

SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion

XIII

The Louis H. Jordan Bequest

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JORDAN LECTURES 1987

**Buddha-nature, Mind
and the Problem of
Gradualism in a
Comparative
Perspective**

*On the Transmission
and Reception of
Buddhism in India
and Tibet*

by

DAVID SEYFORT RUEGG

SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN
STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

1989

Published by
SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
*Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square,
London WC1H 0XG*

© *School of Oriental and African Studies 1989*

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Ruegg, David Seyfort

Buddha-nature, mind and the problem of gradualism in a comparative perspective: on the transmission and reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet

I. Buddhism

I. Title II. Series

294.3

ISBN 0-7286-0152-4

Typeset by H CHARLESWORTH & CO LTD, HUDDERSFIELD
Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge

CONTENTS

FOREWORD	I
I. THE BUDDHIST NOTION OF AN IMMANENT ABSOLUTE AS A PROBLEM IN COMPARATIVE RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS	17
II. THE GREAT DEBATE BETWEEN 'GRADUALISTS' AND 'SIMULTANEISTS' IN EIGHTH-CENTURY TIBET	56
III. MODELS OF BUDDHISM IN CONTACT AND OPPOSITION IN TIBET: RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN THE GREAT DEBATE OF BSAM YAS	93
IV. THE BACKGROUND TO SOME ISSUES IN THE GREAT DEBATE	138
1. THE GIVING UP OF ACTIVITY AND <i>KARMA</i>	141
2. VOLUNTARY DEATH, SELF-IMMOLATION AND THE <i>SAMASĪSI(N)</i>	147
3. THE GRADUAL AS OPPOSED TO THE SIMULTANEOUS/INSTANTANEOUS AND THE PROCEDURE OF LEAPING	150
4. THE CONJUNCTION OF QUIETING AND INSIGHT AND OF MEANS AND DISCRIMINATIVE KNOWLEDGE	182
5. ABSENCE OF NOTION (<i>SAMJÑĀ</i>) AND NON-MENTATION (<i>AMANASIKĀRA</i>)	192
6. ON A <i>BHĀVANĀKRAMA</i> IN BHAVYA'S <i>MADHYAMAKARATNAPRADĪPA</i>	206
7. SILENCE	209
INDEX	213

Foreword

COMPARATIVE studies in religion and philosophy have over the years given rise to a number of questions and problems, and the very status and validity of the comparative method in these two fields have indeed often been the object of critical reflection and interrogation. This has been the case in particular where either totally different religious or historically independent philosophical traditions were the matter of comparison, even though the phenomenological method has of course proved to be productive in religious studies.¹

Somewhat less problematical no doubt is religious and philosophical comparison within a single culture and closely related traditions. The specialist in Indian religion and philosophy for example has been accustomed to compare the Brāhmanical/Hindu, Jaina and Indian Buddhist traditions which – whatever their ultimate genetic relationships may be – have clearly followed distinct lines of development. Furthermore, within each of these three traditions, the Indianist has found it meaningful to undertake comparisons between separate currents: e.g., to name only some of the broadest, between Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism, Śvetāmbara and Digambara, or Śrāvakayāna and Mahāyāna. Reference can be made in this connexion to two previous series of the Jordan Lectures, one by Louis Renou (*Religions of Ancient India*, 1953) and the other by Jan Gonda (*Viṣṇuism and Śivaism*, 1970). One form of comparison at least – a basically historical and textually oriented one – has thus been well-established among

¹ For recent discussions of the notion of comparative religion reference may be made to E. Sharpe, *Comparative religion: a history* (London, 1975); and F. Whaling, *Contemporary approaches to the study of religion*, i (Berlin–New York–Amsterdam, 1983), p. 165 ff. Concerning the comparison of Indian and Western philosophy, reference can still be made to S. Schayer, 'Indische Philosophie als Problem der Gegenwart' in: *Jahrbuch der Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft* 15 (Heidelberg, 1928), pp. 46–69, and D. H. H. Ingalls, *Journal of Oriental Research* (Madras) 22 (1954), pp. 1–11; see also recently W. Halbfass, *Indien und Europa* (Basel–Stuttgart, 1981). For the approach of a phenomenologist (and 'traditionalist'), see for example H. Corbin, *Philosophie iranienne et philosophie comparée* (Paris, 1985).

scholars of Indian religions and philosophies for more than a century and a half.

Extensive typological and structural studies in Indian religions and philosophies, or in the traditions of Buddhism, have on the other hand been relatively rare. Scholarly effort has hitherto been concentrated mainly on the necessary philological analysis of the texts, their pericopes and units of tradition, and on tracing historical developments and influences within India; in so doing, however, some practitioners of this historical-philological method have shown strangely little awareness of the presuppositions and pre-judgements with which they were operating, as if in the human sciences historical causality, development and influence were totally transparent and unproblematic things. Equally, the problems in intercultural transmission raised by the spread of Indian thought and civilization northwards and eastwards have attracted only modest attention. And even less work has been done on discovering comparable elements in the different Indian religious and philosophical traditions both within and outside India, i.e. on the task of identifying in terms of what has been termed family resemblances, in polythetic classification, the criss-crossing and sometimes overlapping strands that make up the traditions.² Yet, when we consider Buddhism in its various traditions in India, in China and in Tibet (where, in addition to strictly speaking Tibetan constituents, typologically Indic and Sinitic strands are to be identified beside Indian,

² The notion of family resemblance was made use of in philosophy by L. Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical investigations* (§ 67), and it has been the subject of further philosophical discussion since R. Bambrough, 'Universals and family resemblances', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 60 (1960-61), pp. 207-22 (reprinted in: G. Pitcher [ed.], *Wittgenstein, the Philosophical Investigations: A collection of critical essays* [New York, 1966], pp. 186-204). For comparative purposes in the anthropological study of descent and affinity, this notion has been employed, along with that of 'polythetic' as opposed to 'monothetic' classification, by R. Needham, e.g. in his 'Polythetic classification', *Man* 10 (1975), pp. 349-69. See also the same author's *Belief, language and experience* (Oxford, 1972) and *Against the tranquility of axioms* (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 36-65, with pp. 5-11 of the 'Advertisement' where Needham writes that 'the denotations of a verbal concept need express no essential idea that is common to all its applications' (p. 9). Traditional 'monothetic' classifications operate with the common-feature definition of a class, i.e. a class defined by the invariable presence of certain common characteristic attributes in each and every individual. By contrast, in a polythetic arrangement or chain no single feature is essential, or sufficient, for membership in the classification in which all the individuals do *not* share one single characteristic feature. I am indebted to Srinivasa Ayya Srinivasan for calling my attention to this work in social anthropology and for illuminating discussions of it.

Chinese and Central Asian components actually known historically to have been introduced from outside), the question may even arise as to whether the name 'Buddhism' denotes one single entity rather than a classification embracing (more or less polythetically) a very large number of strands held together by family resemblances. In their work Sinologues have been wont to focus above all on what is Chinese, and hence on discontinuities between Chinese and Indian Buddhism; and whereas some Tibetologists have emphasized continuities as well as differences between Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, others have preferred to underscore the discontinuities above all else.

In the following essays an attempt is made to investigate a pair of themes in Buddhist thought by considering, in historical and comparative outline, their treatment in some traditions of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, while referring on occasion also to parallels in non-Buddhist Indian thought (Brahmanism and Jainism) and in Chinese Buddhism. The two themes are, schematically stated, 'nature' and 'nurture' in the twin realms of soteriology and gnoseology, a pair of topics that call for examination in terms of the notions of 'innatism', 'spontaneism' and 'simultaneism' as contrasted with graded acquisition and reinforcement through progressive cultivation. Connected themes are enstatic concentration (gnoseological rather than cataleptic) as against intellectual analysis, ethical and spiritual quietism in contrast to effort, and cataphaticism as opposed to apophaticism. Put in these terms, these notions are of course largely 'etic' ones of Western origin, and they require to be investigated and specified in the light of the rich 'emic' categories belonging to the traditions being considered. Since a full treatment of each of them in Indian and Tibetan thought could easily fill volumes, they can of course only be outlined in these essays. It perhaps needs to be explicitly noted also that, whereas the co-ordinate pair of theory (*darśana* = *lta ba*, *theōria*) and practice (*caryā* = *spyod pa*, *praxis*) underlies much of what is said in our Buddhist sources, *praxis* has perforce to be considered here more in terms of taxonomies or theories of practice than as spiritual experience and practice *per se*.³ As for *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti* — ultimate reality and the

³ This specification is made explicit in response to a valuable methodological observation made by Alexander Piatigorsky.

surface level – which are also at the foundation of so much of what is at issue in our sources, they cannot be gone into separately for want of space.

The themes mentioned above will be considered in relation to the hermeneutics of the doctrine of the Buddha-nature – the *tathāgatagarbha* or germinal ‘Essence’ of the Tathāgata; to Emptiness of the heterogeneous (*gžan ston* : **parabhāvaśūnyatā*) as opposed to Emptiness of own-nature (*ran ston* : *svabhāvaśūnyatā*); to the contrast between ‘simultaneist’ (*cig c[h]ar* : *yugapad*) spontaneity and naturalness on the one side and on the other ‘gradualist’ (*rim gyis* : *krama*) reinforcement and cultivation – the tension in both theory and practice round which revolved, according to Tibetan sources, the ‘Great Debate’ of bSam yas that is reputed to have opposed the Indian *ācārya* Kamalaśīla and the Chinese *ho-shang* Mo-ho-yen (*hva śari* Mahāyāna) at the court of the Tibetan ruler Khri Sroñ lde btsan towards the end of the eighth century CE; to the notion of the *dkar po chig thub* as the unique and self-sufficient sovereign remedy which is effective against all the Ills of Saṃsāra, which gives rise immediately and all at once to Awakening – i.e. the direct ‘face-to-face’ encounter with, and recognitive identification (*no ’phrod pa*) of, Mind (*sems* = *citta*) as it really is – and which is thus the specific ‘remedy’ that by itself ‘cures’ all conceptual constructions and discursivity of thinking that are at the root of Saṃsāra; and finally to the concepts subsumed under or associated with Quiet (*śamatha* = *ži gnas*) and Insight (*vipaśyanā* = *lhag mthoñ*), which are thought of as making up a co-ordinated pair or an integrated syzygy.

According to the sources to be considered, the issues in the ‘Great Debate’ of bSam yas did not, it is true, necessarily hinge directly on the interpretation of the *tathāgatagarbha*-doctrine, which is in fact mentioned only occasionally in some of the relevant documents. And, conversely, the contrasts innate/acquired and cataphatic/apophatic in the hermeneutics of the *tathāgatagarbha* did not inevitably engage the oppositions simultaneousness/gradualness and ethical or intellectual quietism/effort. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Indo-Tibetan problematics of *tathāgatagarbha*-hermeneutics and the issues addressed in the ‘Great Debate’ are evidently linked by a number of thematic strands that cross and intertwine, making up so to say lattices of

ideas. And sometimes in the Tibetan exegetical traditions they have been collocated or treated in parallel.⁴

Now, in the entire spectrum of their applications, the terms *tathāgatagarbha*, *cig c(h)ar ba* and *rim gyis pa* do not appear to define a single, constant and unitary core-notion or essence. Rather, they correspond to contextually varying values grouped round these terms or *topoi*. In the case of *tathāgatagarbha*, this may well have to do with the fact that it is not a referring term for any entity (*bhāva*), but a metatheoretical expression or counter. As for the terms *cig char ba* and *rim gyis pa* – and also *dkar po chig thub* – they too do not designate invariant referents but seem rather to describe sets of features that vary from case to case; and they can be variously applied depending on their particular place in a given system of thought. Thus, while most schools recognize the *cig char ba* in some context, they may do so in differing ways and connexions, so that the specific application of this term and category can vary from school to school; nevertheless, the notions in question are bound together by a range of family resemblances.

An attempt is furthermore made here to show how, once the 'Great Debate' of bSam yas had become a partly dehistoricized *topos* in the Tibetans' later reconstruction of their (partly lost) early history, and in particular in their 'constitution of tradition', the expression 'teaching of the Hva šaṅ' has served, in the Tibetan historical and doctrinal texts, as a model or exemplar for a theory considered to have unduly stressed that form of quietism which

⁴ The Buddha-nature (*saṅs rgyas kyi rari bžin*) and simultaneous Yoga-Bhāvanā (*theg pa chen po la cig char rnal 'byor du bsgom pa'i thabs*) are treated together for example in MS BN Pelliot tibétain 835. Cf. MS BL (IOL) Stein 693, ff. 15b, 27b–29b; Stein 710, f. 36b (*saṅs rgyas raṅ grub*) and f. 38a. See also Wang Hsi's *Cheng-li chüeh* in P. Demiéville, *Le concile de Lhasa* (Paris, 1952), pp. 107, 116, 118 and 151; and below, Chapter ii, pp. 73 and 86.

G. Tucci had at one time expressed the opinion that a substantial part of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna's ideas along with those of the Indian Siddhas were preserved not only in the Tibetan rDzogs chen school but also in the Jo naṅ pa school, whose doctrine was in large part based on the *tathāgatagarbha* theory; see G. Tucci and W. Heissig, *Die Religionen Tibets und der Mongolei* (Stuttgart, 1970), p. 27. Compare however our remarks in *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub* (Paris, 1973), p. 7 n. 1. This opinion was not repeated in the English version of Tucci's work, *The religions of Tibet* (London, 1980).

A kind of refiguration of the *dkar po chig thub* as a medical metaphor is perhaps to be found in a number of Sūtras, for example in the Mahāyānist *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* – a major source of the *tathāgatagarbha*-theory – which is itself described as a medicine or remedy.

excludes ethical and intellectual effort or that form of understanding that focuses non-analytically on the Empty alone, in contravention of the Buddhist principle that Quiet (*śamatha*) and Insight (*vipaśyanā*) – like means (*upāya*) and discriminative understanding (*prajñā*) – are co-ordinate and have to be cultivated together either in alternation or in unison as a fully integrated syzygy (*yuganaddha*). In this way, in Tibetan philosophical discourse, the figure of the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna and his teaching have come to fulfil a practically emblematic function, one that may in fact be somewhat different from the position actually occupied by the historical *ho-shang* Mo-ho-yen. The following study will then be concerned as much with the impact and significance of the ‘Great Debate’ of bSam yas for the Tibetan tradition – in other words its *Wirkungsgeschichte* – as with the question of what actually happened at the discussions in which the *ho-shang* Mo-ho-yen was involved toward the end of the eighth century in Tibet.

A fundamental problem at issue is, very briefly stated, the relation between the Fruit (*phala* = ‘*bras bu*) – i.e. ultimate and perfect Awakening (*anuttarasamyaksambodhi*) in buddhahood – , the spiritual Ground (*gṛhi*) – known as the *tathāgatagarbha* or Buddha-nature – and the Path (*mārga* = *lam*) in all its stages. (To a certain degree, this is also the problem of the relation between *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti*, or between *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra* which is usually described in the Mahāyāna as one of non-duality.) Now, to the extent that non-duality and non-difference are being focused on, the Fruit of buddhahood is stated to be Awakened to immediately, that is, without any mediating process consisting in the practiser’s utilization of means (*upāya*); and such direct comprehension could thus be described as a face-to-face encounter with and recognitive identification of Mind (*sems no* ‘*phrod pa*). Yet over-emphasis on such immediacy – implying as it would a telescoping together of Ground and Fruit – runs the risk of making redundant the Path with its virtues and perfections (*pāramitā* = *phar phyin*) – and especially the first four of them that lead to the *prajñāpāramitā* – and it would then represent less a theory of non-duality than one of monistic identity between Ground and Fruit (i.e. a theory not accepted in any simple form

in Mahāyāna Buddhism). In some Buddhist traditions, the complex problem of the relation (or the description of the relation) between ultimate Awakening and means – viz. the virtues of generosity, etc. – has been treated in terms of the dedicatory transmutation (*pariṇāmanā* = *yonis su bsñio ba*) of these virtues into Awakening (*bodhi*); interestingly, however, this question of *pariṇāmanā* was scarcely thematized in the documents relating to the ‘Great Debate’ of bSam yas.⁵

In discussing the simultaneous/gradual polarity in Buddhist thought, especially on the Sūtra-level of the Pāramitāyāna, it is essential to be quite clear as to whether it is the Fruit or the Path that is in question. Now, that the realization of the Fruit at the very end of the practice of the Path is instantaneous (and in some sense ‘simultaneous’) is generally recognized, and this was therefore hardly the issue. It is accordingly the status of the Path – alongside the difficult problem of the ‘homology’ of Ground and Fruit and the ‘proleptic anticipation’ of the latter in the former – that is the problem being addressed.

The question further arises as to whether, given its positive and cataphatic character, the *tathāgatagarbha* theory was a syncretism, or a symbiotic accommodation, with the *ātman*-doctrine of Brāhmanical thought – that is, in effect, a crypto-Brāhmanical ‘soul’-theory in Buddhism. Or was it perhaps conceived as inclusivistic of this *ātman*-doctrine in the sense of Paul Hacker’s ‘inclusivism’, i.e. as incorporating this ‘soul’-theory in a subordinate position? Or, again, is it an authentic Buddhist treatment of a theme – and a religious and philosophic problem – which recurs in various forms throughout the history of Indian thought? A related question arises

⁵ It is true that Sa skya Paṅḍi ta has referred to *pariṇāmanā* in proximity to some references he made to the (*dkar po*) *chig thub*, i.e. to a spiritual factor, said to have been assumed by the Hva śāṅ Mahāyāna during the ‘Great Debate’ of bSam yas, that is supposed to operate as the unique and self-sufficient factor making possible the immediate and ‘simultaneous’ achievement of Awakening. See for example his *sDom gsum rab dbye*, ff. 34a and 38b, and his *sKyes bu dam pa rnams la sprivi ba’i yi ge*, f. 5b. However, in these places *pariṇāmanā* is not treated as either a bridge between, or as a factor permitting a leap from, the conditioned level of activity and impurity to the unconditioned level. And Sa skya Paṅḍi ta is evidently criticizing the treatment of *pariṇāmanā* as a *supplement* to the *chig thub*, that is, as supporting a factor that was supposed by its proponents to be already totally effective and altogether self-sufficient in achieving Awakening. On *pariṇāmanā* in connexion with the elimination of *nimitta* and *upalambha* and with reference to the *cig char/rim gyis* opposition, see also MS BN Pelliot tibétain 116 (125–6) and Pelliot tibétain 823, verso.

with respect to the theory of the Emptiness of the heterogeneous (*gṛān ston*) in contradistinction to that of the Emptiness of own-nature (*ran ston*) associated with Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamaka thought. Are these two opposed theories of *śūnyatā* to be placed on exactly the same level and accordingly to be treated as incompatible and mutually exclusive? Or are they complementary in the sense that they somehow supplement each other? Or, again, are they perhaps simply incommensurable (somewhat in the sense that this term currently has in the history of science)?

Opposed – and hence apparently irreconcilable – strands of thought are indeed to be found in our sources. But it would seem that more consideration, and probably more weight, have to be given to the possibility that the strands in question are forms of thought (and techniques) existing as polarities in tension between which the Buddhist traditions have from early times felt the need to strike a balance, rather than necessarily contradictory doctrines (and incompatible techniques) which could be harmonized only artificially and superficially, by some stratagem such as ‘inclusivism’.

Some aspects of the proto-history of the opposition between ‘simultaneist innatism’ – expressed in mystical or cataphatic terms – on the one side and analytical, and gradualist, cultivation – expressed in terms of intellection or apophaticism – on the other side have been recently addressed by Lambert Schmithausen, who has distinguished between ‘positive-mystical’ and ‘negative-intellectualist’ conceptions of liberation and Awakening in earlier Buddhist canonical sources.⁶ Similarly, in a recent publication by Paul Griffiths, the analysis of Buddhist meditation is based on an antithesis between the mystical-enstatic and the intellectual-analytical,⁷ with the Attainment of Cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) even being compared with cataleptic trance.⁸

⁶ See L. Schmithausen, ‘On some aspects of descriptions or theories of ‘liberating insight’ and ‘enlightenment’ in Early Buddhism’, in: K. Bruhn and A. Wezler (eds.), *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus: Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf* (Wiesbaden, 1981), pp. 199–250, especially p. 214 ff. To these two trends Schmithausen (p. 218 f.) has added the ‘Samjñāvedāyitanirodha-Liberation theory’ in which the progressive *anupūrvavihāra* pattern covers nine successive stages beginning with the first Dhyāna and continuing through a stage where notions and feelings come to a stop.

⁷ P. J. Griffiths, *On being mindless: Buddhist meditation and the mind-body problem* (La Salle, 1986).

⁸ Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 11, describes the *nirodhasamāpatti*-theory as ‘even more radical in its rejection of mental activity than are the dominant Western models for the understanding

The question thus again arises as to how these currents found in Sūtra-Buddhism, in fundamental classical Śāstras and in later Indian and Tibetan sources in fact relate to each other. Are they to be regarded as altogether heterogeneous and antithetical in the sense of being incompatible and mutually exclusive? And was the attempt to reconcile and harmonize the 'positive-mystical' with the 'negative-intellectual', as found already in some earlier texts, 'inclusivistic' in Hacker's sense, as has been suggested by Schmithausen?⁹ Or are they rather strands making up the whole fabric of Buddhist theory and practice, and standing in a structural relation of complementarity, with emphasis being placed sometimes on the one and sometimes on the other, whereas the two are in actuality considered to be required to supplement, and to reinforce, each other?

When analysing the textual pericopes and units of tradition identifiable in the literature of Buddhism, it will be useful to examine them not only in terms of historical stratification and chronological accretion of earlier and later textual matter, and of possible attempts made subsequently to reconcile and harmonize incompatible elements, but also in terms of a synchronic and structural co-ordination, motivated by considerations of a philosophical or meditative kind, of distinct but still complementary

of catalepsy'. See also Schmithausen, *op. cit.*, p. 223. However, Buddhist tradition seems usually to have regarded that form of exclusively concentrative enstasis that amounts to catalepsy as characteristic not of the supramundane (*lokottara*) *bhāvanā* of the Samāpattis but of the mundane (*laukika*) *bhāvanāmarga* alone. On this often neglected distinction see Chapter iv below.

⁹ Schmithausen, *op. cit.*, pp. 223 and 230. Schmithausen has defined Hacker's 'inclusivism' as 'a method of intellectual debate in which the competing doctrine, or essential elements of it, are admitted but relegated to a subordinate position, or given a suitable reinterpretation, and which aims not so much at reconciliation but at prevailing over the other doctrine or its propounders' (p. 223). And he adds that this 'inclusivistic' tendency 'is especially conspicuous in a few texts belonging to the "negative-intellectual" current' (p. 223).

The question arises in this context as to whether, as asserted by J. Bronkhorst, these twin trends continue two genetically different traditions – one a rigoristic, ascetic and suppressive tradition attested e.g. in connexion with the Buddhist Samāpattis and Vimokṣas, but nevertheless of non-Buddhist origin, and the other the authentic Buddhist meditation in which insight plays a major part, and which is characteristic of Buddhist mindfulness, the Dhyānas and the realization of the four *satyas*. See J. Bronkhorst, *The two traditions of meditation in Ancient India* (Stuttgart, 1986). Bronkhorst's treatment of the relevant material is not infrequently based on unexplicated or unexamined (and anything but self-evident) presuppositions about 'contradictions' in the traditions. (See e.g. the review by S. Collins, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1987, pp. 373–5.)

(or, perhaps, incommensurable) currents. In other words, we may be faced here not just with historically heterogeneous and logically incompatible elements artificially, or even forcibly, brought together in the course of diachronic stratification reflected in text-historical layers, but also by currents in synchronic tension and structural contrast.

Not only for Kamalaśīla but also for his Sūtra and Śāstra sources the synergistic co-ordination of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* in a syzygy is no more a mere artifice, or a case of inclusivistic subordination, than is the co-ordination of salvific means (*upāya*) and discriminative knowledge (*prajñā*), of Compassion (*karuṇā*) and Emptiness (*śūnyatā*), etc. In many classical periods of the Buddhist tradition it is indeed precisely this co-ordination of polarities that constitutes the specific character of theory and practice.

The relation between a positive or mystical current and a negative or analytical one – for example a cataphatic approach and positive theory and an apophatic approach and negative theory concerning insight and Awakening – or between the Emptiness of the heterogeneous (*gžan ston*) and the Emptiness of own-nature (*ran ston*) theories of *śūnyatā* and the *tathāgatagarbha* can provide the comparativist with interesting and methodologically instructive cases of opposed theories and approaches existing in tension. Certain Buddhist traditions have regarded the first pair – attested respectively in the ‘scholastic corpus’ (*rigs tshogs*) and the ‘hymnic corpus’ (*bstod tshogs*) both ascribed to the same Nāgārjuna – as complementary (or, perhaps, as incommensurable in the sense mentioned above). But other traditions have subordinated one theory to the other, regarding the subordinate one as intentional (*ābhiprāyika*) and as representing only a provisional sense in need of further interpretation (*neyārtha*) and the superordinate theory as corresponding accordingly to the definitive and ultimately intended sense (*nītārtha*) in the Buddha’s teaching. And although the latter pair – viz. Emptiness of own-nature as expressed in the ‘Second Cycle’ of the Buddha’s teaching and Emptiness of the heterogeneous as ostensibly taught in parts of the ‘Third Cycle’ – has frequently been regarded as antithetical

and contradictory – with the one being interpreted as *nītārtha* and the other as *neyārtha* – it may be possible within the frame of systematic Buddhist hermeneutics to think in terms of a complementarity (or incommensurability) between two theories belonging to distinct universes of religious-philosophical discourse rather than in terms of a contradiction between theories competing on the same level. At all events, a theory such as that of the *tathāgatagarbha* in the ‘Third Cycle’ clearly cannot be simply, reductionistically or ‘inclusivistically’ identified with the classical Prajñāpāramitā or Madhyamaka notion of *śūnyatā* as expressed in the ‘Second Cycle’. Nonetheless, at least some hermeneuticians – for example those of the Tibetan dGe lugs pa school – have been prepared to let them stand side by side as valid teachings that are both definitive in sense (*nītārtha*), rather than treat the one as definitive and the other as intentional and in need of being further interpreted in a sense other than the obvious and provisional surface meaning, as has been done in other hermeneutical traditions.

To return now to the pair of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, and to the concentrative and enstatic current on the one side and the analytical and observational current on the other side, as soteriological methods on the Path of Awakening they can be regarded not as mutually exclusive and contradictory, but as complementary and as equally necessary for the achievement of Awakening. If one current is emphasized at the expense of the other, there can indeed emerge an unbridgeable gap between them in philosophical theory and also in the theory of spiritual practice. But cultivated as co-ordinate components of the Path, they not only reinforce each other but they are both seen in theory and practice to be necessary in order to achieve their full effect.

With regard to the gradual/sudden (or subitist) polarity as it is known in sinological studies, it may well be that the circumstance that it ‘assumed its particular importance in the Chinese Buddhist tradition suggests that it resonated with, or gave form to, a similar pre-existent polarity within Chinese thought’,¹⁰ and even that it is

¹⁰ P. Gregory (ed.), *Sudden and gradual* (Honolulu, 1987), p. 1.

a 'peculiarly sinitic mode of approaching the enlightening experience'.¹¹ The materials gathered in these essays nevertheless document the fact that the gradual/simultaneous polarity – *krama/yugapad* in Sanskrit and *rim gyis/cig char* in Tibetan – is neither uniquely and exclusively nor pre-eminently Chinese, and that it is in fact very well attested as a polar contrast or tension, and sometimes also as a conflict, in the Indian Buddhist traditions too. That the cultural and intellectual matrices and networks of concepts in which this polarity has found expression differ appreciably between India and China is of course no less clear, so that it is no doubt legitimate to speak of distinct Indian and Chinese developments (and also of Indic and Sinitic models in the Buddhism of Tibet). Meaningful comparison can perhaps be most fruitfully pursued in terms of typologies, structures and lattices of family resemblances.

As for the historical relation between Ch'an/Zen and the teachings of the Indian Siddhas, R. A. Stein and L. Gómez have noted that it is very unlikely that Ch'an could have derived from or been directly influenced by Indian Vajrayāna or Siddha schools;¹² and to assume that the former originates from the latter would no doubt involve an historically unwarranted 'soft methodology' (to borrow an expression used in another connexion by Gómez¹³). Nevertheless, *mutatis mutandis*, the typological parallels and family resemblances do seem clear enough for the comparativist to have to address them very seriously.¹⁴

The extent to which *mahāmudrā*¹⁵ is to be seen as 'gradualist' or 'simultaneist' was moreover an important subject of reflection and discussion in Tibet. And Sa skya Paṇḍi ta for one considered what

¹¹ Tu Wei-ming, 'Afterword: Thinking of "enlightenment" religiously', in: P. Gregory (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 448.

¹² R. A. Stein, 'Illumination subite ou saisie simultanée: Note sur la terminologie chinoise et tibétaine', *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 179 (1971), pp. 5–6, who concludes: 'Si on se décidait à retenir les analogies [entre le Tch'an et le tantrisme indien ou la Mahāmudrā], on devrait sans doute songer à des développements parallèles'; and L. Gómez, 'Purifying gold', in: P. Gregory (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 70.

¹³ L. Gómez, *op. cit.*, p. 139, n. 14.

¹⁴ And the possibility of the existence of links between the Vajrayāna and some trends in at least later Ch'an (if only in Tibet) cannot be totally excluded *a priori* either. See below, Chapter iii, pp. 122, 131–2, 137.

¹⁵ Globally described as 'gradualist' by L. Gómez, *op. cit.*, p. 143, n. 41. But this description would not fit well the current of the Tibetan Mahāmudrā tradition represented by Žaṅ Tshal pa for example (see Chapter iii).

he termed 'Neo-Mahāmudrā' (*da lta'i phyag rgya chen po*) to have continued ideas of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna. Whether Sa skya Paṅḍi ta conceived of this continuation only in terms of direct genetic and historical dependence or also in terms of typological similarity is perhaps not quite certain, as is the question whether he would have himself made such a conceptual distinction. At all events he writes that the 'Neo-Mahāmudrā' he was criticizing was based on texts left behind in Tibet by the Hva šaṅ.¹⁶ Nevertheless, that the Hva šaṅ's 'simultaneist' teaching was not unprecedented in the history of Buddhist thought is amply demonstrated by a study of the Indian documents including Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākramas* where much earlier canonical discussions of the point are cited. And the link between 'Neo-Mahāmudrā' and the teachings of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna posited by Sa skya Paṅḍi ta could then be due to a typological relationship, without a direct historical dependence having necessarily to be assumed by the historian and comparativist to exist between them.¹⁷

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The essays in this book are based on the Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion delivered at the School of Oriental and

¹⁶ See Sa skya Paṅḍi ta, *sDom gsum rab dbye* (sDe dge ed.), f. 26a. On texts concealed by the Hva šaṅ before his banishment from Tibet, and on the motif of the boot he left behind, see the 'Alternative Tradition' of the *sBa bžed* (ed. mGon po rgyal mtshan, Beijing, 1982, p. 75), apparently used by Sa skya Paṅḍi ta also in his *Thub pa'i dgois gsal* (sDe dge ed.), f. 50a. The boot the Hva šaṅ is said to have left behind in Tibet has sometimes been interpreted as a token of the future revival there of his teaching. Cf. below, Chapters ii and iii.

In the case of the 'Neo-Mahāmudrā' as well as of what he terms 'Chinese-style rDzogs chen' (*rgya nag lugs keyi rdzogs chen*), Sa skya Paṅḍi ta writes in his *sDom gsum rab dbye* (f. 25b) that the notions *yas 'bab* and *cig char ba*, and the notions *mas 'dzegs* and *rim gyis pa* are equivalent, there being no distinction in point of fact.

¹⁷ In an article entitled 'Sa skya pandita's account of the bSam yas Debate: History as polemic', *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 5 (1982), pp. 89–99, Roger Jackson has tried to show that Sa skya Paṅḍi ta's treatment of the Debate and the *dkar po chig thub* problem was 'simply a case of polemical anachronism' motivated by 'virulent opposition to the White Panacea and other mahāmudrā teachings' which he wished to 'discredit' (p. 96). Recently, in an article in the *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 10/2 (1987), pp. 27–68, M. Broido has taken up this line of argument and sought to explain Sa skya Paṅḍi ta's critique as inspired by 'personal animosity' (p. 30) against Phag mo gru pa, and as 'invective' (p. 45). Treating Sa skya Paṅḍi ta's critique in such a way as to reduce it to mere distortion, polemic and invective however results in trivializing the very real, and meaningful, problems being seriously addressed by him – problems that had a long history in Buddhism even before he took

African Studies, University of London in March 1987. In view of both the lecture-form at their origin and the limitations of space available, they do not lay claim to being comprehensive treatments of the themes with which they deal. As already noted, a full-scale history of these themes could easily fill several volumes. The reader will not therefore find here an exhaustive discussion of either the primary or secondary sources. It is hoped, nevertheless, that this study will make it possible for the reader to form an idea both of the historical, philosophical and religious significance of the subjects treated and of the major hermeneutical and comparative problems that surround their interpretation. In the notes appended to the essays the reader will find references to many of the main primary sources and to further discussions and bibliographical material in the secondary sources (to the extent that these unfortunately so often inaccessible materials have been available). These essays will have fulfilled their purpose if they succeed in focusing attention on a number of salient points in Buddhism and in indicating approaches that may be of value in the analysis and interpretation of the complex themes and vexed questions that have been broached.

For rendering classical Chinese terms and the names of Chinese Buddhist masters the Wade-Giles system has been employed. The names of places still existing have however been rendered according to the *pinyin* system currently in use in China (for example Dunhuang instead of Tun-huang).

them up. It has also to be borne in mind that Sa skya Paṅḍi ta's account of the issues raised in the 'Great Debate' of bSam yas is paralleled not only by the accounts found in the *sBa bžed*, which he cites, but also by material included in the History attributed to the rDzogs chen master Nān ral (see Chapter ii below). As for Broido's assertion (p. 42) that Sa skya Paṅḍi ta charged the proponents of the *dkar po chig thub* and related doctrines with being no Buddhists at all, the passage he quotes (in his note 67) as evidence from the *Thub pa'i dgonis gsal* (f. 50b2) does not demonstrate this point. In the text cited, *phyi rabs pa* is simply the opposite of *sna rabs pa* 'earlier'. And although it is true that Sa skya Paṅḍi ta has described the opposed doctrines he rejects in the *Thub pa'i dgonis gsal*, f. 50b2 ff., as neither Śrāvakayāna nor Mahāyāna and hence as not being the teaching of the Buddha (see f. 48b4), there is surely an important difference between characterizing and then rejecting a doctrine as non-Buddhist in the course of a reasoned argument about matters of fundamental importance and denouncing the holder of this doctrine as being no Buddhist at all. In its turn the description *phyi rabs pa* has to be understood in the context of what Sa skya Paṅḍi ta terms 'Neo-Mahāmudrā', in contradistinction to what he considers to be the old, and authentic, Mahāmudrā that belongs to the Tantric division of Buddhism, and which he has by no means rejected (see Chapter iii below).

The author wishes to thank the Centre of Religion and Philosophy and the authorities of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, for the opportunity to present these papers, and the participants in the seminars for their observations and criticisms which helped to clarify many a point.



The Buddhist Notion of an Immanent Absolute as a Problem in Comparative Religious and Philosophical Hermeneutics

BECAUSE of its philosophical and religious significance in the fields of soteriology and gnoseology the Mahāyānist theory of the *tathāgatagarbha* occupies a crucial position in Buddhist thought, and indeed in Indian thought as a whole. No doubt the number of Indian Buddhist sources devoted to this theory is relatively limited: they are chiefly the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra* together with very considerable portions of other Sūtras such as the *Śrīmālā*, the Mahāyānist *Mahāparinirvāṇa*, and some sections of the *Laṅkāvatāra* and the *Ghanavyūha*; several Tantric texts; and the long first chapter of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* with its very extensive commentary which quotes a number of Sūtras dealing with the subject that are now otherwise unavailable in their original Indian versions. The majority of the other Sūtras and Indian Śāstras of the Mahāyāna either allude only incidentally to the *tathāgatagarbha*, sometimes even with a critical intent, or they do not explicitly refer to it at all, as is the case also with the Śrāvakayānist literature. And, so far as we know, it is chiefly in the Buddhism of Central Asia (Khotan, Tibet and Mongolia) and East Asia that the problem of the *tathāgatagarbha* assumed the proportions of a controversial topic, and that it has as such remained until the present day the object of numerous discussions and sometimes even of polemics. However, the foundations of these Central and East Asian developments were clearly present in India, as a careful study of the extensive materials available readily demonstrates. In particular, the hermeneutical problems posed by the theory of the

tathāgatagarbha are by no means unknown to the Sūtras and earliest Śāstras on the subject.¹

In virtue of both their extent and their contents, the Sūtras treating the *tathāgatagarbha* – or other systematically related doctrines such as the natural luminosity (*prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā*) of Mind (*citta*) and the spiritual Germ existent by nature (*prakṛtistha-gotra*)² – are amongst the most important of the Mahāyāna. And the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*, a work traditionally included among the treatises ascribed to Maitreya, is unquestionably one of the basic Śāstras of the Mahāyāna; its subtitle *Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra* indeed underscores the fact that it is a text summarizing what was considered the final and ultimate teaching of the Mahāyāna. The idea that the doctrine of the *tathāgatagarbha* and Buddha-nature is one of the supreme teachings of the Mahāyāna is explicitly stated besides in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*.³

Mahāyānist doctrine is mainly concerned with the Path (*mārga*) of the Bodhisattva and supreme and perfect Awakening (*bodhi*), that is, the state of a *buddha*. Now the term *tathāgatagarbha* is used to denote the ‘buddhomorphic’ Base or Support for practice of

¹ On Buddhist Sūtra-hermeneutics see É. Lamotte, ‘La critique d’interprétation dans le bouddhisme’, in *Annuaire de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire Orientales et Slaves* (Mélanges Grégoire, Brussels), 9 (1949), pp. 341–61, and also the same author’s ‘La critique d’authenticité dans le bouddhisme’, in *India antiqua* (Festschrift J. Ph. Vogel, Leiden, 1947), pp. 213–22; R. Thurman, ‘Buddhist hermeneutics’, *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 46 (1978), pp. 19–39; and *Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold* (Princeton, 1984); D. Seyfort Ruegg, ‘Purport, implicature and presupposition: Sanskrit *abhiprāya* and Tibetan *ḍgoṅs pa* | *ḍgoṅs gḍi* as hermeneutical concepts’, *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 13 (1985), pp. 309–25, and 16 (1988), pp. 1–4.

Concerning in particular the hermeneutical questions arising in connexion with the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra* (Paris, 1969), and *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub* (Paris, 1973), pp. 27f., 49f., 73f., 114n., 122–3, 134. On Tantric hermeneutics, with which this paper will not be directly concerned, much interesting work has recently been done by M. Broido; see e.g. *Journal of the Tibet Society* 2 (1982), p. 5ff., and *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12 (1984), p. 1ff.

² On the meanings of *gotra*, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* xxxix (1976), pp. 341–63, as well as *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*.

³ *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (Tibetan translation of the Mahāyānist version from Sanskrit), f. 195a6, and Colophon, f. 222b. Here and below, references are to the IHa sa edition of the Tibetan bKa’ gyur. (For an English translation of a (Sino-)Japanese version of this Sūtra, see Koshi Yamamoto, *The Mahayana Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra* [Karin Buddhist Series 5], Tokyo, 1973–1975.)

the Path, and hence the motivating 'cause' (*hetu: dhātu*) for attainment of the Fruit (*phala*) of buddhahood. Even when the texts do not use the term *tathāgatagarbha* to designate this factor making it possible for all living beings ultimately to attain liberation and buddhahood, the importance of the theme of the *tathāgatagarbha* is therefore basic to the soteriology and gnoseology of the Mahāyāna.

To designate this same factor, certain texts use in addition the terms (*tathāgata*)*dhātu*, *prakṛtistha-gotra* and *prakṛtiprabhāsvara-citta*, words that have a longer history in the development of Buddhist thought. The at least partial systematic equivalence of these terms from the points of view of soteriology and gnoseology is set out in several of the scriptural sources for the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine.

THE SOTERIOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL STATUS OF THE *TATHAGATAGARBHA* AS A PROBLEM IN EXEGESIS AND HERMENEUTICS

If the fundamental rôle played by the notion of the 'Embryo-Essence' (*garbha*), or Germ, and by the spiritual 'Element' (*dhātu*) of the *tathāgata* is accordingly clear, the metaphysical and soteriological status of the *tathāgatagarbha*, *tathāgatadhātu* and *gotra* is somewhat less so. While the *prakṛtistha-gotra* as the Support (*ādhāra*) for practice of the Path is evidently situated on the 'causal' level – i.e. that of the sentient being in Saṃsāra – and while the *tathāgatagarbha* is said to exist in all sentient beings without exception, the *tathāgatadhātu* on the other hand is present not only on this level of ordinary sentient beings but also, evidently, on the level of buddhahood itself. This difference makes it impossible to regard the *tathāgatagarbha* and *tathāgata-dhātu* as simply identical in all doctrinal contexts.

The *tathāgatagarbha* is characterized as permanent (*nitya*), immutable (*dhrūva*), blissful (*sukha*), and eternal (*śāśvata*), and sometimes we are even told that it is *ātman*. These are epithets that one would expect to relate to the Absolute – indeed, *prima facie*, to a substantial Absolute.

The parallelism between the *tathāgatagarbha* (or its equivalents) and the Vedāntic *ātman* is quite striking and it might even be thought at first sight that a crypto-Vedāntic tendency has here

come to the surface in Buddhism. The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* accordingly calls attention to the danger of simply equating the Buddhist teaching on the *tathāgatagarbha* with the *ātmavāda* of the Tīrthikas; and it clearly distinguishes between the Buddha's doctrine of the Embryo-Essence of the *tathāgata* and the heterodox doctrine of a permanent and substantial universal Self.⁴

In evaluating the interrelation of the theory of the *tathāgatagarbha* with the *ātmavāda*, everything depends on just what the Buddhist and Brāhmanical philosophers mean by the word *ātman*. For the Buddhists and Brahmanists evidently do not always intend exactly the same thing when they use this word. Moreover, even within Buddhist usage, there is a difference between the use of the word *ātman* in a positive (or *svamata*) context, as an epithet of a factor such as the *tathāgatagarbha*, and its employment in a negative or polemical (i.e. *paramata*) context to designate an eternal entity rejected in Buddhist thought. It must be observed furthermore that the Buddhist critique of the *ātman* is generally directed against the notion of an unchangeable substantial entity; and it has been remarked by scholars that the earlier Buddhists seem not to refer to the Upaniṣadic *ātman*/*brahman*,⁵ and that the majority of the later Buddhists also practically ignore

⁴ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (ed. B. Nanjio), ii, pp. 77–79. In the introductory paragraph of Ch. vi of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (p. 220.3), *ātman* nevertheless appears in exactly the same context in which the expression *tathāgatagarbha-ālayavijñāna* appears in the sequel in the same Sūtra.

⁵ On this point H. Nakamura, 'The Vedānta philosophy as was revealed in Buddhist scriptures', in *Pañcāmṛtam* (Śāradīya Jñāna Mahotsava 3, Śrī Lāl Bahādur Śāstrī Rāṣṭrīya Saṃskṛta Vidyā Pīṭha, Delhi, 2024 [= 1968], pp. 6, 8–12), was somewhat less categorical than P. Horsch, 'Buddhismus und Upaniṣaden', in *Pratidānam* (Festschrift F. B. J. Kuiper, The Hague, 1967), pp. 462–77, who considered that there are no references to the Upaniṣadic *ātman* / *brahman* in the earlier Buddhist literature. And in his *History of early Vedānta philosophy*, I (Delhi, 1983), Nakamura has expressed the opinion that the concept of Brahmā and other Upaniṣadic ideas are to be found scattered throughout the early Buddhist scriptures (pp. 135–9). K. R. Norman, 'A note on *attā* in the *Alagaddūpama-sutta*' in *Studies in Indian philosophy* (Memorial volume in honour of Pandit Sukhlaji Sanghvi, L.D. Series 84, Ahmedabad, 1981), pp. 19–21, finds an echo of the Upaniṣadic *ātman* in the world-*ātman* concept of the *Majjhimanikāya* (I, pp. 130–42) (on which see, however, P. Horsch, *loc. cit.*, p. 467). But it is very difficult indeed to say how specific to the Upaniṣads the *ātman*-concept mentioned in this Sutta in fact was. A recent study on the *ātman*-problem especially in the Theravāda tradition is S. Collins, *Selfless persons* (Cambridge, 1982).

the Advaita-Vedānta of Śaṅkārācārya.⁶ The question therefore arises as to the extent to which the Buddhist critique of the *ātmanvāda* is applicable to the Vedāntic *ātman/brahman*, at least in its philosophically elaborated versions.⁷

The Buddhist texts themselves have much of interest to say on the subject of parallels between Buddhist and Brahmanical thought. One important Sūtra, the Mahāyānist *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, alludes to the problem of the interrelation of the Buddhist and Brahmanical notions of the *ātman* and absolute reality in the following passage:

The six [Tīrthika-]masters asked: 'Gautama, if the self (*ātman*) does not exist, who will do good and evil?' – Bhagavat replied: 'If what is called "self" does [it], can one say [of this "self", as the Tīrthikas do] that it is "permanent" (*nitya*)? And if it is permanent, does it sometimes do good and sometimes evil? If there is a moment when it does both good and evil, will it be said that the self is "infinite"? If it is the self that acts, why does it do something evil? If it is the self that acts, and if [this self] is knowledge, how is it that doubt arises in a being about the non-existence of the self? Hence, as concerns the Tīrthika doctrine, the self certainly does not exist.'⁸

⁶ The *Advaita-Vedānta* seems to be mentioned for the first time in Buddhist literature by Kamalāśīla in his Pañjikā on Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* (328 f. dealing with the Aupaṇṣadikas). Bhāskara is mentioned, together with a certain 'Bhagavant' (= Śaṅkara-Bhagavatpāda?), by Advayavajra, *Tattvaratnāvalī* (p. 19).

