passage on the special power mentioned above was borrowed to form the detailed instructions on contemplation of mind, for these two cases are found in the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* of both schools.

2. Essential teachings on the four *satipaṭṭhānas*

As the authenticity of the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* is questionable, how can we know what the four *satipaṭṭhānas* really refer to according to the Buddha? Since different *Nikāyas* were transmitted, and probably redacted, by different *bhāṇakas* who were not influenced by the traditions of the *bhāṇakas* of other *Nikāyas*,³⁵ ideas concerning the four *satipaṭṭhānas* that occur in different *Nikāyas* are most likely to be early, if not original, teachings on the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, which were regarded as essential by the *bhāṇakas* of different *Nikāyas*. We will find that most of them appear to be what can be called “pericopes,” i.e. passages containing the basic doctrinal elements which are often used to build up larger discourses.³⁶

2.1 The basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula

A passage on the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, aptly called “the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula” by Gethin (2001: 45ff.), is widely found in all the four *Nikāyas*:³⁷

The four establishments of mindfulness. What four? Here, monks, a monk dwells contemplating the body as a body (*kāye kāyānupassī*), ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. He dwells contemplating feelings as feelings, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. He dwells contemplating mind as mind, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. He dwells contemplating *dhammas* as *dhammas*, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world.³⁸

There are difficulties with the terms *kāye kāyānupassī*, *vedanāsu vedanānupassī*, *citte cittānupassī*, and *dharmesu dhammānupassī*. Take *kāye kāyānupassī* as an example; the word “body” occurs twice: one is locative (*kāye*), and the other (*kāya*) is coupled with *anupassin* (“contemplating”) to form a compound. This phrase has been translated in different ways. *Bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati* is translated by Gethin (2001: 29) as “a *bhikkhu* with regard to the body dwells watching body.” Similarly, Ven. Anālayo (2003: 31) translates it as “in regard to the body a monk abides contemplating the body,” and interprets the formula by drawing on components of the Pali *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*: “in regard to your own body or the bodies of others, direct awareness to its (or their) impermanent nature evident in different aspects of the body, such as the process of breathing, or its postures and activities, or its anatomical constitution, or its elementary qualities, or its decay at death” (pp. 33–34). Hamilton (1996: 173) interprets the formula thus: “With regard to the body, the *bhikkhu* is first of all to centre his attention on the body *qua* body, and not on the feelings or anything else he might associate with the body. . . .” This interpretation is in accordance with the commentary on the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*:

It should be understood that after saying “with regard to the body,” mention (*gahaṇa*) of body is made (*katan*) for the second time [by saying] again “contemplating the body” for the sake of showing analysis (*vavatthāna*) without mixing up (*asammissato*) and discrimination of the mass (*ghanavinibbhoga*), etc. Therefore with regard to the body one does not contemplate feelings, nor does one contemplate mind or *dhammas*, but only contemplates the body. Thus (*ti*) analysis without mixing up is shown by pointing out the very attribute of contemplation of the body with regard to the thing called “body.”³⁹

Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1627 ff.) translates *kāye kāyānupassī* as “contemplating the body in the body” in his translation of the *Samyutta Nikāya*. Similarly, the Chinese translation of the *Dharmaskandha* by Xuanzang has “to dwell contemplating the body *in* this internal (or ‘that external’, ‘internal and external’) body,”⁴⁰ and the Chinese translation of the **Mahāprajñā-pāramitā-śāstra* by Kumārajīva has “contemplating the body *inside* the internal (or ‘external’, ‘internal and external’) body.”⁴¹ This is a literal translation, taking the locative *kāye* as meaning “in the body.” Another way of translating *kāye kāyānupassī* is “contemplating the body as a body”; e.g. in the Sarvāstivāda version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* translated into Chinese by Gautama Saṃghadeva,⁴² and in the translation of the *Majjhima Nikāya* by Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (1995: 145 ff.). These two ways of translation seem to be able to render a good sense in conformity with some similar expressions in the Canon.

For example, *ekacco puggalo sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccānupassī viharati aniccasaṇṇī* at AN IV 13 can be translated as “A certain person dwells contemplating impermanence in all conditioned things, apperceiving/conceiving impermanence [in them]” or “A certain person dwells contemplating all conditioned things as impermanent,⁴³ apperceiving/conceiving [them] as impermanent.” Likewise, *bhikkhu asubhānupassī kāye viharati, āhāre paṭik-kūlasaṇṇī, sabbaloke anabhiratasāṇṇī*,⁴⁴ *sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccānupassī* at AN II 150 can be translated as “A monk dwells contemplating ugliness in the body, apperceiving/conceiving repulsiveness in food, apperceiving/conceiving discontent in the whole world, apperceiving/conceiving impermanence in all conditioned things” or “A monk dwells contemplating the body as ugly, apperceiving/conceiving food as repulsive,⁴⁵ apperceiving/conceiving the whole world as discontent, apperceiving/conceiving all conditioned things as impermanent.” In these cases, words in the locative such as all conditioned things and body (*sabbasaṅkhāresu, kāye*) define the sphere of the objects where one’s contemplation is located, and words coupled with *anupassin* such as impermanence and ugliness (*anicca, asubha*) indicate the nature of the objects to be contemplated. This is also the case with *kāye kāyānupassī*, etc., in the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula. The sphere of the objects one is contemplating is the body (*kāye*, locative), feelings, etc., while the nature of the objects to be contemplated is also the body (*kāya* coupled with *anupassin*), feelings, etc. Such expressions in the formula can be paraphrased as “contemplating ‘bodyness’ in the body,” etc. This means to view things in the way they actually are. Similarly, Goenka (1998: 22) translates: “witnessing the reality of the body in the body,” etc.

This is also reminiscent of a passage concerning cognition cited from the *Salāyatana Saṃyutta* in our discussion of *sati* and *saṇṇā* in Chapter 1: “In the seen there will be merely the seen; in the heard there will be merely the heard; in what is thought of there will be merely what is thought of; in the cognized there will be merely the cognized (*viññāta*).”⁴⁶ Likewise, in the above two passages quoted from the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*, the word *saṇṇī*, conceiving or apperceiving, is used in a similar sense as *anupassī*, contemplating. The same semantic analogy may apply to the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula, where *anupassī* also virtually functions as *saṇṇā*. Thus such expressions as *kāye kāyānupassī*, etc. in the formula represent *sati* as a faculty that steers *saṇṇā* in a proper way, so that one’s cognition is wholesome and conducive to insight that leads to liberation. Just as the above passage in the *Salāyatana Saṃyutta* alludes to refutation of the Self as discussed in Chapter 1, such expressions may also imply that one should contemplate the body in the way the body is, but not view the body as a “self” or anything substantial, and so conforms to the important Buddhist doctrine of “not-self” (*anattā*). This interpretation is supported by the commentary on the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*,

He sees the body in this body, but does not see other natures [in this body]. Why is that said? He does not see the natures of permanence, pleasure, self and beauty in this body which is by nature impermanent, unsatisfactory, not-self and ugly, in the way that people see water in a mirage that is without water by nature.⁴⁷

In the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula I use “in order to remove” to translate *vineyya*, which is an absolutive (or gerund)⁴⁸ and would normally be translated as “having removed,”⁴⁹ for the absolutive is normally used to express an action preceding the action of the main verb of a sentence.⁵⁰ Such a translation, however, will cause problems. If we translate: “having removed covetousness and dejection concerning the world,” the formula will mean that contemplation of the body, feelings, mind and *dhammas* should be practiced after removing covetousness and dejection. Thus removing covetousness and dejection becomes a prerequisite for the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. This evidently contradicts the “*ekāyana* formula” (discussed below in Section 2.6) found in the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* and the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta*, which describes the four *satipaṭṭhānas* as a path for the disappearance of suffering and dejection (*domanassa*), etc.,⁵¹ and therefore implies that removing dejection is a purpose of, rather than a prerequisite for, the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. Ven. Nyānuttara (1979: 280) argues that *vineyya* in this context means “overcoming,” not “having overcome,” and the phrase has to mean that the practice of *satipaṭṭhāna* and overcoming covetousness and dejection take place at the same time. He (p. 283) also invokes a gloss in the commentary on the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta*: “By overcoming covetousness and grief is meant the fruit of contemplation” (tr. Nyānuttara).⁵² This shows that the commentator considers overcoming covetousness and dejection to be a result of the *satipaṭṭhāna* practice. In other words, overcoming covetousness and dejection is a goal, not a prerequisite, for *satipaṭṭhāna*. In the light of the context, it seems to make better sense to render *vineyya* as “in order to remove” rather than as “having removed.”

This translation can find support in Gombrich’s (1998: 15) discussion of an absolutive, *abhisamecca*, in the *Metta Sutta* of the *Sutta-nipāta*. Norman (1992: 16) translates the first verse: “This is what is to be done by one who is skilful in respect of the good, having attained (*abhisamecca*) the peaceful state.”⁵³ Gombrich (1998: 15) follows the commentary and takes “the peaceful state” (*santam padam*) to mean Nibbāna, the Buddhist’s religious goal, and raises the question: “But if that is so, why is the person who has attained *nibbāna* being told what he has to do? Surely he has no more duties?” He proposes a solution to this puzzle: “[I]n Pāli the infinitive, which is most commonly used to express purpose, can be used as an absolutive. So here that same semantic assimilation would be operating in reverse, and the introductory verse is saying what one has to do *in order to attain nirvana*.” (p. 15)

Disagreeing with this point, Norman (2004: 76) says,

My explanation of the problem is to say that the commentary is wrong in saying that *santaṃ padaṃ* means *nibbānaṃ* . . . I take *santa* literally as ‘peaceful’. It is used often enough as an epithet of a bhikkhu (where it certainly does not imply ‘gained Nibbāna’) and I see no reason why *santipadaṃ* (which is what I understand *santaṃ padaṃ* to mean) should not literally mean ‘state of being peaceful, calm, at rest’.

In a passage of the *Samyutta Nikāya*, however, *santaṃ padaṃ* is indeed used as a synonym of Nibbāna: “This is the peaceful state (*santaṃ padaṃ*), this is the sublime state, that is, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishment of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, Nibbāna.”⁵⁴ (tr. Bodhi, 2000: 1694). Even *santipada* appears to refer to Nibbāna in the *Muni Sutta* of the *Sutta-nipāta* (tr. Norman, 1992: 22):

208. Who(ever) having cut down what has grown, would not plant (any new) growing thing, (and) would not bestow (moisture) upon it, him they call a solitary wandering sage. That great seer has seen the state of peace.

209. Having considered the fields (of activity), having crushed the seed, he would not bestow the moisture (of affection) upon it. That sage indeed, seeing the end of birth and death, leaving speculation behind, is not counted (in any category).⁵⁵

Collins (1982: 220) says, “We can then understand the symbolic dichotomy further by seeing that *saṃsāra* is a life of constant agriculture, planting seeds and reaping their fruit, while *nirvāṇa* is the abandonment of such a life.” The above two verses are no doubt depicting such abandonment of life in *saṃsāra*, and the statement “That great seer has seen the state of peace” apparently means that he has witnessed or experienced Nibbāna. Similarly, in a short text in the *Pārāyanavagga* of the *Sutta-nipāta*, Jatukaṇṇī asks the Buddha to preach “the state of peace” (*santipada*), and the Buddha’s answer in the ensuing verses (Sn 1098–1100) is about destruction of greed and taints (*āsava*), which implies Nibbāna as it is described as taintless (*anāsava*) liberation (MN I 73–74).

The above canonical passages all support the commentary’s explanation of *santaṃ padaṃ* in the *Metta Sutta* as Nibbāna. Here one could add another point. In this *sutta* the *taṃ* preceding *santaṃ padaṃ* implies that the audience knows what is being referred to, i.e. “that *santaṃ padaṃ*” is being used to refer to a specific state of peace which has already been explained (RFG).

Norman (2004: 75) concedes: “If *santaṃ padaṃ* is indeed a synonym of Nibbāna, then it is inappropriate to say that the subject of the sutta has already obtained it.” Accordingly, it is inappropriate to translate *santaṃ padaṃ abhisamecca* as “having attained the peaceful state.” The best solution is perhaps what has been proposed by Gombrich, that is to take *abhisamecca*, which is an absolutive as confirmed by Norman (2004: 76), as being used as an infinitive to express purpose, and translate it as “in order to attain.”

In our basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula, *vineyya* can be reckoned as another example of an absolutive being used to express purpose, since “practicing the four *satipaṭṭhānas* in order to remove covetousness and dejection” renders much better sense than “practicing the four *satipaṭṭhānas* after having removed covetousness and dejection,” and also accords well with the *ekāyana* formula. On the other hand, as Perniola (1997: 375) points out, some absolutives can indicate actions that follow the action of the main verb. This can probably be applied to our case. In other words, one removes (*vineyya*) covetousness and dejection after one has dwelt (*viharatī*) contemplating the body, etc.

The following two sections will deal with some stock passages formed by converting this basic formula into teachings for different purposes.

2.2 The “internal-external” formula

The basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula is sometimes combined with the words “internally” (*ajjhataṃ*), “externally” (*bahiddhā*) and “[both] internally and externally” (*ajjhatabhiddhā*), and thereby forms the “threefold way of developing the four *satipaṭṭhānas*”⁵⁶:

He dwells contemplating the body as a body internally, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world; he dwells contemplating the body as a body externally, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world; he dwells contemplating the body as a body internally and externally, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. [The same is said of feelings, mind and *dhammas*.]⁵⁷

An abridged form of this formula is also found in the *Nikāyas*, including the refrain of the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*: “He dwells contemplating the body as a body internally, or he dwells contemplating the body as a body externally, or he dwells contemplating the body as a body internally and externally.” [The same is said of feelings, mind and *dhammas*.]⁵⁸

While its Sanskrit counterpart *adhyātma* means “own, belonging to self; concerning self or individual personality” (MW p. 23, s.v. *adhyātma*), the

Pali word *ajjhattam* can also mean “concerning oneself” (DOP p. 34, s.v. *ajjhattam*). This meaning, as I will show, fits our case very well, but it has been translated as “internal” or “internally” in the context of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* by many people since ancient times.⁵⁹ They probably try to preserve some philosophical nuances implied in the context, especially in contrast with *bahiddhā* (externally). Therefore I will follow my predecessors.

The *Vibhaṅga* (193–201) and the commentary on the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (Ps I 252) explain that “internally” refers to oneself, while “externally” refers to another being. This explanation is supported by a passage in the *Janavasabha Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*:

Here a monk dwells contemplating the body as a body *internally*, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. As he dwells contemplating the body as a body *internally*, he becomes rightly concentrated on it and rightly pure. Rightly concentrated on it and rightly pure, he produces knowledge and vision *externally* of *another’s body*.⁶⁰

Here “externally” explicitly indicates “another’s body,” and in contrast, “internally” strongly suggests “his own body” in the context. This passage seems to say that producing knowledge and vision of another’s body is a natural outcome of the internal contemplation. The crux of the practice obviously lies in the internal contemplation. This is reflected by the fact that “internally” precedes “externally” in the formula. As discussed above, as far as many practices listed in the different versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna sutta* are concerned, it is difficult to take another’s body, etc., as objects of contemplation, so the external contemplation may be an inferential activity on the basis of the internal contemplation. In regard to this issue, Nyanaponika Thera (1962: 59–60) says,

[I]n the systematic meditative development of Insight only *internal* objects are taken up and brought into the focus of Bare Attention. This is so because only one’s own bodily and mental processes are accessible to direct experience. . . . Mindfulness on *external* objects, however, may, and should, be cultivated outside the strict meditative practice. Those *external* objects, i.e. bodily and mental activities of others, will present themselves to us either by direct sense-perception or by inference.

Ven. Mahasi Sayadaw (1994: 41) also says that contemplating the body, etc., externally refers to “contemplation to the life processes of others, by way of inference (*anumāna*).” Walshe (1995: 592, note 660) also holds a similar opinion.

As for “contemplating internally and externally,” the last part of the threefold way of developing the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, there seems to be no

explanation in the *Nikāyas*. The *Vibhaṅga*'s explanation does not associate the objects with any specific individual, for example: "How does a monk dwell contemplating feelings as feelings internally and externally? Here a monk understands a pleasant feeling thus: '[It is] a pleasant feeling'."⁶¹ This seems to suggest a purely objective understanding of the contemplated objects with the blurring of distinctions between self and others. The commentary on the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* explains in a different way: contemplating his own body as a body at one time and contemplating another's body as a body at another time.⁶² I agree with Ven. Anālayo (2003: 98), who says that the *Vibhaṅga* offers a more convincing perspective, while the commentarial presentation does not really add anything new to the previous two stages, "contemplating internally" and "contemplating externally."

2.3 The "arising-vanishing" formula

In *sutta* 40 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta*, the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula is expanded through combination with the phrases "the nature of arising," "the nature of vanishing" and "the nature of arising and vanishing":

A monk dwells contemplating the nature of arising in the body, dwells contemplating the nature of vanishing in the body, and dwells contemplating the nature of arising and vanishing in the body, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. [The same is said of feelings, mind and *dhammas*.]⁶³

An abridged form of this passage is included in the refrain of the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*.⁶⁴ It implies contemplation of impermanence, and is connected with development of insight (*vipassanā*) as discussed in Chapter 3. In the first *sutta* of the *Anuruddha Saṃyutta*, the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula is even expanded through combination with these three phrases and also with the three aspects discussed above: internally, externally, both internally and externally.⁶⁵

2.4 The four *satipaṭṭhānas* and concentration

While the foregoing two formulae are related to insight meditation, in *sutta* 4 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* there is a passage which is also similar to the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula but which suggests concentration or serenity meditation. Here the Buddha says that monks who are newly ordained, monks who are trainees (*sekha*), and those who are arahants should all practice the four *satipaṭṭhānas* in this way: "They dwell contemplating the body (feelings, etc.) as a body, ardent, fully aware, fixed (*ekodibhūta*), pure-minded, concentrated, with one-pointed mind."⁶⁶ This appears to be a

modified basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula that contains expressions which denote concentration. Here *ekodibhūta* is etymologically and semantically identical with *ekodibhāvaṇ* in the second *jhāna* formula. The expression “concentrated, with one-pointed mind” is used to indicate the attainment of concentration (*samādhisampadā*) in the *Majjhima Nikāya*,⁶⁷ and also occurs in a formula preceding the standard *jhāna* formula that probably serves as a prologue to the four *jhānas*.⁶⁸

This “modified basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula” is very similar to a passage recurring in the *Nikāyas*: “established in mindfulness, fully aware, concentrated, with one-pointed mind,”⁶⁹ as opposed to “with mindfulness neglected, not fully aware, not concentrated, with wandering mind.”⁷⁰ It is possible that the “modified basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula” is modeled on this much more commonly found formula. Later in this chapter I will show that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* were possibly formulated relatively late as compared with other teachings of the Buddha.

In Chapter 3 we have also discussed several other instances in the *Nikāyas* where the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are applied to, or serve as the causes of, concentration, including the *jhānas*. Such widely found correlation between the four *satipaṭṭhānas* and concentration can be seen as an essential teaching on the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.

2.5 The four objects of contemplation

There are four objects of contemplation in the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula: body, feelings, mind and *dhammas*. This is why this teaching is called “the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.” Unfortunately, there seems to be no explanation of these four objects in the *Nikāyas* except for the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, which derives its exposition of contemplation of the body from the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* and its exposition of contemplation of mind from a passage describing a supernatural power as discussed above. Despite its long exposition, the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* does not give any clear explanation of what these four objects refer to and why these four are chosen. Presumably at the Buddha’s time these matters were self-evident. The later Buddhist literature of different schools has attempted to understand the four objects of *satipaṭṭhāna* in terms of the five aggregates (*khandha*), an analysis of the human being very commonly found in the *Nikāyas*.

The *Peṭakopadesa*, a paracanonical text in the Theravāda tradition, associates the five *khandhas* with the four *satipaṭṭhānas* in its sixth chapter:

Here the five aggregates are the four grounds for individual existence. The aggregate of form is the body as a ground for individual existence. The aggregate of feeling is feelings as a ground for individual existence. The aggregate of apperception and the aggregate of volitional activities are *dhammas* as a ground for individual

existence. The aggregate of consciousness is mind as a ground for individual existence.⁷¹

The same passage also occurs in the *Yin chi ru jing* (陰持入經, **Sūtra*⁷² on *Skandha, Dhātu and Āyatana*),⁷³ which was translated into Chinese by the Parthian An Shigao in the second century AD. Zacchetti (2002: 76) has identified this text as the sixth chapter of the *Peṭakopadesa*. The “original” sectarian affiliations of these two texts are still unclear. Bechert (1955–56–57: 352f.) has concluded that the *Peṭakopadesa* intruded into the Theravāda tradition from outside.⁷⁴ Zacchetti (2002: 94) demonstrates that the *Yin chi ru jing*/*Peṭakopadesa* (Chapter 6) is not a Sarvāstivādin text.

The same relationship between the four *satipaṭṭhānas* and the five *khandhas* was also indicated by Buddhaghosa in his commentary on the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (Ps I 280–281). Similarly, the *Dharmaskandha*, a Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma* text, identifies “*dhammas*” in contemplation of *dhammas* with “the aggregates of apperception and volitional activities” (T 26, 478b ff.), but it makes no mention of three other aggregates in the passages dealing with contemplation of the body, feelings and mind. The **Mahāvibhāṣā*, a later Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharma* work, states that the establishments of mindfulness in the body, feelings, and mind are preached respectively to cure the form aggregate, feeling aggregate and consciousness aggregate; the establishment of mindfulness in *dhammas* is preached to cure the aggregates of apperception and volitional activities.⁷⁵ The relationship between the four *satipaṭṭhānas* and the five aggregates suggested in the above texts can be illustrated as follows:

1. contemplation of the body——form
2. contemplation of feelings——feeling
3. contemplation of mind——consciousness
4. contemplation of *dhammas*——apperception and volitional activities

This correspondence between the two sets of teaching was apparently widely accepted by different traditions as the above texts present it. None of these texts, however, gives any reference to the earliest texts. Below is a discussion of such a correspondence between the *satipaṭṭhānas* and the *khandhas* according to the earliest stratum of the Canon, and an attempt to find out what exactly the four objects refer to.

Sutta 42 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* may cast some light on our problems. It reads:

- a1) By the arising of food comes the arising of the body. By the ceasing of food comes the ending of the body.
- a2) By the arising of contact comes the arising of feelings. By the ceasing of contact comes the ending of feelings.

- a3) By the arising of name-and-form comes the arising of mind (*citta*).
By the ceasing of name-and-form comes the ending of mind.
a4) By the arising of attention (*manasikāra*) comes the arising
of *dharmas*. By the ceasing of attention comes the ending of
dharmas.⁷⁶

Here is an analysis into causal facts by the dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) principle, a typical way the Buddha explained the *samsāric* experience and escape from it. Words similar to the above passage are found scattered in both *Sutta* 56 and *Sutta* 57 of the *Khandha Saṃyutta*⁷⁷ as follows:

- b1) By the arising of food comes the arising of form. By the ceasing of food comes the ceasing of form. . . .
b2) By the arising of contact comes the arising of feelings. By the ceasing of contact comes the ceasing of feelings . . . By the arising of contact comes the arising of apperception. By the ceasing of contact comes the ceasing of apperception . . . By the arising of contact comes the arising of volitional activities. By the ceasing of contact comes the ceasing of volitional activities. . . .
b3) By the arising of name-and-form comes the arising of consciousness. By the ceasing of name-and-form comes the ceasing of consciousness.⁷⁸

The conditions for the arising and ceasing of the body, feelings and mind as stated in *sutta* 42 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* are exactly the same as the conditions for the arising and ceasing of the five aggregates (*khandha*) found in the *Khandha Saṃyutta*. This suggests a connection between the five *khandhas* and the first three of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. Below is a discussion of this connection.

2.5.1 Body (*kāya*)

As discussed before, *kāya* has different meanings. So does *rūpa*, “form.” Hamilton (1996: 3ff.) indicates two main kinds of description of the *rūpakkhanda* in the *Sutta Piṭaka*: the simple and general description, and the detailed and specific description. The simple and general descriptions are two, the first of which obviously refers to *rūpa* as the body:

And why, monks, do you call it form? It “suffers” (*ruppati*), monks, so it is called “form” (*rūpa*). Suffers from what? Suffers from cold, suffers from heat, suffers from hunger, suffers from thirst, suffers from contact with flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun-heat and serpents.⁷⁹

The second of the simple descriptions analyzes *rūpa* into the four great elements and the form derived from them.⁸⁰ The detailed and specific description gives a comprehensive explanation of the four great elements; here the term *rūpa* explicitly refers to both “internal elements,” i.e. things belonging to one’s own body such as hair of the head, bile, etc., and “external elements,” i.e. inanimate things that do not belong to the body (e.g. MN I 185–189). As Hamilton (1996: 4) says, “both types of analysis of *rūpa* indicate that the term primarily refers to the body, in accord with the Buddha’s central concern with the human being.” Moreover, according to passage b1 in *sutta* 56 and *sutta* 57 of the *Khandha Saṃyutta*, form (*rūpa*) is dependent on food, which implies that food maintains the body, so in this case form refers only to the body, not to the external elements. Corresponding to b1, a1 confirms that *kāya* in the first *satipaṭṭhāna* also refers to the body, just like *rūpa* in b1.

2.5.2 *Feelings* (*vedanā*)

The meaning of a2 exactly conforms to that of the first part in b2; even the wording is almost identical. There is no doubt that contemplation of feelings is related to the aggregate of feeling. The aggregates of apperception and volitional activities, which are also conditioned by contact, appear irrelevant to contemplation of feelings. These two aggregates are connected with contemplation of *dhammas* according to later Buddhist literature mentioned above. It is noteworthy that feeling being conditioned by contact is also found in various types of the dependent origination formula in the *Nikāyas*.⁸¹

2.5.3 *Mind* (*citta*)

Since a3 apparently corresponds to b3, mind (*citta*) in a3 and consciousness (*viññāṇa*) in b3 are likely to refer to the same thing. *Citta* and *viññāṇa* are referred to as synonyms in the *Nikāyas*.⁸² In a3 and b3 they are both described as being conditioned by name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*).⁸³ This denotes a link in the dependent origination formula, i.e. *nāmarūpa* and *viññāṇa* condition each other,⁸⁴ although in many cases the standard twelve-fold formula only mentions that *viññāṇa* conditions *nāmarūpa*. In the cases where *nāmarūpa* and *viññāṇa* condition each other, these two mark the beginning of the chain of dependent origination, and seem to imply that these two together constitute the rebirth of a new life, and form the basis for the subsequent development of the individual. For example, *sutta* 65 of the *Nidāna Saṃyutta* states (tr. Bodhi, 2000: 602):

It is to this extent that one may be born and age and die, pass away and be reborn, that is, when there is consciousness with name-and-

form as its condition, and name-and-form with consciousness as its condition. With name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases; with the six sense bases as condition, contact . . .⁸⁵

Some passages on dependent origination even imply that *viññāṇa* is related to the cause of rebirth and is understood as something that connects the previous life to this life. For example, in the *Mahānidāna Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, the Buddha asks: “If *viññāṇa* did not enter a mother’s womb, would name-and-form be reborn for existence in this form?”⁸⁶ The answer is “no.” This apparently means that when conception takes place, *viññāṇa* serves as a transmigrating factor and enables the development of the new personality.⁸⁷ This meaning of *viññāṇa* is also found in other passages.⁸⁸ Similarly, as Johansson (1979: 157) indicates, *citta* is sometimes used in a way that suggests a personal identity from existence to existence. For example, in *sutta* 21 of the *Sotāpatti Saṃyutta*, the Buddha tells Mahānāma not to be afraid of death because even if his body is eaten by crows, vultures, etc., his mind (*citta*) which has been trained in faith, morality, learning, generosity, and wisdom, goes upwards and to distinction.⁸⁹ A verse in the *Devatā Saṃyutta* reads: “Craving generates a person; his mind (*citta*) runs about; a being has entered *saṃsāra*; karma [determines] his destiny.”⁹⁰ As Collins (1982: 214) says, this verse means that a person’s mind transmigrates.

Therefore *citta* is similar to *viññāṇa* in functioning as a transmigrating factor that survives physical death. Both *citta* and *viññāṇa* are responsible for the continuity of beings in the round of rebirth. In both cases, however, there exists a paradox: while *citta* or *viññāṇa* maintain a personal identity from existence to existence, they are also both said to be dependent on *nāmarūpa* and therefore subject to change. As mentioned above, the “arising-vanishing formula” teaches contemplating the nature of arising and vanishing in the four objects, including *citta*. The Buddha also emphasizes that what is called “*citta*” and “*viññāṇa*” arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by night, and so should not be grasped thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self.”⁹¹ Therefore, just like *viññāṇa*, *citta* as it were has an eschatological sense, and at the same time stress is laid on its impermanent nature in order to avoid being identified with an eternal transmigrating entity, or the “Self” (*attan*).⁹²

In the *Mahātaṇhāsankhaya Sutta*, the Buddha refutes the opinion that the same *viññāṇa* wanders in the round of rebirth and experiences the result of karma by pointing to its conditionality, that is, it is conditioned by the six sense faculties and sense objects (MN I 258–259). Thus the seemingly eschatological implication of *viññāṇa* is diluted by its temporary psychological aspect, but the point here, as Collins (1982: 104) says, is not to deny that consciousness is in any way the vehicle of rebirth. The same explanation of *viññāṇa* is also applied to *citta* in the *Abhidhamma*. In its exposition of “contemplating mind as mind” in the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, the *Śāriputrābhidharma*, which

Bureau (1950) and Frauwallner (1995: 97) attribute to the Dharmaguptakas, explains *citta* as the six classes of consciousness (六識身 = *cha viññāṇakāyā*),⁹³ which are classified in terms of the six senses.⁹⁴ Such explanations of *viññāṇa* and *citta* highlight the changeable nature of *viññāṇa/citta* in terms of its contents, which change all the time dependent on the objects. On the other hand, the nature or quality of *viññāṇa/citta* is relatively stable, and it is the nature of mind or consciousness that determines the nature of a renewed existence or otherwise liberation. This can be seen in *sutta* 51 of the *Nidāna Saṃyutta*:

Monks, if a person immersed in ignorance generates a meritorious volitional activity, consciousness fares on to the meritorious; if he generates a demeritorious volitional activity, consciousness fares on to the demeritorious; if he generates an imperturbable volitional activity, consciousness fares on to the imperturbable.⁹⁵

Ven. Bodhi (1998: 160–161) interprets this passage as: “A meritorious volition infuses consciousness with a meritorious quality and thereby steers consciousness towards rebirth in a realm resulting from merit. . . .” Similarly, in the foregoing *sutta* 21 of the *Sotāpatti Saṃyutta*, the nature of mind (*citta*) is shaped by faith, morality, etc., and it is in this sense that mind goes upwards and to distinction. The nature of mind will be elucidated below.

Although most of the section on mindfulness of mind in the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* is likely to have been borrowed from a different and older context of “reading” other people’s minds as discussed above, this passage provides us with a good source for understanding the term *citta*. What *citta* refers to can be deduced from the words qualifying *citta*. This passage gives a list: mind with lust, mind without lust, mind with hatred, mind without hatred, mind with delusion, mind without delusion, contracted mind, distracted mind, exalted mind, unexalted mind, surpassed mind, unsurpassed mind, concentrated mind, unconcentrated mind, liberated mind, unliberated mind. As Ven. Anālayo (2003: 177) notes, in the light of these terms, *citta* “usually refers in the discourses to ‘mind’ in the conative and emotional sense, in the sense of one’s mood or state of mind.” Hamilton (1996: 110) also suggests that the central meaning of *citta* is one’s “state of mind.” The foregoing list of different states of mind appears to be a spectrum of spiritual levels that reflect one’s progress on the path to liberation. *Citta* as indication of spiritual levels is also suggested by the expressions “gladdening the mind,” “concentrating the mind,” and “liberating the mind” in the third tetrad of the sixteen exercises of mindfulness of breathing, which is related to the third *satipaṭṭhāna* as discussed in Chapter 3.

We can see from the foregoing list of states of mind that *citta* can be characterized by volitions. Hamilton (1996: 112) says that *citta* is the source of volitions, and draws our attention to the fact that *citta* comes from the same

verbal root as such active terms as *cetanā*, “intention” or “volition.” The close association of *citta* with volitions suggests that the aggregate of volitional activities (*saṅkhārā*) would probably be better ascribed to *citta* of the third *satipaṭṭhāna* than to *dhammas* of the fourth *satipaṭṭhāna* as suggested in later Buddhist literature. If we consider this together with the identification of *citta* with *viññāṇa*, *citta* has a broader sense than *viññāṇa* as the fifth *khandha*, and is probably closer to *viññāṇa* in some passages implying the analysis of the individual into *kāya* and *viññāṇa*,⁹⁶ or into *kāya* and *citta*.⁹⁷ The case may be that the four objects of the *satipaṭṭhānas* represent an alternative analysis of a being or phenomena to that of the five *khandhas*. On the other hand, the correspondence between the passage cited from *sutta* 42 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* and that from *sutta* 56 and *sutta* 57 of the *Khandha Saṃyutta* suggests that the compilers of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* or probably even the Buddha himself regarded the first three objects of the *satipaṭṭhānas* as corresponding to the three *khandhas*, namely, *rūpa*, *vedanā* and *viññāṇa*. Nevertheless, such correspondence may not represent a rigid equation between them. The Buddha’s skill in means allows for different ways of viewing human experiences and phenomena, and different schemes may correspond to each other in one way or another without being incompatible.

2.5.4 Dhammas

As to attention (*manasikāra*) being the condition for *dhammas* as stated in passage a4, Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1928, note 182) associates it with a passage in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*: “All *dhammas* come into being through attention; all *dhammas* arise from contact.”⁹⁸ This passage apparently concerns cognition, and *dhammas* seem to refer to the objects of one’s cognition. In his interpretation of the fourth *satipaṭṭhāna*, Karunaratna (1989: 485) says, “All *dhammas* constitute objects of the mind; it is by the arising of attention (*manasikāra*) that they present themselves to the mind as objects.” Nyanaponika Thera and Ven. Bodhi (2000: 313, note 40) also say, “The world of objects becomes present to consciousness only through attention (*manasikāra*).”⁹⁹ In the *Nikāyas* the term *manasikāra* and its verbal form *manasikaroti* are sometimes used in conjunction with *nimitta*, which refers to the six sense objects¹⁰⁰ or objects in other senses.¹⁰¹ The *Abhidhamma* literature such as the *Atthasālinī* explains *manasikāra* in terms of yoking the associated states to the object or turning towards the object.¹⁰² As a complement to the *Atthasālinī*’s explanation, Ven. Bodhi (1993: 81) says that *manasikāra* is “the mental factor responsible for the mind’s advertence to the object, by virtue of which the object is made present to consciousness.”¹⁰³ Chapter 4 discussed the classification of our experienced world into the individual possessed of consciousness (*saviññāṇako kāyo*), and all external objects (*nimitta*). It is very likely that this classification evolves into the four subjects of *satipaṭṭhāna*. That is to say, *saviññāṇako kāyo* was first divided

into *kāya* (here meaning “body”) and *viññāṇa* (“mind” as opposed to body),¹⁰⁴ and then developed into *kāya*, *vedanā* and *citta*, while all external *nimittas* were replaced by *dhammas*.

On the other hand, *dhammas* in the fourth *satipaṭṭhāna* may convey another meaning. In the earliest texts the Buddha often says, “Pay attention!” (*manasikarohi* or *manasikaroṭha*) before he starts a discourse.¹⁰⁵ Thus a4 might mean that the understanding of teachings (*dhamma*) is conditioned by attention (*manasikāra*). The fourth *satipaṭṭhāna* in the Pali version of the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* has five sections regarding:

1. the five hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*)
2. the five aggregates (*khandha*)
3. the six internal and six external sense bases (*āyatana*)
4. the seven enlightenment factors (*bojjhaṅga*)
5. the four noble truths (*ariyasacca*)

The Sarvāstivāda version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* has only three of them: the five hindrances, the sense bases¹⁰⁶ and the seven enlightenment factors. The last four in the above list are all among the items of the *māṭṛkās* (comprehensive lists of the fundamental doctrinal items) of the *Vibhaṅga* and the *Dharmaskandha*¹⁰⁷, and the first can be found in the contents of the *Khuddakavatthu* in the *Vibhaṅga*’s *māṭṛkā* (Vibh 378) and the **Kṣudravastuka* (雜事) in the *Dharmaskandha*’s *māṭṛkā* (T 26, 497a–b). Quite different from the above two versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, the other Chinese version in the *Ekottara Āgama* includes only two sets of teaching in the fourth *satipaṭṭhāna*: the seven enlightenment factors and the four *jhānas*, which too are both among the items of the *māṭṛkās* of the above two *Abhidharma* works. As Frauwallner (1995: 3) points out, *māṭṛkās* existed in the oldest Buddhist tradition and later on developed into the *Abhidharma*, and they preserve the doctrinal concepts of the Buddha’s sermons in the form of comprehensive lists. Therefore contemplation of *dhammas* probably means reflecting on objects (*dhammas*) available to consciousness in accordance with the Buddha’s teaching of actuality, represented by the categories of the Dharma such as the *māṭṛkās*. Gombrich (1996: 35–36) says that the commonest use of *dhammā* (plural) refers to the contents of thought, but in the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* “the *dhammā* that the text spells out are in fact the teachings of the Buddha . . . The Buddha’s teachings come to be the same as (any) objects of thought, because anything else is (for Buddhists) unthinkable.” Ven. Bodhi (2000: 44) has a similar view:

Of course, any existent can become an object of mind, and thus all *dhammas* in the fourth *satipaṭṭhāna* are necessarily mind-object; but the latter term puts the focus in the wrong place. I now understand *dhammas* to be phenomena in general, but phenomena arranged in

accordance with the categories of *the* Dhamma, the teaching, in such a way as to lead to a realization of the essential Dhamma embodied in the Four Noble Truths.

Therefore *dhammas* in the fourth *satipaṭṭhāna* can cover virtually whatever phenomena become the objects of consciousness, which are contemplated through the Buddhist point of view. Thus the objects of the first three *satipaṭṭhānas* can also be made the objects of the fourth, *dhammas*.¹⁰⁸ This has been illustrated in Chapter 3 on the sixteen aspects of mindfulness of breathing as correlated with the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. The first three *satipaṭṭhānas* are concerned with the subjective experiences themselves, while the last one involves the objective reflection on those experiences and contemplation of the ultimate truth on the basis of them.¹⁰⁹ In other words, the first three *satipaṭṭhānas* focus on one's personal physical and psychological conditions, while the last one is contemplating phenomena (*dhammā*), including those personal conditions, in accordance with the Buddha's teachings (Dhamma). The first three are centered on direct experiences, while the last one involves abstract systematization or formulation of the first three. The four objects of *satipaṭṭhāna* and the five aggregates may just be alternative classifications of human experience that should be understood and transformed. Although the *Samyutta Nikāya* suggests some kind of correspondence between the first three *satipaṭṭhānas* and the aggregates of *rūpa*, *vedanā* and *viññāṇa*, it seems too far-fetched to squeeze the aggregates of *saññā* and *saṅkhārā* into the four *satipaṭṭhānas* by equating them to the objects of the fourth *satipaṭṭhāna* as later literature does, but rather *saṅkhārā* is better assigned to *citta* of the third *satipaṭṭhāna* as mentioned above. As discussed in Chapter 4, *kāyagatā sati* may have derived from a certain scheme of phenomenological classification: the individual (*kāya*) and name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*) external to him, or the individual (*kāya*) possessed of consciousness and all the objects (*nimitta*) external to him. In the same way, the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are based on a different scheme of phenomenological classification, which is probably intended to be more comprehensive. The correspondence is illustrated in Figure 5:

2.6 The ekāyana formula

A passage which is called "the *ekāyana* formula" by Gethin (2001: 44ff.) is found in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta* and the first, eighteenth and forty-third *suttas* of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Samyutta*:

Ekāyana, monks, is this path (*magga*) for the purification of beings, for the overcoming of sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of suffering and dejection, for the attainment of the method, for the realization of Nibbāna—that is, the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.¹¹⁰

THE FOUR SATIPAṬṬHĀNAS




Figure 5

Etymologically *ekāyana* is composed of *eka*, “one,” and *ayana*, “going.” As Gethin (2001: 59) points out, in the four primary *Nikāyas* the formula describing the *ekāyano maggo* is only applied to the *satipaṭṭhānas*. In the Chinese *Samyukta Āgama*, however, passages similar to this formula containing the term *ekāyano maggo* (一乘道¹¹¹) are found to refer also to other sets of practice such as the four bases for supernatural power (*iddhipāda*)¹¹² and mindfulness of the Buddha, Dharma, Saṃgha, morality, generosity and deities.¹¹³ A parallel passage on mindfulness of these six objects is found in a newly published Sanskrit manuscript in the Schøyen Collection (reconstructed by Harrison, 2007: 203–204), which also includes this formula: *ṣaḍ ime āyusmaṇtas tena bhagavatā jānatā paśyatā tathāgatenārhatā samyak-saṃbuddhena saṃbādhe avakāṣe viśeṣādhigamā ākhyātā ekāyano mārgaḥ sa(r2tvānām viśuddhaye śo)kaparidravāṇām samatikkramāya duḥkhadaurmanasyānām astagamāya nyāyasya dharmasyādhigamāya <|> katame ṣaṭ | ihāyusmaṇta āryaśrāvakaḥ tathāgataḥ ākārataḥ samanumara(r3ti | . . . punar aparaṃ (ā)yuṣmaṇta āryaśrāvako dharmam ākārataḥ samanumarati . . .*¹¹⁴

These occurrences of the *ekāyana* formula could be interpolations since it is not found in the Pali counterparts of the above texts.¹¹⁵ This can also be deduced from the **Mahāvibhāṣā*, which states: “Are the right abandonings, the bases for supernatural power, the faculties, the powers, the enlightenment factors, and the path factors “the one-going path” (**ekāyana-mārga*)? If yes, why does that *sūtra*¹¹⁶ only refer to the *satipaṭṭhānas* as the one-going path, not to the others?”¹¹⁷ In what follows the **Mahāvibhāṣā* does not cite any other *sūtras* to support its argument that the foregoing sets of teaching are also **ekāyana-mārga*, but rather it gives five explanations attributed to “someone says.” This suggests that the authors, who were the most learned Sarvāstivādins claimed to be “the five hundred arhants,” did not know of any canonical passages like the ones I quoted above which refer to supernatural powers, etc. as *ekāyana-mārga*. Therefore it is most likely that

originally the term *ekāyano maggo* (*ekāyana-mārga*) was assigned exclusively to the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.

Gethin (2001: 64) discusses the possible meanings of *ekāyana* in this formula, and is in favor of interpreting it as “going alone” and “going to one.” Both Gethin (2001: 62) and Ven. Anālayo (2003: 28) agree in regarding *ekāyano maggo* in this context as resembling *ekāyanena maggena* in a simile in the *Mahāsīhanāda Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I 74), but they seem to disagree in their interpretations of this simile. Gethin (p. 63) interprets the term as “a particular path that leads to a particular place—and that place only,” while Ven. Anālayo interprets the term as “the direct path.” I would like to propose an alternative interpretation which may highlight the fact that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are singled out for the designation *ekāyano maggo*.

Gethin (2001: 61) has already considered a passage in the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* (BU 2.4.11; 4.5.12) in his discussion of this term. On the basis of this passage and others, Ven. Sujato (2006: 177–186) argues that *ekāyana* means “leading to unification (of mind)” and that “the primary purpose of satipaṭṭhana is to lead to jhāna.” I would like to suggest a different interpretation of *ekāyano maggo* based on the above Upaniṣadic passage. In this passage *ekāyana* means the “point of convergence” (Olivelle, 1998: 68–69). Likewise, the *ekāyano maggo* in our formula could imply that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* constitute the path where various strands of practice converge. Our discussions in this chapter and Chapter 3 show that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* cover the two main categories of meditation, serenity and insight meditation, and that the early teachings on this practice are mainly general guidelines. As guidelines, the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are to be applied to or cover different practices. Nyanaponika Thera (1962: 7) says,

The teachings of the Buddha offer a great variety of methods of mental training and subjects of meditation, suited to the various individual needs, temperaments and capacities. Yet all these methods ultimately converge in the “Way of Mindfulness” called by the Master himself “the Only Way” (or: the Sole Way; *ekāyano maggo*).

My interpretation is also in accord with Gethin’s (2001: 65–66) following remark:

As for the Nikāyas, there is a sense in which, of the seven sets, the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are the most versatile and universally applicable . . . with the four *satipaṭṭhānas* we have the nearest thing in the four Nikāyas to basic general instruction in Buddhist ‘[meditation] practice’ or *yoga*.