On the earlier Vedānta see Bhāvaviveka, *Madhyamakahrdayakārikās* ch. viii (cf. iii.288f.). To what extent the Buddhists before Bhāvaviveka were really familiar with the Vedānta in its Upaniṣadic sources is problematical. On a passage of the *Ta-chih-tu-lun* ascribed to Nāgārjuna – and supposed by É. Lamotte to refer to Upaniṣadic ideas (see *Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, II [Louvain, 1949], pp. 738 and 747) – see K. Bhattacharya, *L'ātman-brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien* (Paris, 1973), pp. 133–5. On the *Daśabhūmivibhāṣāśāstra*, also ascribed to Nāgārjuna, and on works attributed to Āryadeva, see H. Nakamura, *History of early Vedānta philosophy*, I, pp. 158, 165. And on Aśvaghōṣa, the *Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra* and Harivarman's *Tattva/Satyasiddhi*, see Nakamura, *op. cit.*, p. 141f.

⁷ A recent study on this difficult question is K. Bhattacharya, *L'ātman-brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien*. See also the same scholar's article on *brahman* in Buddhist literature in *Sri Venkateswara Univ. Oriental Journal* (Tirupati), 18 (1975), pp. 1–8.

⁸ *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, Tibetan version translated from the Chinese, vol. kha, f. 221a of the lHa sa ed. (quoted in Bu ston's *mDzes rgyan*, f. 26b–27a, and translated in D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub* [Paris, 1973] pp. 123–4).

The Sūtra then explains:

‘What is called “self” is the *tathāgata*. Why is this so? The [Buddha-]Body (*sku*) being infinite is free from the blemish of doubt, and it neither acts nor grasps, so that it is said to be “permanent”. In virtue of non-production and non-cessation (*anutpāda*, *anirodha*) it is said to be “blissful” (*sukha*). In virtue of the absence of the impurities of *kleśa* it is said to be “very pure” (*parisuddha*, *viśuddha*). In virtue of the absence of ten marks, it is said to be “Empty” (*śūnya*). Consequently, the *tathāgata* is permanent, blissful, self, very pure, Empty and without marks. – The Tīrthikas [then] said: “If the *tathāgata* is Empty because he/it is permanent, blissful, self, very pure, and without marks, this is indeed so! And knowing that the *dharma* taught by Gautama is also not Empty (*ston pa ma yin pa*), we accept and retain it.” Many Tīrthikas then took to religion in the Teaching of the Buddha with their minds full of faith.’⁹

In another passage the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* represents the Tīrthikas who behold the radiance of the Buddha as thinking the following:

‘If only Gautama did not teach a nihilistic view (*uccheda-dṛṣṭi*), we would accept instruction and the discipline (*śīla*) from him.’ – [The Buddha thereupon observes:] ‘I then knew the thoughts of these wandering ascetics (*parivrājakas*) ... I said to them: “Why do you think that I teach a nihilistic view?”’ – The wandering ascetics answered: ‘Gautama, in all the Śūtras you have said that there is no self in all living beings. If you thus say that no self exists, how can that not be a nihilistic view? If no self exists, who will bind himself by discipline and who will infringe it? – Bhagavat replied: ‘I have not said that no self exists in all living beings. If I have

⁹ *Ibid.* Bu ston, *mDzes rgyan*, f. 27a, considered that this statement is, however, intentional (*dgois pa can = ābhiprāyika*), the motive (*dgos pa = prayojana*) being to introduce Tīrthikas to the Buddha’s teaching (by *avatāraṇābhisamdhī*) and the intentional foundation (*dgois gži*) being the Emptiness of *dharmas* having discursive development (*prāpañca*) in *tathatā*, which is free from *prapañca* relating to the dichotomously conceptualized binary pair Empty/not Empty (*ston mi ston gi spros pa*) (the negative here being a case of *paryudāsa*-type negation). On the terms *dgois pa can*, *dgois gži* and *dgos pa*, see below.

always said that the Buddha-nature (*sañs rgyas keyi ran bžin*) exists in all living beings, is this very Buddha-nature then not self? Thus I do not teach a nihilistic theory. If, because one does not see the Buddha-nature of all sentient beings, one asserts the not permanent, the not self, the not blissful, and the not very pure, it is said that one teaches nihilism.' Then, after the ascetics had heard the explanation that this Buddha-nature is self, they all produced the thought (*citta*) directed toward supreme and perfect Awakening (*anuttarasamyaksambodhi*). And having at that moment entered religious life (*pravraj-*), they exerted themselves on the path of Awakening (*bodhimārga*).¹⁰

But the Sūtra nevertheless continues:

This Buddha-nature is not in reality *ātman*, and it is for the sake of sentient beings that a self is spoken of. Whereas in virtue of the existence of causes and conditions the Tathāgata has spoken of not-self (*bdag med pa*) as self, in reality there is no self. Though he has spoken thus, this was no untruth either. It is because of the existence of causes and conditions that it is said that the self is not-self. Whereas self exists in reality, it is with a view to the world of living beings (*loka*) that it has been said that there is no self. But that was no untruth. The Buddha-nature is not-self (*bdag med de*); and if the Tathāgata has spoken of 'self', this is because a designation has been employed (*btags pa yin pa'i phyir*).¹¹

Elsewhere the same Sūtra explains:

If what is called 'self' were an eternally permanent (*kūṭa-sthanitya*) *dharma*, there would be no freedom from suffering (*duḥkha*). And if what is called 'self' did not exist, pure

¹⁰ *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, Tibetan version translated from the Chinese, vol. kha, f. 137b–138a (quoted in Bu ston's *mDzes rgyan*, f. 22a–23a, and translated in *Traité*, pp. 113–14).

¹¹ *Ibid.* In this case Bu ston, *mDzes rgyan*, f. 23a, has explained that designating the *tathāgatagarbha*, which is not self, as self is a case of *pratipakṣābhisaṃdhi*, i.e. that this teaching was intended as a counteragent against the contempt the Tīrthikas may feel for the Dharma (because they take it to be nihilistic).

religious conduct (*brahmacarya*) would be of no avail ... It is to be known that the Buddha-nature is the Middle Way (*madhyamā pratīpat*) altogether free from the two extremes (*antadvaya*) ... Non-duality is reality:¹² by nature self and not-self are without duality (*gñis su med pa*). The Lord Buddha has thus affirmed that the meaning of the *tathāgata-garbha* is unfathomable ... In the *Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra* also I have already taught that self and not-self are without duality by characteristic.¹³

Furthermore it is explained:

When one sees that all is Empty, failure to see the non-Empty will not be called the Middle Way. When one sees all up to [the limit of] non-self, failure to see the self will not be called the Middle Way. What is called 'Middle Way' is Buddha-nature.¹⁴

In these passages the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* is evidently making use of paradoxical and antiphrastic expressions to emphasize the difficulty of understanding – the unfathomability – of absolute reality, and also, perhaps, to show that the sense of a given statement depends on the pragmatic situations in which it is uttered and on exactly what is meant by the terms used in it. It is, moreover, to be remembered that any statement carries along with it and evokes, in the discursus of linguistic usage, a counter-statement. Thus, while the *Sūtra* certainly does not seek to defend any heterodox theory of the *ātman*, it still does not reject out of hand an absolute which may, at least provisionally and conventionally, be designated by the name 'ātman', etc.

The commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* sums up the problem by saying:

It is to be understood that attainment of the perfection of supreme-self (*paramātma-pāramitā*) is the fruit of cultivating

¹² *yañ dag pa ñid (samyaktva ?)*.

¹³ *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, Tibetan version translated from the Chinese, vol. ka, f. 186a–188b (quoted in Bu ston's *mDzes rgyan*, fol. 24a–b, and translated in *Traité*, pp. 117–18).

¹⁴ *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, Tibetan version translated from the Chinese, vol. kha, f. 130a–b (quoted in Bu ston's *mDzes rgyan*, f. 26a, and translated in *Traité*, p. 121).

the perfection of discriminative understanding (*prajñāpāramitā*), as the reverse (*viparyaya*) of attachment to the postulation of the non-existent self of the heterodox, who see a self in the five Groups as objects of appropriation.¹⁵ For all the heterodox have imagined as self a thing consisting of matter (*rūpa*) and the other [*skandhas*], [but] which does not have this [self] as its nature; and this thing as grasped by them is always not-self (*anātman*) by reason of the [very] fact that it does not conform to the characteristic of self (*ātmalakṣaṇa*).¹⁶ But the Tathāgata has attained the supreme limit of the non-substantiality of all things (*sarvadharmanairātmya*) by means of exact gnosis; and this non-substantiality as seen by him is always considered as self because it conforms to the proper characteristic of not being self (*anātmalakṣaṇa*). For [here] non-substantiality (*nairātmya*) is held to be self in the manner of 'that which is fixed in the mode of non-fixation'.¹⁷

From the viewpoint of the Buddhist, then, the situation is that the Tīrthikas' conception of *ātman* does not, and cannot, really correspond to their own definition of the *ātman*; and for this reason it is unacceptable.¹⁸ Hence it is first said in the passage quoted above that the self – i.e. the self of the speculative *ātmavāda* (to which the *ātman* of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* and the other comparable Buddhist scriptures only appears to correspond) – does not exist.¹⁹ But this does not imply that the reality

¹⁵ *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i.36, p. 31.10–12: *pañcasūpādānaskandheṣu ātmadarśinām anyatīrthyānām asadātmagrāhābhirativiparyayeṇa prajñāpāramitābhāvanāyāḥ paramātmāpāramitādāhigamaḥ phalaṃ draṣṭavyam*. On the 'showing' (*paridīpana*) of *lokottaradharmas* by the counteragent (*pratipakṣa*) of *laukikadharmas*, see also *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i. 154–5 (p. 76.19).

¹⁶ i.e. to the postulated definition of an *ātman*.

¹⁷ The *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i. 36 reads here (p. 31.13–16): *tathāgataḥ punar yathābhūtajñānena sarvadharmanairātmyaparapāramiprāptaḥ | tac cāsyā nairātmyam anātmalakṣaṇena yathādarśanam avisaṃvāditvāt sarvakālam ātmābhipreto nairātmyam evātmēti krtvā | yathōktaṃ sthito 'sthānāyogenēti |* – Cf. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* ix. 23 on *paramātmān*.

Cf. *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* i, p. 8, for the application of the antiphrastic statement *susthito 'sthānāyogena*.

¹⁸ See also *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* vi. 2. Cf. Āryadeva, *Catuhśataka* x. 3ab (quoted in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* ix. 12, *avataṛaṇikā*): *yas tavātmā mamānātmā tenātmānīyamān na saḥ |* 'Your self is for me not self (*bdag min*), so that it is not self for lack of certainty (*ma rtes phyir*).'

¹⁹ See above, p. 21.

sometimes referred to in the Sūtra by the name *ātman* does not exist; for in this case the term is used to designate absolute reality in such a manner that theory and definition coincide. Hence it is next said that the self does indeed exist in reality, even though one is no doubt obliged to reject the concept of a self so long as one has in mind the speculative *ātmavāda* of the Tīrthikas. But, again, a one-sided affirmation of a supposedly 'true' absolute as the referent of the term *ātman* would be no more finally correct than the negation of an *ātman*. In short, for the Buddhist, the principle of the Middle Way always remains fully operative, and he therefore eschews both the eternalist and the nihilist views.

EXEGETICAL AND HERMENEUTICAL APPROACHES: SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Obliged as they thus were by these apparent parallels clearly to differentiate between the *tathāgatagarbha* – and the Buddhist notions of absolute reality informed by certain inseparable and constitutive factors – on the one side and on the other side an eternal and unchanging entity like the *ātman* or *brahman*, the Buddhist philosophers had available two hermeneutical possibilities, either of which would permit them to remain faithful to their fundamental principle of the non-substantiality (*nairātmya*) of the individual (*puṅgala*) – as accepted by practically the whole of the Buddhist tradition²⁰ – and the non-substantiality of the factors of existence (*dharma*) – as elaborated in the Mahāyāna.

I

One solution to this hermeneutical problem was based on the idea of a teaching given by the Buddha that is not final and definitive, but which is 'intentional' (*ābhīprāyika*) and non-definitive since its meaning requires to be elicited by explication and further

²⁰ The Vātsīputrīyas are an (at least apparent) exception.

interpretation (*neyārtha*).²¹ It consists in supposing that a teaching concerning the presence of the *tathāgatagarbha* in all living beings is really an expedient device motivated by the Buddha's wish to attract persons clinging to the idea of a Self and thus to introduce them to his teaching, which will then free them from this clinging; or again by the Buddha's wish to eliminate in his disciples such ethical and cognitive obstacles to the cultivation of the path of spiritual liberation as a feeling of depression on the part of those who have little confidence in their ability to attain buddhahood,²² or a feeling of superiority on the part of those who might look down on others less capable than themselves, or an inability to distinguish between the real and unreal according to the Middle Way. These motives have been expressly mentioned in the Sūtra literature as well as in the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*.²³ And on the basis of the passage of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (ii, p. 78) relating to the intentional and non-definitive nature of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine, Candrakīrti²⁴ and some of his Tibetan followers – e.g. Sa skya Paṇḍi ta²⁵ and Bu ston²⁶ – have emphasized the intentional (*dgois pa can = ābhiprāyika*) and non-definitive character of a teaching requiring further interpretation in another sense (*drañ don = neyārtha*). For such a teaching refers on the literal surface-level to an *ātman*-like spiritual principle such as the *tathāgatagarbha*; but it is considered to have ultimately in

²¹ On these two terms and concepts in Sūtra hermeneutics, see the literature quoted above in n. 1. It should be emphasized that here the term 'intentional' is being used as a technical equivalent in English for Sanskrit *ābhiprāyika*, an adjectival derivative from *abhiprāya* 'intention; purport' by means of the suffix *-ika-* denoting 'belonging to'. See the present writer's article on the terms *abhiprāya = dgois pa* and *dgois gži* in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 13 (1985), pp. 309–25.

²² According to Harivarman's *Tattva/Satyasiddhiśāstra* (ch. xxx), the Buddha has taught original purity of Mind as an expedient because indolent persons, on hearing that Mind is originally impure, would think that they will be unable to remove its impure nature, and they would therefore not strive to produce the pure Mind. See S. Katsumata, 'Concerning various views of human nature', *Tōyō University Asian Studies* 1 (Tōkyō, 1961), pp. 38–39.

²³ *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* i. 156–7. Cf. Bu ston, *mDzes rgyan*, f. 19a–25a (translated in *Traité*, pp. 105 ff.).

²⁴ See *Madhyamakāvatāra* vi. 95 (edited by L. de La Vallée Poussin, p. 198.14–15) with reference to the teaching mentioned in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, ch. ii, that the *tathāgatagarbha* possessing all thirty-two *lakṣaṇas* of a *buddha* exists in *sattvas* 'sentient beings'.

²⁵ See Kun dga' rgyal mtshan, *sDom gsum rab dbye*, f. 9a.

²⁶ See Bu ston's *mDzes rgyan*, *passim*.

view as its 'intentional ground' (*dgoṅs gźi*) the theory of *nairātmya*, *śūnyatā* and *bhūtakoṭi*²⁷ as generally understood in the Mahāyāna. As will be seen below, the author of the *Tarkajvālā* evidently also had a similar view of the purport of the *tathāgata-garbha* doctrine.

This concept of intentionality is far from being a merely *ad hoc* hermeneutical device of some commentators, and it has behind it a long history in Indian semantics and semiotics. Already in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, *vivakṣā* 'intention to express' appears as a factor that can determine the use of a word-form. This *vivakṣā* may be either ordinary and 'mundane' (*laukikī vivakṣā*), which means that it corresponds with ordinary linguistic usage as covered by the usual rules of grammar; or it can on the other hand depend on the intention that a speaker has in a given set of circumstances and context (*prāyoktrī vivakṣā*).²⁸ When used independently, an expression is determined by the speaker's intention to express; but if an expression is conditioned by external circumstances also it is said to be dependent.²⁹ The later Sanskrit grammarians then extended the scope of this principle of intention. Jinendrabuddhi, the commentator on the *Kāśikā*, states that the determining factor in word-formation may be not only the existence of a corresponding object referred to but also the speaker's intention to express.³⁰ Śaraṇadeva (twelfth century) also considers word-formation to be dependent on *vivakṣā*.³¹ We furthermore read in a *paribhāṣāsūtra* of the *Cāndravyākaraṇa* (no. 68): 'The determination of the desired [word form] results from pervasion by an intention to express (*vivakṣāvyaṅpter iṣṭāvasa-yah*).' Hence, according to this developed doctrine, it is the

²⁷ See *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* ii, p. 78.6-7, and vi, p. 223.3-4. On the concepts of *dgoṅs gźi* and *draṇi don* see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 13 (1985), pp. 309-25, and 15 (1987), pp. 1-4.

²⁸ Patañjali, *Mahābhāṣya* V. i. 16, which explains: *laukikī vivakṣā yatra prāyasya sampratyaayah | prāya iti loko vyapadiśyate*. Here *loka* = *prāya* is the general, as opposed to the individual in *prāyoktrī vivakṣā*.

²⁹ Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* I. ii. 59: *tad yadā svātantryeṇa vivakṣā tadā bahuvacanaṃ bhaviṣyati, yadā pāratantryeṇa tadaikavacanadvivacane bhaviṣyatah ||* (comment on Pāṇini I. ii. 59 *asmado dvayoś ca*). Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* III. i. 87 (p. 67.12-13).

³⁰ *Nyāsa* on *Kāśikā* I. i. 16: *na hīha śabdaśāstre vastunaḥ sattaiva śabdasaṃskārasya pradhānam kāraṇam | kim tarhi | vivakṣā ca |*

³¹ *Durghatavṛtti* on II. ii. 8: *vivakṣādhīnā śabdavyutpattiḥ*. Cf. on I. iii. 36.

speaker's intention to express that is decisive in the domain of word-formation; and the criterion of *vivakṣā* can also serve the purpose of justifying an unusual individual word-form (in the case of *prāyoktrī vivakṣā*) or frequently met word forms that are, nevertheless, not covered by the usual rules of grammar (in the case of *laukikī vivakṣā*).³²

As for the Buddhist logicians' theory, it has been summed up by Dharmakīrti who states that *vivakṣā* is the cause linking word and meaning, and that linguistic convention (*saṃketa*) has the function of revealing this intention.³³

The concept of significative intention later came to occupy a perhaps even more important place from our present point of view in the Indian theories of aesthetics and poetics (*alaṃkāra-śāstra*). There the secondary semantic function (*gaṇṇavṛtti*) based on transfer of meaning (*upacāra*) or metonymy – i.e. *lakṣaṇā* 'indication' – is at least partly governed by the concept of a speaker's motive (*prayojana*) when uttering a sentence. For example, if in a sentence the primary denotation (*abhidhā*) of a word gives no intelligible and satisfactory meaning, it may be supposed that its use in that sentence is figurative or 'indicational' (*lākṣaṇika*). Nevertheless, in terms of this doctrine, the assumption of *lakṣaṇā* is no mere arbitrary procedure because the following conditions must operate: (i) the primary meaning of a word – the *mukhyārtha* conveyed by denotation (*abhidhā*) – must show incompatibility (*anupapatti*) with the intended purport of the sentence in which it is found, so that the former is as it was

³² Cf. L. Renou, *Terminologie grammaticale du sanskrit*, s.v. *vivakṣā*. See also Helārāja on *Vākyapadīya* III. iii (*sambandha*). I concerning the *prayoktur abhiprāyaḥ* 'intention of the user [of speech]', which is one of the three things conveyed by the use of words, together with the *ātmīyaṃ rūpam* of the word (Bhartṛhari's *svarūpa*) and the *arthaḥ phalāsādhanaḥ* (Bhartṛhari's *bāhyo 'rthaḥ*). Bhartṛhari himself (III. iii. 1a) speaks of the *jñānaṃ prayoktuḥ*. Helārāja observes that the relation between word and the speaker's intention is one of effect and cause (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*, rather than the *vācyavācakabhāva* which obtains between *artha* and *śabda*).

³³ *Pramāṇavārttika* i. 327ab: *vivakṣā niyame hetuḥ saṃketas tatprakāśanaḥ*. The auto-commentary explains: *vivakṣayā hi śabda 'rthe niyamante, na svabhāvataḥ, tasya kvacid apratibandhena sarvatra tulyatvāt | yatrāpi pratibandhas tadabhidhānanīyamābhāvāt | sarvaśabdaiḥ karaṇānām abhidhānaprasaṅgāt | tasmād vivakṣāprakāśanāyābhiprāyanivedanalakṣaṇaḥ saṃketaḥ kriyate |* (cf. ii. 16). In i. 65 Dharmakīrti contrasts the idea that words (*vācaḥ*) are dependent on *vivakṣā* with the idea that they are dependent on a thing (*vastuvasā*).

cancelled by the latter (*mukhyārthabādha*);³⁴ (ii) then either the secondary meaning (*gaunārtha*) expressed by a word retains only a remote semantic connexion with the primary meaning and significant power of the word and is sanctioned rather by established and recognized linguistic convention (*rūḍhi*);³⁵ or the secondary meaning of the word is practically dissociated from the primary meaning, in which case it will be conditioned by the specific motive (*prayojana*) the speaker has when uttering the sentence in which the word occurs.³⁶ In his *Locana* on the *Dhvanyāloka* (i.1 and i.4) of Ānandavardhana (ninth century), Abhinavagupta (tenth-eleventh century) has enumerated cancellation of the primary meaning (*mukhyārthabādha*), cause (*nimitta*) and motive (*prayojana*) as the three 'seeds' of meaning-transfer (*upacāra*).

To quote an often-mentioned example of such a motivated utterance: according to many classical Indian poetics and semiologists, the words *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* – meaning literally 'the herdsmen's station in the Ganges [river] – is a case of *prayojanavātī lakṣaṇā* or motivated indication because the use of the unexpected and semantically anomalous expression *gaṅgāyām* 'in the Ganges' – instead of, e.g., *gaṅgātīre* 'on the banks of the Ganges' or some other similar expression – has the purpose of conveying the presence in this herdsmen's station of a high degree of coolness, purity and holiness (*śītalatvapavitatvasevyatva*), i.e. the very qualities which characterize the Ganges and which are thus transferred to this herdsmen's station by means of this particular 'indicational' turn of phrase.³⁷

The concept of *prayojana* came, finally, to play a fundamental rôle in Indian semiology in the doctrine of poetic suggestion (*vyañjanā*) or resonance (*dhvani*), i.e. that factor considered by

³⁴ According to some sources, the incompatibility consists in *tātparyānupapatti*, i.e. in incompatibility with the true purport of the sentence with regard to the speaker's intention. See e.g. Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana, *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* 82; Dharmarājadhvarīndra, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, § iv. 30.

³⁵ *tadyogaḥ*; *mukhyārthasambandha* or *śakyasambandha*; also *nimitta*. See Abhinavagupta, *Locana* (Kashi Sanskrit Series ed., 1940) i. 1 (p. 30) and i. 4 (p. 59).

³⁶ Cf. Mammaṭa (second half of the eleventh century), *Kāvyaṭīkā* ii. 9; Viśvanātha (fourteenth century?), *Sāhityadarpaṇa* ii. 5–7. On these and related points see e.g. K. Kunjunni Raja, *Indian theories of meaning* (Adyar, 1969).

³⁷ See Abhinavagupta, *Locana* i. 4 (p. 60).

many authorities to constitute a third semantic function additional to, and distinct from, both primary denotation (*abhidhā*) and secondary indication (*lakṣaṇā*). Indeed, in his famous commentary on the *Dhvaṅyāloka*, Abhinavagupta has stated that this suggestive function of words belongs to the domain of *prayojana*.³⁸

It is of the greatest interest to observe that practically the same semiological concept and criteria have been applied in Buddhist hermeneutics to identify and define a scriptural statement that is intentional (*ābhiprāyika*) and in need of interpretative elicitation in a sense other than the obvious surface one (*neyārtha*) since it is non-definitive within the frame of a given philosophical system. Thus, before a scriptural passage can be characterized as being *ābhiprāyika* and *neyārtha*, its meaning must be shown to be cancelled by another teaching the meaning of which is, in a particular doctrinal system, recognized as final and definitive (*nītārtha*) and non-*ābhiprāyika*. In addition, it must refer indirectly, by a kind of philosophical-systematic 'implicature',³⁹ to a certain 'deep meaning' which has not been directly conveyed to the addressed disciple by the statement in question but which is final and definitive. And, thirdly, the use of a non-definitive statement requiring further interpretative elicitation in another sense (*neyārtha*) must be conditioned by a definable and legitimate motive (*prayojana*) of the speaker – in the case of a Sūtra the Buddha himself who, in virtue of his expertness in means (*upāyakauśalya*), employs an *ābhiprāyika* and *neyārtha* statement as a device (*upāya*) in order to benefit his listener.⁴⁰

³⁸ Abhinavagupta, *Locana* i. 17: *dhvananam prayojanaviṣayam* (p. 148 f.). Cf. i. 4 (p. 60–61) and iii. 33 (p. 441–2).

³⁹ For this use of the term 'implicature', see the present writer's article in *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 13 (1985), pp. 313 and 316 f.

⁴⁰ The hermeneutical status of the Buddha's teaching would thus differ significantly from that of the Vedic *śruti*, inasmuch as the latter is considered by the Mīmāṃsakas to be authorless (*apauruṣeya*). In his *Svavṛtti* on the *Pramāṇavārttika* i (Svārthānumānapariccheda) 325, Dharmakīrti – followed by Kaṛṇakagomin and Manoranthanandin – observes that, according to this assumption of Jaimini's Mīmāṃsā school, there could be no *vivakṣā* (linking *śabda* with *artha*), no *saṃketa* and no *abhiprāya* – in other words no authorial intention – for the Veda.

In Buddhist hermeneutics as traditionally practised, there can be no question of radically relativizing the intended purport of a canonical utterance or text (so-called semantic autonomy) and banishing the idea of authorial intention (so-called authorial irrelevance)

The Tibetan hermeneuticists have accordingly identified three characteristic factors that define a scriptural statement as intentional (*dgois pa can* = *ābhiprāyika*) in the sense that it is of non-definitive meaning and, hence, in need of further interpretative elicitation in another sense (*dran ba'i don* or *bkri ba' i don* = *neyārtha*): (i) the motive (*dgos pa* = *prayojana*) impelling the speaker (i.e. the Buddha) to give the teaching in question; (ii) the 'intentional ground' or intended 'deep meaning' (*dgois gži*) not conveyed (to the addressee) on the surface-level of the teaching in question, but only as it were by philosophical-systematic implicature and presupposition; and (iii) an incompatibility between the *ābhiprāyika* 'surface' teaching that is *neyārtha* and the actually intended non-*ābhiprāyika* 'deep meaning' that is *nītārtha*. This last factor, known as *dños la gnod byed* or incompatibility with the primary meaning, is clearly very close to the poeticians' and semiologists' *mukhyārthabādha* 'cancellation of primary meaning'. And the first of the above-mentioned three factors, the motive, is equally close to the poeticians' and semiologists' *prayojana*. As for the second factor, the *dgois gži* (**abhipreta-vastu*), it is parallel to (though probably not derived from or immediately reducible to) the concept of *vyangya*, i.e. the meaning that is conveyed by the suggestive function of a word according to the *dhvani* theory of Indian poetics (which was itself apparently modelled on that of *sphoṭa*).⁴¹

Let us now return to our scriptural statements that accept *ātman*, or that present the *tathāgatagarbha* and Buddha-nature as permanent, immutable, blissful, *ātman*, etc. In order to show that

in favour of an interpretation, or 'reading', gained against the background of the reader's (or listener's) prejudgement or preknowledge. Buddhist hermeneutical theory, although it most certainly takes into account the pragmatic situation and the performative and perlocutionary aspects of linguistic communication, differs accordingly from much contemporary writing on the subject of literary interpretation and the hermeneutic circle. For criticisms of these recent trends in hermeneutics, see E. Betti, *Teoria generale della interpretazione* (Milan, 1955), and *Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften*² (Tübingen, 1972); E. D. Hirsch, *Validity in interpretation* (New Haven, 1967) and *Aims of interpretation* (Chicago, 1976).

⁴¹ For the *dgois gži* see above, n. 27. And for some applications of this theory in Tibetan Sūtra hermeneutics, see *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub*, pp. 83–119, and *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du goṭra*, pp. 158, 166, 199 n., 208, 212, 221 f., 399.

they are intentional (*ābhiprāyika*) and non-definitive because their meaning requires explication and further interpretation (*neyārtha*), it will be necessary to establish three things: (i) that they are cancelled by the teaching of the non-substantiality of the *pudgala* and the *dharmas*, which is recognized in the Mahāyāna to be final and definitive; (ii) that the non-definitive 'surface meaning' relates intentionally – i.e. by systematic 'implicature' – to a 'deep meaning', viz. the *bhūtakoti* and *śūnyatā* or *dharmanairātmya*;⁴² and (iii) that the use of the intentionally motivated statement proceeds from certain identifiable and legitimate motives such as the above-mentioned wish on the Buddha's part to attract and instruct those clinging to a Self (*ātmagrāha*), to encourage those who have little confidence in their own spiritual capabilities, and to eliminate pride based on the idea that one is superior to the irreligious and 'damned' *icchāntikas* constitutionally unable (at least temporarily) to attain liberation.

The parallelism between the semantic theory of suggestion (*vyañjanā*) and poetical resonance (*dhvani*) on the one hand and the Buddhist hermeneutician's theory of *ābhiprāyika* and *neyārtha* teaching on the other is, therefore, striking. They seem to have been fully elaborated about the same time, for the aesthetic theory of *vyañjanā* and *dhvani* was developed chiefly by Ānandavardhana and his commentator Abhinavagupta from the ninth to the eleventh century, whilst the Buddhist theory appears in well worked out form by the time of Ratnākaraśānti in the beginning of the eleventh century. The basic principles of this Buddhist hermeneutical theory however appear much earlier in the works of Candrakīrti (seventh century);⁴³ and its germs are indeed traceable in such works as the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* of Asaṅga (fourth century).

In Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha* in particular, mention is made of the Buddha's *avatāraṇābhisamdhī* (Tib. *gžug pa la ldem por dgonis pa*), that is, of that kind of allusive intention by means of which the Buddha is held by the Buddhist hermeneuticians to introduce certain non-Buddhists to the Śrāvakayāna through surface-level

⁴² See *Lankāvatārasūtra* ii, p. 78; and vi, p. 223.

⁴³ In addition to Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvātāra* vi. 95 (already cited above), see *ibid.*, vi. 97; and his *Prasannapādā* i, pp. 41–43, and xv. 11, p. 276.

(*saṃvṛti*) reference to a personal entity (*pudgala*), such a provisional teaching being in accord with the inclinations of these still immature addressees.⁴⁴ And in his *Madhyamakakārikās* Nāgārjuna has observed that the Buddha sometimes made use of the designation (*prajñāpita*) 'ātman' and sometimes taught (*deśita*) *anātman* – in the manner so to say of the first two positions of a tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*) – whilst on other occasions he taught that there is neither *ātman* nor *anātman* (xviii.6). According to Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* these three forms of teaching are meant to accord with the mental inclinations (*āśaya*) of distinct and progressively more advanced types of disciples (*hīnamadhyotkeṣṭa-vīneyajana*). The form of teaching based on a tetralemma is regarded by Nāgārjuna as an *anusāsana* (xviii.8), that is, according to Candrakīrti, as a progressive and graded teaching (*anupūrvyā śāsanam*) adapted in each stage to different degrees of addressees to be trained (*vīneyajana*) by the Buddha.⁴⁵

Although only further detailed investigation can perhaps determine whether the literary or the philosophical application of these semiological and hermeneutical principles is older, the fact remains that virtually the same notions have found employment in both areas. This parallelism underscores once again the fundamental importance for the history of Indian thought of its exegetical and hermeneutical methodology based on analysis of language and meaning, as distinct from particular doctrines which of course vary considerably from school to school. These methods employed by the Indian thinkers appear, then, as a unifying thread behind the very great diversity of philosophical schools and even religions.

⁴⁴ Asaṅga, *Mahāyānasamgraha* § 2.31 with Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya* (D, f. 154b), and *Asvabhāva's *Upanibandhana* (D, f. 233b) which interprets the allusion to a *pudgala* in terms of an *upapāduka sattva*.

The references to *avatāraṇābhisamḍhi* as a means of reducing the addressed disciple's terror (*utrāsa*) in the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (xii. 16) and *Bhāṣya* – as well as in Sthiramati's *Vṛttibhāṣya* (D, f. 240b) and *Asvabhāva's *Ṭikā* (D, f. 107a) – concern exclusively the Śrāvaka's introduction to the Mahāyāna by the provisional teaching bearing on the existence of *nūpa*, etc., and not the introduction of the 'outsider' by provisional allusions to a *pudgala* (or *ātman*). On *abhisamḍhi* and related terms, see D. Seyfort Ruegg in: C. Caillat et al. (ed.), *Formes dialectales dans les littératures indo-aryennes* (Paris, 1989), p. 299 ff.

⁴⁵ Cf. *Kāśyapaparivarta* § 57; Nāgārjuna, *Ratnāvalī* ii. 3–4; and Āryadeva, *Catuḥśataka* xiv. 21 with Candrakīrti's comment which mentions a tetralemma based on the *ātman* notion. See the analysis in D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5 (1977), pp. 7–9.

It is clear, however, that so powerful a hermeneutical instrument as the idea of an intentionally motivated 'surface' teaching of provisional or non-definitive meaning requiring interpretation in a sense other than the obvious surface one, and opposed to a 'deep' teaching of final and definitive meaning, had to be handled with care and restraint – and no doubt also as sparingly as possible – in order not to be tainted with arbitrariness and disregard for a canonical corpus. Moreover, it is plain that the mere existence of a motive behind a teaching cannot *alone* suffice to justify the conclusion that it is 'intentional' (*ābhiprāyika*) in the technical sense in question, in other words that it is of provisional or non-definitive value; for any teaching at all is motivated to the extent that its author has in view an intended meaning when he communicates it. This is indeed the reason the hermeneuticians have insisted that the other two above-mentioned conditions should also be satisfied.

II

An alternative solution to the problem raised by the status of the *tathāgatagarbha* and the theory of the absolute in the canonical texts dealing with it is suggested, however, by a careful analysis of the doctrine of the Sūtras and Śāstras expounding this doctrine with a view to determining its precise position in relation to the doctrine of non-substantiality (*nairātmya*) and Emptiness (*śūnyatā*), which is generally accepted in the Mahāyāna.

If we examine the form of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine that the *Lankāvatārasūtra* has described as comparable (at least *prima facie*) with the *ātmavāda* of the Tīrthikas, we in fact notice that it does not correspond exactly with the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching that has usually been set out in the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra* and elsewhere, but rather with the idea that in all sentient beings there exists a spiritual principle already having the specific characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of perfect buddhahood, i.e. with an idea that is very similar indeed to the *ātmavāda*.⁴⁶ Thus, according to the *Lankāvatārasūtra*, it is this idea that all *sattvas* are *already in the full sense buddhas* that is to be questioned. But the theory of an Embryo-Essence of the

⁴⁶ See *Lankāvatārasūtra* ii, p. 77.15–78.1.

tathāgata usually taught in the majority of the Sūtras as well as in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* is hardly reducible to this latter idea, which the Buddhist would have to treat as either metaphorical or intentional when it appears in a scriptural text.⁴⁷

Moreover, the doctrine of *śūnyatā* is not repudiated either by the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (see i.156) and its Commentary or by the principal scriptural sources dealing with the *tathāgatagarbha* and the doctrines related to it. On the contrary, certain passages of the Commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and of the *Śrīmālāsūtra* it quotes⁴⁸ even support a certain kind of assimilation of the *tathāgatagarbha* with *śūnyatā* (though in these passages the question of the precise meaning of *śūnyatā* remains open).⁴⁹ Furthermore, the Commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* effectively disposes of the notion that *śūnyatā* could be either an entity to which to cling or the destruction of a previously existing entity. Now the *tathāgatagarbha* has been presented in these sources in a way corresponding to this definition of Emptiness (*Ratnagotravibhāga* i.154–5 and i.12), so that some commentators consider the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine to be in fact a restatement of the *śūnyatā* doctrine.⁵⁰

An analysis of the *tathāgatagarbha* theory in addition reveals that, if absolute reality on the so-called causal (*gṛhi*) level – viz. the *tathāgatagarbha* – or on the resultant (*phala* = 'bras bu) level –

⁴⁷ It is to be noted that this latter form of the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching, which is on the face of it comparable with the *ātmavāda*, seems to be less frequently met with. See for example *Mahābherīsūtra*, f. 181b, quoted in Bu ston's *mDzes rgyan*, fol. 6a (translated in *Traité*, p. 79). But contrast e.g. *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, kha, f. 134b, quoted in *mDzes rgyan*, f. 18a (translated in *Traité*, p. 103). In this connexion, the doctrines of the Tibetan Jo nañ pa school, and the related doctrines of other schools, pose a problem that will have to be treated separately.

⁴⁸ *Ratnagotravibhāga*–Commentary i. 154–5, quoting the *Śrīmālādevīsīmhanādasūtra*, fol. 445a.

⁴⁹ See also *Laiḱāvātārasūtra* ii, p. 79.8–9, and vi, p. 223.3–4, already cited. The *gṛhan stori* of the Jo nañ pa and similar schools, as opposed to the *rañ stori*, needs to be considered in this connexion.

⁵⁰ See *Ratnagotravibhāga* i. 160 along with several of the Tibetan commentaries. On the hermeneutical tradition that assimilates the *tathāgatagarbha* and *śūnyatā* theories, and which is represented for example by the Tibetan dGe lugs pas, see *Théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, p. 402 f.

viz. the *dharmadhātu*, buddhahood, etc. – has been described cataphatically by the positive terms ‘permanent’, ‘immutable’, ‘blissful’, etc., it is not because this reality is regarded as some kind of permanent substantial entity endowed with these attributes as inhering properties, but rather because the *paramārtha* is so characterized in order to distinguish it from the *saṃvṛti* level that is properly characterized by the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* of impermanent, painful, etc. It is therefore thought by some interpreters that, when applied to the unconditioned, this positive definition through inversion of what is specific to the conditioned does not imply the existence of the *paramārtha* as a permanent substantial entity established ‘in truth’, i.e. hypostatically (*bden par grub pa*). Inasmuch as such a definition uses terms in a descriptive and systematic context without, however, applying them to a thing regarded as an entity having self-existence (*svabhāva*), it is perhaps what might be called metatheoretical; that is, it does not refer to some objective, first-order entity. And, as noticed above, in the context of the description of Buddha-nature as *ātman*, our texts have themselves spoken of a designation (*prajñapti*).

The positive description of absolute reality found in certain Buddhist texts proceeds, in addition, from what might be termed its *gnoseological constitution*. For these ‘qualities’ (*dharma, guṇa*) are thought of not as separable properties inhering in an entity as their substratum, but rather as inseparable (*avinirbhāga*) and as therefore constituting, or *informing*, absolute reality on the level of gnoseology.⁵¹

In terms of this interpretation – and irrespective of whether its wording is held to be explicit and literal (*sgra ji bžin pa = yathāruta-*) or not – the *tathagatagarbha* teaching is considered by many authorities to be of certain and definitive meaning (*nītārtha*). That is, according to the alternative interpretation being discussed here which has been favoured for example by the Tibetan Prāsaṅgikas of the dGe lugs pa school, because the doctrine of the *tathāgatagarbha* relates in the last analysis to *śūnyatā* and *nairātmya* it must be of definitive meaning (*nītārtha*); for following the definition provided by the *Akṣayamatīnirdeśasūtra*, a Sūtra in which *śūnyatā*,

⁵¹ This gnoseological aspect has been of fundamental importance for the Jo nañ pa and related schools in Tibet.

ānimitta, *apraṇihita*, *anabhisamṣkāra*, etc., are taught is *nītārtha*.⁵² And here, in the frame of this Sūtra's definition, the question whether the teaching is expressed literally and explicitly need not arise. Therefore, in this hermeneutical system at least, the term *nītārtha* will mean 'of definitive meaning' or 'of certain meaning' (Tibetan *nes pa'i don*), rather than 'of explicit meaning' (a usage that is appropriate in the hermeneutical system of the Vijñānavādins – who follow the *Samādhinirmocanasūtra* – and also of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas).

The version of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine found in the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra* and other Sūtras of the same category can, moreover, probably even be regarded as being in addition of explicit meaning. For what these texts have spoken of is the presence of an Embryo-Essence (*garbha*) or Germ of the *tathāgata* in the conscious stream of all sentient beings. On the other hand, in its presently available form at least, the version of the teaching mentioned in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* according to which the *tathāgatagarbha* incarnate in sentient beings is endowed with the thirty-two perfectly developed characteristics of the *buddha* (p. 77) raises very considerable problems for Buddhist thought. And even though this version of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine is stated to refer to *śūnyata*, *ānimitta*, *apraṇihita*, etc., such a purport has presumably to be taken here as the intentional ground (*dgoṅs gži*) or 'deep meaning' of an intentional (*dgoṅs pa can = ābhiprāyika*) statement having as its motive (*dgos pa = prayojana*) the Buddha's wish to eliminate the terror that immature people (*bāla*) feel for selflessness and non-substantiality (*nairātmyasamtrāsa*), in other words their fear of Emptiness.⁵³

Now, as is well known, Śaṅkārācārya has sometimes been accused by his Brāhmanical opponents of being a Buddhist in disguise. In the present context what is of special interest is the at

⁵² See Candrakīrti's quotation of the Sanskrit text of the *Akṣayamatīrdeśasūtra* in his *Prasannapadā* i, p. 43. Compare also the *Samādhirājasūtra* vii. 5, also quoted in *Prasannapadā* i, p. 44.

⁵³ See *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* ii, p. 78. Cf. *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub*, Introduction, pp. 32–33, 57 f.; and *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, pp. 313 ff., 393, 403.

least partial parallelism between the Buddhist's positive description of absolute reality both by means of attributes that are the reverse of those properly applicable to the relative level and by means of characterization through inseparable constitutive qualities on the one side, and on the other Śaṅkara's treatment of *satya* 'truth', *jñāna* 'knowledge' and *ananta* 'infinite' as constitutive qualities of *brahman*. According to his Bhāṣya on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, *satya*, *jñāna* and *ananta* are in fact distinctive characteristics proper only to *brahman*, which they thus differentiate from all else. Hence these essential characteristics are not mere attributes inhering in *brahman* as one member of a class; for *brahman* – the real – is unique. These epithets therefore define its uniqueness by delimiting (: *niyantr̥tva*) it from all that it is not, i.e. the unreal.⁵⁴ Despite very important differences in the philosophical background and problematics between Śaṅkara and the Buddhist philosophers in question, the similarity in the procedures and methods used to define ultimate reality is thus remarkable.

The suggestion that certain Buddhist and Brāhmanical notions of the absolute have some points of contact is therefore not unworthy of consideration. Indeed, we have already encountered some passages where the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* represents the Tīrthikas as readily assenting to that particular formulation of the Buddha's teaching in which the existence of the Buddha-nature or *tathāgatagarbha* is emphasized. And elsewhere the same Sūtra goes so far as to say that Brāhmaṇa Tīrthikas have borrowed some of the Buddha's teachings and incorporated them in their own scriptures.⁵⁵ If he may be supposed to have been influenced, however indirectly, by earlier Buddhist thinking on the problem of the *paramārtha*, Śaṅkara could be a case in point.

In a remarkable passage the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* moreover points to a certain equivalence between various names and notions of the

⁵⁴ It has been suggested by M. Biardeau that this theory of the *Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya* represents a final stage in the development of Śaṅkara's thought, following on his apophaticism; see *Indo-Iranian Journal* 3 (1959), p. 100 (cf. *Journal asiatique* 1957, p. 371 f.). But P. Hacker has placed this *Bhāṣya* in the middle period of Śaṅkara's philosophical development; see *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens* 12–13 (1968), pp. 129–30, 135, 147. Cf. also G. Maximilien, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 19 (1975), p. 117 f.

⁵⁵ See Bu ston, *mDzes rgyan*, f. 22a–b (translated in *Traité* p. 113–14) and f. 27a (translated in *Traité*, p. 123–4).

supreme, which is called by some *svayambhū*, *buddha*, *brahman* (or: *brahmā?*), *viṣṇu*, *īśvara*, etc., and by others *śūnyatā*, *tathatā*, *bhūtaakoṭi*, *dharmadhātu*, *nirvāṇa*, *advaya*, etc.⁵⁶ And the great Svātantrika-Mādhyamika authority Bhāvaviveka (sixth century) remarks in the chapter of his *Madhyamakahr̥dayakārikās* devoted to an exposition of reality (*de kho na ñid = tattva*) that the great Bodhisattvas Ārya-Avalokiteśvara, Ārya-Maitreya and others revere the supreme *brahman* (neuter) under the apparently paradoxical mode of non-reverence (*anupāsanayoga*).⁵⁷ The commentary on the *Madhyamakahr̥dayakārikās*, the *Tarkajvālā*, in its section dealing with the Vedānta, adds that the absolute is *brahman* (or *brahmā?*) because it is essentially *nirvāṇa* (*mya ñan las 'das pa'i bdag ñid*).⁵⁸

In the section of the *Tarkajvālā* devoted to Śrāvakayāna teachings it is nevertheless pointed out that the all-pervasiveness of the *tathāgatagarbha* and also the Vijñānavādin's *ādānavijñāna* (= *ālayavijñāna*) has been taught for the sake of certain persons who have not freed themselves from the dogmatic postulation of a self (*ātmagrāha*).⁵⁹ It may be that the author of this commentary (just like his later Prāsaṅgika counterpart Candrakīrti) himself regarded the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine as intentional and non-definitive.⁶⁰ It is furthermore remarked in the *Tarkajvālā* that the proposition that the *tathāgata* has not entered into Nirvāṇa and that he is not 'extinguished' (*ñi ba = śānta*) – an idea found in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* – would be incompatible with the fundamental principles of Buddhist thought (the *dharmoddānas*).⁶¹

In reply to the suggestion that, in view of parallels between them, the *nairātmya* of the Buddhist is really similar to the Vedantic *ātman*, it is moreover explained in the sections of the

⁵⁶ *Lankāvatārasūtra* iii, p. 192–3.

⁵⁷ Bhāvaviveka, *Madhyamakahr̥dayakārikā* iii. 290: *āryāvalokiteśāryamaitreyādyās ca sūrayaḥ | anupāsanayogena munayo yad upāsate ||*. See also *Tarkajvālā* iii, 289 f. (P. f. 140a) (cf. *Indo-Iranian Journal* 5 [1961–2], p. 273).