The term *ekāyano maggo* can be rendered as a comprehensive or “all-inclusive” path, which appropriately characterizes the four *satipaṭṭhānas* as basic general instruction applicable to various Buddhist practices. This

interpretation can be reinforced by examining a passage on *kāyagatā sati* recurring in the *Nikāyas*:

Monks, just as whoever has pervaded the great ocean with his mind, for him whatever streams flow into the ocean are included, so whoever has developed and cultivated *kāyagatā sati*, for him whatever wholesome states are conducive to gnosis are included.¹¹⁸

Here is a simile analogous to the one in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*: “The ocean is the converging point of all the waters.”¹¹⁹ *Kāyagatā sati* is compared to the ocean, which implies that *kāyagatā sati* covers all the wholesome states conducive to gnosis. Likewise, describing the four *satipaṭṭhānas* as a path of *ekāyana*, or the converging point, is tantamount to the comparison of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* to the ocean, which also implies that they cover all the wholesome states conducive to gnosis. It is possible that both the simile for *kāyagatā sati* and *ekāyana* for the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are inspired by the same passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and that these two sets of teaching refer to the same thing.

3. The four *satipaṭṭhānas* and *kāyagatā sati*

Apart from the foregoing imagery shared by the four *satipaṭṭhānas* and *kāyagatā sati*, the two bear many other similarities, and some canonical passages even imply that they are the same thing. As discussed in Chapter 4, *kāyagatā sati* refers to mindfulness applied to an individual who experiences through the six senses, which cover both physical and mental phenomena. Similarly, the objects of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are parallel to the aggregates (*khandhas*), and also cover both physical and mental aspects. Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1122) notes: “[T]he six internal and external sense bases offer an alternative to the five aggregates as a scheme of phenomenological classification.” Viewed from this angle together with our earlier discussions, *kāyagatā sati* and the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are just different expressions of the same practice based on different schemes of classification of the same phenomena. Furthermore, *kāyagatā sati* involves a very wide range of Buddhist teaching just like the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. A simile mentioned above denotes that *kāyagatā sati* covers all the wholesome states conducive to gnosis, while at AN I 61 *samatha* and *vipassanā* are said to be two wholesome states conducive to gnosis. As discussed above, these two great categories of Buddhist meditation are covered by the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. Moreover, in *sutta* 20 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* there is no mention of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* but only *kāyagatā sati* (SN V 169–170). Since the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* is devoted to the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, *kāyagatā sati* is probably regarded as identical with the four *satipaṭṭhānas* by the compiler of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*.

In *sutta* 13 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta*, when Ānanda was grieving over the death of Sāriputta, the Buddha exhorted him to dwell with himself and the Dhamma as his island and his refuge by resorting to the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.¹²⁰ In *sutta* 9 of this *Saṃyutta*, just before passing away, the Buddha gave the same instruction as his last teaching for his disciples to follow either before or after he passed away.¹²¹ These two *suttas* probably provide the background to the following two verses attributed to Ānanda in the *Theragāthā*:

(1034) All the directions are obscure; the teachings are not clear to me; as [my] good friend has died, it seems like darkness.

(1035) For one whose companion has passed away, for one whose master is dead and gone, there is no friend like *kāyagatā sati*.¹²²

In the foregoing *sutta* 13 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta*, Ānanda says something very similar to verse 1034: “Having heard that the Venerable Sāriputta has attained final Nibbāna, all the directions are obscure and the teachings are not clear to me.”¹²³ According to the commentary, verse 1034 was said by Ānanda after he heard about the death of Sāriputta.¹²⁴ Thus it is beyond doubt that the “good friend” in this verse refers to Sāriputta. “For one whose companion has passed away” in verse 1035 is glossed by the commentary as “for one who is deprived of his good friend.”¹²⁵ In other words, “companion” in this verse refers back to Sāriputta in verse 1034. The word “master” (*satthar*) in the Canon usually refers to the Buddha. According to these two verses, since Ānanda lost his reliable friend (Sāriputta) and master (the Buddha), he had to count on *kāyagatā sati* as his spiritual guide. This is strikingly analogous to the purport of the foregoing two *suttas* in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta*, and therefore *kāyagatā sati* in the *Theragāthā* apparently refers to the same teaching as the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* was employed as a basis for composing the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. It is likely that *kāyagatā sati* is an earlier teaching than the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. The four *satipaṭṭhānas* could have been formulated at a later period to express the same teaching as *kāyagatā sati*, and could have even been particularly emphasized by the Buddha and/or his disciples in order to replace *kāyagatā sati*, since the four *satipaṭṭhānas* seem to be more comprehensive and cause less confusion than *kāyagatā sati*, which some people may take to mean mindfulness of the physical body.

4. The four *satipaṭṭhānas* emphasized as the Buddha’s final teaching

While the Chinese parallel to the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* in the *Ekottara Āgama* has its setting in Sāvatti (舍衛國, T 2, 568a), the setting given in the

Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda versions of this text is Kammāsadhamma (MN I 55; 劍磨瑟曇, T 1, 582b) of the Kuru country, which may imply that these two versions were supposed by their compilers to have been composed at a rather late time. The Kuru country, whose capital was near the modern Delhi,¹²⁶ was located very far to the west of where the Buddha carried out most of his ministry (see the map near the front of the book). It is even more remote than Saṅkassa (or Saṅkissa, Skt Sāṃkāśya), a place which according to the tradition was visited by the Buddha,¹²⁷ and the visit has been doubted by some scholars because of its long distance from the heartland of Buddhism at that time.¹²⁸ Hirakawa (1991: 259) even argues: “Kosambī was the furthest west to which the Buddha himself visited and preached the Dharma during his ministry,”¹²⁹ while Saṅkassa was located even further west than Kosambī (Kauśāmbī).¹³⁰

Several *suttas* are said to have been delivered in Kammāsadhamma.¹³¹ Ven. Thich Minh Chau (1991: 55) points out that more texts in the Chinese *Madhyama Āgama* than in the Pali *Majjhima Nikāya* have their settings in Kammāsadhamma, and he suggests that this is because the Sarvāstivādins preferred places related to their stronghold or their own native places.¹³² In other words, the compilers’ regional sense might have affected the selection of settings for the *suttas*. Thus it is possible that the compilers started to include Kammāsadhamma as a setting in the Canon when Buddhism had spread to the northwest, which could have happened after the Buddha’s death. On the other hand, Mayeda (1964: 69) argues that the Buddha’s visit to the Kuru country must be a fact since this is recorded in many early texts and they cannot be denied altogether.

In any case, the location of Kuru has led some scholars to speculate about the lateness of the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. Lily de Silva (n.d.: 3–4) holds that the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* was not preached “until the *Dhamma* spread from its original seat of Magadha to the outskirts of the Kuru country.” Ven. Anālayo (2003: 16) says, “[T]he detailed instructions found in the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta* and the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* apparently belong to a later period, when the Buddha’s teaching had spread from the Ganges valley to the distant Kammāsadhamma in the Kuru country, where both discourses were spoken.” The narrative framework, however, could have been arbitrarily set up in the compilation of the Canon, as Gombrich (1990b: 22) points out: “In its account of how the Canon came to be compiled, at the First Council, the introduction to the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* frankly says that words of the narrative portions were inserted on that occasion, and thus clearly distinguishes between the words attributed to the Buddha and their settings.” Therefore the setting of a *sutta* may not tell us the exact place and time at which it was delivered. Nevertheless, the setting of the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* at least suggests that the compilers of these two schools may have considered or believed this discourse to have been delivered at a rather late time. Likewise, the following

investigation of the settings of the *suttas* in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* demonstrates that, apart from the *suttas* with unidentified settings, all of those discourses were supposed to have been given at a later or the last stage of the Buddha's lifetime or even after his death.

The second half of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* is comprised of fifty-four *suttas* which give no settings and are modeled on the same stock formulae as those in several other *Saṃyuttas* of the *Mahāvagga* in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*.¹³³ The settings of the first fifty *suttas* in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* can be listed as follows (figures refer to *sutta* numbers):

Sāvatthi: 3, 5, 10, 11, (13), 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 48, 49

Ambapālī's Grove in Vesālī: 1, 2

Beluvagāmaka in Vesālī: 9

Pāvārika's Mango Grove in Nālandā: 12

Ukkacelā: 14

Sāvatthi¹³⁴: 13

(The above are delivered shortly before the Buddha's death.)

Pāṭaliputta: 21, 22, 23 (delivered shortly before or after the Buddha's death)

Uruvelā: 18 (not proclaimed until much later after the Buddha's enlightenment)

Sālā: 4

Sedaka: 19, 20

Sāketa: 26, 27, 28

Rājagaha: 29, 30

(Time is unidentified in the above *suttas*.)

Setting not given: 6, 7, 8, 33, 38, 39, 40, 42, 45, 46, 47, 50

The occurrence of Sāvatthi as the setting is remarkably frequent, in 21 out of the 50 *suttas*. According to the later tradition, during his forty-five year-long ministry the Buddha was traveling without a regular dwelling for the first twenty years, but from then on he settled in Sāvatthi.¹³⁵ This may explain why so many *suttas* were set in Sāvatthi. On the other hand, Schopen's (1997) research may cast some light on this issue. He cited the following passage from the *Kṣudrakavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* (tr. Schopen, 1997: 575):

The Blessed One said: "Upāli, those who forget the name of the place, etc., must declare it was one or another of the six great cities, or somewhere where the Tathāgata stayed many times. If he forgets

the name of the king, he must declare it was Prasenajit; if the name of the householder, that it was Anāthapiṇḍada; of the lay-sister, that it was Mṛgāramātā.”

Schopen (1997: 575–576) says that the two categories, “places where the Buddha stayed many times” and “the six great cities,” are almost coterminous. He (p. 576) points out that the range of options among the six cities is severely restricted by the additional provisions. If the name of a king or householder or female lay follower is lost, it must be replaced with the names Prasenajit, Anāthapiṇḍada or Mṛgāramātā, while all these three were from Śrāvastī (Pali Sāvatthi). Therefore the rules set in the passage cited above from the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* clearly favor Śrāvastī. Schopen (1997: 578) says, “[A]ssuming even a moderate operation of such rules, we should find a *sutta* literature dominated by Śrāvastī, and that is exactly what we find in the Pāli collection.” He gives several examples, such as (1) Gokhale (1982: 10) finds that 593 out of 1009 texts in his sample are set in Sāvatthi; (2) in Ven. Thich Minh Chau’s (1991: 52–56) analysis of the Chinese *Madhyama Āgama*, 44 out of 98¹³⁶ *sūtras* are set in Śrāvastī. Schopen (1997: 579) concludes: “The shape of all our collections would, moreover, seem to suggest that redactional rules very similar to those in the *Kṣudrakavastu* operated in all traditions or monastic groups, even if the Mūlasarvāstivādin version is the only one so far discovered.” The extraordinarily frequent occurrence of Sāvatthi as the setting in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* probably results from the application of such rules, and so the *suttas* with this setting will not be taken into account in our discussion of the dating of the *suttas*.

Of the remaining *suttas*, three are found in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (DN II 72–168), traditionally the account of the Buddha’s last days: *sutta* 2¹³⁷ is found at DN II 94–95; *sutta* 9¹³⁸ is found at DN II 98–101; *sutta* 12¹³⁹ without the last paragraph is found at DN II 81–83. *Sutta* 14¹⁴⁰ is set on the occasion of Sāriputta’s and Moggallāna’s deaths. Since the above *sutta* 12, an account of Sāriputta’s lion’s roar, is included in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, the account in *sutta* 14 must be regarded as even later during the Buddha’s last days. In this connection it would be interesting to discuss *sutta* 13. According to this text, the Buddha was staying in Sāvatthi when Ānanda brought him the news of Sāriputta’s death and the Buddha gave instruction on how to dwell with oneself and the Dhamma as one’s island and refuge, which is explained by the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. The same instruction is also found in *sutta* 14 and in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (DN II 100). Sāriputta’s death and the occurrence of this instruction suggest that the account in *sutta* 13 is intended to be set during the Buddha’s final journey, but the setting of the *sutta* in Sāvatthi causes problems with regard to chronology. This is noticed by Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1924, note 157):

In the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, Sāriputta's lion's roar (just above) takes place during what appears to be the Buddha's final journey along the route from Rājagaha to Vesālī. From Vesālī the Buddha heads towards Kusinārā without ever returning to Sāvattthi, some 200 km to the west. Yet the present sutta shows the Buddha residing at Sāvattthi when he receives the news of Sāriputta's death. To preserve the traditional chronology, the commentaries (Spk here, and Sv II 550) have the Buddha make an additional side trip to Sāvattthi following his rains retreat at Beluvagāmaka (see DN II 98–99), an excursion not mentioned in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*.

The explanation in the commentaries seems farfetched. The setting of this *sutta* in Sāvattthi may well be an outcome of applying rules like those in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*. The counterpart of this *sutta* in the Chinese *Samyukta Āgama* (*sūtra* 638) gives a different setting, stating that the Buddha was staying in Rājagaha (王舍城, T 2, 176b). In any case, it is beyond doubt that if the Buddha gave such instruction after Sāriputta's death, this must have taken place not long before the Buddha passed away.

Just like *sutta* 2, which is included in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, *sutta* 1 is set at Ambapālī's Grove in Vesālī. These two *suttas* were put together by the compilers presumably because they were considered to have been taught during the same period when the Buddha was staying there. There is no specific indication in the *Nikāyas* that he visited Ambapālī's Grove at another time.¹⁴¹ According to the accounts given in the *Vinaya* (I 231–233) and the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (DN II 94–98), Ambapālī was converted by the Buddha and gave her grove to the Buddhist order shortly before his death.¹⁴² It is very unlikely that the Buddha stayed in this grove and gave *sutta* 1 there before she gave her grove to the Buddhist order.

Three *suttas* (21, 22, 23) are set in Pāṭaliputta, where Ānanda and Bhadda carry on dialogues. According to the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (DN II 84ff.) and the *Vinaya* (I 226ff.), during the Buddha's final journey this city was a mere village called Pāṭaligāma,¹⁴³ and he prophesies its prosperity and perils by calling it Pāṭaliputta.¹⁴⁴ In all of the other *suttas* in the *Nikāyas* mentioning the city Pāṭaliputta,¹⁴⁵ only the Buddha's disciples appear on the scene but not the Buddha himself. One of these *suttas* even records that a monk Udena told a Brahmin about the Buddha's death.¹⁴⁶ In the light of these facts, the three *suttas* in question must be meant to be events that occurred after the Buddha had passed away or when he visited Pāṭaligāma during his final journey. The contents of two of the three *suttas* also reflect this historical background. In *sutta* 22 whether or not the true Dhamma can endure after a Tathāgata has passed away is said to depend on whether the four *sati-paṭṭhānas* are cultivated or not. *Sutta* 23 talks about the decline of the true Dhamma in a similar way. These *suttas* imply the awareness of crisis among the Buddha's disciples who had already lost or were about to lose their master.

To sum up, a total of nine *suttas* are set at the time shortly before or even after the Buddha's death.

In *sutta* 18, when the Buddha had just become enlightened in Uruvelā, he reflected on the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, which were expressed by the *ekāyana* formula and the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula. Then Brahmā Sahampati appeared before the Buddha, repeated the contents of the Buddha's reflection, and uttered a verse in conclusion. The whole *sutta* makes no mention of the Buddha's preaching. This *sutta* is almost identical with *sutta* 43, except that *sutta* 43 is set in Sāvattī, where the content of *sutta* 18 becomes the Buddha's preaching in the form of retrospection. These two *suttas* imply that the Buddha did not preach the four *satipaṭṭhānas* immediately after his enlightenment although he was awake to them. He revealed this experience of his some time later, according to *sutta* 43 in Sāvattī, which probably also denotes a forgotten setting. These two texts seem to imply that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* represent a rather late teaching.

Lastly, *sutta* 4 is set in Sālā and *suttas* 19, 20 are set in Sedaka. There seems to be no information about when the Buddha visited these two places. In the three *suttas* set in Sāketa (26, 27, 28) and two in Rājagaha (29, 30), the Buddha does not appear but only his disciples carry on dialogues or give sermons. There is no other information on when the events in these *suttas* may have taken place.

In conclusion, among the settings of the *suttas* in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta*, all those which appear to be valid or identifiable point to a rather late period in the Buddha's lifetime or even after his death. Although this does not mean that these discourses were actually delivered at the exact places or time given in these *suttas*, it may suggest that the compilers of these texts "remembered" or believed that these discourses on the four *satipaṭṭhānas* were delivered rather late. This probably reflects the possibility that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* were particularly emphasized by the Buddha at a later stage in his teaching career. Besides, the arrangement of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* also gives a similar sign. C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1936: 257–258) states:

Yet, if we turn to the Fours lists in the Fourth Collection . . . we see that these four *sati*-practices are *missing from the Fours*! They first occur in the Fives, of course, not as titular, but incidentally only, and subsequently. The only occurrence of the term *satipaṭṭhāna* in the Fours is almost an anticipation of a formula not yet drafted: "By himself he makes mindfulness present, and causes another to practice in making it present." Is not this, taken together, suggesting to us that, when the Fours were (orally) collected in the gradual compiling of the Fourth Collection, the formula known as the Four Presences of Mindfulness was not yet drafted?

She seems to suggest that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* might not have been taught by the Buddha, and not even been formulated when the section on the “Fours” in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* was compiled. It is possible, however, that the Buddha taught this practice at a relatively late time, perhaps not long before he passed away, so that many disciples were not familiar with it. The early compilers of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* were probably among these people, and therefore the four *satipaṭṭhānas* did not assume a prominent role in their compilation of texts. Another possible reason for the omission of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* from the “Fours” is, as suggested by C.A.F. Rhys Davids herself earlier,¹⁴⁷ that the *Aṅguttara* and *Saṃyutta Nikāyas* were not independently compiled, so that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* and some other important tenets that are fully dealt with in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* are not included in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* under their own number.

The instructions on dwelling with oneself and the Dhamma as one’s island and refuge found in *suttas* 9, 13 and 14 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* and the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* show that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* were especially emphasized as his final teaching in his old age. This teaching, which is characterized by the term *ekāyana*, may represent the Buddha’s attempt to summarize or conclude his entire teaching on how to practice for the realization of the ultimate religious goal.

Conclusion

The place of mindfulness within the system of Buddhist doctrine

Hamilton (2000: 5) notes: “All systems of practice *are* based on theoretical underpinnings whether the latter are explicit or not. . . . there are *reasons why* the systems of practice are thought to be efficacious in achieving their aim.” On the basis of textual analysis of Pali, Chinese, and Sanskrit sources, Buddhist philosophy aided by modern psychology offers a valuable perspective on why the practice of mindfulness (*sati*) is efficacious in achieving the soteriological aim. The essence of *sati* consists in the proper functioning of *saññā*, the critical point in the cognitive process. *Sati* prevents *saññā* from going astray to conceptual proliferation (*papañca*) and thereby develops a wholesome process of cognition conducive to the gnosis (*vijjā*) that brings about liberation. The transformation of *saññā* by *sati* also prevents feelings from developing into emotional agitation, which causes the underlying tendencies (*anusaya*) to lie latent in a person and bind him to the round of rebirths. *Sati* conducts the wholesome functioning of *saññā* so that one can properly identify reality, abandon wrong views and maintain emotional equanimity, *upekkhā*. The path to liberation through the four *jhānas* represents a systematic process of refining the cognitive apparatus and reducing emotional disturbance in order to prepare the mind for the ultimate goal, and *sati* is essential to this process.

In the light of the relationship between *sati* and *saññā*, we can classify *sati* according to the different ways in which it functions in practice. It can be simple awareness, protective awareness, introspective awareness, or it can deliberately form conceptions. *Sati* was taught in diverse forms in early Buddhism. It can be concluded that *sati* serves as a general guideline or a fundamental principle that is to be applied to various practices, including *samatha* and *vipassanā* meditation as well as daily activities. Mindfulness of breathing in the form of sixteen exercises correlated with the four *satipaṭṭhānas* illustrates how *samatha* and *vipassanā* can be brought together to achieve the religious aim. The practice of mindfulness is not only concerned with oneself, but it can also be altruistic. The process of developing loving kindness (*mettā*) is a type of mindfulness that should be practiced to form one’s ethical attitude towards all beings.

Examination of the settings of *suttas* in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* suggests that the Buddha probably started to preach the four *satipaṭṭhānas* (establishments of mindfulness) at a late stage in his teaching career, and particularly emphasized it as his final teaching. The scheme of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* was promoted as the paradigm for the practice of mindfulness in early Buddhism. In the Canon it is given as the explanation for the faculty of mindfulness (*satindriya*)¹ and for right mindfulness (*sammāsati*).² Mindfulness of breathing (*ānāpānasati*) is also often expounded by way of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. The four *satipaṭṭhānas* are prescribed as the method for developing all the seven enlightenment factors in the *Ānāpānasati Sutta* (MN III 85–87). The doctrines of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) and the aggregates (*khandha*) are linked to the causal analysis of the four subjects of *satipaṭṭhāna*.

In this book I put forward the theoretical underpinnings on which the practice of *kāyagatā sati* and of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are based. An investigation into the Pali and Chinese versions of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* demonstrates that the antecedent version of this text from which these two versions derived was a composite of extracts from different texts. The way in which that antecedent version was composed indicates that *kāyagatā sati* did not refer only to mindfulness concerning the physical body, as the Pali version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* and the later tradition suggest. At a later point when *kāyagatā sati* came to be understood as mindfulness concerning the physical body, the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* further provided essential material for the composition of the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. In fact, *kāyagatā sati* and the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are two different ways of formulating the teaching on *sati* according to different schemes of classification of phenomena, which cover the individual and the external world perceived. *Kāyagatā sati* is based on the analysis of our experienced world into the individual possessed of consciousness and all the objects external to him. The four *satipaṭṭhānas* provide an alternative classification of the empirical world which consists of personal physical and psychological conditions on the one hand (body, feelings, mind), and whatever objects are perceived through the Buddhist point of view on the other (*dhammas*). Both *kāyagatā sati* and the four *satipaṭṭhānas* concern subject-object interaction, where lies the crux of *saṃsāra* as well as Nirvana.

Can liberation be achieved through *sati* alone without *samatha*?

It is important to note that while many canonical passages show or imply that mindfulness or *satipaṭṭhāna* is closely related to *samatha* meditation or the aggregate of concentration, the later Theravāda tradition tends to restrict the scope of mindfulness, especially *satipaṭṭhāna*, to *vipassanā* meditation or development of wisdom. This is perhaps because of the tendency in the tradition to redefine “liberation by wisdom” (*paññāvimutti*) as being

liberated by insight alone without high meditative attainments, although “liberation by wisdom” originally did not mean so as demonstrated by Gombrich (1996: 96–134). A good example of such redefinition can be seen in the *Susīma Sutta* (SN II 119–128). In the Pali version of this *sutta* a number of monks claimed to be “liberated by wisdom” without any experience of the formless attainments or the development of the first five *abhiññās*. The commentary even takes a step further and glosses it as: “We are *jhāna*-less, dry-insight practitioners (*sukkha-vipassaka*), liberated by wisdom alone.”³ Another example is in the *Kīṭāgiri Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, where a person liberated by wisdom does not touch in person and stay in those peaceful liberations that are formless, transcending forms.⁴ Apparently those formless liberations refer to the four formless attainments.

As Cousins (1996: 57) points out, the references to arahants “liberated by wisdom” in the earlier texts (including the *Susīma Sutta*) seem mostly to say that they had not developed the formless attainments or the first five *abhiññās*,⁵ but the later tradition even accepts that there were such arahants who had not developed all or even any of the four *jhānas*.⁶ Gombrich (1996: 126) notes that a lack of the supernormal knowledges (*abhiññās*) may imply that the meditative attainments (i.e. attainments of the *jhānas*)⁷ which bestow those powers have not been reached. A similar way of redefining “liberation by wisdom” is also found in the Sarvāstivāda tradition preserved in the Chinese *Samyukta* and *Madhyama Āgamas*. In the Chinese version of the *Susīma Sutta* in the *Samyukta Āgama*, a monk who claims to be “liberated by wisdom” admits that he does not attain any of the four *jhānas* or the peaceful liberations that are formless, transcending forms.⁸ The Chinese version of the *Kīṭāgiri Sutta* in the *Madhyama Āgama* states that a monk liberated by wisdom does not touch in person (lit. with his body) and stay in the eight liberations.⁹ The last five of the eight liberations are the four formless attainments and the attainment of cessation. According to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the first three liberations are connected to the first *jhāna*,¹⁰ while the second one even covers all the four *jhānas*.¹¹ But I have not found such explanations in either the four main *Nikāyas* or the *Āgamas*. In any case, in the Sarvāstivāda *Samyukta* and *Madhyama Āgamas*, “liberation by wisdom” has a broader sense than that in the Theravāda *Nikāyas*, in that the former covers not only those “liberated” without experiencing the formless attainments, but also those “liberated” without experiencing even lower levels of meditative attainments, the *jhānas*. As Ven. Sopāka (2004: 174–175, 255) points out, in accordance with the Theravāda version of the *Susīma Sutta*, this *sutta* as cited in the *Vinaya* of the Mahāsāṃghikas (T 22, 362b–363b) also says that those monks claimed to be “liberated by wisdom” without any experience of the formless attainments. This version of the story may go back to pre-sectarian times, that is, before the schism between the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviras. Then the Theravāda school which is still extant and the Sarvāstivāda school both derived from the Sthaviras, and the

former preserved the story shared by the Mahāsāṃghikas while the latter modified it. The idea of “liberation by wisdom” without experiencing any meditative attainments (even the *jhānas*) as presented in the Sarvāstivāda version of the *Susīma Sutta* and the Theravāda commentaries could be a later development, as Ven. Sōpāka (2004: 258) suggests.

This tendency to devalue concentration, whether the formless attainments or even the *jhānas*, may have affected the tradition’s interpretation of *sati* or *satipaṭṭhāna*, and therefore *sati* is dissociated from *samatha* or *saṃādhi* meditation. Ven. Rahula (1980: 271) maintains that *saṃādhi* is pre-Buddhist while *vipassanā-bhāvanā* is the true Buddhist meditation, and the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* is the most complete and important teaching on this true meditation. Similarly, Nyanaponika Thera (1962: 103) translates *sukkhavipassanā* as “Bare Insight,” by which he means “the exclusive meditative practice of it without a previous attainment of the Absorptions,” and he regards the *satipaṭṭhāna* as belonging to “Bare Insight.” However, the *Vibhaṅga*, a Theravāda *Abhidhamma* text, says that when a monk attains the first *jhāna* and contemplates the body (feelings, etc.) as a body (feelings, etc.), at that time *sati*, *anussati*, etc. are called “*satipaṭṭhāna*,”¹² and that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* may be connected with *vitakka*, *vicāra*, *pīti*, *sukha*, and *upekkhā*,¹³ which are characteristic of the *jhānas*. Similarly, the **Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* contains a section on a sophisticated exposition of how to practice the four *smṛtyupasthānas* in the context of the four *dhyānas* and the formless liberations.¹⁴ The tendency to dissociate *satipaṭṭhāna* from *samatha* is apparently a rather late development.

The Pali version of the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, which is highly venerated in the Theravāda tradition, may have some connection with this tendency. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Section 1, the four *jhānas* are included in the Sarvāstivāda version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, but they are missing in the Pali version. The Pali version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, almost identical with the first *satipaṭṭhāna* on the body in the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, also contains the four *jhānas*. The absence of the four *jhānas* in the Pali (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* and the refrain characteristic of *vipassanā* in the text may have led practitioners and scholars to regard *satipaṭṭhāna* as a purely insight meditation. For example, while discussing the relationship between concentration and insight, Griffiths (1981: 615) says, “[I]n the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta*, in both its DN and MN forms, we find the clear implication that *nibbāna* can be attained by the practice of mindfulness alone without the concentraton [*sic*] games involved in *saṃādhi-bhāvanā*.” In Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, however, we have seen that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are applied to concentration in many cases. Even in the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* itself, the last part of the statement of mindfulness of breathing refers to the attainment of the fourth *jhāna* as demonstrated in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.

Although mindfulness can be practiced outside the context of the *saṃatha* meditation, there is probably no explicit indication in the Canon that one

can achieve liberation by the practice of *sati* alone without the attainment of the *jhānas*. However, *vipassanā* is usually regarded by the tradition as the *sine qua non* of liberation while *samatha* is seen as only subordinate and not essential for the realization of nirvana.¹⁵ Since *satipaṭṭhāna* is generally identified by the tradition with *vipassanā*, a natural corollary is that liberation is to be attained by *satipaṭṭhāna* alone. A passage in the *Nikāyas* has been taken as having such an implication. It is the “*ekāyana* formula” found in the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* and *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta*. *Ekāyano maggo* is often rendered as “the one and only path” or “the only way.”¹⁶ Thus the four *satipaṭṭhānas* come to be understood as the only way to purify beings and realize nirvana, as Ven. Sīlānanda (2002: 9) interprets this formula:

The *satipaṭṭhāna* method helps to purify your minds. This is the only way for the purification of the minds of all beings. When you practice *vipassanā* meditation, you do not have greed or hatred or delusion or pride or other defilements . . .

As discussed in Chapter 5, Section 2.6, however, *ekāyana* in the context of *satipaṭṭhāna* is most likely to mean a point of convergence as it does in BU 2.4.11, where the simile “the ocean is the converging point of all the waters” is also analogous to the simile describing *kāyagatā sati* in the *Nikāyas*. It has also been demonstrated that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* and *kāyagatā sati* are just two different formulations of the same teaching with different emphases. The implication is that just as the ocean is the converging point of all the waters, the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, or *kāyagata sati*, include all the wholesome states conducive to gnosis (*viññā*), which states refer to *samatha* and *vipassanā* (see Chapter 5, Section 3). Rather than the “only way,” the term *ekāyano maggo* is meant to describe the four *satipaṭṭhānas* as a comprehensive or “all-inclusive” path, where various strands of practice converge, including development of both concentration and wisdom. This will not lead to the conclusion that the practice of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* alone without *samatha* meditation enables one to attain liberation. On the contrary, the *ekāyana* formula implies that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* have to be practiced in a comprehensive way in order to achieve nirvana. It is clearly stated in the *Dhammapada* that: “There is no *jhāna* for one who has no wisdom (*apaññassa*); there is no wisdom (*paññā*) for one who does not practice *jhāna*. He in whom there are *jhāna* and wisdom indeed comes into the presence of nirvana.”¹⁷

Sati is a general guideline for Buddhist practice, and is to be applied to different aspects of Buddhist practice. It is indispensable for the path to liberation, yoking *samatha* and *vipassanā* together. According to *sutta* 53 of the *Bojjhaṅga Saṃyutta* (SN V 112–115), as one of the seven enlightenment factors, *sati* is said to be always useful¹⁸ while the other six should be practiced only at appropriate times. In Buddhaghosa’s discussion of the five

faculties, strong *sati* is a regulating force which is needed in all instances to protect the mind from unwanted consequences due to an excess of any of the other four faculties, namely faith, energy, concentration and wisdom (Vism 130). A statement by Conze (1962: 51) may serve as a conclusion of this book:

If one were asked what distinguishes Buddhism from all other systems of thought, one would have to answer that it is the Dharma-theory and the stress laid on mindfulness. Mindfulness is not only the seventh of the steps of the holy eightfold path, the third of the five virtues, and the first of the seven limbs of enlightenment. On occasions it is almost equated with Buddhism itself.

Appendix 1

AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDA VERSION OF THE *SATIPAṬṬHĀNA SUTTA*

Introduction

Apart from the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* of MN and the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta* of DN in Pali, two other versions are preserved in Chinese translation. One of them is found in the *Madhyama Āgama* (中阿含[經]) and is entitled *Nianchu Jing* (念處經), which is equivalent to the Pali title “*Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*.” The other is the first discourse of the twelfth chapter (**Ekāyana-mārga Varga* 壹入道品) in the *Ekottara Āgama* (or *Ekottarika Āgama* 增壹阿含經). The following concerns the former Chinese version, which is more closely related to the Pali version than the latter.

The *Madhyama Āgama* (中阿含[經]) was translated into Chinese by Gautama Saṃghadeva in AD398.¹ from Prakrit or some Middle Indic language.² Widespread agreement has been reached in attributing the *Madhyama Āgama* to the Sarvāstivāda school.³ Some unique expressions in this text will be shown to be characteristic of this school.

The full text was translated into English by Ven. Thich Nhat Hanh (1990: 151–167), which is a groundbreaking contribution, but it does not tackle textual problems in depth. Ven. Thich Minh Chau (1991: 87–95) also made an abridged translation of the text. Here is an attempt to provide a critical translation of this important text, and to make sense of some difficulties in the Chinese text. This involves taking into account the features and styles of medieval Chinese, especially in the context of translating Buddhist scriptures from Indic languages into Chinese. Some words or passages in the text are compared with their Pali or Sanskrit counterparts for the purpose of clarification. Emendations are suggested where possible errors in transcription or printing occur.

The translation is based on the Taishō edition (which is a recension based on the Korean editions collated with the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions⁴) collated with the Jin and Qisha editions, which are the earliest editions available to me. The Jin and Qisha editions were printed in AD1173⁵ and 1234⁶ respectively when China was divided into two states. The Jin edition was printed in the Jin Dynasty in the North, and the Qisha was printed in

the Song Dynasty in the South. The Taishō edition is based on the Korean edition, and the Korean edition originates from the Jin edition.⁷ Similarly, several later editions are based on the Qisha edition.⁸ In this sense, the Jin and Qisha editions are very valuable in terms of producing a recension close to the original.

English Translation

[T 1, 582b] **The Discourse on the Establishments of Mindfulness, the second [discourse of] the Chapter on Cause (*Nidāna Varga) [in the] Madhyama Āgama** chanted [on] the second [day in] the small earthen city.⁹

(Preamble)

I have heard thus. On one occasion the Buddha dwelt¹⁰ among the Kurus¹¹ in Kammāsaddhamma, a town of the Kurus. At that time the World-honored One (世尊, **bhagavant* or *lokanātha*) told the monks: “There is ‘one path’ (一道, **ekāyana-magga*) which purifies beings, surmounts grief and fear, eliminates suffering and distress, abandons crying and weeping, and attains the true Dharma—namely the four establishments of mindfulness. The past Tathāgatas, free from attachment and perfectly enlightened, all destroyed the five hindrances, defilements of the mind and weakeners of wisdom, established [their] minds [and] dwelt properly in the four establishments of mindfulness,¹² cultivated the seven factors of enlightenment, and attained the unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment. The future Tathāgatas, free from attachment and perfectly enlightened, all will destroy the five hindrances, defilements of the mind and weakeners of wisdom, will establish [their] minds [and] dwell properly in the four establishments of mindfulness, will cultivate the seven factors of enlightenment, and will attain the unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment. Now I, the present Tathāgata, free from attachment and perfectly enlightened, also have destroyed the five hindrances, defilements of the mind and weakeners of wisdom, have established [my] mind [and] am dwelling properly in the four establishments of mindfulness, have cultivated the seven factors of enlightenment, and have attained the unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment. What are the four? The establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating the body as a body; likewise the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating feelings . . . mind . . . *dharma*s as *dharma*s.

(I. Contemplation of the Body)

(I. 1) What is the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating the body as a body? A monk, when walking, understands: “[I am] walking”; when standing, he understands: “[I am] standing”; when sitting, he understands: “[I am] sitting”; when lying down, he understands: “[I am] lying down”; when asleep, he understands: “[I am] asleep”; when awake, he understands: “[I am]

awake”; when asleep [and/or] awake, he understands: “[I am] asleep [and/or] awake.” Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge (**ñāṇa*), vision (**dassana*), and gnosis (**vijjā*).¹³ This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 2) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk is fully aware of going out and in, well observes and analyzes; he is fully aware of bending back and stretching [his limbs], stooping and raising [his head], his serene and solemn deportment, properly wearing his *saṅghāṭi* (僧伽梨)¹⁴ and [other] clothes [and carrying his] bowl,¹⁵ walking, standing, sitting, lying down, being asleep, being awake, speaking and keeping silent. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 3) Again, a monk contemplates the body as [582c] a body. When evil unwholesome thoughts arise, a monk severs and extinguishes [them] with wholesome *dharma* thoughts. Just as a carpenter or a carpenter’s apprentice holds an inked string and applies it to the wood, and then chops the wood with a sharp axe to straighten it, so when evil unwholesome thoughts arise, a monk severs and extinguishes [them] with wholesome *dharma* thoughts. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 4) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk, with his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the palate, restrains one mental state with [another] mental state, severs and extinguishes [another mental state].¹⁶ Just as two strong men seize a feeble man, grasping him randomly¹⁷ by any part [of his body] and beating him at will, so a monk, with his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the palate, restrains one mental state with [another] mental state, severs and extinguishes [another mental state]. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 5) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk, being mindful of breathing in, understands: “[I am] mindful of breathing in”; being mindful of breathing out, he understands: “[I am] mindful of breathing out.” Taking a long in-breath, he understands: “[I am] taking a long in-breath”; taking a

long out-breath, he understands: “[I am] taking a long out-breath.” Taking a short in-breath, he understands: “[I am] taking a short in-breath”; taking a short out-breath, he understands: “[I am] taking a short out-breath.” He learns to breathe in [perceiving] the whole body; he learns to breathe out [perceiving]¹⁸ the whole body. He learns to breathe in stopping bodily activity; he learns to breathe out stopping verbal¹⁹ activity. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 6) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion. Just as a skilled bath man fills a container with bath powder, and mixes [bath powder and] water into a lump, making water drench, moisten, pervade and fill [the lump] with no part unpervaded; so too a monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 7) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of concentration drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of concentration. Just as a spring in the mountain, clean and not muddy, [583a] is full and overflows, and there is no chance for water from the four directions to enter [the spring], and from the bottom of the spring water wells up spontaneously and spills over, drenches, moistens, pervades and fills the mountain with no part unpervaded; so too a monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of concentration drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of concentration. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 8) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk makes the pleasure born of the absence of rapture drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the pleasure born of the absence of rapture. Just as blue, red and white lotuses are born and grow in water, existing under water, so their roots, stems, flowers and leaves are all

drenched, moistened, pervaded and filled [with water] with no part unpervaded; so too a monk makes the pleasure born of the absence of rapture drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the pleasure born of the absence of rapture. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 9) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk resolves upon²⁰ pervading his body with the pure state of mind, attaining and dwelling²¹ [therein]; no part of his body is unpervaded by the pure state of mind. Just as a person is covered with a garment [measuring] seven cubits or a garment [measuring] eight cubits, [so that] no part of his body—from head to foot—is not covered; so too for a monk no part of his body is not pervaded by the pure state of mind. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 10) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk, attending to²² the conception of light, well grasps, well holds and well recollects what he attends to. As before, so after; as after, so before; as by day, so at night; as at night, so by day; as below, so above; as above, so below. Thus being unperturbed (**aviparyasta*), [his] mind is free from entanglement.²³ [He] develops a bright mind, and in the end [his] mind is not covered by darkness. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 11) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk well grasps the reviewing-sign and well recollects what he attends to.²⁴ Just as [583b] a person sits contemplating [another] person lying down, or lies down contemplating [another] person sitting; so a monk well grasps the reviewing-sign and well recollects what he attends to. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 12) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk, however his body is placed²⁵ as he likes or dislikes,²⁶ sees [his body] from head to foot [as] full of various kinds of impurity: “In this body of mine there are head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, rough [or/and] smooth thin skin, skin,²⁷ flesh,

sinews, bones, heart, kidney, liver, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, spleen, stomach, lumps of feces, brain, brain root²⁸, tears, sweat, snot, spittle (唾), pus, blood, fat, marrow, saliva (涎), phlegm²⁹, and urine. Just as a container is filled with some seeds, and a person with [unimpaired] eyes can see [them] all clearly, namely: “rice, millet seeds, and the seeds of turnips and mustard”; so too a monk, however his body is placed as he likes or dislikes, sees [his body] from head to foot [as] full of various kinds of impurity: “In this body of mine there are head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, rough [or/and] smooth thin skin, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, heart, kidney, liver, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, spleen, stomach, lumps of feces, brain, brain root, tears, sweat, snot, spittle, pus, blood, fat, marrow, saliva, phlegm, and urine. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 13) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk contemplates the elements of the body, [thinking:] “In this body of mine there are the earth element, the water element, the fire element, the wind element, the space element, and the consciousness element.”³⁰ Just as a butcher, having killed a cow and peeled its skin, spreads [it] on the ground and divides [it] into six pieces; so too a monk contemplates the elements of the body, [thinking:] “In this body of mine [there are] the earth element, the water element, the fire element, the wind element, the space element, and the consciousness element.” Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 14) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk sees that corpse which for one or two days, or even for six or seven days, has been pecked by crows and hawks, eaten by jackals and wolves, burnt by fire, or buried underground, or has totally decomposed and decayed; having seen it, he compares himself with it thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.” Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

Again, a monk [583c] contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground a skeleton that is blue, decomposed, half eaten³¹ with bones [lying] on the ground; having seen it, he compares himself with it thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.” Thus a monk contemplates

the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground [a skeleton] without skin, flesh and blood, connected only by sinews; having seen it, he compares himself with it thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.” Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground disconnected bones scattered in all directions—foot-bones, shin-bones, thigh-bones, hip-bones, back-bones, shoulder-bones, neck-bones, and the skull at different places; having seen them, he compares himself with them thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.” Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground bones that are as white as shells, or blue as the color of doves,³² or red as if smeared with blood, decayed and crumbled to dust; having seen them, he compares himself with them thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.” Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.” If a monk or a nun thus contemplates the body as a body little by little³³, this is called “the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating the body as a body.”

(II. Contemplation of Feelings)

What is the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating feelings as feelings? A monk, when feeling a pleasant feeling, understands that he feels a pleasant feeling. When feeling a painful feeling, he understands that he feels a painful feeling. When feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he understands that he feels a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. When feeling a pleasant [feeling of the] body . . . a painful [feeling of the] body . . . a neither-painful-nor-pleasant [feeling of the] body . . . a pleasant [feeling of the] mind . . . a painful [feeling of the] mind . . . a neither-painful-nor-pleasant [feeling of the] mind . . . a pleasant worldly³⁴ [feeling] . . . a

painful worldly [feeling] . . . a neither-painful-nor-pleasant worldly [feeling] . . . a pleasant unworldly³⁵ [feeling] . . . a painful unworldly [feeling] . . . a neither-painful-nor-pleasant unworldly [feeling] . . . a pleasant [feeling with] desire . . . a painful [feeling with] desire . . . a neither-painful-nor-pleasant [feeling with] desire . . . a pleasant feeling without desire . . . a painful [584a] feeling without desire . . . a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling without desire . . . , he understands that he feels a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling without desire. Thus a monk contemplates internal feelings as feelings, contemplates external feelings as feelings, and establishes mindfulness with regard to feelings, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates feelings as feelings.” If a monk or a nun thus contemplates feelings as feelings little by little, this is called “the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating feelings as feelings.”

(III. Contemplation of Mind)

What is the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating mind as mind? A monk understands as it actually is mind with desire as mind with desire; he understands as it actually is mind without desire as mind without desire . . . with hate . . . without hate . . . with delusion . . . without delusion . . . with defilement . . . without defilement . . . contracted . . . distracted . . . inferior . . . superior . . . little . . . great . . . cultivated . . . uncultivated . . . concentrated . . . unconcentrated . . . ; having an unliberated mind, he understands unliberated mind as it actually is; having a liberated mind, he understands liberated mind as it actually is. Thus a monk contemplates internal mind as mind, contemplates external mind as mind, and establishes mindfulness with regard to mind, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates mind as mind.” If a monk or a nun thus contemplates mind as mind little by little, this is called “the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating mind as mind.”

(IV. Contemplation of *Dharmas*)

(IV. 1) What is the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating *dharma*s as *dharma*s? With the eye and forms as condition,³⁶ there arise internal fetters. When fetters really exist internally, a monk understands this as it actually is: “fetters exist internally”; when fetters really do not exist internally, he understands this as it actually is: “fetters do not exist internally”; if there arise unarisen internal fetters, he understands this as it actually is; if arisen internal fetters have ceased and no longer arise, he understands this as it actually is. Thus the ear . . . the nose . . . the tongue . . . the body . . . With the mind and mind-objects as condition, there arise internal fetters. When fetters really exist internally, a monk understands this as it actually is: “fetters exist internally”; when fetters really do not exist internally, he understands this as it actually is: “fetters do not exist internally”; if there arise unarisen internal fetters, he understands this as it actually is; if arisen internal fetters

have ceased and no longer arise, he understands this as it actually is. Thus a monk contemplates internal *dharmas* as *dharmas*, contemplates external *dharmas* as *dharmas*, and establishes mindfulness with regard to *dharmas*, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates *dharmas* as *dharmas*,” namely the six internal bases.