⁵⁸ *Tarkajvālā* viii, f. 286b5 (Peking ed.). Cf. *Indo-Iranian Journal* 2 (1958), pp. 177 and 188. The 'small fault' (*alpāparādha*) of the Aupaniṣadikas has been referred to by Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṃgraha* (330).

⁵⁹ *Tarkajvālā* iv, f. 169a8.

⁶⁰ Cf. *Théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, pp. 35, 403–405.

⁶¹ *Tarkajvālā* iv, f. 169b1.

Madhyamakahr̥dayakārikās and *Tarkajvālā* dealing with the Vedānta that this is not so. For *nairātmya* is precisely the absence of the self-nature characteristic of the Vedantic *ātman*. Nor could that which is *anātman* be at the same time *ātman* because of the incompatibility (*virodha*) of the two. And no comparison may be drawn with, for example, horse-nature that is at the same time not cow-nature (*ba lai gi ño bo ma yin pa*), that is, with a case of implicative and presuppositional (*paryudāsa*) negation rather than of the non-implicative and presuppositionless *prasajya*-negation involved in *nairātmya*. Accordingly, this *bhāva-niḥsvabhāvatā* could never be an *ātman* that is either a creator-agent (*byed pa po = kartḡ*, as in the theistic systems) or an enjoyer-agent (*za ba po = bhokṡḡ*, as in the Sāṃkhya), these entities being as unreal as the proverbial son of a barren woman. In so far as a cognitive object without self-nature is made the object of thought, it might perhaps be conceived of e.g. as single and unique; but this will be a mere mental construction, which is the source of imputation (*samāropa*).⁶²

It is clear, then, that the authors of the basic Mahāyāna-Śāstras were no more ready to admit any form of substantialism on the level of the unconditioned than they were on that of the conditioned: the Mahāyānist *pudgalanairātmya* and *dharmanairātmya* make this quite impossible.

Moreover, for the canonical texts teaching the *tathāgatagarbha* and Buddha-nature, the Middle Way eschewing both eternalism and nihilism remained valid. And the affirmation of an absolute or *ātman* opposed to *anātman* or *nairātmya* in a dichotomously conceptualized binary pair (*vikalpa*) based on discursive proliferation (*prapañca*) would, therefore, be no more acceptable than the purely nihilistic position of a dogmatic denial of the absolute.

Therefore, contrary to what has sometimes been suggested – and despite the undeniable parallels noted above between the problems treated and the methods used on the Buddhist and Brahmanical sides – the *tathāgatagarbha* theory, as well as the theory of the *paramārtha* with which it is connected, can not

⁶² *Tarkajvālā* viii, f. 305a–b.

constitute an 'absolute monism that is more Brahmanical than Buddhist'.⁶³ Not only is this Buddhist theory not reducible to an *ātmavāda* – i.e. a theory positing a permanent and substantial *ātman* – but the non-duality (*advaya*) to which the Buddhist texts refer is not simply identical with the Vedāntic *advaita*. In fact, in the perspective of the theory of the non-differentiation of *tathatā* and *dharmadhātu*, there is non-duality (*advaya*) of the *dhātu* of the *sattva* and the *dhātu* of the *tathāgata*, just as, according to the *Madhyamaka*, there is non-duality of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, or of the impure (*samālā*) and the pure (*nirmalā*) *tathatā*. But the sources do not thereby posit the substantial existence of some kind of spiritual entity apart from which nothing would be real, in the sense of the monistic Advaita-Vedānta. (It is true that in the history of Buddhist thought we occasionally meet an ontological and more or less substantialist interpretation of absolute reality, and also of the *tathāgatagarbha*, for example in the tradition of the 'Void of the heterogeneous' (*gžan ston*) taught in the Tibetan Jo nañ pa school and some of its Indian sources. But it should be noted that the Jo nañ pa theory was inspired to a great extent by the Tantric notion of the immanence of buddhahood, and in particular by the Kālacakra system; and the Jo nañ pas would appear to have extrapolated when they applied to the original *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine certain concepts of this Tantric system. This point is in need of further investigation.)

To sum up, in Buddhist Mahāyānist thought we find both a *via negationis*, in which reality is represented negatively and ap-

⁶³ See É. Lamotte *L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti* (Louvain, 1962), p. 56. Comparable views have been expressed by E. Frauwallner, in *Beiträge zur indischen Philologie und Altertumskunde* (Festschrift W. Schubring, Hamburg, 1951), p. 155 (= *Kleine Schriften*, p. 644) and *Anthropologie religieuse, Supplements to Numen*, Vol. II (Leiden, 1955), p. 129 (= *Kleine Schriften*, p. 699); and by H. Nakamura, *History of early Vedānta philosophy*, I (Delhi, 1983), pp. 153–7, and 182 (cf. p. 136).

Such interpretations of the *tathāgatagarbha* and related doctrines would appear not only to have largely overlooked the fundamental questions of systematic exegesis and hermeneutics referred to above, but also to depend on a theory of language and communication in which non-referring or metalinguistic (and sometimes metatheoretical) expressions – i.e. 'counters' or 'chiffres' such as *tathāgatagarbha* and *ātman* as encountered in the texts quoted above – are treated as if they must necessarily designate substantial referents of an object-language. Such interpretations thus seem to derive not merely from historical-philological method, but also from a pronouncedly positivistic view of the world (and of language).

proached *apophatically*, and a *via eminentiae*, in which it is represented positively and approached *cataphatically*. The former approach is no doubt characteristic of the vast majority of Buddhist texts of both the earlier and later periods. But the latter approach is to be found both in the earliest texts (where we find allusions for example to an *amataṃ padaṃ* and to *nibbāna* as *nicca*, *dhuva*, etc.⁶⁴) and in the Mahāyāna. In neither of these cases would it however seem justified to assume the survival of some 'pre-canonical Buddhism' radically different from the canonical forms.⁶⁵ The problem is surely more one of philosophy, hermeneutics, and linguistic description than of historical survivals.

Equally important, it would be quite incorrect to represent Buddhism as invariably asserting the non-existence of self and making a dogma of *nairātmya* and *śūnyatā*. While it is of course true that the known schools of Buddhism (with the apparent exception of the Vātsīputrīya Pudgalavādins) rejected the current speculative theories concerning a substantial self, an authoritative Sūtra has nevertheless warned that the dogmatic view of Emptiness (*śūnyatādṛṣṭi*) is even more dangerous than the individualist dogma (*pudgaladṛṣṭi*). And it is explained that *śūnyatā* is in fact release from all speculative views founded on discursive development of the dichotomously constructed conceptual opposition self/non-self, etc.⁶⁶ For the Middle Way lies precisely 'between'

⁶⁴ See for example *Itivuttaka* II. ii. 6 (§ 43, p. 37): *atthi ... ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asañkhatāṃ. no ce taṃ ... abhaviṣṣa ajātaṃ ... asañkhatāṃ, nayidha jātassa ... sañkhatassa nissaraṇaṃ paññāyetha. ...*

*āhāranettippabhavaṃ nālaṃ tad abhinanditum |
tassa nissaraṇaṃ santaṃ atakkēvacaraṃ dhūvaṃ ||
ajātaṃ asamuppannaṃ asokaṃ virajaṃ padaṃ |
nirodho dukkhadhammānaṃ sañkhārūpasamo sukho ||*
ti; and *Itivuttaka* III. ii. 2 (§ 51, p. 46) and III. iii. 4 (§ 73, p. 62): *kāyena amataṃ dhātuṃ phassayitvā nirupadhiṃ | ... deseti sammāsambuddho asokaṃ virajaṃ padaṃ || ti*. Compare also *Suttanipāta* 204; *Theragāthā* 521 and 947, *Dhammapada* 114; *Aṅguttaranikāya* II 247; III 356; *Majjhimanikāya* I 436–7; *Samyuttanikāya* IV 373; *Paṭisambhidāmagga* I 13, 15, 70; and *Saddanīti* (ed. H. Smith), p. 70.

⁶⁵ See for example the present writer's remarks in *The study of Indian and Tibetan thought* (Leiden, 1967), pp. 9–13, 37–38.

⁶⁶ *Kāśyapaparivarta* §§ 55–57, 64–65. See also Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* xiii. 8; and *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i. 32–33 (p. 28.5–13).

the extremes included in any such binary pair.⁶⁷ As between the respective faults of the eternalist dogma and the nihilist dogma, then, all the schools of Buddhism would wish to say is probably that the nihilistic one may, in practice, be even more dangerous than its opposite because it makes spiritual effort impossible. But this clearly does not amount to a dogmatic positing of eternalism or the *ātmavāda*.

What is of paramount importance in the last analysis is perhaps not so much whether absolute reality is to be described positively or negatively, as whether the theory adopted actually avoids representing this reality either as the nihilistic destruction of some (pre-existing) entity or as a real void to which one might cling dogmatically. This is because the Middle Way consists, as has been seen, precisely in the cessation of all dichotomous conceptual constructions (*vikalpa*) concerning a self as opposed to a non-self, etc. Hence it has been possible for the Mahāyāna Buddhist on occasion to make use even of the terms *nitya*, *ātman*, etc., in order to indicate, through characterization by inversion, or to point to absolute reality, while at the same time rejecting any view which posits an *ātman* as an eternal entity.

THE COGNITIVE STATUS OF THE *TATHĀGATAGARBHA* AND THE ABSOLUTE

If from the soteriological point of view the *tathāgatagarbha* theory somehow implies the immanence of the absolute – or, inasmuch as the *tathāgatagarbha* is ‘still’ obscured by adventitious impurities (*āgantukamāla*), at least its proleptical presence – in all beings in Saṃsāra, the question arises as to how a practiser is to realize it cognitively. For our sources not only state that absolute reality is beyond the range of ratiocinative thinking (*atarkya*) and free from the four extreme positions of discursive thinking (*catuṣkoṭi*) and that it cannot therefore be expressed verbally (*avācya*, *anabhilāpya*), but they also affirm that it is discursively inconceivable (*acintya*) and even unknowable (*ajñeya*). In other words, if

⁶⁷ In *Samādhirājasūtra* ix. 27 it is even stated that the wise person does not take a stand in a middle position either. On the rejection of the last two positions of the ‘tetralemma’ (*catuṣkoṭi*), see D. Seyfort Rugg, *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5 (1977), pp. 1–71.

paramārtha is unthinkable, is not absolute reality in its function of Base or Support of spiritual practice (*pratipatter ādhāraḥ*) – that is, the *prakṛtistha-gotra* or *tathāgata-garbha* – cognitively inaccessible also? And in this case are we not confronted with a curious, and indeed somewhat paradoxical, situation in which an absolute that is (at least proleptically) immanent in all sentient beings from the soteriological point of view would, nevertheless, be cognitively transcendent?

Concerning the gnoseological status of the *tathāgata-garbha*, one point seems to be clear. If the texts affirm that the *paramārtha* is ineffable, this means that discursive language cannot grasp its very nature; for such language is inextricably bound up with pragmatic and discursive usage (*vyavahāra*) and the dichotomizing conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) inherent in discursive proliferation (*prapañca*). And if these texts add that the *paramārtha* is unthinkable, this no doubt signifies that it cannot be the object of such conceptual thinking. But does it then follow that the *paramārtha* cannot be comprehended (*adhigam-*, etc.) by any form of knowledge, and that conceptual thinking and language can never point to it, by anticipation as it were (as in *udbhāvanā-saṃvṛti*)? Though the sources indeed speak frequently enough of comprehension (*adhigama*) of the absolute and state that it is to be known directly and introspectively (*pratyātmavedanīya*, etc.), the replies which the fundamental works on the *tathāgata-garbha* theory have given to these questions are unfortunately perhaps not quite as explicit as one might wish. And as a result later commentators are sometimes in disagreement about the exact gnoseological status of the *paramārtha* as well as of the *tathāgata-garbha*.

One group of thinkers has held that the *tathāgata-garbha* is in fact cognitively inaccessible and quite transcendent: not only is it beyond language (*sgra = śabda*) and discursive construction (*rtog pa = kalpanā*), but it cannot even be the object of a cognitive judgement (*žen pa'i yul*).⁶⁸ This school can of course found its thesis on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*,⁶⁹ and on its commentary which

⁶⁸ See 'Gos lo tsā ba gZon nu dpal, *Deb ther sion po*, cha, f. 10b (Roerich, p. 349).

⁶⁹ *Ratnagotravibhāga* i. 9 and 153.

quotes a number of scriptures to this effect.⁷⁰ The *Śrīmālāsūtra* in particular states that the Mind which is very pure by nature is hard to comprehend; it is only accessible to Bodhisattvas endowed with the great *dharma*, and not to Pratyekabuddhas and Śrāvakas who only approach it through confidence or 'faith' (*śraddhā*) in the *tathāgata*.⁷¹

Another group of thinkers has on the contrary come to the conclusion that the *paramārtha* is accessible to the practiser, at least to a certain degree, even on the earlier stages of the path. This school also considers that it is even possible to indicate – to point to – it by words.⁷² This is indeed what the Sūtras and Śāstras are concerned with doing. For their interpretation these commentators can also find authority in the systematic exegesis of the scriptures which make the *paramārtha* immanent not only soteriologically but also gnoseologically.

This problem of the transcendence as against the immanence of the absolute is closely connected with the idea of confidence or 'faith' (*śraddhā*).

The *Ratnagotravibhāga*, following Sūtras quoted in its commentary, has indeed stated that the *paramārtha* can only be cognitively approached (*anu-gam-*) through faith.⁷³ And the commentary sums the matter up by saying that *dharmatā* is the object of neither deliberative thinking (*na cintayitavyā*) nor dichotomizing conceptual construction (*na vikalpayitavyā*), and that it can therefore be the object only of convinced adhesion (*adhimoktavayā*).⁷⁴

Convinced adhesion (*adhimukti*, *adhimokṣa*) figures in fact as one cause of the purification of the *tathāgatadhātu* from the

⁷⁰ *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i. 12, 25 and 153.

⁷¹ *Śrīmālāsūtra*, f. 450a, quoted in the *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i. 25 (p. 22.1-4).

⁷² E. H. Johnston in his edition of the *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i. 12 (p. 12-14) – a quotation from the *Śrīmālāsūtra* – reads *sūcyate* 'is indicated, pointed to'. L. Schmithausen has proposed altering this reading to *ity ucyate* (*Weiner Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 15 [1971], p. 137). The term *sūcyate* is found again in *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i. 93, where it is applied to the *caturākāraguṇaṇiṣpattayasambhinnalakṣaṇo nirvāṇadhātuḥ*; and in i. 1, in connexion with the seven-fold *adhigamārtha*.

⁷³ *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i. 153 and i. 1; compare also v. 9.

⁷⁴ *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i. 153 (*avatarāṇikā*).

adventitious impurities that obscure it;⁷⁵ it leads to the attainment of reality, and it is the antidote against the *icchāntika*'s hostile resistance (*pratigha*) to the *dharma* of the Mahāyāna.⁷⁶ And if a person is so to speak committed (*adhimucya*) to the immutability of the *dharma*, he does not experience fatigue with regard to the *dharma*.⁷⁷

The circumstance that absolute reality can be cognitively approached (*anu-gam-*, *ā-gam-*) through faith⁷⁸ holds true, according to the sources,⁷⁹ not only for the worldling (*prthagjana*), but also for the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha, who can comprehend the inconceivable (*acintya*) fact of both the naturally pure Mind (*prakṛtipariśuddhacitta*) – i.e. the *tathāgatagarbha* – and its state of defilement (*upakliṣṭatā*) only through faith (*śraddhā*).⁸⁰ And it also holds true for the 'young' Bodhisattva newly started on his course (*navayānasamprasthita*); for such a young Bodhisattva is not yet able to know the *tathāgatagarbha* as absolute *śūnyatā* because his mind is distracted from Emptiness (*śūnyatāvīkṣipta*) by reason of the fact that he mistakenly takes it either to be the destruction of a previously existing entity or to be some negative entity to which to cling.⁸¹

It is for these reasons that the transcendence of absolute reality and of the *tathāgatagarbha* which can only be comprehended through faith has been maintained by the Tibetan commentators rNog Blo ldan šes rab (1059–1109), the pupil of the Kashmiri scholar Sajjana, and by gTsañ nag pa (twelfth century), and then later by Bu ston (1290–1364) (who in any event assimilated the *tathāgatagarbha* directly with the *dharmakāya* on the resultant level of the Fruit, i.e. with the *buddha*-level).

But other interpreters, especially those of the dGe lugs pa school, have laid the emphasis elsewhere. They have preferred to

⁷⁵ *Op. cit.*, i. 36. ⁷⁶ *Cf. op. cit.*, i. 12.

⁷⁷ *Op. cit.*, i. 68, quoting the *Sāgaramatipariṣcchā*.

⁷⁸ *Op. cit.*, i. 153; cf. v. 9. ⁷⁹ *Cf. op. cit.*, i. 1 and 25.

⁸⁰ *Śrīmālāsūtra*, f. 450a, quoted in *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i. 25. Cf. f. 445a, quoted in *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i. 154–5.

⁸¹ *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary*, *avatanīkā* to i. 154–5; and the *Śrīmālāsūtra* quoted thereafter.

It may be recalled here that these texts too support the assimilation of the *tathāgatagarbha* to *śūnyatā*: *tathāgatagarbhajñānam eva tathāgatānām śūnyatājñānam* (*Śrīmālāsūtra*, f. 445a) and *tathāgatagarbhasūnyatārthanaya* (*Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i. 154–5 *avatanīkā*, p. 75.17). Compare pp. 33 and 36 above.

regard faith above all as a necessary preliminary that is required to calm and clarify the mind (cf. *cittaprasāda*) so that one may be able to understand the *paramārtha*. This shift in emphasis regarding the gnoseological status of the *paramārtha* and the rôle of faith is due to several reasons, some of which evidently proceed from systematic exegesis. In the first place, these interpreters observe that *śraddhā* – to the extent that it is based on a communication received from outside in the form of an instruction from a teacher or a text – is necessarily bound up with language, and hence with *vikalpa* and *prapañca*. (This is a principle emphasised also by the Buddhist epistemologists.) Now it is, as we have seen, axiomatic with all the schools that the ultimate comprehension of absolute reality must be direct and immediate, and that it is attained finally through non-conceptual gnosis (*jñāna* = *ye śes*); and it is therefore plain that faith could never be considered the direct and immediate instrument of the ultimate comprehension of the *paramārtha*. Hence, without in any way minimizing the transcendental absoluteness of ultimate reality, the advocates of this interpretation stress a certain immanence of the *paramārtha*. And, needless to say, faith understood as receptive calmness and clarity of spirit (*prasāda*) remains highly prized by these thinkers also. It is, moreover, to be noted that the passage of the *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* (i. 153) quoted above does not really stand against this interpretation; for in it the opposition is not between faith and direct non-conceptual gnosis, but between faith and ratiocinative or discursive knowledge.⁸² The implication, then, is that the *paramārtha* may indeed have to be approached in the first instance through faith – that is, with receptive clarity of mind – but this certainly does not deny that its actual comprehension ultimately takes place through non-conceptual gnosis.

In the second place, these interpreters differ from certain other Buddhist schools in maintaining that not only the Nobles (*ārya*) belonging to the Vehicles of the Bodhisattva but also Nobles of the other two *yānas* – the Ārya-Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas – have also to be able to comprehend the non-substantiality of the *dharmas* as well as of the individual (*puṅgala*). Thus, according to them, the difference between the advanced adepts of the three

⁸² Cf. *Ratnagotravibhāga-Commentary* i. 12.

yānas in this matter rests in the precise mode of their comprehension of *śūnyatā*, which is fuller in the case of the Ārya-Bodhisattva than in the case of the Ārya-Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha.⁸³ Following this interpretation, the references in Sūtra (the *Śrīmālāsūtra*, etc.) and Śāstra (the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and its Commentary) to the essential rôle of faith in understanding the *paramārtha* have therefore to do with the fact that only the Bodhisattva endowed with the sharpest faculties (*tīkṣṇendriya*) is able to understand it in all its aspects exclusively through his transcending discriminative knowledge (*prajñā*) without first having to have recourse to faith. Consequently, faith may properly be said to be a characteristic feature of the other two ways, that of the Śrāvaka and that of the Pratyekabuddha. In sum, although the object of the Śrāvaka's and the Pratyekabuddha's understanding – *nairātmya* and *śūnyatā* – is the same as the Bodhisattva's, the mode of their comprehension is not as full and all-embracing, and their understanding in this sense is only partial.⁸⁴

It thus appears that these thinkers have drawn what we might call the systematic consequences of the gnoseological implications of the *tathāgatagarbha* theory by combining it with the theory of the One Vehicle (*ekayāna*). In fact, apart from its classificatory or taxonomic function (and an occasional polemical rôle), the doctrine of the *yānas* has a very clearly marked gnoseological content in Mahāyānist thought. It is very difficult if not impossible to reconcile the theory of the three ultimately distinct Vehicles of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva, only the last of which would lead to buddhahood, with the theory of the *tathāgatagarbha*, which affirms that the germinal capacity for buddhahood is present in all sentient beings without exception,

⁸³ Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden, 1981), p. 7 n. 16 and p. 74; *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, pp. 171, 231 f., 239, 309 f. See also É. Lamotte, *Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, IV (Louvain, 1976), p. 2135 f.

⁸⁴ A rather different view of the rôle of faith in the *tathāgatagarbha* literature has been put forward by S.-B. Park, *Buddhist faith and sudden enlightenment* (Albany, 1983). There, in his interpretation of the *Ta ch'eng ch'i hsin lun* ascribed to Aśvagoṣa, he opposes what he terms 'patriarchal faith' (Chinese *tsu hsin*, implying 'I am buddha') to 'doctrinal faith' (Chinese *chiao hsin*, implying 'I can become buddha').

and which can therefore be thought to imply that they are all destined sooner or later to become *buddhas*. But the *ekayāna* theory, which holds that all vehicles ultimately converge in a single course leading to buddhahood, is quite in harmony with, and complementary to, the theory of the *tathāgatagarbha*.⁸⁵

BUDDHA-NATURE AND *PARAMĀTMAN* IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

If we now consider the Buddha-nature or *tathāgatagarbha* and the Buddhist *paramātman* in a comparative perspective, in the light of the complex relationship seen in the transmitted texts of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*⁸⁶ between the *ātman* idea of the Brahman Tīrthikas and these Buddhist theories – and, indeed, between the Brāhman Parivrājakas and the Buddha – several explanatory models suggest themselves.

Are we perhaps confronted here with a quite straightforward example of historical influence exercised by Brahmanism on Buddhism? And, if this be the case, do we find here a case of ‘just use’ – i.e. something comparable to the *usus iustus* or *chrēsis* of non-Christian ideas in early Christianity discussed by Paul Hacker⁸⁷ – whereby Buddhists might have sought thoroughly to transform and reorient for their own needs an idea originally, and fundamentally, foreign to them? Or was this an attempt on the part of the Buddhists to take over and incorporate, in the specific sense of Hacker’s inclusivism,⁸⁸ a Brahmanical idea with only superficial modification, subordinating it merely in a formal way to Buddhism and, perhaps, seeking at the same time to conceal their debt to a Brahmanical concept? Or, again, do we have here

⁸⁵ On the gnoseological implications of the *ekayāna* doctrine, see *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du goṭra*, especially pp. 177–243.

⁸⁶ See above, pp. 21–24.

⁸⁷ See P. Hacker, *Kleine Schriften* (Wiesbaden, 1978), pp. 338 ff., 798 ff. On Buddhism and *chrēsis*, see *op. cit.*, p. 351.

⁸⁸ See P. Hacker, *op. cit.*, Index s.v. *Inklusivismus*; and his article ‘Inklusivismus’ in G. Oberhammer (ed.), *Inklusivismus* (Vienna, 1983), pp. 11–28. As examples of inclusivism in Buddhism – which Hacker further characterizes as ‘inclusivism of strength’ – Hacker cites the Buddhist notion of *tapas* and *Brahmā* (p. 23 ff.). It should be made clear that Hacker has not himself mentioned the Buddhist *tathāgatagarbha* or *paramātman* theories as examples of either inclusivism or *chrēsis*.

a Buddhist effort to find a perhaps syncretistic accommodation with Brahmanism? Or, on the contrary, might a fundamental religious and philosophical problem – one that is common, *mutatis mutandis*, to so many schools of Indian thought – be coming here to the surface from a common Indian religious and philosophical ground while taking on a specifically Buddhist stamp? (These alternative hypotheses are not all mutually exclusive, and more than one process could conceivably have been involved in the development of the Buddhist theories in question.) A full and detailed study of the Mahāyānist *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* and all the related texts will be required to enable us to decide which of these alternatives is (or are) applicable in each individual case.

One thing seems at all events clear: the antithesis *anātman/ātman* cannot, in the present context, be used as a criterion for distinguishing between the Buddhist and the Brahmanical Tīrthika.

Against the first alternative – the hypothesis in its general form of a Buddhist borrowing from Brahmanical thought as entertained for example by E. Frauwallner, É. Lamotte and H. Nakamura⁸⁹ – arguments have been advanced above based not only on the fundamentally important place occupied in Mahāyānist thought by these theories and their relation to certain concepts found in the old Buddhist canon – e.g. the natural luminosity of Mind, the notion of a spiritual Germ and that of a stable, permanent and immortal state (*pada*)⁹⁰ – but also on the distinctive and specific way that these theories have been taught and explicated in the relevant Buddhist Sūtras and Śāstras which makes any simple identification between them most difficult and problematic. In these circumstances, then, it will not do to treat them as foreign imports at some point in the history of Buddhism under the overwhelming influence of Hinduism and/or Brahmanical philosophy. The problem of the natural luminosity of Mind, the ‘buddhomorphic’ Ground of Awakening and the relation between it and buddhahood as the Fruit of Awakening is in fact too deeply embedded in Buddhist thought, and it is too significant religiously and philosophically,

⁸⁹ See above, n. 63.

⁹⁰ See above, p. 43.

for such an explanation to be wholly satisfactory. And the same considerations militate equally against the 'just use' version of the hypothesis of historical borrowing by Buddhists from Brahmanism. As for the version of this hypothesis based on religio-philosophical inclusivism, although (in agreement with Hacker's model) a resemblance – or, rather, parallelism – exists between the *ātman* of Brahmanical thought and the *tathāgatagarbha* and *paramātman* theory of the Buddhists, and although the superiority of the latter to the former is asserted or assumed by the Buddhists, the fact remains that (contrary to Hacker's model) they are not normally identified by the Sūtras and Śāstras that teach them; whereas the difference between the two is not only noted but is considered fundamental by these same sources.

Concerning the second main hypothesis of a Buddhist accommodation with Brahmanical thought, it is important to observe that such a view of the matter is not unknown to the Buddhist tradition. But its applicability will depend on precisely what is to be understood by accommodation, and also on what status is assigned to the relevant theories in Buddhist systematic hermeneutics. The accommodation model is compatible with the view mentioned above found in important sections of the Buddhist tradition according to which, in the Buddha's allusions to an *ātman* or *pudgala*, there is involved a certain *avatāraṇābhisam̐dhi*, that is, an 'allusive intention of introduction' effecting the attraction (*ākarṣaṇa*), by means of a provisional and 'intentional' (*ābhiprāyika*) teaching, of persons attached to the idea of a permanent *ātman*, who are thus not yet ready to receive the Buddha's ultimate and definitive teaching of non-substantiality (*nairātmya*) since it inspires terror (*saṃtrāsa*) in them.⁹¹ According to this view, the intentional teaching in question will be considered as *neyārtha* and, consequently, as not giving expression to the Buddha's definitive (*nītārtha*) doctrine.

In such a form of accommodation with the Brahmanical *ātman*, there is no question of a syncretism between Buddhism and

⁹¹ See above, p. 38.

Brahmanism if by syncretism we understand a merging of the two.⁹²

The problem posed by the theories of the Buddha-nature, the 'buddhomorphic' Ground of Awakening and the *paramātman* cannot, however, be evacuated by simply treating the Sūtras teaching them as 'intentional' and *neyārtha*. For, as seen above, such teachings are too well-documented and philosophically rooted in several strata of Buddhist thought. They are indeed treated by a considerable part of the Buddhist hermeneutical tradition as non-intentional and *nītārtha*, for they are explicated in such a manner as to be consonant with the definitive teachings of *nairātmya* and *śūnyatā* according to the criterion established by the *Akṣayamatīnirdeśasūtra* and the *Samādhirājasūtra*.⁹³ And, above all, they have been set out in a specifically Buddhist manner. Hence, following this view too, there is neither inclusivism nor syncretism, and also no conclusive evidence of *usus iustus*.

In sum, in its older texts as well as in more recent ones, the Buddhist canon contains references to what can be regarded as an absolute on the level of Ground or Fruit. These references can be neither interpreted away nor overlooked; and it would be as misleading to assign them an exclusively precanonical or protocanonical status as it would be to regard them as exclusively late and non-canonical. In the Mahāyāna these ideas have found clear expression in the theories of the Buddha-nature and *tathāgatagarbha* as the buddhomorphic Ground of buddhahood expounded in the *tathāgatagarbha*-Sūtras and the related Śāstras such as the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (ch. i), the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (ch. ix) and the *Abhisamayālamkāra* (ch. i), and also in the Tantras.

Moreover, a positive theory and a cataphatic approach both to this Ground and to buddhahood are well documented in the history of Buddhist thought beside the predominant apophatic theory. Sometimes these two doctrines appear as complementary, or indeed as incommensurable, theories. (This is the case in particular when they are developed into the theory of Emptiness

⁹² For a discussion of syncretism in the Buddhist context see H. Bechert, *Buddhism in Ceylon and studies on religious syncretism in Buddhist countries* (Göttingen, 1978), p. 19 ff.; compare also W. Heissig and H. J. Klimkeit (eds.), *Synkretismus in den Religionen Zentralasiens* (Wiesbaden, 1987).

⁹³ See above, pp. 37–38.

of own-nature [*rāṇi stoti*] and Emptiness of the heterogeneous [*gṛāṇi stoti*].) More often, the one is considered to be of provisional meaning requiring elicitation in another sense (*neyārtha*) and to be hierarchically subordinate to the other, which is definitive and of certain value (*nītārtha*). (This interpretation is also available when the *rāṇi stoti* and *gṛāṇi stoti* theories are regarded as antithetical.)

Finally, and most importantly, the *tathāgatagarbha* and *paramān* theories in Buddhism, together with the procedure of characterization of the absolute by inversion in relation to the relative,⁹⁴ may be seen as intended to neutralize and cancel both *ātmavāda* and *anātmavāda* in so far as they represent a binary pair of conceptually antithetical positions that the Buddhist Middle Way is to transcend. Thus, at a certain stage in Buddhist thought, these theories serve as a sort of metatheory that founds a metalinguistic description of the absolute — which is itself inexpressible within the binary structure of discursive thinking (*vikalpa*) and the four positions of the tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*), and hence in a language presupposing positive and negative entities.⁹⁵

In the light of the available evidence, then, it appears difficult to maintain that, far from denying the Upaniṣadic *ātman*, the Buddha only denied what was mistakenly believed to be the *ātman*, and that the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* and the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*-Commentary have continued in the line of the Upaniṣadic *ātman* doctrine, as has been argued by Kamaleswar Bhattacharya in his nevertheless challenging and well-documented book on *ātman-brahman* in Buddhism.⁹⁶ It may be the case that the Buddha and the older Buddhist texts did not negate the *ātman* in due propositional form, and that such a negation belongs to later sources only. But to conclude that the old Buddhist tradition was in basic agreement with the Upaniṣadic *ātman* doctrine is quite another matter, especially when it is anything but certain that this older tradition was even familiar with the Upaniṣads.⁹⁷ The overwhelming weight of the Buddhist tradition clearly does not support this conclusion. And its acceptance would not only imply,

⁹⁴ See above, pp. 24–25.

⁹⁵ See above, pp. 41, 44f., 48.

⁹⁶ Bhattacharya, *L'ātman-brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien*, pp. 3, 69–70, 137–8.

⁹⁷ See above, p. 20.

that the majority of Buddhists have misunderstood the Buddha's teaching but overlooks the highly important distinctions between the *ātman* and the Buddhist *tathāgatagarbha* and *paramātman* made in the Buddhist Sūtras and Śāstras treating the latter.

The theories in question accordingly seem to be no less deeply rooted and motivated in Buddhist thought than is the *ātman* theory in other forms of Indian thought. But rather than either an identity or a convergence of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine with the Brāhmanical *ātmavāda* we have here a distinct theory that stands in a highly interesting tension with the *ātmavāda*. We have also found the Buddhists sometimes sharing a common stock of philosophical and exegetical methods with the Brahmanical schools. But these methods are variously applied on each side. Historically they are sometimes even attested for the first time in Buddhist texts, without it however being possible to prove that they actually originated there.⁹⁸ Be this as it may, the Buddhists have concluded that the Brahmanist Tīrthikas' doctrine of the *ātman* (as they understood it) was both radically incoherent in itself⁹⁹ and incompatible with the Buddha's intention.

Thus we seem to have distinct, and unconfutable, theories and treatments of problems which are deeply embedded in Indian thought. They emerge from a common ground or substratum of religious and philosophical thinking but remain in a relation of tension.

When referring to a common ground or substratum, it should then be clear that it is not being suggested here that Buddhist thought may be assimilated or reduced to another system called Brahmanism or (in the narrower sense) Hinduism. What we call Indian Buddhism is the creation of Indians, and very often of Brahmans, in the context of Indian civilization; but it is a distinct creation beside Upaniṣadic and later Vedāntic thought. When considering the Brāhmanical *ātman* and the Buddhist theories in question, the common ground and the differences have equally to be kept clearly in mind.

⁹⁸ See above, pp. 31, 33-34.

⁹⁹ See above, p. 25.

The Great Debate between 'Gradualists' and 'Simultaneists' in eighth-century Tibet

INTRODUCTION

FOR THE Tibetologist and historian of Buddhism, and equally for the specialist in comparative religion and intercultural studies, the remarkable encounter that took place in Tibet in the second part of the eighth century between the traditions of a non-scholastic, 'spontaneist' and more or less quietist Dhyāna (Ch'an) Buddhism – represented by several Chinese and Korean Ho-shangs and in particular by their best-known protagonist in Tibet, the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen¹⁰⁰ – and the scholastically highly developed and monastically organized Yogācāra-Mādhyamika tradition of India – represented by Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla – is a subject of very considerable interest.

This encounter of two traditions and the ensuing confrontation between its representatives have often been described as a Sino-Indian or Indo-Chinese controversy, debate or council. And the debate has been referred to by scholars as the Council of lHa sa (Demiéville), the Council of bSam yas (Tucci) and, more

¹⁰⁰ On the name Mo-ho-yen, as well as on the epithet *ho-shang* (Tib. *hva śaṅ*) derived from Skt. *upādhyāya* 'master', see P. Demiéville, *Le concile de Lhasa* (Paris, 1952), pp. 9 ff.

It should be recalled that other Ho-shangs such as Me 'go/mgo and Kim (Ch. Chin, below, n. 116) had preceded Mo-ho-yen in Tibet. See e.g. *sBa bžed*, ed. mGon po rgyal mtshan (Beijing, 1982) (=G), pp. 6–10, 65, 67–68; ed. R. A. Stein (Paris, 1961) (*Zabs btags ma* version =S), pp. 4–6, 8–10, 55, 57; dPa' bo gTsong lag phren ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, ff. 115a5, 116a4. The *Chos 'byuri* by Ne'u Paṅdi ta, the *sNon gyi gtam Me tog phren ba*, ed. T. Tsepal Taikhang, *Rare Tibetan historical and literary texts from the library of Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa*, I (New Delhi, 1974), f. 15a (p. 87), indeed mentions their presence already at the time of King Sroṅ btsan sgam po in the seventh century; and Bu ston (*Chos 'byuri*, f. 124b6) gives the name Ma hā de va tshé, while the *Deb ther dmar po* (f. 16b = p. 35) gives the name Ma hā de ba. Cf. P. Demiéville, *Concile*, p. 11, n. 4, on the Hva śaṅ Mahādeva at the time of Sroṅ btsan sgam po.

recently, the Council of Tibet (Demiéville and Ueyama). It should be noted at the outset that in the strict ecclesiastical sense this confrontation was not, however, a council, nor was it even a synod. The Tibetan historical sources have most often represented it as a debate (*rtsod pa*) in the form of an investigative discussion (*gšags*) between two parties that took place, in quite classical Indian and Buddhist style, with the Tibetan ruler acting as witness and arbiter (*dpañ po = sākṣin*). In the Chinese texts from Dunhuang, the discussion between the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen (Tib. Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna or Mahā yan) and his interlocutors is presented mainly in the form of a series of polemical questions put to Mo-ho-yen with his replies.¹⁰¹ In the Tibetan Dunhuang documents (and in the *bSam gtan mig sgron*),¹⁰² Mahāyāna's teachings take the form of aphorisms or logia.

At the beginning of the discussion between Kamalaśīla and Mo-ho-yen as described in Tibetan sources, the Chinese Master asks whether, being senior in residence, he will be required either to put questions or to answer them. Kamalaśīla replies that he should discuss in accordance with his true thinking (*ḍgoñs pa ltar šags thob cig, sBa bžed*, S, p. 57; see also Ṇaṅ ral, *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po*, ed. R. O. Meisezahl, f. 430a2), or that he should formulate his thesis (*pratijñā*) in accordance with his true thinking (*ḍgoñs pa ltar dam bca' žog cig, sBa bžed*, G, p. 68), or that he should discuss his intended theory (*ḍgoñs pa'i lta ba la šags thob cig, dPa' bo gTsub lag phreñ ba, mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, f. 116b7). According to a passage of Wang Hsi's *Cheng-li chüeh*, Mo-ho-yen requested a discussion with the 'Brahman monk' (f. 128a), but Mo-ho-yen is later shown describing himself as unfit for debate because of his advanced years and asking the King to put an end to the controversy (f. 143a). Indeed, what he was obliged in the

¹⁰¹ See Demiéville, *Concile*. The source of the questions put to Mo-ho-yen according to Wang Hsi's *Cheng-li chüeh* is the so-called 'Brahman monk' (*Concile*, pp. 39-40), presumably Kamalaśīla.

The question and answer form of discussion was evidently used also in cases where there appears to have been no debate, for example in T'an-k'uang's 'Dialogues' translated by W. Pachow, *A study of the twenty-two dialogues of Mahāyāna Buddhism* (Taipei, 1979), and in Hung-jen's 'Discourse' translated by W. Pachow, *Chinese Buddhism* (Washington, 1980), pp. 35-53. For T'an-k'uang and his rôle in connexion with the problems posed by the 'Great Debate', see below, p. 128.

¹⁰² See below, p. 66.

discussions to state, following the Sūtras, was, he says, conceived only as an answer to the questions put to him; it was not the true system of his Dhyāna, which is ineffable (ff. 153a–155a).

In connexion with this encounter Demiéville once wrote: 'En matière d'histoire tibétaine ... il faut se méfier des méfiances hâtives'.¹⁰³ In the case of what will be referred to here as the Great Debate, and of the complex issues occupying the 'Gradualists' and 'Simultaneists' in their encounter, the sources need to be studied with great attentiveness and care using every instrument that philological, historical, religious, philosophical and hermeneutical analysis can place in our hands. Our sources often differ as to details, and sometimes they diverge on more important matters too. Some of them are contemporary with the events related, or they at least reproduce accounts ultimately going back to these events. Other sources are on the contrary later, they certainly contain interpretations and some distortions, and they may partake of what has been called the 'invention of tradition'.¹⁰⁴ They are all of course the product of intellectual and historical processes that need to be identified and reconstructed. It would probably be illusory, however, to think that from any of these sources we can now retrieve a definitive factual version of events exactly as they happened. But to say this is not to espouse historical scepticism or agnosticism. For it is of the greatest interest to investigate the accounts of these formative events in the history of Tibetan civilization and thought provided by Tibetan sources, and especially by the histories written before the middle of the fourteenth century, and to discover how their views of the Great Debate relate to Buddhist religious and

¹⁰³ *Concile*, p. 18.

¹⁰⁴ *The invention of tradition* is the title of a book of essays, edited by E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (Cambridge, 1983), dealing with rather different situations in modern England, Scotland, Wales, continental Europe, India and Africa; and the use of the expression here should not be understood as implying an identification with such situations. For the bSam yas monastic centre, one might compare also the concept of '*Lieux de mémoire*', the title of a collection of essays edited by P. Nora (Paris, 1986).

On the constitution of tradition in the case of Ch'an Buddhism in the Sung period – after a break in the clan and school traditions of the T'ang – see H. Schmidt-Glitzner, *Die Identität der buddhistischen Schulen und die Kompilation buddhistischer Universalgeschichten in China* (Munich, 1982), p. 27 ff.

philosophical history.¹⁰⁵ This is what will be essayed in the following, and an attempt will be made to see what light these views throw on religious and philosophical currents in Tibet and in Buddhism. In this way we shall be able to see how Tibetan Buddhists received and reacted to two important and distinct traditions within Buddhism and to the Chinese and Indian masters who were the transmitters of these traditions.

Although the accounts we find in the extant versions of the *sBa bžed*, in the *Chos 'byun Me tog sñin po* of Ñaṅ Ñi ma 'od zer, in Bu ston's *Chos 'byun*, and in the *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* of dPa' bo gTsong lag phreṅ ba differ in several respects, what happened seems in broad outline to have been the following according to the Tibetan sources.

In the third quarter of the eighth century, during the reign of Khri Sroṅ lde btsan, (rg. c. 755–794?),¹⁰⁶ one of the foremost Buddhist masters of the time, Śāntarakṣita, was invited to Tibet with a view to establishing Buddhism on a firm and lasting institutional and philosophical basis. Śāntarakṣita was responsible for the ordination of the first Tibetan monks according to the rite of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya (perhaps in 779) and for the foundation (in perhaps 787 or in 775–779) of bSam yas, the first monastic centre to be established in central Tibet. In the course of his work in spreading the Buddhist Dharma and establishing the Tibetan Saṃgha, Śāntarakṣita encountered influential Buddhist masters of Chinese origin who were known in Tibet by the generic name *hva śani* derived from the Chinese word *ho-shang* (Skt. *upādhyāya*). Around the teachers of both Chinese and Indian origin who were active in propagating Buddhism there then gathered a number of Tibetan monk-disciples and lay followers. And as a consequence of this teaching activity flowing from both

¹⁰⁵ Extracts relevant to the Great Debate from the *sBa bžed* (*Žabs btags ma* version) and dPa' bo gTsong lag phreṅ ba's *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, as well as from Bu ston's *Chos 'byun* and some later sources, have been assembled by G. W. Houston, *Sources for a history of the bSam yas debate* (St. Augustin, 1980).

¹⁰⁶ Many contemporary Tibetan historians however place the birth of Khri Sroṅ lde btsan, or his accession to the throne, in the year 790, and his death in 858 (or 848). See for example Tshe tan žabs druṅ, *bsTan rtsis kun las btus pa* (mTsho sñon Printing House, 1982).

the Chinese and Indian Buddhist traditions (not to speak of important Central Asian influences) there came to the fore certain differences between the doctrinal and monastic traditions of Śāntarakṣita's school and the apparently less organized meditative and teaching traditions of the Ho-shangs that were linked in particular with Ch'an (Dhyāna) Buddhism. Then, owing apparently to an accident, Śāntarakṣita died in Tibet. And his disciple Kamalaśīla, evidently already renowned in India, was invited, probably in accordance with his master's recommendation to the King, to continue Śāntarakṣita's work in Tibet.

It was probably in the 780s or early 790s that the tension between the two Buddhist currents of thought mentioned above reached a critical point. According to a number of Tibetan historical sources, a full-scale debate was then arranged between the party led by Kamalaśīla, the successor of the Ācārya-Bodhisattva Śāntarakṣita, and the Hva ṣaṅ Mahāyāna. It is said to have taken place under the supervision of the ruler Khri Sroṅ lde btsan himself at the Byaṅ chub gliṅ temple of the bSam yas monastic centre. In this debate as reported by our sources, Kamalaśīla appears as the leading figure of the Indo-Tibetan school, which was placed to the monarch's left in the debate. And the Hva ṣaṅ Mahāyāna figures as both the protagonist and main spokesman of a Sino-Tibetan school, which was placed to the monarch's right.

As Tibetan supporters of Kamalaśīla's school special mention is made of Ye ṣes dbaṅ po – a leading monk from the influential sBa family identified with sBa gSal snaṅ or sBa Ratna, who was appointed chief monk (*rin lugs = chos dpon*) by Khri Sroṅ lde btsan – and 'Ba'/sBa dPal dbyaṅs – another monk evidently connected with the same family, who was named chief monk when Ye ṣes dbaṅ po retired after meeting with certain difficulties.¹⁰⁷ Mention is also made of sBa Saṅ ši (ta). A certain Vairocana – who despite his name may have been a Tibetan – is also named as a follower of this school.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Religious from the dBa'(s)/sBa and Myaṅ families were already associated with, or were disciples of, Śāntarakṣita according to the Turkestan (Śa cu) document published by F. W. Thomas, *Tibetan texts and documents*, II (London, 1951), p. 85.

¹⁰⁸ These names are found in the lists of the *sad mi mi bdun*, who were to form the first Tibetan Saṅgha at bSam yas. See the discussion in G. Tucci, *Minor Tibetan texts*, II (Rome, 1958), p. 12 ff. (On a Vairocana who wrote in Sanskrit, and who was presumably an Indian, see V. V. Gokhale, *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Diamond Jubilee Volume [1977], pp. 635–43.)

On the other side, as supporters of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna and/or opponents of Ye šes dbaṅ po, special reference is made to a triad of disciples – a certain mÑa' Bi ma or sÑa Bye ma (perhaps a Vimala[mitra]?),¹⁰⁹ Myaṅ Ša mi (who is known to our sources also as the associate of another, earlier Ho-shang)¹¹⁰ and an unnamed master from the rÑog family¹¹¹ – as well as to Co rMa rma¹¹² and the Bhadanta Laṅ ka.¹¹³ Khri Sroṅ lde btsan's 'Bro consort ('Bro bza) and his maternal aunt (*sru*) are also mentioned as supporters of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna.¹¹⁴ And as an opponent of Ye šes dbaṅ po mention is made in particular of Myaṅ/Ñaṅ Tiṅ ne 'dzin bzaṅ po, who was apparently the associate of an earlier Ho-shang too.¹¹⁵

It is noteworthy that Kamalaśīla figures here as only one of the principal debaters on the side opposed to the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna,

¹⁰⁹ See *sBa bžed*, G, pp. 65 and 68 (sÑa Bye ma), and S, p. 55 (mÑa Bi ma); Ñaṅ ral Ñi ma 'od zer, *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po*, ed. R. O. Meisezahl (St. Augustin, 1985), ff. 426b3 and 429b3 (Ña Bi ma); dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, ff. 115a5 and 116b4 (sÑags Bye ma la). Cf. Demiéville, *Concile*, p. 41.