(IV. 2) Again, a monk contemplates *dharmas* as *dharmas*. When desire really exists internally, a monk understands this as it actually is: “desire exists”; when desire really does not exist internally, he understands this as it actually is: “desire does not exist”; if there arises unarisen desire, he understands this as it actually is; if arisen desire has ceased and no longer arises, he understands this as it actually is. Thus anger . . . sleep . . . restlessness and remorse . . . When doubt really exists internally, he understands this as it actually is: “doubt exists”; when doubt really does not exist internally, a monk understands this as it actually is: “doubt does not exist”; if there arises unarisen doubt, he understands this as it actually is; if arisen doubt has ceased and no longer arises, he understands this [584b] as it actually is. Thus a monk contemplates internal *dharmas* as *dharmas*, contemplates external *dharmas* as *dharmas*, and establishes mindfulness with regard to *dharmas*, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates *dharmas* as *dharmas*,” namely the five hindrances.

(IV. 3) Again, a monk contemplates *dharmas* as *dharmas*. When the mindfulness enlightenment factor really exists internally, a monk understands this as it actually is: “the mindfulness enlightenment factor exists”; when the mindfulness enlightenment factor really does not exist internally, he understands this as it actually is: “the mindfulness enlightenment factor does not exist”; if there arises the unarisen mindfulness enlightenment factor, he understands this as it actually is; if the arisen mindfulness enlightenment factor abides, is not forgotten, does not decline, and is further developed and increased, then he understands this as it actually is. Thus discrimination of *dharmas* . . . energy . . . rapture . . . tranquility . . . concentration . . . When the equanimity enlightenment factor really exists internally, a monk understands this as it actually is: “the equanimity enlightenment factor exists”; when the equanimity enlightenment factor really does not exist internally, he understands this as it actually is: “the equanimity enlightenment factor does not exist”; if there arises the unarisen equanimity enlightenment factor, he understands this as it actually is; if the arisen equanimity enlightenment factor abides, is not forgotten, does not decline, and is further developed and increased, then he understands this as it actually is. Thus a monk contemplates internal *dharmas* as *dharmas*, contemplates external *dharmas* as *dharmas*, and establishes mindfulness with regard to *dharmas*, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates *dharmas* as *dharmas*,” namely the seven enlightenment factors. If a monk or a nun thus

contemplates *dhammas* as *dhammas* little by little, this is called “the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating *dhammas* as *dhammas*.”

(Coda)

If a monk or a nun establishes [his or her] mind [and] dwells properly in the four establishments of mindfulness for seven years, he or she will definitely attain [one of] two fruits: either attaining final wisdom here and now (*diṭṭhe dhamme*), or if there is a residue [of clinging]³⁷ (*upādisesa*), attaining the state of a non-returner (*anāgāmitā*). Let alone seven years, . . . six . . . five . . . four . . . three . . . two . . . one year, if a monk or a nun establishes [his or her] mind [and] dwells properly in the four establishments of mindfulness for seven months, he or she will definitely attain [one of] two fruits: either attaining final wisdom here and now, or if there is a residue [of clinging], attaining the state of a non-returner. Let alone seven months, . . . six . . . five . . . four . . . three . . . two . . . one month, if a monk or a nun establishes [his or her] mind [and] dwells properly in the four establishments of mindfulness for seven days and nights, he or she will definitely attain [one of] two fruits: either attaining final wisdom here and now, or if there is a residue [of clinging], attaining the state of a non-returner. Let alone seven days and nights, . . . six . . . five . . . four . . . three . . . two . . . Let alone one day and night, if a monk or a nun establishes [his or her] mind [and] dwells properly in the four establishments of mindfulness little by little for a brief moment, [after] thus practicing in the morning, he or she will definitely make progress in the evening, [or after] thus practicing in the evening, he or she will definitely make progress in the [following] morning.” The Buddha spoke thus. Those monks, having heard what the Buddha said, were delighted and practiced accordingly.

The Discourse on the Establishments of Mindfulness, the second [discourse], is finished.³⁸

Appendix 2

AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDA VERSION OF THE *KĀYAGATĀSATI SUTTA*

Introduction

Below is a translation of a text entitled *Nianshen Jing* (念身經), which is equivalent to the Pali title “*Kāyagatāsati Sutta*.” This text is included in the Chinese translation of the *Madhyama Āgama* (中阿含 [經]), which belongs to the Sarvāstivādins. For a general introduction, see Appendix 1. The Chinese version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* differs considerably from the Pali version, but it is largely ignored, and probably has not yet been translated into English by others.¹

English Translation

[T1, 554c] **The Discourse on Mindfulness of the Body, the tenth [discourse of] the Chapter on King Long-life² [in the] Madhyama Āgama** chanted [on] the second [day in] the small earthen city.

(Preamble)

I have heard thus. On one occasion the Buddha dwelt in the State of Aṅga, and went to Keniya’s residence at Āpaṇa with a large gathering of monks. Then when night had passed and dawn had broken, the World-honored One (**bhagavant*, *lokanātha*) dressed, took his bowl, entered Āpaṇa to beg for food. After finishing his meal in the afternoon, he put away his robe and bowl, washed his hands and feet, put a sitting mat (*nisīdana*) on his shoulder, and went to a forest. Having entered that forest and reached the foot of a tree, he laid out the sitting mat and sat cross-legged.

At that time many monks, after lunch, gathered sitting in a preaching hall and discussed this matter: “Virtuous ones! The World-honored One is marvelous and extraordinary. He practices mindfulness of the body, analyzes and widely spreads it, thoroughly knows, thoroughly contemplates, thoroughly practices and thoroughly protects it. He is well possessed of good conduct,³ dwelling in a state of concentrated mind. The Buddha says that mindfulness of the body is of great fruit, [namely] obtaining the eye, possessing the sight and seeing the supreme truth.”

At that time the World-honored One, while sitting in meditation, with his pure divine ear surpassing humans he heard the monks, after lunch, gathering and sitting in a preaching hall, and discussing this matter: “Virtuous ones! The World-honored One is marvelous and extraordinary. He practices mindfulness of the body, analyzes and widely spreads it, thoroughly knows, thoroughly contemplates, thoroughly practices and thoroughly protects it. He is well possessed of right conduct, dwelling in a state of concentrated mind. The Buddha says that mindfulness of the body is of great fruit, [namely] obtaining the eye, possessing the sight and seeing the supreme truth.” Having heard thus, the World-honored One got up from sitting meditation in the late afternoon,⁴ went to the preaching hall, laid out his seat, and sat in front of the crowd of monks.

Then the World-honored One addressed the monks: “What matter were you discussing before? For what matter are you gathering and sitting in the preaching hall?” Then the monks said, [555a] “World-honored One, we monks, after lunch, gathered sitting in the preaching hall, and discussed this matter: ‘Virtuous ones! The World-honored One is marvelous and extraordinary. He practices mindfulness of the body, analyzes and widely spreads it, thoroughly knows, thoroughly contemplates, thoroughly practices and thoroughly protects it. He is well possessed of right conduct, dwelling in a state of concentrated mind. The Buddha says that mindfulness of the body is of great fruit, [namely] obtaining the eye, possessing the sight and seeing the supreme truth.’ World-honored One, we discussed such a matter before. For this matter we are gathering and sitting in the preaching hall.”

The World-honored One addressed the monks again: “Why did I say that practicing mindfulness of the body, analyzing and widely spreading it conduces to great fruit?” Then the monks addressed the World-honored One: “The World-honored One is the root of the Dharma; the World-honored One is the lord of the Dharma; the Dharma is from the World-honored One. We wish [him] to preach it. Having heard, we will be able to understand the meaning comprehensively.” Thus the Buddha said, “You listen carefully! Think about it well! I shall analyze its meaning for you.” Then the monks received the instruction and listened.

(The Main Discourse)

(1) The Buddha said, “How does a monk practice mindfulness of the body? A monk, when walking, understands: “[I am] walking”; when standing, he understands: “[I am] standing”; when sitting, he understands: “[I am] sitting”; when lying down, he understands: “[I am] lying down”; when asleep, he understands: “[I am] asleep”; when awake, he understands: “[I am] awake”; when asleep [and/or] awake, he understands: “[I am] asleep [and/or] awake”.

Thus however his body behaves,⁵ a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements (**upakkilesa*)⁶ in the mind, and obtains a concentrated

mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(2) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk is fully aware of going out and in, well observes and analyzes; he is fully aware of bending back and stretching [his limbs], stooping and raising [his head], his serene and solemn deportment, properly wearing his *saṅghāṭi* (僧伽梨)⁷ and [other] clothes [and carrying his] bowl, walking, standing, sitting, lying down, being asleep, being awake, speaking and keeping silent.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(3) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. When evil unwholesome thoughts arise, a monk severs and extinguishes [them] with wholesome *dharma* thoughts. Just as a carpenter or a carpenter’s apprentice holds an inked string and applies it to the wood, and then chops the wood with a sharp axe to straighten it, so when evil unwholesome thoughts arise, a monk severs and extinguishes [them] with wholesome *dharma* thoughts.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices [555b] diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(4) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk, with his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the palate, restrains one mental state with [another] mental state, severs and extinguishes [another mental state].⁸ Just as two strong men seize a feeble man, grasping him randomly by any part [of his body] and beating him at will, so a monk, with his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the palate, restrains one mental state with [another] mental state, severs and extinguishes [another mental state].

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(5) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk, being mindful of breathing in, understands: “[I am] mindful of breathing in”; being mindful of breathing out, he understands: “[I am] mindful of breathing out.” Taking a long in-breath, he understands: “[I am] taking a long in-breath”; taking a long out-breath, he understands: “[I am] taking a long out-breath.” Taking a short in-breath, he understands: “[I am] taking a short in-breath”;

taking a short out-breath, he understands: "[I am] taking a short out-breath." He learns to breathe in [perceiving]⁹ the whole body; he learns to breathe out [perceiving] the whole body. He learns to breathe in stopping bodily activity; he learns to breathe out stopping verbal¹⁰ activity.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by "a monk practices mindfulness of the body."

(6) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion. Just as a skilled bath man fills a container with bath powder, and mixes [bath powder and] water into a lump, making water drench, moisten, pervade and fill [the lump] with no part unpervaded; so too a monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by "a monk practices mindfulness of the body."

(7) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of concentration drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of concentration. Just as a spring in the mountain, extremely clean and clear,¹¹ is full and overflows, [555c] and there is no chance for water from the four directions to enter [the spring], and from the bottom of the spring water wells up spontaneously and spills over, drenches, moistens, pervades and fills the mountain with no part unpervaded; so too a monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of concentration drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of concentration.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by "a monk practices mindfulness of the body."

(8) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk makes the pleasure born of the absence of rapture drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the pleasure born of the absence of rapture. Just as blue, red and white lotuses are born and grow in water, existing under water, so their roots, stems, flowers and leaves are all

drenched, moistened, pervaded and filled [with water] with no part unpervaded; so too a monk makes the pleasure born of the absence of rapture drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the pleasure born of the absence of rapture.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(9) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk resolves upon pervading his body with the pure state of mind, attaining and dwelling [therein]; no part of his body is unpervaded by the pure state of mind. Just as a person is covered with a garment [measuring] seven cubits or a garment [measuring] eight cubits, [so that] no part of his body—from head to foot—is not covered; so too a monk resolves upon pervading his body with the pure state of mind, attaining and dwelling [therein];¹² no part of his body is unpervaded by the pure state of mind.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(10) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk, attending to¹³ the conception of light, well grasps, well holds and well recollects what he attends to. As before, so after; as after, so before; as by day, so at night; as at night, so by day; as below, so above; as above, so below. Thus being [556a] unperturbed, [his] mind is free from entanglement. [He] develops a bright mind, and in the end [his] mind is not covered by darkness.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(11) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk well grasps, well holds¹⁴ the reviewing-sign and well recollects what he attends to. Just as a person sits contemplating [another] person lying down, or lies down contemplating [another] person sitting; so a monk well grasps, well holds the reviewing-sign and well recollects what he attends to.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(12) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk, however his body is placed¹⁵ as he likes or dislikes, sees [his body] from head to foot [as] full of various kinds of impurity, namely: “In this body there are head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, rough [or/and] smooth thin skin, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, heart, kidney, liver, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, spleen, stomach, lumps of feces, brain, brain root, tears, sweat, snot, spittle (唾), pus, blood, fat, marrow, saliva (涎), phlegm,¹⁶ and urine. Just as a container is filled with some seeds, and a person with [unimpaired] eyes can see [them] all clearly, namely: “rice, millet seeds, barley, wheat, big and small sesames and beans,¹⁷ and the seeds of turnips and mustard”; so too a monk, however his body is placed as he likes or dislikes, sees [his body] from head to foot [as] full of various kinds of impurity, namely: “In this body there are head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, rough [or/and] smooth thin skin, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, heart, kidney, liver, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, spleen, stomach, lumps of feces, brain, brain root, tears, sweat, snot, spittle, pus, blood, fat, marrow, saliva, phlegm, and urine.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(13) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk contemplates the elements of the body, [thinking:] “In this body of mine there are the earth element, the water element, the fire element, the wind element, the space element, and the consciousness element.” Just as a butcher, having killed a cow and peeled its skin, spreads [it] on the ground and divides [it] into six pieces; so too a monk contemplates the elements of the body, [thinking:] “In this body of mine [there are] the earth element, the water element, the fire [556b] element, the wind element, the space element, and the consciousness element.”

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(14) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk sees that corpse which for one or two days, or even for six or seven days, has been pecked by crows and hawks, eaten by jackals and dogs,¹⁸ burnt by fire, or buried underground, or has totally decomposed and decayed; having seen it, he compares himself with it thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.”

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having

obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground a skeleton that is blue, decomposed, half eaten with bones [lying] on the ground; having seen it, he compares himself with it thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.”

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground [a skeleton] without skin, flesh and blood, connected only by sinews; having seen it, he compares himself with it thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.”

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground disconnected bones scattered in all directions—foot-bones, shin-bones, thigh-bones, hip-bones, back-bones, shoulder-bones, neck-bones, and the skull at different places; having seen them, he compares himself with them thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.”

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices [556c] diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground bones that are as white as shells, or blue as the color of doves, or red as if smeared with blood, decayed and crumbled to dust; having seen them, he compares himself with them thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.”

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(Similes)

If anyone thus practices mindfulness of the body and spreads it widely, it will encompass all those wholesome things (**dhamma*), namely the things that are components of enlightenment (**bodhi-pakkhiya-dhamma*). If he has mind and resolves on pervading [something] like the great ocean, those small rivers are all included in the ocean. [Likewise,] if anyone thus practices mindfulness of the body and spreads it widely, it will encompass all those wholesome things, namely the things that are components of enlightenment.¹⁹

If any recluses and Brahmins dwell without having properly established mindfulness of the body, with a limited mind (**paritta-citta*), Māro pāpimā²⁰ will surely be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body. This is as if there were a jug, empty inside and devoid of water, standing firmly on the ground. Suppose a person were to take water and pour it into the jug. What do you think, monks? Would that jug in such a case hold the water?" The monks replied: "Yes, it would, World-honored One. For what reason? It is empty and devoid of water and standing firmly on the ground, so it would surely hold." "Likewise, if any recluses and Brahmins dwell without having properly established mindfulness of the body, with limited mind, Māro pāpimā will surely be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body.

If any recluses and Brahmins dwell having properly established mindfulness of the body, with an immeasurable mind (**appamāṇa-citta*), Māro pāpimā will never be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are not devoid of mindfulness of the body. This is as if there were a jug, full of water, standing firmly on the ground. Suppose a person were to take water and pour it into the jug. What do you think, monks? Would that jug in such a case still hold [more] water?" The monks replied: "No, World-honored One. For what reason? That jug is full of water and standing firmly on the ground, so it would not hold." "Likewise, if any recluses and Brahmins [557a] dwell having properly established mindfulness of the body, with immeasurable mind, Māro pāpimā will never be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are not devoid of mindfulness of the body.

If any recluses and Brahmins dwell without having properly established mindfulness of the body, with limited mind, Māro pāpimā will surely be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body. This is as if a strong man were to throw a big heavy stone at wet mud. What do you think, monks? Would the mud take in [the stone?]" The monks replied: "Yes, it would, World-honored One. For what reason? The mud is wet and the stone is heavy, so [the mud] would surely take in [the stone]." "Likewise, if any recluses and Brahmins dwell without having properly established mindfulness of the body, with limited mind, Māro pāpimā will surely be able

to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body.

If any recluses and Brahmins dwell having properly established mindfulness of the body, with immeasurable mind, Māro pāpimā will never be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are not devoid of mindfulness of the body. This is as if a strong man were to throw a light feather ball at a stable door. What do you think, monks? Would that [door] take in [the ball]?” The monks replied: “No, World-honored One. For what reason? The feather ball is light and slow, while the door stands stably, so [the door] would not take in [the ball].” “Likewise, if any recluses and Brahmins dwell having properly established mindfulness of the body, with immeasurable mind, Māro pāpimā will never be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are not devoid of mindfulness of the body.

If any recluses and Brahmins dwell without having properly established mindfulness of the body, with limited mind, Māro pāpimā will surely be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body. This is as if a person seeking fire would take a dry wood as the base and drill it with a dry drill. What do you think, monks? Would that person make a fire in this way?” The monks replied: “Yes, he would, World-honored One. For what reason? He drills a dry wood with a dry drill, so he would surely make it.” “Likewise, if any recluses and Brahmins dwell without having properly established mindfulness of the body, with limited mind, Māro pāpimā will surely be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body.

If any recluses and Brahmins dwell having properly established mindfulness of the body, with immeasurable mind, Māro pāpimā [557b] will never be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are not devoid of mindfulness of the body. This is as if a person seeking fire would take a wet wood as the base and drill it with a wet drill. What do you think, monks? Would that person make a fire in this way?” The monks replied: “No, World-honored One. For what reason? He drills a wet wood with a wet drill, so he would not make it.” “Likewise, if any recluses and Brahmins dwell having properly established mindfulness of the body, with immeasurable mind, Māro pāpimā will never be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are not devoid of mindfulness of the body.

(Benefits)

It should be understood that there are eighteen benefits (**ānisaṃsa*) for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely. What eighteen? A monk is able to bear oppression by hunger, thirst, cold, heat, mosquitoes, gadflies, flies, fleas, wind and the sun, and can also bear

abusive remarks and thrashing; [if] his body suffers from diseases and feels extreme pain, and even if his life is about to end, he can endure all those disagreeable [feelings]. This is called the first benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk can endure the disagreeable. If the disagreeable arises, his mind never gets stuck. This is called the second benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk can endure dread. If dread arises, his mind never gets stuck. This is called the third benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, in a monk arise three unwholesome thoughts: thought of desire, thought of anger and thought of malice. If the three unwholesome thoughts arise, his mind never gets stuck. This is called the fourth²¹ benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk, secluded from desire, secluded from evil unwholesome states . . . attains and dwells in the fourth *jhāna*. These are called the fifth to the eighth²² benefits for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk has eradicated the three fetters, attains to [the fruit of] **sotāpanna* (須陀洹 *xutuohuan*, “stream-enterer”), will not fall into unwholesome states, is destined to enlightenment, will experience at most seven rebirths; having gone and come between the heavens and the human world seven times,²³ he puts an end to suffering. This is called the ninth benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk has eradicated the three fetters and attenuated lust, anger and delusion, attains to [the fruit of] “gone-and-come-once” (**sakadāgāmin*); having gone and come between the heavens and the human world once, he puts an end to suffering. This is called the tenth benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk has eradicated the five lower fetters, has been born in the other world, and then attains the final Nirvana, attains to the non-relapse state without returning to this world. [557c] This is called the eleventh benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk has peaceful liberation (**santa-vimokkha*), free from form, obtains the formless, witnesses in person and attains such concentration,²⁴ and dwells therein; and with insight through wisdom he understands the taints (**āsava*) and abandons the taints. This is called the twelfth²⁵ benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk [has obtained] the bases for supernatural power (*iddhipāda*), divine ear, knowledge of others’ minds, knowledge of past lives, knowledge of births and deaths, has eradicated the taints, attains liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom which are without the taints, in this very life attains the self-knowledge, self-awareness, self-witness and dwells therein. He

understands as it really is: “Birth has been destroyed, the holy life has been established, what should be done has been done, there will be no more experience of becoming.” This is called the thirteenth to eighteenth²⁶ benefits for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

It should be understood that one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely has these eighteen benefits.” The Buddha spoke thus. Those monks, having listened to what the Buddha said, were delighted and practiced accordingly.

The Discourse on Mindfulness of the Body, the tenth [discourse], is finished.²⁷

Appendix 3

A TABULAR COMPARISON OF THE PALI AND THE TWO CHINESE VERSIONS OF THE *SATIPAṬṬHĀNA SUTTA*

Pali: *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* of MN and *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta* of DN

Ch.1: 念處經 (= *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*) of the *Madhyama Āgama*

Ch.2: the first *sūtra* of 壹入道品 (**Ekāyana-mārga Varga*) of the *Ekottara Āgama*

I. CONTEMPLATION OF THE BODY

	Pali	Ch.1	Ch.2
mindfulness of breathing	✓	✓	
understanding the four postures	✓	✓	
acting in full awareness in daily life	✓	✓	
reviewing the body as full of various kinds of impurity	✓	✓	✓
reviewing the body by way of elements ¹	✓	✓	✓
contemplating a corpse in different states of decomposition	✓	✓	✓
extinguishing evil unwholesome thoughts with wholesome <i>dharma</i> thoughts		✓	
with teeth clenched and the tongue pressed against the palate, restraining one mental state with [another] mental state		✓	
the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion pervading the body		✓	
the rapture and pleasure born of concentration pervading the body		✓	
the pleasure born of the absence of rapture pervading the body		✓	
pervading the body with the pure state of mind		✓	
attending to the conception of light, and developing a bright mind		✓	

grasping the reviewing-sign and recollecting what he attends to	✓
--------------------------------------------------------------------	---

¹ Ch.1 has six elements, while Pali and Ch.2 has four.

II. CONTEMPLATION OF FEELINGS

	Pali	Ch.1	Ch.2
understanding: “I feel a pleasant (painful, neither-painful-nor-pleasant) feeling” when feeling a pleasant (painful, neither-painful- nor-pleasant) feeling	✓	✓	✓
understanding: “I feel a worldly ¹ pleasant (painful, neither-painful-nor-pleasant) feeling” when feeling a worldly pleasant (painful, neither-painful-nor-pleasant) feeling	✓	✓	✓
understanding: “I feel an unworldly ² pleasant (painful, neither-painful-nor-pleasant) feeling” when feeling an unworldly pleasant (painful, neither-painful-nor-pleasant) feeling	✓	✓	✓
understanding: “I feel a pleasant feeling” when feeling a pleasant feeling, not feeling a painful feeling			✓
understanding: “I feel a painful feeling” when feeling a painful feeling, not feeling a pleasant feeling			✓
understanding: “I feel a neither-painful-nor- pleasant feeling” when feeling a neither- painful-nor-pleasant feeling, without pain and happiness			✓
feeling a pleasant (painful, neither-painful- nor-pleasant) [feeling of] body		✓	
feeling a pleasant (painful, neither-painful- nor-pleasant) [feeling of] mind		✓	
feeling a pleasant (painful, neither-painful- nor-pleasant) [feeling with] desire		✓	
feeling a pleasant (painful, neither-painful- nor-pleasant) feeling without desire		✓	

¹ Pali *sāmisā*. Both Ch.1 and Ch.2 translate it as “food.”

² Pali *nirāmisā*. Both Ch.1 and Ch.2 translate it as “non-food.”

III. CONTEMPLATION OF MIND

	Pali	Ch.1	Ch.2
understanding mind with (without) lust as mind with (without) lust	✓	✓	✓
understanding mind with (without) hate as mind with (without) hate	✓	✓	✓
understanding mind with (without) delusion as mind with (without) delusion	✓	✓	✓
understanding contracted (distracted) mind as contracted (distracted) mind	✓	✓	✓
understanding exalted (unexalted) mind as exalted (unexalted) mind	✓	✓	✓
understanding surpassed (unsurpassed) mind as surpassed (unsurpassed) mind	✓	✓	✓
understanding concentrated (unconcentrated) mind as concentrated (unconcentrated) mind	✓	✓	✓
understanding liberated (unliberated) mind as liberated (unliberated) mind	✓	✓	✓
understanding defiled (undefiled) [mind] as defiled (undefiled) [mind]		✓	
understanding cultivated (uncultivated) [mind] as cultivated (uncultivated) [mind]		✓	
understanding having a (having no) passionate mind as having a (having no) passionate mind			✓
understanding having a (having no) disturbed mind as having a (having no) disturbed mind			✓
understanding having a (having no) pervaded mind as having a (having no) pervaded mind			✓
understanding having an (having no) immeasurable mind as having an (having no) immeasurable mind			✓

IV. CONTEMPLATION OF *DHAMMAS*

	Pali	Ch.1	Ch.2
the five hindrances	✓	✓	
the five aggregates	✓		
the six sense bases	✓	✓	
the seven enlightenment factors	✓	✓	✓
the four noble truths	✓		
the four <i>jhānas</i>			✓

GLOSSARY

This is a glossary of selected Pali and Sanskrit terms. Sanskrit equivalents to some of the Pali words are given in parentheses.

- Abhidhamma (Abhidharma)** “higher teaching,” one of the three divisions of the Buddhist canon recognized by many schools
abhiññā supernormal knowledge or power
Āgama a division of the *Sutta(Sūtra)-piṭaka* in the early Buddhist canon, roughly corresponding to the Pali *Nikāya*
ānāpānasati mindfulness of breathing
arahant (arhant) one who has attained nibbāna
āsava (āsrava) literally “influx”; taint, which binds sentient beings to *saṃsāra*
Brahmā a class of deities; the supreme God in Brahmanism
citta mind; state of mind
Dhamma (Dharma) truth; teaching
dhammas (dharma) phenomena; things; mental objects; [mental] states
jhāna (dhyāna) a meditative attainment, absorption
kāya body; individual
kāyagatā sati mindfulness directed to the individual
kāyasati synonym for *kāyagatā sati*
khandha aggregate
Mahāsāṃghika “a follower of the great community,” name of an early Buddhist school
Māra “Death,” personification of death and evil
nāmarūpa name-and-form
nibbāna (nirvāṇa) nirvana, the extinction of all *āsavas* and liberation from *saṃsāra*
Nikāya a division of the *Sutta-piṭaka* in the Pali canon
nimitta sign, object [of meditation]; cause
Piṭaka “basket,” referring to any of the three divisions of the Buddhist canon
saññā apperception, conception
samādhi concentration
samatha serenity [meditation]
saṃsāra the round of rebirths

- Samyutta*** “connected”, group of connected *suttas* as a section of SN
- Saṅgha/Saṃgha** the Buddhist order
- saṅkhāra/saṃkhāra*** volitional formation; a conditioned thing
- Sarvāstivāda** “the doctrine that all exists,” name of an early Buddhist school
- satipaṭṭhāna (smṛtyupasthāna)*** establishment of mindfulness
- sati-sampajañña*** mindfulness and full awareness
- sutta (sūtra)*** a discourse attributed to the Buddha or his disciples
- Sutta(Sūtra)-piṭaka*** “basket of *suttas*,” one of the three divisions of the Buddhist canon
- Tathāgata** “Thus come” or “Thus gone,” an epithet of the Buddha
- Theravāda** “the doctrine of the elders,” name of a Buddhist school
- Upaniṣads** a class of Brahmanical texts aiming at revealing the secret meaning of the Vedas
- vagga (varga)*** chapter
- Vaibhāṣika** a Sarvāstivādin following the *Vibhāṣa* treatises
- Vinaya** “(monastic) discipline,” one of the three divisions of the Buddhist canon
- viññāṇa*** consciousness
- vipassanā*** insight [meditation]
- Yogācāra** “Yoga practice,” name of a school of Mahāyāna Buddhism

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

- 1 e.g. Nyanaponika, 1962; Thich Nhat Hanh, 1990; Goenka, 1998; Gunaratana, 2002; Silānanda, 2002.
- 2 SN V 180.
- 3 By searching CSCD and CBETA.
- 4 Willemen *et al*, 1998: 38; Lamotte, 1988: 13; Hirakawa, 1991: 253.
- 5 Hirakawa, 1990: 22–23; Norman, 1991.
- 6 Mhv V 1–4 (p. 28); Dīp V 16ff. (p. 35f.).
- 7 T 49, 15a.
- 8 T 49, 15a.
- 9 Mhv V 19–21 (p. 30); Dīp VI 1 (p. 41), VI 19–22 (p. 43).
- 10 cf. also Lamotte, 1988: 156.
- 11 De Jong (1981: 108) demonstrates that the *Samyukta Āgama* was translated from a Sanskrit original. (I am indebted to Ven. Anālayo for this reference.) The other three *Āgamas* are considered to have come from Prakrit originals: For the *Dirgha Āgama*, see Karashima (1994: 51); for the *Madhyama Āgama*, see Waldschmidt (1980: 137), von Hinüber (1982: 246), Ven. Anālayo (2006b: 5); for the *Ekottara Āgama*, see Mayeda (1985: 103).
- 12 Lü, 1963: 242; Kumoi, 1963: 248; Ui, 1965: 136; Enomoto, 1984; Thich Minh Chau, 1991: 18–27.
- 13 Kumoi, 1963: 248; Ui, 1965: 136; Hiraoka, 2000: 501.
- 14 Lü, 1963: 242; Enomoto, 1984.
- 15 Lü, 1963: 242; Kumoi, 1963: 248; Ui, 1965: 135; Waldschmidt, 1980: 136; Salomon 1999: 173–174.
- 16 Lü, 1963: 242; Kumoi, 1963: 247; Ui, 1965: 138; Lamotte, 1988: 154.
- 17 Reference given by Von Hinüber (1997: 64): E. Frauwallner (1971): “Abhidharma-Studien IV. Der Abhidharma der anderen Schulen,” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 15, p. 106.
- 18 Von Hinüber, 1997: 101; Norman, 1997: 150–151.
- 19 According to the Theravāda tradition, the canonical texts were first written down in the first century BC in Sri Lanka (Bechert, 1991: 9). Gombrich (1990b: 29) says, “There has long been a general consensus that the earliest surviving Mahāyāna texts go back to the second or first century BC.” Norman (2006: 121) considers it to be likely that Hinayāna (the early schools’) texts were also being committed to writing, in North India if not in Sri Lanka, at that time.
- 20 Similarly, Winternitz (1933: 7) says, “It is possible that the canon was not compiled all at once, but at several meetings of the monks.”
- 21 Griffiths, 1983: 56; Gombrich, 1987: 77.
- 22 As illustrated by Gombrich (1987).

- 23 Olivelle, 1996: xxxvi.
 24 Gombrich, 1988: 59; Rahula, 2000: 17.
 25 Dhs § 62: *katamo tasmim samaye saikhārakkhandho hoti? phasso . . . sati . . . ye vā pana tasmim samaye aññe pi atthi paṭiccasamuppannā arūpino dhammā ṭhapetvā vedanākkhandham ṭhapetvā saññākkhandham ṭhapetvā viññānakkhandham ayaṃ tasmim samaye saikhārakkhandho hoti.*
 26 cf. also Nāṇamoli & Bodhi (1995: 38 and 40).
 27 e.g. Ven. Sīlānanda (2002: 9) says, “The *satipaṭṭhāna* method helps to purify your minds. This is the only way for the purification of the minds of all beings. When you practice *vipassanā* meditation. . . .”

1 MINDFULNESS IN SOTERIOLOGY: TRANSFORMATION OF COGNITION AND EMOTION

- 1 A large part of this section is cited from Kuan (2005a) with kind permission of *Satyābhisamaya: A Buddhist Studies Quarterly*.
- 2 cf. *The New Oxford Dictionary of English* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) s.v. apperception: “the mental process by which a person makes sense of an idea by assimilating it to the body of ideas he or she already possesses.”
- 3 As 110: *sā sañjānanalakkhaṇā paccabhiññānaraṣā.*
- 4 As 110: *aparo nayo . . . puna-sañjānana-paccaya-nimitta-karaṇa-rasā.* *Paccaya* is missing in Ee, but occurs in CSCD and is quoted by Nyanaponika (1998: 121).
- 5 Sanskrit words in parentheses are added by me. CU 7.13.1: *yadā vāva te smareyur, atha śṛṇuyur, atha manvīrann, atha vijānūran. smareṇa vai putrān vijānāti, smareṇa paśūn.*
- 6 Klaus (1992: 82), who translates *smara* as “attention,” argues that *smara* in this case does not mean “memory,” but refers to some disposition on which sensory perception depends, i.e. attention, awareness, or mindfulness.
- 7 SN V 198: *katamañ ca, bhikkhave, satindriyam? idha, bhikkhave, ariyasāvako, satimā hoti paramena satinepakkena samannāgato cirakatam pi cirabhāsitaṃ pi saritā anussaritā. so kāye kāyānupassī viharati. pe. vedanāsu . . . citte . . . dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhā-domanassaṃ.* cf. MN I 356.
- 8 *Sammāsati* in the context of the Noble Eightfold Path is also defined as the four *satipaṭṭhānas* at MN III 252.
- 9 AN III 24: *samādhim bhikkhave bhāvayataṃ appamāṇaṃ nipakāṇaṃ patis-satāṇaṃ pañca ṇāṇāni paccattaṃ yeva uppajanti.*
- 10 Mp III 231: *nipakā patissatā ti nepakkena ca satiyā ca samannāgatā hutvā.*
- 11 This will be discussed in Chapter 5, Section 2.1.
- 12 *Dhamma* here has been interpreted in two different ways. As discussed by Gethin (2001: 55, note 111) and von Rospatt (1995: 203f., note 433), *dhamma* here is taken by the commentaries to indicate the conditions for the arising and vanishing of the body, while the subcommentaries allow that it can mean “nature” (*jāti-dhamma*) here. (I am grateful to Dr R.M.L. Gethin for the above references) Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1927, note 178) holds that it is more consistent with the use of the suffix *-dhamma* elsewhere to take it as meaning “subject to” or “having the nature of” here. Von Rospatt also shares the same opinion. I agree with them.
- 13 e.g. MN I 56, 59, 60; SN V 183: *samudayadhammānupassī (vā) kāyasmim viharati, vāyadhammānupassī (vā) kāyasmim viharati, samudayavāyadhammānupassī (vā) kāyasmim viharati . . .*

- 14 e.g. MN I 56: *dīghaṃ vā assasanto: dīghaṃ assasāmi ti pajānāti*.
- 15 *Sara*, memory, is missing in Ee, but occurs in both CSCD and BJT. Since many words in this sentence also occur in an earlier paragraph of the same *sutta* (MN III 132), where we have *sarasamkappānaṃ* rather than just *samkappānaṃ* (thoughts), it is more coherent to also have *sarasamkappānaṃ* in this paragraph. This reading is supported by Nāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995: 995), who translate “memories and intentions” (*samkappa* can also mean “intention”).
- 16 Cousins (1992: 140) points out that *samkappa* arises dependent on *saññā* according to SN II 143ff. and MN II 27f.
- 17 MN III 136: *ime cattāro satipaṭṭhānā cetaso upanibandhanā honti gehasitānañ c’ eva sīlānaṃ abhinimmadanāya gehasitānañ c’ eva sarasamkappānaṃ* (BJT CSCD; *sara* is missing in Ee) *abhinimmadanāya* . . .
- 18 Hayes (2000: 13) states: “‘Cognition’ is the general term which we give to mental activities, such as remembering, forming concepts, using language or attending to things.”
- 19 AN V 109 = MN I 57: *imam eva kāyaṃ uddhaṃ pādatalā adho kesamatthakā tacapariyantam pūraṃ nānappakārassa asucino paccavekkhati* . . .
- 20 Norman (2006: 55) points out that the way in which group of synonyms were used to explain or elaborate concepts suggests that texts of this type were composed and then transmitted orally.
- 21 Similarly at AN IV 145ff., AN II 150. I am grateful to Dr Alexander Wynne for the reference.
- 22 AN V 111.
- 23 This argument could agree with the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. Dhs §§1–364 shows that *sati* exists in various wholesome states of mind (*kusala-citta*). In the *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, *sati* is one of the nineteen mental factors (*cetasika*) common to beauty (*sobhanasādhāraṇa*). Ven. Bodhi (1993: 85) explains that these nineteen mental factors are invariably present in all beautiful consciousness.
- 24 e.g. Dhs §§ 1–364 shows that *saññā* exists in various wholesome states of mind. Dhs §§ 365–427 shows that *saññā* exists in various unwholesome states of mind. Dhs §§ 431ff. shows that *saññā* exists in various indeterminate states of mind. In the *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, *saññā* is among the seven mental factors (*cetasika*) common to every consciousness (*sabbacittasādhāraṇa*) (Bodhi 1993: 77).
- 25 As I 122: *sati* . . . *thira-saññā-padaṭṭhānā*.
- 26 I am grateful to Dr R.M.L. Gethin for his advice on this point. I have assimilated it in my discussion above.
- 27 Verses 768, 771, 855, 916, 933, 962, 964, 973, 974, 975.
- 28 Verses 792, 802, 841, 847, 874, 886.
- 29 MN I 108: *yathāvādī kho āvuso sadevake loke samārake sabrahmake sasamaṇabrāhmaṇiṇiṃ pajāya sadevamanussāya na kenaci loke viggayha tiṭṭhati, yathā ca pana kāmehi viṣaṃyuttaṃ viharantaṃ taṃ brāhmaṇaṃ akathaṃkathim chinnakukkucçaṃ bhavābhava vītataṇhaṃ saññā nānuseñti, evaṃvādī kho ahaṃ āvuso evamakkhāyī ti*. cf. T 1, 603b.
- 30 Norman (1992: 133–134, 242) takes *bhavābhava* as a rhythmical lengthening for *bhavabhava* and translates it as “various existences.” But this fails to explain why rhythmical lengthening should occur in prose here in the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta*. He (p. 242) also indicates that as an alternative the commentary *Saddhammapajjotikā* takes this compound as *bhava+abhava*. The counterpart of the *Madhupiṇḍika Sutta* in the Chinese *Madhyama Āgama* also translates it as “existence, non-existence” (T 1, 603b: 有, 非有). It seems plausible to understand it as “existence, non-existence,” because craving is often said to be of three kinds (e.g. DN III 216, 275): craving for sensual pleasure (*kāmatanḥā*), craving

for existence (*bhavataṇhā*) and craving for non-existence (*vibhavataṇhā*). Moreover, Sn 778 says, “Having removed desire for both extremes . . .” (*ubhosu antesu vineyya chandaṃ* . . .). This is apparently in contrast with *avītatāṇhāse bhavābhavesu* in Sn 776 since both extremes (*ubho ante*) refers to “All exists” (*sabbam atthī ti*) and “All does not exist” (*sabbam n’ atthī ti*) at SN II 17. In addition, parallel to the phrase “*bhavadiṭṭhi ca vibhavadiṭṭhi ca*” found at DN III 212 and AN I 83, Sn 786 should be rendered as: “The purified one does not form a view (*diṭṭhi*) anywhere in the world in regard to existence and non-existence (*bhavābhavesu*)” rather than “. . . in regard to various existences.”

However, the *Mahānidessa* glosses *bhavābhavesu* as various existences or repeated existence (pp. 48–49 for Sn 776, p. 315 for Sn 901). *Bhavābhava* undoubtedly means “various existences” in some later texts, e.g. Ap 457 and Bv 35. (I am grateful to Mr. Cousins for the references.) Nevertheless, for the doctrinal reasons discussed above, *bhavābhava* in our case must mean “existence and non-existence.”