The *rus*-name here may be equivalent to gÑags (as in the case of gÑags Jñāna-Kumāra, the disciple of Vimala), in which case the Bi ma/Bye ma in question would of course be a Tibetan, rather than the Indian Vimala(mitra).

¹¹⁰ See *sBa bžed*, G, pp. 65 and 67; S, pp. 55.1 and 57.11; *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 115a4 and 116b4; Ñaṅ Ñi ma 'od zer, *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po*, f. 429b3 together with f. 426b3.

On Ša mi see also G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, II, pp. 9–10. A certain Myaṅ gŠa (?) mi go cha has been mentioned in connexion with the Bodhisattva (i.e. Śāntarakṣita) in the document published by F. W. Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 85. This document also mentions another member of the Myaṅ family in the same context.

¹¹¹ For rÑog Rin po che, compare Demiéville, *Concile*, p. 33.

¹¹² In the *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 118b7, Co rMa rma is described as the *gzims mal pa* or chamberlain (cf. f. 120b6) (cf. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, II, p. 38, and *Preliminary report on two scientific expeditions in Nepal* [Rome, 1956], p. 89). Compare *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po*, f. 429a.

¹¹³ The Bhadanta Laṅ ka is not mentioned in the *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po* (f. 429a), which mentions Co ma (?) only.

¹¹⁴ On these two see Demiéville, *Concile*, pp. 25, 33.

¹¹⁵ See *sBa bžed*, G, p. 63–64; S, p. 54; and *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 114b4; *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po*, f. 425'al (= Ms B, f. 237a7).

The *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po* also refers to his being a disciple of Vimalamitra (f. 472a4) and to his exile and murder (?) (f. 473a; Ms B, f. 258a) at the time of King Glaṅ dar ma. This source in addition mentions his connexion with dBu ru (f. 472a4). On Tiṅ ne 'dzin and the Myaṅ, see also the inscription of the dBu ru Žva'i lha khaṅ in H. E. Richardson, *A corpus of early Tibetan inscriptions* (London, 1985), pp. 43 ff. Cf. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, II, p. 52 f.; below, p. 75.

and that in this capacity mention is made also of Ye šes dbaṅ po (in the unsupplemented version of the *sBa bžed* and in the 'Alternative Tradition' quoted in the same text) and of 'Ba' dPal dbyaṅs (in the unsupplemented version of the *sBa bžed*) and/or (sBa) Saṅ ši (ta) (in the supplemented version of the *sBa bžed*).¹¹⁶ Indeed, Kamalaśīla – who had reportedly only recently arrived in Tibet – was presumably still unable to speak Tibetan fluently. But this circumstance would of course neither prove that he was not directly involved in the Great Debate nor that he was not present at it.¹¹⁷ According to the Tibetan historical texts under consideration, the Great Debate ended with the Hva šaṅ's conceding defeat and the Tibetan monarch's decree that his teachings should no longer be propagated in Tibet. Several sources also record that it was further decreed that Nāgārjuna's theory (*lta ba*) should be accepted,¹¹⁸ while in the domain of practice (*spyod pa*) the Six Perfections should be kept to.¹¹⁹

In view of the weighty Tibetan participation in the Great Debate on Kamalaśīla's side and also of the close association of Tibetans with the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna – whose teachings cannot,

¹¹⁶ This Saṅ ši (ta) has sometimes been identified with (sBa) dPal dbyaṅs, but the question of his identity is far from clear. See Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, II, pp. 11–12, 22, 24; P. Demiéville, in M. Soymié (ed.), *Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang* (Geneva-Paris, 1979), pp. 4–7 (referring also to H. Obata).

The *sBa bžed* (S, p. 5) mentions a rGya phrug gar mkhan Saṅ ši. And a Saṅ ši is mentioned also in connexion with sBa gSal snaṅ (G, p. 10 ~ S, p. 9); he seems to have been linked with Kim Hva šaṅ (S, p. 10; cf. G, p. 7). Kim – Chinese Chin Ho-shang – was the name of a Korean Ch'an master, Musang (Ch. Wu-hsiang, 694–762) who taught in Sichuan (Chengdu). Cf. S. Yanagida, in W. Lai and L. Lancaster (eds.), *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet* (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 18, 193; P. Demiéville, in Jao Tsong-yi and P. Demiéville, *Peintures monochromes de Dunhuang* (Paris, 1978), p. 47, and in M. Soymié (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5, 7, 11–12 (referring also to Z. Yamaguchi). – Wu-chu (Tib. Bu chu, 717–774), who is known to the rDzogs chen tradition (*bsam gtan mig sgron*), was in contact with Wu-hsiang/Musang in Chengdu (Demiéville, *Contributions*, p. 5); but there were significant differences in their views (p. 7).

¹¹⁷ On the question of the language(s) in which the discussions and debates were held, their number, and of the participants in them, see P. Demiéville, *T'oung-Pao* 56 (1970), p. 42; Y. Imaeda, *Journal asiatique* 1975, p. 129.

¹¹⁸ See *sBa bžed*, S, p. 62.6 (the specific reference to Nāgārjuna is not in the other version); Bu ston, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 129b5; *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 119a2; Ṇaṅ Ṇi ma 'od zer, *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po*, f. 435b5.

¹¹⁹ The accounts of the Great Debate differ to a greater or lesser extent in the various sources, and there seems to have taken place a conflation with earlier discussion(s) in which a certain Me mgo (?) (rather than Mo-ho-yen) was the leading Ho-shang.

moreover, be exclusively identified with any specific known Chinese school of Ch'an and may reflect a version peculiar to Central Asia notwithstanding elements in common with the Northern, Southern and Pao-t'ang Schools – it may then be more accurate to speak not (as has often been done) of a clash in Tibet between Indian and Chinese Buddhism and of an ensuing Sino-Indian debate or council, but rather of the encounter, tension and confrontation between certain Indo-Tibetan and Sino-Tibetan traditions. (This question of the description of the traditions facing each other will be discussed in Chap. iii.)

At issue in this encounter, and in the ensuing Great Debate, were the doctrine of the 'Gradualists' (*rim gyis pa*) known as gradual engagement (*rim gyis 'jug pa*) – and also as the (*br*)*tse(n) mun/min (pa)* (Chinese *chien men [p'ai]*) – of Kamalaśīla and his Tibetan followers and the teaching of the 'Instantaneists' or 'Simultaneists' (*cig c[h]ar ba*) otherwise known as simultaneous engagement (*[g]cig c[h]ar gyis 'jug pa*) – and also as the (*s*)*ton mun/min (pa)* (Chinese *tun men [p'ai]*) – of the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yeu and his Tibetan followers.¹²⁰

I. ON SOME EARLIER TIBETAN HISTORICAL SOURCES ON THE GREAT DEBATE

For long the best known Tibetan historical source on the Great Debate was no doubt Bu ston's *Chos 'byuñ* (f. 128a–129b). In 1935 E. Obermiller – who had already published in 1932 an English translation of the relevant section of Bu ston's history – called attention also to what he supposed to be one of Bu ston's main sources on the subject, the third *Bhāvanākrama* by Kamalaśīla.¹²¹ This work indeed contains many passages that are perti-

¹²⁰ See *sBa bžed*, S, p. 54; Ne'u Pañḍi ta, *Chos 'byuñ*, f. 22a1; Bu ston, *Chos 'byuñ*, f. 129b; Dalai Lama V, *Bod kyi deb ther dpyid kyi rgyal mo'i glu dbyañs*, f. 39b (= p. 89); Thu'u bkvan Blo bzañ chos kyi ñi ma, *Grub mtha' šel gyi me loñ*, rGya nag chapter, f. 10 ff. (with the transcriptions *tun men/min* and *tsi'an men/tsi yan min*).

For some pseudo-etymological explanations, based on Tibetan, of the originally Chinese expressions, see *sBa bžed*, G, p. 64 and S, p. 54.12–13; dPa' bo gTsong lag phreñ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 115a; and Nañ Ñi ma 'od zer, *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po*, f. 426b.

¹²¹ E. Obermiller, *Journal of the Greater India Society* 2 (1935), pp. 1–11. See also Obermiller's posthumously published facsimile edition of the third *Bhāvanākrama* (Moscov, 1963).

ment to the Great Debate with Mo-ho-yen; but none of Kamalāśīla's three *Bhāvanākramas* actually mentions Mo-ho-yen. And based as it is largely on quotations from Sūtras, Kamalāśīla's treatment of the progressive stages of meditative realization (*bhāvanā* = *bsgom pa*) involving, beside Quieting of mind (*śamatha* = *ži gnas*), the fundamental factors of exact analytic investigation (*bhūtapratyavekṣā* = *yan dag pa'i so sor rtog pa*) and its culmination in analysis of the factors of existence (*dharmaprativācya* = *chos šin tu rnam par 'byed pa*) or discriminative knowledge produced from meditative realization (*bhāvanāmayī prajñā* = *bsgom pa las byun ba'i šes rab*), and then finally in Insight (*vipaśyanā* = *lhag mthoñ*), refers specifically neither to any particular debate or to any individual opponent. Kamalāśīla's three treatises are accordingly relevant to Buddhist philosophical theory and practice in general.

As for the historical existence of Kamalāśīla and his master Śāntarakṣita, it is of course very well established by their extant works available in Sanskrit or in Tibetan translations in the bsTan 'gyur as well as by many references in original Tibetan historical and philosophical works. The historical existence of the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen/Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna (or Mahā yan) and of the debate(s) in which he took part in Tibet – the two matters left somewhat unclear in Tibetan bsTan 'gyur as well as in the Sanskrit sources – has, despite some hesitations and obscurities in the Tibetan traditions, been demonstrated by Wang Hsi's *Tun-wu ta-cheng cheng-li chüeh* or 'Ratification of the true principles of the Great Vehicle of Sudden Awakening' preserved in two Chinese manuscripts from Dunhuang (*Pelliot 4646* and *Stein 2672*) which has been translated into French and commented on by Demiéville in his *Le concile de Lhasa* and 'Deux documents de Touen-houang sur le Dhyāna chinois'.¹²² In addition to Wang Hsi's Preface, the *Cheng-li chüeh* comprises three 'Memorials' two of which consist

¹²² In: *Essays on the history of Buddhism presented to Professor Zenryu Tsukamoto* (Kyōto, 1961), pp. 1–27.

Pelliot tibétain 823 contains a Tibetan version of a part of Wang Hsi's *Cheng-li chüeh*; cf. Y. Imaeda, *Journal asiatique* 1975, p. 127 ff. For further parallels between the Chinese sources and Tibetan manuscripts from Tun-huang, see L. Gómez, 'The direct and gradual approaches of the Zen master Mahāyāna: Fragments of the teachings of Mo-ho-yen' in: R. Gimello and P. Gregory, *Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen* (Honolulu, 1983), p. 106 ff.

mainly of a number of questions put to Mo-ho-yen together with his replies. On the Tibetan side corroboration is forthcoming from the Tibetan Dunhuang documents, a number of which have been recently analysed by L. Gómez in his 'The direct and gradual approaches of Zen Master Mahāyāna: Fragments of the teachings of Mo-ho-yen'.¹²³

Modern scholarly study of the Tibetan Dunhuang sources on Dhyāna and Ch'an was inaugurated in 1939 when Marcelle Lalou published MS BN Pelliot tibétain 996.¹²⁴ This document contains the lineage of a certain Tibetan Dhyāna master named Tshig tsa Nam (m)k(h)a'i sñiñ po which includes a Dhyāna teacher named A rtañ hyver, who travelled from India to Kučā, and two Chinese masters.¹²⁵ The same Dunhuang text also contains a summary of the teachings of another important early Dhyāna master, sPug Ye šes dbyañs.¹²⁶ Subsequently, and especially over the past decade and a half, there has been a veritable flood of articles on the Dunhuang documents pertaining to the history of Ch'an, and on the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen. The extensive recent Japanese literature on the subject was inaugurated in 1968 by Ueyama Daishun, who has since been joined by many other scholars; this literature has been surveyed in a recent publication by D. Ueyama.¹²⁷ Some of the relevant Western and Japanese secondary literature has also been considered by L. Gómez.¹²⁸

¹²³ See n. 122.

¹²⁴ M. Lalou, 'Document tibétain sur l'expansion du Dhyāna chinois', *Journal asiatique* 1939, pp. 505-23.

¹²⁵ Cf. *bSam gtan mig sgron* or *rNal 'byor mig gi bsam gtan* (see below, n. 129), f. 90b3; Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, II, p. 21; R. Kimura, *Journal asiatique* 1981, p. 187.

¹²⁶ Cf. R. Kimura, *Journal asiatique* 1981, p. 183 ff.

¹²⁷ D. Ueyama, 'The study of Tibetan Ch'an manuscripts recovered from Tun-huang: a review of the field and its prospects' in: W. Lai and L. Lancaster, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-49. See also P. Demiéville, 'Récents travaux sur Touen-houang', *T'oung Pao* 56 (1970), pp. 1-95, and 'L'introduction au Tibet du bouddhisme sinisé d'après les manuscrits de Touen-houang' in M. Soymié, *Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang*, pp. 1-15, together with G. Mala and R. Kimura, 'Additif' in: M. Soymié (ed.), *Nouvelles contributions aux études de Touen-houang* (Geneva, 1981), pp. 321-7; G. Mala, 'Empreinte du Tch'an chez les mystiques tibétains' in: *Le Tch'an (Zen): racines et floraisons* (Hermès 4, Nouvelle série, Paris, 1985), pp. 387-424.

¹²⁸ L. Gómez, 'Indian materials on the doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment' in: W. Lai and L. Lancaster (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 393-434; and 'The direct and gradual approaches of the Zen master Mahāyāna' in: R. Gimello and P. Gregory (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 69-167.

Another major source for the Dhyāna tradition in Tibet, as well as for the Mahāyoga and Atiyoga or rDzogs chen, is the *bSam gtan mig sgron* or *rNal 'byor mig gi bSam gtan*. This text is ascribed to the rDzogs chen master gNubs chen Sañs rgyas ye šes, who is reputed to have lived in the eighth or ninth century.¹²⁹ What is of importance in the present context is the fact that this text contains a chapter on the Gradualist's Tsen min/men – i.e. the *rim gyis pa* or *rim [gyis] 'jug pa* – which is in turn connected with those Sūtras communicated to persons of inferior faculties (*dban po tha šal*, f. 31b) whose meaning moreover requires to be elicited in another sense (*dran ba don : neyārtha*, f. 12a), and which is further described as a method that is as it were misleading (*rim gyis sbyon ba bslu 'drid 'dra*, f. 25b). The next chapter concerns the more advanced 'Simultaneist' sTon mun – i.e. the *cig car ba* or *cig car 'jug pa* – which is connected with the final and definitive sense (*ñes don = nītārtha*, f. 25b), that is, the real intended sense (*yan dag dgonis pa'i don*, f. 25b).¹³⁰ This work contains a veritable mine of

¹²⁹ *bSam gtan mig sgron*, or *rNal 'byor mig gi bSam gtan*, published in 1974 in Leh by S. W. Tashigangpa in his *Smantstis Shesrig Spenzdod*, vol. 74. The date of this text as we have it is not altogether free from doubt.

Its reputed author, gNubs (chen) Sañs rgyas ye šes, is usually stated to have lived at the time of Padmasambhava, and to have been a pupil of Vimalamitra and even Śrīsiṃha towards the end of the eighth century. In his *gSañ snags snia 'gyur la bod du rtsod pa snia phyir byun ba rnam kyī lan du brjod pa, ñes don 'brug sgra* (ed. Sanje Dorji, *Collected writings of Sog-bzlog-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan*, Volume I, New Delhi, 1975), f. 9a–b, Sog bzlog pa (b. 1552/3) has rejected the opinion (apparently maintained by 'Bri khuñ dPal 'dzin) that sNub (*sic*) ban Sañs rgyas ye šes was a contemporary of King dPal 'khor btsan – the son of gNam lde 'od sruñs, son of Glañ dar ma, and supposedly the last of the old Central Tibetan line of kings – which would have put him no earlier than the end of the ninth century. The *bSam gtan mig sgron* cites (f. 91b) a *bDen gnīs 'jug pa*, but this is not the work by Atiṣa included in the dBu ma section of the bsTan 'gyur. This text knows the Ch'an succession of seven masters (*bdun brgyud*) beginning with 'Darmodhāra' (Bodhi-Dharma) and culminating in Mahāyāna (Mo-ho-yen) (f. 8a), as well as the story of the sandal/boot of 'Darmotāra' (f. 12b) (see below, pp. 73, 87–88) but it is uncertain how firm a basis these references can provide for the dating of the text. Very significant, however, is the reference to absolute, non-presuppositional and non-implicative, negation (*med par dag pa = prasajyapratishedha*, f. 37a) and, in a note is small letters, to *sādhyasama* (? *sgrub bya mthun pa*, f. 73b); these concepts became common in Tibetan philosophical literature starting in the eleventh century. 'Gos gZon nu dpal refers to the *bSam gtan mig gi sgron ma* being studied in the eleventh century (*Deb ther sñion po*, ga, f. 17a5; Roerich, p. 137).

¹³⁰ For the need of superior faculties (*dban po mnon po*) to understand the Hva šañ's teaching, and for the function of the ultimate and definitive sense (*ñes don* as opposed to *dran don*) in this teaching, see Nañ Nñi ma 'od zer, *Chos 'byun Me tog sniñ po*, ff. 425'b, 430a–b and 435b. Cf. below, pp. 84, 93, 98, 117, 141–2.

information on the lineages and teachings of the Ho-shangs, including Mahā yan who is counted as the seventh master in line from Bo de dar mo tā ra (*sic*) in a succession beginning with Kāśyapa ('od sruñs, f. 8a, 12a, 29a). In this text Kamalaśīla and the Hva šaṅ Mahā yan have been mentioned side by side (f. 8a, 17a); but it is noteworthy that no mention has been made of the Great Debate in which they are said by the other sources under consideration here to have been involved. Material very similar to that of the *bSam gtan mig sgron* is moreover contained in the *gter ma* text known as the *bKa' than sde lña*, in the chapter entitled *Blon po bka'i than yig*.¹³¹ These texts clearly testify to the links between the Dhyāna traditions of the Ho-shangs and the rDzogs chen pas/rÑiñ ma pas. But it is at the same time notable that the *bSam gtan mig sgron* has explicitly distinguished between the sTon mun or Cig car bas and both the rNal 'byor chen po (Mahāyoga) and the rDzogs chen and Atiyoga, placing the sTon mun or *cig car gyis 'jug pa* as a second stage between the first stage consisting of the Tsen men or *rim gyis 'jug pa* and the third and fourth stages of Mahāyoga and the rDzogs chen.

In the wake of the current interest in the history and teachings of the various forms of Ch'an under the T'ang, what may be called the Tibetan and Tibetological dimension of the Great Debate and its background in the Dhyāna traditions of India and Central Asia have since Tucci's masterly discussion of 1958 sometimes been relegated to the background.

Moreover, Y. Imaeda has gone so far as to express doubt as to whether an actual confrontation and debate ever really took place between Mo-ho-yen and Kamalaśīla,¹³² and the same scholar has described what is probably in its core our earliest Tibetan historical record on the subject, the *sBa bžed*, as a relatively late work dating from the early fourteenth century.¹³³ These ques-

¹³¹ The *Lo pañ bka'i than yig* is cited as a source concerning the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna and the Great Debate by Tshe dbañ nor bu (1698/9–1755) in his *rGya nag hwa šari gi byuri tshul grub mtha'i phyogs sña bcas sa bon tsam smos pa yid kyī dri ma dag byed dge ba'i chu rgyun* (reprinted in Vol. v of his works, Dalhousie, 1977), f. 7b4. But the text quoted actually corresponds to that of the *Blon po bka'i than yig*, f. 19a (ed. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, II, p. 68).

¹³² See Y. Imaeda, *Journal asiatique* 1975, p. 140.

¹³³ Cf. Imaeda, *loc. cit.*, p. 126. For a recently published account of the Great Debate according to the *sBa bžed*, see F. Faber, *Acta Orientalia* 47 (1986), pp. 33–61.

tions will therefore be investigated in the following on the basis of some of the older Tibetan sources.

That a true debate took place towards the end of the eighth century at the *Byañ chub gliñ* of *bSam yas* between *Kamalaśīla* and the Tibetan Gradualists on the one side and the *Hva šaň Mahāyāna*, i.e. *Mo-ho-yen*, supported by his Tibetan 'Simultaneist' followers on the other under the aegis of the Tibetan ruler *Khri Sroñ lde btsan* is stated in both available texts of the *sBa bžed* (G, pp. 67–75 and S, pp. 57–62). This chronicle connected with the first Tibetan monastic centre of *bSam yas* (see G, p. 82.11) contains records of the *sBa* family, members of which are reputed to have participated in the Great Debate.¹³⁴ And the *sBa* records may well be our oldest *chos 'byuñ* source on the subject; at all events the *sBa bžed* has been described as the 'matrix' (*phyi mo*) – i.e. the textual source – of all Tibetan chronicles (*rgyal rabs*) and religious histories (*chos 'byuñ*) as well as the record (*bka' gtsigs*, etc.) of *bSam yas*.¹³⁵

The Supplemented Version (*Žabs btags ma*) of the *sBa bžed* became widely available to modern scholarship only in 1961, when R. A. Stein published a facsimile edition of it. And another, unsupplemented version of the *sBa bžed* was published as recently as 1980 in Beijing by *mGon po rgyal mtshan*. The title *sBa bžed* appears in Tibetan sources also in the forms *rBa bžed*, *dBa' bžed*, *dPa' bžed* and *sPa bžed*.¹³⁶ The reference in each case appears to be

¹³⁴ The colophon of the *sBa bžed* G p. 82 mentions the view that, in the title *sBa bžed*, *sBa* refers to *sBa gSal snañ*, as well as to another view that this *rus*-name refers to *sBa Saň ši*. This colophon then adds that the *sBa bžed* is in fact widely regarded as the record of *bSam yas* (*bsam yas bka' thams [= than?]*). A version known as the *Mi sPa bžed* (*sic*) is connected with *gSal snañ* and *Saň ši* in *Sum pa mkhan po Ye šes dpal 'byor's dPag bsam ljon bzaiñ*, f. 101a5 (p. 155).

¹³⁵ See the title-page of the 1978 Dharamsala edition of the *Žabs btags ma* version.

¹³⁶ The form *dPa' bžed* is found in *Sa skya Pañđi ta Kun dga' rgyal mtshan, sKyes bu dam pa rnam la sprin ba'i yi ge* (sDe dge ed.), f. 72b4, while the *Thub pa'i dgoris pa rab tu gsal ba*, f. 50b2, has both *dBa' bžed* (but *dPa' bžed* in the N-GMPP Ms from Nepal, f. 72a5) and 'Ba' bžed; and the same text mentions in addition a *rGyal bžed* (cf. above, n. 134). 'Gos gŽon nu dpal's *Deb ther ston po*, ka, f. 20a4, and *Sum pa mkhan po's dPag bsam ljon bzaiñ*, f. 101a5 (p. 155), have *sPa bžed* (*gtsaň ma*). The spelling *rBa bžed* is found in *Bu ston's Chos 'byuñ* (f. 93b2), and in *dPa' bo gTsong lag phreñ ba's mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 120a5.

As for the family name, the forms *sBa*, *rBa*, *dBa*', *dBa's* 'Ba' and *Bha* are all found (as

to the sBa family – seemingly known earlier as dBa'(s) and also as 'Ba' – which played so prominent a part in the development of the bSam yas monastic centre, and indeed in the whole history of Tibet in the second half of the eight century, starting apparently at the end of the reign of Mes Ag tshom(s) and continuing throughout the reign of Khri Sroñ lde btsan. The *sBa bžed* is in fact considered the work of a member of this family, sBa gSal snañ.¹³⁷ This man, who had once been governor of Mañ yul province in southern Tibet and was in contact with a certain Ho-shang (Me mgo/'go), became closely associated with Śāntaraḡṡita by whom he is said to have been ordained under the name of Ye šes dbañ po.¹³⁸ Another name closely associated with Śāntara-

well even as dPa' and sPa).

Three versions of the *btsan po mñia bdag gi bka' gtsigs* are mentioned in the sources. One is said to have been deposited in the Tibetan King's own hand (*rje'i phyag [sbal]*); another is said to have been in lHa sa; and the third is said to have been taken to Kham (see *sBa bžed*, G, p. 82 ~ S, p. 65). Several sources furthermore mention the *sBa bžed* properly speaking, presumably the one deposited according to some authorities with the ministers and officials; the *rGyal bžed*, presumably the one deposited with the King; and the *Bla bžed*, in other words the version deposited with the Tibetan clergy. See Sa skya Pañđi ta, *Thub pa'i dgoñs pa rab tu gsal ba* (sDe dge ed.), f. 50b; Sog bzlog pa Blo gros ryal mtshan, *gSañ snags sia 'gyur la bod du rtsod pa sia phyir byuñ ba nams keyi lan du brjod pa, nies don 'brug sgra* (in *Collected works of Sog-bzlog-pa*, ed. Sanje Dorje, Vol. i, New Delhi, 1975), f. 6a, f.; Sum pa mkhan po Ye šes dpal 'byor, *dPag bsam ljon bzai*, f. 101 (= p. 155); Brag dgon žabs druñ dKon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas, *Deb ther rgya mtsho*, I, f. 4a; A khu šes rab rgya mtsho, *dPe rgyun dkon po 'ga' žig gi tho yig*, ed. Lokesh Chandra, *Materials for a history of Tibetan literature*, Part iii (New Delhi, 1963), nos. 11015–17. See also A. Vostrikov, *Tibetan historical literature* (Calcutta, 1970), pp. 24–26. According to Sog bzlog pa, *op. cit.*, f. 6a4, the *Bla bžed* was composed, following the *sBa bžed*, by Bla chen po (dGoñs pa rab gsal, or Ye šes 'od?). The identity of the *Mi sPa bžed* mentioned by Sum pa mkhan po, *op. cit.*, f. 101a5 (p. 155) is not certain.

In connexion with the record of three versions of the King's commands, of which one was apparently the *sBa bžed*, compare the report that the King's decision after the Great Debate was preserved in three versions, one of which was deposited in the King's hand or archive (*phyag dbal/sbal*) and another of which was distributed among the ministers (*žani blon*) (*sBa bžed*, G, p. 76; S, p. 62).

¹³⁷ This attribution cannot of course hold for the entire Supplemented Version – the *Žabs btags ma* – which recounts events from the time of the accession of Khri Sroñ lde btsan's successor Mu ne btsan po down to the time of Atiša in the middle of the eleventh century. Even the unsupplemented version recounts the death of sBa Ye šes dbañ po (G, p. 78 ff., identified with sBa gSal snañ in a note on p. 76) and sBa Sañ ši (identified with dPal dbyañs, G. pp. 76, 78).

¹³⁸ See Bu ston, *Chos 'byuñ*, f. 125b7. (But compare f. 127a3 of the same work which connects this name with another monk.) See also *sBa bžed*, S, p. 51; Bu ston, *Chos 'byuñ*, f. 127a5; dPa' bo gTsong lag phreñ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 103b–104a. Cf. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, II, pp. 17–18.

kṣita is that of sBa Ratna, who is also stated to have become a monk under the name of Ye šes dbaṅ po (*sBa bžed*, G, p. 64 note) and who is mentioned as an associate of Kamalaśīla during the Great Debate.¹³⁹ According to an alternative view mentioned in the colophon of the *sBa bžed*, the name sBa refers to the records of ('Ba') Sañ ši (ta). The name Sañ ši alternates in some places with the name ('Ba'/sBa) dPal dbyaṅs, and the two seem in fact to refer to one and the same person. dPal dbyaṅs – the successor of Ye šes dbaṅ po as chief monk (*riri lugs*) – is well known as another of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna's main opponents and interlocutors in the Great Debate.

Now it is true that Imaeda, followed tentatively by Demiéville, has dated the *sBa bžed* to the early fourteenth century.¹⁴⁰ This dating would seem at first sight to find support in the fact that the Supplemented Version of the *sBa bžed* (S, p. 54.11) refers to the *gSuñ rab rin po che'i mdzod*, i.e. to Bu ston's *Chos 'byuñ* completed c. 1323. But this reference is missing in the other version (G, p. 64); and Bu ston has himself referred to a *rBa bžed* in his own *Chos 'byuñ* in another context (f. 93b2). Moreover, Bu ston's source for the section in his *Chos 'byuñ* on the Great Debate may well have been a *sBa bžed*; at any rate, the accounts of it we find in both texts are clearly closely related. And the later accounts in many *Chos 'byuñ* texts rely on either Bu ston or the *sBa bžed*, or on both. In his *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* completed in 1564, dPa' bo gTsong lag phreṅ ba (1504–1566) has quoted an 'Alternative Tradition' in a form that is practically identical with the one found in the unsupplemented version of the *sBa bžed* (G, pp. 72–73). Most important in this context, however, is the fact that Sa skya Paṅḍi ta Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182–1251) much earlier referred to a *dPa' bžed* (or *dBa' bžed*) in his discussions of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna's teachings.

¹³⁹ In the *sBa bžed*, S, p. 50, sBa Ratna is mentioned as the first Tibetan monk; but compare Bu ston, *Chos 'byuñ*, f. 127a, and Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, II, p. 19. Z. Yamaguchi (*Hirakawa felicitation volume*, Tōkyō, 1975, p. 641 ff.) has identified dPal dbyaṅs = sBa Sañ ši with sBa Ratna. Bu ston, *Chos 'byuñ*, f. 128a, distinguishes between dPal dbyaṅs and Bha (*sic*) Ratna. The *sBa bžed* (S, p. 50) may identify 'Ba' Khri gzigs with sBa Ratna, and (S, p. 51) 'Ba' Khri (b)žer (Sañ ši ta) with dPal dbyaṅs (?). Compare *sBa bžed*, G, pp. 58–59, 76, where the equivalences sBa Khri gzigs = sBa dPal dbyaṅs = sBa Sañ ši (ta) have been indicated in small type; cf. p. 64.

¹⁴⁰ Imaeda, *Journal asiatique*, p. 126; Demiéville in M. Soyumié (ed.), *Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang*, p. 4.

In sum, despite the fact that the Supplemented Version of the *sBa bžed* published by Stein must for the reasons mentioned above be considered as a whole to be much later than the eighth century, and although the recensions of the *sBa bžed* now available to us differ in wording and in many details, there would nevertheless seem to exist no compelling reason to reject as completely spurious and unreliable the matter on which the recensions agree in substance. And there is reason to think that both these recensions contain ancient records or traditions (*bžed lugs*) that could go back to members of the sBa family which played so important a rôle at the time of the foundation of bSam yas and the controversy between the 'Gradualists' and 'Simultaneists' in late eighth-century Tibet, and that we thus have reflected (however indirectly) in our texts of the *sBa bžed* the views of major participants in these events.

Among other important earlier Tibetan historical sources, the *Bod kyi rgyal rabs*, an old chronicle in some three folios only by the Sa skya hierarch Grags pa rgyal mtshan (1147–1216), has not entered into doctrinal matters, and this very short work contains no reference to the Hva šaṅ and the controversy between Gradualists and Simultaneists. And in the *Chos la 'jug pa'i sgo* by the Sa skya hierarch bSod nams rtse mo (1142–1182), a work that does include briefly at the end some Chos 'byuṅ type material relating to Tibet, we also find no mention of these matters. It seems, then, that in the Sa skya historical tradition Sa skya Paṅḍi ta (1182–1251) was the first of the great hierarchs to direct his attention to the controversy between Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's school and the Ho-shangs, which he has done in several of his writings.

In the history by Ne'u/Nel pa Paṅḍi ta Grags pa smon lam blo gros, the *sNon gyi gtam Me tog phreṅ ba* (dated to 1283 or 1343) which on many points follows traditions different from those found in the *Chos 'byuṅ* of the author's contemporary Bu ston,¹⁴¹

¹⁴¹ Cf. G. Roerich, *The Blue annals* (Calcutta, 1949); p. viii; H. Uebach, in M. Brauen and P. Kvaerne (eds.), *Tibetan studies* (Zürich, 1978), pp. 219–230; and in B. Aziz and M. Kapstein (eds.), *Soundings in Tibetan civilization* (New Delhi, 1985), p. 147 f.

we find an allusion to the debate (*rtsod pa*) between the sTon min and the rTse min (f. 22a1), the Tibetan transcriptions of the Chinese names of the two opposed tendencies of 'Simultaneism' and 'Gradualism'. Ne'u Paṇḍi ta has however provided no details about the doctrinal points at issue except to say, very interestingly, that the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna taught a doctrine that was in agreement with the Mahāmudrā (*phyag rgya chen po 'thun pa'i grub mtha' bzun*, f. 21b5). This point had already been made earlier by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta.¹⁴² Ne'u Paṇḍi ta concludes his account of the matter by stating (f. 22a1) that the monk Mahāyāna was defeated and reporting that it was thereupon decreed that only Dharma (*chos 'ba' žig*) – that is, evidently, the Dharma taught by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla following Nāgārjuna – should henceforth be practised in Tibet, and that non-Dharma (*chos ma yin pa*) should not be practised (f. 22a2).

The account of the controversy and ensuing debate between the 'Gradualists' and 'Simultaneists' provided by Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290–1364) in his *gSuñ rab rin po che'i mdzod* (ff. 127a–129b) has hitherto been no doubt the best known one since it has been drawn upon by a number of later Tibetan historians. Bu ston recounts how, in view of disagreements between Śāntarakṣita's followers such as Ye šes dbaṅ po and the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna, Kamalaśīla was invited to Tibet to replace his master Śāntarakṣita, who had recently died as the result of an accident. A debate was then organized with the King sitting in the centre as witness and arbiter, and with the Hva šaṅ placed to his right and Kamalaśīla accompanied by the Tsen min to his left. Bu ston explains that the Chinese term *tsen min (pa)* corresponds to *rim gyis pa* 'Gradualist', and that the Chinese term *ton mun (pa)* corresponds to *gcig car ba* 'Simultaneist'. According to Bu ston's account, the points at issue were the Hva šaṅ's teaching of the need for simultaneous engagement (*gcig car [du] 'jug pa*) while giving up all activity and thinking and the teaching of Kamalaśīla's school concerning the need for gradual engagement (*rim gyis*

¹⁴² See below, p. 101ff. 'Brug pa Kun legs has also spoken of a *phyag rgya hva šaṅ gi lta ba* in his *gSuñ 'bum, kha*, f. 14a (quoted by R. A. Stein, *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 179 [1971], p. 10 note). Compare also the colophon of the *bSam gtan mig sgron* ascribed to gNubs Saṅs rgyas ye šes (Leh, 1974), f. 254a, for references to the relation between the (*da lta'i*) *phyag chen* and the teaching of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna.

'jug pa) which is compared with the step-by-step ascent of a mountain. As part of the 'Simultaneist' teaching, mention is made of primal buddhahood (*darī po nas sañs rgyas*, f. 129a–b).¹⁴³ As opponents of the Hva šaṅ's Simultaneist teaching Bu ston mentions dPal dbyaṅs and Ye šes dbaṅ po beside Kamalaśīla. And Co rMa rma is mentioned as an associate of the Hva šaṅ. Already at the beginning of the debate the King is stated by Bu ston to have ordered that the loser should not remain. And after he had conceded defeat the Hva šaṅ is accordingly said to have been sent home (*rgya'i yul du brdzañs*), at which point he concealed books of his as 'treasures' (*gter du sbas so*). The King decreed that henceforth the system (*lugs*) of Nāgārjuna should be observed in the domain of theory, that in the domain of praxis the ten Dharma-practices (*chos spyod*) should be followed, and that the Ton mun system was not to be permitted. Finally, according to Bu ston, four Chinese executioners of the Hva šaṅ (*hva šaṅ gi rgya'i bšan pa mi bži*) killed Kamalaśīla by squeezing his kidneys; and Ye šes dbaṅ po then died after having given up food. As already noted, Bu ston's account is quite closely related to the version we find in the *sBa bžed*, and it is probably based on it.

Another Tibetan history, the *Deb ther dmar po* (*Hu lan deb ther*) composed in 1346 by Tshal pa Kun dga' rdo rje (dGe ba'i blo gros), merely mentions Kamalaśīla and the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna (f. 17b1 = p. 37) without, however, saying anything about a controversy or debate between 'Gradualists' and 'Simultaneists'.

The story of the Hva šaṅ, Kamalaśīla and the Great Debate was thereafter taken up by other historians of the bKa' brgyud pa school. It is true that in his *Deb ther sñon po* completed in 1478 the Karma pa historian 'Gos gŽon nu dpal (1393–1481) does not mention the Great Debate; nor does he refer to Kamalaśīla in connexion with events at that time although he speaks of Śāntarakṣita. But he alludes to Hva šaṅs and to the story that one of them left behind in Tibet one of his boots as a presage of the spread of the Teaching in Tibet (ka, f. 21a); and he specifies that a Hva šaṅ prophesied that the conversion of Tibet was to be the special responsibility (*'dul skal*) of Śāntarakṣita, and that nobody

¹⁴³ On this point see below, note 164.

else would be of help in this task (f. 2125). Another historian from the Karma pa school, dPa' bo gTsug lag phreñ ba (1504–66), has on the contrary dealt in detail with the Great Debate and with the rôle of Kamalaśīla in his *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* (ja, ff. 114a–122b). The treatment of the Great Debate and of Kamalaśīla's rôle in the *Chos 'byuñ bstan pa'i padma rgyas pa'i ñin byed* by the 'Brug pa bKa' brgyud pa Padma dkar po (1527–1592) is very closely related to Bu ston's account and thus to that of the *sBa bžed*.¹⁴⁴

Thus, in the earlier Tibetan historical literature up to the middle of the fourteenth century as available to us until recently, apart from the *sBa bžed* the exact school-links of which are not altogether clear, the encounter and controversy in Tibet between the 'Gradualists' and 'Simultaneists' and the Great Debate are found mentioned above all in sources connected with the Sa skya pa and, probably, the bKa' gdams pa schools. Later the subject was treated by bKa' brgyud pa authors too such as dPa' bo gTsug lag phreñ ba, who has based his account on the *sBa bžed* (including the 'Alternative Tradition' reproduced in the unsupplemented recension of the *sBa bžed*) and has also quoted (f. 119b) Bu ston's *Chos 'byuñ*.

II. THE *CHOS 'BYUÑ ME TOG SÑIÑ PO* OF ÑAÑ ÑI MA 'OD ZER

The relative paucity and possible onesidedness of these older Tibetan historical materials have now been compensated in a most valuable and important way by the recent publication of the *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po sBran rtsi'i bcud*, a history of Buddhism ascribed to the twelfth-century rñiñ ma author Ñañ Ñi ma 'od zer.¹⁴⁵ For the most part, this work corroborates and supplements the accounts of the encounter between 'Gradualists' and 'Simultaneists' and of the Great Debate available from the sources mentioned above. But in certain respects it gives us a different view of some important details.

¹⁴⁴ Ed. Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi, 1968), f. 164b ff. For other later Tibetan sources on the Great Debate, see G. W. Houston, *Sources for a history of the bSam yas debate*.

¹⁴⁵ See: *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po sBran rtsi'i bcud*, MS A and B, in *Rin chen gter mdzod chen po'i rgyab chos*, Volumes 5 and 6 (Paro, 1979); and R. O. Meisezahl, *Die grosse Geschichte des tibetischen Buddhismus nach alter Tradition*, Monumenta tibetica historica 1/3 (St. Augustin, 1985).

The date of birth of Ņañ ral has been variously given as 1124 and 1136, and his death has been placed in either 1192 or 1204. He is renowned as a master of the rDzogs chen, and as a Discoverer (*gter ston*) of both rŅiñ ma and Bon po texts (*gter ma*).¹⁴⁶ He thus belongs to a tradition quite different from the author(s) of the *sBa bžed*, from Bu ston and the other gSar ma pa authors of later Chos 'byuñs who follow the *sBa bžed* and/or Bu ston in their accounts of the Great Debate, and from Sa skya Pañđi ta.

Ņi ma 'od zer's family name Ņañ/Myañ (both spellings have the same pronunciation) might possibly suggest a link, however distant, with the tradition of Myañ/Ņañ Tiñ ñe 'dzin (bzañ po),¹⁴⁷ the preceptor of the young Khri lDe sroñ btsan (Sad na legs, reigned c. 800–815?), a disciple of Vimalamitra from whom he received the sŅiñ thig teaching, and hence a very important early teacher of the rDzogs chen. As already noted above, Myañ Tiñ ñe 'dzin bzañ po figures as an opponent of sBa Ye šes dbañ po. Another master evidently connected with the Myañ/Ņañ tradition, Myañ/Ņañ Ša mi, is also known as the associate of a Hva šañ sometimes known as Me 'go/mgo and of sŅa Bye ma (*sBa bžed*, G, p. 67–68, and S, p. 57).

The *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po* accordingly is one of our earliest datable Tibetan sources concerning the encounter between 'Gradualists' and 'Simultaneists' and the Great Debate. Its author is senior by at least half a century to Sa skya Pañđi ta, who has hitherto been our oldest securely datable authority on the subject. The *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po* may then be surpassed in antiquity only by sBa records incorporated in the *sBa bžed*, and perhaps by

¹⁴⁶ On Ņañ ral and the question of 'ambivalent' – i.e. Buddhist (rDzogs chen) and Bon po – *gter stons*, see A. M. Blondeau in L. Ligeti (ed.), *Tibetan and Buddhist studies commemorating the 200th anniversary of the birth of Alexander Csoma de Kőrös* (Budapest, 1984), p. 77 ff., and Meisezahl's introduction to his facsimile edition of the *Chos 'byuñ*.

¹⁴⁷ Richardson, *A corpus of early Tibetan inscriptions*, p. 44, regards such a connexion as perhaps speculative. The Myañ ban Tiñ ñe 'dzin (bzañ po) founded the dBu ru Žva'i lha khañ 50 miles north-east of lHa sa on the Mañ ra chu. As for the Ņañ bđag and Ņañ ral Ņi ma 'od zer, though born in lHo brag, his *gdan sa* is to be found in Myañ stod according to the *'Dzam gliñ rgyas bšad* (f. 65a; Wylie, p. 71). And the Myañ clan to which Tiñ ñe 'dzin belonged may have originated in the upper valley of the Myañ chu around rGya mda' according to Richardson (*Corpus*, p. 44; see also *Bulletin of Tibetology* 4 (1967), p. 19 n. 10 on the location of Myañ). Eva Dargyay has listed Myañ Tiñ ñe 'dzin as an ancestor of Ņañ ral Ņi ma 'od zer in her *Rise of esoteric Buddhism in Tibet* (Delhi, 1977), p. 57, but without clearly giving her source.

another source stemming from the same school as Ņaṅ ral, the *bSam gtan mig sgron* ascribed to gNubs Saṅs rgyas ye šes the date of which is, however, not established with certainty and which does not in any case explicitly mention the Great Debate even though it has much to say on the two schools of thought that then confronted each other.

It is at all events very important for the question of the reliability of the Tibetan accounts of the Great Debate that the version given in the *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sṅiṅ po* is in many parts close to, and sometimes indeed practically identical in wording with, the *sBa bžed*. In particular, this text relates the defeat of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna by the 'Gradualists' headed by Kamalaśīla and his subsequent departure from Tibet. The only possible conclusion seems then to be that if Ņaṅ ral did not actually follow the *sBa bžed* in one of its recensions, he was making use of either a source of the extant recensions of the *sBa bžed* or of some other text closely related to it.

The *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sṅiṅ po* thus seems effectively to dispose of the suspicion that the account of the Great Debate and of the Hva šaṅ's defeat by Kamalaśīla's school to be found in the *sBa bžed*, in Bu ston's *Chos 'byuṅ* and in the many later sources that give this version of events was nothing but a tendentious sectarian fabrication of Atiṣa's bKa' gdams pas, and of other gSar ma pas such as the Sa skya pas and dGe lugs pas, which was concocted in order to discredit the traditions including the Dhyāna ones associated with the rŅiṅ ma pas/rDzogs chen pas.¹⁴⁸ It has to be recalled also that in his *Deb ther dmar po*, composed in 1346 after the *Chos 'byuṅ*s of both Ne'u Paṅḍi ta and Bu ston, Kun dga' rdo rje has made no point of mentioning the Great Debate or the Hva šaṅ's defeat, something he might be expected to have done had this version of events been a fabrication of the gSar mas pas. It is equally noteworthy that whereas Sa skya Paṅḍi ta attached importance to criticizing the Hva šaṅ's teachings, the Great Debate and the Hva šaṅ's defeat have been mentioned by neither of his two great predecessors as hierarchs of Sa skya – Grags pa

¹⁴⁸ On the relationship between the *sBa bžed* and the rŅiṅ ma tradition, see also Sog bzlog pa, *Ņes don 'brug sgra*, f. 6a f.

rgyal mtshan in his *Bod kyi rgyal rabs* and bSod nams rtse mo in his *Chos la 'jug pa'i sgo* – although these two authors were contemporaries of the rÑiñ ma pa Ñañ ral who has recounted these things.

The account given by the rDzogs chen pa Ñañ ral of the Great Debate and especially of the Hva šaṅ's defeat is all the more significant for the evaluation of the authenticity and reliability of the sources containing them because at least as early as the time of Kloñ chen rab 'byams pa (1308–1363) rDzogs chen pa authorities have inclined to look on the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna's teachings with favour (see below, p. 102).

On the following points the account found in the *Chos 'byun Me tog sñiñ po* concerning the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna and the Great Debate deserves special mention. Some of them are quite close to what has been recorded in the *sBa bžed* and in the later Tibetan historical sources, but a few reflect noteworthy divergences from the hitherto available accounts.