- 31 Sn 847: *saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā, paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā. saññā ca diṭṭhi ca ye aggahesuṃ te ghaṭṭayantā vicaranti loke ti.*
- 32 e.g. SN IV 208: *taṃ enaṃ dukkhāya vedanāya paṭighavantaṃ yo dukkhāya vedanāya paṭighānuso so anuseti.* MN I 433: *anuseti tv ev’ assa sakkāyadiṭṭhānuso.*
- 33 MN I 109–110: *yatonidānaṃ bhikkhu purisaṃ papañca-saññā-saṅkhā samudācaranti, ettha ce n’ atthi abhinanditabbaṃ abhivaditabbaṃ ajjhositabbaṃ es’ ev’ anto rāgānuso yānaṃ es’ ev’ anto paṭighānuso yānaṃ es’ ev’ anto diṭṭhānuso yānaṃ . . . es’ ev’ anto daṇḍādāna-satthādāna-kalaha-viggaha-vivādatuvantuva-pesuñña-musāvādānaṃ.*
- 34 Hamilton (1996: 18) says, “[O]ne might suggest that what is referred to by the terms *cakkhu*, *sota*, *ghāna* and so on is not primarily the sense organs eye, ear, nose, etc., but that the terms are to be interpreted figuratively as the faculties of vision, hearing, smell and so on.” The *Kathāvatthu* also criticizes the view that one sees with the physical organ eye. (Kv 573f.)
- 35 MN I 111–112: *cakkhuñ c’ āvuso paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvīññānaṃ, tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi, yaṃ vitakketi taṃ papañceti, yaṃ papañceti tatonidānaṃ purisaṃ papañca-saññā-saṅkhā samudācaranti atītānāgatapaccuppannesu cakkhuvīññeyyesu rūpesu.*
- 36 *saññānidānā hi papañcasamkhā.*
- 37 *na brāhmaṇo aññato suddhim āha diṭṭhe sute sīlavate mute vā.*
- 38 MN I 388: *sace kho paṇ’ assa evaṃ diṭṭhi hoti: iminā ’haṃ sīlena vā vatena vā tapena vā brahmacariyena vā devo vā bhavissāmi devaññataro vā ti, sā ’ssa hoti micchādiṭṭhi.*
- 39 *tassīdha diṭṭhe va sute mute vā pakappitā n’ atthi aṇṇ pi saññā.*
- 40 The *Mahānidessa* interprets this verse thus: *Na saññasaññī* means that he is not abiding in natural *saññā*. *Na visaññasaññī* means that he is not deranged nor is his mind disturbed. *No pi asaññī* means that he is not one who has attained *nirodha*, nor is he a being without *saññā*. *Na vibhūtasaññī* means that he is not one who achieves the four formless attainments. (Nidd I 279–280: *na saññasaññī na visaññasaññī ti. saññasaññīno vuccanti ye pakatisaññāya ṭhitā, na pi so pakatisaññāya ṭhito. visaññasaññīno vuccanti ummattakā ye ca khittacittā, na pi so ummattako, no pi khittacitto ti, na saññasaññī na visaññasaññī. no pi asaññī na vibhūtasaññī ti. asaññīno vuccanti nirodhasamāpānā ye ca asaññasattā, na pi so nirodhasamāpānno, no pi asaññasatto. vibhūtasaññīno vuccanti ye catunnaṃ arūpasamāpattīnaṃ lābhino, na pi so catunnaṃ arūpasamāpattīnaṃ lābhī ti*)

- 41 e.g. Gómez (1976: 144), Nakamura (1980b: 168), Norman (1992: 100), Lang (1994: 151).
- 42 Translation based on Bodhi, 2000: 1175. SN IV 73: *ettha ca te, mālukyaputta, diṭṭha-sutamutaviññātabbesu dhammesu diṭṭhe diṭṭhamattaṃ bhavissati, sute sutamattaṃ bhavissati, mute mutamattaṃ bhavissati, viññāte viññātamattaṃ bhavissati.*
- 43 This phrase *khīyati no pacīyati* has no subject. The commentary suggests suffering and defilement (Spk II 384: *khīyati ti khayaṃ gacchati. kiṃ taṃ? dukkhaṃ pi kilesa-jātaṃ pi.*). Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1177) chooses “suffering,” which I think is plausible because the next line has “for one who diminishes suffering” (*apacinato dukkhaṃ*). In addition, the first six verses have “for one who accumulates suffering” (*ācinato dukkhaṃ*), which appears to be in contrast with this phrase in the last six verses.
- 44 SN IV 73–75: *imassa khvāhaṃ, bhante, bhagavatā saṃkhittena bhāsitaṃ vitthārena atthaṃ ājānāmi:*
rūpaṃ disvā sati muṭṭhā, piyanimittaṃ manasikaroto.
sāratattito vedeti, taṃ ca ajjhosa tiṭṭhati.
tassa vaḍḍhanti vedanā anekā rūpasambhavā.
abhijjhā ca vihesā ca cittaṃ ass’ ūpahaññati (Ee assu pahaññati; emendation according to Bodhi, 2000: 1411; CSCD *assūpahaññati*).
evam ācinato dukkhaṃ, ārā nibbānaṃ vuccati (1) . . .
na so rajjati rūpesu, rūpaṃ disvā patissato.
virattacitto vedeti, taṃ ca nājjhosa tiṭṭhati.
yathāssa passato rūpaṃ, sevato cāpi vedanaṃ.
khīyati no pacīyati, evaṃ so carati sato.
evam apacinato dukkhaṃ, santike nibbānaṃ vuccati (7) . . .
- 45 *Viññātabba* is rephrased as *viññāta* in the passage quoted above (SN IV 73).
- 46 Vism 451: *rūpāyatanaṃ diṭṭhaṃ nāma dassanavisayattā, saddāyatanaṃ suttaṃ nāma savanavisayattā, gandha-rasa-phoṭṭhabbattaṃ mutaṃ nāma sampattagāhaka-indriyavisayattā, sesaṃ viññātaṃ nāma viññāṇass’ eva visayattā ti.*
- 47 See Chapter 4.
- 48 SN I 188: *saññāya vipariyesā cittaṃ te pariḍayhati. nimittam parivajjehi subhaṃ rāgūpasamhitaṃ . . . sati kāyagatā ty atthu . . .*
- 49 As will be discussed in Section 3.1, feeling (*vedanā*) can be divided into the original feeling and the secondary feeling. Feeling in this formula refers only to the former. The original feeling is neutral as it is the mere reception of sensory data, while the secondary feeling is the subsequent subjective reaction to the original one, and is conditioned by *saññā*.
- 50 Sn 916: *mūlaṃ papañcasamkhāyā ti bhagavā mantā asmī ti sabbam uparundhe.*
- 51 Sn 916: *yā kāci taṇhā ajjhattaṃ, tāsaṃ vinayā sadā sato sikkhe.*
- 52 AN IV 68–69: *“hoti tathāgato param maraṇā” ti kho bhikkhu taṇhāgatam etaṃ saññāgataṃ etaṃ maññitam etaṃ papañcitam etaṃ . . .*
- 53 DN III 137–138: *katame te cunda pubbanta-sahagatā diṭṭhinissayā ye vo mayā vyākataṃ yathā te vyākattabbā yathā ca te na vyākattabbā? santi cunda eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino: “sassato attā ca loko ca, idam eva saccaṃ moghaṃ aññaṃ ti” . . . “asassato attā ca loko ca . . .” . . .*
- 54 DN III 139–140: *katame ca te cunda aparanta-sahagatā diṭṭhinissayā ye vo mayā vyākataṃ yathā te vyākattabbā yathā ca te na vyākattabbā? santi cunda eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā evaṃvādino evaṃdiṭṭhino: “rūpī attā hoti arogo param maraṇā idam eva saccaṃ, moghaṃ aññaṃ ti” . . . “attā ucchiṇṇati vinassati, na hoti param maraṇā . . .”*
- 55 DN III 138, 139: *yaṃ ca kho te evaṃ āhaṃsu “idam eva saccaṃ, moghaṃ aññaṃ ti” taṃ tesam nānujānāmi. taṃ kissa hetu? aññathā-saññino pi h’ ettha cunda sant’ eke sattā.*

- 56 Luis O. Gómez (1976: 140) says, “Contrary to the customary insistence on ‘right views’ the *Aṭṭhakavagga* speaks of giving up *all* views.” But according to Sn 786 it seems that the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, just like other parts of the *Suttapīṭaka*, only denounces metaphysical views widely held by the Buddha’s contemporary religions, and does not deny right view in the Noble Eightfold Path.
- 57 DN III 141: *imesañ ca, cunda, pubbantasahagatānaṃ diṭṭhinissayānaṃ imesaṃ ca aparantasahagatānaṃ diṭṭhinissayānaṃ pahānāya samatikkamāya evaṃ mayā cattāro satipaṭṭhānā desitā paññattā. katame cattāro? idha, cunda, bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ. vedanāsu . . . citte . . . dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā, vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ.*
- 58 SN IV 232: *katamā ca, bhikkhave, chattiṃsa vedanā? cha gehasitāni somanassāni, cha nekkhammasitāni somanassāni, cha gehasitāni domanassāni, cha nekkhammasitāni domanassāni, cha gehasitā upekkhā cha nekkhammasitā upekkhā.*
- 59 The following translations are based on those of Nāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995: 1067–1070).
- 60 MN III 217: *tattha katamāni cha gehasitāni somanassāni? cakkhuvīññeyyānaṃ rūpānaṃ iṭṭhānaṃ kantānaṃ manāpānaṃ manoramānaṃ lokāmisappaṭisaṃyuttānaṃ paṭilābhaṃ vā paṭilābhato samanupassato pubbe vā paṭiladdhapubbaṃ atītaṃ niruddhaṃ vipariṇataṃ samanussarato uppajjati somanassaṃ . . .*
- 61 Nāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995: 1067ff.) translate *nekkhamma* as “renunciation.” PED (s.v. *nekkhamma*) takes this word as a derivation from *nikkhamma* (gerund of *nikkhamati*), equivalent to Sanskrit **naiṣkramya*, and gives a meaning “renunciation.” On the other hand, PED suggests that *nekkhamma* may be a bastard derivation from *nikkāma* (= Sanskrit **naiṣkāmya*), which means “desireless,” but the form should be *nekkamma*. In his discussion of this term, Gethin (2001: 192) argues: “[T]here appears to be no clear reason for thinking *nekkhamma*—as well as **nekkamma*—cannot stand for **naiṣkāmya*.” The Chinese translation is “absence of desire” (無欲 T 1, 692c–693b), which supports the latter etymological explanation. I am grateful to Dr Gethin for indicating to me the problems with this term.
- 62 MN III 217: *tattha katamāni cha nekkhammasitāni somanassāni? rūpānaṃ tv eva aniccataṃ viditvā vipariṇānavirāgaṇirodhaṃ, ‘pubbe c’ eva rūpā etarahi ca sabbe te rūpā aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammā’ ti evaṃ etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato uppajjati somanassaṃ . . .*
- 63 MN III 218: *tattha katamāni cha gehasitāni domanassāni? cakkhuvīññeyyānaṃ rūpānaṃ iṭṭhānaṃ kantānaṃ manāpānaṃ manoramānaṃ lokāmisappaṭisaṃyuttānaṃ appaṭilābhaṃ vā appaṭilābhato samanupassato pubbe vā appaṭiladdhapubbaṃ atītaṃ niruddhaṃ vipariṇataṃ samanussarato uppajjati domanassaṃ . . .*
- 64 MN III 218: *tattha katamāni cha nekkhammasitāni domanassāni? rūpānaṃ tv eva aniccataṃ viditvā vipariṇānavirāgaṇirodhaṃ, ‘pubbe c’ eva rūpā etarahi ca sabbe te rūpā aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammā’ ti evaṃ etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya disvā anuttareṣu vimokkhesu pihaṃ upaṭṭhāpeti—‘kudā ’ssu nāmi’ ahaṃ tad āyatanāṃ upasampajja viharissāmi yad ariyā etarahi āyatanāṃ upasampajja viharanti’ ti iti anuttareṣu vimokkhesu pihaṃ upaṭṭhāpayato uppajjati pihapaccayā domanassaṃ . . .*
- 65 Nāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995: 1069) translate: “who has not conquered his limitations or conquered the results [of action].” They take *-jina* as deriving from the root *ji*, “to conquer.” Norman (1992: 164), however, indicates that this case is possibly an example of the derivation of *-jina* < *jīna* (“to know”). This makes much better sense of the sentence in question.

- 66 MN III 219: *tattha katamā cha gehasitā upekkhā? cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā uppajjati* (BJT, CSCD; missing in Ee) *upekkhā bālassa mūlhassa puthujjanassa anodhijjassa avipākajinassa anādinavadassāvino assutavato puthujjanassa*. . . .
- 67 MN III 219: *tattha katamā cha nekkhammasitā upekkhā? rūpānaṃ tv eva aniccataṃ viditvā vipariṇāma virāgaṇi rodhaṃ, ‘pubbe c’ eva rūpā etarahi ca sabbe te rūpā aniccā dukkhā vipariṇāmadhammā’ ti evaṃ etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato uppajjati upekkhā*. . . .
- 68 MN III 220: M III 220: 1. *yāni cha nekkhammasitāni somanassāni tāni nissāya tāni āgama yāni cha gehasitāni somanassāni tāni pajahatha, tāni samatikkamatha* . . . 2. *yāni cha nekkhammasitāni domanassāni tāni nissāya tāni āgama yāni cha gehasitāni domanassāni tāni pajahatha, tāni samatikkamatha* . . . 3. *yā cha nekkhammasitā upekkhā tā nissāya tā āgama yā cha gehasitā upekkhā tā pajahatha, tā samatikkamatha* . . . 4. *yāni cha nekkhammasitāni somanassāni tāni nissāya tāni āgama yāni cha nekkhammasitāni domanassāni tāni pajahatha, tāni samatikkamatha* . . . 5. *yā cha nekkhammasitā upekkhā tā nissāya tā āgama yāni cha nekkhammasitāni somanassāni tāni pajahatha, tāni samatikkamatha* . . .
- 69 SN IV 208: *assutavā bhikkhave puthujjano dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno socati kilamati paridevati urattāṭṭikandati sammoham āpajjati. so dve vedanā vedayati: kāyikaṃ ca, cetasikaṃ ca*.
- 70 SN IV 208: *seyyathā pi bhikkhave purisaṃ sallena vijjheyyuṃ, tam enaṃ dutiyena sallena anuvethaṃ vijjheyyuṃ*.
- 71 SN IV 209: *sutavā ca kho bhikkhave ariyasāvako dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno na socati na kilamati na paridevati na urattāṭṭikandati na sammoham āpajjati. so ekaṃ vedanaṃ vedayati: kāyikaṃ, na cetasikaṃ*.
- 72 Spk III 77: *pacchā uppajjamānā domanassa* (CSCD; missing in Ee)-*vedanā pi evaṃ eva purimavedanāya balavatarā hoti*.
- 73 SN V 209: *yaṃ kho, bhikkhave* (BJT CSCD; Ee *bhikkhu*), *cetasikaṃ sukhaṃ, cetasikaṃ sātaṃ, manosaṃphassaṃ sukhaṃ sātaṃ vedayitaṃ, idaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, somanassindriyaṃ* . . . *yaṃ kho, bhikkhave, cetasikaṃ dukkhaṃ, cetasikaṃ asātaṃ, manosaṃphassaṃ dukkhaṃ asātaṃ vedayitaṃ, idaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, domanassindriyaṃ*. cf. MN III 250; DN II 306.
- 74 e.g. Bodhi (2000), Aronson (1979). Guenther (1974: 124) emphasizes that this term is best translated by “equanimity.”
- 75 P. Ekman, W.V. Friesen and P. Ellsworth identify seven emotions according to five investigators, with “interest” being added to the above six emotions. (Ekman, 1982: 42–43)
- 76 e.g. § 398 and § 420. Nyanaponika Thera (1983: 7) also says that the specific factors operative in emotion belong to the *saṅkhārakkhandha*.
- 77 Padmasiri de Silva (2005: 40) holds a similar (although not the same) opinion: “With the emergence of craving and grasping we discern the transition from the state of a feeling into the experience of an emotion.”
- 78 My italics throughout this passage.
- 79 MN III 221: *tayo satipaṭṭhānā yad ariyo sevati yad ariyo sevamāno satthā gaṇaṃ anusāsitaṃ arahatī ti*.
- 80 MN III 221: (1) (full text) *idha, bhikkhave, satthā sāvakanāṃ dhammaṃ deseti anukampako hitesī anukampaṃ upādāya: “idaṃ vo hitāya, idaṃ vo sukhāya” ti. tassa sāvakā na sussūsanti* (BJT CSCD; Ee *sussūyanti*), *na sotaṃ odahanti, na aññācittaṃ upaṭṭhapenti, vakkamma ca satthu sāsanaṃ vattanti. tatra, bhikkhave, tathāgato na c’ eva attamaṇo* (Ee BJT; CSCD *anattamaṇo*) *hoti, na ca attamaṇataṃ* (Ee BJT; CSCD *anattamaṇataṃ*) *paṭisaṃvedeti, anavassuto ca viharati sato sampajāno. idaṃ, bhikkhave, paṭhamaṃ satipaṭṭhānaṃ yad ariyo sevati, yad ariyo sevamāno satthā gaṇaṃ anusāsitaṃ arahatī*.

(2) *puna c' aparāṃ, bhikkhave, satthā sāvakaṇaṃ dhammaṃ deseti anukampako hitesī anukampaṃ upādāya*: “idaṃ vo hitāya, idaṃ vo sukhāyā” ti. *tassa ekacce sāvakaṃ na sussūsanti* (BJT CSCD; Ee *sussūyanti*), *sotaṃ odahanti*, . . . ; *ekacce sāvakaṃ sussūsanti* (Ee *sussūyanti*), *sotaṃ odahanti*. . . *tatra, bhikkhave, tathāgato na c' eva attamano hoti, na ca attamanataṃ paṭisaṃvedeti; na ca anat-tamano hoti, na ca anattamanataṃ paṭisaṃvedeti. attamanatañ ca anattamanatañ ca tad ubhayaṃ abhinivajjetvā so upekkhako viharati sato sampajāno. idaṃ, bhikkhave, dutiyaṃ satipaṭṭhānaṃ yad . . . arahati.*

(3) *puna c' aparāṃ, bhikkhave, satthā sāvakaṇaṃ dhammaṃ deseti . . . tassa sāvakaṃ sussūsanti* (BJT CSCD; Ee *sussūyanti*), *sotaṃ odahanti*. . . *tatra, bhikkhave, tathāgato attamano c' eva hoti, attamanatañ ca paṭisaṃvedeti, anavas-suto ca viharati sato sampajāno. idaṃ, bhikkhave, tatiyaṃ satipaṭṭhānaṃ yad . . . arahati.*

81 However, the commentary of both CSCD and Ee supports the reading in Ee. Ps V 27: **na c' eva** (CSCD: *ca*) **attamano** ti na sakamano. *ettha ca gehasitadomanassavasena appaṭṭito hoti ti na evaṃ attho daṭṭhabbo. appaṭṭipannakesu pana attamanatākāraṇassa abhāven' etaṃ vuttaṃ.*

82 SN I 111: *hitānukampī sambuddho yad aññaṃ anusāsati anurodhavirodhehi vip-pamutto tathāgato ti.*

83 無作為 (“doing nothing”) might be a synonym of 捨 (“equanimous”). 捨 is a standard translation for *upekkhā* (noun) or *upekkhaka* (adjective), but it can also mean “to give up,” “to abandon.” *Upekkhā* is a state in which one does not react emotionally to whatever is sensed. In other words, one does not emotionally do anything with the object.

84 T 1, 693c–694a: (1) 若如來為弟子說法，憐念愍傷，求義及饒益，求安隱快樂，發慈悲心，是為饒益，是為快樂，是為饒益樂。若彼弟子而不恭敬，亦不順行，不立於智，其心不趣向法，次法，不受正法，違世尊教，不能得定者，世尊不以此為憂感也。但世尊捨無所為，常念常智。是謂第一意止，謂聖人所習，聖人所習已，眾可教也。(2) 復次，如來為弟子說法，憐念愍傷，求義及饒益，求安隱快樂，發慈悲心，是為饒益，是為快樂，是為饒益樂。若彼弟子恭敬順行而立於智，其心歸趣向法，次法，受持正法，不違世尊教，能得定者，世尊不以此為歡喜也。但世尊捨無所為，常念常智。是謂第二意止，謂聖人所習，聖人所習已，眾可教也。(3) 復次，如來為弟子說法，憐念愍傷，求義及饒益，求安隱快樂，發慈悲心，是為饒益，是為快樂，是為饒益樂。或有弟子而不恭敬，亦不順行，不立於智，其心不趣向法，次法，不受正法，違世尊教，不能得定者，或有弟子恭敬順行而立於智，其心歸趣向法，次法，受持正法，不違世尊教，能得定者，世尊不以此為憂感，亦不歡喜。但世尊捨無所為，常念常智。是謂第三意止，謂聖人所習，聖人所習已，眾可教也。

85 Akvy 646–647: *yathāsūtram iti trīṇīmāni bhikṣavaḥ smṛtyupasthānāni yāni āryaḥ sevate yāni āryaḥ sevamāno 'rhati gaṇaṃ anuśāsayitum. katamāni trīṇi?* (1) *iha bhikṣavaḥ śāstā śrāvakaṇāṃ dharmāṃ deśayati anukampakaḥ* (Ak-S: *anukampakaḥ*) *kāruṇiko 'rthakāmo hitaiṣi karuṇāyamānaḥ: idaṃ vo hitāya idaṃ vo sukhāya idaṃ vo hitasukhāya. tasya me* (same in Ak-S, but it should be *tē*) *śrāvakaḥ śuśrūṣante. śrotram avadadhāti. ājñācittam upasthāpayanti. prati-padyante dharmasyānudharmaṃ. na vyatikramya vartante śāstuh śāsane. tena tathāgatasya na nandī bhavati na saumanasyaṃ na cetasa utplāvitatvam. upekṣakas tatra tathāgato viharati smṛtaḥ samprajānan. idaṃ prathamāṃ smṛtyupasthānaṃ yad āryaḥ sevate yad āryaḥ sevamāno 'rhati gaṇaṃ anuśāsayitum. (2) punar aparāṃ śāstā dharmāṃ deśayati pūrvavat. tasya te śrāvakaḥ na śuśrūṣante. na śrotram avadadhāti. n' ājñācittam upasthāpayanti. na pratipadyante dharmasyānudharmaṃ. vyatikramya vartante śāstuh śāsane. tena tathāgatasya n' āghāto bhavati nākṣāntir nāpratrayo na cetaso 'nabhirāddhiḥ.*

upekṣakas tatra tathāgato viharati smṛtaḥ saṃprajānan. idaṃ dvitīyaṃ smṛtyupasthānaṃ yad āryaḥ sevate yad āryaḥ sevamāno 'rhati gaṇaṃ anuśāsayitum. (3) punar aparāṃ bhikṣavaḥ yāvac chāsane tatra tathāgatasya na nandī bhavati na saumanasyaṃ na cetasa utplāvitatvaṃ. n' āghāto nākṣāntir nāpratyayo na cetaso 'nabhirāddhiḥ. upekṣakas tatra tathāgato viharati smṛtaḥ saṃprajānan. idaṃ tṛtīyaṃ smṛtyupasthānaṃ yad āryaḥ sevate yad āryaḥ sevamāno 'rhati gaṇaṃ anuśāsayitum iti.

- 86 T 27, 160b: 當說三念住。云何為三？一者佛說法時，若諸弟子恭敬聽受，如教奉行，如來於彼不生歡喜，心不踴躍，但**起大捨，住念正知**，隨宜教誨。二者佛說法時，若諸弟子不恭聽受，不如教奉行，如來於彼不生嗔恨，心無悵恨，不捨保任，但**起大捨，住念正知**，隨宜教誨。三者佛說法時，一分弟子恭敬聽受，如教奉行，一分弟子不恭敬聽受，不如教奉行，如來於彼不生歡喜，亦不嗔恨，但**起大捨，住念正知**。
- 87 T 25, 91b: ... 三意止。一者受教敬重佛無喜。二者不受教不敬重佛無憂。三者敬重不敬重心無異。（“... the three **smṛtyupasthānas*: firstly [if they] accept the teaching and are respectful, the Buddha is not delighted; secondly [if they] do not accept the teaching and are not respectful, the Buddha is not sad; thirdly [if some] are respectful and [others] are not respectful, [the Buddha's] mind remains the same.”）
- 88 T 32, 242c–243a: 佛成就三念處故，所以應禮。若說法時，聽者一心，不以為喜。若不一心，不以為憂，常行捨心。（“Since the Buddha has achieved the three **smṛtyupasthānas*, he deserves homage. While preaching, if the audience are single-minded, he is not delighted at it; if [the audience] are not single-minded, he is not sad at it; he constantly practises the mental state of *upekkhā*.”）
- 89 MN III 301–302: *kathaṇ c' ānanda, ariyo hoti bhāvitindriyo? idh' ānanda, bhikkhuno cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā uppajjati manāpaṃ, uppajjati amanāpaṃ, uppajjati manāpāmanāpaṃ. so sace ākaṇkhati: paṭikkūle appaṭikkūlasaṇṇī vihareyyan ti, appaṭikkūlasaṇṇī tattha viharati; sace ākaṇkhati: appaṭikkūle paṭikkūlasaṇṇī vihareyyan ti, paṭikkūlasaṇṇī tattha viharati; sace ākaṇkhati: paṭikkūle ca appaṭikkūle ca appaṭikkūlasaṇṇī vihareyyan ti, appaṭikkūlasaṇṇī tattha viharati; sace ākaṇkhati: appaṭikkūle ca paṭikkūle ca paṭikkūlasaṇṇī vihareyyan ti, paṭikkūlasaṇṇī tattha viharati; sace ākaṇkhati: paṭikkūlaṇ ca appaṭikkūlaṇ ca tad ubhayaṃ abhinivajjetvā upekhako vihareyyaṃ sato sampajāno ti, upekhako tattha viharati sato sampajāno ... sotena ... ghānena ... jivhāya ... kāyena ... manasā ...*
- 90 MN III 299 (full text): *idh' ānanda, bhikkhuno cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā uppajjati manāpaṃ, uppajjati amanāpaṃ, uppajjati manāpāmanāpaṃ. so evaṃ pajānāti: 'uppannaṃ kho me idaṃ manāpaṃ, uppannaṃ amanāpaṃ, uppannaṃ manāpāmanāpaṃ. taṇ ca kho saṅkhatam oḷārikaṃ paṭiccasamuppannaṃ. etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ yad idaṃ upekkhā' ti. tassa taṃ uppannaṃ manāpaṃ uppannaṃ amanāpaṃ uppannaṃ manāpāmanāpaṃ nirujjhati, upekkhā saṇṭhāti.*
- 91 The order of the first four items is different. Its order is (2), (1), (4), (3).
- 92 Hamilton (1996: 61) says, “We also read of conceptual activity of *saññā* as conception being deliberately used, ... to give names to things or concepts in a way which conduces to subsequent ‘right thinking’.” The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* gives an example for passage B (quoted from Nāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 1359): “To abide perceiving the repulsive in the unrepulsive, one pervades a (sensually) attractive person with the idea of the foulness of the body.” Many people may apperceive this person as attractive. This apperception of “the agreeable” is not deliberate, but an involuntary or habitual reaction of ordinary people. It is subjective, connected with the sense of “I am”, which is the root of *papañca-samkhā* as stated in Sn 916. In contrast, pervading this person with the idea of the

foulness of the body is forming a deliberate conception for the purpose of meditative training, in order to counteract the apperception of attractiveness, which may give rise to some emotions and to *karma*.

- 93 SN V 296: ettāvātā kho āvuso bhikkhu cattāro satipaṭṭhānā āraddhā hontī ti.
94 Translation based on Bodhi, 2000: 1266–1267.
95 SN IV 211–212: tassa ce, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno evaṃ satassa sampajānassa appamattassa ātāpino pahitattassa viharato uppajjati sukhā vedanā, so evaṃ pajānāti: ‘uppannā kho me ayaṃ sukhā vedanā. sā ca kho paṭicca, no appaṭicca. kiṃ paṭicca? imam eva kāyaṃ paṭicca. ayaṃ kho pana kāyo anicco saṅkhato paṭiccasamuppanno. aniccaṃ kho pana saṅkhataṃ paṭiccasamuppannaṃ kāyaṃ paṭicca uppannā sukhā vedanā kuto niccā bhavissatī’ ti. so kāye ca sukhāya ca vedanāya aniccānupassī viharati, vayānupassī viharati, virāgānupassī viharati nirodhānupassī viharati, paṇinissaggānupassī viharati. tassa kāye ca sukhāya ca vedanāya aniccānupassino viharato, vayānupassino viharato, virāgānupassino viharato, nirodhānupassino viharato, paṇinissaggānupassino viharato, yo kāye ca sukhāya ca vedanāya rāgānusayo, so pahīyati.
96 DN II 277–279: “kathaṃ paṭipanno pana, mārisa, bhikkhu papañcasaññāsāṅkhā-nirodha-sārappa-gāmini-paṭipadaṃ paṭipanno hotī ti?” “somanassaṃ p’ ahaṃ, devānam inda, duvidhena vadāmi, sevitaḥham pi, asevitaḥham pi. domanassaṃ p’ ahaṃ, devānam inda, duvidhena vadāmi, sevitaḥham pi, asevitaḥham pi. upekkhaṃ p’ ahaṃ, devānam inda, duvidhena vadāmi, sevitaḥham pi, asevitaḥham pi. somanassaṃ p’ ahaṃ, devānam inda, duvidhena vadāmi, sevitaḥham pi, asevitaḥham pi ti iti kho paṇ’ etaṃ vuttaṃ. kiṃ c’ etaṃ paṭicca vuttaṃ? tattha yaṃ jaññā somanassaṃ: imaṃ kho me somanassaṃ sevato akusalā dhammā abhivaḍḍhanti, kusalā dhammā parihāyanti ti, evarūpaṃ somanassaṃ na sevitaḥham. tattha yaṃ jaññā somanassaṃ: imaṃ kho me somanassaṃ sevato akusalā dhammā parihāyanti, kusalā dhammā abhivaḍḍhanti ti, evarūpaṃ somanassaṃ sevitaḥham. tattha yaṃ ce savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ, yaṃ ce avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ, ye avitakke avicāre se paṇitatare. somanassaṃ p’ ahaṃ, devānam inda, duvidhena vadāmi sevitaḥham pi, asevitaḥham pi ti. iti yaṃ taṃ vuttaṃ, idam etaṃ paṭicca vuttaṃ . . . domanassaṃ . . . upekkhaṃ . . .”
97 e.g. MN I 21–22, 181–182. The formula is included in the citation from SN V 213–215 in the note below.
98 I am grateful to Mr L.S. Cousins for this reference.
99 SN V 213–215: idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vivicc’ eva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekaṃ pītisukhaṃ paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati, ettha c’ uppannaṃ (cuppannaṃ in Ee, BJT and CSCD) dukkhindriyaṃ aparisesaṃ nirujjhati . . . idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vitakkavicāraṇaṃ rūpasamā ajjhattaṃ sampasādanaṃ cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ samādhiyaṃ pītisukhaṃ dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati, ettha c’ uppannaṃ domanassindriyaṃ aparisesaṃ nirujjhati . . . idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu pītiyā ca virāgā upekkhako ca viharati sato ca sampajāno sukhaṃ ca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti yaṃ taṃ ariyā ācikkhanti ‘upekkhako satimā sukhavihārī’ ti tatiyaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati, ettha c’ uppannaṃ sukhindriyaṃ aparisesaṃ nirujjhati . . . idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sukhaṃ ca pahānā dukkhassa ca pahānā pubb’ eva somanassadomanassānaṃ atthagamā adukkhamasukhaṃ upekkhāsati paṇisuddhiṃ catutthaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati, ettha c’ uppannaṃ somanassindriyaṃ aparisesaṃ nirujjhati . . . idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sabbaso nevasaññāsaññāyatanāṃ samatikkamma saññāvedayitanirodhaṃ upasampajja viharati, ettha c’ uppannaṃ upekkhindriyaṃ aparisesaṃ nirujjhati.
100 Literally “neutral therein upekkhā.” Ven. Nānamoli (1975: 167) translates it as “equanimity as specific neutrality.” C.A.F. Rhys Davids translates

- tatramajjhataṭṭā* as “balance of mind,” “mental equipoise” (Aung, 1910: 230). I follow Ven. Ñāṇamoli’s translation.
- 101 e.g. Vism 161. Here *jhānupekkhā* refers to the *upekkhā* of the third *jhāna*, and *pārisuddhupekkhā* refers to the *upekkhā* of the fourth *jhāna*. Both are said to be the same as *tatramajjhātupekkhā*.
- 102 Aung, 1910: 229–230 and Gethin, 2001: 157.
- 103 SN IV 232: *katamā ca, bhikkhave, pañca vedanā? sukhindriyaṃ, dukkhindriyaṃ, somanassindriyaṃ, domanassindriyaṃ, upekkhindriyaṃ*. See also SN V 209.
- 104 T 28, 979b: 憂根初禪滅無餘。苦根二禪滅無餘。喜根三禪滅無餘。樂根四禪滅無餘。
- 105 T 32, 285b: 如經中說：憂根初禪中滅。喜根三禪中滅。樂根四禪中滅。Here the pain faculty and the second *jhāna* are not mentioned.
- 106 T 30, 331a: 謂初靜慮出離憂根。第二靜慮出離苦根。第三靜慮出離喜根。第四靜慮出離樂根。I am grateful to Mr Yu-wen Yang and Dr Kin-tung Yit for the above references to the relationship between the faculties and the *jhānas* in the Chinese sources.
- 107 T 30, 331a: 如薄伽梵無倒經中說如是言。（“As Bhagavat says thus in the *Aviparīṭaka Sūtra*.”）
- 108 The following arguments on feelings are mainly cited from Kuan (2005b) with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.
- 109 Although worldly liberation (*vimokkha*) and unworldly liberation, etc. are also discussed in this text, they are treated in a different way and cannot be seen as feelings.
- 110 T 28, 312 a, b: 喜是受陰攝。Both *prīti* and *saumanasya* (*somanassa*) are translated as 喜, but they can be distinguished from the contexts.
- 111 This probably means “even more unworldly” as *upekkhā* in the fourth *jhāna* refers to freedom from disturbances of both emotion and sensation, while *upekkhā* in the third *jhāna* refers to freedom from emotional disturbances only.
- 112 T 2, 123b: 云何無食捨？謂彼比丘離喜貪、捨心，住正念正知，安樂住彼聖說捨，第三禪具足住。是名無食捨。云何無食無食捨？謂比丘離苦息樂，憂喜先已離，不苦不樂，捨、淨念、一心，第四禪具足住。是名無食無食捨。
- 113 The commentary on the *Majjhima Nikāya* takes *pārisuddhi* (purity) to apply to both *upekkhā* and *sati*: “Purity of mindfulness means pure mindfulness. Equanimity is also pure equanimity.” (Ps IV 90: *satipārisuddhī ti parisuddhā sati yeva. upekkhā pi parisuddhā upekkhā*). The Sarvāstivādins also say that the fourth *dhyāna* consists of four factors, including purity of equanimity (*upekṣāparisuddhi*) and purity of mindfulness (*smṛtipārisuddhi*). See the **Mahāvibhāṣa* (T 27, 412a) and Ak-P 438. Accordingly, *upekṣāsatipārisuddhi* should be translated as “purity of equanimity and of mindfulness.” This seems plausible since both *sati* and *upekkhā* are mentioned in the third *jhāna*, and thus the term *upekṣāsatipārisuddhi* might be intended to indicate that these two factors are both further elevated, or “purer,” in the fourth *jhāna*. However, the *Vibhaṅga*, a Theravāda *Abhidhamma* work, regards *upekkhā* as the cause of *satipārisuddhi*: “By this equanimity, this mindfulness is uncovered as pure and clean. Therefore this is called *upekṣāsatipārisuddhi*” (Vibh 261: *ayaṃ sati imāya upekṣāya vivatā hoti parisuddhā pariyoḍatā. tena vuccati upekṣāsatipārisuddhin ti*).
- 114 Referring to the *Uppaṭipāṭika Sutta*, Cousins (1973: 125 and note 78) says: “In fact by the time the fourth *jhāna* is reached, physical pleasure, as well as both pleasant and unpleasant emotion, have been gradually eliminated.”
- 115 Quoted from Barnes, 1976: 172 and 175.
- 116 e.g. MN 4, 27, 39, 51. Other knowledges are added to the three knowledges in some texts, e.g. DN 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10.

- 117 DN I 185: *saññuppadā ca pana ñānuppadō hotī ti.*
 118 AN IV 426: *yāvatañ saññāsamaṇṇapatti tāvatā aññāpaṭivedho.*
 119 DOP s.v. *aññā*, PED s.v. *aññā*.
 120 e.g. AN III 29; MN I 74.
 121 Gombrich, 1996: 117.
 122 AN I 61: *dve 'me bhikkhave dhammā vijjābhāgiyā. Katame dve? samatho ca vipassanā ca. samatho ca bhikkhave bhāvitō kam attham anubhoti? cittaṃ bhāvīyati. cittaṃ bhāvitam kam attham anubhoti? yo rāgo so pahīyati. vipassanā bhikkhave bhāvitō kam attham anubhoti? paññā bhāvīyati. paññā bhāvitā kam attham anubhoti? yā avijjā sā pahīyati. . . . iti kho bhikkhave rāgavirāgā cetovimutti, avijjāvirāgā paññāvimutti ti.*
 123 e.g. SN V 421.
 124 e.g. SN II 1. Ignorance is not a metaphysical First Cause as Nyanaponika Thera and Ven. Bodhi (2000: 314, note 56) stress.
 125 I am indebted to Professor Peter Harvey for this idea.

2 TYPES AND FUNCTIONS OF MINDFULNESS

- 1 MN I 56: *bhikkhu dīghaṃ vā assasanto "dīghaṃ assasāmi" ti pajānāti; dīghaṃ vā passasanto "dīghaṃ passasāmi" ti pajānāti. rassaṃ vā assasanto "rassaṃ assasāmi" ti pajānāti; rassaṃ vā passasanto "rassaṃ passasāmi" ti pajānāti. . . . evaṃ pi bhikkhave bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati.*
 2 MN I 56–57: *puna ca paraṃ, bhikkhave, bhikkhu gacchanto vā "gacchāmi" ti pajānāti, thito vā "thito 'mhi" ti pajānāti, nisinno vā "nisinno 'mhi" ti pajānāti, sayāno vā "sayāno 'mhi" ti pajānāti. yathā yathā vā pan' assa kāyo paṇihito hoti tathā tathā naṃ pajānāti. . . . evaṃ pi bhikkhave bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati.*
 3 MN I 59: *bhikkhu sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyamāno "sukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyāmi" ti pajānāti; dukkhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyamāno "dukkhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyāmi" ti pajānāti; adukkhamasukhaṃ vā vedanaṃ vediyamāno "adukkhamasukhaṃ vedanaṃ vediyāmi" ti pajānāti. . . . evaṃ kho bhikkhave bhikkhu vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharati.*
 4 Ee only gives the reading *yato ca*, while CSCD reads *satova*. Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1426) says, "Wherever Ee has *yato ca*, I read with Be and Se *sato va*." This is supported by the Chinese translation 正念來去, "coming and going with right mindfulness." (T 2, 314a).
 5 SN IV 189: *kathañ ca, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno cāro ca vihāro ca anubuddho hoti, yathā carantaṃ viharantaṃ abhiññhādomanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā nānūsavanti? seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, puriso bahukaṇṭakaṃ dāyaṃ paviseyya. tassa purato pi kaṇṭako, pacchato pi kaṇṭako, uttarato pi kaṇṭako, dakkhiṇato pi kaṇṭako, heṭṭhato pi kaṇṭako, uparito pi kaṇṭako. so sato va (CSCD; BJT sato ca, Ee yato ca) abhikkameyya, sato va (CSCD; BJT sato, Ee yato ca) paṭikkameyya: "mā maṃ kaṇṭako" ti. evaṃ eva kho, bhikkhave, yaṃ loke piyarūpaṃ sātārūpaṃ, ayaṃ vuccati ariyassa vinaye kaṇṭako ti.*
 6 SN IV 189–190: *bhikkhu cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā piyarūpe rūpe nādhimuccati, apiyarūpe rūpe na vyāpajjati, upaṭṭhitakāyasati ca viharati. . . . manasā dhammaṃ viññāya . . .*
 7 e.g. MN I 180: *so cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā na nimittaggāhī hoti nānubyañjanaggāhī. yatvādhikaraṇam enaṃ cakkhundriyaṃ asaṃvutaṃ viharantaṃ abhiññhādomanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā anāvasaveyyuṃ tassa saṃvaraṃ paṭipajjati, rakkhati cakkhundriyaṃ, cakkhundriye saṃvaraṃ āpajjati. . . . sotena saddaṃ sutvā . . . ghāṇena gandhaṃ ghāyitvā . . . jivhāya rasaṃ sāyitvā . . . kāyena phoṭṭhabbaṃ phusitvā . . . manasā dhammaṃ viññāya . . .*

- 8 In these two passages *anusavanti* and *anvāssaveyyuṃ* (flow in, flow upon) are used only in a figurative sense.
- 9 As I 122: *cakkhu-dvārādi-rakkhaṇato dovāriko viya ca daṭṭhabbo*. Another simile comparing *sati* to a gatekeeper is found at AN IV 111.
- 10 SN IV 200: *seyyathā pi, bhikkhave, puriso chappāṇake gahetvā nānāvisaye nānāgocare dalhāya rajjuyā bandheyya . . . dalhe khīle vā thambhe vā upanib-andheyya. atha kho te, bhikkhave, chappāṇakā nānāvisayā nānāgocarā sakaṃ sakaṃ gocaravisayaṃ āviñcheyyuṃ . . . yadā kho te, bhikkhave, chappāṇakā jhattā assu kilantā, atha tam eva khīle vā thambhe vā upatīṭṭheyyuṃ, upanīṣideyyuṃ, upanipajjeyyuṃ. evaṃ eva kho, bhikkhave, yassa kassa ci bhikkhuno kāyagatā sati bhāvitā bahulīkatā, taṃ cakkhuṃ nāviñchati manāpiyesu rūpesu, amanāpiyā rūpā na paṭikkulā honti . . . evaṃ kho, bhikkhave, saṃvaro hoti. “dalhe khīle vā thambhe vā” ti kho, bhikkhave, kāyagatāya satiyā etaṃ adhivacanaṃ.*
- 11 e.g. SN IV 119–120, 184–186.
- 12 e.g. MN I 85.
- 13 A similar expression is found in the *Cullaniddesa* (p. 272): “Here someone sees a beautiful woman or girl. Having seen her he grasps at the sign in detail (*anubyañjanaso nimittaṃ gaṇhāti*): ‘beautiful hair, beautiful mouth . . .’”
- 14 This is translated from *saṅghāṭī-patta-cīvara-dhāraṇe* in the Pali *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (MN I 57). *Saṅghāṭī* refers to the upper robe of a Buddhist monk (CPED s.v. *saṅghāṭī*). *Dhāraṇa* derives from *dhāreti*, which can mean “to carry” or “to wear” (PED s.v. *dhāreti*). Ven. Nāṇamoli and Ven. Bodhi (1995: 147) translate *saṅghāṭī-patta-cīvara-dhāraṇe* as “when wearing his robes and carrying his outer robe and bowl.” But PED (s.v. *cīvara*) states: “In starting on his begging round the bhikkhu goes **patta-cīvaraṃ ādāya**, that is literally ‘taking his bowl & robe.’ But this is an elliptical idiom meaning ‘putting on his outer robe and taking his bowl.’ A bhikkhu never goes into a village without wearing all his robes, he never takes them, or any one of the three, with him.”
- 15 e.g. MN I 57, SN V 142: *abhikkante paṭikkante sampajānakārī hoti, ālokite vilokite sampajānakārī hoti, sammāñjite pasārite sampajānakārī hoti, saṅghāṭīpat-tacīvaradhāraṇe sampajānakārī hoti, asite pīte khāyite sāyite sampajānakārī hoti, uccārapassāvakamme sampajānakārī hoti, gate ṭhite nisinne sutte jāgarite bhāsīte tuṇhībhaṇe sampajānakārī hoti.*
- 16 e.g. DN I 70; MN I 181, 269, 274.
- 17 He is said to have flourished around 50 BC to AD 100 by Johnston (1936: xvii), and around AD 100 by B. Bhattacharya (1976: 14–20).
- 18 The text does not give any particular heading to this section, but the topic can be inferred from the context (Saun XIII 30–XIV 45), where the four virtues Nanda possesses as stated at AN IV 166–168 are elaborated, the last virtue being mindfulness and full awareness.
- 19 Saun XIV 35 (p. 100): *athāsanagatasthānaprekṣitavyāhṛtādiṣu saṃprajānan kriyāḥ sarvāḥ smṛtim ādhātum arhasi.*
- 20 Ven. Anālayo (2003: 143–144) indicates that several of the activities listed in this formula occur as a set elsewhere in the *suttas* in the context of instructions given to monks regarding proper behaviour (e.g. MN I 460; AN II 123–124). These instances, however, make no mention of *sampajāna*.
- 21 Translated from *caṃkamaṃ adhiṭṭhāti*. Ee gives another reading *kammaṃ adhiṭṭhāti*, “performs action.”
- 22 AN III 325: *idaṃ pi chaṭṭhaṃ anussatiṭṭhānaṃ dhārehi. idh’ ānanda, bhikkhu sato va abhikkamati, sato va paṭikkamati, sato va tiṭṭhati, sato va nisīdati, sato va seyyaṃ kappeti, sato caṃkamaṃ (va kammaṃ) adhiṭṭhāti. idaṃ, ānanda, anussatiṭṭhānaṃ evaṃ bhāvitam evaṃ bahulīkatam satisampajaññāya saṃvattatī ti.*

- 23 MN III 112–113: *tassa ce, ānanda, bhikkhuno iminā vihārena viharato caṅkamāya cittaṃ namati, so caṅkamati: “evaṃ maṃ caṅkamantaṃ nābhijjhādomanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā anvāssavissantī” ti. itiha tattha sampajāno hoti. tassa ce, ānanda, bhikkhuno iminā vihārena viharato ṭhānāya . . . tiṭṭhati . . . tassa ce, ānanda, bhikkhuno iminā vihārena viharato nisajjāya . . . nisīdati . . . tassa ce, ānanda, bhikkhuno iminā vihārena viharato sayanāya . . . sayati . . .*
- 24 AN IV 167: *sace, bhikkhave, nandassa puratthimā disā āloketabbā hoti, sabbañ cetaso samannāharitvā nando puratthimaṃ disaṃ āloketi: “evaṃ me puratthimaṃ disaṃ ālokeyato nābhijjhādomanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā anvāssavissantī” ti. itiha tattha sampajāno hoti.*
- 25 AN IV 168: *nandassa viditā vedanā uppajjanti, viditā upaṭṭhahanti, viditā abbhaththaṃ gacchanti; viditā saññā . . . viditā vitakkā uppajjanti, viditā upaṭṭhahanti, viditā abbhaththaṃ gacchanti.*
- 26 T 2, 73b: 彼善男子難陀勝念正知者，是善男子難陀觀察東方，一心正念，安住觀察。觀察南、西、北方，亦復如是，一心正念，安住觀察。如是觀者，世間貪、憂 (according to Y M; T has 愛, which is wrong)、惡不善法不漏其心。彼善男子難陀覺諸受起，覺諸受住，覺諸受滅，正念而住，不令散亂。覺諸想起，覺諸想住，覺諸想滅。覺諸覺起，覺諸覺住，覺諸覺滅，正念心住，不令散亂。是名善男子難陀正念正智成就。Here 勝念正知 and 正念正智 are obviously synonyms, and may be translated from *smṛti-samprajanya*.
- 27 T 2, 73a–b: 若眼見色，不取色相，不取隨形好。 . . . 貪、憂 (according to S Y M; T has 愛, which is wrong)、惡不善法不漏其心，生諸律儀。防護於眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意根，生諸律儀。
- 28 e.g. MN I 180–181, 269, 273–274; DN I 70–71, 100.
- 29 e.g. MN I 273: *indriyesu guttadvārā bhavissāma, cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā na nimittaggāhī nānubyañjanaggāhī. yatvādhikaraṇaṃ enaṃ cakkhundriyaṃ asaṃvutaṃ viharantaṃ abhijjhādomanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā anvāssaveyyuṃ tassa saṃvarāya paṭipajjissāma, rakkhissāma cakkhundriyaṃ, cakkhundriye saṃvaram āpajjissāma . . .* (The same is said of the other five senses.)
- 30 e.g. MN I 274: *satisampajaññaṃ samannāgatā bhavissāma, abhikkante paṭikkante sampajānakārī, ālokitē vilokite sampajānakārī, samāñjite pasārite sampajānakārī, saṅghātipattacīvaradhāraṇe sampajānakārī, asite pīte khāyite sāyite sampajānakārī, uccārapassāvakaṃ sampajānakārī, gate ṭhite nisinne sutte jāgarite bhāsīte tuṇhībhave sampajānakārī.*
- 31 As mentioned in the Introduction, the same discourses given by the Buddha may have been memorised by different disciples in different ways, and recorded in different words or arrangements by the compilers. During this process, deviations and errors could have occurred due to lapses of memory or for other reasons. Therefore, comparing passages of different versions with standard accounts may help to clarify the meanings of these passages, or it may help to identify possible mistakes and rectify them.
- 32 *Sampajāna* is explained by the *sati-sampajañña* formula in *sutta* 2 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta*, and by passage C in *sutta* 35 as mentioned before. It is noteworthy that these two texts are both entitled “*Sato*,” and both explain *sato* and *sampajāno*.
- 33 As mentioned in Chapter I, dejection (*domanassa*) is a secondary feeling conditioned by cognition.
- 34 CDIL No. 13868, *smṛti*. = Pali *sati*, Prakrit *saṃii*.
- 35 Brockington, 1996: 80.
- 36 Schubring (1962: 305), Jaini (1979: 247–248).
- 37 AN III 415: *cetanā ’haṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi*.
- 38 MN I 372–373.

- 39 Translation based on Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 866. MN II 259: *seyyathā pi, sunakkhatta, puriso sallena viddho assa savisena gālhūpalepanena . . . tassa so bhisakko sallakatto satthena vaṇamukhaṃ parikanteyya. satthena vaṇamukhaṃ parikantetvā esaniyā sallaṃ eseyya. esaniyā sallaṃ esitvā* (CSCD; Ee, BJT *esetvā*) *sallaṃ abbaheyya, apaneyya visadosaṃ anupādisesaṃ.*
- 40 MN II 260: *vaṇo ti kho, sunakkhatta, chann' etaṃ ajjhakkānaṃ āyatanānaṃ adhivacanaṃ; visadoso ti kho, sunakkhatta, avijjāy' etaṃ adhivacanaṃ; sallan ti kho, sunakkhatta, taṇhāy' etaṃ adhivacanaṃ; esanī ti kho, sunakkhatta, satiyāy' etaṃ adhivacanaṃ.*
- 41 Horner (1964: 50f.) translates *apilāpāna* as “not wobbling,” and its verbal form *apilāpeti* “does not wobble.” Part of this account is quoted in the *Atthasālinī*, where *apilāpāna* is translated by Maung Tin (1958: 160) as “not floating away.” As Norman (1988: 50) points out, other texts, even though they quote Mil (e.g. As 121 and Ps I 83), take this to be from *plavati*, “to swim, float,” and explain *sati* as being “non-floating.” Gethin (2001: 38) suggests that this could be a misunderstanding or reinterpretation. Norman (1988: 51) indicates that *apilāpeti*, the causative of *apilapati*, means “to cause to be recited, to enumerate” and then “to remind someone of something by enumerating it to them.”
- 42 Mil 37–38: (1) *sati, mahārāja, uppajjamānā kusālākusala-sāvajjānavajja hīnappañīta-kaṇhasukka- sappaṭibhāga-dhamme apilāpeti: “ime cattāro satipaṭṭhānā, ime cattāro sammappadhānā, ime cattāro iddhipādā, imāni pañc' indriyāni, imāni pañca balāni, ime satta bojjhaṅgā, ayaṃ ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, ayaṃ samatho, ayaṃ vipassanā, ayaṃ vijjā, ayaṃ vimuttī” ti. tato yogāvacaro sevitaṃ dhamme sevati, asevitaṃ dhamme na sevati. bhajitaṃ dhamme bhajati abhajitaṃ dhamme na bhajati. evaṃ kho, mahārāja, apilāpanalakkhaṇā satī ti . . .*
(2) *sati, mahārāja, uppajjamānā hitāhitānaṃ dhammānaṃ gatiyo samannesati: “ime dhammā hitā, ime dhammā ahitā. ime dhammā upakārā, ime dhammā anupakārā” ti. tato yogāvacaro ahite dhamme apanudeti, hite dhamme upagaṇhāti. anupakāre dhamme apanudeti, upakāre dhamme upagaṇhāti. evaṃ kho, mahārāja, upagaṇhanalakkhaṇā satī ti.*
- 43 This includes the cases where the verbal form *anussarati*, rather than *anussati*, is used. There are a few occurrences of a fivefold series, which is largely the same as the sixfold with one item missing, e.g. at AN I 207–211, where *cāga* is omitted, and at AN V 335–337, where *saṅgha* is replaced by *kalyāṇamitta* and *sīla* is missing.
- 44 e.g. DN III 250, 280; AN III 284ff., 312ff., 452, V 329ff. c.f. Lamotte (1970: 1329).
- 45 Only at AN I 30, 42 according to Lamotte (1970: 1329).
- 46 cf. Yinshun (1993: 49).
- 47 Translation based on Bodhi, 2000: 320. SN I 220: *taṃ kissa hetu? tathāgato hi, bhikkhave, arahaṃ sammāsambuddho vītarāgo vītadoso vītamoho abhīru acchambhī anutrāsī apalāyī ti.*
- 48 e.g. AN III 287: *yathārūpāya saddhāya samannāgatā tā devatā ito cutā tattha upapaṇṇā, mayhaṃ pi tathārūpā saddhā saṃvījati . . . sīlena . . . sutena . . . cāgena . . . paññāya . . .*
- 49 MN I 57 and 58–59.
- 50 Spk III 266: *asubha-bhāvanāya vaṇṇaṃ bhāsati ti yā ayaṃ kesādīsu vā uddhumātakādīsu vā . . .*
- 51 *ajjhattaṇ ca bahiddhā ca kāye chandaṃ virājaye.*
- 52 e.g. DN III 289, 291; SN V 132. cf. Bodhi, 2000: 1914, note 119.
- 53 AN III 306f. and IV 320 (full text): *idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu divase nikkhante rattiyā paṭihitāya* (Ee gives other readings: *paṭigatāya, sammihitāya, pahūtāya; CSCD patihitāya; BJT patihitāya*) *iti paṭisaṅcikkhati: “bahukā kho me paccayā*

marāṇassa: ahi vā maṃ ḍaṃseyya, vicchiko vā maṃ ḍaṃseyya, satapadī vā maṃ ḍaṃseyya; tena me assa kālakiriya, so maṃ' assa antarāyo. upakkhalitvā vā papateyyaṃ, bhattaṃ vā me bhuttaṃ vyāpajjeyya . . . tena me assa kālakiriya, so maṃ' assa antarāyo" ti. tena, bhikkhave, bhikkhunā iti paṭisaṅcikkhitabbaṃ: "atthi nu kho me pāpakā akusalā dhammā appahīnā, ye me assu rattiṃ kālaṃ karontassa antarāyāyā" ti. sace, bhikkhave, bhikkhu paccavekkhamāno evaṃ jānāti: "atthi me pāpakā akusalā dhammā appahīnā, ye me assu rattiṃ kālaṃ karontassa antarāyāyā" ti, tena, bhikkhave, bhikkhunā tesam yeva pāpakānaṃ akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ pahānāya adhimatto chando ca vāyāmo ca ussāho ca ussoḷhī ca appaṭivānī ca satī ca sampajaññaṃ ca karaṇīyaṃ.

- 54 Sn 149–151 = Khp 8: *mātā yathā niyaṃ puttaṃ āyusā ekaputtam anurakkhe, evaṃ pi sabbabhūtesu mānasam bhāvaye aparimāṇaṃ mettaṃ ca sabbalokasmiṃ. mānasam bhāvaye aparimāṇaṃ uddhaṃ adho ca tiriyaṃ ca asambādhaṃ averaṃ asapattaṃ. tiṭṭhaṃ caraṃ nisinna vā sayāno yāvata' assa vigatamiddho etaṃ satipaṇṇasīya, brahman etaṃ vihāraṃ idha-m-āhu.*
- 55 Sn 147: *diṭṭhā vā ye vā addiṭṭhā . . . bhūtā vā sambhavesī vā—sabbe satī bhavantu sukhittatā.*
- 56 SN V 169: *"so tattha ñāyo" ti bhagavā avoca, "yathā medakathālikā antevāsī ācariyaṃ avoca. attānaṃ, bhikkhave, rakkhissāmi ti satipaṭṭhānaṃ sevitaṃ; paraṃ rakkhissāmi (BJT, CSCD; Ee rakkhissamā) ti satipaṭṭhānaṃ sevitaṃ. attānaṃ, bhikkhave, rakkhanto paraṃ rakkhati, paraṃ rakkhanto attānaṃ rakkhati. kathaṃ ca, bhikkhave, attānaṃ rakkhanto paraṃ rakkhati? āsevanāya, bhāvanāya, bahulīkammaṇa—evaṃ kho, bhikkhave, attānaṃ rakkhanto paraṃ rakkhati. kathaṃ ca, bhikkhave, paraṃ rakkhanto attānaṃ rakkhati? khantiyā, avihiṃsāya, mettāyā, anudayaṭṭāya".*

3 MINDFULNESS IN METHODOICAL MEDITATION

- 1 SN IV 194–195.
- 2 AN I 43, MN III 94: *yassa kassaci kāyagatāsati bhāvitā bahulīkatā, antogadhā tassa kusalā dhammā ye keci vijjābhāgiyā.*
- 3 At AN III 334 and SN V 345 there are six wholesome states conducive to gnosis, which refer to six *saññās*, namely *aniccasaññā*, *anicce dukkhasaññā*, *dukkhe anattasaññā*, *pahānasaññā*, *virāgasaññā*, and *nirodhasaññā*. These six can be regarded as belonging to *vipassanā*.
- 4 I have checked all the references to these two terms given in PED and in the indexes to the four principal *Nikāyas*.
- 5 *santo so bhagavā samathāya dhammaṃ deseti.*
- 6 *Sīlasampadā*, *cittasampadā* and *paññāsampadā* expounded in the *Kassapaśihanāda Sutta* (DN I 171–174) refer to the same as *sīlakkhandha*, *samādhikkhandha* and *paññākkhandha* in the *Subha Sutta* (DN I 206–208).
- 7 *Adhisīlasikkhā*, *adhicittasikkhā* and *adhipaññasikkhā* that recur in the *Nikāyas* (e.g. AN I 229ff., DN III 219) also refer to the same as *sīlakkhandha*, *samādhikkhandha* and *paññākkhandha*. As Buddhaghosa indicates in his *Visuddhimagga* (p. 4), these three trainings (*sikkhā*) are shown by *sīla*, *samādhi* and *paññā* respectively.
- 8 See also Mahasi Sayadaw, 1994; Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 40f.; Soma Thera, 1981: xv.
- 9 MN I 56, SN V 183: *samudayadhammānupassī (vā) kāyasmīṃ viharatī, vayadhammānupassī (vā) kāyasmīṃ viharatī, samudayavayadhammānupassī (vā) kāyasmīṃ viharatī . . .*
- 10 Paṭi II 236–237.

- 11 e.g. Vin I 14, MN I 138–139, SN II 124–125.
- 12 e.g. MN I 56; SN V 143, 297.
- 13 MN I 62, DN II 304–314.
- 14 DN III 279, AN III 24: *so kho panāhaṃ imaṃ samādhiṃ sato 'va samāpajjāmi, sato 'va vuṭṭhahāmi ti.*
- 15 e.g. DN II 265; AN IV 410.
- 16 MN I 301: *yo ca sammāvāyāmo yā ca sammāsati yo ca sammāsamādhi ime dhammā samādhikkhandhe saṅgahitā.*
- 17 MN I 301: *cattāro satipaṭṭhānā samādhinimittā.* I am grateful to Dr Alexander Wynne for this reference.
- 18 e.g. DN I 70–71, 172, 207.
- 19 e.g. MN I 180–181, 269.
- 20 e.g. MN I 273–275.
- 21 MN I 273–274: *jāgariyaṃ anuyuttā bhavissāma, divasaṃ caṅkamena nisajjāya āvaraṇīyehi dhammehi cittaṃ parisodhessāma. rattiyā paṭhamañjā yāmaṃ caṅkamena nisajjāya āvaraṇīyehi dhammehi cittaṃ parisodhessāma. rattiyā majjhimañjā yāmaṃ dakkhiṇena passena sīhaseyyaṃ kappessāma pāde pādaṃ accādhāya, satā sampajānā uṭṭhānasaññaṃ manasikarivā. rattiyā pacchimañjā yāmaṃ paccuṭṭhāya caṅkamena nisajjāya āvaraṇīyehi dhammehi cittaṃ parisodhessāma ti*
- 22 e.g. MN I 181, 274: *so pacchābhataṃ piṇḍapāṭapaṭikkanto nisīdati pallaṅkaṃ ābhujitvā ujum kāyaṃ paṇidhāya parimukhaṃ satiṃ upaṭṭhapetvā.*
- 23 e.g. MN I 181, 275: *thīnamiddhaṃ pahāya vīgatathīnamiddho viharati ālokasaññā sato sampajāno.*
- 24 The phrase *ālokasaññā sato sampajāno* is found at many places in a similar context, e.g. DN I 71, DN I 207, DN III 49; MN I 269, MN I 347.
- 25 AN IV 86: *ālokasaññaṃ manasikareyyāsi divāsaññaṃ adhiṭṭheyyāsi yathā divā tathā rattim yathā rattim tathā divā. iti vivaṭena cetasaṃ apariyonaddhena sap-pabhāsaṃ cittaṃ bhāveyyāsi.*
- 26 See Chapter 4, Section 1.1.
- 27 AN III 285ff., V 329ff.: (P1) *yasmiṃ . . . samaye ariyasāvako tathāgataṃ anusarati nev' assa tasmīṃ samaye rāgapariyuṭṭhitaṃ cittaṃ hoti, na dosapariyuṭṭhitaṃ cittaṃ hoti, na moha-pariyuṭṭhitaṃ cittaṃ hoti; ujugataṃ ev' assa tasmīṃ samaye cittaṃ hoti tathāgataṃ ārabha. ujugatacitto kho pana . . . ariyasāvako labhati atthavedaṃ, labhati dhammavedaṃ, labhati dhammūpasam-hitam pāmujaṃ.*
(P2) *pamuditassa pīti jāyati. pīṭimanassa kāyo passambhati. passaddhakāyo sukhaṃ vedayati. sukhino cittaṃ samādhiyati.*
- 28 e.g. DN I 73ff., 182f., 207f.: *tass' ime pañca nīvaraṇe pahīne attani samanupassato pāmujaṃ jāyati. pamuditassa pīti jāyati. pīṭimanassa kāyo passambhati. passaddhakāyo sukhaṃ vedeti. sukhino cittaṃ samādhiyati. so vivicc' eva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekaṃ pītisukhaṃ paṭhamajjhānaṃ upasampajja viharati . . . duttiyajjhānaṃ . . . tatiyajjhānaṃ . . . catutthajjhānaṃ . . .*
- 29 Vism 212: *assa evañjā rāgādi-pariyuṭṭhānābhāvena nikkhambhita-nīvaraṇassa . . .*
- 30 Vism 212: *jhānaṅgāni uppajjanti.*
- 31 Vism 212: *appanaṃ appatvā upacārapattam eva jhānaṃ hoti.*
- 32 SN V 156: *tassa kāye kāyanupassino viharato kāyārammaṇo vā uppajjati kāyasmīṃ parilāho cetaso vā līnattaṃ bahiddhā vā cittaṃ vikkhipati. tenānanda bhikkhunā kismiṃcid eva pasādaniye nimitte (BJT; Ee nimitta) cittaṃ paṇidāhitabbaṃ. tassa kismiṃcid eva pasādaniye nimitte cittaṃ paṇidāhato pāmujaṃ jāyati. pamuditassa pīti jāyati. pīṭimanassa kāyo passambhati. passaddhakāyo sukhaṃ vedayati. sukhino cittaṃ samādhiyati. so iti paṭisaṅcikkhati (BJT; Ee paṭisaṅcikkhati).*

- yassa khv āhaṃ atthāya cittaṃ paṭisaṃharāmī ti. so paṭisaṃharati c' eva na ca vitakketi na ca vicāreti. avitakko 'mhi avicāro ajjhattaṃ satimā sukhā asmī ti pajānāti.
- 33 Spk III 205: *kismiñ cid eva pasādanīye pasādāvahe buddhādīsu aññatarasmiṃ ṭhāne kammaṭṭhānacittaṃ ṭhapetabbaṃ.*
- 34 e.g. SN II 69–70, V 343; DN II 93–94.
- 35 MN I 37–38: *so buddhe aveccappasādena samannāgato 'mhī ti labhati atthavedaṃ, labhati dhammavedaṃ, labhati dhammūpasamhitaṃ pāmujiṃ. pamuditassa pūti jāyati. pūṭimanassa kāyo passambhati. passaddhakāyo sukhā vedeti. sukhino cittaṃ samādhīyati.* (The same is said of dhamme and saṅghe.)
- 36 AN I 3: *līnacittassa, bhikkhave, anuppannañ c' eva thīnamiddhaṃ uppajjati uppannañ ca thīnamiddhaṃ bhiyyobhāvāya vepullāya saṃvattatī ti.*
- 37 SN V 64–65, 103: *atthi, bhikkhave, aratī tandi vijambhitā bhattasammado cetaso ca līnattaṃ. tattha ayonisomanasikārabahulīkāro ayam āhāro anuppannassa vā thīnamiddhassa uppādāya, uppannassa vā thīnamiddhassa bhiyyobhāvāya vepullāya.*
- 38 Vetter (2000: 26) says, “In compounds such as *marāṇasaññā*, *aniccasaññā*, etc., *saññā* can be translated as ‘contemplation’.” I agree with him, and suggest that this also applies to our cases.
- 39 Sv III 1019: *samādhinimittaṃ vuccati aṭṭhikasaññādivasena adhigato samādhi yeva.*
- 40 Vism 193: *asubhāni subhaguṇo dasasatalocanena thutakitti yāni avoca dasabalo ekekajjhānāhetūni* (VH; Ee °hetuni) This verse is also found in the commentary on the *Dhammasaṅgāṇi* (As 198). Therefore it could have come from the old *aṭṭhakathā* in Singhalese (LSC).
- 41 Vism 194: *yasmā pana dasavidhe pi etasmiṃ asubhe, . . . tasmā paṭhamajjhānam ev' ettha hoti, na dutiyādīni.*
- 42 SN V 150–152: *tassa kāye kāyānupassino viharato cittaṃ na samādhīyati, upakkilesā na pahīyanti. so taṃ nimittaṃ na uggaṇhāti. vedanāsu . . . citte . . . dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā, vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ. tassa dhammesu dhammānupassino viharato cittaṃ na samādhīyati, upakkilesā na pahīyanti. so taṃ nimittaṃ na uggaṇhāti. sa kho so, bhikkhave, bālo avyatto akusalo bhikkhu na c' eva lābhī diṭṭhe va dhamme sukhavīhārānaṃ, na lābhī satisampajāññassa. taṃ kissa hetu? tathā hi so, bhikkhave, bālo avyatto akusalo bhikkhu sakassa cittaṃ na samādhīyati, upakkilesā na pahīyanti. so taṃ nimittaṃ na uggaṇhāti. . . idh' ekacco paṇḍito vyatto kusalo bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati . . .*
- 43 e.g. MN I 357: *catunnaṃ jhānaṃ . . . diṭṭhadhammasukhavīhārānaṃ.* See also MN I 40–41.
- 44 MN I 207–209.
- 45 MN III 157: *idha mayaṃ, bhante, appamattā ātāpino pahitattā viharantā obhāsañ c' eva sañjānāma dassanañ ca rūpānaṃ. so kho pana no obhāso na cirass' eva antaradhāyati dassanañ ca rūpānaṃ, tañ ca nimittaṃ na paṭivijjhāmā ti.*
- 46 T 1, 536c: 汝等不達此相.
- 47 e.g. MN III 161: *yasmīñ kho ahaṃ samaye rūpanimittaṃ amanasikaritvā obhāsanimittaṃ manasikaromī, obhāsaṃ hi kho tamhi samaye sañjānāmi, na ca rūpāni passāmi,* “On that occasion when I do not attend to the sign of forms but attend to the sign of radiance, then I conceive the radiance but do not see forms.” The Chinese version (T 1, 539a) also has “the sign of forms” 色相 (**rūpa-nimitta*) and “the sign of radiance” 光明相 (**avabhāsa-nimitta*).
- 48 MN III 157–160: *ahaṃ pi sudaṃ, anuruddhā, pubbe va sambodhā anabhisambuddho bodhisatto va samāno obhāsañ c' eva sañjānāmi dassanañ ca rūpānaṃ. so kho pana me obhāso na cirass' eva antaradhāyati dassanañ ca rūpānaṃ . . . tassa mayhaṃ, anuruddhā, etad ahoṣi: vicikicchā kho me udapādi, vicikicchādhikaraṇaṃ ca pana me samādhi cavi. samādhimhi cute obhāso antaradhāyati dassanañ ca rūpānaṃ*

- ... *amanasikāro kho me udapādi*... *vicikicchā cittassa upakkilesa ti*...
amanasikāro cittassa upakkilesa ti...
- 49 e.g. the twenty-four *suttas* in the *Anuruddha Saṃyutta* of SN are all concerned with the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.
- 50 e.g. SN II 212–214 and 216–217; DN III 281.
- 51 In the *Sīlakkhandha Vagga* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (vol. I), these six are achieved after attaining the four *jhānas*. In the *Majjhima Nikāya* (e.g. nos. 4, 27, 39, 51) the same is said of the three gnoses (*vijjā*), or called three knowledges (*ñāna*).
- 52 “Sign” is the standard translation of *nimitta*, but its meaning is ambiguous. *Nimitta* may refer to any phenomenon which is made an object of concentration. (RFG)
- 53 Vism 125: *tass’ evaṃ karontassa anukkamena nīvaraṇāni vikkhambhanti, kilesā sannisīdanti, upacārasamādhinā cittaṃ samādhīyati, paṭibhāganimittaṃ uppajjati*.
- 54 Vism 152: *paṭibhāganimittaṃ vaḍḍhetabbam. tassa dve vaḍḍhanābhūmiyo: upacāraṃ vā appanā vā*.
- 55 Vism 126: *yadi hi taṃ īdisaṃ bhavēyya, cakkhuvīññēyyaṃ siyā . . . na paṇ’ etaṃ tādisaṃ . . . saññajam etaṃ ti*.
- 56 At AN V 134–135, the Buddha says, “Sound is a thorn for the first *jhāna*; *vitakkavicāra* is a thorn for the second *jhāna*; *pīti* is a thorn for the third *jhāna*; breathing-in-and-out is a thorn for the fourth *jhāna*.” (cf. SN IV 217) The *Abhidhamma* (Kv XVIII 8, p. 572f.) infers from this passage that the five senses do not work in the *jhānas*. However, MN I 293 and AN IV 426–427 suggest that the first three formless attainments are to be perceived by a mind free from the functioning of the five senses, but make no mention of the *jhānas*.
- 57 MN III 136: (A) *so ime pañca nīvaraṇe pahāya cetaso upakkilese paññāya dubbaṭṭikaraṇe kāye kāyānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ, vedanāsu pe citte . . . dhammesu* (BJT; Ee *dhammesu*) *dhammānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ*.
 (B) *seyyathāpi, aggivessana, hatthidamako mahantaṃ thambaṃ paṭhaviyaṃ nikkhañitvā āraññakassa nāgassa gīvāya upanibandhati āraññakānaṃ c’ eva sīlānaṃ abhinimmadanāya āraññakānaṃ c’ eva saraṣaṃkappānaṃ* (BJT, CSCD; Ee omits *sara*) *abhinimmadanāya āraññakānaṃ c’ eva darathakilamathaparilāhānaṃ abhinimmadanāya gāmaṇte abhiramāpanāya manussakantesu sīlesu samādapanāya, evaṃ eva kho, aggivessana, ariyasāvakaṃ ime cattāro satipaṭṭhānā cetaso upanibandhanā honti gehasitānaṃ c’ eva sīlānaṃ abhinimmadanāya gehasitānaṃ c’ eva saraṣaṃkappānaṃ* (BJT, CSCD; Ee omits *sara*) *abhinimmadanāya gehasitānaṃ c’ eva darathakilamathaparilāhānaṃ abhinimmadanāya nāyassa adhiḡamaṃ nibbānassa sacchikiriyāya*.
 (C) *taṃ enaṃ tathāgato uttariṃ vineti: ehi tvaṃ, bhikkhu, kāye kāyānupassī viharāhi mā ca kāyūpasamhitaṃ vitakkaṃ vitakkesi, vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharāhi mā ca vedanūpasamhitaṃ vitakkaṃ vitakkesi, citte cittānupassī viharāhi mā ca cittūpasamhitaṃ vitakkaṃ vitakkesi, dhammesu dhammānupassī viharāhi mā ca dhammūpasamhitaṃ vitakkaṃ vitakkesi ti*.
 (D) *so vitakkavicāraṇaṃ vūpasamā ajjhattaṃ sampasādanaṃ cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ . . . pe . . . tatiyaṃ jhānaṃ . . . catutthaṃ jhānaṃ* (CSCD; BJT: full *jhāna* formula; Ee: *dutiya-jhānaṃ, tatiyajjhānaṃ*) *upasampajja viharati*.
- 58 e.g. MN I 181, 270.
- 59 As mentioned in Chapter 1, *anupassin* (contemplating) is often synonymous with *saññin*.
- 60 e.g. MN I 182: *bhikkhu pītiyā ca virāgā upekkhako ca viharati sato ca sampajāno, sukhaṃ ca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti, yaṃ taṃ ariyā ācikkhanti: “upekkhako satimā sukhavihārī” ti tatiyaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati*.

- 61 e.g. MN I 182: *bhikkhu sukhassa ca pahānā dukkhassa ca pahānā, pubbe va somanassadomanassānaṃ atthagamā, adukkhaṃ asukhaṃ upekkhāsati pārisuddhiṃ catutthaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati.*
- 62 MSA 143: *smṛtiḥ saṃprajanyaṃ caupanibandhakaḥ ekena cittasyālabhanā-visārāt dvitīyena visāraprajñānāt.*
- 63 Here *ālambana* (“object”) refers to the meditation object since it is in the context of discussing the fourfold base for supernatural power (*rddhipāda*), which is said to be based on *dhyānapārami* (= Pali *jhāna*^o). See MSA 142 (verse 52): *dhyānapāramiṃ āśritya prabheda hi caturvidhaḥ . . .* The Chinese translation, although not very accurate, makes this point very clear: “Due to mindfulness, the mind in a state of concentration (**samādhi*) is not separate from the object.” (T 31, 643c: 由正念故心於定中不離所緣。)
- 64 Paṭi-s-a II 478–479: *upanibandhati etāya ārammaṇe cittaṃ ti upanibandhanā nāma sati.*
- 65 Paṭi-s-a II 478: *nimittabhūtaṃ kāraṇabhūtaṃ nāsikaggaṃ vā mukhanimittaṃ vā.*
- 66 e.g. SN V 323–324, MN III 83–85.
- 67 In my opinion, it is more likely that the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, on which the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* is based, borrowed the first four exercises from the scheme of sixteen exercises, because this text is, to a great extent, a late composite of extracts from other contexts. See Chapter 4.
- 68 e.g. MN I 425; AN V 111–112; Vin III 70–71.
- 69 MN I 56, DN II 291; T 1, 582c.
- 70 MN III 89; T 1, 555b.
- 71 *Paṭisaṃvedī* (nominative singular of *paṭisaṃvedin*) is derived from *paṭisaṃvedeti*, which can mean “to feel, experience, perceive” (PED s.v. *paṭisaṃvedeti*). Examples of *paṭisaṃvedeti* meaning “to perceive” can be found at DN II 336f. and AN IV 427. Bodhi (2000: 1765ff.) translates “experiencing.” I translate “perceiving” for the following reasons. Firstly, in the *Saṃyukta Āgama* the word equivalent to *paṭisaṃvedī* is translated as “being aware, knowing” (覺知 T 2, 206, 208). The great translator Xuanzang also translates a similar term “覺了” in his translation of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (T 30, 432f.). Secondly, to translate *citta-paṭisaṃvedī* in the third tetrad as “experiencing mind” does not make good sense. Lastly, one may argue that one can experience something without noticing it. But in our case, one must be aware of those objects described in this practice of mindfulness.
- 72 e.g. SN V 323, MN III 83: *bhikkhu dīghaṃ vā assasanto “dīghaṃ assasāmī” ti pajānāti; dīghaṃ vā passasanto “dīghaṃ passasāmī” ti pajānāti. rassaṃ vā assasanto “rassaṃ assasāmī” ti pajānāti; rassaṃ vā passasanto “rassaṃ passasāmī” ti pajānāti. “sabbakāyapaṭisaṃvedī assasissāmī” ti sikkhati; “sabbakāyapaṭisaṃvedī passasissāmī” ti sikkhati. “passambhayaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ assasissāmī” ti sikkhati; “passambhayaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ passasissāmī” ti sikkhati.*
- 73 MN I 301, SN IV 293: *assāsapassāsā . . . kāyasaṅkhāro.*
- 74 T 2, 150a: 出息、入息名為身行。
- 75 T 1, 582c: 學止身行息入，學止口行息出。
- 76 e.g. MN III 82; SN V 311; SN V 323; T 2, 206b; T 2, 208a.
- 77 SN IV 217: *catutthaṃ jhānaṃ samāpannassa assāsapassāsā niruddhā honti.*
- 78 SN IV 217–218: *catutthaṃ jhānaṃ samāpannassa assāsapassāsā paṭippassadhā honti.*
- 79 T 27, 136b: 止身行者是第四靜慮。
- 80 T 27, 136b: 止身行者謂令息風漸漸微細乃至不生。
- 81 Vism 275: *catutthajjhāne atisukhūmo appavattim eva pāpuṇāti ti.*
- 82 I am grateful to Professor Peter Harvey for this suggestion.

- 83 Paṭi I 185: *iti kira “passambhayaṃ kāyasāṅkhāraṃ assasissāmī” ti sikkhati, “passambhayaṃ kāyasāṅkhāraṃ passasissāmī” ti sikkhati. evaṃ sante vātūpaladdhiyā ca pabhāvanā na hoti, assāsapassāsānaṃ ca pabhāvanā na hoti, ānāpānasatiyā ca pabhāvanā na hoti . . .*
- 84 Paṭi I 185–186: . . . *paṭhamam olārikā assāsapassāsā pavattanti; olārikānaṃ assāsapassāsānaṃ nimittam sugghatattā sumanasikatattā sūpadhāritattā, niruddhe pi olārike assāsapassāse, atha pacchā sukhmakā assāsapassāsā pavattanti. sukhmakānaṃ assāsapassāsānaṃ nimittam sugghatattā sumanasikatattā sūpadhāritattā, niruddhe pi sukhmake assāsapassāse, atha pacchā sukhmakānaṃ assāsapassāsānaṃ nimittammanattā pi cittaṃ na vikkhepaṃ gacchati. evaṃ sante vātūpaladdhiyā ca pabhāvanā hoti . . .*
- 85 e.g. SN V 323–324, MN III 84: *“pīṭapaṭisaṃvedī assasissāmī” ti sikkhati, “pīṭapaṭisaṃvedī passasissāmī” ti sikkhati. “sukhapāṭisaṃvedī assasissāmī” ti sikkhati, “sukhapāṭisaṃvedī passasissāmī” ti sikkhati. “cittasāṅkhārāpaṭisaṃvedī assasissāmī” ti sikkhati, “cittasāṅkhārāpaṭisaṃvedī passasissāmī” ti sikkhati. “passambhayaṃ cittasāṅkhāraṃ assasissāmī” ti sikkhati, “passambhayaṃ cittasāṅkhāraṃ passasissāmī” ti sikkhati.*
- 86 Vism 287: *sappīṭike dve jhāne samāpajjati. Vism 288: tiṇṇaṃ jhānaṃ vasena sukhapaṭisaṃviditā.*
- 87 MN I 301, SN IV 293: *saññā ca vedanā ca cittasāṅkhāro. But SĀ says that conception (*saññā) and volition (*cetanā) are called “mental formation.” (T 2, 150a: 想、思名為意行) If so, mental formation would have nothing to do with feelings, but just like the Pali Nikāyas, SĀ also arranges perceiving/calming mental formation under contemplation of feelings, the second satipaṭṭhāna (T 2, 208b).*
- 88 SN IV 218: *saññāvedayitanīrodhaṃ samāpannassa saññā ca vedanā ca paṭipassaddhā honti.*
- 89 This text is attributed by Santati (Avs: Introduction 137–140) to the Sarvāstivāda school “in a broader sense comprising the doctrines, categories and controversies of both the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika schools.” He says that the compilation of this text might have commenced before the first century B.C. (Avs: Introduction 65), and he dates the commentator, Vīryasrīdatta, to the eighth century A.D. (Avs: Introduction 133–134)
- 90 Avs 237: *pratiprasrambhayan vā cittasaṃskārān iti sūkṣmatāṃ nayan krameṇārūpyasamāpatti-saṃkrāntyā, sarvāṃś ca prajahan nirodhasamāpattāv iti. I am grateful to Mr L.S. Cousins for the reference.*
- 91 SN V 319: *bhikkhu ce pi ākaṇheyya: “sabbaso nevasaññānāsaññāyatanam (BJT; Ee °tānaṃ) samatikkamma saññāvedayitanīrodhaṃ (BJT; Ee saññāv°) upasampajja vihareyyan” ti, ayaṃ eva ānāpānasatisamādhī sādhukaṃ manasikātabbo.*
- 92 MN I 249: *sato sampajāno niddaṃ okkamitā ti.*
- 93 AN III 251, Vin I 295: *pañc’ ime bhikkhave ānisaṃsā upaṭṭhitasatissa sampajānassa niddaṃ okkamayato: . . . na pāpakaṃ supinaṃ passati, . . .*
- 94 e.g. MN III 84, SN V 324: *“cittapaṭisaṃvedī assasissāmī” ti sikkhati, “cittapaṭisaṃvedī passasissāmī” ti sikkhati. “abhippamodayaṃ cittaṃ assasissāmī” ti sikkhati, “abhippamodayaṃ cittaṃ passasissāmī” ti sikkhati. “samādahaṃ cittaṃ assasissāmī” ti sikkhati, “samādahaṃ cittaṃ passasissāmī” ti sikkhati. “vimocayaṃ cittaṃ assasissāmī” ti sikkhati, “vimocayaṃ cittaṃ passasissāmī” ti sikkhati.*
- 95 e.g. DN I 73, 182, 207: *tass’ ime pañca nīvaraṇe pahīne attani samanupassato pāmujaṃ jāyati. pamuditassa pīti jāyati. pīṭimanassa kāyo passambhati. passaddhakāyo sukhāṃ vedeti. sukhino cittaṃ samādhīyati.*
- 96 cf. Gethin, 2001: 51
- 97 MN I 296 and 297.

- 98 e.g. MN I 477, SN II 123: *ye te santā vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppā te kāyena phassitvā viharati.*
- 99 Paṭi II 40: *katamo sāmāyiko vimokkho? cattāri jhānāni catasso ca arūpasamāpattiyo.*
- 100 e.g. MN III 84, SN V 324: “*aniccānupassī assasissāmī*” *ti sikkhati*, “*aniccānupassī passasissāmī*” *ti sikkhati*. “*virāgānupassī assasissāmī*” *ti sikkhati*, “*virāgānupassī . . . nirodhānupassī . . . paṭinissaggānupassī assasissāmī*” *ti sikkhati*, “*paṭinissaggānupassī passasissāmī*” *ti sikkhati*.
- 101 MN I 435–436: *paṭhamam jhānam upasampajja viharati. so yad eva tattha hoti rūpagataṃ vedanāgataṃ saññāgataṃ saikhāragataṃ viññāgataṃ te dhamme aniccatō dukkhato rogato gaṇḍato sallato aghato ābādhato parato palokato suññato anattato samanupassati. so tehi dhammehi cittaṃ paṭivāpeti. so tehi dhammehi cittaṃ paṭivāpetvā amatāya dhātuyā cittaṃ upasaṃharati: “etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ yad idaṃ sabbasaṃkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhakkhaya virāgo nirodho nibbānan” ti . . .*
- 102 The Chinese version of this text (T 1, 779c–780a) makes no mention of the deathless element.
- 103 See the Introduction.
- 104 Its author Asaṅga was originally a follower of the Sarvāstivāda school (T 50, 188b–c). Willemen *et al.* (1998: 61–62) also shows a close connection between the Mūlasarvāstivādins and the *Yogācārabhūmi*, of which the *Śrāvakaḥ* forms a part.
- 105 ŚrBh 231. Xuanzang’s translations of these four terms are 無常, 斷, 離欲 and 滅。 (T 30, 432b)
- 106 See the Introduction.
- 107 T 1, 780a: 彼觀此覺無常, 觀興衰、觀無欲、觀滅、觀斷、觀捨。
- 108 *santaṃ etaṃ padam paṇītam* (BJT, CSCD; Ee *phanitam*) *etaṃ padam, yad idaṃ sabbasaṃkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhakkhaya* (Ee BJT; CSCD *taṇhākkhaya*) *virāgo nirodho nibbānam. yā hi ’ssa, bhante, paṇṇā tad assa paṇṇindriyam.*
- 109 MN I 436: *rūpasaññānam samatikkamā . . . ākāśānācāyatanam upasampajja viharati.*
- 110 As discussed by Schmithausen (1981: 224), there are three possible ways to render the compound *aññāpaṭivedho*: (1) “attainment [to Liberating] Insight,” if *aññā* is taken as accusative; (2) “penetration [into Truth by means of Liberating] Insight,” if *aññā* is taken as instrumental; (3) “penetration [which is Liberating] Insight,” according to the *Niddesa*.
- 111 AN IV 426: *yāvatā saññāsamāpatti tāvatā aññāpaṭivedho.*
- 112 DN I 185: *saññupādā ca pana ñānupādo hoti ti.*
- 113 I am aware of a paradox in the Canon where insight seems to be concurrent with the attainment of cessation. A passage recurs thus: “One enters and dwells in the cessation of apperception and feelings, and having seen with wisdom, his taints are destroyed.” (e.g. MN I 175, AN IV 454) This has been discussed by scholars in different ways. cf. Griffiths, 1981: 616; Harvey, 1995: 165.
- 114 The commentary on the foregoing *sutta* of AN says, “the *nevasaññānā-saññāyatana* is not called an “attainment with *saññā*” because of its subtlety.” (Mp IV 198: *nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ pana sukhumattā saññāsamāpatti ti na vuccati*)
- 115 MN III 84–85: *so yaṃ taṃ abhijjhādomanassānam pahānam taṃ paṇṇāya disvā sādhuṃ ajjhupekkhitā hoti.*
- 116 Vism 291: *idaṃ catutthacatukkaṃ suddhavipassanāvasen’ eva vuttam.*
- 117 e.g. Bucknell & Stuart-Fox (1986: 37) and Anālayo (2003: 134–135).
- 118 I am grateful to Professor Peter Harvey for reminding me of this point.

4 KĀYAGATĀ SATI: MINDFULNESS DIRECTED TO THE EXPERIENCER

- 1 Footnote 1 at AN I 43 says, “Title in ChS: *Kāyagatāsati Vaggo*.”
- 2 Ps IV 144: *puna ca param . . . pe . . . evaṃ bhikkhave bhikkhu kāyagataṃ satim bhāveti ti satipaṭṭhāne cuddasavidhena kāyānupassanā kathitā*.
- 3 Vism 240: *kathaṃ bhāvitā, bhikkhave, kāyagatā sati? kathaṃ bahulīkatā mahapphalā hoti mahānisaṃsā? idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu araṇṇagato vā* (quoted from MN III 89)
- 4 Vism 240.
- 5 This will be discussed later. The four glosses run thus: “He makes the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion drench, steep, fill and pervade this body (*kāya*) . . .” (for the first *jhāna*); “He makes the rapture and pleasure born of concentration drench, steep, fill and pervade this body (*kāya*) . . .” (for the second *jhāna*), etc. (MN III 92–94, tr. Nāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 953f.)
- 6 Vism 197: *kesādhedam rūpakāyaṃ gatā*.
- 7 See the Introduction.
- 8 These practices are almost all identical to those in the section on contemplation of the body in the Sarvāstivāda version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. For an English translation of the two texts see Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.
- 9 PED s.v. *kāya*, pp. 207–208 takes this word in this case to mean “the self as experiencing a great joy,” “the whole being,” etc. DOP s.v. *kāya*, p. 670 gives a meaning: “the experiencer of sensation and feeling, either (a) generally (physically and/or mentally),” where it quotes a passage on the first *jhāna* from DN which is the same as that in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*.
- 10 Some scholars doubt that the Theravāda school of today is directly related to the original Theravāda (Sthavira[vāda]) school. Ven. Yinshun (1994: preface & 36–38) identifies the extant Theravāda school with the Tāmraśāṭṭiya school, an offshoot from the Vibhāyavādins. Choong (2000: 3) holds a similar opinion. But Dutt (1970: 53) contends that the Tāmraśāṭṭiyas were Saṃkrāntivādins (Saṃkrāntikas), out of which school arose the Sautrāntikas.
- 11 Winternitz (1933: 232–233) states: “In wording and in the arrangement of the texts, the Sanskrit Canon evinces great similarity to the Pāli Canon, but on the other hand, there are many points of difference too. A feasible explanation of this is that both canons had a common source, probably the lost Māgadhī Canon.”
- 12 According to CSCD. The title extracted from the *uddāna* in Ee is Udāyi. There is no parallel to this *sutta* in the Chinese *Āgamas*. There are other discourses with the same title, e.g. SN IV 166, AN II 43.
- 13 For the translation of *jhāna*, cf. DOP s.v. *anussati*.
- 14 This is quoted in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.
- 15 The term *anussati* (Skt *anusmṛti*) derives from the verb *anussarati* (*anu-√smṛ*), which means “to remember,” “to recollect” or “to call to mind” (DOP s.v. *anussarati* and *anussati*). In some contexts it can also mean the same as *sati*. Harrison (1992: 228) has pointed out the interchangeability of *smṛti* (*sati*) and *anusmṛti* (*anussati*).
- 16 The first and the fifth are not counted here because, as will be shown later, the four *jhānas* in the *Kāyagatā Sutta* are also found in another set of practices, and are more likely to derive from that set rather than from the *anussatiṭṭhānas*.
- 17 MN I 119–121: *tesaṃ pahānā ajjhataṃ eva cittaṃ santiṭṭhati sannisīdati ekodhihoti samādhīyati*. The Chinese counterpart of this text, the **Adhicitta Sūtra* (增上心經) of the *Madhyama Āgama*, also has a similar refrain: When the unwholesome thoughts have disappeared, his mind becomes constantly steadied, still internally, and he becomes single-minded and attains concentration. (T 1, 588a–589a: 惡念滅已，心便常住，在內止息，一意得定。)

- 18 MN III 89–94: *tassa evaṃ appamattassa ātāpino pahitattassa viharato ye gehasiṭṭa sarasāṇikappā te pahīyanti. tesam pahānā ajjhataṃ eva cittaṃ santiṭṭhati sannisīdati ekodihoti samādhīyati. evaṃ pi, bhikkhave, bhikkhu kāyagataṃ satīṃ bhāveti.*
- 19 By searching CSCD.
- 20 MN III 111: *bhikkhu ce pi ākaṇkheyya: ajjhataṃ suññataṃ upasampajja vihareyyan ti, ten' ānanda, bhikkhunā ajjhataṃ eva cittaṃ saṅghapetabbaṃ sannisādetabbaṃ ekodikātabbaṃ samādhātabbaṃ. kathaṃ ca, ānanda, bhikkhu ajjhataṃ eva cittaṃ saṅghapeti sannisādeti ekodikaroti samādahati?*
- 21 患 is used to translate a word equivalent to Pali *upakkilesa*, e.g. T 1, 536c ff. = MN III 160–161.
- 22 T 1, 555a–556c: 如是比丘隨其身行，便知上如真。彼若如是在遠離獨住，心無放逸，修行精勤，斷心諸患而得定心。得定心已，則知上如真。是謂比丘修習念身。
- 23 This text is included in the Chinese translation of the *Madhyama Āgama*, which belongs to the Sarvāstivādins.
- 24 念 has been used to translate different words in Buddhist texts (see also next note). It is a standard translation for words derived from √*smṛ* like *smṛti* (Pali *saṭi*), but it is also a translation for words derived from *manas-√kr* (e.g. SJD s.v. *manasikāra*). The Pali counterpart of 念 in this passage is *manasikaroto* (MN I 119, see quotation below), which supports the rendering of the word as “attending to” rather than “being mindful of.”
- 25 Here 念 must be translated from a word equivalent to Pali *vitakka* in that the Pali counterpart of 念 in this passage is *vitakka* (MN I 119), and 念 is also used to translate this word throughout a *sūtra* called 念經 (T 1, 589a–590a), which is equivalent to the Pali *Dvedhāvitaṅga Sutta* (MN I 114–118).
- 26 T 1, 588a: 比丘者念相善相應。若生不善念者，彼因此相復更念異相善相應，令不生惡不善之念。彼因此相更念異相善相應，已生不善念即便得滅。惡念滅已，心便常住，在內止息，一意得定。猶木工師、木工弟子，彼持墨繩用絃於木，則以利斧斫令直。如是比丘因此相復更念異相善相應，令不生惡不善之念...
- 27 MN I 119: *bhikkhuno yaṃ nimittaṃ āgama yaṃ nimittaṃ manasikaroto uppajjanti pāpakā akusalā vitakkā chandūpasamhitā pi dosūpasamhitā pi mohūpasamhitā pi, tena, bhikkhave, bhikkhunā tamhā nimittā aññaṃ nimittaṃ manasikātabbaṃ kusālūpasamhitāṃ. tassa tamhā nimittā aññaṃ nimittaṃ manasikaroto kusālūpasamhitāṃ ye pāpakā akusalā vitakkā chandūpasamhitā pi dosūpasamhitā pi mohūpasamhitā pi te pahīyanti te abbatthataṃ gacchanti. tesam pahānā ajjhataṃ eva cittaṃ santiṭṭhati sannisīdati ekodihoti samādhīyati. seyyathā pi, bhikkhave, dakkho palagaṇḍo vā palagaṇḍantevāsī vā sukhumāya āṇiyā oḷārikaṃ āṇiṃ abhinīhaneyya abhinīhareyya abhinivajjeyya, evaṃ eva kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno yaṃ nimittaṃ āgama yaṃ nimittaṃ manasikaroto...*
- 28 T 1, 588c: 彼比丘便齒齒相著，舌逼上齶，以心修心，受持、降伏... 猶二力士捉一羸人，受持、降伏...
- 29 MN I 120–121: *tena, bhikkhave, bhikkhunā dantehi dantaṃ ādhāya jivhāya tāluṃ āhacca cetasā cittaṃ abhiniggaṇhitabbaṃ abhinippīletabbaṃ abhisantāpetabbaṃ... seyyathā pi, bhikkhave, balavā puriso dubbalataraṃ purisaṃ sīse vā gahetvā khandhe vā gahetvā abhiniggaṇheyya abhinippīleyya abhisantāpeyya,...*
- 30 By searching CSCD and CBETA.
- 31 There are 34 *suttas* in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, 152 in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, 2889 in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, and 2344 in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*. Thus the total number of *suttas* in the four main *Nikāyas* is 5419. However, von Hinüber (1997: 36 and 39) points out that these are the figures actually counted in the European edition, but according to the tradition there should be 7762 *suttas* in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, and 9557 *suttas* in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*.