(1) The discussions between the 'Gradualists' and 'Simultaneists' in Tibet at the end of the eighth century are presented as taking the form of a formal debate (*rtsod pa*) between two tendencies, each engaged in trying to reach a decisive conclusion in investigative argument (*gšags*), with the Tibetan ruler himself acting as the witness-arbiter (*dpañ po* = *sākṣin*) between Kamalaśīla and his Tibetan followers on the one side and the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna and his supporters on the other.¹⁴⁹

That this kind of discussion taking the form of a regular debate, familiar as it is to us from treatises on the Indian *vāda*-

¹⁴⁹ For the rôle of the *sākṣin* in a debate, see for example Dharmakīrti, *Vādanāyāya* with Śāntarakṣita's comment (ed. Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi, 1972), pp. 69, 107. A king's court is recognized as a *vādādhikaraṇa* or suitable place for debate by Asaṅga, *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, p. 104. The arbiter-witness is also known as *sabhāpati* (e.g. in Vācaspatimiśra's *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* V. ii. 21). For later debates between Buddhists and Taoists under the Yüan, including one in which the young 'Phags pa took part in 1258 and which was presided over as crown prince by the future emperor Qubilai, see T. Thiel, *Monumenta Serica* 20 (1961), pp. 39–46.

That such a debate should have been organized and presided over (at least occasionally) by a king or prince is accordingly in no way unusual and need not be considered as later legend, or 'invention of tradition', by the Tibetan writers.

tradition, could have been already known in Tibet at the end of the eighth century is in accord with the likelihood that a high degree of scholastic knowledge and skill had been introduced in Tibet at that time by Śāntarakṣita (who indeed commented on Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*) and Kamalaśīla, and with the fact that extensive scholastic knowledge is demonstrated a little later by such an early Tibetan scholar as sNa nam Ye šes sde.¹⁵⁰

That just this scenario of a formal debate between Kamalaśīla and the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna should have been accepted for the controversy between the 'Gradualists' and 'Simultaneists' by the author of the *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po*, who belonged to a school for which the use of philosophical debate was however anything but characteristic, is of considerable significance for assessing the Tibetan account of these events. This fact could be explained in various ways. The author may simply have been relying on the *sBa bžed*, or on some closely related source belonging to a tradition that did make extensive use of debate in its philosophical exercises. Or these traditions may have been current in at least a section of the rñiñ ma school too. Or, again, it may be that events actually took the form described in the above-mentioned Tibetan sources. All that can be said at present is that this account of the controversy may reflect one of the earliest Tibetan views of these events handed down by the sBa family and accepted also by the author of the *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po*, even though this precise scenario is not known to us from the Dunhuang documents; or, on the contrary, it may be a more or less dramatized reconstruction by Tibetan writers of a slightly later period (possibly at the start of the *phyi dar* or Second Propagation of Buddhism in Tibet) in accordance with a standard schema of Indo-Tibetan philosophical and religious discussion.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. for example D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Journal asiatique* 1979, p. 207 ff., on sNa nam Ye šes sde. And for a discussion of other scholastic treatises ascribed to early Tibetan authors, see Tucci, *Minor Tibetan texts*, II, p. 122 ff.

Subsequently, philosophical discussion in the form of debate appears to have been cultivated at the very latest by the time of Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109–1169) at gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog. This seminary was founded in 1073 by rNog Legs pa'i šes rab, the uncle of rNog Blo ldan šes rab whose writings also attest a high degree of scholastic knowledge and who acted as abbot of this seminary. The forms of religio-philosophical discussion and debate have been set out in some detail by Sa skya Paṅḍi ta in his *mKhas 'jug* (Ch. iii), the oldest Tibetan text on the subject that appears to be available at present. Cf. now D. Jackson, *The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III)* (Vienna, 1987).

At all events, the fact that the *Chos 'byun Me tog sñin po* does mention a formal debate in which Kamalaśīla and his followers prevailed over the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna lends no support to the opinion that the account found in the *sBa bžed* and in Bu ston's *Chos 'byun* represents nothing but a deliberate and tendentious distortion of events by opponents of the 'Simultaneists' and of the rÑin ma/rDzogs chen traditions motivated by sectarian bias. An argument *ex silentio* based on the absence of an explicit reference in the Chinese documents to a formal debate between the Ho-shang and Kamalaśīla or his Tibetan followers cannot be regarded as conclusive, especially in view of the clearly polemical character of Wang Hsi's *Cheng-li chüeh* studied by Demiéville.

(2) In agreement with other sources, the *Chos 'byun Me tog sñin po* (f. 433a-b) has placed the master dPal dbyaṅs among the opponents of the Hva šaṅ and the *cig char 'jug pa* or 'Chinese theory' (*rgya'i lta ba*) of the sTon min pas. This connexion is in accord with the attachment of dPal dbyaṅs to the 'Ba'/sBa family (for example in the *sBa bžed*). Tucci¹⁵¹ has entertained the hypothesis that since a (certain) dPal dbyaṅs is stated to have belonged to the gÑan family, and indeed to have been a disciple of Vimalamitra and gÑags Jñānakumāra,¹⁵² the attachment of the participant in the debate named dPal dbyaṅs to the party of Kamalaśīla and sBa Ye šes dbaṅ po may simply reflect a desire on the part of the author(s) of the *sBa bžed* to glorify their own family. But the fact that the *Chos 'byun Me tog sñin po* also regards this dPal dbyaṅs as an associate of Kamalaśīla and Ye šes dbaṅ po goes against this hypothesis; and the alternative view considered by Tucci, namely that we have here two different masters having the same name, is the likely one. It should be noted, moreover, that the words ascribed to dPal dbyaṅs in this *Chos 'byun*, in one version of the *sBa bžed* (G, p. 70) and in the *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* (ja, f. 117b) are ascribed in the *Žabs btags ma* version of the *sBa bžed* (S, p. 59) to a certain Saṅ ši, a name (or title) borne by another member of the 'Ba' family (S, p. 17.15). (Strangely, the

¹⁵¹ G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, ii, pp. 20-21, 150. Cf. Demiéville, in: M. Soymié (ed.), *Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang*, p. 11 (referring to Z. Yamaguchi).

¹⁵² See *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, tha, f. 25a (p. 215.7); *Deb ther sñon po*, ga, f. 2a (p. 104). On gÑan dPal dbyaṅs see R. Kimura, *Journal asiatique*, 1981, pp. 191-2.

Supplemented Version of the *sBa bžed* then (S, p. 60) ascribes to dPal dbyaṅs the intervention in the Great Debate which the unsupplemented version (G, p. 70–71) attributes to Ye šes dbaṅ po.)

(3) In its account of the Great Debate the *Chos 'byun Me tog sñiṅ po* (f. 433b2) mentions, in the intervention ascribed to the master dPal dbyaṅs, a trifurcation of the 'middle Nikāyas' (? *dbus sde rnam gsum*). What is meant by this enigmatic expression is unfortunately not clear.^{152a}

However, in this connexion both recensions of the *sBa bžed* – G (p. 70.16) where dPal dbyaṅs is also mentioned as the speaker, and S (p. 60.5) where Sañ ši is named as the speaker – as well as Bu ston's *Chos 'byun* (f. 129a6) and the *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* (ja, f. 118a1) all read *dbu ma rnam gsum*. Now, if the reference were to the three well-known schools of the Madhyamaka (*dbu ma*) recognized by the later Tibetan doxographers, this passage could hardly be dated before the eleventh or twelfth century when, as a consequence of the activity of Pa tshab Ņi ma grags (said to have been born in 1055) and his associates, the *Prāsaṅgika (Thal 'gyur ba) branch of the Madhyamaka first became established in Tibet in addition to the (Sautrāntika-)Svātantrika and the (Svātantrika-)Yogācāra-Madhyamaka branches already recognized by the ninth century. At all events, it seems highly unlikely that dPal dbyaṅs (or Sañ ši) should have spoken of three branches of the Madhyamaka in Tibet at the end of the eighth century, when none of the known sources of that period seems ever to mention this third branch.

The reading *dbus sde* in the *Chos 'byun Me tog sñiṅ po* seems to place the problem in a different light, and it might even be supposed to reflect an earlier version of the passage in question (although it is not clear to what the expression *dbus sde* might refer). On the other hand, the reading *dbus sde* might represent a

^{152a} The problem is compounded by the fact that in another historical work giving an account of the Great Debate and also ascribed to Ņaṅ ral – the Mi rje lhas mdzad *Byaṅ chub sems dpa' sems dpa' chen po chos rgyal mes dbon rnam gsum gyi rnam par thar pa, Rin po che'i phren ba* published in 1980 at Paro – we read *dbu ma rnam pa lia ma mthun te ston min 1 char du 'jug mchis te* (f. 125b4–5). (The authorship of this work is not clear, and one folio is missing just before the last page of the reprint.)

correction, by *Ñān ral* or by a source or a redactor of his, of the reading *dbu ma nam gsum*. For the earlier *rÑiñ ma/rDzogs chen* authors did not ordinarily recognize three branches of the *Madhyamaka*;¹⁵³ in addition, the author (or a redactor) of the *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po* could well have been aware of the fact that this triple division of the *Madhyamaka* was not recognized in Tibet at the time of the Great Debate. Nevertheless, it must be noted that our *Chos 'byuñ* itself explicitly mentions (f. 512a) both *Candrakīrti* – the main source of the **Prāsaṅgika* branch of the *Madhyamaka* – and *Pa tshab Ñi ma grags* – reputedly its first major Tibetan proponent; but it has done so without mentioning the *Thal 'gyur ba* (**Prāsaṅgika*) as a distinct, third branch of the *Madhyamaka*.

(4) Concerning the circumstances of *Kamalaśīla*'s death after the Great Debate, the author of the *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po* differs from the account we find in the *sBa bžed*, and he diverges completely from the version found in *Bu ston*'s *Chos 'byuñ* and the related sources.

According to the *sBa bžed* (G, p. 77–78; S, p. 64) and the *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* (ja, f. 122b6), *Kamalaśīla* was murdered by executioners (*gšed ma*) despatched by the *mu stegs pa*. This name, corresponding to Skt. *tīrthika/tīrthakāra*, designates a non-Buddhist, and in particular a Hindu sectarian. What *mu stegs pa* was intended to denote in this context is, however, uncertain.¹⁵⁴ And the difficulty is compounded from the point of view of the Tibetan tradition by the fact that, in the prophetic testament he is supposed to have given *Khri Sroñ lde btsan*, *Śāntarakṣita* is recorded to have foretold that after his death there would no

¹⁵³ The **Prāsaṅgika* school of *Madhyamaka* is not known to the *bSam gtan mig sgron*. *Roñ zom Chos kyi bzañ po* (eleventh century) mentions only the *mDo sde dbu ma* and the *rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma* in his *Man niag lta phreñ 'grel pa* (f. 28b), *lTa ba'i brjed byañ* (f. 11b–12a) and *Grub mtha' brjed byañ* (f. 5a–6a). However, *Kloñ chen rab 'byams pa* (1308–1363) has recognized the **Prāsaṅgika* branch, for example in the *Grub mtha' mdzod* (f. 54b f. ~ 40a f.).

¹⁵⁴ Tucci has supposed that *Kamalaśīla* may have been killed by *Bon pos* (*Minor Buddhist texts*, II, p. 45). But since the reference is to executioners from China, could the *mu stegs pa* in this case have been *Taoists* (or even *Buddho-Taoists*)? On *Taoism* in Tibet at this time, see *Demiéville* in *M. Soyumié* (ed.), *Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang*, p. 6. Compare for example the *Li'i yul luñ bstan pa*, translated by *F. W. Thomas*, *Tibetan literary texts and documents concerning Chinese Turkestan*, I (London, 1935), p. 84.

longer be any *mu stegs pas* in Tibet, but that instead a split would develop in the Buddhist Dharma itself.¹⁵⁵ Bu ston (or possibly a source of his) may have noticed this discrepancy between the account that Kamalaśīla was murdered by an agent of the *mu stegs pa* and what Śāntarakṣita had foretold in his testament, which he has recorded in his *Chos 'byuñi*.¹⁵⁶ For according to Bu ston Kamalaśīla was murdered by four executioners from China belonging to the Hva šaṅ (*hva šaṅ gi rgya'i bšan pa mi bži*, f. 129b6), a version of events that was later followed by Padma dkar po (*Chos 'byuñi*, f. 165a6) among others. In other words, Bu ston (or a source) may have engaged in a kind of rational reconstruction of events and concluded – given what Śāntarakṣita was held to have foretold – that it must have been the Ho-shang's party that was responsible for Kamalaśīla's alleged murder. In these circumstances, fully satisfactory grounds hardly exist for explaining Bu ston's version (along with that of Padma dkar po and others) by simply ascribing to him a desire to denigrate the Ho-shang.

It is of special interest to observe in this connexion that the *Chos 'byuñi Me tog sñiñ po* (f. 138a) not only knows nothing of Bu ston's version mentioning executioners sent by the Hva šaṅ as Kamalaśīla's murderers but distances itself from the *sBa bžed's* account of a murder by agents of the *mu stegs pa* by qualifying it as a report by means of the verb *zer ba* 'it is said'. And it states instead that Kamalaśīla was killed by an Indian servant Dhanaśrī who was looking for gold.

(5) In the *Chos 'byuñi Me tog sñiñ po* (f. 429b–430a) it is related that at the start of the Great Debate at the Byaṅ chub gliñ of bSam yas the King decreed that the loser should, as the price of defeat, receive a punishment (*chad pa gcod do*), which is however not specified. But no mention is made in this text of the banishment from Tibet by royal command of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna after he lost the debate. According to this account the

¹⁵⁵ *sBa bžed*, G, pp. 66, 72; and S, p. 56; Bu ston, *Chos 'byuñi*, f. 127b; dPa' bo gTsong lag phreñ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 115b. Cf. *Chos 'byuñi Me tog sñiñ po*, f. 427b–428a.

¹⁵⁶ Bu ston, *Chos 'byuñi*, f. 127b. It should however be noted that the teaching of non-activity which was Mo-ho-yen's, and to which Kamalaśīla refers in his *Bhāvanākrama* (iii, p. 20), has been connected by Kamalaśīla with teachings of the *mu stegs can* (*tīrthikas*) called *kun tu tshol ba*, evidently the Ājīvikas. See below, p. 142.

Hva šaṅ left, apparently voluntarily, not for China but for Bodh Gayā (rDo rje gdan) in India (f. 436a-b).

In the *sBa bžed* (G, p. 75 and S, p. 62) it is related that the Hva šaṅ returned to China (*slar rgya nag tu gšegs*) (cf. *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. i19a). The *rGyal rabs gsal ba'i me lon* (p. 182) too states that he departed (*bžud pa*) for China. For their part, Bu ston (*Chos 'byun*, f. 128b2) and Padma dkar po (*Chos 'byun*, f. 165a3-4) report that already at the very start of the Great Debate the Tibetan monarch decreed that the loser was not to remain in his realm; and these two sources relate that after losing the debate the Hva šaṅ was sent off (*rdzon ba*) – i.e. probably, was banished – to China (Bu ston, f. 129b6; Padma dkar po, f. 165a5). Wang Hsi's *Cheng-li chüeh* on the other hand refers neither to a defeat nor to the banishment of Mo-ho-yen; and it mentions (f. 129a) an official edict authorizing the practice of his Dhyāna teaching. The Chinese material indicates furthermore that Mo-ho-yen returned to Dunhuang.¹⁵⁷

The discrepancies in the accounts of the fate of Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen after the Great Debate have given rise to the hypothesis that he was involved in more than one debate, and that whereas he won the earlier debate he was finally defeated in a later one.¹⁵⁸ This is of course not impossible, but it would be as difficult to prove as it would be to disprove on the basis of the available evidence; it is at least equally possible that the divergence between the accounts reflects not the different outcome of two or more debates, but differing views of a single set of events.

(6) Of special interest is the account given in the *Chos 'byun Me tog snin po* of the fate of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna's teaching in Tibet.

Both recensions of the *sBa bžed* (G, p. 75; 2, p. 62) and the *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* (ja, f. 119a) relate that the Tibetan ruler condemned the practice of the Hva šaṅ's Dharma (known as the

¹⁵⁷ See Demiéville, *Concile*, pp. 253 and 278, who has identified Mo-ho-yen with a Chinese Bhadanta living at Dunhuang after the time of the Great Debate and occupying a high post in the local administration there. Cf. Imaeda, *Journal asiatique*, 1975, p. 140-1.

¹⁵⁸ Demiéville distinguished at least three distinct sessions; see *T'oung Pao* 56 (1970), pp. 40-42. See also D. Ueyama, *Tōhō gakuhō* 35 (1964), pp. 141-214, with Demiéville's summary in *T'oung Pao* 56, pp. 29-43 (and pp. 43-44 on Z. Yamaguchi's critique of Ueyama); Imaeda, *Journal asiatique* 1975, pp. 126, 129, 140.

ston min pa cig char 'jug). And the *Žabs btags ma* version (S, p. 62), followed by the *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* (f. 119a), further specifies that the King decreed that henceforth the theory of Nāgārjuna should be accepted and that in the sphere of practice the Six Perfections should be adhered to. This version is followed in substance by Bu ston (*Chos 'byun*, f. 129b) and Padma dkar po (*Chos 'byun*, f. 165a). In the words of Ne'u Paṅḍi ta's *Chos 'byun* (f. 22a), after the defeat of the Hva šaṅ, non-Dharma (*chos ma yin pa*) was not to be practised, and Dharma alone (*chos 'ba' žig*) – that is, evidently, the Dharma taught by Kamalaśīla following Śāntarakṣita and, ultimately, Nāgārjuna – was to be practised. Interestingly, the *Blon po bka'i than yig* (f. 28a), a section of the *bKa' than sde lia* which reproduces rDzogs chen traditions (cf. *Pelliot tibétain 116*), specifies that it was the Yoga-Madhyamaka (*rnal 'byor dbu ma'i gžun*) that was to be followed, but without mentioning Kamalaśīla in this connexion; this source in fact states that the *ston mun cig car 'jug pa* is the Madhyamaka.

Now the *Chos 'byun Me tog sāni po* (f. 435b) relates that, after the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna had conceded defeat in the Great Debate, the debate was reconciled on the side of Dharma (*rtsod pa chos phyogs su 'dum par byas so*). And the King declared that in substance there was no disagreement (*don la mi mthun pa tsam mi 'dug ste*) between the two parties to the debate, and that with respect to the method of practising the Path the Hva šaṅ's Dharma, known as the *cig char du 'jug*, is a teaching concerning persons whose faculties are highly developed (*dbañ po yañ rab sbyaṅis pa can gyis chos* [variant from Ms B: *lam*] *yin la*).¹⁵⁹ But, the King added, the ten Dharma-practices had been condemned [by the Hva šaṅ] starting with the case of those whose faculties are middling (*dbañ po 'brin man chad chos spyod bcu la skyon bskal*): Mind thus becomes drowsy (*sems ni byin*), good equipment (*tshogs = sambhāra*) is not accumulated, and because others' mental training is interrupted the Dharma also declines and is interrupted. And, the King concludes, you [i.e. the Hva šaṅ] must practise meditative realisation (*bsgoms žig*). Henceforth, in the sphere of theory (*lta ba*), the theory of Nāgārjuna should be

¹⁵⁹ On the highly developed faculties (*dbañ po rnon po = tikṣṇendriya*) required to penetrate the Hva šaṅ's teaching, see also above p. 66.

accepted, and in the sphere of praxis (*spyod pa*) the Six Perfections should be practised; the ten Dharma-practices (*chos spyod bcu*) should be exercised; in the sphere of meditative realization (*bsgom pa*) mental training is through the three kinds of discriminative understanding (*šes rab = prajñā*); Means (*thabs = upāya*) and Prajñā should be yoked together (*zuni du 'brel bar gyis*), and one should engage thus in meditative realization.

This version of the King's decree does not, it is true, actually disagree with the words found in the *sBa bžed*, most of which it contains while omitting only a few. But by including several additional phrases the *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po* has nevertheless put another complexion on the Great Debate and the King's decree following it. Thus, the King's remark that the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna's teaching does not disagree *in substance* with that of Kamalaśīla's school and that it is the teaching (*chos*) – or, according to a variant reading, the Path (*lam*) – followed by advanced disciples effaces the radical opposition between the 'Gradualist' and the 'Simultaneist'.¹⁶⁰

Nevertheless, in the *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po* there is recorded the King's decree to the effect that Nāgārjuna's theory was thenceforth to be accepted, and that the practice of the Pāramitās and the yoking together in *yuganaddha* of Upāya and Prajñā should be observed.

Interestingly, the *bSam gtan mig sgron* has quoted (f. 23b–24a) a verse from the *rTen 'brel sñiñ po*, stating that it provides the source for the meditative realization of the *sTon mun*, in other words of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna's school. Now this *rTen 'brel sñiñ po* must be the *Pratītyasamutpādakārikās* ascribed to Nāgārjuna; for the verse quoted corresponds to verse 7 of this text (which is paralleled by *Ratnagotravibhāga* i. 154 and *Abhisamayālamkāra* v. 21, and partially by Aśvaghōṣa's *Saundaranandakāvya* xiii. 44).¹⁶¹ It thus appears that an important rDzogs chen text that

¹⁶⁰ This view of the matter is similar to the one attested in the *bSam gtan mig sgron*. And it is even attested in an intervention in the Great Debate ascribed either to *sBa dPal dbyans* or *Saṅ ši* (see below, p. 86).

¹⁶¹ This verse is quoted also in the *dMyigs su med pa tshul gcig pa'i gžun* (Pelliot tib. 116), f. 164 (cf. F. Faber, *Acta Orientalia* 46 [1985], pp. 71–72), and in Vimalamitra's *Cig car 'jug pa rnam par mi rtog pa'i bsgom don* (D, f. 10b). For a recent discussion of the *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikās*, see C. Dragonetti, *WZKS* 30 (1986), pp. 109–22 (where

treats the 'Simultaneist' doctrine favourably has gone so far as to cite a text elsewhere usually ascribed to Nāgārjuna as a major source for the Hva šaṅ's school.¹⁶² This significant linkage is not weakened, from the point of view of the Tibetan tradition, by the fact that the results of modern scholarship make it unlikely that Nāgārjuna was actually the author of this verse, which fits rather into a distinct doctrinal complex (with which the Hymnic Corpus ascribed to Nāgārjuna may, however, be connected).

Finally, the relationship between twenty-one Indian Ācāryas and five (Chinese) Hva šaṅs has been described in the *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po* (f. 437b) as a peaceful one at the Byams pa gliṅ, after the defeat of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna in the Great Debate at the Byaṅ chub gliṅ of bSam yas and his departure for Bodh Gayā in India.

Even according to the sBa traditions, a leading member of this family – dPal dbyaṅs or Saṅ ši – remarked during the course of the Great Debate that although there indeed existed a difference as to 'means of access' (*'jug sgo*) between the 'Simultaneists' and 'Gradualists' the two were nonetheless broadly in agreement as to their doctrines concerning the attainment of buddhahood. In other words, their doctrines of the Fruit (*'bras bu*) were generally in harmony; and the disagreement between the two parties in the Great Debate concerned their respective theories of practice of the Path.¹⁶³ Kamalaśīla's followers also rejected the idea of original Awakening (*dan po nas saṅs rgyas*).¹⁶⁴

(7) The *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po* (f. 436b) rejects as false

they are tentatively ascribed to a certain Śuddhamati, a Mādhyamika author of perhaps before the sixth century).

¹⁶² Nāgārjuna is quoted elsewhere in texts belonging to the Dhyāna-tradition, for example in *Pelliot tibétain 116* (f. 164), where he is placed before a seven-membered line (*bdun rgyud*) beginning with *Bo de dar ma ta la*, and culminating in *Ma ha yan*.

Compare also *Thu'u bkvan Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ṅi ma*, *Grub mtha' šel gyi me loṅ*, rGya nag Chapter, f. 11b–13b, on the *sñiṅ po don gyi brgyud pa* and the *tsuṅ men (pa)*, a line that includes the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna at its end, and Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Rāhula towards its beginning. See below, p. 117f.

¹⁶³ See *sBa bžed*, G, p. 70.18–19, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, f. 118a2, and *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po*, f. 433b3–4 (quoting dPal dbyaṅs); *sBa bžed*, S, p. 60.6–7 (quoting Saṅ ši): *'jug sgo tha dad kyāṅ saṅs rgyas (thob par 'dod par) (g)cig (žes) 'bras bu ('dod pa) (cig la) (don gyi) (spyi) mthun pa ...* (The reading of the *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po* is problematical here.)

¹⁶⁴ See *sBa bžed*, S, p. 60.10 (quoting dPal dbyaṅs); G, p. 70.23; *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, f. 118a3; *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po*, f. 433b6 (quoting Ye šes dbaṅ po): *cig char (du) 'jug na (khyed) da duṅ (ruṅ) ci byed dan po nas saṅs rgyas na ci ṅes...*

rumour the reports that the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna immolated himself in fire after his defeat in debate or, alternatively, that in despair (*yid mug pa*) he left for home after leaving behind one of his boots as a token of the future spread of his teaching in Tibet.

Such a case of self-immolation, followed by death facing in the direction of the Sukhāvātī-heaven, of a Chinese master (*rgya nag mkhan po*) – according to the context apparently the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna himself – is in fact reported in part of the ‘Alternative Tradition’ of the *sBa bžed* (G, p. 75; but not reproduced in dPa’ bo gTsong lag phreṅ ba’s *mKhas pa’i dga’ ston*, f. 120). Both recensions of the *sBa bžed* have nevertheless elsewhere recounted that the Hva šaṅ left for China after having first constructed a temple in Tibet (G, p. 76; S, p. 62–63). The false rumour to which the *Chos ’byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po* refers is then perhaps the account found in the ‘Alternative Tradition’ of the *sBa bžed*.

Such an auto-da-fé by setting fire to the head carried out by a Hva šaṅ after having lost an argument is however reported in both recensions of the *sBa bžed* (G, p. 68.1; S, p. 57.12), but only one version specifies that he thereupon died (G, p. 68.1; cf. also *mKhas pa’i dga’ ston*, ja, f. 115a5 and 116b4). The Hva šaṅ who thus immolated himself is, however, given the suggestive name, or probably rather epithet, of *Me mgo/Me ’go*, literally ‘Fire-head’ (see also *sBa bžed*, S, p. 10.1 and p. 52). This appellation could well be based on the Chinese practice of lighting a lamp on the top of a monk’s head at the time of ordination,¹⁶⁵ and it may then have been reinterpreted as signifying that the Ho-shang immolated himself.¹⁶⁶ The reports of this Hva šaṅ’s auto-da-fé are doubtless influenced in addition by the practice of ritual self-cremation occasionally adopted by monks in East (and South East) Asia.¹⁶⁷

It is interesting to observe that in this context the *Chos ’byuṅ*

¹⁶⁵ Cf. J. J. M. de Groot, *Le code du Mahāyāna en Chine* (Amsterdam, 1893), pp. 218–220; cf. pp. 50–51, 220 ff.

¹⁶⁶ For such suicides by Tibetans (!) in the *Cheng-li chüeh*, see Demiéville, *Concile*, pp. 41–42.

¹⁶⁷ For a bibliography of this practice, see Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, II, pp. 10, 284; E. Lamotte, *Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse* (Louvain, 1949), p. 740 n. 1; J. Filliozat, *Journal asiatique*, 1963, pp. 21–51, and *Arts asiatiques* 15 (1967), pp. 65–88; P. Demiéville, *Choix d’études bouddhiques* (Leiden, 1973), pp. xxxviii–xxxix, 264–5. See below, pp. 149–50.

Me tog sñiri po (f. 429b4) relates that the Hva šaṅ Mi/Me go died (? *bro dor*),¹⁶⁸ while his associates – Nāṅ Ša mi, rÑog and sÑa¹⁶⁹ – ‘contracted illness’ (*na tsha skyed*). The *Žabs btags ma* version of the *sBa bžed* (S, p. 57) also states that the three ‘contracted illness’. Another version of the *sBa bžed* however specifies that they died as the result of self-mutilation (G, p. 67–68; cf. *mKhas pa’i dga’ ston*, ja, f. 116b).

As for the report that the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna departed for China after leaving his boot behind in Tibet, it is found also in the ‘Alternative Tradition’ of the *sBa bžed* (G, p. 75.8, not reproduced in the *mKhas pa’i dga’ ston*, f. 120). The motif of the boot left behind is known also in connexion with another Hva šaṅ (perhaps one connected with sBa gSal snaṅ in the *sBa bžed*, G, p. 9 ~ S, p. 8).¹⁷⁰ The association of this motif with Bodhidharma is of course known from the Chinese Ch’an tradition; and in Tibetan sources it is found in connexion with the Dhyāna-master Bodhi-Dharmottāra in the *bSam gtan mig sgron* (f. 12b).¹⁷¹

(8) It is significant that in the *Chos ’byuṅ Me tog sñiri po* (f. 425’a6) the expression *dkar po chig thub* – a term presumably borrowed from the vocabulary of Tibetan pharmacology and denoting in the present context a spiritual sovereign remedy – is recorded as a description, based on a medical metaphor, of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna’s ‘spontaneist’ and cognitively nativist teaching of face-to-face intuitive confrontation with and comprehension of Mind (*sems no ’phrod pa*, etc.).

The same expression is found in addition in the ‘Alternative

¹⁶⁸ See *Chos ’byuṅ Me tog sñiri po*, f. 426b4, where the expression *bro bor* is found. In standard classical Tibetan, *bro bor ba* and *bro dor ba* mean ‘to swear an oath’ (*mma’ bskeyal ba/skeyel ba*). In the present context, however, not only does this meaning not fit well but the corresponding passages in the parallel sources indicate that the appropriate meaning is ‘to die’ (*ši* in *sBa bžed*, G, p. 68.1, and in dPa’ bo gTsong lag phreṅ ba’s *mKhas pa’i dga’ ston*, ja, f. 116b4; *’das* in *mKhas pa’i dga’ ston*, ja, f. 115a5).

¹⁶⁹ See above, p. 61.

¹⁷⁰ See also ‘Gos gŽon nu dpal, *Deb ther ston po*, ka, f. 21a3 (Roerich, p. 41); bSod nams rgyal mtshan, *rGyal rabs gsal ba’i me loṅ* (ed. Kuznetsov), p. 182. Cf. *bSam gtan mig sgron*, f. 12 (in connexion with ‘Bodhidharmottāra’); mGon po skyabs, *rGya nag chos ’byuṅ* (Sichuan ed., 1983), p. 122. See also G. Tucci, *Tibetan painted scrolls* (Rome, 1949), p. 615 n. 252, and *Minor Buddhist texts*, II (Rome, 1958), p. 44.

¹⁷¹ Compare Thu’u bkvan Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ṅi ma, *Grub mtha’ šel gyi me loṅ*, rGya nag Chap., f. 13a.

Tradition' of the *sBa bžed* (G, pp. 72–75), from where dPa' bo gTsug lag phren ba has taken it (*mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 120a6–7). And it is known too from Sa skya Paṇḍi ta's treatment of the Hva šaṅ's teaching in connexion with his criticism of the Neo-Mahāmudrā (*da lta'i phyag rgya chen po*) and Chinese-style rDzogs chen (*rgya nag lugs keyi rdzogs chen*).¹⁷² A corresponding medical concept is, moreover, found in Wang Hsi's *Cheng-li chüeh* (f. 146b); there, in the context of Mo-ho-yen's own presentation of his teaching on non-reflection and non-examination, the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* is quoted on the subject of the medicine called *agada*, which is said to heal all illnesses.¹⁷³

This attestation in the *Chos 'byun Me tog sñin po* – which as seen above is not unfavourable to the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna – of the expression *dkar po chig thub* as a description of the 'Simultaneist' teaching, supported as it is by the presence of a parallel medical description ascribed to Mo-ho-yen himself in the *Cheng-li chüeh*, disposes of the suspicion that the comparison with the Hva šaṅ's teaching of certain other doctrines current in Tibet that also made use of the image of the *dkar po chig thub* as a spiritual panacea was arbitrary and nothing but a transparent polemical device used by Tibetan opponents of these later teachings such as Sa skya Paṇḍi ta (see below, Chap. iii).

In sum, largely concordant accounts of the Great Debate between the 'Gradualists' headed by Kamalaśīla and represented in addition by Ye šes dbaṅ po and dPal dbyaṅs – both members of the sBa family – on the one side and the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen associated with Myaṅ/Ñaṅ Ša mi and other Tibetan followers on the other side have been handed down in the traditions of the sBa family (*sBa bžed*) followed by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta and Bu ston, and perhaps also by Ne'u Paṇḍi ta, and in the *Chos 'byun Me tog sñin*

¹⁷² See Sa skya Paṇḍi ta, *sDom gsum rab dbye*, f. 25b–26b. Cf. *Thub pa'i dgoṅs pa rab tu gsal ba*, f. 48b–50b, 59b; and *sKyes bu dam pa rnams la sprin ba'i yi ge* f. 3a ff.

¹⁷³ See Fa-hsien's Chinese translation of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (T 376, p. 893b), a passage that is however not found in the other Chinese translations according to Demiéville, *Concile*, p. 122 n. 7. In the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* it is, moreover, the Sūtra itself that is compared with the *agada*. Cf. *Hōbōgirin*, p. 180, s.v. *Akada*.

po by the rDzogs chen master of the Ņaṅ family, Ņi ma 'od zer. Assuming that the ascriptions of these texts are not wholly without foundation – and no reason to think otherwise has so far emerged – the account of the Great Debate and the issues addressed in it can be securely traced back at least as far as the early thirteenth century, in other words to no less than a century before Bu ston and to a time just before Sa skya Paṅḍi ta. No cogent reason has appeared either for supposing that sBa traditions, at least in their core, are not even older. Indeed – except of course for the supplemented version of the *sBa bžed*, which continues down to the time of Atiša, and the very end of the unsupplemented version, which records events after the death of Ye šes dbaṅ po – the sBa traditions may go back essentially to the time of sBa gSal snaṅ (identified with Ye šes dbaṅ po) and dPal dbyaṅs, two of Mo-ho-yen's main opponents in the Great Debate.

As for the *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sṅiṅ po*, the question arises as to whether its author, *Ņaṅ ral Ņi ma 'od zer*, could have made use of records going back as far as *Ņaṅ/Myaṅ Ša mi* – an early advocate of 'Simultaneist' teachings and apparently an associate of the Hva šaṅ known as *Me mgo/Me 'go*, of *sŅa Bye ma la/mŅa' Bi ma*,¹⁷⁴ and perhaps of Mo-ho-yen himself¹⁷⁵ – and *Myaṅ ban Tiṅ ne 'dzin bzaṅ po* – a supporter of the Ho-shangs and an opponent of Ye šes dbaṅ po.

Now, if the *sBa bžed* and sources such as the writings of Sa skya Paṅḍi ta, Bu ston's *Chos 'byuṅ* and the *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* which agree with it have transmitted records of the sBa family going back to the time of the Great Debate whilst the *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sṅiṅ po* might perhaps be conjectured to reflect, at least to some degree, ancient traditions of the Myaṅ/Ņaṅ family, it will be all the more significant that the account of the events surrounding the Great Debate found in the latter *Chos 'byuṅ* agrees fairly closely with the account in the sBa traditions. At all events, on several points of importance in the present context, the *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sṅiṅ po* hardly differs more from one or the other of the *sBa bžed* versions than these differ from each other. Hence, if *Ņaṅ ral* was not actually following a version of the sBa records, it

¹⁷⁴ See above, pp. 61, 88.

¹⁷⁵ See *sBa bžed*, G, pp. 65–68, and S, pp. 55–57.

must be concluded that he was drawing either on a closely related text or on some older common source.¹⁷⁶

Therefore, and despite some important differences such as the ones noted above, the very considerable degree of agreement between the sBa records and the *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po* lends support if not to the assumption that the controversy and debate between Kamalaśīla's school and the Hva śaṅ(s) actually took place in *exactly* the way related in these sources, then at least to the likelihood that these accounts are not mere fabrications by post-twelfth-century gSar ma pa writers motivated by hostility to the teachings of the eighth-century 'Simultaneists' and the rDzogs chen pas.

It has to be borne in mind too that if Kamalaśīla and the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna figure in a kind of complementary theoretical opposition to each other, Śāntarakṣita and Padmasambhava – a major source of the rÑiñ ma tradition – stood in a relation of complementary suppletion according to the sources. Thus, in our sources there can be no question of an undifferentiated blanket rejection of all that is rÑiñ ma or rDzogs chen; and it will not be possible either to hold that the rejection of the Hva śaṅ and his teachings was simply inspired by hostility to rDzogs chen with which his teachings bear a certain typological affinity that did not go unrecognized by rÑiñ ma pa authorities (see below, p. 102).

In the historiography of Tibetan religion and philosophy matters are seldom so simple as to be explainable merely by a conspiracy theory. If alterations and distortions of historical events have actually taken place, then both the causes and the

¹⁷⁶ In his *rGya nag hva śaṅ gi byuñ tshul grub mtha'i phyogs sñia bcas sa bon tsam smos pa*, f. 14a, Tshe dbaṅ nor bu has referred also to the sBa bžed in connexion with the differences between the Chinese Ho-shangs and the Indian Siddhāntas, as well as to the bSam gtan mig gi 'grel pa (i.e. the bSam gtan mig sgron) of gNubs Rin po che.

Furthermore, as already noted, monks of the dBa'/sBa and Myaṅ families were already linked as disciples of Śāntarakṣita according to the Turkestan (Ša cu) document published by F. W. Thomas (see above, n. 107 and n. 110). Later, a certain sBa sgom was the disciple of Myaṅ Śes rab 'byuñ gnas of the dBu ru Žva'i lha khaṅ founded by Myaṅ Tiñ ñe 'dzin, and a contemporary of Myaṅ Byaṅ chub grags (Myaṅ Śa ba can); see gŽon nu dpal, *Deb ther sñon po*, ga, f. 33b (=p. 173-4).

For a later rÑiñ ma view of the Great Debate as reported in the sBa bžed and as discussed by Sa skya Pañḍi ta, in addition to Tshe dbaṅ nor bu's work already cited above see Sog bzlog pa Blo gros rgyal mtshan, *gSañ sñiags sñia 'gyur la bod du rtsod pa sñia phyir byuñ ba rnams keyi lan du brjod pa, ñes don 'brug sgra*, ff. 6a ff. and 117a-120b.

processes of these changes are probably fairly complex. Much historical, religious and philosophical analysis remains to be done on the eighth-century encounter in Tibet between 'Gradualism' and 'Simultaneism' for which the documentation is multifarious and sometimes opaque. An attempt in this direction will be made in the two following essays.

III

Models of Buddhism in Contact and Opposition in Tibet: Religious and Philosophical Issues in the Great Debate of bSam yas

WHAT then were the fundamental questions at issue in the encounter between Sāntarakṣita's and Kamalāśīla's Yogācāra-Madhyamaka school on the one side and on the other the doctrines of the Ho-shangs teaching in Tibet and the Dunhuang area with Mo-ho-yen (Mahāyāna/Mahā yan) amongst the best known of them?

In his *Bhāvanākrama* (III, ed. Tucci, pp. 13–14) Kamalāśīla has given the following summary of some teachings that represent the views of an unnamed opponent:

A certain [teacher] has the following opinion: 'It is because of the force of good and bad deeds (*śubhāśubhakarman*), produced through mental construction (*cittavikalpa*), that sentient beings (*sattva*) revolve in the round of existences (*saṃsāra*), experiencing the fruits of deeds (*karmaphala*) such as heaven (*svargādi*).¹⁷⁷ Those who on the contrary neither think on anything (*na kiṃcic cintayanti*) nor perform any deed whatever are completely freed (*parimuc-*) from the round of existences. Therefore nothing is to be thought on (*na kiṃcic cintayitavyam*), nor is salutary conduct (*kuśalacaryā*) consisting in generosity and the like (*dānādi*) to be practised. It is only in respect to foolish people (*mūrkhajana*) that salutary conduct consisting in generosity and the like has been indicated (*nirdiṣṭā*).'

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Wang Hsi's *Cheng-li chüeh*, f. 134a ff. (translated by Demiéville, *Concile*, pp. 75 ff.); *Stein 468* (cf. L. Gómez, in R. Gimello and P. Gregory [eds.], *Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen* [Honolulu, 1983], p. 107); *Pelliot tibétain 21* (cf. L. Gómez, *Studies*, p. 124).

Several lines further on in the same text Kamalaśīla again cites (p. 14) the assertion that the practice of generosity and the other virtues is not to be carried out, and he later quotes the thesis (p. 20): 'No deed whatever, salutary or otherwise, is to be performed'.

Kamalaśīla also cites (p. 15) the teaching according to which one 'enters' all factors through non-mind and non-mentation (*sarvadharmeṣv asmrītyamanasikāreṇa praviśati*).¹⁷⁸ And in another *Bhāvanākrama* (I, ed. Tucci, p. 212) Kamalaśīla quotes the *Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī*'s observation that 'by non-mentation one sets aside the phenomenal marks of visible matter and so forth' (*amanasikārato rūpādinimittaṃ varjayati*). According to Kamalaśīla's explanation, what is here intended by the term *amanasikāra* is not simple absence of mentation (*manasikārābhāvamātra*) but, rather, that non-objectifying or non-apprehension which belongs to him who analyses through discriminative knowledge (*prajñayā nīrūpayato yo 'nupalambhaḥ = śes rab kyis brtags na mi dmigs pa gaṇi yin pa*).¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ Cf. *Cheng-li chüeh* f. 135a f. (Demiéville, p. 76 f.); *Stein 468* (Gómez, p. 108) and 709 (Gómez, p. 114); *Pelliot tibétain 823* (Gómez, p. 126). Cf. *bSam gtan mig sgron*, f. 73a f.

¹⁷⁹ Kamalaśīla has taken up this point in his *Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī-Ṭīkā* (P, f. 156b–157b). There he observes first that when something is perceived by being presented in cognition (*snañ bar 'gyur bas mñon du 'gyur pa*), it is something that may then be removed through non-mentation (*amanasikāra*). Next he argues that such *amanasikāra* is not mere absence of mentation [in the sense of absolute, non-presuppositional and non-implicative, negation, or *prasajyapratiseḍha*]. For, non-existence being no thing (*dños po med pa*), it cannot serve as the cause for anything at all; and without correct analytical examination (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*) it is impossible not to attend (*manas-ke-*) to the phenomenal signs (*nimitta*) of matter (*rūpa*) and the other [*skandhas*] presented in cognition. Nor, however, does something other than this mentation constitute *amanasikāra* [in the sense of relative, presuppositional and implicative negation, or *paryudāsa*]; for it would then follow that some other thing such as *rūpa* and the other [*skandhas*] too could be *amanasikāra*, [*amanasikāra*] being then not the counter-agent (*pratipakṣa*) against them [as is required by the theory]. Accordingly, what was intended [when *amanasikāra* was spoken of in the *Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī*] is that an *amanasikāra* that is the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* – the contrary of that *manasikāra* [which is to be counteracted] – constitutes *amanasikāra*.

Alternatively, because *amanasikāra* is a product (*phala*) [of analytical examination], it has been stated that *bhūtapratyavekṣā* is to be designated metonymically by the term '*amanasikāra*'. That is, by merely indicating its product, it becomes evident by implication (*arthasāmarthyā*) that [analytical examination as the cause of *amanasikāra*] is to be effected. So it is possible fully to remove the phenomenal signs (*nimitta*). For, granted that the Yogin thus analytically examines phenomenal signs such as *rūpa* presented in his cognition [even though] in a form that is erroneous (*viparyasta*) owing to the force of misknowledge

In his *Bhāvanākrama* (III, p. 25–26) Kamalaśīla also cites the thesis that the Six Perfections (*pāramitā*) are contained in *Dhyāna*, so that through the cultivation (*sevanā* = *bsten pa*) of the latter all the Perfections are cultivated, whereas generosity (*dāna*) and the others should not be cultivated separately.¹⁸⁰ This thesis contrasts with the view (based on the *Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras*) according to which, in order to be true Perfections, the other *pāramitās* must be under the direction of the Perfection of discriminative understanding (*prajñāpāramitā*).

Now, he who suitably joins together *dhyāna* and *prajñā* is called *prajñottaradhīyāyin* (*šes rab mchog gi bsam gtan pa*), i.e. a meditator for whom discriminative understanding is paramount.¹⁸¹ At this high stage of attainment, mind (*manas*) – or *manasikāra* according to *Bhāvanākrama* II (ed. Goshima, p. 47) – characterized as it henceforth is by the cessation of analytical reflection (*uparatavicāra*) is wholly without linguistic conceptual construction (*nirjalpaikarasa* = *brjod pa med pa nian gcig tu gyur pa*);¹⁸² and it operates of itself (*svarasavāhin* = *ran gi nian gis 'jug pa*), so that the Yogin will then abide in determining reality without conceptual effort (*anabhisaṃskāratas*).¹⁸³ When Mind (*citta*) is thus *svarasavāhin* and proceeds in balance (*samaprayṭta* = *mñam par 'jug pa*) there will be equanimity because of the relaxation of mental inflexion (*ābhogaśīthilikaraṇād upekṣaṇīyam*).¹⁸⁴ This is what is known as the Path

(*avidyā*), once they are not cognitively objectified (*ālamb-*) [any longer], conceptual attraction (*abhiniveśa*) [to them] is removed. When they have been removed, absence of phenomenal sign (*animitta*) is comprehended ... [157b5]. In this way, the characteristic of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* is considered in this connexion to be *amanasikāra*. Although it is [indeed] of the nature of dichotomizing construction (*vikalpa*), it will [nevertheless] be consumed by the fire of correct Gnosis (*yan dag pa'i ye šes* = *samyagjñāna*) produced by it, just as e.g. two fire-sticks are consumed by the fire produced by rubbing them together. Thus, he who wishes to produce Gnosis free from *vikalpa* must first cultivate Insight (*vipaśyanā*), the characteristic of *bhūtapratyavekṣā*. Thereby phenomenal signs will be fully removed.

This image of the fire-sticks burnt up by the fire that issues from them is taken from the *Kāśyapa-parivarta* § 69; see *Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 20, and below, pp. 114, 206. And on the *nirvikalpa/avikalpa/praveśadhāraṇī*, in addition to Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākramas* (I, p. 212 and III, p. 11), compare Sthiramati's *Triṃśikābhāṣya* 22d, 28–30. See also K. Matsuda, *Bukkyō seminā* 34 (1981), pp. 40–49.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Pelliot *tibétain* 116 (171 f.) and 117; Stein 709 (Gómez, pp. 80, 87).

¹⁸¹ *Bhāvanākrama* III (ed. Tucci), p. 8; II (ed. Goshima), p. 47. (This concept has to be distinguished from *dṛṣṭyuttaradhīyitā* in Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, p. 68, which constitutes a ground for Affects [*saṃkleśa*].)