32 AN III 25–27.

33 I am grateful to Dr. Sarah Shaw for drawing my attention to this text.

34 The meaning of “reviewing-sign” is not clear. The passage quoted below is the only reference to it in the earliest stratum of the Pali Canon. Hare (1934: 19) in his translation of the *Ariguttara Nikāya* comments on this passage thus: “Our simile does not appear to recur elsewhere.” The commentary glosses it as “reviewing-knowledge” (*paccavekkhanā-ñāṇa*, Mp III 235), which is not helpful either. The term “reviewing-sign” is first explained in the *Vibhaṅga* as “reviewing-knowledge (*paccavekkhanā-ñāṇa*) of one who has emerged from this or that concentration” (Vibh 334: *tamhā tamhā samādhimhā vuṭṭhitassa paccavekkhanāñāṇaṃ paccavekkhanānimittaṃ*).

35 AN III 27: *puna ca paraṃ, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno paccavekkhanānimittaṃ sugghataṃ hoti sumanasikataṃ sūpadhāritaṃ suppaṭividdhaṃ paññāya. seyyathā pi, bhikkhave, añño 'va aññaṃ paccavekkheyya, ṭhito vā nisinnaṃ paccavekkheyya, nisinna vā nipannaṃ paccavekkheyya. evaṃ eva kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno paccavekkhanānimittaṃ sugghataṃ hoti sumanasikataṃ sūpadhāritaṃ suppaṭividdhaṃ paññāya*.

36 報 can mean “again, repeat” (再，重複， HDZ I, 466), and is likely to be translated from *uttara*. The meaning of this text is clear from the content of the Pali *Dasuttara Sutta*, which provides ten themes that serve as the framework repeatedly for different doctrinal subjects. (DN III 272ff.)

37 This text was translated by An Shigao in the second century A.D., much earlier than the complete translation of the *Dīrgha Āgama* by Buddhayaśas and Zhu Fonian in A.D. 412–413, which is attributed to the Dharmaguptakas by many scholars (see the Introduction).

38 T 1, 234b–c.

39 T 1, 234c: 亦有道弟子受身觀諦，已熟念、熟居、熟受，譬如住人觀坐人，坐人觀臥人。

40 Cf. Ono, 1968: 46–47.

41 By searching CSCD and CBETA.

42 MN III 96–97: “*yassa kassa ci, bhikkhave, kāyagatā sati bhāvitā bahulikatā, so yassa yassa abhiññāsacchikarāṇīyassa dhammassa cittaṃ abhininnāmeti abhiññāsacchikiriyāya, tatra tatr' eva sakkebhavyataṃ pāpuṇāti sati sati āyatane. seyyathā pi, bhikkhave, udakamaṇiko pūro udakassa samatittiko kākaṭṭheyyo ādhāre ṭhapito. tam enaṃ balavā puriso yato yato āvajjeyya, āgaccheyya udakaṃ*” *tī? “evaṃ, bhante.” “evaṃ eva kho, bhikkhave, yassa kassa ci kāyagatā sati bhāvitā bahulikatā so yassa yassa abhiññāsacchikarāṇīyassa dhammassa cittaṃ abhininnāmeti abhiññāsacchikiriyāya, tatra tatr' eva sakkebhavyataṃ pāpuṇāti sati sati āyatane.*

seyyathā pi same bhūmibhāge caturassā pokkharāṇī ālībaddhā pūrā udakassa samatittikā kākaṭṭheyyā. tam enaṃ balavā puriso yato yato ālīṇ muñceyya, āgaccheyya udakaṃ” *tī? “evaṃ, bhante.” “evaṃ eva kho, bhikkhave, yassa kassa ci kāyagatā sati bhāvitā . . .*

seyyathā pi, bhikkhave, subhūmiyaṃ cātummahāpathe ājaññaratho yutto assa ṭhito odhastapatodo, tam enaṃ dakkho yoggācariyo (BJT CSCD; Ee yogācariyo) assadammaśārathi abhiruhitvā vāmena hatthena rasmiyo gahetvā dakkhiṇena hatthena patodaṃ gahetvā yen' icchakaṃ yad icchakaṃ sāreyyāpi paccāsāreyyāpi (BJT CSCD; Ee yen' icchakaṃ sāreyya); evaṃ eva kho, bhikkhave, yassa kassa ci kāyagatā sati bhāvitā . . .

43 AN III 27–28: “*evaṃ bhāvite kho, bhikkhave, ariye pañcaṅgike sammāsamādhimhi evaṃ bahulikate yassa yassa abhiññāsacchikarāṇīyassa dhammassa cittaṃ abhininnāmeti abhiññāsacchikiriyāya, tatra tatr' eva sakkebhavyataṃ pāpuṇāti sati*

sati āyatane. seyyathā pi, bhikkhave, udakamaṇiko ādhāre ṭhapito pūro udakassa samatittiko kākaṭṭheyyo. tam enaṃ balavā puriso yato yato āvajjeyya, āgaccheyya udakan” ti? “evaṃ, bhante.” “evaṃ eva kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ bhāvite ariye pañcaṅgike sammāsamādhimhi evaṃ bahulīkate yassa yassa abhiññāsacchikaraṇīyassa dhammassa cittaṃ abhininnāmeti abhiññāsacchikiriyāya, tatra tatr’ eva sakkhibhabbataṃ pāpuṇāti sati sati āyatane.

seyyathā pi, bhikkhave, same bhūmibhāge pokkharaṇī caturassā ālibaddhā pūrā udakassa samatittikā kākaṭṭheyyā. tam enaṃ balavā puriso yato yato āliṃ muñceyya, āgaccheyya udakan” ti? “evaṃ, bhante.” “evaṃ eva kho, bhikkhave, evaṃ bhāvite ariye pañcaṅgike sammāsamādhimhi evaṃ bahulīkate . . .

seyyathā pi, bhikkhave, subhūmiyaṃ cātummahāpathe ājaññaratho yutto assa ṭhito odhastapatodo. tam enaṃ dakkho yoggācariyo assadammasārathi abhirūhitvā vāmena hatthena rasmiyo gahetvā dakkhiṇena hatthena patodaṃ gahetvā yen’ icchakaṃ yad icchakaṃ sāreyya pi paccāsāreyya pi. evaṃ eva kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ bhāvite ariye pañcaṅgike sammāsamādhimhi evaṃ bahulīkate . . .

- 44 The third simile about a chariot is also found at SN IV 176, where it is applied to the restraint of the sense faculties.

- 45 By searching CSCD.

- 46 AN III 28–29: *so sace ākaṅkhati “anekavihitaṃ iddhividhaṃ paccanubhaveyyaṃ: eko pi hutvā bahudhā assaṃ . . . pe . . . yāva brahmalokā pi kāyena ’va samvatteyyaṃ” ti, tatra tatr’ eva sakkhibhabbataṃ pāpuṇāti sati sati āyatane.*

so sace ākaṅkhati “dibbāya sotadhātuyā visuddhāya . . . pe . . . ye dūre santike cā” ti, tatra tatr’ eva sakkhibhabbataṃ pāpuṇāti sati sati āyatane.

so sace ākaṅkhati “parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ cetasā ceto paricca pajāneyyaṃ: sarāgaṃ vā cittaṃ sarāgaṃ cittaṃ ti pajāneyyaṃ . . . pe . . . avimuttaṃ vā cittaṃ avimuttaṃ cittaṃ ti pajāneyyaṃ” ti, tatra tatr’ eva sakkhibhabbataṃ pāpuṇāti sati sati āyatane.

so sace ākaṅkhati “anekavihitaṃ pubbenivāsaṃ anussareyyaṃ, seyyathidaṃ ekam pi jātiṃ, dve pi jātiyo . . . pe . . . iti sākāraṃ sa-uddesaṃ anekavihitaṃ pubbenivāsaṃ anussareyyaṃ” ti, tatra tatr’ eva sakkhibhabbataṃ pāpuṇāti sati sati āyatane.

so sace ākaṅkhati “dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantaṃānusakena . . . pe . . . yathākammūpage (CSCD; Ee yathākammupage) satte pajāneyyaṃ” ti, tatra tatr’ eva sakkhibhabbataṃ pāpuṇāti sati sati āyatane.

so sace ākaṅkhati “āsavaṇaṃ khayā anāsavaṃ cetovimuttaṃ paññāvimuttaṃ diṭṭh” eva dhamme sayāṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja vihareyyaṃ” ti, tatra tatr’ eva sakkhibhabbataṃ pāpuṇāti sati sati āyatane ti.

- 47 e.g. SN II 212–214 and 216–217; DN III 281.

- 48 e.g. DN I 77 ff., 100, 124. An even closer resemblance between the passage in question and the standard formula on developing the six *abhiññās* can be found in the *Gāvī Sutta* of the *Anguttara Nikāya* (IV 421–422), where a description of the nine meditative attainments is followed by a passage containing the passage in question and the six special faculties. See Kuan (2004: 143–144).

- 49 *sakkhi-bhavyataṃ* in A = *sakkhi-bhabbataṃ* in X, Y.

- 50 This seems to mean that any meditative attainment could be a basis for developing supernormal knowledge. Similarly, according to the *Mahāmālunkyaṇaputta Sutta* (MN I 435–436), the *Aṭṭhakanāgara Sutta* (MN I 350–352) and a *sutta* in the *Anguttara Nikāya* (AN V 343–346), one may attain the destruction of the taints, the sixth supernormal knowledge, after attaining any of the four *jhānas* and the first three formless attainments.

- 51 It is stated at AN I 43 that *kāyagatā sati* leads to seven benefits, including *diṭṭhadhammasukha-vihāra*, which refers to *jhāna* as mentioned in Chapter 3.

- 52 Griffiths, 1983: 56; Gombrich, 1987: 77.

- 53 T 2, 123b: 云何無食捨？謂彼比丘離喜貪，捨心，住正念正知，安樂住彼聖說捨，第三禪具足住。是名無食捨。
- 54 Kuan, 2005b: 304.
- 55 See Chapter 5, Section 1.
- 56 Among the four passages peculiar to the Chinese version, the fourth practice “with teeth clenched and the tongue pressed against the palate, restraining one mental state with [another] mental state” is admittedly related to the body. But “with teeth clenched and the tongue pressed against the palate” seems rather like a physical exercise than mindfulness of the body. It is not surprising that this practice is given as one of the ascetic practices which the Buddha tried out before his enlightenment (MN I 242; II 93, 212).
- 57 Both the four elements and the six elements are found in the Pali *Majjhima Nikāya* and the Chinese *Madhyama Āgama*, e.g. the four elements at MN I 185 = MĀ T 1, 464c, and the six elements at MN III 62 = MĀ T 1, 723b. Therefore both lists may go back to a very early period, probably before the schisms.
- 58 See Appendix 2.
- 59 By searching CBETA, CSCD, PTC, and indexes to the different books of the *Nikāyas*.
- 60 There are different readings, but none of them seem to make sense.
- 61 Both readings 脬 and 泡 can mean bladder as 膀胱 (EDC VII 1063).
- 62 Urine is mentioned twice, but in different words.
- 63 The sentence has an interrogative word, 耶 (yé), but this must be a misprint for 也 (yě), which has a similar pronunciation but expresses the indicative mood.
- 64 T 2, 556c: 所謂念身者，髮、毛、爪、齒、皮、肉、筋、骨、膽、肝、肺、心、脾、腎、大腸、小腸、白臟膀胱、屎、尿、百葉、滄腸 (S; T 滄蕩; Y M Q 倉腸)、胃 (Q; T 脾)、泡 (T S; Y M Q 脬)、溺、淚、唾、涕、膿、血、肪脂、涎 (S Y M Q; T 漾)、髑髏、腦。何者是身為？地種是也，水種是也，火種是耶，風種是也。為父種、母種所造耶？從何處來？為誰所造？眼、耳、鼻、口 (T; S Y M Q 舌)、身、心。此終當生何處？如是，諸比丘，名曰念身。 The Jin edition of this text is not available.
- 65 e.g. DN I 209; SN IV 83, 194, 292: *cātummahābhūṭiko mātāpettikasambhavo*.
- 66 The references below are found by searching CSCD, PTC, and indexes to the different books of the *Nikāyas*.
- 67 In this *sutta*, *kāya* appears to mean the physical body since it is described as “consisting of the four great elements, originating from mother and father, built up out of boiled rice and gruel . . .” (tr. Bodhi, 2000: 1252. SN IV 194: “*nagaran’ ti kho, bhikkhu, imass’ etaṃ cātummahābhūṭikassa kāyassa adbhivacanāṃ mātāpettikasambhavassa odanakummāsūpacayassa . . .*”). However, this description is a stock formula describing *kāya* recurring in the *Nikāyas* (e.g. DN I 76; MN II 17; SN IV 83, 292; V 369–370) and might well have been added to this *sutta*.
- 68 e.g. *kāya* in the simile-accompanied glosses on the *jhānas* mentioned in Section 1. Similarly, commenting on *kāya* in *pīṭimanāya kāyo passambhissati, passad-dhakāyā sukhāṃ vedayissāmi* in the *Vinaya* (I 294), Rhys Davids and Oldenberg (1882: 224) say, “*Kāya* is neither ‘body’ nor ‘faculties;’ it is the whole frame, the whole individuality.”
- 69 SN IV 184–185: *kathaṃ, āvuso, avassuto hoti? idhāvuso, bhikkhu cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā piyarūpe rūpe adhimuccati, apiyarūpe rūpe vyāpajjati, anupaṭṭhitakāyasati viharati parittacetaso, taṃ ca cetovimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti yathā’ssa te uppannā pāpakā akusalā dhammā aparisesā nirujjhanti . . .*
- 70 DOP s.v. *anusavati* and *anvāssavati*.
- 71 This figurative expression shares common ground with an important concept in Jainism. Dundas (2002: 96–97) indicates that the flowing in of karma (*āsrava*),

which adheres to the soul (*jīva*), was also present at the very earliest stage of Jain teachings as textually constituted.

- 72 According to CSCD. The title extracted from the *uddāna* in Ee is *Bālena pandito*.
- 73 SN II 23–24: *avijjānīvaranaṣṣa, bhikkhave, bālassa taṇhāya sampayuttassa evaṃ ayaṃ kāyo samudāgato. iti ayañ c' eva kāyo bahiddhā ca nāmarūpaṃ, itth' etaṃ dvayaṃ, dvayaṃ paṭicca phasso, saḷvāyatanāni yehi phuṭṭho bālo sukhadukkhaṃ paṭisaṃvediyati etesaṃ vā aññatarena.*
- 74 Spk II 38: *ayañ c' eva kāyo ti ayañ c' assa attano saviññāṇako kāyo. bahiddhā ca nāmarūpaṃ ti bahiddhā ca paresaṃ saviññāṇako kāyo. attano ca parassa ca pañcahi khandhehi chahi āyatanehi cāpi ayaṃ attho dīpetabbo va.*
- 75 Spk II 38–39: *dvayaṃ paṭicca phasso ti aññattha cakkhurūpādīni dvayāni paṭicca cakkhusamphassādayo vuttā, idha pana ajjhattikabāhirāni āyatanāni.*
- 76 PED s.v. *devaka*: “only in **sa°-loka** the world including the gods in general.” e.g. MN I 108. Another example is *sa-Indā devā sa-Brahmakā sa-Pajāpatikā* (MN I 140). Here Inda, Brahmā and Pajāpati are all included in *devā*, “gods.” cf. PED 329: “**devā sa-indakā** (the gods, including Indra . . .)”
- 77 e.g. MN III 18, 32; SN II 252, 253; III 80, 103; AN I 132; IV 53.
- 78 e.g. SN IV 73–74: *rūpaṃ disvā sati muṭṭhā piyanimittam manasikaroto . . . saddaṃ . . . gandhaṃ . . . rasaṃ . . . phassaṃ . . . dhammaṃ . . .*
- 79 e.g. SN III 80, 103, 136, 169f.
- 80 e.g. DN I 76; SN II 94.
- 81 Here are all the references to *saviññāṇako kāyo* (only in locative *saviññāṇake kāye*) I was able to find by searching CSCD: MN III 18, 19, 32, 36; SN II 252, 253; III 80, 103, 136, 169, 170; AN I 132, 133, 134; IV 53.
- 82 This is Bodhi's (2000: 1429, note 209) interpretation of consciousness as compared to the lord of the city in the simile.
- 83 e.g. SN IV 186, 189–190, 120: *bhikkhu cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā piyarūpe rūpe nādhimuccati, apiyarūpe rūpe na vyāpajjati, upaṭṭhitakāyasati ca viharati appamāñacetaso, tañ ca cetovimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti yattha 'ssa te uppannā pāpakā akusalā dhammā aparisesā nirujjhanti . . .* cf. MN I 270.

5 THE FOUR *SATIPATTHĀNAS*: MINDFULNESS AS A COMPREHENSIVE PATH

- 1 I have searched CSCD.
- 2 Below are the references given by Gethin (2001: 31, note 9): *sati upaṭṭhāpetabbā* (DN II 141), *satiṃ upaṭṭhapetvā/upaṭṭhāpetvā* (Vin I 24; DN I 71; MN II 139; SN I 179; AN II 210; Th 946; Thī 182; etc.).
- 3 Norman (1983: 45) also says, “[T]he second portion dealing with the four truths . . . has a separate existence in the Majjhima-nikāya (141),” i.e. the *Saccavibhaṅga Sutta*.
- 4 As pointed out by Rahula (2000: 69).
- 5 This will be discussed in Section 2.6.
- 6 This will be discussed in Section 2.1.
- 7 These refer to the practices described in the six sections under contemplation of the body stated above, where the sixth section contains nine practices.
- 8 T 1, 582b–584b. For the English translation, see Appendix 1.
- 9 See the Introduction.
- 10 T 2, 567c–569b. This text has been translated into English by Ven. Thich Nhat Hanh (1990: 168–177) and Ven. Pāsādika (1998: 495–502).
- 11 See the Introduction.

- 12 He uses six versions: 1. Pali version; 2. Chinese version in the *Madhyama Āgama* (T 1, 582b 7 ff.); 3. Chinese version in the *Ekottara Āgama* (T 2, 568a 1 ff.); 4. Pv 203, 22–207,14; 5. ŚA (T 28, 612 b 28–616 c 7); 6. ŚrBh 291, 5 ff.; 371, 7 ff.; 203, 4 ff; 111, 11 ff. See Schmithausen (1976: 244, notes 7, 8, 10).
- 13 The numbers in brackets refer to the numbers given above to the practices under: I. Contemplation of the body or IV. Contemplation of *dhammas* in the (*Mahā*)*satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*.
- 14 Reviewing the body by way of the four elements, and contemplating a corpse in different states of decomposition.
- 15 But Lin (1949: 122–123) still regards *kāyagatā sati* as mindfulness of the physical body.
- 16 e.g. Ho, 2001: 140; Anālayo, 2003: 120.
- 17 DN I 79; I 232 (it should be 233); MN I 34, 69.
- 18 MN I 59; DN II 299: *bhikkhu sarāgaṃ vā cittaṃ sarāgaṃ cittaṃ ti pajānāti. vītarāgaṃ vā cittaṃ vītarāgaṃ cittaṃ ti pajānāti . . . sadosaṃ . . . vītadosaṃ . . .*
- 19 e.g. DN I 79–80, 233; DN III 281; MN I 34–35, 69; MN III 12, 98; SN II 121–122, 213; SN V 265, 304; AN I 255; AN III 17–18, 280.
- 20 The Chinese counterpart of this passage can also be found at other places in the *Āgamas*, where it refers to a special power among a list of achievements. e.g. T 1, 553b; T 2, 776b.
- 21 *parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ cetasā ceto paricca pajānāti* (or *pajāneyyaṃ*, or *pajānāmi*, or *pajānātha*).
- 22 e.g. all the passages cited in note 19.
- 23 Norman (1983: 9) states: “We may deduce from the fact that versions of one and the same *sutta* or utterance in different parts of the canon sometimes differ, that the *bhāṇakas* responsible for the transmission of each text were quite independent, and were not influenced by the traditions of the *bhāṇakas* of other *nikāyas*.” Norman (1989: 34) also says, “the *bhāṇakas* did not merely recite texts, but also added to their collections.” Von Hinüber (1997: 25) also holds that *bhāṇakas* may have been the redactors of the texts.
- 24 MN I 56 ff.: *iti ajjhataṃ vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati, bahiddhā vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati, ajjhatabhiddhā vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati. samudāy-adhammānupassī vā kāyasmīṃ viharati, vāyadhammānupassī vā kāyasmīṃ viharati, samudāyavāyadhammānupassī vā kāyasmīṃ viharati. atthi kāyo ti vā paṇ’assa sati paccupaṭṭhitā hoti yāvad eva ñāṇamattāya paṭissatimattāya, anissito ca viharati, na ca kiñci loke upādiyati. evaṃ pi, bhikkhave, bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati.*
- 25 Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 1326, note 1129.
- 26 e.g. SN V 183, 294–295, 297; AN III 450.
- 27 Pv 204–206. However, *adhyātmaṃ* is missing, most likely by mistake, in the section on mindfulness of breathing.
- 28 Śp 1428–1431.
- 29 These nine charnel ground contemplations are quite different from the Chinese version, but closer to the Pali.
- 30 Pv 206–207.
- 31 It is a scribal convention to write *bahirddhā* for *bahirdhā*.
- 32 Śp 1432–1434. The last charnel ground contemplation is referred to as *adhyātmakāye*, which must be a wrong reading.
- 33 “Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by ‘a monk contemplates the body as a body’.” (T 1, 582b ff.: 如是比丘觀內身如身，觀外身如身，立念在身，有知有見，有明有達。是謂比丘觀身如身。)

- 34 Quotation from Gombrich (1990b: 24).
- 35 Norman, 1983: 9.
- 36 See the Introduction.
- 37 Although this formula is not found in the Chinese versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, it recurs in the *Samyukta Āgama* (T 2, 171 ff.), mostly expanded by combining with “internal,” “external” and “internal and external.” This expanded version is also found in the *Madhyama Āgama* (T 1, 543c).
- 38 e.g. MN I 56; DN II 290: *cattāro satipaṭṭhānā. katame cattāro?idha bhikkhave bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ, vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ, citte cittānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ, dhammesu dhammānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ.* cf. SN V 141; AN IV 457.
- 39 Ps I 241: *kāye ti ca vatvā puna kāyānupassī ti dutiyaṃ kāyagahaṇaṃ asammis-sato vavatthāna-ghana-vinibbhogaḍi-dassanattamaṃ katan ti veditabbaṃ. tena kāye na vedanānupassī na cittadhammānupassī vā, atha kho kāyānupassī yevā ti kāyasaṅkhāte vatthusmiṃ kāyānupassanākārass’ eva dassanena asammissato vavatthānaṃ dassitaṃ hoti.*
- 40 T 26, 475c ff.: 於此內身住循身觀.
- 41 T 25, 402c ff.: 內身中循身觀.
- 42 T 1, 582b ff.: 觀身如身.
- 43 The word *anicca* can be either an adjective, “impermanent,” or a noun, “impermanence.” PED s.v. *nicca*: “Far more freq. as **anicca** (adj.; *anicca*? nt. n.) unstable, impermanent, inconstant; (nt.) evanescence, inconstancy, impermanence.”
- 44 Ee and BJT has *anabhirata*, which is a past participle or adjective, whereas CSCD has *anabhirati*, which is a noun.
- 45 Like *anicca*, *asubha* and *paṭikkūla* can be either nouns or adjectives. See PED s.v. *asubha* and *paṭikkūla*. The two different readings (*anabhirata/anabhirati*) mentioned in the previous note suggest that either an adjective or a noun is expected to fit the context.
- 46 Translation based on Bodhi, 2000: 1175. SN IV 73.
- 47 Ps I 242: *ayaṃ hi etasmiṃ kāye kāyānupassī yeva, nāññadhammānupassī. kiṃ vuttaṃ hoti? yathā anudakabhūtāya pi marīciyā udakānupassino honti, na evaṃ aniccadukkhānatta-asubhabhūte yeva imasmiṃ kāye nicca-sukha-atta-subhabhāvānupassī.*
- 48 The word *vineyya* can also be an optative (PED s.v. *vineti*). But its Sanskrit counterparts in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* (MPS 200) and two *Prajñāpāramitā* texts (Pv 204; Śp 1427) are *vinīya*, which is no doubt an absolutive.
- 49 e.g. Nāṇamoli & Bodhi (1995: 145) translates: “having put away”; Nyanaponika (1962: 117): “having overcome.”
- 50 Warder, 1991: 48.
- 51 MN I 55–56, DN II 290, SN V 167, 185: *ekāyano ayaṃ, bhikkhave, maggo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā sokaparidevānaṃ (°pariddavānaṃ) samatikkamāya dukkhadomanas-sānaṃ atthagamāya . . .*
- 52 The commentary on the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (Sv III 759) reads: *abhijjhādomanassavinayena bhāvanābalaṃ* (same in CSCD) *vuttan ti*. This gloss also occurs in the commentary to the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (Ps I 244), but it has *phala* (same in CSCD) instead of *bala*. Ven. Nyānuttara probably refers to the reading in Ps rather than Sv. Searching CSCD, I only found one other occurrence of this expression at Paṭi-a I 177, which has *phala* instead of *bala*, agreeing with the reading of Ps.
- 53 Sn 143: *karaṇīyaṃ atthakusalena yaṃ taṃ santaṃ padaṃ abhisamecca.*

- 54 SN V 226: *santam etaṃ padaṃ paññātam* (BJT, CSCD; Ee *phanitam*) *etaṃ padaṃ, yad idaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭṭinissaggo taṇhakkhaya* (Ee BJT; CSCD *taṇhākkhaya*) *virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ*. This is the only reference to *santam padaṃ* in the earliest texts I found by searching CSCD. This passage is also cited in the *Mahāniddesa* (II 342) and *Cullaniddesa* (CSCD 127).
- 55 Sn 208: *yo jātam ucchijja na ropayeyya jāyantaṃ assa nānuppavecche. tam āhu ekaṃ muninaṃ carantaṃ, addakkhi so santipadaṃ mahesi*. Sn 209: *saṅkhāya vatthūni pamāya bījaṃ, sineham assa nānuppavecche. sa ve muni jātikhayantadassī, takkaṃ pahāya na upeti saṅkhaṃ*.
- 56 SN V 143: *cattāro satipaṭṭhāne tividhena bhāveyyāsi*.
- 57 e.g. SN V 297, 143: *ajjhataṃ (vā) kāye kāyānupassī viharati (viharāhi) ātāpī sampajāno satimā, vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ; bahiddhā (vā) kāye kāyānupassī viharati (viharāhi) ātāpī sampajāno satimā, vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ; ajjhatabhiddhā (vā) kāye kāyānupassī viharati (viharāhi) ātāpī sampajāno satimā, vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ*.
- 58 MN I 56ff.: *ajjhataṃ vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati, bahiddhā vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati, ajjhatabhiddhā vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati . . . vedanāsu . . . citte . . . dhammesu . . .*
AN III 450: *ajjhataṃ kāye . . . pe . . . bahiddhā kāye . . . ajjhatabhiddhā kāye . . . ajjhataṃ vedanāsu . . . bahiddhā vedanāsu . . . ajjhatabhiddhā vedanāsu . . . ajjhataṃ citte . . . bahiddhā citte . . . ajjhatabhiddhā citte . . . ajjhataṃ dhammesu . . . bahiddhā dhammesu . . . ajjhatabhiddhā dhammesu dhammānupassī viharitum*.
- 59 e.g. in SRTD translated by An Shigao (T 1, 234a), in the Chinese translation of all the four *Āgamas* by different translators, in the translations by Kumārajīva and Xuanzang as mentioned above, in modern translations by Nyanaponika Thera (1962: 155), Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (1995: 146ff.), Walshe (1995: 336ff.). Similarly, Gethin (2001: 53) translates “within,” and Conze (1961: 140) translates “inward.”
- 60 DN II 216: *idha bho bhikkhu ajjhataṃ kāye kāyānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ. ajjhataṃ kāye kāyānupassī viharanto tattha sammā samādhīyati, sammā vipassīdati, so tattha sammā samāhito sammā vipassanno bahiddhā parakāye ñāṇadassanaṃ abhinibbatteti*. cf. T 1, 36a: 內身觀已，生他身智。內觀受已，生他受智。內觀意已，生他意智。內觀法已，生他法智。
- 61 Vibh 196: *kathaṃ ca bhikkhu ajjhatabhiddhā vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharati? idha bhikkhu sukhaṃ vedanaṃ “sukhā vedanā” ti pajānāti*.
- 62 Ps I 252: *Ajjhatabhiddhā vā ti kālena attano kālena parassa vā catu-iriyāpathaparigaṇhanena kāye kāyānupassī viharati* (CSCD; Ee *viharati*).
- 63 SN V 183: *bhikkhu samudayadhammānupassī kāyasmaṇ viharati, vayadhammānupassī kāyasmaṇ viharati, samudayavayadhammānupassī kāyasmaṇ viharati, ātāpī sampajāno satimā, vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ . . .*
- 64 e.g. MN I 56ff.: *samudayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmaṇ viharati, vayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmaṇ viharati, samudayavayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmaṇ viharati*.
- 65 SN V 294–295.
- 66 SN V 145: *te pi kāye kāyānupassino viharanti ātāpino sampajānā ekodibhūtā vipassannacittā samāhitā ekaggacittā . . .*
- 67 MN I 194, 201: *so tāya samādhisampadāya attān’ ukkaṃseti, paraṃ vambheti: aham asmi samāhito ekaggacitto, ime paṇ’ aññe bhikkhū asamāhitā vibbhantacittā ti*.
- 68 MN I 21, 117: *āraddhaṃ kho pana me vīriyaṃ ahoṣi asallīnaṃ, upaṭṭhitā sati asammuṭṭhā, passaddho kāyo asāraddho, samāhitaṃ cittaṃ ekaggaṃ*.

- 69 AN I 266, III 391–392; MN I 32; It 91: *upaṭṭhitasati sampajāno samāhito ekaggacitto*.
 70 *muṭṭhassati asampajāno asamāhito vibbhantacitto*.
 71 Peṭ 121: *tattha pañcakkhandhā cattāri attabhāvavattūni bhavanti. yo rūpak-khandho, so kāyo attabhāvavattu. yo vedanakkhandho, so vedanā attabhāvavattu. yo saññākkhandho* (Ee inserts *so saññā attabhāvavattu*. *ye*, which is omitted according to BJT and Nāṇamoli, 1964: 166) *ca* (BJT; Ee omits) *saikhārakkhandho ca* (BJT; Ee omits) *te dhammā attabhāvavattu. yo viññāṇakkhandho, so cittaṃ attabhāvavattu*.
 72 Zacchetti (2002: 75, note 7) points out that this text is clearly not a *sūtra*. I am grateful to Mr L.S. Cousins for showing me this article.
 73 T 15, 175c: 彼五陰為四身有。從所有色陰是屬身。從有痛陰是屬痛身。從有識陰是屬意身。從有想陰亦行陰是屬法身。The word equivalent to *attabhāvavattu* in Pali is translated as 身 at the beginning of this passage, “body.” In the following exposition of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, *kāya* of the first *satipaṭṭhāna* is also translated as 身. In our context, two 身, one for *kāya* and the other for *attabhāvavattu*, are expected to be related to the aggregate of form, but only one 身 occurs (same in Q and J).
 74 Quoted from von Hinüber (1997: 81).
 75 T 27, 938a: 對治色蘊故說身念住。對治受蘊故說受念住。對治識蘊故說心念住。對治想蘊行蘊故說法念住。
 76 SN V 184: *āhārasamudayā kāyassa samudayo. āhāranirodhā kāyassa atthagamo. phassasamudayā vedanānaṃ samudayo. phassanirodhā vedanānaṃ atthagamo. nāmarūpasamudayā cittassa samudayo. nāmarūpanirodhā cittassa atthagamo. manasikārasamudayā dhammānaṃ samudayo. manasikāranirodhā dhammānaṃ atthagamo*.
 77 The Chinese *Samyukta Āgama* has an equivalent passage as follows (T 2, 15b):
 1) [Through] the arising of craving is the arising of form. [Through] the ceasing of craving is the ceasing of form.
 2) [Through] the arising of contact is the arising of feeling, apperception and volitional activities. [Through] the ceasing of contact is the ceasing of feeling, apperception and volitional activities.
 3) [Through] the arising of name-and-form is the arising of consciousness. [Through] the ceasing of name-and-form is the ceasing of consciousness.
 Although the first item in the Chinese version is a bit different from that in the Pali, i.e. craving is in the place of food, there is a close relation between craving and food according to a passage in the *Mahātaṇhāsankhaya Sutta* as follows: “These four foods have craving as their source, craving as their origin; they are born and produced from craving.” (MN I 261)
 78 SN III 59–61 and 62–64: *āhārasamudayā rūpasamudayo. āhāranirodhā rūpanirodho . . . phassasamudayā vedanāsamudayo. phassanirodhā vedanānirodho . . . phassasamudayā saññāsamudayo. phassanirodhā saññānirodho . . . phassasamudayā saikhārasamudayo. phassanirodhā saikhāranirodho . . . nāmarūpasamudayā viññāpasamudayo. nāmarūpanirodhā viññāṇanirodho*.
 79 SN III 86: *kiñ ca bhikkhave rūpaṃ vadetha? ruppattī ti kho bhikkhave tasmā rūpan ti vuccati. Kena ruppattī? sītena pi ruppattī uñhena pi ruppattī jighacchāya pi ruppattī pipāsāya pi ruppattī dāmsa-makasa-vātātapa-sirīmsapa-samphassena pi ruppattī*.
 80 e.g. SN III 59: *cattāro ca mahābhūtā catunnaṃ ca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ idaṃ vuccati bhikkhave rūpaṃ*.
 81 e.g. *Nidāna Samyutta* of the *Samyutta Nikāya*, *Mahānidāna Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*.
 82 e.g. SN II 94, 95: *yaṃ ca kho etaṃ bhikkhave vuccati cittaṃ iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇaṃ iti pi . . .*
 DN I 21: *yañ ca kho idaṃ vuccati cittaṃ ti vā mano ti vā viññāṇaṃ ti vā . . .*

- 83 Commenting on a3, Bodhi (2000: 1928) states: “In this passage *citta* is taken to be synonymous with *viññāṇa*; *nāmarūpa*, being the condition for the latter, is the condition for the former as well.”
- 84 e.g. DN II 32, 62–63; SN II 104: *viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpan ti . . . nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇan ti*.
- 85 SN II 104: *ettāvata jāyetha vā jīyetha* (CSCD BJT; Ee *jīyetha vā jāyetha*) *vā mīyetha* (CSCD BJT; Ee *māyetha*) *vā cavetha vā upapajjetha vā, yad idam nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇaṃ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ; nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatanam; saḷāyatanapaccayā phasso . . .*
- 86 DN II 63: *viññāṇam va hi, ānanda, mātu kucchiṃ okkamitvā vakkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ itthattāya abhinibbattissathā ti?*
- 87 cf. Kalupahana, 1975: 116–118; Johansson, 1979: 57. *Kucchiṃ okkamati* is an idiom denoting conception (e.g. DN II 12; Thī 436).
- 88 SN II 65: *tasmiṃ patiṭṭhite viññāṇe virūlḥe āyatim punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti* (“When this consciousness is established and grown, there is the production of renewed existence in the future.”). For other instances, see SN I 122, III 124.
- 89 SN V 369–370: *tassa yo hi khv āyaṃ kāyo rūpī . . . tam idh’ eva kākā vā khādanti gijjhā vā khādanti . . . yañ ca khv assa cittaṃ dīgharattaṃ saddhāparibhāvitaṃ sīla-suta-cāga-paññā* (CSCD; Ee omits *paññā*)-*paribhāvitaṃ tam uddhagāmi hoti visesagāmi*.
- 90 SN I 38: *tañhā janeti purisaṃ, cittaṃ assa vidhāvati. satto saṃsāram āpādi, kammaṃ tassa parāyanan ti*.
- 91 SN II 95: *yañ ca kho etaṃ, bhikkhave, vuccati cittaṃ iti pi, mano iti pi, viññāṇam iti pi, taṃ rattiya ca divasassa ca aññad eva uppajjati aññaṃ nirujjhati*. SN II 94: *yañ ca kho etaṃ, bhikkhave, vuccati cittaṃ iti pi, mano iti pi, viññāṇam iti pi, . . . etaṃ bhikkhave assutavato puthujjanassa . . . parāmaṭṭham “etaṃ mama, eso ’ham asmi, eso me attā” ti*.
- 92 For a solution to this paradox, see Collins (1982: 214).
- 93 T 28, 615a: 云何心？若心、意、識、六識身。
- 94 e.g. SN III 61: *chayime, bhikkhave, viññāṇakāyā: cakkhuvīññāṇam, sotaviññāṇam, ghānavīññāṇam, jivhāvīññāṇam, kāyaviññāṇam, manovīññāṇam*.
- 95 Translation based on Bodhi (2000: 587). SN II 82: *avijjāgato ’yaṃ bhikkhave purisapuggalo puññaṃ ce saṅkhāram abhisankharoti, puññūpagaṃ hoti viññāṇam. apuññaṃ ce saṅkhāram abhisankharoti, apuññūpagaṃ hoti viññāṇam. āneñjam ce saṅkhāram abhisankharoti, āneñjūpagaṃ hoti viññāṇam*.
- 96 e.g. DN I 76; SN II 94.
- 97 e.g. SN III 1, V 369.
- 98 AN V 107 (= AN IV 339): *manasikārasambhavā sabbe dhammā, phassasamudayaṃ sabbe dhammā*.
- 99 Similarly, Hamilton (1996: 30) suggests that the use of *dhammas* in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas* is compatible with the understanding of *dhammā* as objective phenomena in general as in the context of *dhammā* being the object of the *manodhātu*.
- 100 e.g. SN IV 73–74: *rūpaṃ disvā sati muṭṭhā piyanimittam manasikaroto . . . saddaṃ . . . gandhaṃ . . . rasaṃ . . . phassaṃ . . . dhammaṃ . . .*
- 101 e.g. MN I 119, 296; III 161.
- 102 As I 133: “*manasikāro*” . . . *so sārāṇalakkaṇo, sampayuttānaṃ ārammaṇe* (CSCD; Ee *ārammaṇa*) *sampayojanaraso, ārammaṇābhīmukhabhāvavapaccupaṭṭhāno*.
- 103 cf. also Aung, 1910: 17.
- 104 e.g. DN I 76; SN II 94.

- 105 e.g. DN I 124, 157; II 2, 76.
- 106 Although the Chinese version (T 1, 584a) makes no mention of the term “six external sense bases,” they are actually implied in the text as forms (色) and mind-objects (法) are mentioned.
- 107 cf. Frauwallner, 1995: 43.
- 108 Similarly Warder (1971: 280) renders *dhammas* in the fourth *satipaṭṭhāna* as the “contents of thought,” and says, “It could of course be suggested that any *dhamma* could be regarded as a thought-content in so far as it could be thought of, as an idea or concept, including physical phenomena.”
- 109 It is of some interest to note a point Gethin (2001: 306) makes when he discusses a passage in the *Visuddhimagga*. He says, “[W]hen the mind is transcendent, when its object is *nibbāna* . . . In a sense the practice of all the *satipaṭṭhānas* involves the watching of *dhammas* . . . However, it is only when they are truly seen as *dhammas*, rising and falling, that there is *dhammānupassanā*; at that stage the point seems to be that practitioner sees not *dhammas* so much as *dhamma* itself, which, it seems, amounts to seeing *nibbāna*.” Similarly, as he shows (p. 324), according to the *Abhidharmakośa* “This more advanced stage of *dharma-smṛty-upasthāna* unifies the watching of *kāya*, *vedanā*, *citta* and other *dhammas*,” but “this kind of *smṛty-upasthāna* is not strictly confined to transcendent consciousness.”
- 110 MN I 55–56; DN II 290; SN V 141, 167, 185: *ekāyano ayaṃ bhikkhave maggo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā sokaparidevānaṃ (°pariddavānaṃ) samatikkamāya dukkhadomanassānaṃ atthagamāya nāyassa adhigamāya nibbānassa sacchikiri-yāya, yad idaṃ cattāro satipaṭṭhānā*.
- 111 The Chinese translation equivalent to *ekāyano maggo* is 一乘道. But 一乘 is a standard translation for *ekayāna*, “one vehicle.” The translator probably confused *ekāyana* with *ekayāna*.
- 112 T 2, 147b: 如來·應·等正覺所知所見，說四如意足，以一乘道淨眾生，滅苦惱，斷憂悲。何等為四？欲定斷行成就如意足、精進定、心定、思惟定斷行成就如意足。
- 113 T 2, 143b–144a: 佛·世尊·如來·應·等正覺所知所見，說六法出苦處，昇於勝處，說一乘道淨諸眾生，離諸惱苦，憂悲悉滅，得真如法。何等為六？謂聖弟子念如來·應·等正覺 . . . 念於正法 . . . 念於僧法 . . . 念於戒德 . . . 念施法 . . . 念於天德 . . .
- 114 I am grateful to Professor Paul Harrison for providing this information.
- 115 T 2, 147b = SN V 271–273. T 2, 143b–144a = AN III 314–317, where (p. 314) occurs a passage almost identical to the *ekāyana* formula without the words *ekāyano ayaṃ maggo*.
- 116 “That *sūtra*” must refer back to 契經 (“*sūtra*”) found at T 27, 943a, from which the *ekāyana* formula is cited.
- 117 T 27, 943c: 正斷、神足、根、力、覺支、道支為是一趣道不？若是者，何故彼經唯說念住名一趣道，不說餘耶？
- 118 MN III 94, AN I 43: *seyyathā pi, bhikkhave, yassa kassa ci mahāsamuddo cetasā phuṭo, antogadhā tassa kunnadiyo yā kā ci samuddaṇṇamā, evam eva kho, bhikkhave, yassa kassa ci kāyagatā sati bhāvitā bahulikatā, antogadhā tassa kusalā dhammā ye ke ci vijjābhāgiyā*.
- 119 BU 2.4.11; 4.5.12: *sa yathā sarvāsām apāṃ samudra ekāyanam evaṃ . . .*
- 120 SN V 163: *attadīpā viharatha attasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā, dhammadīpā dhammasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā. kathaṃ cānanda bhikkhu attadīpo viharatī attasaraṇo anaññasaraṇo, dhammadīpo dhammasaraṇo anaññasaraṇo? idhānanda bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharatī . . . vedanāsu . . . citte . . . dhammesu . . .*

- 121 SN V 154: *ye hi keci ānanda etarahi vā mam' accaye vā attadīpā viharissanti attasaraṇā . . .*
- 122 Translation based on Norman, 1995: 95. Th 1034: *na pakkhanti disā sabbā, dhammā na paṭibhanti maṃ, gate kalyāṇamittamhi, andhakāraṃ va khāyati.*
Th 1035: *abbhatītasahāyassa, atītagatasatthuno n' atthi etādisaṃ mittam yathā kāyagatā sati.*
- 123 SN V 162: *disā pi me na pakkhāyanti, dhammā pi maṃ na paṭibhanti 'āyasmā sārīputto parinibbuto' ti sutvā.*
- 124 Th-a III 119: ***na pakkhantī*** *ti ādikā āyasmato sārīputtassa dhammasenāpatino parinibbutabhāvaṃ sutvā therena bhāsītā.*
- 125 Th-a III 120: ***abbhatītasahāyassā*** *ti apagatasahāyassa, kalyāṇamittarahitassa ti attho.*
- 126 T.W. Rhys Davids, 1903: 27; DPPN I 642.
- 127 Dhp-a III 224ff.
- 128 e.g. Foucher, 1963: 205–206; Strong, 2001: 117.
- 129 A similar view has been expressed by Yamada (1953: 248). Thomas (1927: 115, note 2) even says, “It is doubtful if Buddha ever went so far west as Kosambī.”
- 130 For the above locations, see the map near the front of the book.
- 131 e.g. DN no. 15; MN no. 75; SN II 92, 107; AN V 29–30.
- 132 Dutt (1970: 135) states: “The Sarvāstivādins selected Mathura as the venue of their early activities and it was from this place that they fanned out to Gandhāra and Kashmir . . .” Mathurā is very near to the south of the Kuru country, which is halfway between Mathurā and Kashmir. Several inscriptions dated from 100 BC to AD 200 or 300 also confirm the presence of the Sarvāstivādins in Mathurā (Lamotte, 1988: 523).
- 133 The *Magga-*, *Bojjhaṅga-*, *Indriya-*, *Sammappadhāna-*, *Bala-*, *Iddhipāda-*, and *Jhāna-saṃyutta*.
- 134 This setting is unlikely. See discussion below.
- 135 e.g. Bv-a 4: *bhagavā hi paṭhamabodhiyaṃ vīsati vassāni anibaddhavāso hutvā yattha yattha phāsukaṃ hoti, tattha tatth' eva gantvā vaṣī ti. tato paṭṭhāya pana sāvatthiṃ yeva upanissāya jetavanamahāvihāre ca pubbārāme ca dhuvaparibhogavasena vasi.*
- 136 The number cited by Schopen (1997: 578) is ninety-four, which is mistaken.
- 137 Equivalent to *sūtra* 622 of SĀ (T 2, 174a–b).
- 138 No equivalent in SĀ.
- 139 Equivalent to *sūtra* 498 of SĀ (T 2, 130c–131a).
- 140 Equivalent to *sūtra* 639 of SĀ (T 2, 177a–b), but the setting is *Madhurā (Pali Mathurā).
- 141 Apart from the above two *suttas* in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta* and the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, the only reference to the Buddha's staying at Ambapālī's Grove is AN IV 100, from which we cannot tell whether this is a different visit from that recorded in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*.
- 142 Scholars agree in this point, e.g. DPPN I 155; Hirakawa, 1990: 36; An, 2003: 68, note 8.
- 143 DPPN II 178.
- 144 DN II 87–88, Vin I 229.
- 145 Searching CSCD, I found the following references: MN I 349ff., II 163; SN V 15, 16; AN III 57f., V 342, 347.
- 146 MN II 162.
- 147 See her Prefatory Note to the *Anguttara-Nikāya Volume VI Indexes*, London: Pali Text Society, 1960 (First published 1910), vii–viii.