¹⁸² *Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 5.6–7. ¹⁸³ *Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 8.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. *Bhāvanākrama* I (ed. Tucci), pp. 266–7; II, pp. 49–53.

where Quieting and Insight operate in conjunction (*śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddhavāhī mārgo niṣpannaḥ* = *ʒi gnas dari lhag mthoñ zuri du 'brel ba'i lam grub pa*).¹⁸⁵

The concept of the balanced process of Mind in *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, as a consequence of which there is neither drowsiness (*laya* = *byin ba*) nor excitation (*auddhatya* = *rgod pa*) of Mind, is further illustrated by the image of a pair of oxen going along yoked together (*yuganaddhavāhibalivardadvaya* = *glari gñis zuri du 'brel ba*).¹⁸⁶ Crucial in this context is exact analysis (*bhūtapratyavekṣā* = *yan dag par so sor rtog pa*) leading to analysis of the factors of existence (*dharmapracicaya* = *chos šin tu rnam par 'byed pa*) and discriminative understanding (*prajñā* = *šes rab*), and to Insight (*vipaśyanā* = *lhag mthoñ*).

According to Kamalaśīla, then, there should indeed be a simultaneous operation (*cig car 'jug pa*) of Means (*thabs* = *upāya*) consisting in generosity, etc., and of Prajñā, this being the Path of their joint processing (*yuganaddhavāhī mārgaḥ*).¹⁸⁷

Such practice leads to the Bodhisattva's achievement of objectifying the entirety of things (*vastuparyantatālabana* = *dños po'i mtha' la dmigs pa*),¹⁸⁸ to his birth in the Tathāgata-Family (*tathāgatakula*), to his entry into faultless determination (*skyon med pa* = *niyāma*),¹⁸⁹ and thus ultimately to buddahood.

The opposed doctrines, which are found most clearly reported in the third *Bhāvanākrama* and which Kamalaśīla has rebutted in detail by means of a very extensive array of quotations from the Sūtras and some Śāstras, are not, as already mentioned, explicitly ascribed by him to the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen or to any other contemporary. Indeed, as is frequently the case in Indian philosophical treatises, no explicit information is provided as to whether they were the actual views held by some particular contemporary of the author. The fact that they are envisaged in the Mahāyānist canonical texts cited by Kamalaśīla leads one to suppose that they are quite old opinions. However, there are

¹⁸⁵ *Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 9.

¹⁸⁶ *Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 10; cf. I, p. 207, and II, p. 35.

¹⁸⁷ *Bhāvanākrama* II, p. 71.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. *Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 30.6.

¹⁸⁹ *Bhāvanākrama* II, p. 77, quoting the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* i, p. 12.

clear links between Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākramas* and *Avikapla-praveśadhāraṇī-Ṭīkā* and Mo-ho-yen's views as found in the Tibetan fragments from Dunhuang and in Wang Hsi's *Cheng-li chüeh*.

The two tendencies confronting each other have regularly been described, and clearly contrasted, in the older Tibetan historical texts by means of the designations *rim gyis pa* or *rim gyis 'jug pa* for Kamalaśīla's school and *(g)cig c(h)ar ba* or *cig c(h)ar [du] 'jug pa* for Mo-ho-yen's school. The term *rim gyis pa*, a noun derived from the locution *rim gyis* 'gradually', corresponding to Skt. *kramaṇa*, may accordingly be rendered by 'gradualist', the emphasis in this tendency being on the step-by-step serial cultivation (*bhāvanā*) through reinforcement (*abhyāsa*) of the Path of Awakening with its successive gradations (*rim pa = krama*). And *rim gyis 'jug pa* can be rendered as 'gradual engagement' or 'gradual process' (*'jug pa = pravṛt-*). To render accurately the second term *(g)cig c(h)ar ba* is somewhat more difficult. Since in this tendency emphasis is put on the immediate, instantaneous, simultaneous and holistic – i.e. the single-moment – nature of Awakening, and because the term employed is derived from the expression *cig c(h)ar du* 'in one instant, simultaneously' which is used to render the Sanskrit words *yugapat* and *sakṛt* and which may be glossed by *dus gcig tu* 'at one time, at once' (Skt. *ekavāram*), the term can be rendered either as 'instantaneous/instantaneist' or as 'simultaneous/simultaneist'. The frequently employed renderings 'sudden' for *cig c(h)ar* and 'Subitist' for *cig c(h)ar ba* are of course appropriate also to the extent that these words – together with Skt. *sakṛt* and *ekavāram* – are additionally associated with the idea of suddenness; but only occasionally (see below) is the word *cig c(h)ar* actually used to describe actions that are sudden and abrupt (*glo bur*) as distinct from those that are either simultaneous with each other or instantaneous.

In our Tibetan sources 'Gradualism' is in addition often referred to by the expression *(br)tse(n) min/mun*, and the 'Gradualist' by the word *(br)tse(n) min/mun pa*. And 'Simultaneism' is known as the *(s)ton min/mun*, and the 'Simultaneist' as a *(s)ton min/mun pa*. These words, which are clearly not Tibetan in origin, correspond respectively to the Chinese expressions *chien men (p'ai)* '(school of) gradual entrance' and *tun men (p'ai)* '(school

of) immediate entrance'.¹⁹⁰ Another contrasting pair of expressions in Chinese are *ch'ien wu* 'gradual Awakening' and *tun wu* 'sudden Awakening'. It is however not certain that simultaneity and suddenness are in fact totally identical notions in the history of the Dhyāna schools; but the clarification of this point is crucial for the history of Ch'an rather than for that of the Tibetan doctrines being considered here.¹⁹¹

The 'Gradualist' procedure is compared in Tibetan sources with a progressive, step-by-step ascent toward a mountain peak, or with a monkey's gradual climbing to the top of a tree from below (*mas 'dzeg*). On the contrary, the 'Simultaneist' procedure is compared with an eagle's sudden or abrupt (*glo bur*) descent on to the top of a tree from above (*yas babs, yas 'bab*).¹⁹² This pair of metaphorical descriptions is thus intended graphically to illustrate a distinguishing feature of two contrasting procedures.

The Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna is stated to have said that not thinking on anything whatever, not conceptualizing anything whatever and not practising anything whatever constitute an objectifying that involves simultaneous engagement (*dmigs pa gcig char 'jug pa*), so that this is as (one) on the tenth Bodhisattva-stage (*sa = bhū-mi*).¹⁹³ He is also shown as sometimes asserting that his method is taught for persons whose faculties are superior (*dbañ po rnon po = tiḅṣṇendriya*), whereas the Dharma-practice based on generosity and so forth (*dānādi*) has been taught rather for those whose faculties are blunt.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁰ Cf. n. 120.

¹⁹¹ On this terminology cf. Demiéville, *Concile*, pp. 10, 14–15, 18–19, 35; n. 50–51, 74–75, 184, and 279; R. A. Stein, *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 179 (1971), pp. 3–30. (See now also P. Gregory [ed.], *Sudden and Gradual* [Honolulu, 1987].)

¹⁹² This comparison is placed in the mouth of the Hva šaṅ in the 'Alternative Tradition' of the *sBa b 'ed* (G, p. 74), and in *Ñāṅ Ñi ma 'od zer, Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po* (ed. R. O. Meisezahl) f. 430b. See however the critique of these examples, as well as of the corresponding meanings, in the 'Alternative Tradition' of the *sBa bžed* (G, p. 74); in *dPa' bo gTsong lag phreñ ba, mKhas pa'i dga' ston, ja*, f. 120b2–3 and f. 122a–b (which refers to the 'Alternative Tradition'); and in the *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po*, f. 432a. These examples are also mentioned by Sa skya Pañḍi ta in his *sDom gsum rab dbye*, f. 25b, and (together with Kamalaśīla's critique) in his *Thub pa'i dgoris pa rab tu gsal ba*, f. 49b.

¹⁹³ *sBa bžed*, G, p. 68.20; S, p. 58.7; *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po*, f. 430b5.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. *sBa bžed*, G, p. 68.17; S, p. 58.5; *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po*, f. 425'b5, 430b3, and 435b3. See pp. 66, 84, 93, 117, 141–2.

A feature characteristic of the teachings ascribed in our Tibetan sources to the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna is the eradication of all discursive thinking in any and every form and an emphasis on non-mentation (*yiḍ la mi byed pa* = *amanas(i)kāra*) and non-minding (*dran pa med pa* = *asmṛti*) as the necessary – and indeed sufficient – condition for achieving the meditator's goal of understanding (*rtogs pa*) or face-to-face recognition (*rio 'phrod/sprod pa*) of Mind (*sems*).

This denial of the fitness of mental activity and analysis for the understanding of reality is the more remarkable as the Buddha himself is regularly presented as having enjoined his disciples to attend (Pali: *sunotha*) and apply their minds (Pali: *manasi karoṭha*) to his teaching; indeed, thorough application of mind (*yoniso manasikāro*) has been one of the salient and most highly prized features in Buddhism. In the Abhidharma *manaskāra* has been defined as inflexion of thinking (*cetasa ābhogaḥ*), and it is listed among the *cittamahābhūmika-dharmas* alongside *mati* (defined as *prajñā dharmapravacayaḥ*, 'discriminative understanding and analysis of the dharmas'), *smṛti* (defined as *ālambanāsampramoṣa*, 'non-forgetting of the object of thought'), and *samādhi* (defined as *cittasyāikāgratā*, 'one-pointedness of mind').¹⁹⁵ A negative valuation of *manas(i)kāra* was, however, a characteristic of the Siddha movement, especially for example with Maitrīpāda (c. 1000 CE), as well as of Dhyāna/Ch'an. It can be accounted for by its association with discursive thinking and mental construction (*vikalpa*), which have to be brought to a stop before direct and immediate understanding of reality can be achieved, and perhaps also by the fact that mentation is absent in certain superior forms of Samāpatti and Vimokṣa meditation. Clearly, what the Hva šaṅ was seeking was a 'return' to inborn and spontaneous Mind, in the form of its immediate face-to-face recognition, rather than an application of mind to what is communicated from outside, even if this communication be from the Buddha himself; for such mediated, 'other-conditioned' (*parapratyaya*) verbal-conceptual communication is inextricably tied up with mental construction

¹⁹⁵ Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ii. 24. Compare Asaṅga, *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (ed. Pradhan), p. 6.

(*rtog pa = kalpanā*) and binary conceptualization (*rnam par rtog pa = vikalpa*).

A noteworthy metaphorical description of the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen's teaching was, as already mentioned above, by means of the expression *dkar po chig thub* found in both the 'Alternative Tradition' of the *sBa bžed* and Ṇaṅ ral's *Chos 'byun Me tog sñin po*, as well as in later Tibetan sources. In the vocabulary of Tibetan pharmacology, this term evidently designates a certain substance (either mineral or vegetable) considered as a sovereign remedy, or at least as a pre-eminent antidote effective all by itself.¹⁹⁶ Just so, according to the 'Alternative Tradition' of the *sBa bžed*, understanding of Mind in face-to-face recognition was regarded by the Hva ṣaṅ as a spiritual *dkar po chig thub* that acts alone, like a panacea (*sems rtogs na dkar po chig thub yin pas des chog zer nas*, G, p. 72). In dPa' bo gtsug lag phreṅ ba's *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* it is further specified that the doctrine of pure understanding of Mind (*sems rtogs pa*) known as *dkar po chig thub*, which suffices for the achievement of Awakening, involves the denial (*skur pa 'debs pa = apavāda*) of both salvific means (*thabs = upāya*) and discriminative knowledge (*šes rab = prajñā*; ja, f. 120a7); and it is added that the teaching according to which Awakening results from 'recognition in confrontation' of Mind is stated to have been described as this same *dkar po chig thub* (*den ṣaṅ chos rnal ma rnam bor nas sems nio 'phrod pas 'tshaṅ rgya bar 'dod pa dkar po chig thub tu 'gro ba'i rgyu mtshan de yin gsuṅ*, ja, f. 120b6).¹⁹⁷ This description is confirmed by Ṇaṅ ral's *Chos 'byun Me tog sñin po*, which cites the teaching that when there is understanding issuing from face-to-face recognition there is Awakening, and that it is therefore necessary to recognize Mind face-to-face, this mode of knowing being the *dkar po chig thub* (*raṅ nio šes nas rtogs na ṣaṅ rgya/ de'i phyir sems nio 'phrod dgos/ de šes na dkar po chig thub yin*, f. 425'45-6). As already noted above, Wang Hsi's *Cheng-li chüeh* (f. 146b) includes a passage where Mo-ho-yen compares his

¹⁹⁶ Cf. L. van der Kuijp, *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 9 (1986), p. 149.

¹⁹⁷ Elsewhere in the *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, the expression *sems nio rtogs pa* has been used. The Tibetan expressions *sems rtogs pa*, etc. – as well as *sems la blta ba*, etc., in the Dunhuang documents – correspond to Chinese *k'an hsin*, on which see Demiéville, *Concile*, pp. 43 n. 1, 51-52, 78, 125-6, 158. Cf. below, n. 461.

teaching of non-reflection and non-examination with the *agada*-medicine mentioned in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, which describes itself as this antidote that heals all illness.

The idea of the understanding and face-to-face recognition of Mind being a sort of spiritual medicine that is self-potentiating and effective entirely by itself – the *dkar po chig thub* – has been discussed and severely criticized by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182–1251) in his *Thub pa'i dgonis pa rab tu gsal ba* (ff. 48b, 50a, 56b)¹⁹⁸ and *sDom gsum rab dbye* (ff. 25b–26a), as well as in his *Phyogs bcu'i saris rgyas dari byañ chub sems dpa' rnam la žu ba'i 'phrin yig* (f. 6b), *sKyes bu dam pa rnam la sprin ba'i yi ge* (ff. 3a–4a) and *Epistle to Glo bo Lo tsā ba Šes rab rin chen* (f. 28a–b). With the exception of *Ñān Ñi ma 'od zer's Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñin po* (and *Byañ chub sems dpa' sems dpa' chen po chos rgyal mes dbon rnam gsum gyi rnam par thar pa rin po che'i phren ba?*), these works of Sa skya Paṇḍi ta appear to be the oldest securely datable Tibetan sources discussing the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna's teachings now available.

In the account of the Hva šaṅ's teachings in the *sDom gsum rab dbye* (ff. 25b–26a), this unique 'medicine' is even mentioned in the prophetic testament that Śāntarakṣita is deemed to have delivered to Khri Sroñ Ide btsan and in which he recommended that after his death his disciple Kamalaśīla should be called to Tibet when a split would occur in the Dharma, so that he might then combat the teaching of the Hva šaṅ described as the *dkar po chig thub*. For his version Sa skya Paṇḍi ta seems to have relied on the 'Alternative Tradition' of the *šBa bžed*, where Śāntarakṣita's prophecy is quoted by Ye šes dbaṅ po and in which the *dkar po chig thub* is also expressly named (G, p. 73.3).¹⁹⁹

In his account of what he termed the method (*gžuñ lugs*) of the Chinese Bhikṣu and Master (*mkhan po*), Sa skya Paṇḍi ta has

¹⁹⁸ Cf. R. Jackson, *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 5 (1982), pp. 91–93.

¹⁹⁹ The expression *dkar po chig thub* does not, however, appear in the version of Śāntarakṣita's testament given in Bu ston's *Chos 'byuñ* (f. 127b), in dPa' bo gTsub lag phren ba's *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* (ja, f. 115b), and in Padma dkar po's *Chos 'byuñ* (ed. Lokesh Chandra, f. 164b). (See however *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 120a).

joined what he called 'today's Mahāmudrā' (*da lta'i phyag rgya chen po*) – described as almost (*phal cher*) a Chinese Dharma system (*rgya nag chos lugs*) – and the Chinese-style rDzogs chen (*rgya nag lugs keyi rdzogs chen*).²⁰⁰ And using the metaphor of (the eagle's sudden) descent from above (*yas 'bab*) along with the designation *cig char ba*, he has pointed out defects in all three doctrines together.²⁰¹

Exactly what Sa skya Paṇḍi ta had in mind when speaking of a 'Neo-Mahāmudrā' is perhaps not altogether clear from this passage of the *sDom gsum rab dbye*. His purpose was evidently to contrast it with an older Mahāmudrā teaching, that is, probably, with the classical one he accepted (ff. 26a–b); and his criticism does not therefore appear to be indiscriminately directed against all forms of Mahāmudrā. Indeed, in this connexion, he has explicitly recognized the version connected with Nāgārjuna; and he has also separately mentioned both Nāropa's and Maitrīpāda's Mahāmudrā teachings (f. 26a5).

Now we know that sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen (1079–1153) – an early Tibetan master who combined the bKa' brgyud pa traditions, one of whose fundamental teachings is

²⁰⁰ It is to be noted that the rDzogs chen master Śrī Siṃha is sometimes described as *rgya nag po'i slob dpon* 'the master offrom China'.

²⁰¹ A connexion between the Hva śān Mahāyāna's teaching and the *phyag chen* (*mahāmudrā*) has been mentioned in Ne'u Paṇḍi ta's *Chos 'byuñi* (f. 21b: *hva śān ma hā ya na byon pas/ phyag rgya chen po 'thun pa'i grub mtha' bzun*). 'Brug pa Kun legs (1455–1529) has also spoken of a *phyag rgya ha śān gi lta ba* in his *gSuñ 'bum* (kha, f. 14a), quoted by Stein, *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 179 (1971), p. 10. (And a connexion with the [*da lta'i*] *phyag chen* is at least suggested in the colophon of the *bSam gtan mig sgron* [f. 254a].)

On the rDzogs chen side, Kloñ chen rab 'byams pa (1308–1363) has mentioned the closeness of the Hva śān's teachings to aspects of *rdzogs chen* (see the *gNas lugs mdzod 'grel*, f. 33b ~ 23b). See also the *Blon po'i bka'i thari yig* of the *bKa' thari sde lña*. And Tshē dbañ nor bu (1698/9–1755), *rGya nag ha śān gi byuñi tshul grub mtha'i phyogs sñā bcas sa bon tsam smos pa* (Volume V of his collected writings, Dalhousie, 1977), ff. 8b, 10b and 12b, has distinguished in the Hva śān's teachings between what is correct and what is not. In particular, Tshē dbañ nor bu alludes to a *partial* similarity (*cha 'dra ba*, f. 8b4–5), as does the *bSam gtan mig sgron* (f. 93b3). According to an opinion rejected by Sog bzlog pa (b. 1552/3), *gNubs Sañs rgyas ye šes conflated* (*sres pa*) the doctrine of the Hva śān with that of the *Man riag lta ba'i phreñ ba* ascribed to Padmasambhava (see the *gSari sñags sñā 'gyur la bod du rtsod pa'i sñā phyir byuñi ba rñams keyi lan du brjod pa, Nes don 'brug sgra* [New Delhi, 1975], f. 9a–10a). Further, A ro Ye šes 'byuñ gñas held both the seven-fold lineage-tradition of India and the seven-fold lineage-tradition of the Chinese Hva śān(s), which he taught to two disciples who then passed them on to Roñ zom Chos keyi bzah po (eleventh century) (see 'Gos gZon nu dpal, *Deb ther sion po*, ga, f. 30b).

precisely the Mahāmudrā, with the tradition of Atiṣa – in fact made use of the expression *dkar po chig thub* for his teaching. Thus, in his *Dus gsum mkhyen pa'i žus lan*, *dkar po chig thub* is a name for a form of spiritual realization (*ñams*) that is undetermined as to the length of its preparation and cognitive origin, and which remains constant and is linked with the yogic signs of hyperthermia.²⁰² And in his *Phag mo gru pa'i žus lan sGam po pa* has referred to the *dkar po chig thub* as that by the knowledge of which alone total freedom ensues (*gcig šes kun grol*); through it the fetters of grasping at the cycle of existences (*'khor bar 'dzin pa'i sgrog*) burst of themselves, and the level of Great Bliss in Own-Mind is attained (*rañ sems bde ba chen po'i sa non bya ba yin*).²⁰³ This passage on the *dkar po chig thub* follows one in which the 'Gradualist' (*rim gyis pa*) and the 'Simultaneist' (*cig car ba*) are distinguished as to the degree of their spiritual practice, the *cig car ba* being described as more advanced on a continuous scale of development than the *rim gyis pa*. Here the concept of the *dkar po chig thub* does not appear linked specifically and exclusively with the Mantra domain of Tibetan Buddhist thought.

Žaň Tshal pa brTson 'grus grags pa (1123–1193) was another early bKa' brgyud pa master who made use of the expression *dkar po chig thub* in his teachings.²⁰⁴ He is in fact considered as the main propagator of the *dkar po chig thub* in the bKa' brgyud pa

²⁰² *Collected works (gSun 'bum)*, Delhi, 1975, tha, f. 187b f.; *rTsis ri'i spar ma* (La dvags khrid dpon 'Khrul žig Padma chos rgyal, *dKAr rñiri gi skeyes chen du ma'i phyogs rdzogs keyi gdams nag gnad bsds ner mkho rin po che'i gter mdzod*), ca/3, f. 1b–2b.

²⁰³ *Collected works*, da, f. 236b; *rTsis ri'i spar ma*, ca/2, f. 4b.

For Phag mo gru pa in this connexion, see also Sog bzlog pa, *Nes don 'brug sgra*, f. 118a; D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'A Karma bKa' brgyud work on the lineages and traditions of the Indo-Tibetan dBu ma (Madhyamaka)', in *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci memoriae dicata*, III (Rome, 1988), p. 1259.

²⁰⁴ See the *Phyag rgya chen po lam zab mthar thug* (in the *rTsis ri'i spar ma*, ña/2), f. 26b1 = *Phyag rgya chen po'i lam mchog mthar thug* (in Koň sprul's *gDams nag mdzod*, ña/21), f. 13b7. This text deals also with the bKa' brgyud pa theory of the three kinds of person (*gari zag*), the *rim gyis pa*, the *thod rgal ba* and the *gcig char ba*. Cf. Padma dkar po (1527–1592), *Phyag rgya gan mdzod*.

On Žaň Tshal pa/Tshal pa/mTshal pa brTson 'grus grags pa (Žaň rin po che), see Tshal pa Kun dga' rdo rje, *Deb ther dmar po*, p. 126 f.; 'Gos gZon nu dpal, *Deb that smion po*, ña, f. 136 f.; Thu'u bkvan Blo bzaň Chos kyi ñi ma, *Grub mtha' šel gyi me lon*, bKa' brgyud chapter, f. 19b and f. 25b. Cf. Stein, *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 179 (1971), p. 10 n. and M. Broïdo, *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 8 (1985), p. 49 n. 3. For his works, see *Writings (bKa' thor bu) of Žaň gYu brag pa brTson 'grus grags pa* (Palampur, 1972) (e.g. p. 712 for the *dkar po chig thub*).

school.²⁰⁵ 'Gos gZon nu dpal mentions in particular his teacher sGom pa's instruction on setting aside all conceptual and analytical investigation when engaging in true meditative realization (*brtag dpyad ma byed par bsgoms śig*).²⁰⁶

Now Sa skya Paṇḍi ta has expressed the view that the Mahāmudrā is to be realized only on the basis of Mantra sources (*sDom gsum rab dbye*, f. 25b5), and he thus appears to exclude the validity of anything like a Sūtra-based version of Mahāmudrā. When speaking of a Neo-Mahāmudrā, then, Sa skya Paṇḍi ta may have been adverting to sGam po pa's Sūtra-based form of the Mahāmudrā.²⁰⁷ And if it was indeed to these teachings of the bKa' brgyud pa tradition of sGam po pa that he was referring under the name of *da lta'i phyag rgya chen po*, Sa skya Paṇḍi ta was then presumably not directly criticizing the highly problematic would-be Mahāmudrā that was propagated in the Kingdom of Western Tibet in particular in the tenth and eleventh centuries, and which Atiṣa was invited there to help combat. According to the **Bodhipathadīpa-Pañjikā* ascribed (perhaps incorrectly) to Atiṣa himself, this deviant and pernicious doctrine, which was sometimes known under the name of Mahāmudrā, would seem to have had a strong – and in this case totally unauthentic – 'spontaneist' and 'innatist' tendency. (Nevertheless, Sa skya Paṇḍi ta might be expected to have wished in particular to attack this infamous doctrine – one with which sGam po pa's Sūtra-based form of Mahāmudrā could have had nothing in common, especially in view of the fact that sGam po pa belonged also to Atiṣa's bKa' gdams pa lineage. See below, p. 121.)

In his extensive commentary on the *sDom gsum rab dbye* – the *sDom pa gsum gyi rab tu dbye ba'i rnam bśad* (f. 104a ff.) – Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge (1429–1489) has contrasted the authentic Buddhist Mahāmudrā and the Neo-Mahāmudrā criticized by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta, describing the first – his school's own (*ran lugs*) – as

²⁰⁵ See for example lCañ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bžag pa gsal bar bśad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdes rgyan*, kha, f. 21a (= p. 300).

²⁰⁶ *Deb ther sñon po*, ña, f. 137b (G. N. Roerich's translation, *Blue annals*, p. 714, is misleading here). This sGom pa Tshul khriṃs sñiṃ po (1116–1169) was the nephew and disciple of sGam po pa (ña, f. 27a–b).

²⁰⁷ Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'A Karma bKa' brgyud work on the lineages and traditions of the Indo-Tibetan dBu ma (Madhyamaka)', in: *Orientalia I. Tucci memoriae dicata*, III, pp. 1256, 1258–62.

an Indian system (*rgya gar gyi lugs*) and the second – a doctrine held by others (*gžan lugs*) – as a Chinese system (*rgya nag lugs*). The last doctrine he has in fact defined as a specious Insight (*lhag mthoñi ltar śnañ*) because it is a view that posits the Empty alone (*stoni rkyañ du lta ba*). This consists in the suppression of thought-construction in a sort of cataleptic fixation on the Empty (*stoni pa had de 'jog pa'i rtoḡ pa kha tshom pa ñid*) (ff. 104b1). In this context Go rams pa, quoting the *sBa bžed* (f. 106a1), devotes a long discussion to the teachings of the Hva śaṅs and the Great Debate of bSam yas between Kamalaśīla and Mahāyāna (ff. 105b–110a). His evaluation of the Hva śaṅ's doctrine is basically in agreement with that of the *sBa bžed* (G, p. 73), which alludes in this connexion to the impurity of view (*lta ba'i sñigs ma = dṛṣṭikaṣāya*) consisting in taking pleasure in Emptiness.^{207a} Go rams pa however goes further, connecting (f. 110a) the doctrine of the Hva śaṅ criticized by Sa skya Pañḍi ta with the deviant doctrines, also known under the name of Mahāmudrā, which spread at the time of Kings Yum brtan and 'od sruñs after the breakdown of the old Tibetan kingdom consequent on the death of Glañ da ma. In view of this connexion it may then be that Go rams pa even linked in his mind the debased pseudo-Mahāmudrā combatted in Western Tibet by Atiṣa and Rin chen bzañ po with the Hva śaṅ's teachings which, he says, were recovered at that time from their places of concealment (*gter sa*), although he has not explicitly made this connexion in his comment.

Śākya mchog ldan (1428–1507), another master of the Sa skya pa school, has proceeded in a more complex (and also somewhat more conciliatory) fashion when discussing the Hva śaṅ's teaching and the Neo-Mahāmudrā. This creative and rather innovative thinker was also an advocate of the theory of the Emptiness of the heterogeneous (*gžan ston*), which he describes as being in harmony with the Mahāmudrā in contradistinction to the doctrine of the Emptiness of own-nature (*rani ston*).^{207b} He was thus linked

^{207a} Sa skya Pañḍi ta, *Thub pa'i dgoñs gsal*, following the *sBa bžed*, mentions both the *dṛṣṭikaṣāya* of taking pleasure in Emptiness (f. 49a3) and the rejection of all activity (*bya byed*) on the path to Awakening (f. 49b2). Bu ston's reference to the Hva śaṅ's nihilism (*chad lta*) in his *Chos 'byuñi* (f. 128a1) relates rather to quietism and ataraxia.

^{207b} Śākya mchog ldan, *Lun rigs gñis kyi phyag rgya chen po bžed tshul la 'khrul pa sel ba'i bstan bcos*, zuiñ 'jug gi gru chen (gSuñ 'bum, vol. tsa/14), f. 14b2–3.

with the Tibetan tradition of *tathāgatagarbha*-exegesis that interpreted the Buddha-nature in a 'spontaneist' and 'innatist' fashion.

Now, in several works Śākya mchog ldan distinguishes between Fixation-Bhāvanā ('*jog sgom*) and Inspection-Bhāvanā (*dpyad sgom*), pointing out that it is necessary to determine whether Fixation is to be preceded by Inspection or not.^{207c} The *dpyad sgom* used in dispelling imputation (*sgro 'dogs = samāropa*) is connected roughly with Prajñāpāramitā-philosophy and the Madhyamaka, the bKa' gdams pa Po to ba being cited as a master of this method (tsa/14, f. 24b). As for '*jog sgom*', it would correspond mainly to intuitive awareness (*ñams myoñ*), the coincidence of Bliss and the Empty (*bde ston*) in Mantrayāna and the Mahāmudrā. And while noting that still other systems of meditation have been developed based on traditions that are neither Mahāmudrā nor Madhyamaka, Śākya mchog ldan points to the fact that they have been rejected by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta in his *Thub pa'i dgoñs gsal* (tsa/18, f. 4a). Śākya mchog ldan furthermore connects analytic Inspection (*dpyad pa*) with the scholar-paṇḍit, i.e. the specialist in scholastic philosophy (*mtshan ñid pa*) who engages in *pratyavekṣā*; Fixation-Bhāvanā is on the contrary linked by him with that kind of Yogin who takes everything just as it is, without engaging in mental construction and analysis, i.e. with the type of practiser known as the *ku sā li pa* (tsa/18, f. 4b; tsa/14, ff. 15b-16a; tsa/21, f. 7a-b).

With regard to the problem of the kinds of Mahāmudrā, Śākya mchog ldan concludes that the theory of the non-duality of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* as explicated by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta and the Mahāmudrā-teaching of 'Candraprabhā-Kumāra' (i.e. sGam po pa) are, notwithstanding the difference in their names, one in sense and import (*don gcig*). This is so in spite of the fact that the former doctrine as described by Śākya mchog ldan is concerned with the eradication and stoppage of imputation (*samāropa: sgro*

^{207c} Śākya mchog ldan, *Phyag rgya chen po'i śan 'byed ces bya ba'i bstan bcos* (*Phyag rgya chen po gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos*, *Tshans pa'i 'khor lo*), gSuñ 'bum, vol. tsa/14, ff. 8b-13a (addressed to a certain Sa skyoñ mchog, i.e. the Rin spuñs pa ruler); *Lun rigs gñis kyi phyag rgya chen po bžed tshul la 'khrul pa sel ba'i bstan bcos*, *zuiñ 'jug gi gru chen*, gSuñ 'bum, vol. tsa/14, ff. 13a-25a (addressed to Karma dBañ phyug dpal); and *mKha' spyod dbañ po'i spyan druñ du 'bul ba'i mol mchid*, gSuñ 'bum, vol. tsa/18, ff. 1b-5a (addressed to Žva dmar IV, Chos grags ye šes, 1453-1524?); and Replies to the Rin spuñs sde pa Śākya rgyal mtshan and sDe pa gar pa, gSuñ 'bum, tsa/21, f. 5b ff.

'dogs chad pa, 'gog pa) by means of analytic inspection and reasoning (*rigs pa*) based on learning and reflection, and that it follows in particular the second of the Buddha's three turnings of the Wheel of Dharma (i.e. the Prajñāpāramitā) and its teaching of the Emptiness of own-nature (*ran ston*) as explicated by Candrakīrti; whereas sGam po pa's Mahāmudrā is concerned rather with intuitive awareness in Gnosis (*ye šes kyis nams su myoñ ba*) born of the Consecrations and is in accord with the last of the Buddha's three turnings of the Dharma-Wheel which is of definitive sense (*nies don*) and where Emptiness of the heterogeneous (*gžan ston*) has been taught (*tsa/18*, f. 2b). Indeed, Candrakīrti is considered the author not only of the analytical-philosophical *Madhyamakāvatāra* but also of the mystical-philosophical *Pradīpoddhyotana* (*tsa/18*, f. 4a2).

It thus appears that Śākya mchog ldan sought to harmonize the whole of the authentic Mahāmudrā with the doctrinal position adopted by Sa skya Pañḍi ta in his *Thub pa'i dgoñs gsal* and *sDom gsum rab dbye*, and also to re-establish the *gžan ston* tradition known from the hermeneutics of the *tathāgatagarbha*-doctrine and the Kālacakra beside the *ran ston* of the main line of the Madhyamaka school (after an early version of the *gžan ston*, anterior to that taught by the Jo nañ pa Dol bu pa [1292–1361], had been rejected by Sa skya Pañḍi ta).

It has at the same time to be borne in mind that the Neo-Mahāmudrā has been criticized by Sa skya Pañḍi ta and his followers in the main line of the Sa skya school on the ground that it was based in large part on the non-Tantric Prajñāpāramitā tradition rather than on the authentic pure Tantric tradition of the 'standard' Mahāmudrā. Now, given that Śākya mchog ldan fully accepted sGam po pa's Mahāmudrā, it is perhaps not clear how, as a follower of Sa skya Pañḍi ta, he considered that the two prongs of the latter's criticism of the Neo-Mahāmudrā – viz. as not based on the authentic pure Tantric tradition and as close to the Hva šañ's teaching – combine to constitute a compelling refutation of this Neo-Mahāmudrā. Śākya mchog ldan's reorganization of the doctrinal categories and his shifting of the hermeneutical frame accepted by Sa skya Pañḍi ta and the main line of the Sa skya school indeed makes it difficult fully to reconcile the views of this fifteenth-century Sa skya pa with the

position of the thirteenth-century Sa skya hierarch on the Neo-Mahāmudrā and its connexions with the Hva šaṅ's teachings. Gorms pa's critique of the Hva šaṅ's teaching together with the Neo-Mahāmudrā may accordingly be considered typical of the main-line Sa skya school.

Šākya mchog ldan's above-mentioned attempt to harmonize Sa skya Paṅḍi ta's teaching with that of sGam po pa in the matter of the Mahāmudrā would seem to suggest at all events that he considered that it was indeed the latter's Mahāmudrā doctrine that was the object of the Sa skya hierarch's criticism.

As for the Hva šaṅ, according to Šākya mchog ldan his mistake lay in having failed duly to differentiate between surface-level *saṃvṛti* and ultimate *paramārtha*, theory and practice, *jñāna* and *vijñāna*, the level of learning and reflection (*thos bsam*) and that of meditative realization (*bsgom pa*), and the indirect provisional *neyārtha* and the definitive *nītārtha*, as a consequence of which he came to believe that mere non-mention (*ci yan yid la mi byed pa tsam: amanasikāra-mātra*) constitutes the essential (tsa/14, f. 10b5-6; tsa/21, f. 5b). Šākya mchog ldan concludes that in the true Mahāmudrā freedom from conceptual construction and non-mentation are altogether unlike the Hva šaṅ's meditation (tsa/14, f. 11a1-2) and are not dull quietude (*lteṅs po'i gži gnas*, tsa/18, f. 3b; tsa/21, ff. 5b, 6b).

Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554) – the eighth hierarch of the Karma branch of sGam po pa's bKa' brgyud pa school – however evidently understood Sa skya Paṅḍi ta's criticism of Neo-Mahāmudrā as being directed against the non-mentation (*yid la mi byed pa*) teaching of Maitrīpāda and also Saraha, sGam po pa's great predecessors in this Indo-Tibetan lineage. Like sGam po pa's, their teachings were considered to be linked also with the Sūtra and not solely with the Mantra department of Indo-Tibetan thought.²⁰⁸ Nevertheless, as already noted above, it would seem that Sa skya Paṅḍi ta wished rather to distinguish the Neo-Mahāmudrā he was criticizing from Nāgārjuna's and evidently also from Nāropa's and Maitrīpāda's (*sDom gsum rab dbye*, f. 26a).

With regard to Žaṅ tshal pa as the propagator of the *dkar po*

²⁰⁸ See D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'A Karma bKa' brgyud work ...' (n. 203), pp. 1258-62.

chig thub in the bKa' brgyud pa school,²⁰⁹ Thu'u bkvan Blo bzañ Chos kyi ñi ma writes in his *Grub mtha' šel gyi me loni* that up to the time of Žaň Rin po che *dkar po chig thub* had not been well known as a term (*tha sñad*) in that school, but that from his time onwards it became very well known (bKa' brgyud pa chapter, f. 19b). And he adds (f. 25b) that of the many refutations found in Sa skya Pañđi ta's *sDom gsum rab dbye* the chief ones turn out to be directed against the *dkar po chig thub* teaching of Žaň Tshal pa and the *dgoñs gcig* teaching of 'Bri guñ pa; indeed, he notes, many writers have emulated Sa skya Pañđi ta and concluded that this teaching of Žaň Tshal pa had the meaning of non-mentation (*gid la mi byed pa*). Very interestingly, however, Blo bzañ Chos kyi ñi ma then observes that if an impartial person considers the sayings of Žaň Tshal pa, it becomes apparent to him that they do not in fact belong to the position (*phyogs*) of non-mentation; hence the refutation in the *sDom gsum rab dbye* was clearly an over-hasty statement (*thub chod kyi gsun*). As for the fundamental view of Mar pa, the source of the *Dvags po bKa' brgyud*, Blo bzañ Chos kyi ñi ma describes it as *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka* (f. 17b4).

The fact that the *Hva šaň Mahāyāna* is represented as having upheld at the Great Debate the principles of non-mentation and of not thinking on anything (*ci yañ mi sems pa*) probably accounts for Sa skya Pañđi ta's association of him with what he terms the 'almost' Chinese Dharma-system of Neo-Mahāmudrā, and also with Chinese-style *rDzogs chen*.²¹⁰ As he has written in his *sDom gsum rab dbye*, despite the fact that the Neo-Mahāmudrā and the Chinese-style *rDzogs chen* have different names they are in substance without difference with respect to their simultaneism (*cig char ba*) and subitistic procedure (*yas 'bab*) (f. 25b); and the Neo-Mahāmudrā based on the literal wording of the tradition of the Chinese Master (*rgya nag mkhan po'i gžun lugs kyi yi ge tsam*) was for the most part (*phal cher*) a Chinese Dharma-system (f. 26a). It is not impossible that in his account Sa skya Pañđi ta was thinking as much in terms of typological strands and family resemblances between teachings as in terms of direct and immediate historical influences. That he may not have meant to reject *all*

²⁰⁹ See above, pp. 103–04.

²¹⁰ See also the discussion of Sa skya Pañđi ta's view in *Sog bzlog pa*, *Nes don 'brug sgra*, ff. 117a–120b.

the teachings of Chinese Buddhism is perhaps suggested by the fact that with respect to the rejection of the Hva śāñ Mahāyāna's teachings in Tibet he has written 'that Chinese system' (*rgya nag lugs de*, f. 26a3).

As for the doctrine of the Hva śāñ Mahāyāna as criticized and rejected by the main line of the Sa skya pa school, what was at issue was clearly not only quietism in the sense of the abandonment of praxis and the first four perfections (*pāramitā*) – though it was this too – but also a faulty form of *vipaśyanā* consisting in the *dṛṣṭikaṣāya* of taking pleasure in Emptiness – that is, in a frozen and more or less unconscious or cataleptic fixation in the Empty.

The current of thought in Tibet, and earlier in India, that thus emphasized, to the practical exclusion of all other exercises, the cultivation of non-construction (*akalpa[nā]*, *avikalpa*, etc.) and the spontaneous and gnoseologically innate recognition of Mind together with its Quieting (*śamatha*) was opposed by a school of thought that laid much stress on correct analysis (*bhūtapratyavekṣā* = *yañ dag par so sor rtog pa*) leading to the full development of the investigation of the factors of existence (*dharmaprapicaya* = *chos rnams śin tu rnam par 'byed pa*) and of discriminative knowledge born from meditative realization (*bhāvanāmayī prajñā*) together with Insight (*vipaśyanā* = *lhag mthoñ*).

Among the early bKa' gdams pa masters, Atiśa's disciple Po to ba Rin chen gsal (1031?–1105) has stated in his *Be'u bum* that if, after having determined non-substantiality (*bdag med* = *nairātmya*) by reasoning on the stages of learning and reflection (*thos bsam* = *śruta* and *cintā*), one then simply realizes non-construction (*mi rtog*) on the stage of meditative realization (*sgom pa* = *bhāvanā*), this would represent a faulty realization of Emptiness which is irrelevant (*'brel med* = *asambaddha*) and cannot function as the true counteragent (*gñen po* = *pratipakṣa*) against the positing of a hypostatized entity like a personal self (*gañ zag* = *pudgala*).²¹¹ Another early bKa' gdams pa who considered that the extreme form of the non-mentation doctrine was incompatible with the Madhyamaka is Gro luñ pa, the disciple of rÑog Blo ldan šes rab

²¹¹ This passage is quoted from Tsoñ kha pa, *Lam rim chen mo* (lHa sa ed.), f. 510b.

(1059–1109).²¹² It should nevertheless be noted that Dīpaṃ-karaśrījñāna's *Ekasmṛtyupadeśa* (*Dran pa gcig pa'i man niag*) is described as an instruction on simultaneous engagement (*cig car 'jug pa = yugapadvṛtti*); both discriminative understanding and means are involved in this instruction, as is the sequence (*krama*) of objectification followed by non-objectification (*dmigs pa med pa*) described as effortless and spontaneous (*anābhoga*).

In his classical treatise on the Path of Awakening, Tsoñ kha pa has devoted much discussion to the relationship in meditative realization (*sgom pa = bhāvanā*) between the settling function of Fixation-Bhāvanā (*'jog sgom*) and the analytical function of Inspection-Bhāvanā (*dpyad sgom*) derived from analysis (*dpyod pa = vicāra*).²¹³ Typologically speaking, it is no doubt true that non-mentation and non-analysis as advocated (according to Tibetan accounts) by 'Simultaneists' such as the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna bear a resemblance to Fixation-Bhāvanā and to Quieting (*ži gnas = śamatha*). The distinction lies in the fact that alongside Fixation-Bhāvanā and Quieting the procedure for philosophical thought and meditation adopted by Kamalaśīla and his Tibetan followers requires in addition the application of the discriminative understanding of investigative analysis (*so sor rtog pa'i šes rab = pratyavekṣā-prajñā*) and Insight (*lhag mthoñ = vipaśyanā*).

For Tsoñ kha pa the essential point is then that these two forms of *bhāvanā* should be treated as complementary. For otherwise there might be simple acquaintance (*go ba tsam*), but there could be no full realization of the theory (*lta ba*) of non-substantiality and Emptiness, i.e. the 'analytically inspected sense' (*dpyad pa'i don*) (*Lam rim chen mo*, f. 501b2). Neither acquaintance (*go ba*) not followed by analytical inspection nor the mere assertion (*dam bca' ba tsam*) of impermanence and the like can be effective alone;²¹⁴

²¹² For Gro luñ pa's understanding of non-mentation (*yiḍ la mi byed pa*), see his *bDe bar gšegs pa'i bstan pa rin po che la 'jug pa'i lam gyi rim pa mnam par bśad pa* (*bs Tan rim*), f. 377a–b etc. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, in: *Orientalia I. Tucci memoriae dicata*, iii, p. 1257, for Karma Mi bskyod rdo rje's view of the matter.

²¹³ Tsoñ kha pa, *Lam rim chen mo*, ff. 495a6–516a2. (Cf. A. Wayman, *Central Asiatic Journal* 21 [1977], pp. 139–44 [and *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 78 (1958), pp. 214–16].)

²¹⁴ On the problem of the thesis (*dam bca' = pratijñā*) in the Madhyamaka and Mahāyana, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'On the thesis and assertion in the Madhyamaka/dBu ma', in: E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (ed.), *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy* (Vienna, 1983), pp. 205–41, especially pp. 223–4 with reference to the Hva šaṅ.

and ascertainment (*nies pa*) of non-substantiality must therefore be firmly and repeatedly established by means of both fixation and inspection in co-ordination (f. 502b–503a). Only from effecting the serial alternation (*re mos su byed pa*) of fixation and inspection can there arise the Gnosis that is free from conceptual construction (*mi rtog pa'i ye šes = nirvikalpaka-jñāna*) (f. 504b5).

Tsoñ kha pa's gnoseological model for understanding reality is derived from his interpretation of a distinction made many centuries earlier by Dharmakīrti²¹⁵ between a cancelling or sublating counteragent (*bādhaka*) whose function is ascertainment (*niścaya*) and a mental construction to be cancelled (*bādhya*, as being mere imputation, *samāropa*), and from Dharmakīrti's further distinction between negative determination (*vyavaccheda = rnam par gcod pa* 'exclusion') and positive determination (*pariccheda = yoñs su gcod pa* 'delimitation').²¹⁶ Now, in Tsoñ kha pa's model, the settling Fixation-Bhāvanā corresponds to the phase of cancellation (*gnod byed = bādhaka : vyavaccheda*) whilst the analytical Inspection-Bhāvanā corresponds to the phase of positive determination (*sgrub byed = sādhana : pariccheda*). The first, representing as it does only the non-construction of a hypostatized entity (*bden par yod pa mi rtog pa*), cannot effect the ascertainment of non-substantiality (*nairātmya*); and in addition there is required, as the ascertaining counteragent against conceptual construction, the understanding (*rtogs pa : adhigama*) of non-hypostatization (*bden med*) and of the non-substantiality (*bdag med*) of both a personal self (i.e. *pudgalanairātmya*) and the factors of existence (i.e. *dharmanairātmya*) (f. 504b–505a).

In support of this type of philosophical and meditative realization in two co-ordinate phases, Tsoñ kha pa has quoted many passages from Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākramas*. In addition, he has cited *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* iii. 21 where Bhāvaviveka has spoken of *prajñā* following on concentration of mind; *Madhyamakāvātārabhāṣya* vi. 120 where Candrakīrti has described how stoppage (*'gog pa : nirodha*) of hypostatization is followed by

²¹⁵ Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika* i. 49ab.

²¹⁶ See Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* (ed. E. Steinkellner), p. 25* f. For a further application of this model by Tsoñ kha pa to the case of understanding reality, see D. Seyfort Ruegg in E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (eds.), *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy*, pp. 225–7.

analytical inspection (*rnam par dpyad pa : vicāra*); and *Bodhicaryāvatāra* viii. 4 where, following the *Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras*, Śāntideva has treated successively the Perfections of Dhyāna and Prajñā (f. 503a–b).