CONCLUSION

- 1 e.g. SN V 198.
- 2 e.g. MN III 252.
- 3 Spk II 126–127: *mayam nijjhānakā sukkhavipassakā, paññāmatteva vimuttā ti.*
- 4 MN I 477: *katamo ca, bhikkhave, puggalo paññāvimutto? idha, bhikkhave, ekacco puggalo ye te santā vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppā te na kāyena phassitvā viharati.*
- 5 e.g. MN I 477, SN II 121–123.
- 6 Sv II 512: *so sukkhavipassako ca paṭhamajjhānādisu aññatarasmim̐ thatvā arahattaṃ patto cā ti pañcavidho hoti.*
- 7 The *abhiññās* are developed after attaining the four *jhānas* according to several *suttas* in the *Sīlakkhandha Vagga* of DN.
- 8 T 2, 97a: 時彼須深語比丘言：「尊者，云何學離欲、惡不善法，有覺有觀，離生喜樂，具足初禪，不起諸漏，心善解脫耶？」比丘答言：「不也，須深。」復問：「云何離有覺有觀，內淨一心，無覺無觀，定生喜樂，具足第二禪，不起諸漏，心善解脫耶？」比丘答言：「不也，須深。」復問：「云何尊者離喜捨心，住正念正智，身心受樂，聖說及捨，具足第三禪，不起諸漏，心善解脫耶？」答言：「不也，須深。」復問：「云何尊者離苦息樂，憂喜先斷，不苦不樂，捨淨念，一心，具足第四禪，不起諸漏，心善解脫耶？」答言：「不也，須深。」復問：「若復寂靜解脫起 (*sic*, also in J and Q) 色、無色，身作證具足住，不起諸漏，心善解脫耶？」答言：「不也，須深。」Here 起, “arising,” could be a misprint for 超, “transcending.” This emendation can be supported by Xuangzang’s translation of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, where “transcending” (超) is used (T 29, 146a: 契經言：無色解脫最為寂靜，超諸色故。)
- 9 T 1, 751b: 云何比丘有慧解脫？若有比丘八解脫身不觸成就遊... The same definition of “liberation by wisdom” is also found in SĀ, e.g. T 2, 240a.
- 10 Dhs §§ 248–250.
- 11 Dhs §§ 204, 205.
- 12 e.g. Vibh 203: *idha bhikkhu yasmiṃ samaye lokuttaraṃ jhānaṃ bhāveti niyyānikaṃ apacayagāmiṃ diṭṭhigatānaṃ pahānāya paṭhamāya bhūmiyā pattiyaṃ vivicca’ eva kāmehi... pe... paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati dukkhāpaṭipadaṃ dandhābhīṇaṃ kāye kāyānupassī, yā tasmim̐ samaye sati anussati... pe... sammāsati satisambojjhaṅgo maggaṅgaṃ maggapiyāpannaṃ: idaṃ vuccati satipaṭṭhānaṃ.* The same is said of *vedanāsu vedanānupassī, citte cittānupassī* and *dhammesu dhammānupassī*.
- 13 Vibh 206: *siyā savitakkasavicārā, siyā avitakkavicāramattā, siyā avitakka-avicārā. siyā pītisahagatā, siyā sukkasahagatā, siyā upekkhāsahagatā.*
- 14 T 27, 945a–947c.
- 15 e.g. Rahula (2000: 68–69), Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (1995: 38).
- 16 e.g. T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1910: 327), Nyanaponika (1962: 7), Sīlānanda (2002: 8–9).
- 17 Dhṛp 372: *n’ atthi jhānaṃ apaññassa, paññā n’ atthi ajhāyato. yamhi jhānaṃ ca paññā ca sa ve nibbānasantike.*
- 18 SN V 115: *satiṇ ca* (CSCD; Ee *satim ca*; BJT *satiṇ*) *khv āhaṃ bhikkhave sabbatthikaṃ vadāmi ti.*

APPENDIX 1 AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDA VERSION OF THE SATIPAṬṬHĀNA SUTTA

- 1 Lü, 1963: 242.
- 2 Waldschmidt, 1980: 137; von Hinüber, 1982: 246. For more references, see Ven. Anālayo (2006b: 5).

- 3 Lü, 1963: 242; Kumoi, 1963: 248; Ui, 1965: 136; Enomoto, 1984; Thich Minh Chau, 1991: 18–27.
- 4 These three editions refer to the Zifu edition (資福藏) in the Song Dynasty, Puning edition (普寧藏) in the Yuan Dynasty and Jiaxing edition (嘉興藏) in the Ming Dynasty. See 《中華大藏經(漢文部分)》內容簡介 (A Brief Introduction to the Contents of the *Tripitaka of China (Chinese Part)*), p. 4.
- 5 Cai, 1976: 4.
- 6 Tong, 1997: 12.
- 7 Cai, 1976: 19.
- 8 《中華大藏經(漢文部分)》內容簡介 (A Brief Introduction to the Contents of the *Tripitaka of China (Chinese Part)*), p. 5.
- 9 At the beginning of the 65th *Sūtra* (T 1, 506b) of the *Madhyama Āgama* there are the following words: “The second day’s chanting is called ‘the small earthen city.’ There are four and a half chapters, containing 52 *sūtras* in total.” (第二日誦名小土城，有四品半，合有五十二經。) At the beginning of each of the first 64 *sūtras* we can find the words: “chanted on the first day” (初一日誦). It is presumed that the first 64 *sūtras* were chanted on the first day of the council; then the following 52 *sūtras*, including our text, were chanted on the second day. I am grateful to Mr. Yuwen Yang for the reference and suggestion.
- 10 遊 literally means “travel,” “play.” In MĀ, however, this character is often used to translate the word equivalent to *viharati* (“to dwell,” “to abide”) in the Pali counterparts.
- 11 拘樓瘦 is obviously translated from a word equivalent to *kurūsu* in the Pali, which is the locative plural of *kuru*, meaning “among the Kurus.”
- 12 立心正住於四念處 is very likely to have been translated from words equivalent to *catusu satipaṭṭhānesu supatīṭṭhitacittā* in Pali, which recurs in the *Nikāyas* in an almost identical context (tr. Bodhi, 2000: 1642):
 Whatever Arahants, Perfectly Enlightened Ones arose in the past, all those Blessed Ones had first abandoned the five hindrances, corruptions of the mind and weakeners of wisdom; and then, with their minds well established in the four establishments of mindfulness, they had developed correctly the seven factors of enlightenment; and thereby they had awakened to the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment. (The same is said of “whatever Arahants, Perfectly Enlightened Ones will arise in the future” and “the Blessed One, who is at present the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One.” SN V 160–1 = DN II 83 = DN III 101: *ye pi te, bhante, ahesum atītam addhānaṃ arahanto sammāsambuddhā, sabbe te bhagavanto pañca nīvaraṇe pahāya, cetaso upakkilese paññāya dubbalīkaṇe, catusu satipaṭṭhānesu suppatīṭṭhitacittā, satta bojjhaṅge yathābhūtaṃ bhāvetvā, anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhim abhisambujjhīsu.*) cf. AN V 195.
- 13 有明有達 literally means “possessing 明, possessing 達.” Since both 明 and 達 can render gnosis (*vijjā*), 有明有達 may simply mean “possessing gnosis.” In the Chinese *Madhyama Āgama*, the word equivalent to Pali *tevijja* (triple gnosis) is normally translated as 三明, but sometimes as 三達 or even 三明達. (For example, T 1, 688c: 三達有何義? = MN II 144: *tevijjo bho kathaṃ hotīā?*; T 1, 610b: 九十比丘得三明達 = SN I 191: *saṭṭhi bhikkhū tevijjā*)
 From the context we can also infer that 有明有達 means possessing gnosis (*vijjā*). This phrase is preceded by 有知有見, “possessing knowledge (*ñāṇa*), possessing vision (*dassana*),” while *ñāṇadassana* is synonymous with the triple gnosis according to the *Vinaya*. (e.g. Vin IV 26: *ñāṇadassanan ti tisso vijjā*. Vin III 91: *ñāṇan ti tisso vijjā. dassanan ti yaṃ ñāṇaṃ taṃ dassanaṃ, yaṃ dassanaṃ taṃ ñāṇaṃ.*)

One may ask why “possessing gnosis” is not translated simply as 有明 or 有達 or 有明達. This can be explained by the following reason. As Wan (2002: 65) indicates, during the period of the Six Dynasties (from early third century to late sixth century) translation of Buddhist texts often used a style that formed a rhythm of four syllables in prose. In order to follow this style, 有明有達 was adopted in our context (立念在身，有知有見，有明有達).

Thich Nhat Hanh (1990: 152ff.) translates 有知有見有明有達 as “with understanding, insight, clarity, and realization.” Thich Minh Chau (1991: 88) translates: “obtaining knowledge, obtaining vision, obtaining light, obtaining attainment.”

- 14 *Saṅghāṭi* refers to the upper robe of a Buddhist monk (CPED s.v. *saṅghāṭi*), which is one of his three robes (PED s.v. *saṅghāṭī*).
- 15 This phrase (善著僧伽梨及諸衣鉢) is apparently translated from the equivalent to *saṅghāṭi-patta-cīvara-dhāraṇe* in the Pali *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (MN I 57). *Dhāraṇa* derives from *dhāreti*, which can mean “to carry” or “to wear” (PED s.v. *dhāreti*). Ven. Nāṇamoli and Ven. Bodhi (1995: 147) translate this compound as “when wearing his robes and carrying his outer robe and bowl.” But PED (s.v. *cīvara*) states: “In starting on his begging round the bhikkhu goes **patta-cīvaraṃ ādāya**, that is literally “taking his bowl and robe.” But this is an elliptical idiom meaning “putting on his outer robe and taking his bowl.” A bhikkhu never goes into a village without wearing all his robes, he never takes them, or any one of the three, with him.”
- 16 Thich Minh Chau’s (1991: 88) translation for 以心治心治斷滅止 is “uses his mind to **rectify** his mind, to cut off, to extinguish, to stop.” 治斷滅止 also occurs in the previous section, which he translates as “to rectify, to cut off, to extinguish, to stop” (p. 88). There is a problem in his translation. He translates 治 as “to rectify.” In this section 治 occurs twice, but he only translates the first one instead of translating the whole phrase as “uses his mind to **rectify** his mind, to **rectify**, to cut off, to extinguish, to stop.” In my opinion, 治斷滅止 should be taken as 治斷 and 滅止, which must be translated from two Indic words rather than from four words, just as in its Pali counterpart, and hence there is no repetition of the verb 治. The Pali phrase for 以心治心治斷滅止 is *cetasā* (以心) *cittaṃ* (心) *abhiniggaṇhitabbaṃ* (治) *abhinippīletabbaṃ* (治斷) *abhisantāpetabbaṃ* (滅止) (MN I 120). In addition, Zhu (1992: 124–129) says that in this period (Medieval China) there was a new development in the Chinese language, namely, using two or more syllables (i.e. characters) to form new vocabulary, and the Chinese translation of the Buddhist texts contributed a lot to this development. Moreover, as mentioned above, when this text was translated, translation of Buddhist texts often used a style that formed a rhythm of four syllables in prose, which requires each of the two Indic words to be translated into two Chinese characters in our case. (齒齒相著，舌逼上齶，以心治心，治斷滅止。) In the Pali all of the three verbs—*abhiniggaṇhitabbaṃ*, *abhinippīletabbaṃ*, *abhisantāpetabbaṃ*—qualify *cittaṃ*, but in the Chinese the last two verbs 治斷 (= *abhinippīletabbaṃ*) and 滅止 (= *abhisantāpetabbaṃ*) do not seem to qualify 心 as they come after it. This is an example of trying to fit the rhythm in Chinese at the sacrifice of the original meaning in the Indic text. Thich Nhat Hanh’s (1990: 153–154) translation also agrees with my opinion, although it is a bit free: “[T]aking one part of his mind to restrain (治) another part of his mind, he counterbalances (治斷) a thought and transforms (滅止) it.”
- 17 旋 can mean “randomly.” See HDC 6, 1608, s.v. 旋: 漫然，隨意.
- 18 T and J read 學, which means “to learn,” while S, Y, M and Q read 覺, which means “to feel” or “to perceive.” The whole sentence is 學(覺)一切身息入; 學(覺)一切身息出. I suppose that the original could have both words occurring twice

- in this sentence in that both words occur twice in the Pali, viz. *sikkhati*, “to learn” (=學), and *paṭisaṃvedī*, “perceiving (adjective, =覺)” (MN I 56).
- 19 T, J, Q all read 口 (verbal), which must be a wrong reading for 身 (bodily) since the Pali has *kāya* (bodily) instead of “verbal” (MN I 56), and the statement “He trains thus: ‘I will breath in calming (*passambhayaṃ*) bodily formation’; he trains thus: ‘I will breath out calming *bodily* formation.’” is a stock phrase found at many places in both the Pali canon and the canon in Chinese translation, e.g. MN III 82; SN V 311; SN V 323; T 2, 206b; T 2, 208a.
- 20 This sentence is a bit different from its Pali counterpart at MN III 94: *so imam eva kāyaṃ parisuddhena cetasā pariyodātena pharitvā nisinno hoti*. (“He sits pervading this body with a pure bright mind.” Tr. Nāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 954.) I translate 意解 (literally “mind-liberate” or “mind-understand”) as “resolve upon” because 意解 is usually used to translate words derived from *adhi-√muc* (SJD 1047 s.v. *Muc*), “to resolve upon.” For example, a passage in MĀ reads: 大心解脫者，若有沙門、梵志... 依一樹意解大心解脫遍滿成就遊 (T 1, 550a). Its Pali counterpart is: *katamā, gahapati, mahaggaṭā cetovimutti? idha, gahapati, bhikkhu yāvatā ekaṃ rukkhamaṇaṃ mahaggaṭaṃ ti pharitvā adhimuccitvā viharati*. (MN III 146: “What, householder, is the exalted deliverance of mind? Here a bhikkhu abides **resolved upon** an area the size of the root of one tree, pervading it as exalted.” Tr. Nāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 1003) Thich Nhat Hanh (1990: 156) translates: “A practitioner who is aware of body as body, envelops the whole of his body with a clear, calm mind, filled with understanding.” Thich Minh Chau (1991: 90) translates: “With a pure mind and comprehending (*sic*) consciousness, the monk pervades all over this body and dwells in it.”
- 21 成就遊, “attaining [and] dwelling,” could be translated from words equivalent to *upasampajja viharati*. This is a stock expression employed to describe attaining the *jhānas* in the usual *jhāna* formula. e.g. T 1, 657c: 初禪成就遊 = MN I 181: *paṭhamam jhānam upasampajja viharati*. Apart from *jhāna*, this expression also applies to “internal emptiness” at T 1, 738c: 內空成就遊 = MN III 111: *ajjhataṃ suññataṃ upasampajja viharitum*.
- 22 念 has been used to translate different words in Buddhist texts. It is a standard translation for words derived from $\sqrt{smṛ}$ like *smṛti* (Pali *sati*), but it is also a translation for words derived from *manas-√kr* (e.g. SJD s.v. *manasikāra*). The Pali counterpart of 念 in this passage is *manasikaroti* (AN III 323), which supports the rendering of the word as “attending to” rather than “being mindful of.”
- 23 “Free from entanglement” (無有纏) could be translated from a word equivalent to *apariyuṭṭhāna* in Pali (Skt *aparyuṭṭhāna*, SJD s.v. *paryuṭṭhāna* gives the meaning 纏), but the Pali counterpart of this passage (AN III 323) has *apariyonaddha* (unenvolved) rather than *apariyuṭṭhāna*.
- 24 Here 念 is translated as “attends to” rather than “is mindful of” because its Pali counterpart is *manasikataṃ* (AN III 27). See note 22 above.
- 25 此身隨住, lit. “this-body-follow (or “according to”)-stand,” could be translated from words equivalent to *imaṃ kāyaṃ yathāṭṭhitam* (all accusatives) in the Pali *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (MN I 57) or *yathā yathāśya kāyaḥ sthito bhavati* in Sanskrit (Pv 204), which means “however this (his) body is placed.” However, both of them are in a different context from the Chinese. The Pali occurs at the beginning of the paragraph on contemplating elements, while the Sanskrit occurs in the paragraph on understanding the four postures.
- 26 隨其好惡 could be translated from words equivalent to *praṇītam apraṇītam vā* at Pv 204, which is preceded by the above-mentioned phrase *yathā yathāśya kāyaḥ sthito bhavati* in the paragraph on understanding the four postures. *Praṇīta* can mean “wished, desired” or “good (as food)” (MW 660, s.v. *pra-ñī*). Conze’s (1961:

- 140) translation “whether in a good way or not” obviously takes the latter meaning of *praṇīta*, while the Chinese translation apparently takes the former. From the context, the Chinese translation seems more plausible. 此身隨住，隨其好惡 (however this body is placed as he likes or dislikes) is translated by Thich Minh Chau (1991: 90) as “this body, which is now living, following its likes and dislikes,” and by Thich Nhat Hanh (1990: 157) as “this body exists due to the interdependence of the parts of the body.”
- 27 “Rough [and/or] smooth thin skin, skin” is translated from 麤細薄膚、皮. “Thin skin, skin” (薄膚、皮) could be translated from words equivalent to *tvak carma* found in Pv 205 and Sp 1430. Both words can mean “skin, hide” (MW s.v. *tvac* and *carman*), while the Pali version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* has only one word for “skin,” *taco* (MN I 57). A different reading for 麤細 (rough smooth) is found in S, which reads 塵網 (lit. dusty net; EDC II, 1268: the mortal world). It may be a wrong reading for 塵垢 (dust, dirt), since the *Dharmaskandha* (T 26, 476a) and the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (T 30, 428c; ŚrBh 203) both have 塵垢 (**rajas, mala*, “dust, dirt”) in place of 麤細 (rough smooth) in the list of the bodily parts. It is possible that the original was 塵垢 (dust, dirt), which later became 塵網 (dusty net), and then 麤細 (rough smooth). This can be inferred from the following facts: (1) The Chinese *Madhyama Āgama* belongs to the Sarvāstivādin (see Introduction). (2) The *Dharmaskandha* is a Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma* text. (3) The *Śrāvakabhūmi* may have been influenced by the Sarvāstivāda doctrines as its author Asaṅga was originally a follower of the Sarvāstivāda school (see *The Biography of Master Vasubandhu*, T 50, 188b–c). Willemsen *et al* (1998: 61–62) also shows a close connection between the Mūlasarvāstivādin and the *Yogācārabhūmi*, of which the *Śrāvakabhūmi* forms a part. Therefore, it is very likely that the Chinese version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* also has “dust, dirt” as is characteristic of the Sarvāstivādin list of bodily parts. Dust and dirt are not included in the list of bodily parts in the Pali version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*; nor are they found in the other Chinese parallel to this *sutta*.
- 28 According to 一切經音義 (*On the Pronunciations and Meanings in the Tripiṭaka*, written by Huilin 慧琳, AD737–820), “brain root” refers to the occipital bone (T 54, 651a: 腦根: 奴老反。言腦後玉枕也。cf. HDC 6, 1357).
- 29 Q, S, Y and M read 痰 “phlegm,” but J and T read 膽 “gall bladder.” The latter reading must be wrong since it does not fit the context where liquid parts are enumerated, and phlegm (*semha*, MN I 57) is found in the Pali, but not gall bladder.
- 30 The Pali counterpart only mentions four elements, with the omission of space and consciousness elements. The *Dharmaskandha* also has six elements (T 26, 476a–b) like the Chinese version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. The addition of the consciousness element in these Sarvāstivāda texts does not seem plausible since consciousness cannot be seen as an element of the body. This can be explained by the following reason. As discussed in Chapter 5, the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* could have been composed on the basis of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, when *kāyagatā sati* came to be understood as mindfulness of the physical body. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, *kāyagatā sati* was not so considered when the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* was composed. The Chinese version of this text preserves those practices irrelevant to mindfulness of the body, which were included in the version antecedent to the Chinese and Pali versions. The antecedent version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* probably had the six elements (including consciousness) as preserved in the Chinese version since *kāya* of *kāyagatā sati* originally referred to the individual that possesses consciousness, *saviññāṇako kāyo*, as discussed in Chapter 4. When *kāyagatā sati* came to be understood as mindfulness of the body and the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* provided the basis for composing the first *satipaṭṭhāna* in the

Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, reflecting on the six elements naturally fell into the first *satipaṭṭhāna*, contemplation of the body.

- 31 T and J read 食半, “half eaten.” S, Y, M and Q read 餘半, “half remaining.”
- 32 This description is not found in the Pali version. A more detailed description occurs in the Chinese translation of the *Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*: “The remaining bones are scattered on the ground. Several hundred or several thousand years later, their appearance turns blue, like the colour of doves.” (T 7, 79b: 餘骨散地，經多百歲或多千年，其相變青，狀如鴿色。)
- 33 少少, lit. “little little,” can mean 不久 “soon,” 很少 “very little,” 稍微 “slightly” and 輕視年少者 “to despise young people” (HDC 2,1647), but none of these meanings seems to fit the context. I suggest that it could be a literal translation from a term like *stokastokam* in Sanskrit or *thokaṃ thokaṃ* in Pali, which is composed of double “little” and means “little by little.”
- 34 食, lit. “food,” must be translated from a word equivalent to *sāmisa* in the Pali counterpart (MN I 59), which means “of the flesh,” “mixed with other food” (DOP s.v. *āmisa*). *Sāmisa* is composed of the prefix *sa* and *āmisa*, which means “flesh,” “food” (DOP s.v. *āmisa*). This word is better translated as “worldly” in this context, as it is by Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995: 149).
- 35 無食, literally “non-food,” must be translated from a word equivalent to *nirāmisa* in the Pali (MN I 59), which is opposite to *sāmisa* and is better translated as “unworldly,” as it is by Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995: 149).
- 36 眼緣色, literally “eye condition form,” could be a word-for-word translation from an expression equivalent to Pali *cakkhuṃ paṭicca rūpe*, “depending on the eye and forms” (e.g. MN I 111). Therefore, it should be understood as “with the eye and forms as condition” or “conditioned by the eye and forms.”
- 37 The Pali counterpart of 有餘 (there is a residue) is *sati upādisese* (MN I 62), which means “if there is a residue (*sesa*) of clinging (*upādi*).”
- 38 M omits this sentence.

APPENDIX 2 AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDA VERSION OF THE *KĀYAGATĀSĀTI SUTTA*

- 1 The following annotated translation is mostly cited from Kuan (2007) with kind permission of BJK Institute of Buddhist and Asian Studies.
- 2 This refers to Dīghāyu (or Dīghāyu), a king of Kosala. cf. Vin I 343ff.
- 3 善具善行 is probably translated from words equivalent to *ācāra-gocara-sampanna*, “possessed of the practice of right conduct” (cf. PED s.v. *ācāra*). This Pali phrase occurs at AN I 63f. Its Chinese counterpart is 善修善具 (T 1, 448c). A similar phrase 善具善趣 is found in another *sūtra* (T 1, 772a) in a similar context, namely the practice of morality (戒, *sīla*). In our case, 善具善行 may also refer to the practice of *sīla*, and the following phrase refers to the practice of *samādhi*. Thus two of the three trainings (*sikkhā*) are meant here. 善具 (“to well possess”) apparently translates a word equivalent to Pali *sampanna*, and *ācāra-gocara* is translated as 善行 (“good conduct”), 善修 (“good practice”) or 善趣 (“good action”) in the above instances. In Chinese a verb normally precedes its object, which is the case with 善具善行 and 善具善趣. Chinese translations of Buddhist texts, however, occasionally put verbs after their objects under the influence of Indic syntax, as in the case of 善修善具. Another example is the phrase “well grasping the reviewing-sign,” which is 觀相善受 in our text (see the eleventh practice below), but 善受觀相 in the Chinese version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (T 1, 583a).

- 4 晡時 refers to 3 to 5 o'clock in the afternoon.
- 5 隨其身行 can be rendered literally as “to follow his body-action” or “according to his body-action,” but neither makes good sense in this context. It is very likely that this phrase is parallel to 此身隨住 in our text (see the twelfth practice below). As discussed in Appendix 1, 此身隨住 could be translated from words equivalent to *imam eva kāyaṃ yathāñhiṭaṃ* in Pali or *yathā yathāsyā kāyaḥ sthito bhavati* in Sanskrit, which means “however this (his) body is placed.” Since 行, apart from meaning “action,” is also a standard translation for *gata* in the four postures, 隨其身行 in our case could be translated from words equivalent to *imam kāyaṃ yathāgataṃ* in Pali or *yathā yathāsyā kāyaḥ gato bhavati* in Sanskrit. Thus it can mean “however this (his) body behaves” as *gata* can mean “behaved” (PED s.v. *gata*). On the other hand, 隨 can mean 聽任 (HDC 11, 1102), “to let someone do whatever he likes.” Thus 隨其身行 may be translated as “Let his body behave in whatever manner he likes.”
- 6 患 is used to translate a word equivalent to Pali *upakkilesa*, e.g. T 1, 536c ff. = MN III 160–161.
- 7 *Saṅghāṭi* refers to the upper robe of a Buddhist monk (CPED s.v. *saṅghāṭi*), which is one of his three robes (PED s.v. *saṅghāṭī*).
- 8 For my translation of 以心治心 · 治斷滅止, see Appendix 1.
- 9 It is likely that the original had both 學 (“to learn”) and 覺 (“to feel” or “to perceive”) occurring twice in this sentence, but 覺 was missing at some point during the process of transcribing the text. This is inferred from the following facts. Both words occur twice in the Pali version, viz. *sikkhati*, “to learn,” and *paṭisaṃvedī*, “perceiving (adjective)” (MN III 89). This passage is also found in the Chinese version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, where different readings are found: T and J read 學 (“to learn”), while S, Y, M and Q read 覺 (“to feel” or “to perceive”). See Appendix 1.
- 10 口 (verbal) must be a wrong reading for 身 (bodily). See Appendix 1.
- 11 The wording here is slightly different from its counterpart in the Chinese version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*.
- 12 The sentence “resolves upon pervading the body with the pure state of mind, attaining and dwelling [therein]” is missing in the Chinese version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*.
- 13 For my translation of 念 as “attending to,” see Appendix 1.
- 14 善持 “well holds” is not found in the Chinese version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*.
- 15 For my translation of 此身隨住 as “however his body is placed,” see Appendix 1.
- 16 Q, Y and M read 痰 “phlegm,” but J and T read 膽 “gall bladder.” The latter reading must be wrong, since it does not fit the context where liquid parts are enumerated, and phlegm (*semha*, MN III 90) rather than gall bladder is found in the Pali version.
- 17 The expression “barley, wheat, big and small sesames and beans” is not found in the Chinese version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*.
- 18 The Chinese version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* has “wolves” (狼) instead of “dogs” (狗).
- 19 This paragraph is not very clear. Its Pali counterpart reads: “Monks, just as whoever has pervaded the great ocean with his mind, for him whatever streams flow into the ocean are included, so whoever has developed and cultivated *kāyagatā sati*, for him whatever wholesome states are conducive to gnosis are included.” (MN III 94).
- 20 魔波旬 is probably translated from words equivalent to *Māro pāpimā* in Pali (e.g. SN I 103), “Māra the evil one.”
- 21 According to M; “the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh” in T Q J.

- 22 According to M; “called the eighth benefit” in T Q J.
- 23 According to Q J S Y M; “once” in T.
- 24 如其像定 can be literally translated as “concentration [which has] resemblance to its/his image.” It recurs in the Chinese *Madhyama Āgama*, e.g. T 1, 559c, 596a, 620b. A similar term 如其像三昧, “*samādhi* [which has] resemblance to its/his image,” is also found in the Chinese *Saṃyukta Āgama* at T 2, 139b. In the Pali counterparts of the above four references, no such expressions can be found (AN IV 85, MN I 33–36, MN I 332, SN V 294–297). Nakamura explains 如其像定 as “entering meditation without moving like a statue.” (BDJ 1060, s.v. 如其像定). I would suggest that 如其像定 and 如其像三昧 could mean “such concentration” for the following reason. 如其像三昧 recurs in the 佛說梵網六十二見經 (T 1, 266a–c), “*The Sūtra on the Brahmā Net of Sixty-two Views Expounded by the Buddha*,” which is an independent translation of a text equivalent to the *Brahmajāla Sutta* in the *Dīgha Nikāya*. The Pali counterpart of the expression 如其像三昧 is *tathārūpaṃ cetosamādhiṃ*, “such mental concentration” (DN I 13–16). In our case, 如其像定 could also have been translated literally from *tathārūpaṃ samādhiṃ* as *tathā* can mean “likewise” (如) and *rūpa* can mean “image” (像), while *tathārūpa* means “such.”
- 25 According to M; “twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth” in T J Q.
- 26 According to M; only “eighteenth” in T J Q.
- 27 M omits this sentence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

A. Pali and Sanskrit Texts

References to Pali texts are to the Pali Text Society editions, unless otherwise noted.

- Abhidharma-kośabhāṣya*, ed. P. Pradhan, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.
- Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*, ed. Swāmī Dwārikādās Śāstrī, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1987.
- Aṅguttara Nikāya*
- Apadāna*
- The Arthaviniścaya-sūtra and Its Commentary (Nibandhana)*, ed. N.H. Santati, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1971.
- Atthasālinī*
- Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*
- Buddhavaṃsa*
- Buddhavaṃsa-aṭṭhakathā*
- Chāndogya Upaniṣad*
- Dhammapada*
- Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā*
- Dhammasaṅgaṇī*
- Dīgha Nikāya*
- The Dīpavaṃsa: An Ancient Buddhist Historical Record*, ed. and tr. by Hermann Oldenberg, London: Williams and Norgate, 1879.
- Itivuttaka*
- Kathāvatthu*
- Kathāvatthu Commentary* (included in the *Paramatthadīpanī*)
- Khuddakapāṭha*
- Mahāniddesa*
- Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (see MPS)
- Mahāvaṃsa*
- Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra*, ed. Sylvain Lévi, Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, Éditeur, 1907.
- Majjhima Nikāya*
- Manorathapūraṇī* (Commentary on the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*)
- The Milindapañho*, ed. V. Trenckner, London: Williams & Norgate, 1880.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Paṭisambhidāmagga*
Peṭakopadesa, revised edition, 1982.
Papañcasūdanī (Commentary on the *Majjhima Nikāya*)
Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, London: Luzac & Co., 1934.
Saddhammappakāsinī (commentary on the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*)
Samyutta Nikāya
Śāratthappakāsinī (Commentary on the *Samyutta Nikāya*)
Śatasāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā, ed. Pratāpacandra Ghōṣa, Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1905.
The Saundarananda of Aśvaghōṣa, ed. E.H. Johnston, London: Humphrey Milford, 1928.
Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā by Yaśomitra, ed. Unrai Wogihara, Tokyo: The Publishing Association of Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, 1932–1936.
Śrāvakabhūmi, ed. K. Shukla, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1973.
Sumaṅgalavilāsinī (Commentary on the *Dīgha Nikāya*)
Sutta-nipāta
Theragāthā
Theragāthā-aṭṭhakathā (included in the *Paramatthadīpanī*)
Therīgāthā
Udāna
Vibhaṅga
The Vinaya Piṭakaṃ, ed. Hermann Oldenberg, Edinburgh: Williams & Norgate, 1879.
Visuddhimagga (see Vism and VH)

B. Texts in Chinese Translation

References are to the Taishō editions.

- 大乘莊嚴經論 *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra*
 大智度論 **Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra*
 中阿含經 *Madhyama Āgama*
 成實論 **Tattvasiddhi* or **Satyasiddhiśāstra*
 舍利弗阿毘曇論 *Śāriputrābhidharma*
 [阿毘達磨]法蘊足論 *Dharmaskandha*
 阿毘曇毘婆沙論 **Abhidharmavibhāṣā-śāstra*
 [阿毘達磨]大毘婆沙論 **Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* or **Mahāvibhāṣā*
 阿毘曇甘露味論 **Abhidharmāmṛta(rasa)-śāstra*
 長阿含經 *Dīrgha Āgama*
 長阿含十報法經 (*Sūtra on the Ten Repeated Dharmas of the Dīrgha Āgama*)
 異部宗輪論 **Samayabhedoparacanacakra*
 陰持入經 (*Sūtra on Skandha, Dhātu and Āyatana*)
 婆薮槃豆法師傳 (*The Biography of Master Vasubandhu*)
 瑜伽師地論 *Yogācārabhūmi*
 增壹阿含經 *Ekottara (Ekottarika) Āgama*
 雜阿含經 *Samyukta Āgama*

Secondary Sources and Translations

English titles in parentheses are my translations.

- Allon, Mark (1997) *Style and Function: A Study of the Dominant Stylistic Features of the Prose Portions of Pali Canonical Sutta Texts and Their Mnemonic Function*, Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies of the International College for Advanced Buddhist Studies.
- An, Yang-Gyu (2003) (tr.) *The Buddha's Last Days: Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, Oxford: Pali Text Society.
- Anālayo, Ven. (2003) *Satipaṭṭhāna: The Direct Path to Realization*, Birmingham: Windhorse Publications.
- (2006a) “Mindfulness in the Pāli *Nikāyas*”, *Buddhist Thought and Applied Psychological Research: Transcending the Boundaries*, ed. D.K. Nauriyal, Michael S. Drummond and Y.B. Lal, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 229–249.
- (2006b) “The Chinese Version of the *Dantabhūmi Sutta*”, *Buddhist Studies Review* 23/1, pp. 5–19.
- Andō, Shōken 安藤正見 (1981) 「原始仏教における四念処について」 (“On the Four *Satipaṭṭhānas* in Original Buddhism”), 印度學佛教學研究 *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 29/2, pp. 146–147.
- Aronson, Harvey B. (1979) “Equanimity (*Upekkhā*) in Theravāda Buddhism”, *Studies in Pali and Buddhism: A Memorial Volume in Honor of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap*, ed. H. Bechert, et al., Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, pp. 1–18.
- Aung, Shwe Zan (1910) (tr.) *Compendium of Philosophy*, London: Pali Text Society.
- Balota, David A. and Marsh, Elizabeth J. (2004) *Cognitive Psychology: Key Readings*, New York: Psychology Press.
- Bareau, A. (1950) “Les origines du Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra”, *Le Muséon* LXIII, pp. 69–95.
- Barnes, Michael Anthony (1976) *The Buddhist Way of Deliverance: A Comparison between the Pali Canon and the Yoga-praxis of the Great Epic*, unpublished B. Litt. thesis, Oxford.
- Bechert, Heinz (1955–56–57) “Zur Geschichte der buddhistischen Sekten in Indien und Ceylon”, *La Nouvelle Clio* VII-VIII-IX (*Mélanges Christian Courtois et William Marçais*), pp. 311–360.
- (1991) “Methodological Considerations Concerning the Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition”, *Buddhist Studies Review* 8, pp. 3–19.
- Bhattacharya, Biswanath (1976) *Aśvaghoṣa: A Critical Study*, West Bengal: Santiniketan.
- Bhattacharya, Kamaleswar (1980) “*Diṭṭham, Sutaṃ, Mutam, Viññātam*”, *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula*, ed. Somaratna Balasooriya et al., London: Gordon Fraser, pp. 10–15.
- Bodhi, Bhikkhu (1993) (ed.) *A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma: The Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Ācariya Anuruddha*, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.
- (1998) “A Critical Examination of Ñāṇavīra Thera's ‘A Note on Paṭiccasamuppāda’” Part Two, *Buddhist Studies Review* 15/2, pp. 157–181.
- (2000) (tr.) *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha*, Oxford: Pali Text Society.
- Brockington, J.L. (1996) *The Sacred Thread*, 2nd edition, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (First published 1981)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bronkhorst, Johannes (1985) "Dharma and Abhidharma", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 48, pp. 305–320.
- Bucknell, Roderick S. and Stuart-Fox, Martin (1986) *The Twilight Language: Explorations in Buddhist Meditation and Symbolism*, London: Curzon Press.
- Buswell, Robert E. Jr. and Jaini, Padmanabh S. (1996) "The Development of Abhidharma Philosophy", *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* Vol. VII: *Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D.*, ed. Karl H. Potter, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, pp. 73–119.
- Cai, Yunchen 蔡運辰 (1976) "Jinzang Mulu Jiaoshi" 金藏目錄校釋, in *Songzang Yizhen Xumu Jinzang Mulu Jiaoshi Hekan* 宋藏遺珍敘目金藏目錄校釋合刊, ed. Niansheng Cai 蔡念生, Taipei: 新文豐.
- Chappell, David W. (2003) "Buddhist Social Principles", *Psychology and Buddhism: From Individual to Global Community*, ed. Kathleen H. Dockett, G. Rita Dudley-Grant and C. Peter Bankart, New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, pp. 259–274.
- Choong, Mun-keat (2000) *The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study Based on the Sūtrāṅga Portion of the Pali Saṃyutta-Nikāya and the Chinese Saṃyuktāgama*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
- Collins, Steven (1982) *Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravāda Buddhism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1990) "On the Very Idea of the Pāli Canon", *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 15, pp. 89–126.
- Conze, Edward (1961) (tr.) *The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom Part I*, London: Luzac & Company Limited.
- (1962) *Buddhist Thought in India: Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Cousins, L.S. (1973) "Buddhist Jhāna: Its Nature and Attainment According to the Pāli Sources", *Religion* 3, pp. 115–131.
- (1983) "Pāli Oral Literature", *Buddhist Studies: Ancient and Modern*, ed. Philip Denwood and Alexander Piatigorsky, London: Curzon Press, pp. 1–11.
- (1984) "Samatha-yāna and Vipassanā-yāna", *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Hammalava Saddhātissa*, ed. Gatare Dhammapala et al., Nugegoda: University of Sri Jayewardenepura, pp. 56–68.
- (1992) "Vitakka/Vitarka and Vicāra: Stages of Samādhi in Buddhism and Yoga", *Indo-Iranian Journal* 35, pp. 137–157.
- (1996) "The Origins of Insight Meditation", *The Buddhist Forum* Vol. IV, ed. Tadeusz Skorupski, London: School of Oriental and African Studies, pp. 35–58.
- Cox, Collett (1995) *Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence: An Annotated Translation of the Section on Factors Dissociated from Thought from Saṅghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra*, Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.
- de Silva, Lily (n.d.) *Mental Culture in Buddhism (Based on the Mahasatipatthanasutta)*, Colombo: Karunaratne & Sons. Ltd.
- de Silva, Padmal (2001) "A Psychological Analysis of the *Vitakkasaṅṭhāna Sutta*", *Buddhist Studies Review* 18/1, pp. 65–72.
- de Silva, Padmasiri (2005) *An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology*, 4th edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. (First published 1979)

- Dudley-Grant, G. Rita, Bankart, C. Peter, and Dockett, Kathleen H. (2003) "Introduction", *Psychology and Buddhism: From Individual to Global Community*, ed. Kathleen H. Dockett, G. Rita Dudley-Grant and C. Peter Bankart, New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, pp. 1–10.
- Dundas, Paul (2002) *The Jains*, 2nd edition, London: Routledge. (First published 1992)
- Dutt, Nalinaksha (1970) *Buddhist Sects in Indian*, Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay.
- Ekman, Paul (ed.) (1982) *Emotion in the Human Face*, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Enomoto, Fumio 榎本文雄 (1984) 「説一切有部系アールガマの展開——『中阿含』と『雜阿含』をめぐって——」 ("The Development of the *Āgamas* of the Sarvāstivāda School: Centering around the *Madhyama Āgama* and the *Samyukta Āgama*"), 印度學佛教學研究 *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 32/2, pp. 1070–1073.
- Foucher, A. (1963) *The Life of the Buddha According to the Ancient Texts and Monuments of India*, Abridged Translation by Simone Brangier Boas, Middletown Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press.
- Frauwallner, Erich (1973) *History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. I, translated from the German by V.M. Bedekar, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- (1995) *Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems*, translated from the German by Sophie Francis Kidd, Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Gethin, R.M.L. (1992) "The *Mātikās*: Memorization, Mindfulness, and the List", *In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism*, ed. Janet Gyatso, Albany: State University of New York, pp. 149–172.
- (1998) *The Foundations of Buddhism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2001) *The Buddhist Path to Awakening*, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oneworld Publications. (First published by E.J. Brill 1992)
- Goenka, S.N. (1998) *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta Discourses*, Seattle: Vipassana Research Publications.
- Gokhale, B.G. (1982) "Early Buddhism and the Urban Revolution", *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 5/2, pp. 7–22.
- Goleman, Daniel (1975) "The Buddha on Meditation and States of Consciousness", *Transpersonal Psychologies*, ed. Charles T. Tart, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 203–230.
- Gombrich, R.F. (1987) "Three Souls, One or None: The Vagaries of a Pāli Pericope", *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 11, pp. 73–78.
- (1988) *Theravada Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
- (1990a) "Recovering the Buddha's Message", *Buddhist Forum* Vol. I: *Seminar Papers 1987–1988*, ed. T. Skorupski, London: School of Oriental and African Studies, pp. 5–20.
- (1990b) "How the Mahāyāna Began", *The Buddhist Forum* Vol. I, *Seminar Papers 1987–1988*, ed. T. Skorupski, London: School of Oriental and African Studies, pp. 21–30.
- (1996) *How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings*, London & Atlantic Highlands: Athlone Press.