Now, on the ground that by following the Hva šaṅ's instructions (as widely understood by the Tibetans) one would be trying to reach the signless (*mtshan med : ānimitta*) and non-construction (*mi rtog pa : akalpa[nā]*) merely by suppressing all mentation involved in the proliferating activity of mind (*sems 'phro ba : cittam prasarati*) without ever engaging in deconstructive analysis (*rigs pa'i dpyod pa*), Tsoṅ kha pa has rejected the Hva šaṅ's view as being contrary to what has been recommended in the *Ratnameghasūtra*, as interpreted by Kamalaśīla in his *Bhāvanākrama* II (pp. 29 and 45–46) and III (pp. 3, 7, and 18) (f. 503b–504b).²¹⁷

In sum, according to Tsoṅ kha pa, not only is there to be non-construction of any hypostatized entity and of substantiality in the form of a *puḍgala* and *dharmas*, but there must be comprehension of non-hypostatization (*bden med*) and two-fold non-substantiality (*bdag med*). Accordingly, (negative) *absence* of construction of a hypostatized entity and twofold substantiality must be carefully distinguished from (positive) *understanding* of non-hypostatization and non-substantiality (f. 504b–505a).

Now, the *nirvikalpa-jñāna* of the Ārya is of course immediate understanding (*mñon sum du rtogs pa*) of the sense of non-substantiality, empty of the cognitive object (*γul = viśaya*) that is falsely hypostatized in the one or other form of substantiality, i.e. of *puḍgala* or *dharmas*. Nevertheless, even though it is conceded that the required meditative realization by means of the post-analytical (*dpyad nas*) understanding that a hypostatically posited entity does not exist does in fact involve conceptual construction, the latter still proves to be an altogether homogeneous cause (*šin tu rjes su mthun pa'i rgyu*) for non-constructive Gnosis (*nirvikalpa-*

²¹⁷ Interestingly, however, the *bSam gtan mig sgron* ascribes to the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna the teaching that one should *not* suppress notions ('*du šes dgag par yai mi bya*, f. 8324). This version of his teaching appears at first sight different from what is usually found in other sources, both Tibetan and Chinese. It may refer to his rejection of the Śrāvaka's mere suppression of notions (*saṃjñā*) and feeling (*vedita*). See *Pelliot tibétain* 117 and *Stein 709* (cf. L. Gómez in R. Gimello and P. Gregory (eds.), *Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen*, pp. 110–112); and Demiéville, *Concile*, pp. 63 n. 67, 71 (cf. pp. 75–76, 130, 140); below, p. 202 f.

jñāna) (f. 505b4–6). The procedure may therefore be illustrated by the idea suggested in the *Kāśyapaparivarta* (§ 69) that exact analysis (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*) gives birth to *prajñā* and is then consumed by this *prajñā*, just as fire created by attrition of two pieces of wood is as it were consumed in the blaze thus produced (f. 505a).²¹⁸

If on the contrary, following the Hva śaṅ's instruction, one were to suppose that any and every conceptual construction (*rtog pa*) – inclusive, therefore, of *pratyavekṣā* (*so sor rtog pa*) – binds one to Saṃsāra, and then to request the Hva śaṅ's instruction (*gdams niag*) on non-conceptualization (*mi rtog pa*) with the sincere intention of realizing it meditatively, this procedure could, in terms of the Hva śaṅ's own assumption, only result in binding one to Saṃsāra (cf. *Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 15) (f. 506b). In other words, if taken seriously, the Hva śaṅ's method will be self-defeating.

Even if we hold mental cognition (*blo*) to be in error, the point is to discover how we are to know this unless and until we realize that the cognitive object perceived by it is not substantially real. This unreality of the cognitive object, grasped hypostatically, cannot be established by mere assertion (*dam bca' ba tsam*); and the realization of reality depends on bringing together unalloyed scriptural sources (*luṅ = āgama*) and arguments (*rigs pa = yukti*) establishing it. What is required, therefore, is non-construction preceded by already accomplished inspection through *prajñā* pertaining to *pratyavekṣā* (*so sor rtog pa'i šes rab keyi dpyad pa sñon du soṅ ba'i mi rtog pa*), mere non-construction alone being quite inadequate for this (f. 507a).

Tsoṅ kha pa has referred as well to Sūtras such as the *Samādhirāja* and the *Samdhinirmocana* where the synergic co-ordination of Quietening (*śamatha*) and Insight (*vipaśyanā*) have been taught. Chapter viii in particular of the last Sūtra is regarded by the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika Kamalaśīla as a *locus classicus* on the subject of this co-ordination or syzygy. Tsoṅ kha pa has

²¹⁸ This highly important theme, mentioned by Kamalaśīla (*Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 20), is discussed also in the *Mādhyamakaratanpradīpa*, a work ascribed to Bhavya, in Chapter VII entitled *bhāvanākrama* (P, f. 352b), which also alludes to the question of non-mentation. See above, pp. 94–95 note; below, p. 206.

elsewhere referred to the account of the Great Debate²¹⁹ according to which this very Sūtra was contemptuously rejected by the Hva šaṅ (f. 306a).

It is therefore concluded by Tsoṅ kha pa that settling Fixation-Bhāvanā consisting in retention free from dispersal (*mi 'phro bar 'dzin pa'i 'jog sgom*) and Inspection by *prajñā* consisting in analysis (*so sor rtog pa'i šes rab kyis dpyod pa*) should first be made to alternate in meditative realization. In this way *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* reach equilibrium (*cha mñam*), where there is an excess of neither the settling aspect (*gnas cha: sthiti*) nor of analytical investigation (f. 509b). Tsoṅ kha pa observes that *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* are realized separately, and are made to alternate (*spel mar byed pa*) with each other, there being no rule at this stage that Inspection and Fixation should be realized [together] in a single mental continuum (*rgyun gcig*) (f. 510a5).

But in a later stage there follows the yoking together (*zuni du 'brel ba: yuganaddha*), or syzygy, of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, when they merge and operate together (*samapravṛtta: mñam du 'jug pa*). The Path being then characterized by this yoked pair functions of itself (*rañ gi ñaṅ gi 'jug pa = svarasavāhin*), without effort (*mñon par byed pa = abhisamskāra*) and mental inflection (*rtsol ba = ābhoga*) (f. 514a–b). Here the force of analytical Inspection-Bhāvanā (*dpyad sgom*) consisting in *pratyavekṣā* makes it possible to achieve Quieting (*śamatha*) (f. 514b6). And whilst inspection (*dpyod pa*) is *vipaśyanā*, this inspection once brought to perfect completion (*dpyad pa mthar thug pa*) is apprehension of Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) qualified by *śamatha* (f. 515a1).

This Fixation-Bhāvanā that initially alternates and then finally coincides with analytical Inspection, in the form first of a regular sequence and then of a syzygy of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, is not, therefore, to be confused with 'Darkness-Bhāvanā' (*mun sgom*) and with non-construction known as *tsom 'jog gi mi rtog pa* (f. 496a6). These last two expressions are used to describe that one-sided form of totally non-analytical, and practically cataleptic, non-mentation and non-construction so often attributed in the Tibetan treatises to the Hva šaṅ, when *asmṛti* and *amanasikāra*

²¹⁹ See *sBa bžed*, G, p. 66.16 ~ S, p. 56.8; dPa' bo gTsong lag phreñ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 116a2.

are advocated to the exclusion of exact analytical inspection (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*) and the resulting transcending discriminative understanding (*prajñā*).

In Tsoñ kha pa's opinion, Nāgārjuna, Bhāvaviveka, Candrakīrti, Śāntideva, Kamalaśīla and Atiśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna have all agreed on the matter of guidance in meditative realization (*'khrid tshul*) concerning the linkage that should obtain between Fixation-Bhāvanā and Inspection-Bhāvanā. And according to him the same fundamental method was, in addition, taught by Maitreya(nātha) and Asaṅga, and finally by Ratnākaraśānti (eleventh century) who faultlessly upheld their method in his *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (f. 511a).

The doxographer Blo bzañ Chos kyi ñi ma (1737–1802) has stated in his *Grub mtha' šel gyi me loñ* that the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna figures not as a sTon mun pa (as he does in the sources considered above) but as a special kind of Tsuñ men pa. Yet Blo bzañ Chos kyi ñi ma observes straightaway that the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna's doctrine does not prove to be identical with the general theory (*spyi'i lta ba*) of the Tsuñ men pa.²²⁰

The same author then remarks that, according to the Tsuñ men pa, the results of wholesome and unwholesome *karman* sustained by neither release (*ñes 'byuñ = niḥsaraṇa*) nor the *bodhicitta* can respectively engender bliss and pain, but that they nevertheless do not differ in so far as neither turns into the cause of Liberation and Omniscience. In the same way, black and white clouds are different in colour; but still they do not differ in their effect of obscuring the sky.²²¹ Not observing the appropriate distinction, however, the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna has mistakenly asserted that good mental construction (*bzañ rtog*) and evil mental construction (*ñan rtog*) are alike in being fetters. In the instruction on the meditative practice of real Tsuñ men pa theory, there is mention

²²⁰ Thu'u bkvan Blo bzañ Chos kyi ñi ma, *Grub mtha' šel gyi me loñ*, rGya nag Chapter, ff. 11b–13b. I am indebted to Professor R. A. Stein for pointing out to me that Tib. *tsuñ* corresponds here to Ch. *tsung* 'school', i.e. to the Ch'an as the school *par excellence*.

²²¹ Cf. *sBa bžed*, G, p. 68.18 and S, p. 58.5–6; *Stein 709*, f. 7a3 (cf. Gómez in *Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen*, p. 114); *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiri po*, f. 430b4; *Chos 'byuñ mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 117a2.

of inactivity (*ci yan mi bya*) and non-mentation (*gan yan mi bsam*); but they concern the person who has attained direct understanding of reality (*gnas lugs mñion du gyur pa'i gan zag gi dbari du byas pa yin pa*). However, the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna has asserted that starting already with the level of the beginner (*las dan po pa = ādikarmika*), liberation results from total absence of thinking (*ci yan yid la mi byed pa*).²²² The assertion made by this one Hva šaṅ is therefore wrong. But it is nevertheless impossible to hold that all theories of a Ho-shang (*hva šari gi lta ba thams cad*) are consequently false.²²³

According to Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ñi ma (f. 11b ff.), the *tsun men* belongs to the tradition (*brgyud pa*) of the *sñin po don*.²²⁴ The term *tsun men* is explained (f. 14a) as designating a tradition of realization in practice (*sgrub brgyud*), as distinct from a Vinaya one or an exegetical one (*bśad brgyud*).²²⁵

The *sgrub brgyud sñin po don gyi brgyud pa* is said by Blo bzaṅ

²²² See Demiéville, *Concile*, p. 77, and above, pp. 66, 84, 93, 98. But compare *Concile*, pp. 76, 86–88, 120–1, 157, 162, 164, as well as *Stein 709*, f. 40b.

²²³ *Grub mtha' šel gyi me lon*, rGya nag chapter, f. 13b. Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ñi ma seems to have followed an account found in the *rGya nag chos 'byun* of mGon po skyabs (eighteenth century), f. 72a ff. (of the sDe dge ed.; p. 118 ff. of the Sichuan People's Publishing House ed. of 1983).

²²⁴ While the expression *sñin po don* or *sñin po'i don* is often used in Tibet to refer to the *Dohā* traditions of the Siddhas and the bKa' brgyud, according to mGon po skyabs (p. 118) – who also mentions the Mahāmudrā (*phyag rgya chen po*) – the allusion is to a teaching given to Āryadeva by Nāgārjuna; see Tāranātha, *rGya gar chos 'byun* (p. 67), who adds that the *sñin po'i don* was passed on to Rāhulabhadra by Āryadeva (p. 68). Tshe dbari nor bu (*rGya nag hva šari gi byun tshul*, f. 9a) relates the reference to the *ries don sñin po'i mdo sde*, i.e. to the Sūtras of the Third Cycle teaching the *tathāgatagarbha*, such as the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, which deal with *don bsgom* (ff. 9a, 15a). This is also the *tsun men* tradition going back, through the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna, to Kāśyapa and Bodhidharma, even though it is sometimes referred to as the *tun min* (e.g. in the *bSam gtan mig sgron*, f. 8b). It resembles in part the rDzogs chen according to Tshe dbari nor bu (f. 8b); however, it has to be distinguished from the latter in so far as it belongs to the *mdo lam* rather than the *sniags lam* (f. 9b–10a). Tshe dbari nor bu nevertheless concludes that the *don bsgom pa*, the *amanasi(kāra)* method of India and the two *bsam gtan gyi 'jug sgo* of the rGya nag mkhan po are virtually without difference (*phal cher mi mthun pa med do*, f. 12a).

²²⁵ It should be noted that mGon po skyabs differentiates between the *tsun men* (pp. 118–123 of the Sichuan ed. of his *rGya nag chos 'byun*) as a *bka' yi brgyud pa* comprising the twenty-eight Ch'an masters from Mahākāśyapa to Bodhidharmottara (see below) – and to which he has attached the *sñin po don* also known as *rig ston phyag rgya chen po* – and the *zab mo lta ba'i brgyud pa* in connexion with which he has discussed the *tun min* (= *gcig char 'jug pa'i sgo*) as opposed to the *tsi yan men* (= *rim gyis 'jug pa'i sgo*) (pp. 123–4). mGon po skyabs (p. 119) furthermore associates the *tsun men* tradition with the *Ratnaguṇasamca-yagāthās*, Kambala's *Ālokaṃālā*, and Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

Chos kyi ñi ma (f. 12a) to descend through Bodhidharmottara (or Dharmo), the twenty-eighth in a line of spiritual transmission starting with Kāśyapa.²²⁶ However, since in China Bodhidharmottara did not expound his doctrine literally (*sgra ji bžin pa*), but only by means of indirect allusion (*ldem dgoñs kyi gsun*: *saṃdhāvācana*) and symbols (*brda*: *saṃketa*), it is related that those who heard him did not have confidence (*mos pa*) and that they took him to be a teacher of nihilism (*chad lta mkhan*); and so he did not remain in China but went away to the North. The story of Bodhidharma's single shoe is also mentioned, as is the relevant iconography (f. 13a). And it is noted that by some he was identified with Pha dam pa rgya gar or Dam pa sañs rgyas, an Indian master of the Ži byed doctrine who is reputed to have also gone to China. Our author nevertheless expresses uncertainty about the value of this identification because he knows of no reliable source for it (f. 13a).

In agreement with mGon po skyabs, Blo bzañ Chos kyi ñi ma then adds that the *sñiñi po don* (or *tsuñi men*) appears as a Tradition of Symbol-Mahāmudrā (*phyag rgya chen po brda'i brgyud pa*), one that is moreover in substantial agreement with the Tibetan bKa' brgyud pa (f. 13b). He thus approaches what Sa skya Pañdi ta has said in his critique of 'Chinese-style' rDzogs chen and Neo-Mahāmudrā, but apparently without a critical (or polemical) intent.

It is to be noted furthermore that, like mGon po skyabs, Blo bzañ Chos kyi ñi ma distinguishes this *sñiñi po don* – and with it the *tsuñi men* – from the *tun men/min* (*cig car 'jug pa'i sgo*) – the correlate of the *tsi'an men/tsi yan min*²²⁷ (*rim gyis 'jug pa'i sgo*) – which he attaches to the distinct tradition of Profound Theory (*zab mo lta ba'i brgyud pa*) descending through Nāgārjuna and the

²²⁶ This information concerning the Hva šañ Mahāyāna's connexion with Bodhidharmottara's lineage and the *tsuñi men* is found also in Tshe dbañ nor bu, *rGya nag hva šañ gi byuñ tshul*, ff. 5b, 8a, 10b. On f. 9 Tshe dbañ nor bu describes 'Bodhidharmottara' as the source of the *tsuñi men* (see also f. 10b2: *bsam gtan* [?] *mkhan hva šañ tsuñi men rñams*). But, at the same time, Tshe dbañ nor bu maintains the connexion of Bodhidharma and his *brgyud 'dzin* Hva šañ Mahāyāna with the *cig char 'jug pa* following what he refers to as the *Lo pañ bka' thañ* (in fact the *Blon po bka'i thañ yig*, f. 19a); see also f. 7b–8a. On the question of the line of twenty-eight Dhyāna masters, see further below, pp. 152–3.

²²⁷ The spellings *tse ya(n) men/man* are found in Tshe dbañ nor bu, *rGya nag hva šañ gi byuñ tshul*, ff. 3b and 10b.

younger Bhavya (f. 9b-11a).²²⁸ It is in addition of great interest to see that this author considers (f. 11b) it incorrect to regard the latter two traditions as opposed doctrinal systems (*grub mtha'* = *siddhānta*); according to him they are rather to be seen as methods of spiritual instruction (*'khrīd tshul*) by which a disciple may be guided in accordance with his nature.²²⁹ The same was in addition said by a great teacher cited by Blo bzañ Chos kyī ñi ma to apply to the distinction between *cig car ba* and *thod rgal*, which have been counted as two types in the practice of the Path (*lam gyi rim pa*) (f. 11b).

This linking of the Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna with a form of the *tsun men* is clearly of considerable interest. Study of Mo-ho-yen's school-affiliations has suggested that, at least to begin with, he may have been a follower of the somewhat more gradualist Northern School of Ch'an linked with Shen-hsiu (seventh century), and that he only later moved closer to the Southern School represented by Shen-hui (670-762 or 684-758). However, the fact that he is sometimes listed as the seventh master in a line beginning with Dharmottāra/Bodhidharma can be interpreted as indicating rather that he in fact belonged strictly speaking neither to the Northern School, where it was P'u-chi (651-739) who was counted as the successor of the sixth Chinese Patriarch Shen-hsiu, nor to the Southern School, where Shen-hui is counted as the successor of the sixth Chinese Patriarch Hui-neng. Moreover, affinities between Mo-ho-yen and the Pao-t'ang School of Ch'an in Sichuan have also been noted by scholars. And it appears that his teaching was not wholly that of any of the well-known schools of Ch'an and that it was close to Ch'an movements in Sichuan and the Dunhuang area.²³⁰

In the records studied by Demiéville, furthermore, Mo-ho-yen is shown relativizing, and transcending, instantaneous (*tun*) and gradual (*chien*) tendencies within Ch'an.²³¹ Indeed, in a source

²²⁸ See below, pp. 206-09.

²²⁹ See also mGon po skyabs, *rGya nag chos byūi*, p. 173.

²³⁰ Cf. S. Yanagida, in W. Lai and L. Lancaster (eds.), *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet*, pp. 20 ff., 36-37; D. Ueyama, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-49; J. Broughton in R. Gimello and P. Gregory (eds.), *Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen*, pp. 1-68; G. Mala, 'Empreinte du Tch'an chez les mystiques tibétains' in *Le Tch'an (Zen)* (Hermès 4, Nouvelle Série, Paris, 1985), p. 387 ff.

²³¹ See Demiéville, *Concile*, p. 75; in *Essays in the history of Buddhism presented to Professor Z. Tsukamoto* (Kyōto, 1961), pp. 5, 26-27; *T'oung Pao* 56 (1970) pp. 83-86; and

often used by him, the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, we already find a relativization of the pair *yugapad* 'simultaneous' and *kramavṛtti* 'progressive engagement' (ii, pp. 55–56, 82 and 84). Vimalamitra is credited furthermore in the bsTan 'gyur with one treatise on the *cig car ba* doctrine and another on the *rim gyis pa* doctrine; and to the extent that these two works are attributable to a single author (whether he is named Vimalamitra or not), this too could attest an attempt at relativizing and reconciling the opposition between 'Simultaneism' and 'Gradualism' (or, eventually, at more or less inclusivistically integrating and 'recovering' the one in the other). At all events the *Cig car 'jug pa nam par mi rtog pa'i bsgom don* ascribed to Vimalamitra contains materials corresponding to Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākramas*.²³²

In its furthest consequences the innatist and 'spontaneist' doctrine – especially if misunderstood – could, in certain circumstances, lead to ethical relativism or antinomianism.

It is interesting to observe that in connexion with the twin practices of ritualized sexual union and mactation (*sbyor sgröl*) – associated in the eleventh century in the Kingdom of Western Tibet with the so-called Ar tsho Ban de (or A ra mo Ban de) – antinomianism did in fact rage in tandem with immanentism

in: M. Soymié (ed.), *Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang*, pp. 1–7, 10–11; S. Yanagida, *loc. cit.*, p. 16; D. Ueyama, *loc. cit.*, p. 343; J. Broughton, *loc. cit.*, pp. 3, 8–10. Cf. J. McRae, *The Northern School and the formation of early Ch'an Buddhism* (Honolulu, 1986).

L. Gómez (in: R. Gimello and P. Gregory, *Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen*, p. 95) has compared Mo-ho-yen's teachings with Tsung-mi's doctrine of sudden enlightenment followed by gradual cultivation. Tsung-mi belonged to the lineage of Shen-hui and hailed from Sichuan (cf. Yanagida, *loc. cit.*, p. 31). Wu-chu (Tib. Bu cu) of the Pao-t'ang Ch'an school of Sichuan inclined towards 'Subitism', whereas Master Kim (Chin Ho-shang, i.e. Wu-hsiang/Musang), the Korean master who taught in Sichuan, inclined towards 'Gradualism' (see Demiéville, in M. Soymié [ed.], *Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang*, pp. 3–7). On the 'sudden' tendency in the Northern School, in particular with Chih-ta who was a disciple of Shen-hsiu (rather than a later, and perhaps fictitious, master to be placed after Shen-hui), see B. Faure, *Cahiers d'Extrême-Asie* 2 (1986), pp. 123–132.

²³² Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, II, pp. 117, 120–1, speaks of interpolation. And Gómez in *Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen*, p. 147 n. 8, regards 'all Bhāvanākrama passages in the *Cig car* [*'jug pa nam par mi rtog pa'i bsgom don*] as interpolations, and not as instances of plagiarism or concessions to the gradualists'; see also Gómez, in *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet*, p. 397 and p. 430 n. 21. F. Faber has argued against attributing this treatise ascribed to Vimalamitra to (his) Vimalamitra (*Acta orientalia* 46 [1985], p. 49–50).

according to historical sources which tell us that Atiṣa was invited to Western Tibet in the middle of the eleventh century in order to combat this pseudo-Tantric doctrine in collaboration with Rin chen bzañ po. In this case the aberrations in theory and practice were apparently connected not with Chinese Ho-shangs but with a debased form of Mahāmudrā-teaching that was current in the border land with Kāśmīr, where a syncretism had evidently developed between Śivaism and Buddhism in which the doctrine and practice of both are said to have become perverted.²³³

Still, it is perhaps significant that the Supplemented Version of the *sBa bžed*, the *Žabs btaḡs ma*, which has in its first part devoted so much space to the Great Debate and the circumstances surrounding it, deals at the end of its supplement (S, p. 90) with Atiṣa's confutation of those deviant Tantriks who – not having understood the intended purport (*dgonis pa = abhiprāya*) of texts the meaning of which requires to be elicited (*drañ don = neyārtha*) but clinging rather to the bare words (*sgra = vyañjana*) – held that there was no need to have recourse to generosity (*sbyin pa = dāna*) and the other salvific means (*thabs = upāya*); for it is, they maintained, by Emptiness alone that one is Awakened. And in view of the resemblance between some of the problems at issue in the Great Debate and in the false doctrines propagated in Western Tibet by the Ar tsho Ban de which Atiṣa was called on to combat – and in particular the idea of dispensing with means as antidotes and the emphasis laid on the spontaneous innateness of buddhahood – it might even seem that the supplement to the *sBa bžed* was meant as it were to update this older text with a view to confronting a new, but in some respects comparable, situation.

²³³ Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg in: *Tantric and Taoist studies in honour of R. A. Stein (Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 20 [1981])*, pp. 212–26; and *Acta indologica 6 (1984)*, pp. 369–81.

Such antinomianism could, it is true, be derived from 'over-interpretation' of what has been said in even such classical texts of Buddhism as the *Kāśyapaparivarta* (§§ 48–49, on the wise and skilful Bodhisattva's being untouched by the pain of the passions) and Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha* (§ 10.28.11–12, on the theory of the destruction of the *kleśas* through the *kleśas* themselves), which have in fact been cited in just this connexion by the *bSam gtan mig sgron* (see below p. 122). See also *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* xiii. 11, and Stīrāmati, *Madhyāntavibhāḡaḡikā* ii. 14 (p. 76) on *kleśa* as a factor of Awakening (*bodhyarḡga*). See in addition dPal brtsegs, *lTa ba'i rim pa* (cf. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, II, p. 139); and passages from Vimalamitra discussed by L. Gómez in W. Lai and L. Lancaster (eds.), *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet*, pp. 403–4.

However, it is important to note that no comparison has actually been drawn in the *Žabs btags ma* between the religious situation prevailing in Central and Eastern Tibet at the end of the eighth century, at the time of the Great Debate, and the dangerous debasement that menaced the Dharma in Western Tibet in the first part of the eleventh century. At most there may have been a kind of conflation of the problematics of each case.

It is nevertheless very curious to find cited in the *bSam gtan mig sgron* (f. 90a) a passage from a certain *rGya lün* ('Chinese Treatise') according to which even murder is a sin (*sdig pa*) only if the murderer conceives of the murdered person as a sentient being (*sems can*). On the contrary, if one does not do so – that is, in so far as one is able to recognize that all sentient beings are *māyā*-like and dream-like – there can, in the absence of any real sentient being, be no murder. This is compared with the case of killing in dream, where actually there is no killing at all of anybody; and dream and waking are then held to be alike in terms of the view in question. This doctrine seems, however, not to be often met with in our sources connected with the eighth-century Great Debate of *bSam yas*.²³⁴

In other words, despite a certain similarity in ideas, the actual practices and events in the two cases under consideration no doubt appeared altogether different to the authors of our sources. And they therefore did not equate the Hva šaṅ's rather etherealized spontaneous and innatist spiritualism and quietism – which dispensed with the difficult and prolonged 'allopathic' technique of the 'Gradualists' in favour of a spontaneous 'Nature-cure' of Mind²³⁵ – with the deviant ideas and debased practices ascribed to the Ar tsho Ban de, who are reported to have engaged in ritual sexuality and mactation in the guise of a method that also repudiated the customary doctrines and praxis of 'Gradualist' Buddhism.

²³⁴ Compare the citation from the *mghan po* Phag do šaṅ ši published by K. Okimoto, *Indogaku bukyogaku kenkyū* 24/2 (1976), p. 994, who also has some information on a *rgya lün* (*chen po*) (pp. 993–2). In the *bSam gtan mig sgron*, f. 10a2, Dar mo ta ra is credited with a *rGya lün chen po*.

²³⁵ Cf. the comparison of the *rDzogs chen* Man ṅag sde with moxabustion by Kloṅ chen rab 'byams pa, *Grub mtha' mdzod*, f. 126a5 (~p. 348.4–5): *yin śāam yid dpyod du ma lus par gnad thog tu phebs pas me btsa lta bu'o*.

In many Tibetan historical writings, and above all in philosophical and doxographical works, the expressions theory (*lta ba*) of the Hva šaṅ, Dharma-system (*chos lugs*) of the Hva šaṅ and tradition (*gžun lugs*) of the Hva šaṅ have come to be used in a sense that is for all practical purposes dehistoricized and universalized. These expressions have thus come to be widely employed as generic designations for a *type* of theory or teaching that is characterized as quietist, spontaneist, innatist and simultaneist.²³⁶

Since disagreement may exist as to the extent to which Mo-ho-yen (and Ch'an) actually adhered exclusively, or mainly, to such views, this typological use of the expressions is perhaps not entirely justified historically. Yet it can be convincingly derived from the view, reliably ascribed to Mo-ho-yen, that all sentient beings are by their nature *buddhas* and that in coming to an awareness of their intrinsic and innate buddhahood – i.e. the Buddha-nature or *tathāgatagarbha* – any activity or 'reinforcement' of a religious and ethical as well as of an intellectual and discursively philosophical character is therefore altogether superfluous and irrelevant,²³⁷ and may even be a hindrance on the level at least of the advanced practiser.²³⁸ In this perspective, the Triple Vehicle (*triyāna*) is set aside in favour of the Unique Vehicle (*ekayāna*) – or even the Non-Vehicle (*ayāna*) – free from all verbalizations and conceptualization.²³⁹ This interpretation of the Ho-shang's teaching is underpinned by his statements that liberation is achieved in immediate and face-to-face recognition of Mind free from all discursive and ratiocinative mentation, that is, in pure tranquillity unaccompanied by analysis and discriminative understanding.

Under this analysis, the Hva šaṅ's doctrine of the Buddha-nature and *tathāgatagarbha* would not issue in the eternalist view –

²³⁶ L. Gómez in *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet*, p. 428 n. 14, describes the term quietism to refer to Ch'an as an unfortunate legacy of Demiéville's *Concile*. However, if not taken as referring specifically to seventeenth-century European thought, the word does not appear to be unsuitable. The hesychast too does not eschew all activity.

²³⁷ See Demiéville, *Concile*, pp. 95, 107–08, 116–19, 151.

²³⁸ See above, p. 117.

²³⁹ See Demiéville, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 119, 151.

with which these concepts have elsewhere been associated – and it could easily be (mis)understood as practically nihilistic. In Bu ston's *Chos 'byuri*, the Hva šaṅ's teaching is in fact assimilated to the nihilist view (*chad lta = ucchedadṛṣṭi*).²⁴⁰

In sum, virtually irrespective of its primary historical reference, the expression 'Hva šaṅ's theory' (or the like) has been used at least from the time of Sa skya Paṅḍi ta in the thirteenth century up to the present by Tibetan writers as a standard *topos*, and as a convenient *typological* designation for what a historian of religion and philosophy might call gnoseological nativism, soteriological spontaneity, philosophical ataraxia (without of course presupposing any specific reference to Pyrrho or Stoical Pyrrhonism) and ethico-religious quietism (again without any specific reference to Molinos and Madame Guyon and to seventeenth-century European thought). In a large section of the Tibetan tradition it has in this way acquired currency as a term in the description of spiritual theory and practice.

Were it not for the fact that the historical existence of the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen is established by Chinese and Tibetan documents from Dunhuang and that Kamalaśīla and his teacher Śāntarakṣita are well-known figures in the history of Buddhism many of whose writings are extant in the original Sanskrit as well as in Tibetan translation, a historian might indeed have been excused for inferring from the available rather schematic accounts of the Great Debate, and from the almost paradigmatic rôles played in it by the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna and Kamalaśīla, that this event and these names correspond not to historical facts and persons, but to emblematic figures embodying so to say a pair of contrasting religio-philosophical positions in typological and structural opposition. Certainly, in not a few Tibetan historical and doxographical traditions, the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen has been partly dehistoricized and has developed into a practically emblematic figure occupying a paradigmatic, and structurally antithetical, position as the 'Simultaneist' *par excellence* in opposition to the

²⁴⁰ See Bu ston, *Chos 'byuri*, f. 128a1; compare the 'Alternative Tradition' of the *sBa bžed* (G, p. 73) on *stori pa nīd la dga' ba*. See however, *bSam gtan mig sgron*, f. 83a–b, on not falling into annihilation (*chad pa = uccheda*) and on not suppressing *saṃjñā* and not falling into absence of *saṃjñā*.

'Gradualist' Kamalaśīla. And even though the historical documentation available to us of course excludes such an inference, we still have to bear in mind that the figures in question have come to exemplify two important, and old, positions that have often been in tension, either virtual or actual, in the history of Buddhism. (Compare the cases of Muśīla and Nārada, and of Mahākoṭṭhita/Mahākoṭṭhika and Sāriputta, in the old Buddhist canon mentioned below, Chap. iv)

The fact that, for the Tibetan historical and doxographical traditions, important facts concerning the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen were uncertain and wrapped in the mists of time and legend must have greatly contributed to his becoming a somewhat shadowy and emblematic figure. For example, it was evidently not clear to the rÑiñ ma master Tshe dbañ nor bu (1698/9–1755) whether he should be placed in the time of Khri Sroñ lde btsan or earlier, at the end of the reign of this king's predecessor Mes Ag tshom(s) and whether it was he or a disciple of his who debated with Kamalaśīla.²⁴¹ Furthermore, as already noted, although the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna is usually regarded by the Tibetan traditions as a 'Simultaneist', there seems to have been some uncertainty as to whether he should be identified as a *ston mun pa* or as a *tsui men pa*.

Originally, and historically, 'Simultaneism' was possibly just as much complementary with as antithetical to 'Gradualism'. Ñaṅ ral's *Chos 'byuñ Me tog sñiñ po* has presented the teachings of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna and Kamalaśīla as being without difference in substance, notwithstanding the fact that they were pitched at different levels (f. 435b).²⁴² And in the *bSam gtan mig sgron* ascribed to gNubs Sañs rgyas ye šes, simultaneous engagement (*cig car 'jug pa*) is a stage that follows on gradual engagement (*rim gyis 'jug pa*) and leads on first to Mahāyoga (*rnal 'byor chen po*) and

²⁴¹ See Tshe dbañ nor bu, *rGya nag hva šaṅ gi byuñ tshul*, f. 8a–b, where Mahāyāna is placed in the latter part of the reign of Mes Ag tshom can (i.e. Khri lDe gtsug btsan, the father of Khri Sroñ lde btsan) together with his disciples sBa gSal snañ (!) and Myañ Tiñ ñe 'dzin bzañ po and is therefore tentatively distinguished from the Hva šaṅ who debated with Kamalaśīla and who would then have been Mahāyāna's disciple. For an account of *ho-shangs* in Tibet at the time of Mes Ag tshoms, see for example the *sBa bžed*. And on the Hva šaṅ Me 'go/mgo at that time see Chap. ii above.

²⁴² See above, pp. 84–85. On the similar opinion of dPal dbyaṅs see above, p. 86.

then to Atiyoga and rDzogs chen; and although this work mentions the Hva šaṅ Mahā yan and Kamalaśīla in parallel, it does not refer to the Great Debate, nor does it present these two masters as opponents.²⁴³ Kamalaśīla has, moreover, himself admitted the simultaneous operation (*cig car 'jug pa*) of *prajñā* and *upāya* in his *Bhāvanākrama* (II, p. 71).

CONCLUSION

The encounter in late eighth-century Tibet between two distinct, and contrasting, religio-philosophic currents has sometimes been presented in the Tibetan sources as well as by modern scholars as a confrontation between Indian and Chinese Buddhism. And by some modern scholars it has been described as a Sino-Indian or Indo-Chinese controversy, a conflict between Indian and Chinese culture, and sometimes even as a struggle at the Tibetan court between Indians and Chinese pursuing their respective political or religio-political interests.²⁴⁴ The question arises as to whether such descriptions define the nature of the issues involved as precisely as is possible given the documentation available to us.

To take the last description first, although it is not impossible that political factors did play a part in these developments, it seems likely that the opposition between the two parties at the time of the Great Debate stemmed as much, if not more, from rivalries and conflicts between Tibetan magnates and their families (such as the sBa and Myaṅ, members of which had become Buddhist monks) as from national or ethnic rivalry between Indians and Chinese as such. The sBa family with which we have so often been concerned in the course of this discussion for example included some members – sBa gSal snaṅ and perhaps the enigmatic Saṅ ši (ta) – associated with Chinese and Korean Ho-

²⁴³ In Don dam smra ba'i seṅ ge (15th–16th century?), *bŠad mdzod yid bžin nor bu* (ed. Lokesh Chandra, New Delhi, 1969), f. 163a, there is a reference to Kamalaśīla and the Tsen min pa, as well as to the need to yoke together *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* and to follow the theory of Nāgārjuna; but there is no mention of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna as Kamalaśīla's opponent. The *rdzogs chen* and *atiyoga* are, however, mentioned.

²⁴⁴ Compare recently Demiéville in M. Soymié (ed.), *Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang*, p. 7, who refers back to his views expressed in his *Concile*.

shangs,²⁴⁵ and other members – Ye šes dbaṅ po (who is, however, identified as gSal snaṅ once he had become a monk) and dPal dbyaṅs (who may or may not be identical with Saṅ ši) – who were closely linked with Kamalaśīla. As for Mo-ho-yen, two of his main supporters are reported to have been Khri Sroṅ lde btsan's 'Bro consort (the 'Bro bza' Jo mo Byaṅ chub rje) and his maternal aunt (*sru* Yaṅ dag), while other supporters of the Hva saṅ were the chamberlain (*gzims mal pa*) Co rMa rma and a member of the rNog family.²⁴⁶ Myaṅ Tiṅ ñe 'dzin bzaṅ po is also sometimes numbered as one of Ye šes dbaṅ po's chief opponents.

In the eighth century Tibet was in fact a major independent Central Asian power in its own right, especially after imperial power in China was shaken by the An Lu-shan rebellion. And there is no concrete evidence to show that the Tibetans, who figure so prominently in this encounter and the associated controversies, were pursuing anything but their own religious concerns, along perhaps with the political interests of their families and regions. At all events, and contrary to what has sometimes been suggested or implied, there is no reason to suppose that the Tibetans then represented nothing but the proverbial *tabula rasa* merely waiting to be converted or manipulated by Chinese or Indians. For their part, the Indians and Chinese in Tibet at the time would presumably have derived any political influence they may have possessed above all through the Tibetans with whom they were associated. And it is not evident that they would have been on their own in a position to further their national or ethnic interests in Tibet under the guise of a religio-philosophical controversy in which many of the points at issue had a long history in Buddhist thought. In sum, no conclusive evidence has been adduced to demonstrate that this controversy was essentially an eighth-century expression of Sino-Indian geo-political or politico-ideological rivalries and conflicts.

As to the view that the controversy was the consequence of cultural confrontation between Indian and Chinese Buddhism, and ultimately between Indian and Chinese civilization, it has to be borne in mind that there then existed no totally homogeneous

²⁴⁵ See *sBa bžed* cited above, n. 100.

²⁴⁶ See above, p. 60 ff.

and monolithic Indian and Chinese Buddhism. On the one side the Chinese Ch'an traditions – which today are usually regarded as so typically Chinese – not only differed among themselves, but they had their origins, at least in part, in Dhyāna teachings from India and Central Asia and their counterparts in the teachings of certain Indian Siddhas and Yoga-masters. On the other side, the scholastic traditions of India had their Chinese extensions and equivalents, before and during the T'ang, in the San-lun (Madhyamaka) School, in Paramārtha's She-lun (*Mahāyānasamgraha*) School, in Paramārtha's and Hsüan-tsang's Chü-she (*Abhidharma-kośa*) traditions, and in Hsüan-tsang's Fa-hsiang (*dharmalakṣaṇa*) School, as well as more generally in certain component strands of such major Chinese Buddhist schools as the T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen. Furthermore, T'an-k'uang – an (elder?) contemporary of Mo-ho-yen at Dunhuang who evidently was in communication by correspondence with Khri Sroñ lde btsan himself – was linked for example with the Abhidharma and Dharmalakṣaṇa (i.e. Vijnānavāda) traditions in China.²⁴⁷

What the student of comparative religion and intercultural transmission finds here is, then, neither a straightforward case of political conflict in Tibet between India and China, nor even a clear-cut case of cultural confrontation and hostility between homogeneous and monolithic national forms of Buddhism contending for the minds and hearts of Tibetans more or less passively waiting to be converted to the one or the other. Rather, we discover a complex of currents and trends – many of them old and respectable in the history of Buddhism – represented, in varying proportions, in the Buddhist traditions of India and China, and of course subsequently in Tibet itself.

Now, as already noted above, it is quite true that Tibetan sources have themselves underscored the fact that the two tendencies facing each other in Tibet arrived there in the main the one directly from India and the other through China, and that they were propagated respectively by Indian and Chinese masters. And the question of historically Chinese and Indian

²⁴⁷ For the rôle of T'an-k'uang in the context of the Great Debate, see D. Ueyama in W. Lai and L. Lancaster (eds.), *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet*, p. 327; W. Pachow, *A study of the twenty-two dialogues on Mahāyāna Buddhism* (Taipei, 1979).

components in Tibetan Buddhism does unquestionably arise. Moreover, according to Tibetan sources, a certain *ho-shang* endowed with clairvoyance (*mnion šes can*) foretold early in the reign of Khri Sron lde btsan that Tibet was to be the special domain of teaching (*'dul skal*) of Śāntaraṣita (rather than of the *ho-shangs*).²⁴⁸

It would however appear that the Tibetan authors were thinking in terms neither of religio-political and politico-ideological interests and hegemony nor of national forms of Buddhism – a modern concept that would probably have been scarcely intelligible to these authors – but of lines of magisterial transmission and of doctrinal traditions differentiated according to their connexions with regions and lineages. Such classifications are of course well known within India and China; and in Tibet many schools (*chos lugs*) and teaching transmissions (*brgyud pa*) have been differentiated in just this way according to the names of places and regions (e.g. Sa skya pa, Jo nañ pa, dGa' ldan pa, etc.). In other words, geographical regions and family lineages are very likely to have been involved to a degree now difficult precisely to determine in the encounter between currents and tendencies of thought with which we are here concerned. But to see this involvement as basically and essentially reducible to putative ethnic or national forms of Buddhism, or to great-power rivalry in Tibet, is to go beyond the evidence and to impose on it categories of thinking and analysis that are largely anachronistic. On the evidence available, such factors (to the extent that they existed) appear as incidental to the central issues at stake.

In the course of the later development of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, nevertheless, the connexion of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna, and of the other *hva šaṅs*, with China may well have had an impact on the reception of their doctrines in Tibet. For the fact that the *ston mun pa* or 'Simultaneist' teachings are known to have been transmitted by Chinese and Korean Ho-shangs may have resulted in their being questioned or rejected by Tibetan writers on the ground of not being part of the main stock of Buddhism and its lines of transmission to Tibet. This would at the very

²⁴⁸ See *sBa bžed*, G, pp. 7–8; S, pp. 6–7 (cf. G, pp. 11–12; S, p. 12.5); 'Gos gžon nu dpal, *Deb ther sion po*, ka, f. 21a5.

least have made it easier for any Tibetan masters disposed to do so for reasons of theory or practice to take their distance from them.

Already at the end of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth centuries, the Tibetan rulers were evidently striving toward a normalization of the Buddhist teachings being propagated in their realm. This effort is reflected in the decrees attributed to them according to which the (Mūla)Sārvāstivāda should be the standard Nikāya-tradition in Tibet,²⁴⁹ the philosophical theory of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka should be followed there,²⁵⁰ and the dissemination of the Vajrayāna should be restricted.²⁵¹ These decisions – whether they were actually made by the monarch himself or by his advisers in the Dharma, or are part of some subsequent Tibetan 'invention of tradition' – do not, however, amount to the anathematization of all other Śrāvakayānist Nikāyas apart from the (Mūla)Sārvāstivādins, of all schools of philosophy other than Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka, and of the Buddhist Tantras. And, similarly, the monarch's decree forbidding the dissemination of the Hva šaṅ's teachings, assuming again that such a decree was actually issued by him, can perhaps be best understood as part of a further attempt at standardization rather than as an anathematization inspired by Kamalaśīla and his Tibetan followers. It has also to be recalled that at this time Tibetan civilization was in many of its aspects combining Chinese with Indian and Central Asian elements.²⁵² And in the ninth century translations of important Sūtras and major Śāstras (such

²⁴⁹ See Bu ston, *Chos 'byuñ*, f. 130a–b (Obermiller, p. 197), referring to the time of Ral pa can. On the rôle of the Mūlasārvāstivāda Nikāya in Tibet, see D. Seyfort Rugg, 'Über die Nikāyas der Śrāvakas und den Ursprung der philosophischen Schulen des Buddhismus nach den tibetischen Quellen', in H. Bechert (ed.), *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayāna-Literatur*, Part I (Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung III, 1. Göttingen, 1985), pp. 121 f.

²⁵⁰ See above, pp. 62, 73, 84–86. Khri lDe sroñ btsan's decree, reproduced in the *sGra sbyor bam gñis* (ed. N. Simonsson, *Indo-tibetische Studien*, 1, Uppsala, 1957), p. 244 (compare Padma dkar po, *Chos 'byuñ*, ed. Lokesh Chandra, f. 166b), names both Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu as authorities.

²⁵¹ See *sGra sbyor bam gñis*, p. 260 (compare Padma dkar po, *Chos 'byuñ*, f. 168b), in the time of Khri lDe sroñ btsan; Bu ston, *Chos 'byuñ*, f. 130a–b, in the time of Ral pa can = Khri gTsug lde btsan (!).

²⁵² See recently R. A. Stein, 'Tibetica antiqua' I–III, *Bulletin de l'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient* 72 (1983), pp. 149–236, 73 (1984), pp. 257–72, and 74 (1985), pp. 83–133.

as the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra-Tīkā* by the Korean Wŏn ch'uk [613–696], P 5517 = D 4016) were being made from Chinese, notably by 'Go(s) Chos grub (Fa-cheng).²⁵³ But the norm accepted for Tibetan Buddhism from the eighth century onwards has tended to be the twin criteria of the existence of an original Indian canonical source and of a valid Indo-Tibetan tradition of transmission.²⁵⁴

A further interesting point of difference between the Indian (and Indo-Tibetan) tradition and the Chinese tradition of Buddhism was that the former relied at least as much on Śāstra as on Sūtra sources whereas the latter was perhaps based more on Sūtras. It is no doubt to this tendency that Mo-ho-yen was referring when he contrasted his own Sūtra-based teachings and the predominantly Śāstraic content of the Buddhism being propagated by the 'Brahman monk' (*p'o-lo-men seng*).²⁵⁵

In sum, on the basis of the materials discussed above it appears appropriate to distinguish within Buddhism a 'Gradualist' current characteristic of the Sūtras and Śāstras that set out what might be termed the 'allopathic' use of counteragents (*gñen po* = *pratipakṣa* 'antidote') and salvific means (*thabs* = *upāya*) in a progressive course of gnoseological and soteriological reinforcement (*bhāvanā*, *sevanā* and *abhyāsa*); a gnoseologically 'innatist' and a soteriologically 'spontaneist' tendency characteristic in particular of the Siddhas and some Dhyāna-masters who followed above all certain Sūtras which dispense with 'allopathic' means and tend to have recourse mainly, or exclusively, so to say to a 'Nature-cure' based on the holistically immediate and face-to-face 'recognition' of Mind; and, finally, a current best known from the Vajrayāna (but not altogether absent from certain Sūtras and Śāstras) that makes use of what might be called 'homoeopathic' procedures by which obstacles such as the defilements/afflictions (*kleśa* = *ñon*

²⁵³ Cf. S. Inaba in L. Kawamura and K. Scott (eds.), *Buddhist thought and Asian civilization* (Festschrift H. V. Guenther, Emeryville, 1977), pp. 105–13.