- (1998) *Kindness and Compassion as Means to Nirvana in Early Buddhism*, Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.
- (2002) “Another Buddhist Criticism of Yājñavalkya”, 森祖道博士頌寿記念・仏教学インド学論集 *Buddhist and Indian Studies in Honour of Professor Sodo Mori*, Hamamatsu: Kokusai Bukkyoto Kyokai, pp. 21–23.
- Gómez, Luis O. (1976) “Proto-Mādhyaṃika in the Pāli Canon”, *Philosophy East and West* 26, pp. 137–165.
- Griffiths, Paul J. (1981) “Concentration or Insight: The Problematic of Theravāda Buddhist Meditation-Theory”, *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, XLIX/4, pp. 605–624.
- (1983) “Buddhist Jhāna: A Form-Critical Study”, *Religion* 13, pp. 55–68.
- (1986) *On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-body Problem*, La Salle: Open Court.
- Gross, Richard (2001) *Psychology: The Science of Mind and Behaviour*, London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Guenther, Herbert V. (1974) *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma*, Berkeley: Shambhala Publications.
- Gunaratana, Bhante Henepola (2002) *Mindfulness in Plain English*, updated and expanded edition, Boston: Wisdom Publications.
- Gyatso, Janet (ed.) (1992) *In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism*, Albany: State University of New York.
- Hamilton, Sue (1995) “From the Buddha to Buddhaghosa: Changing Attitudes towards the Human Body in Theravāda Buddhism”, *Religious Reflections on the Human Body*, ed. Jane Marie Law, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 46–63.
- (1996) *Identity and Experience: The Constitution of the Human Being According to Early Buddhism*, London: Luzac Oriental.
- (2000) *Early Buddhism: A New Approach*, Surrey: Curzon Press.
- Hare, E.M. (1934) (tr.) *The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Anguttara-Nikāya)* Vol. III, Oxford: Pali Text Society, reprinted, 2001.
- Harrison, Paul (1992) “Commemoration and Identification in *Buddhānusmṛti*”, *In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism*, ed. Janet Gyatso, Albany: State University of New York, pp. 215–238.
- (2007) ‘A Fragment of the **Samādhāvakāśasūtra* from a Newly Identified *Ekottarikāgama* Manuscript in the Schøyen Collection’, *Annual Report of The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University for the Academic Year 2006*, Vol. 10, pp. 201–211.
- Harvey, Peter (1990) *An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1995) *The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvāṇa in Early Buddhism*, Surrey: Curzon Press.
- Hayes, Nicky (2000) *Foundations of Psychology*, 3rd edition, London: Thomson Learning. (First published 1994 by Routledge)
- Heiler, Friedrich (1922) *Die Buddhistische Versenkung*, München: Verlag von Ernst Reinhardt.
- von Hinüber, Oskar (1982) “Upāli’s Verses in the Majjhimanikāya and the Madhyamāgama”, *Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor J.W. de Jong on His Sixtieth Birthday*, ed. L.A. Hercus et al., Delhi: Indian Books Centre.

- (1997) *A Handbook of Pali Literature*, 1st Indian edition, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd. (First published 1996, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co.)
- Hirakawa, Akira 平川彰 (1960) 律藏の研究 *A Study of the Vinaya-Piṭaka*, Tokyo: Sankibo-Busshorin.
- (1990) *A History of Indian Buddhism: From Śākyamuni to Early Mahāyāna*, tr. Paul Groner, University of Hawaii Press.
- (1991) “An Evaluation of the Sources on the Date of the Buddha”, *The Dating of the Historical Buddha* Part 1, ed. Heinz Bechert, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 252–299.
- Hiraoka, Satoshi (2000) “The Sectarian Affiliation of Two Chinese Saṃyuktāgamas”, 印度學佛教學研究 *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 49/1, pp. 500–506.
- Ho, Meng-Ling 何孟玲 (2001) 《中部·念處經》四念處禪修方法之研究 *A Study of Meditative Methods of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness in Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, unpublished M.A. thesis, Huaan University, Taipei.
- Horner, I.B. (1964) (tr.) *Milinda's Questions* Vol. I, London: Luzac & Company.
- Ishikawa, Kaijō 石川海淨 (1939) 「大念處經解題」 (“Introduction to the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta*”), 大崎學報 *Ōsaki Gakuhō* 93, pp. 27–40.
- Jaini, Padmanabh S. (1979) *The Jaina Path of Purification*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- (1992) “*Smṛti* in the Abhidharma Literature and the Development of Buddhist Accounts of Memory of the Past”, *In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism*, ed. Janet Gyatso, Albany: State University of New York, pp. 47–59.
- Jayatilke, K.N. (1963) *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Johansson, Rune E.A. (1979) *The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism*, Oxford: Curzon Press.
- Johnston, E.H. (1936) (tr.) *The Buddhacarita, or Acts of the Buddha* Part II, Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press.
- de Jong, J.W. (1979) “The Daśottarasūtra”, *Buddhist Studies by J.W. de Jong*, ed. Gregory Schopen, Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, pp. 251–273.
- (1981) ‘Fa-hsien and Buddhist Texts in Ceylon’, *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 9, pp. 105–115.
- Kabat-Zinn, Jon (1994) *Wherever You go, There You Are: Mindfulness Meditation in Everyday Life*, New York: Hyperion.
- Kalupahana, David J. (1975) *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii.
- (1992) *A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Karashima, Seishi 辛嶋靜志 (1994) 『長阿含經』の原語の研究——音写語分析を中心として (*A Study of the Original Language of 長阿含經 [Dīrgha Āgama]: Focusing on Analysis of Transliterations*), Tokyo: 平河出版社.
- Karunaratna, Upali (1989) “Dhammānupassanā,” *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism* Vol. IV, Fasc. 4, ed. W.G. Weeraratne, Government of Sri Lanka, pp. 484–486.
- Karunaratne, Upali (1999) “Kāyagatāsati,” *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism* Vol. VI, Fasc. 2, Government of Sri Lanka, pp. 168–169.
- Klaus, Konrad (1992) “On the Meaning of the Root *smṛ* in Vedic literature”, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 36, Supplementband, pp. 77–86.

- Kuan, Tse-fu (2004) *The Practice of Mindfulness in Early Buddhism*, unpublished D.Phil. thesis, Oxford.
- (2005a) “*Saññā* and *Sati*,” *Satyābhisamaya: A Buddhist Studies Quarterly* 32, pp. 191–224.
- (2005b) “Clarification on Feelings in Buddhist *Dhyāna/Jhāna* Meditation,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 33/3, pp. 285–319.
- (2007) “An Annotated Translation of the Chinese Version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*,” *Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies* 8.
- Kumoi, Shōzen (1963) “Āgama (2),” *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism* Vol. I, Fasc. 2, ed. G.P. Malalasekera, Government of Ceylon, pp. 244–248.
- Lamotte, Étienne (1970) *Le Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra)*, Tome III, Louvain: Université de Louvain Institut orientaliste.
- (1988) *History of Indian Buddhism: From the Origins to the Śaka Era*, translated from the French by Sara Webb-Boin, Louvain: Peeters Press.
- Lang, Karen (1994) “Meditation as a Tool For Deconstructing the Phenomenal World,” *The Buddhist Forum* Vol. III, ed. T. Skorupski and U. Pagel, London: School of Oriental and African Studies, pp. 143–159.
- Lin, Li-kouang (1949) *L’Aide-mémoire de la vraie Loi (Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra)*, Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve.
- Lü, Cheng 呂澂 (1963) “Āgama (1),” *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism* Vol. I, Fasc. 2, ed. G.P. Malalasekera, Government of Ceylon, pp. 241–244.
- (1982) 印度佛學思想概論 (*An Introduction to Indian Buddhist Thought*), Taipei: 中華出版公司.
- Mahasi Sayadaw, Ven. (1994) *The Progress of Insight: A Modern Pali Treatise on Buddhist Satipaṭṭhāna Meditation*, tr. Nyānaponika, 3rd edition, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. (1st edition 1965, Kandy: Forest Hermitage)
- Matsuda, Shinya 松田慎也 (1983) 「初期仏教における呼吸法の展開——安般念について——」 (“The Development of the Breathing Practice in Early Buddhism: On *Ānāpānasati*”), 佛教學 *Bukkyo-Gaku* Vol. 15, pp. 49–67.
- Matsumoto, Bunzaburō 松本文三郎 (1914) 仏典の研究 (*A Study of Buddhist Literature*), Tokyo: 丙午出版社.
- Maung Tin, Pe (1958) (tr.) *The Expositor* Vol. I, revised by Mrs. Rhys Davids, reprinted, London: Luzac & Company Ltd. (First published 1920)
- Mayeda, Egaku 前田惠學 (1964) 原始佛教聖典の成立史研究 *A History of the Formation of Original Buddhist Texts*, Tokyo: Sankibo-Busshorin Publishing Co., Ltd.
- (1985) “Japanese Studies on the Schools of the Chinese Āgamas,” *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur*, ed. Heinz Bechert, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Nakamura, Hajime 中村元 (1980a) *Indian Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical Notes*, Hirakata City: KUFs Publication.
- (1980b) “The Theory of ‘Dependent Origination’ in Its Incipient Stage,” *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula*, ed. Somaratna Balasooriya et al., London: Gordon Fraser, pp. 165–172.
- Ñāṇamoli, Bhikkhu (1964) (tr.): *The Piṭaka-Disclosure (Peṭakopadesa)*, London: Pali Text Society.

- (1975) (tr.): *The Path of Purification*, 3rd edition, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. (First published 1956 Colombo)
- Ñāṇamoli, Bhikkhu and Bodhi, Bhikkhu (1995) (tr.) *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*, Boston: Wisdom Publications.
- Ñāṇananda, Bhikkhu (1971) *Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought*, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.
- Norman, K.R. (1983) *Pali Literature (A History of Indian Literature Vol. VII, Fasc. 2, ed. Jan Gonda)*, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
- (1988) “Pāli Lexicographical Studies V: Twelve Pāli Etymologies”, *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 12, Oxford: Pali Text Society.
- (1989) “The Pāli Language and Scriptures,” *The Buddhist Heritage*, ed. Tadeusz Skorupski, Tring: The Institute of Buddhist Studies, pp. 29–53.
- (1991) “Observations on the Dates of the Jina and the Buddha,” *The Dating of the Historical Buddha Part 1*, ed. Heinz Bechert, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 300–312.
- (1992) (tr.): *The Group of Discourses (Sutta-nipāta)* Vol. II, Oxford: Pali Text Society.
- (1995) (tr.): *The Elders’ Verses I Theragāthā*, Oxford: Pali Text Society.
- (2004) “On translating the Suttanipāta,” *Buddhist Studies Review* 21/1, pp. 69–84.
- (2006) *A Philological Approach to Buddhism: The Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai Lectures 1994*, 2nd edition, Lancaster: Pali Text Society. (First published 1997 London)
- Nyanaponika, Thera (1962) *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation: A Handbook of Mental Training Based on the Buddhist Way of Mindfulness*, London: Rider & Company.
- (1983) *Contemplation of Feeling*, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.
- (1998) *Abhidhamma Studies*, 4th edition, revised and enlarged, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. (1st edition 1949, Colombo: Frewin & Co. Ltd.)
- Nyanaponika, Thera and Bodhi, Bhikkhu (2000) (tr.) *Numerical Discourses of the Buddha: An Anthology of Suttas from the Aṅguttara Nikāya*, New Delhi: Vistaar Publications.
- Nyanaponika, Thera and Hecker, Hellmuth (1997) *Great Disciples of the Buddha: Their Lives, Their Works, Their Legacy*, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.
- Nyānuttara, Sayadaw U (1979) “Momentary Concentration: Rebuttal of Reply to Rejoinder II–III,” *Satipaṭṭhāna Vipassanā Meditation: Criticisms and Replies*, Rangoon: Buddha Sasana Nuggaha Organization, pp. 280–290.
- Olivelle, Patrick (1996) (tr.) *Upaniṣads*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (1998) *The Early Upaniṣads—Annotated Text and Translation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ono, Genmyō 小野玄妙 (ed.) (1968) 佛書解説大辭典 *Bussho Kaisetsu Daijiten* Vol. 6, revised edition, Tokyo: 大東出版社. (First published 1933)
- Pande, Govind Chandra (1957) *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*, Allahabad: University of Allahabad.
- Pāsādikā, Bhikkhu (1998) (tr.) “The Smṛtyupasthānasūtra of the Ekottarāgama (EĀ): Translated from the Chinese Version,” *Facets of Indian Culture: Gustav Roth Felicitation Volume*, ed. C.P. Sinha, Patna: Bihar Puravid Parishad, pp. 494–502.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Perniola, Vito (1997) *Pali Grammar*, Oxford: Pali Text Society.
- Prasad, Chandra Shekhar (1993) "The Chinese Āgamas vis-à-vis the Sarvāstivāda Tradition," *Buddhist Studies Review*, 10/1, pp. 45–56.
- Premasiri, P.D. (1972) *The Philosophy of the Aṭṭhakavagga*, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.
- Rahula, Walpola (1980) "Psychology of Buddhist Meditation," *Indianisme et Bouddhisme: Mélanges offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte*, Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste, pp. 267–279.
- (2000) *What the Buddha Taught*, reprinted, Oxford: Oneworld Publications. (1st edition 1959, Bedford: Gordon Fraser Gallery Limited.)
- Ray, Reginald A. (1994) *Buddhist Saints in India: A Study in Buddhist Values and Orientations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rhys Davids, C.A.F. (1931) *Sakya or Buddhist Origins*, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.
- (1936) *The Birth of Indian Psychology and Its Development in Buddhism*, London: Luzac & Co.
- (1937) "Towards a History of the Skandha-Doctrine," *Indian Culture* Vol. III, No. 3–4, pp. 405–411, 653–662.
- (1974) *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, 3rd edition, London: Pali Text Society. (First published 1900)
- Rhys Davids, T.W. (1903) *Buddhist India*, London: T. Fisher Unwin.
- Rhys Davids, T.W. and C.A.F. (1910) (tr.): *Dialogues of the Buddha* Part II, London: Henry Frowde.
- Rhys Davids, T.W. and Oldenberg, Hermann (1882) (tr.) *Vinaya Texts* Part II, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- von Rospatt, Alexander (1995) *The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness: A Survey of the Origins and Early Phase of this Doctrine up to Vasubandhu*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Ruegg, David Seyfort (1998) "Sanskrit-Tibetan and Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionaries and Some Problems in Indo-Tibetan Philosophical Lexicography," *Lexicography in the Indian and Buddhist Cultural Field*, München: Kommission Für Zentralasiatische Studien Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, pp. 115–142.
- Salomon, Richard (1999) *Ancient Buddhist Scrolls from Gandhāra: The British Library Kharoṣṭhī Fragments*, Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Schachter, Stanley and Singer, Jerome E. (1962) "Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State," *Psychological Review*, 69/5, pp. 379–399.
- Schmithausen, Lambert (1976) "Die vier Konzentrationen der Aufmerksamkeit," *Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft* 60, pp. 241–266.
- (1981) "On Some Aspects of Descriptions or Theories of 'Liberating Insight' and 'Enlightenment' in Early Buddhism," *Studien Zum Jainismus und Buddhismus*, ed. K. Bruhn and A. Wezler, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, pp. 199–250.
- (1987) "Part I: Earliest Buddhism," *Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference* Vol. II: *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka*, ed. David Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen, Leiden: Kern Institute, pp. 1–4.
- Schopen, Gregory (1997) "If You Can't Remember, How to Make It Up: Some Monastic Rules for Redacting Canonical Texts," *Bauddhavidyāsudhākaraḥ*:

- Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday*, ed. Petra Kieffer-Pülz and Jens-Uwe Hartmann, Swisttal-Odendorf, pp. 571–582.
- Schubring, Walther (1962) *The Doctrine of the Jainas*, translated from the revised German edition by Wolfgang Beurlen, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Segal, Zindel V., Williams, J. Mark G. and Teasdale, John D. (2002) *Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy for Depression: A New Approach to Preventing Relapse*, New York: The Guilford Press.
- Shaw, Sarah (2006) *Buddhist Meditation: An Anthology of Texts from the Pali Canon*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Shimoda, Masahiro 下田正弘 (1985) 「四念処に於ける不淨觀の問題」 (“The Problems of Contemplation on the Impure in the Four *Satipaṭṭhānas*”), 印度學佛教學研究 *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 33/2, pp. 545–546.
- Silānanda, Venerable U. (2002) *The Four Foundations of Mindfulness*, Boston: Wisdom Publications.
- Skilling, Peter (1997) *Mahāsūtras: Great Discourses of the Buddha* Vol. II, Oxford: Pali Text Society.
- Soma Thera (1981) *The Way of Mindfulness*, 5th revised edition, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. (1st edition 1941)
- Sopāka, Bhikkhu 比丘觀淨 (2004) 復歸佛陀的教導 (*Retrieving the Buddha's Teaching*), Chang-hua: 正法律學團.
- Spiro, Melford E. (1982) *Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and Its Burmese Vicissitudes*, 2nd, expanded edition, Berkeley: University of California Press. (1st edition 1970)
- Strong, John S. (2001) *The Buddha: A Short Biography*, Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
- Stuart-Fox, Martin (1989) “Jhāna and Buddhist Scholasticism,” *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 12/2, pp. 79–110.
- Sujato, Bhikkhu (2006) *A History of Mindfulness: How Insight Worsted Tranquility in the Satipatthana Sutta*, Taipei: The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation.
- Takakusu, J. (1905) “The Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins,” *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 1904–1905, pp. 67–146.
- Takei, Yoshinori 竹井良憲 (1983) 「Anuruddha の一乗道——四念処に関する伝承の背後をさぐる——」 (“Anuruddha’s one-vehicle-path: Investigating what is behind the tradition concerning the Four *Satipaṭṭhānas*”), 印度學佛教學研究 *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 32/1, pp. 162–163.
- Teasdale, John D. (2004) “Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy,” *Cognition, Emotion and Psychopathology*, ed. Jenny Yiend, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 270–289.
- Thich Minh Chau, Bhikṣu (1991) *The Chinese Madhyama Āgama and the Pali Majjhima Nikāya*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Thich Nhat Hanh (1990) *Transformation and Healing: Sūtra on the Four Establishments of Mindfulness*, Berkeley: Parallax Press.
- Thomas, Edward J. (1927) *The Life of Buddha as Legend and History*, London: Kegan Paul.
- Tong, Wei 童瑋 (ed.) (1997) 二十二種大藏經通檢, Beijing: 中華書局.
- Ui, Hakuju 宇井伯壽 (1965) 印度哲學研究 第二 (*Studies of Indian Philosophy* Vol. II), Tokyo: 岩波書店.

- Vetter, Tilmann (2000) *The “Khandha Passages” in the Vinayapiṭaka and the Four Main Nikāyas*, Wien: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Waldschmidt, Ernst (1978) “Mahāmaudgalyāyana’s Sermon on the Letting-in and Not Letting-in (of Sensitive Influences)”, *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 1/1, pp. 25–33.
- (1980) “Central Asian Sūtra Fragments and Their Relation to the Chinese Āgamas,” *The Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition*, ed. Heinz Bechert, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 136–174.
- Walshe, Maurice (1995) (tr.) *The Long Discourses of the Buddha*, Boston: Wisdom Publications.
- Wan, Jin-chuan 萬金川 (2002) 「宗教傳播與語文變遷：漢譯佛典研究的語言學轉向所顯示的意義（之二）」，正觀雜誌 *Satyābhisamaya: A Buddhist Studies Quarterly* 20, pp. 5–82.
- Warder, A.K. (1971) “Dharmas and Data,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1, pp. 272–295.
- (1991) *Introduction to Pali*, 3rd edition, Oxford: Pali Text Society. (First published 1963)
- Wayman, Alex (1976) “Regarding the Translation of the Buddhist Terms Saññā/samjñā, Viññāṇa/vijñāna,” *Malalasekera Commemoration Volume*, ed. O.H. de A. Wijesekera, Colombo: The Malalasekera Commemoration Volume Editorial Committee, pp. 325–335.
- Willemsen, Charles and Dessein, Bart and Cox, Collett (1998) *Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism*, Leiden: Brill.
- Winternitz, Maurice (1933) *A History of Indian Literature* Vol. II, Calcutta: University of Calcutta.
- Woodward, F.L. (1930) (tr.) *The Book of the Kindred Sayings* Part V, London: Pali Text Society.
- Wundt, Wilhelm Max (1897) *Outlines of Psychology* (tr. C.H. Judd), Leipzig: Engelmann.
- Wynne, Alexander (2005) “The Historical Authenticity of Early Buddhist Literature: A Critical Evaluation,” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 49, pp. 35–70.
- Yamada, Ryūjō 山田龍城 (1953) 「原始佛教教團の擴がりとその時代的區分」 (“The expansion of the original Buddhist order and its different phases”), 印度學佛教學研究 *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 1/2, pp. 247–250.
- Yinshun 印順, Ven. (1968) 說一切有部為主的論書與論師之研究 (*A Study on the Śāstras and the Śāstrakāras principally of the Sarvāstivāda School*), Taipei: 正聞出版社.
- (1993) 華雨集 第二冊 *Hua yu ji* Vol. II, Hsinchu: 正聞出版社.
- (1994) 原始佛教聖典之集成 (*Compilation of the Original Buddhist Scriptures*), 3rd revised edition, Taipei: 正聞出版社. (First published 1971)
- Zacchetti, Stefano (2002) “An Early Chinese Translation Corresponding to Chapter 6 of the *Peṭakopadesa* / An Shigao’s *Yin chi ru jing* T 603 and Its Indian Original: A Preliminary Survey,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 65/1, pp. 74–98.
- Zhu, Qingzhi 朱慶之 (1992) 佛典與中古漢語詞彙研究 (*A Study of Buddhist Scriptures and Medieval Chinese Vocabulary*), Taipei: 文津出版社.

INDEX

- abandonment (*prahāṇa*) 77, 78
Abhidhamma/Abhidharma 1, 3, 4, 5, 6,
 8, 14, 17, 27, 30, 57, 65, 83, 104, 105,
 107, 121, 124, 126, 127, 142, 172,
 182, 190, 211
Abhidharmakośa(-bhāṣya) 35, 205,
 207
Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra *see*
Mahāvibhāṣā
Abhidharmāmṛta(rasa)-śāstra 35
Abhidharmavibhāṣā-śāstra 36
abhiññā 67, 85, 91–94, 141, 196, 197,
 207; *see also* supernormal knowledge
 absorption 54, 63, 68, 142; *see also*
jhāna
 access [concentration] (*upacāra*) 63,
 65, 67, 68
Āgamas, four 4, 67, 84, 141, 194, 200,
 202
 aggregates 8, 9, 13, 59, 60, 100, 101,
 102, 105, 109, 120–123, 127, 128,
 131, 140, 203
 altruistic joy (*muditā*) 56
 Ānanda 31, 46, 85, 86, 87, 132, 135,
 136
ānāpānasati 16, 36, 52, 70, 71, 74–76,
 78, 79, 81, 140; *see also* mindfulness
 of breathing
 anger 27, 28, 62, 153, 164
Aṅguttara Nikāya 15, 16, 23, 39, 46,
 47, 55, 57, 59, 62, 64, 75, 78, 81, 84,
 90, 94, 114, 126, 137, 138, 195–197,
 206
 Anuruddha 32, 33, 41, 66–68, 119
anusaya *see* underlying tendencies
anussati 1, 46, 52, 53, 55, 62–65, 82,
 84–86, 142, 186, 194
appanā 63, 68
 apperception (*saññā*) 8, 10, 13, 14,
 18, 19, 28, 34, 48, 52, 60, 66, 73–75,
 120–123, 173, 180, 181, 193, 203
arahant/arahant 59, 119, 129, 141, 208
Arthavinīścaya-sūtra 74
 Asaṅga 211
āsava *see* taints
 asceticism 7, 19
 ascetics 17, 19, 22, 23, 24
 Aśoka 2, 3, 83
asubha *see* ugliness
ātman/lattan *see* self
 attachment 146
 attention (*manasikāra*) 1, 20, 21, 42,
 70, 113, 118, 122, 126, 127, 173
Atthasālinī 14, 17, 43, 126, 186
aveccappasāda 64, 189; *see also*
 confirmed confidence
 aversion 18, 33
avijjā *see* ignorance
 awareness 10, 33, 41, 42, 45–51, 55,
 56, 60, 61, 65, 66, 70, 71, 75, 81, 82,
 86, 105, 110, 113, 136, 139, 173, 184
 Bāhuśrutīyas 30, 35
bhāṇakas *see* reciters
 body 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 24, 33, 41,
 43, 45, 46, 48, 50, 53, 54, 58, 59,
 62–65, 68–72, 76, 79–103 *passim*
 Brahmā 17, 93, 101, 137, 199, 214
 Brahmanism 7, 20
 Brahmins 17, 22, 23, 24, 162, 163

- Brahmavihāra* (divine dwelling) 56
 breathing/in-breath/out-breath, *see*
 mindfulness of breathing
Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 7, 11, 19,
 130, 131
 Buddhaghosa 5, 43, 46, 49, 63, 64, 65,
 73, 80–83, 121, 143, 187
Buddhavaṃsa (Bv) 175
Buddhavaṃsa-aṭṭhakathā (Bv-a) 206
 cessation 23, 25, 34, 99; of
 apperception and feeling (attainment
 of) 60, 66, 73–75, 79, 141, 193;
 synonymous with Nibbāna 77, 78,
 116
cetanā 126, 192
Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7, 14–15
citta 15–17, 57, 58, 64, 66, 74, 86, 87,
 93, 94, 102, 113, 122–129, 174, 187,
 205, 209; *see also* mind
 cognition 10, 13, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23,
 26, 28, 31, 34, 39, 40, 45, 49, 114,
 126, 139, 174, 185
 cognitive process 19, 21, 31, 45, 49,
 50, 102, 103, 139
 compassion 29, 30, 56
 concentration 15, 39, 53, 57–70
 passim, 75, 83, 86–88, 90–95, 101,
 109, 110, 119, 120, 140, 142, 143,
 148, 153, 158, 164, 190, 191, 194,
 196, 214
 conception (*saññā*) 10, 13, 14, 16, 32,
 39, 48, 52–55, 61, 62, 65, 66, 68, 74,
 80, 83, 85, 86, 139, 149, 159, 166,
 180, 181, 192
 conception (in womb) 124, 204
 conceptual proliferation 10, 17–19,
 21–24, 34, 139
 confirmed confidence 64
 consciousness 1, 8, 10, 14, 17–19, 21,
 23, 41, 53, 54, 57, 60, 63, 68, 75, 97,
 99–102, 121–128, 140, 150, 160, 174,
 199, 203
 constructive 52, 53, 55, 56
 contact 18, 22, 26, 27, 32, 42, 45, 51,
 100, 101, 121–124, 126, 203
 corpse 54, 65, 82, 83, 85, 105, 110,
 150, 160, 200
 councils/meetings (of the Buddhist
 Order) 6, 172
 covetousness 15, 20, 42, 43, 45, 47,
 48, 50, 62, 68, 79, 99, 112, 115,
 117–119
 craving 17, 23, 40, 51, 77, 100, 101,
 116, 124, 174
 Daṇḍapāṇi 17, 18
 Dārṣṭāntikas 30, 35
 dejection (*domanassa*) 15, 25, 26,
 33–35, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 68, 79,
 99, 112, 115, 117–119, 128, 185
 dependent origination 33, 40,
 122–124, 140
 deathless 77, 78, 193
 defilements 65–69, 88, 143, 146,
 156–161
 deliberate/deliberately 10, 22, 32,
 52–54, 56, 65, 139, 181
 delusion 27, 46, 53, 62, 88, 125, 143,
 152, 164
 desire 17, 25, 26, 29, 34, 37, 38, 54,
 55, 68, 85, 88, 152, 153, 164, 175
 Dhamma/Dharma 29, 30, 52, 62, 64,
 80, 127–129, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138,
 146, 156, 173
dhammas/dharmas 9, 15, 16, 58, 59,
 64, 65, 68, 69, 77, 79, 80, 104,
 105–110, 112, 113, 115, 117,
 119–123, 126–128, 140, 146,
 152–154, 200, 205
Dhammasaṅgaṇi 8, 27, 36, 54, 65, 141,
 174, 189
 Dharmaguptakas 4, 125, 196
Dharmaskandha 107, 113, 121, 127,
 211
dhyāna see jhāna
Dīgha Nikāya 23, 34, 38, 46, 60, 76,
 90, 104, 118, 124, 190, 195, 203, 214
Dīpavaṃsa (Dīp) 172
Dīrgha Āgama 4, 90, 172
 discrimination/discriminating/discrimin-
 atory 13, 15, 52, 91, 113, 153
 dispassion (*virāga*) 77, 78, 116
domanassa 25, 27, 29, 34, 35, 37, 70,
 115, 173; *see also* dejection
 doubt 17, 62, 66, 153

- early Buddhism 1–4, 6, 9
Ekottara (Ekottarika) Āgama 4, 97,
 99, 102, 106, 107, 127, 132, 145,
 172
 element (*dhātu*) 77, 78, 93, 94, 97,
 150, 160, 193, 211
 emotion 10, 13, 24, 25, 27–34, 36, 39,
 40, 53, 56, 178, 182
 empirical/empiricist 8, 24, 140
 enlightenment 19, 34, 51, 89, 105–108,
 127, 129, 134, 137, 140, 143, 144,
 162, 164,
 equanimity 10, 25–27, 29, 31–35, 38,
 39, 56, 79, 139, 153, 178, 181, 182
 experience 11, 13, 24, 27, 28, 30, 53,
 56, 59, 73, 93, 94, 99–103, 118, 122,
 128, 141, 178

 faculties (*indriya*), five 51, 57, 129,
 143–144; sense- 31, 32, 43, 47–49,
 51, 60, 61, 124, 175
 faith 53, 57, 58, 124, 125
 feeling(s) 8, 10, 18, 21, 28–33, 35, 40,
 42, 60, 66, 74, 75, 78, 83, 119–121,
 123, 151, 152, 176, 178, 185, 194,
 203; original 26–28, 33, 36, 176;
 secondary 20, 24, 27, 28, 33, 36,
 176
 fetters 152, 164
 form (*rūpa*), material 8, 54, 77, 78, 80,
 101; visible 20, 21, 26, 31, 43, 44,
 48, 99, 102, 103
 formless attainments 74–80, 94, 141,
 142, 175, 190, 197
 Four Noble Truths 8, 40, 59, 105

 generosity 52, 53, 124
 gnosis (*vijjā*) 39, 51, 57, 131, 139, 143,
 147–153, 187
 grief 115, 146

 hate/hatred 27, 53, 55, 88, 108, 125,
 143, 152
 hindrance (*nīvaraṇa*) 62–64, 67–69,
 76, 105–108, 127, 146, 153, 208

 identification 13, 15, 16, 26, 32, 33,
 53, 73

 ignorance (*avijjā*) 33, 40, 51, 100, 101,
 125, 183
 ill will 62
 imagination 53, 55
 impermanence/impermanent (*anicca*)
 16, 25, 26, 29, 33, 56, 59, 77, 78,
 113–115, 119, 124, 201
 impure/impurity 16, 53, 54, 82, 83,
 85, 105, 107, 149, 150, 160
 inference 118
 infinite space, sphere of 78
 insight [meditation] 9, 10, 11, 24, 39,
 40, 51, 54, 57, 58, 78–80, 96, 97,
 103, 109, 110, 118, 119, 130, 141,
 142; *see also vipassanā*
 intention (*cetanā*) 50, 126; (*samkappa*)
 87, 174
Itivuttaka (It) 3, 203

 Jainism 50, 198
jhāna/dhyāna 10, 11, 28, 34–40, 48,
 49, 54, 59–80 *passim*, 82, 83, 85, 86,
 90, 91, 93–96, 107, 108, 110, 120,
 127, 130, 139, 141–143, 164, 182,
 190, 191, 194, 197, 198, 207, 210
 joy (*somanassa*) 25, 26, 34, 35
 judgement/judgment 14, 42
 judgmental 42, 70

karmalkamma 50, 51, 93, 124, 181
Kathāvatthu (Kv) 175, 190
Kathāvatthu Commentary 83
kāya (as body) 72, 113, 114, 122, 123,
 126, 127, 129, 194, 198, 205, 210;
see also body
kāya (as individual) 11, 43, 57, 83,
 99–103, 128, 129, 194, 198, 211
kāyagatā sati 9, 11, 12, 21, 43–45, 52,
 53, 57, 81–83, 91–103 *passim*, 108,
 128, 129, 131, 132, 140, 143, 197,
 200, 211, 213
kāyasati 11, 43, 44, 81, 97–100, 102,
 103, 129; *see also kāyagatā sati*
khandha *see* aggregates
Khuddakapāṭha 3, 55
 knowledge 24, 39, 40, 59, 66, 78, 79,
 85, 109, 118, 147–153, 164, 196;
see also supernormal knowledge

- Kumārajīva 113, 202
 Kuru 133, 206
- labeling 14, 26, 28, 29
 liberating insight 34, 57, 97, 103, 193
 liberation, eight 141; by wisdom 39, 40, 93, 99, 103, 140–142, 164, 207; of mind 39, 40, 76, 93, 99, 103, 164; path to 9, 10, 11, 33, 34, 39, 60, 103, 125, 139; peaceful 141, 164; temporary 76, 79
 loving-kindness (*mettā*) 55, 56, 139
- Madhyama Āgama* 4, 30, 62, 66, 78, 82, 84, 106, 133, 135, 141, 145, 146, 155, 172
 Mahā Kaccāna 18
 Mahāmoggallāna 62, 99, 135
Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra 30, 113
 Mahāsāṃghikas 2, 4, 83, 107, 141
 Mahāyāna 4, 6, 30, 70, 107, 172
Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra 70
Mahāvamsa (Mhv) 172
Mahāvibhāṣā 30, 71, 72, 73, 121, 129, 142, 182
 Mahāvīra, Vardhamāna 50
 Mahīṃsāsakas 83
Majjhima Nikāya 16, 17, 24, 31, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 54, 57, 60, 64, 66, 68, 71, 75, 76, 79, 81, 84, 86, 87, 96, 104, 105, 113, 120, 130, 133, 141, 182, 190, 195, 198, 199, 201
manasikāra *see* attention
 Māra 19, 44, 101, 213
 Māro Pāpimā 162, 163, 213
māṭṛkā 4, 107, 127
 meditation 1, 9, 10, 37, 39, 41, 46, 50, 53–63 *passim*, 67, 68, 70, 73, 76, 80, 81, 101, 130, 131, 142, 156; *see also* insight [meditation] *and* serenity [meditation]
 memory 1, 6, 7, 14–16, 28, 111, 112, 173, 174, 185
 metaphysics/metaphysical 23, 24, 59, 177, 183
Milindapañha 51
 mind, concentrated 88, 125, 155–161; immeasurable 55, 103, 162, 163; limited 99, 162, 163; one-pointed 119, 120; state(s) of 9, 10, 17, 37, 41, 57, 58, 74, 83, 86, 87, 110, 125, 149, 159, 174, 213
 mind-organ 19, 98
 mindfulness, of/concerning the body 9, 11, 43, 81–83, 87, 88, 90, 95–97, 198; of breathing 11, 52, 60, 70, 71, 72–76, 78–80, 82, 105, 110, 125, 128, 139, 140, 142, 200, *see also* *ānāpānasati*; of death 16, 52, 55; definition 1; directed to the individual 102, *see also* *kāyagatā sati*; four establishments of 1, 11, 15, 51, 112, 146–154, 208, *see also* *satipaṭṭhānas*; right 1, 2, 60, 140, 183; in psychology 8, 42
 mindfulness and full awareness (*sati-sampajañña*) 33, 46–50, 55, 60, 61, 65, 66, 70, 86, 184
 morality (*sīla*) 52, 53, 57, 58, 60, 64, 124, 125, 129, 212
 Mūlasarvāstivāda 4, 134–136, 193, 211
- nāmarūpa* *see* name-and-form
 name-and-form 100–102, 122–124, 128, 203
 naming 18, 19, 22, 34
 Nanda 47–49, 184
 neither-conception-nor-nonconception, base of 78
 Nibbāna 20, 21, 57, 69, 77, 115–117, 128, 132, 142, 205
Nikāyas 4, 6, 105, 106, 130
ñimitta 11, 21, 48, 60, 63–67, 70, 90, 101, 102, 126, 128, 190; *see also* sign
nirodha *see* cessation
 Nirvana/nirvana 9, 12, 115, 140, 143, 164; *see also* Nibbāna
 Noble Eightfold Path 1, 51, 60, 173
 non-returner 154
 nothingness, sphere of 76
 not-self (*anattā*) 59, 77, 78, 109, 115
- object 12, 14, 22, 23, 32, 42, 49, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 73, 78, 101, 126, 127, 140, 179

- objective 22, 80, 119, 128, 204
ontology/ontological 23, 24
oral tradition/transmission 6, 7, 11, 84, 96, 112
- pain (*dukkha*) 27, 35, 39, 100, 164, 182
Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā (Pv) 110, 200, 201, 210, 211
Papañcasūdanī (Ps) 46, 49, 118, 121, 179, 182, 186, 194, 201, 202
paṭiccasamuppāda see dependent origination
paṭinissagga see relinquishment
Paṭisambhidāmagga 59, 73, 76, 180; commentary 70
perception 14, 23, 62, 73, 118, 173
perversion of *saññā* 21, 45
Peṭakopadesa 120, 121
pleasure (*sukha*) 35, 39, 63, 64, 69, 74, 76, 79, 82, 83, 100, 115, 148, 149, 158, 159, 194
prahāṇa see abandonment
Prajñāpāramitā 107, 110, 201
psychiatry 89
psychology/psychological 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 25, 27, 28, 34, 42, 80, 89, 124, 128, 139
purification 128, 143, 173
purity 19, 38, 182
- radiance 66–68, 189
rapture (*pīti*) 62, 63, 69, 74, 76, 79, 82, 83, 148, 149, 153, 158, 159, 194
reaction 10, 24, 26–28, 30, 32, 44, 176, 180
reality 33, 59, 114, 139
reciters (*bhāṇaka*) 73, 96, 109
recognition 13–16, 42, 52, 103
recollection 15, 16, 24, 26, 52, 53, 74, 86, 109
reflection 55, 80, 128, 137
relinquishment (*paṭinissagga*) 33, 77, 78, 116
restlessness and remorse (*uddhaccakukkucca*) 62, 153
restraint 42–45, 48, 61, 197
round of rebirths 40, 101, 124, 139; see also *saṃsāra*
- samādhi* 38, 39, 53, 57–60, 62–65, 70, 76, 77, 86, 87, 90, 120, 142; see also concentration
samatha 9, 10, 39, 40, 53, 54, 57–60, 70, 71, 78–80, 96, 131, 139, 140, 142, 143; see also serenity [meditation]
Samayabhedoparacanacakra 2, 83
saṃsāra 12, 19, 101, 102, 116, 124, 140; see also round of rebirths
Samyukta Āgama 4, 35, 36, 47, 72, 77, 78, 96, 101, 129, 136, 141, 172, 191, 201, 203, 214
Samyutta Nikāya 29, 36, 64, 71, 81, 98, 104, 105, 113, 116, 126, 128, 131, 134, 138, 195, 203
Saṅgha/Saṃgha 2, 52, 64, 129, 186
saṅkhārasaṃkhāra 8, 9, 25, 27, 28, 35, 36, 59, 72, 126, 128, 129; see also volitional formations
saññā 9, 10, 13–40 *passim*, 41, 45, 49, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, 64, 65, 68, 73–80, 114, 128, 139, 174–176, 180, 189, 193; see also apperception and conception
Sāratthappakāsinī (Spk) 136, 176, 178, 186, 189, 199, 207
Sāriputta 132, 135, 136
Śāriputrābhidharma 124
Sarvāstivāda/Sarvāstivādin 2, 4, 30, 35, 36, 71, 72, 77, 78, 82–86, 88, 90, 91, 95–97, 106, 108, 110, 112, 113, 121, 127, 129, 133–136, 141, 142, 145, 182, 192–195, 206, 211
Śatasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā (Śp) 110, 200, 201, 211
satipaṭṭhānas, four 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 23, 24, 31, 32, 36, 41, 44, 45, 56, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 67–71, 74, 79–81, 104–138 *passim*, 139, 140, 142, 143, 173, 190, 203; three 25, 29–31
sati-sampajañña see mindfulness and full awareness
Satyasiddhiśāstra see *Tattvasiddhi Saundarananda* 46
Sautrāntika 4, 30, 192, 194
schism(s) 2, 3, 83, 112, 141, 198
Self (*ātman/attā*) 19, 20, 21–23, 54, 114, 115, 124

- sensation 10, 26, 83, 182, 194
senses 11, 19, 20, 21, 29–31, 42–45, 48, 50, 51, 61, 68, 81, 97–103, 125, 131, 190
sensory data 13–15, 21, 22, 26, 27, 41–43, 51, 73, 74, 176
sensual pleasure (*kāma*) 36, 39, 44, 45, 63, 69, 74, 85, 174
serenity [meditation] 9–11, 39, 40, 51, 53, 54, 57–59, 78, 96, 119, 130; *see also samatha*
sign (*nimitta*) 14, 20, 21, 45, 48, 60, 65–68, 70, 73, 85, 88, 89, 184, 189, 190; acquired 67, 68; counterpart 67, 68; inspiring 63, 64; reviewing- 83, 85, 90, 91, 93–95, 149, 159, 196, 212
single-minded 88, 180, 194
skill in means 6, 46, 126
sleep/asleep 45, 75, 82, 146, 153, 156, 157
sloth and drowsiness (*thīnamiddha*) 62, 64
sluggishness 63, 64
smṛtyupasthānas *see satipaṭṭhānas*
somanassa 25, 27, 28, 34–37, 70, 96, 182; *see also joy*
sotāpanna (stream-enterer) 164
Spḥuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā 30
Śrāvakabhūmi 78, 191, 211
subject 12, 23, 42, 101, 140
subjective 10, 11, 14, 22, 26, 27, 28, 80, 103, 128, 176
suicide 54
sukha *see pleasure*
Sumaṅgalavilāsinī (Sv) 133, 136, 189, 201, 207
supernatural power (*iddhipāda*) 93, 94, 120, 129, 164, 191
supernormal knowledge 91–95, 97, 197; *see also abhiññā*
Sūtra on the Ten Repeated Dharmas of the Dīrgha Āgama 90
Sutta-nipāta 3, 14, 17, 19, 36, 54, 55, 115, 116
taintless (*anāsava*) 39, 93, 116
taints 93, 116, 164, 193, 197; *see also āsava*
Tathāgata 29, 30, 53, 62, 63, 69, 134, 136, 146
Tattvasiddhi 30, 35
Theragāthā (Th) 98, 132, 199, 206
Theragāthā commentary (Th-a) 206
Theravāda/Theravādin 1–3, 8, 9, 11, 27, 36, 70–72, 75, 77, 78, 83–86, 90, 95, 96, 105, 110, 112, 120, 121, 133, 140–142, 172, 182, 194
Therīgāthā (Thī) 199
thoughts 16, 48, 68, 69, 82, 85–88, 147, 174, 194
tranquil/tranquility 62–64, 69, 76, 77, 153
transformation 10, 13, 31, 32, 39, 56, 69, 103, 139
Udāna 3, 96
Udāyī 84, 85
ugliness/ugly 16, 53, 54, 114, 115
ultimate truth 22, 80, 128
underlying tendencies (*anusaya*) 18, 28, 32, 33, 139
unsatisfactory/unsatisfactoriness (*dukkha*) 25, 26, 29, 59, 77, 78, 115
unwholesome (*akusala*) 14, 16, 17, 34, 42, 43, 45, 47–52, 55, 61, 63, 69, 82, 85–88, 99, 100, 103, 147, 157, 164
unworldly 15, 36–58, 74, 96, 152, 182, 212
upacāra *see access* [concentration]
Upaniṣads 7, 11, 14, 15, 19–21, 130, 131
upekkhā 28, 29, 32, 35–39, 56, 70, 77, 96, 139, 142; *see also equanimity*
Vaibhāṣika 1, 75, 192
Vajjiputtakas 83
Vasubandhu 211
Vasumitra 35, 83
Vibhaṅga 40, 107, 118, 119, 127, 142, 182, 196

INDEX

- vijjā* *see* gnosis
Vinaya 3, 59, 71, 75, 84, 105,
 134–136, 141, 198, 208
viññāṇa *see* consciousness
vipassanā 9, 10, 39, 40, 54, 57, 58,
 59, 70, 71, 78–80, 96, 119, 131,
 139–143, 173, 187; *see also* insight
 [meditation]
virāga *see* dispassion
Visuddhimagga 5, 21, 54, 63, 65, 67,
 68, 72–74, 79, 82, 187, 205
 volition 125, 126, 192
 volitional activities/formations 8, 25,
 27, 35, 36, 120–123, 125, 126, 203;
see also saṅkhāra
 wholesome (*akusala*) 17, 34, 49, 51,
 57, 82, 85, 88, 131, 143, 147, 157,
 162, 174, 187, 213
 wisdom (*paññā*) 18, 25, 26, 39, 40, 53,
 57–60, 68, 69, 78, 79, 90, 93, 99, 103,
 109, 124, 140–143, 146, 164, 193,
 207, 208
 worldly 36, 37, 74, 152, 182, 212
 Xuanzang 113, 191, 193, 202
 Yaśomitra 30
Yin chi ru jing 121
 Yogācāra/Yogācārins 35, 75
Yogācārabhūmi 35, 193, 211