²⁵⁴ For the use of this criterion in editing the canon, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *The life of Bu ston Rin po che* (Rome, 1966), pp. 27–28.

²⁵⁵ See Demiéville, *Concile*, p. 160 and pp. 25, 39–42.

monis) are overcome or cured through themselves.²⁵⁶ And it is necessary to differentiate these currents – which have existed within Buddhism in a relationship of both suppletive and antithetical complementarity – from deviations and aberrations in theory and practice that arose from misunderstanding, debase-ment and misuse of either of the last two currents, and which are therefore distinct from them.

Although one or the other of these currents has no doubt predominated at a given place and time, it would be excessive to maintain that quintessentially and typically the first is Indian and the second is Chinese, and accordingly to represent the Great Debate and the encounter of theories and practices that accompanied it as a conflict between an Indian (or Indic) and a Chinese (or Sinitic) Buddhism. Similarly, however typical the 'Left-hand path' (*vāmācāra*) and the Cīnakrama may have been of certain Himalayan areas, it would not seem possible to consider the grave difficulties that arose in the Kingdom of Western Tibet in the eleventh century, and which led to Atiṣa's being invited there to combat them, only as a clash between Indian and 'Himalayish' tendencies; for the problems involved extended far beyond these geographical and cultural areas.

In terms of any debate between 'nature' and 'nurture' – and in gnoseology and soteriology between nativism and reinforcement – the 'Simultaneist' with his principle of immediacy, spontane-ousness and holism and his theory of the innateness of buddha-hood would appear to stand on the side of 'nature' and gnoseo-logical nativism, whereas the 'Gradualist' with his method of progressively eliminating all obscurations and defilements by means of counter-agents clearly emphasizes the need of 'nurture' and the reinforcement in meditative realization and cultivation of the factors conducive to buddhahood. These two approaches can also be applied to the understanding of the doctrine of the *tathāgatagarbha*, that is, the buddhomorphic nature of all sentient beings. For according to the 'Simultaneist' this teaching signifies

²⁵⁶ Concerning the confluence of the last two currents in the teachings of Ta-mo-to-lo (*Dharmatrāta) according to Pao-t'ang Ch'an, see P. Demiéville, *Peintures monochromes de Dunhuang* (Paris, 1978), pp. 47–48.

For European thought, a connexion has been made between quietism and affectivity in A. Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*⁹ (Paris, 1962), p. 874.

that all sentient beings are already *buddhas*; whilst according to the 'Gradualist' who insists on the need for methodical cultivation the same teaching signifies that on the 'causal' level (*gži*) beings are all potentially *buddhas*, that is, that their inborn capacity of achieving the 'fruit' (*'bras bu*) of buddhahood is proleptic and still unfulfilled. Nevertheless, as said in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* quoted by Kamalaśīla in his *Bhāvanākrama* (II, p. 19), the Matrix or Germ (*gotra*) of the *tathāgata* (*de bžin gšegs pa'i rigs*) is perceived only when Quieting (*śamatha*) and Insight (*vipaśyanā*) are in balance, as is the case with *tathāgatas* or *buddhas*. For when the mental tranquillity of concentration (*samādhi*) predominates and the discriminative function of *prajñā* is weak, as in the case of an Auditor (*śrāvaka*), one does not see the *tathāgatagotra* at all; conversely, if *prajñā* predominates and *samādhi* is weak, as is the case with Bodhisattvas still on the Path of Awakening, it is seen only indistinctly. That Kamalaśīla has thus called attention to the relevance of the *tathāgatagarbha* and *gotra* theories to his other concerns in his *Bhāvanākrama* is in keeping with the fact that in his *Madhyamakāloka* – which he is reputed to have composed in Tibet for the benefit of the monarch²⁵⁷ – he introduced this theory into the main Madhyamaka tradition.

As regards the Vajrayāna, it appears to combine elements of the rapid way of 'nature' and nativism with a recognition that means, both ritual and cognitive, have to be brought into play gradually.

It is of special importance to note that both 'Gradualism' and 'Simultaneism' can find support in the Sūtra literature of Buddhism, and that in the Śāstras also many traces can be found of the idea of gnoseological nativism and soteriological spontaneousness as well as of holism and instantaneousness or 'Subitism'.

In Tibetan literature noteworthy indications are found concerning the manner in which the Tibetans have themselves regarded the interrelation and classification of the component elements of their religion and culture in terms of architectural organization in space.

²⁵⁷ See *sBa bžed G*, p. 77 and *S*, p. 63; *Ñi ma 'od zer, Chos 'byuñi Me tog sñiñi po*, f. 437a6.

In the plan of the great temple complex of bSam yas – where at least part of the Great Debate took place in the Byañ chub gliñ, which was constructed as a cosmogram on the model of the Indian temple of Otantapuri, and where for centuries members of the various Tibetan religious communities have found their monastic centre and have congregated²⁵⁸ – the exposition of Dharma (*chos 'chad pa*) was kept up in the western temple (*gliñ*) of Vairocana, the Dhyāna (*bsam gtan*) tradition of the 'Chinese Hva šaṅ' was cultivated in the western temple Mi g-yo bSam gtan gliñ, Tantric rituals comprising Maṇḍalas and Abhiṣeka were performed in the southern temple of bDud 'dul snaṅs pa gliñ, Discipline (*khirms*) was placed in the eastern rNam dag khirms khañ temple, and the grammatical and literary arts were studied in the eastern Tshaṅs pa temple.²⁵⁹ Here, then, we find a kind of diagram horizontally co-ordinating the various component traditions constituting Tibetan Buddhism.

In the vertical disposition of its successive storeys and their decoration, the central temple (dBu rtse) of bSam yas is said to have reflected a sort of symbiosis – or at all events a collocation – in ascending order of Tibetan, Chinese and Indian modes.²⁶⁰ Thus, whilst the Tibetan style was represented on ground level in this sanctuary built in Tibet for the benefit of the Tibetan people, and whilst the Indian style characterized the pinnacle, the Chinese style is said to have been used in the middle storey. In this way, the component elements of Tibetan religious culture appear

²⁵⁸ See G. Tucci, *To Lhasa and beyond* (Rome, 1956), p. 120.

²⁵⁹ Bu ston, *Chos 'byuñ*, f. 127b; cf. bSod nams rgyal mtshan, *rGyal rabs gsal ba'i me loñ*, Chap. xviii, f. 83b–84a.

The classical Tibetan tradition has usually co-ordinated scholastic instruction (*bšad pa*) and spiritual realization (*sgrub pa*), meditation being associated with the former as well as with the latter. As for the grammatical and literary arts, they are regarded as general and 'exterior', i.e. as not specifically Buddhist, sciences (*vidyāsthāna*) and accomplishments of the Bodhisattva. Cf. *Bodhisattvabhūmi* i. 8 (p. 105) and i. 14 (p. 212).

²⁶⁰ See *sa bžed*, G, pp. 38–45, and S, pp. 31–36; Tshal pa Kun dga' rdo rje, *Deb ther dmar po* (*Hu lan deb ther*), f. 17b (p. 37); *Padma bka'i thani yig*, Ch. lxxxvi (transl. Toussaint, p. 342–3); *rGyal rabs gsal ba'i me loñ*, Ch. xviii, f. 82b–83a. Cf. A. Ferrari et al., *mKhyen brtse's guide to the holy places of Central Tibet* (Rome, 1958), p. 113; Tucci, *To Lhasa and beyond*, p. 119 f.; R. A. Stein, *La civilisation tibétaine*³ (Paris, 1987), p. 201. Reference can also be made to the remarks on the plan and models of the P'u-ning-ssu of Jehol (Chengde) in A. Chayet, *Les temples de Jehol et leurs modèles tibétains* (Paris, 1985), pp. 29, 67; and to P. Mortari Vergara Caffarelli, *Rivista degli studi orientali* 53 (1979), pp. 163–96 (with a bibliography of the question).

vertically ordered in a synthesis. However, no connexion appears to have been specified between the middle storey in Chinese style of the dBu rtse and the teachings of Dhyāna and the Hva śāṅ Mahāyāna.

The ground-plan of the bSam yas temple-complex thus suggests a horizontal co-ordination of philosophical exposition and Dhyāna, and even their structured complementarity and integration. And although the storey in Indian style was placed vertically above the one in Chinese style in the central temple, it is noteworthy that the elevation of this sanctuary has been interpreted by the sources cited as symbolizing neither a subordination nor an inclusivistic subjection of the Dhyāna propagated by Mo-ho-yen to the type of Buddhism taught by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, or to that represented by Padmasambhava. It is to be recalled that, similarly, the teachings of Śāntarakṣita and Padmasambhava are traditionally regarded in Tibet as being in complementary harmony in the sense that their different methods serve the same end. And the close association of both Śāntarakṣita and Padmasambhava with Khri Sroṅ lde btsan has been symbolized for the Tibetan tradition by the *sdom brtson dam pa* device at least since the time of Sa skya Paṅḍi ta, who painted on a wall of bSam yas this emblem in which Śāntarakṣita is represented by a bird, Padmasambhava by a lotus and the Tibetan monarch by a flaming sword.

In summary, when we attempt to piece together from the Tibetan sources the circumstances in which the Great Debate of bSam yas took place, we find no clear and conclusive evidence to show that either Kamalaśīla or Mo-ho-yen was seeking a confrontation. Rather, having become aware of the presence in Tibet of tensions and polarized approaches within the Buddhist traditions connected on the one side with the teachings of certain Ho-shangs and on the other with the doctrines of Śāntarakṣita, the Tibetan monarch and his advisers are said to have taken the initiative in bringing representatives of the two currents together in a discussion because of their concern for the sound establishment and regularization in the kingdom of Buddhist theory and practice. And with this end in view Kamalaśīla was invited to

Tibet, supposedly in accordance with the advice that his master Śāntarakṣita had given just before his death.

It would moreover seem that, on the levels of both Ground (*gži*) and Fruit (*'bras bu*), there was little in Mo-ho-yen's teaching (to the extent to which it is available to us to judge) that could have been totally unfamiliar to Kamalaśīla from recognized Indian sources, despite the Chinese garb in which it was being presented by its propagators.²⁶¹ Equally, much of what Kamalaśīla's teaching stood for was well known to large sections of the Chinese Buddhist traditions, and thus it may not have been quite unfamiliar to Mo-ho-yen. It is however unlikely that Mo-ho-yen and Kamalaśīla could discuss or even converse directly with each other; and it is practically certain that interpreters, presumably Tibetans for the most part, would have had to act as translators in any meeting between them.

In this situation there lay the risk that what was a polarity – and a well-recognized and more or less creative tension – between two currents of thought and two approaches to the Buddhist Path could become magnified in a way not fully explained by any fundamental contradictions in either the commonly held canonical sources or in philosophical doctrine. And the ensuing rift would then have focused less on philosophy, or even on a theory of spiritual and philosophical praxis, than on methods and formulations bearing on the Path. In this way a polarity and tension present even in some of the oldest sources of Indian Buddhism could have assumed the proportions of the radical cleavage that we find in a large number of Tibetan accounts of the Great Debate starting with the *sBa bžed* and continuing in the discussions by Sa skya Paṅḍi ta and his successors.

It has at the same time to be borne in mind that part of the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism was markedly less critical of Mo-ho-yen's teachings. This attitude we find partially reflected in the *Chos 'byun Me tog sñin po* by the rDzogs chen master Ñaṅ ral Ñi ma 'od zer. And another rDzogs chen pa, Kloṅ chen rab 'byams pa, called attention to the similarity between certain of the

²⁶¹ See the remark on the basic agreement between the two parties in the Great Debate in regard to the Fruit (*'bras bu*) and the attainment of buddhahood, and on the difference between them as to the method of procedure (*'jug sgo*), in *sBa bžed*, G, p. 70.18–19 (attributed to dPal dbyaṅs) and S, p. 60.6–7 (attributed to Saṅ ši).

teachings of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna and the doctrine of *rdzogs chen*, as did in a slightly less pronounced way Tshe dbaṅ nor bu also. These masters have done so notwithstanding their recognition of the fact that whereas *rdzogs chen* is deeply Mantrayānist the teachings ascribed to the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna are basically Sūtrayānist.²⁶²

In addition, a closeness in certain respects between some of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna's teachings and Mahāmudrā (*phyag rgya chen po*) was admitted by some bKa' brgyud pa masters, though certainly not by all. A link is indeed suggested by a convergent use of the metaphor of the Sovereign Remedy (*dkar po chig thub*) for the Hva šaṅ's teaching on non-mentational face-to-face recognition of Mind and the non-mentation (*yid la mi byed pa*) teaching of the bKa' brgyud pa, which with sGam po pa and some of his followers had a Sūtra branch in addition to the generally recognized Mantra branch.

It however remains true that neither all the rÑiñ ma rDzogs chen pas nor gSar ma bKa' brgyud pas such as dPa' bo gTsug lag phreñ ba and Padma dkar po have identified themselves with the Hva šaṅ's tradition. The closest approach to such an identification is perhaps to be found in the *bSam gtan mig sgron* ascribed to gNubs chen Saṅs rgyas ye šes and in the *Blon po bka'i thañ yig* of the *bKa' thañ sde lña*. That differences in fact existed between the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna and the forms of Buddhism adopted in Tibet appears to be recognized by most of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition; nevertheless some representatives of this tradition have placed greater emphasis on the differences, taking them as the grounds for a radical cleavage, whereas other Tibetan masters have adopted a noticeably more conciliatory stance toward the teachings they connected with the Hva šaṅ.

²⁶² Some 'Tantric' features however already appear in certain forms of Ch'an; cf. for example R. Kimura, *Journal asiatique* 1981, p. 192 (after gÑan dPal dbyaṅs); D. Ueyama, in W. Lai and L. Lancaster (eds.), *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet*, p. 349 n. 30; B. Faure, in P. Gregory (ed.), *Traditions of meditation in Chinese Buddhism* (Honolulu, 1986), pp. 115-16, 121. Moreover, the *tathāgatagarbha* theory, which is of such great importance in these traditions, is in some respects 'proto-Tantric', while some of its later developments are very clearly Vajrayānist.

The Background to Some Issues in the Great Debate

KAMALAŚĪLA's treatment of the progressive Path of meditative realization (*bhāvanā*) and Awakening combining Quieting and Insight strongly suggests that he considered what might be described as the problem of innateness, immediacy, holism and spontaneity in relation to his theory of gradual development and reinforcement – in a sense of 'nature' in relation to 'nurture' – to be both an old and a recurring one in Buddhist thought.

Concepts such as manifestation or revelation (*abhivyakti*, etc.) in contrast to production or creation (*ārambha*, *utpatti*, etc.), the pre-existence of an effect in its cause (*satkāryavāda*) as opposed to production for the first time of a not previously existing effect (*asatkāryavāda*, *ārambhavāda*), and of simultaneous, non-sequential immediacy as distinct from sequential progressiveness in verbal knowledge and in the meaning of a poem are familiar from Indian philosophical thought, the semantics of the *sphoṭa*-theory and the aesthetics of the *dhvani*-theory.²⁶³ In the Vedānta as the *jñānakāṇḍa*, activity – the ritual works and duties (*karman*, *dharma*) of the *karmakāṇḍa* – has often been denied real soteriological value, gnosis (*jñāna*) alone being regarded as constitutive of deliverance; whereas by other authorities (e.g. Maṇḍanamīśra) the conjunction of gnosis and works (*jñānakarmasamuccaya*) has been recognized as conducive to deliverance. In the Vedānta too the direct instrumentality, for immediate intuitive gnosis (*aparokṣajñāna*) of *brahman*, of both mental reflection (*manana*) and meditative practice (*nididhyāsana*) in addition to *śravaṇa* – i.e. the

²⁶³ In the 'resonance' (*dhvani*) theory of the Indian poetics, for example, there is an opposition between the *asaṃlakṣyakramavyāṅgya* and the *saṃlakṣyakramavyāṅgya*, the two divisions of the *vivakṣitānyaparavācya* which is *abhidhāmūla*. As for progressiveness as opposed to sudden immediacy in the *sphoṭa*-theory of the philosopher-grammarians, see K. Kunjunni Raja, *Indian theories of meaning* (Adyar, 1969), p. 124 f.

'auditive assimilation' of the sense of the authorless and immemorial scriptural *mahāvākyas* inducing knowledge of *brahman* and immediate deliverance (*sadyomukti*, as opposed to *kramamukti*) – has been a subject of discussion. Repeated meditative practice (*prasamkhyāna*) subsequent to this *śravaṇa* has been held (by Sureśvara) to be superfluous in the face of *śābdajñāna* or Word-generated knowledge. Another notion germane to the present enquiry is immediate recognition (*pratyaabhijñā*) – the 'recollection' as it were of reality²⁶⁴ – to which may be added the soteriological concept of the abrupt onset of spiritual realisation (*sāhasa*). Mention may also be made of the state of *anupāya* 'absence of means' which – in so far as it corresponds to the ultimate state of the *turyātīta* where all means are excluded – is free from all mediacy, as opposed to the three successive levels involving means and mediacy of the *āṇava* (*kriyopāya*), the *śākta* (*jñānopāya*) and the *śāmbhava* (*icchopāya*). These terms and ideas – though not identical historically with the questions directly at issue in the Great Debate of bSam yas, and despite the basic difference between Buddhists and the Vedānta with regard to Word (*śabda*) and Word-induced knowledge (*śābdajñāna*) as constituting immediate intuitive gnosis (*aparokṣajñāna*) – nevertheless provide in their problematics a number of interesting parallels and points of comparison with the issues considered by Kamalaśīla and Mo-ho-yen and so merit the attention of the comparativist.

The fact that the authoritative sources cited by Kamalaśīla – mainly Mahāyāna Sūtras – have a direct or indirect bearing on this subject indicates at all events that the problems at issue go back a long way in the history of Buddhist thought. Kamalaśīla was clearly not dealing with issues that had arisen for the first time during the eighth century in the specific historical context of the encounter in Tibet between Indian and Chinese ways of thinking and of a confrontation between Indian and Chinese masters. That this was so seems moreover to have been recognized in the 'Alternative Tradition' of the *sBa bžed*,²⁶⁵ where

²⁶⁴ For some references see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub* (Paris, 1973), p. 78 n. 1.

²⁶⁵ See *sBa bžed*, G, p. 73.5–8.

Kamalaśīla's master Śāntarakṣita is shown referring to the understanding of Mind known as the Sovereign Remedy (*dkar po chig thub*) as a 'stain in theory' (*dṛṣṭikaṣāya*) that consists in taking pleasure in Emptiness (*ston pa ñid la dga' ba*), and which was to be found not only in Tibet but also very widely among persons who are tainted by these 'stains' and take pleasure in the notion of Emptiness.²⁶⁶

Since the evidence available to us indicates that this complex of problems has repeatedly arisen in one form or the other in the history of the Buddhist traditions in South, Central and East Asia – none of which has been entirely homogeneous and monolithic and each of which has included various currents of theory and practice – contrary to what has been suggested in Demiéville's masterly study²⁶⁷ it does not seem appropriate to see in Kamalaśīla's treatment of the issues merely a dehistoricization of the Great Debate. For Kamalaśīla the Great Debate was probably rather one more occasion when this set of religious and philosophical problems embedded in the history of Buddhist thought came once again to be focused upon and to raise acute difficulties. And it was then in the later Tibetan traditions, as already observed, that the expression 'teaching of the Hva šaṅ' was taken from its specific historical context and came to be employed as a dehistoricized *topos* and as a generic designation for a *type* of quietistic and innatist teaching.

What the comparativist has to study here are not so much abstract entities like 'Indian Buddhism', 'Chinese Buddhism' or 'Tibetan Buddhism' – which are to a certain degree merely convenient constructs for the scholar – but rather the structural and typological features subsumed under these designations. This is of course not to deny that certain features are, at particular times and places, predominant in a given geographically delimited form of Buddhism, and that they may characterize and

²⁶⁶ On the *lta ba'i sñigs ma = dṛṣṭikaṣāya*, see Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* iii. 94ab with Yaśomitra's *Vyākhyā*. It is one of the five *kaṣāyas*, on which see e.g. *Lalitavistara* p. 248.13; *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* ii, p. 43.4, 56.8, 58.11; *Bodhisattvabhūmi* i.17 (p. 252); *Mahāvīyūtpatti* 2336–40. These stains characterize especially the last 500-year period of the Dharma (cf. *sBa bžed*, G, p. 66.8; S, p. 56.2–3). On the *dkar po chig thub* see above, pp. 88–89, 100 ff.

²⁶⁷ Demiéville, *Concile*, p. 18.

constitute it: if there were no overarching structures and continuities, but only innumerable discrete features, the terms 'Buddhism', 'Indian Buddhism' and the like would be mere empty names of no use to an historian. But the richness and diversity within the Buddhist traditions militate against taking even such serviceable terms as names of single and homogeneous individual entities. In sum, such constructs can fulfil a useful and legitimate heuristic and descriptive purpose for an historian provided that he does not reify them in historical and comparative work.

In the following, several themes typical of the ideas at issue in the Great Debate, and ascribed either to the 'Gradualists' or the 'Simultaneists', will be considered with a view to identifying earlier examples or prefigurations of these themes and to situating them in the Buddhist (and non-Buddhist) traditions of India.

I. THE GIVING UP OF ACTIVITY AND *KARMA*

While it is recognized that Mo-ho-yen considered the activity of conceptual and discursive thinking (*rnam par rtog pa'i sems*, etc.) to be the root of involvement in the round of existence,²⁶⁸ he is held by Tibetan authorities to have in addition advocated the total relinquishment – at least by all advanced practisers – of not only all unsalutary activity but of all religious and philosophical activity of a salutary kind also.²⁶⁹ For according to him this kind of activity is inextricably bound up with dichotomizing construction (*rnam par rtog pa*) and unreal notions (*m[y]i bden pa'i 'du šes*) and thinking (*m[y]i bden pa'i sems*).²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ See Stein 468 (cf. Gómez, *Studies*, p. 107); Stein 709, f. 28; Cheng-li chüeh, ff. 129b, 131b, 134a–b, 135b, 138a–b.

²⁶⁹ On the giving up of the ten forms of Dharma-practice which was reputedly taught by the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna, see *sBa bžed*, G, p. 68 (cf. p. 73–74); S, p. 58; *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 117al; and *Ñaṅ Ni ma 'od zer*, *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po*, f. 430b2 (where the practice of the ten is compared with gradual ascent, *mas 'dzeg pa*). And for the Tibetan King's command that they should be practised, see *sBa bžed*, G, p. 75 and S, p. 62; *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ff. 119al; and *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po*, f. 435b6. For a list of ten dharmacaryās, see *Mahāvīyutpatti* 903–912.

²⁷⁰ See *sBa bžed*, G, p. 64 (*lus niag gi chos bya mi dgos/ lus niag gi dge bas saṅs mi rgya*); S, p. 54 (*lus niag gi chos spyod dge ba byas pas saṅs mi rgya*); *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 115al (*lus niag gi chos spyod mi dgos/ lus niag gi dge bas 'tshaṅ mi rgya*); G, p. 68 (*thams cad sems keyi rnam par rtog pas bskyed pas/ dge mi dge'i dbaṅ gis las dge mi dge mtho ris daṅ nān soṅ gi 'bras bu myoṅ žiṅ 'khor ba na 'khor ro*) ~ S, pp. 57–58; *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 116b7–117al (... *gaṅ žig ci la yaṅ mi sems žiṅ ci yaṅ mi byed pa de 'khor ba las yoṅs su thar par 'gyur ro*); etc. But

In his third *Bhāvanākrama* Kamalaśīla has ascribed to an unnamed opponent the teaching that no salutary activity consisting in the virtues of generosity and the like should be accomplished, such activity having been taught solely for the foolish (*nāpi dānādikuśalacaryā kartavayā: kevalam mūrkhajanam adhikṛtya danādi kuśalacaryā nirdiṣṭā*, ed. Tucci, p. 14). No action, salutary or otherwise, should be carried out (*na kiñcit kuśalādikarma kartavyam*), for it would lead to the round of existences (*samsārāvāhaka*, pp. 20–21). That Kamalaśīla considered as ancient this idea that *karman*, salutary as well as non-salutary, should be abandoned is shown by the fact that he has ascribed to the old Śramaṇa-school of the Ājīvikas the doctrine that deliverance results from the exhaustion of deeds (*karmakṣayān muktih*, p. 20).²⁷¹ And he has observed that no such doctrine is to be found in the teaching (*pravacana*) of the Buddha, who taught rather that liberation results from the exhaustion of the defilements/afflictions (*kleśa-kṣaya*, pp. 20–21).

Now, in some old Buddhist canonical texts also there are in fact found certain references to the idea that liberation from Ill (*duḥkha*) results from, and consists in, the non-production of any future *kārman* at all and from the ending, often through austerities (*tapas*), of any existing bad *karman*. This idea is there usually ascribed to the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta (Nirgrantha Jñātrputra), in other words to Mahāvīra and the Jainas.²⁷² We also read that immobility of body and renunciation of speech bring Ease

compare *Cheng-li chüeh*, ff. 133b, 135b, 136b–138a, 140b, and 151b. See below, pp. 203–04.

²⁷¹ For *ājīvika*, the Tibetan translation reads *mu stegs can kun tu tshol ba*, although the usual Tibetan equivalent is *kun (tu) 'tsho (ba)*. The doctrine usually associated with the Ājīvikas, and with their reputed founder Makkhali Gosāla/Maskarin Gośāla, is that of determinism and 'destiny' (*niyati*); cf. A. L. Basham, *The Ājīvikas* (London, 1951), p. 224 f. However, the avoidance of action (*karman*) in favour of a kind of ataraxia (*śānti*) is already mentioned, in connexion with Maskarin, by Patañjali, *Mahābhāṣya* VI. i. 154 (*mā kṛta karmāni mā kṛta karmāni, śāntir vaḥ śreyasīty āha, ato maskarī parivrājakeḥ*); see also the *Kāśikā ad loc.* (and Basham, *op. cit.*, p. 79). (The commentators on the *Mahābhāṣya* consider that the actions to be avoided are the *kāmyakarman* alone; for even one desirous of liberation must, according to them, perform the *nitya* and *naimittika* actions [see Nāgeśa *ad loc.*].)

Another resemblance between Makkhali and Mo-ho-yen could then have been thought to lie in the former's denial of the usefulness of moral effort in view of his doctrine of *niyati*.

²⁷² See Majjhima Nikāya I 92–95 and II 214; Aṅguttara Nikāya I 220–1.

(*sukha*).²⁷³ Moreover, in a couple of Buddhist canonical texts the idea that no new *karman* at all should be generated, and that any existing *karman* should be ended, has even been connected with the Buddha himself in a sermon he once addressed to a Nirgrantha and in another one he addressed to Vappa, a disciple of the Nirgranthas.²⁷⁴

The connexion of such a teaching with the Buddha himself seems nevertheless to be rare. When it does occur, it is evidently to be explained by the fact that his auditor was a Nirgrantha and that the teaching was thus intended as an introductory salvific device, a circumstance that would lend support to Kamalaśīla's statement denying that such relinquishment of all activity was the Buddha's own teaching. In the majority of other places where it has been mentioned in the Pali canon, this doctrine has in fact been severely criticized. It is patently inconsistent with such basic principles of Buddhist doctrine as the four correct efforts (*sammāppadhāna* / *samyakprahāṇa*) whereby the exercitant seeks to generate an impulse (*chanda*) with a view both to the production of still non-present salutary *dharmas* and to the increase of already present ones, while also generating an impulse for the non-production only of non-present bad and non-salutary *dharmas* and for the elimination of already present ones.

Certain passages of the old canon have, however, referred to the idea that both good and bad *karman* binds one by leading respectively to good and evil states in the round of existence. And there are accordingly traces in it of the notion of a special kind of karmic intention (*cetanā*) that is neither good nor bad, and which would thus obviate any form of maturing *karman* binding one to *Saṃsāra*. It is thus said that *cetanā* having in view the elimination of black (*kaṇha*), white (*sukka*) and partially black and partially white (*kaṇhasukka*) acts constitutes a fourth kind of act that is neither wholly nor partially black or white (*akaṇhāsukka*) and which is indeed conducive to the exhaustion of acts (*kammakkhaya* *saṃvattati*).²⁷⁵

²⁷³ See Majjhima Nikāya I 94-95.

²⁷⁴ See Aṅguttara Nikāya I 221 and II 196-8.

²⁷⁵ See Aṅguttara Nikāya II 230-37; cf. Dīghanikāya III 230, and Majjhimanikāya I 389-91. The four kinds of *karman* are the black which has a *kaṇhavipāka*, the white which has a *sukhavipāka*, the black-and-white which has *kaṇhasukhavipāka*, and that which is

This last notion of what may be termed deconstructive, or counteractive, *karman* as the fourth variety in a tetralemmatic structure does not, however, appear to be identical with Mo-ho-yen's Mahāyānistically inspired idea of non-activity and quietism; nor indeed is it even totally incompatible with Kamalaśīla's own theory of spiritual practice. But the teaching ascribed to Mo-ho-yen concerning the relinquishment of all action is clearly comparable with the above-mentioned idea of deliverance through the exhaustion of all *karman*, wholesome as well as unwholesome, which Kamalaśīla has ascribed to the Ājīvikas, and which is found connected chiefly with the Nirgranthas in the old canon.

In this connexion attention may be called also to the interesting reference to the question whether exhaustion of action (*karmakṣaya*) can, alone, lead to liberation in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter (ed. Miyasaka, 272c-280b) of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* and in the commentaries on this passage. There – in the frame of a discussion of what has been taken by commentators to be the Nirgrantha doctrine of liberation, which may therefore be compared with the Devadahasutta of the Majjhimanikāya (II 214 ff.) cited above – Dharmakīrti has stated that, without a course of spiritual practices as a remedy (*vipakṣa* = *gñen po*) against desire (*trṣṇā*, and its associated *ātmagraha* or *ātmadrṣṭi*), there can be no freedom from *karman*; and any effort (*yatna*) directed toward *karmakṣaya* is futile so long as *trṣṇā* remains. Indeed, faults (*doṣa*) do not result from *karman*, but it is the person who is 'defective' (*duṣṭa*) that acts; and without false conceptions (*mithyāvikalpa*) there is no craving (*abhilāṣa*) even because of pleasure (*sukha*). Manorathanandin has accordingly remarked that the cause of the *doṣas* is not *karman* but inexact mental activity (*ayoniśomanaskāra*).

Mo-ho-yen's teaching on the subject may be compared too with a doctrine such as that of the *Vajracchedikā* (§ 6, p. 32). There

neither black nor white and which has *akanhāsukkevīpāka* and thus leads to the exhaustion of action (*kammakkhayāya saṃvattati*). Examples of this fourth kind are the eight factors of the Path, from *sammādiṭṭhi* to *sammāsamādhi*, and the seven factors of Awakening (*sambojjhaṅga*), from *sati* and *dhammavicaya* to *samādhi* and *upekkhā* (Aṅguttaranikāya II 236-7). Concerning this kind of *karman*, see L. Schmithausen in R. W. Neufeldt (ed.), *Karma and rebirth: post-classical developments* (Albany, 1986), pp. 207, 222 n. 30.

we read that the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva should not ‘take up’ (*udgrah-*) either *dharma* or *adharmā*; hence, with this in mind (*saṃdhāya*), the Tathāgata has declared that those who fully understand the raft-like Dharma-text (*kolopama dharmaparyāya*) should abandon (*prahā-*) *dharma*s and *a fortiori adharma*s.²⁷⁶ This text would, however, have been known to and recognized by Kamalaśīla, who composed a *Ṭikā* on the *Vajracchedikā*. Besides, the comparison of the Dharma with a raft, which one abandons once one has used it to cross over to the further bank of a stream, is a classical one found in the old canon.²⁷⁷ But as understood by Kamalaśīla – and as attested by passages of the *Cheng-li chüeh* – Mo-ho-yen went appreciably further than this classical view of the matter.

Nāgārjuna has furthermore analysed and deconstructed the notions of action (*karman*), its agent and its fruit in Chapter xvii of his *Madhyamakakārikās*. And the question of giving up both demerit and merit – in the wide sense as well as in the traditional, Vedic sense – is a topic discussed in the first chapter of the **Śataśāstra* ascribed to Ārya-Deva; in the same place also the progressive arising of the Way is mentioned.²⁷⁸ This discussion has to do with the idea of merit and demerit as interconnected concepts in binary thinking (*vikalpa*), and as coimplicates (*pratidvandvin* ‘contrapletes’), and with the fact that the postulation (*grāha*) of the happy and virtuous (*sukha*) and the pure (*śubha*, *śuci*) has to be eliminated together with that of the permanent (*nitya*) and self (*ātman*).²⁷⁹

In a verse of his *Catuḥśataka* (viii. 11) Āryadeva has furthermore written:

akurvāṇasya nirvāṇaṃ kurvāṇasya punarbhavaḥ|
nīscintena sukhaṃ prāptuṃ nirvāṇaṃ tena nētarah||

‘For one who is inactive [there is] Nirvāṇa [whilst] for one who is active [there is] renewed existence: for one free from concerns

²⁷⁶ Cf. *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* i, p. 17; É. Lamotte, *Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, I (Louvain, 1944), p. 64.

²⁷⁷ See the *kullūpama* parable applied to *dhamma* in the *Majjhimanikāya* I 134–5.

²⁷⁸ See G. Tucci, *Pre-Diinnāga Buddhist texts on logic* (Baroda, 1929), pp. 15–19.

²⁷⁹ See e.g. Āryadeva, *Catuḥśataka*, Chap. i–iv.

(*niścinta = sems khral med pa*) Nirvāṇa is easy of achievement, [but] the other [viz. existences] not'. A doctrine of non-activity and ataraxia pure and simple could however be founded on this statement only if the total context of Āryadeva's treatise is left out of account. (In his comment Candrakīrti supposes that Āryadeva has formulated this (apparent) paradox in reply to those who point out how difficult – indeed how virtually impossible – it would be to achieve all the infinite wholesome factors which together constitute the means of achieving Nirvāṇa, the Best Ease (*bde ba dam pa*), whereas to achieve birth requires no effort at all.) It is true that 'participation' in the Tranquil can only exist when there has been produced a turning away in distaste from the here and now [i.e. Saṃsāra according to Candrakīrti] (viii. 12ab: *udvego yasya nāstīha bhaktis tasya kutah śive*). In a teaching concerning the worldly level (*laukikī deśanā*) it is engagement (*pravṛtti*) that is spoken of, whereas disengagement (*nivṛtti*) is taught when speaking of ultimate reality (*paramārthakathā*) (viii. 8). And it is necessarily *dharma* as something involving activity (*pravartaka*) that the foolish practise, while fearing through lack of familiarity (*anabhyāsatā*) that very *dharma* which leads to the cessation of activity (*nivartaka*) (xii. 9). Āryadeva has also specified that for the least able generosity (*dāna*) and for the middling discipline (*śīla*) have been taught; for the best it is the Tranquil (*ṣi ba*) that has been indicated (viii. 14). Indeed, by somebody desiring the wholesome (*puṇyakāma*) no mention should be made of Emptiness, for as a medicine unsuitably used *śūnyatā* could become a poison (viii. 18). Still, the non-wholesome (*apuṇya*) has first to be eliminated, and the [dogma of a] self next; only then may all [postulation and positions relating to entities (cf. viii. 16, 20)] be eliminated (viii. 15).

It is only natural to consider Mo-ho-yen's devaluation of activity, ethical as well as mental, in the frame of Ch'an contemplation of Mind (*k'an-hsin ~ kuan-hsin*) and what Demiéville has termed anoetism (*wu-hsin, wu-nien; pu-kuan; wu-tso-i* 'not planning'), perhaps also of 'One-practice Samādhi' (*i-hsing san-mei*) understood as a quietistic development of *śamatha*, and of course of the Chinese idea of non-activity (*wu-wei*). And this has in fact been done by historians of Chinese

Buddhism.²⁸⁰ It however needs to be recalled that, alongside the cases of rejection of karmic activity noted above from early Indian sources, the question of the combination of knowledge and activity (*jñānakarmasamuccaya*) was also a major problem and point of controversy in classical Vedānta. Thus, whereas Maṇḍanamīśra accepted in his *Brahmasiddhi* a particular conjunction of *karman* and *jñāna*, Śaṅkara and Sureśvara denied all soteriological value to *karman* and recognized only *jñāna* (or *vidyā*) for the achievement of this goal.²⁸¹ Moreover, in his comment on the *Bhagavadgītā* (iv. 21), Śaṅkara has gone so far as to write that, for one seeking liberation, even *dharma* constitutes a fault because it brings about bondage, so that freed from both *dharma* and its opposite (*pāpa* 'evil, sin') one is free from *saṃsāra* (*dharmo 'pi mumukṣoḥ kilbiṣam eva bandhāpādakatvāt | tasmāt tābhyām mukto bhavati, saṃsārān mukto bhavati*). These words of Śaṅkara's were written at a time that was probably not very far removed from that of the Great Debate of bSam yas; and they demonstrate that one of the points that Kamalaśīla has severely criticized in his opponent's teaching has a very close parallel in the thought of a leading Hindu authority of nearly the same time.

Hence, while the teachings of Kamalaśīla's opponents in the Great Debate may indeed have been strongly influenced and reinforced by the milieu in which the Dhyāna schools evolved in China, it is not necessary to account for rejection of activity solely by reference to Chinese developments.

2. VOLUNTARY DEATH, SELF-IMMOLATION AND THE SAMASĪSI(N)

The Pali *Paṭisambhidāmagga* and *Puggalapaññatti* recognize a category of persons (*puggala*) called *samasīsi(n)* 'equal-headed' because, for them, exhaustion of the impurities (*āsavapariyādāna*)

²⁸⁰ See Demiéville, *Concile*, Index s.v. sans pensée. On 'One-practice Samādhi' see B. Faure in P. Gregory (ed.), *Traditions of meditation in Chinese Buddhism* (Honolulu, 1986), pp. 99–128.

²⁸¹ See Maṇḍanamīśra, *Brahmasiddhi* (ed. S. Kuppaswami Sastri, Madras, 1937), pp. 13, 26–26, 36, with Kuppaswami's Introduction, p. xxxi ff. On the relation between *karman* and *vidyā/jñāna* in Śaṅkara, see his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* III, iv. 5, 11, 13 (with reference especially to *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad* IV. iv. 2 and *Īśāvāsyaopaniṣad* 2).

and of life (*jīvitapariyādāna*) are simultaneous.²⁸² This type of person is listed also in the *Nettipakaraṇa*, where he occupies a position after the types known as *saddhāvimutta*, *paññāvimutta*, *suññatavimutta* and *ubhatobhāgavimutta*, and before the *paccekabuddha* and the *sammāsambuddha*.²⁸³ Such a *puggala* represents then a special case of simultaneousness that consists in the co-occurrence of spiritual realization and the end of life.

In several cases of accelerated or precipitate achievement of the state of an Ārya and Arhat alluded to in the Pali tradition, spiritual realization supervenes immediately on a self-inflicted death decided on as a result of a feeling of shock (*saṃvega*) springing from a person's sense of spiritual inadequacy or failure. Examples cited are Godhika Thera and Channa Thera – who cut their own throats because of dissatisfaction with their spiritual progress – and Mahānāma Thera, Sappadāsa Thera and Sīhā Therī – who in disgust prepared to kill themselves. However, in other cases the 'shock' in question is evidently one of pure rapture, resulting from a sense of the beauty of the environment, as in the case of Usabha Thera who was transported by the loveliness (*rāmaṇeyyaka*) of the season's fullness in forest and mountain.²⁸⁴ In still other cases, spiritual realization is said to have been abruptly precipitated by a physical shock brought about by slipping and falling, as in the cases of Bhagu Thera or Dhammā Therī. The phenomenon in question is therefore not exclusively confined to cases of suicide, or near suicide, due to a feeling of inadequateness and depression.²⁸⁵ A common factor in many if not all cases of shock suddenly precipitating (without

²⁸² *Paṭisambhidāmagga* I 101; *Puggalapaññatti*, pp. 2, 13. This category of person – connected with the *naivasamjñānāsamjñā* level – is not accepted by the Sarvāstivādins; cf. A. Bareaux, *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (Paris, 1955), pp. 175, 184, 198, 262.

²⁸³ *Nettipakaraṇa*, p. 190.

²⁸⁴ *Theragāthā* 110 and *Atthakathā* I 217 f. (cited by G. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pali proper names* [London, 1937], p. 439, and W. Rahula, *Zen and the taming of the bull* [London, 1978], p. 22).

²⁸⁵ Such cases have been studied by P.-A. Berglie and C. Suneson in E. Kahrs (ed.), *Kalyāṇamitrārāgaṇam* (Festschrift N. Simonsson, Oslo, 1986), pp. 13–47. To the bibliography cited by them one may add R. Fick, *Der indische Weise Kalanos und sein Flammentod*, Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse, Göttingen, 1938; and K. Bhattacharya, *L'ātan-brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien* (Paris, 1973), pp. 29, 113, 157–9.

exactly causing) spiritual realization seems to be a sense of impermanence (*anicca*), either as an immediately preceding condition in the case of Patācāra Therī (and perhaps Usabha Thera), or as a more remote condition.²⁸⁶

The case of Gautika (or: Bhautika) is known also to the Abhidharma. In his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Vasubandhu has mentioned this Śaikṣa's killing himself because of the disgust he felt (*nirviṇṇa*) for having repeatedly fallen away (*parihīyamāṇa*) from conditional release (*sāmayikī vimuktiḥ*) owing to delectation (*āsvādana*) and the weakness of his faculties (*mṛdvindriyatva*).²⁸⁷ The reference to his attaining Arhatship in these circumstances occurs in connexion with Vasubandhu's exegesis of the technical term *cetanādharmān* (Tib. 'chi bar sems pa'i chos can), which designates in the soteriology of the Abhidharma a category of Arhat interpreted by Yaśomitra as one having the quality of killing himself (*ātmanāraṇadharmān*).²⁸⁸

Whether the self-immolation reported for a Ho-shang and his followers in Tibet after their defeat in debate could be even remotely linked with any of these cases of suicide coinciding with the achievement of spiritual realization is difficult to determine in the absence of clearer and more decisive evidence.²⁸⁹ The cases reported from Tibet of self-immolation may ultimately be connected rather with a distinct set of ideas that go back to Mahāyāna Sūtras such as the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (Ch. xxii) and the *Samādhirājasūtra* (Ch. xxxiii), where the Bodhisattvas Sarvasattvapriyadarśana and Kṣemadatta are related to have burnt an arm or the entire body as a mark of respect for a Tathāgata and his Caitya. These ideas seem then to have been reinterpreted, and to have been literally put into practice as an act of protest and moral pressure, mainly in the Buddhist traditions of East Asia including Vietnam. In its account of the events leading up to the

²⁸⁶ The case of Vakkali Thera does not, however, easily fit this description. On these persons see G. Malalasekera, *op. cit.*, with references to the sources in which they are mentioned. See also É. Lamotte, *Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, II (Louvain, 1949), p. 740 n. 1; Rahula, *op. cit.*, p. 22-23; and Bhattacharya, *op. cit.*, pp. 29, 157-9.

²⁸⁷ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 58b.

²⁸⁸ As though the word *cetanā* 'intention' were equivalent to *chedana* 'destruction' and derived, by a Prakritic development, from the root *chid-* rather than from *cit-* (?). See Yaśomitra, *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* vi. 58b (p. 582).

²⁸⁹ See above, pp. 86-88 with the references cited in n. 167.

Great Debate between the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen and Kamalaśīla, the *sBa bžed* has actually cited the example of a certain sage (*drani sroni = ṛṣi*) bZod pa (Kṣānti?) who set fire to himself and thus made himself a living offering; however, it has done so not in connexion with the Ho-shang and the 'Simultaneist' *ston min pas* (or *cig car bas*) but with reference to a Tibetan folk-etymology, based on *brtse ba* 'compassion', of the term *brtse(n) min pa*, the word of Chinese origin denoting the 'Gradualist' (*rim gyis pa*) school of Kamalaśīla.²⁹⁰

3. THE GRADUAL AS OPPOSED TO THE SIMULTANEOUS/INSTANTANEOUS AND THE PROCEDURE OF LEAPING

The Problem in Early 'Dhyāna' and 'Maitreya-traditions'

Mo-ho-yen's teaching concerning the ultimate irrelevance of good deeds and the virtues for the achievement of liberation and Awakening is evidently closely linked with the notion of an Immediate or Sudden Way either leaping over or simply suppressing stages of the Path that was developed by masters of India and Central Asian 'Dhyāna' and East Asian Ch'an. The contrast between the Gradual (Ch. *chien*) Way and the Immediate or Sudden (Ch. *tun*) Way in Indian, and in particular Kaśmīrian, Dhyāna traditions has been traced, on the basis of sources now available only in Chinese, at least as far back as the Mahāyānist supplement to Saṃgharakṣa's *Yogācārabhūmi*, and to Dharmatrāta and Buddhasena both of whom lived in Kaśmīr c. 400 CE.²⁹¹

This Mahāyānist supplement to the *Yogācārabhūmi* (Taishō 606) by Saṃgharakṣa – a master of the Kaśmīrian Sarvāstivāda school who lived in the second century – which was translated into Chinese by Dharmarakṣa was touched on already in 1926 by J. Rahder;²⁹² and it has since been studied in detail by Demiéville

²⁹⁰ *sBa bžed*, G, p. 64.19 and S, p. 54.13; *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 115a3. The possibility of a link, however indirect, with the *tejodhātusamādhi* and associated ideas should probably also be borne in mind. On these ideas see J. Dantinne, *La splendeur de l'Inébranlable*, i (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1983), pp. 272–4.

²⁹¹ See P. Demiéville, 'La *Yogācārabhūmi* de Saṃgharakṣa', *Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient* 44 (1954), pp. 339–436.

²⁹² J. Rahder, *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (Louvain, 1926), pp. xxi–xxiv.

in his substantial monograph of 1954.²⁹³ Demiéville has dated the addition of this Supplement to the period between Dharmarakṣa's translation of the main text of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in 284 and Tao-an's Catalogue of 384.²⁹⁴ And he has pointed out the relevance of the section of this Supplement on the Bodhisattva's practice to the history of Dhyāna in India and Serindia and to the question of 'Subitism' in China.²⁹⁵ Moreover, in connexion with this same Supplement, Demiéville has studied the procedure of leaping (Ch. *ch'ao-hsing*: **vyutkrāntaka-caryā*) by which the Bodhisattva is enabled to skip over several stages of the Path,²⁹⁶ the concept according to which the Bodhisattva achieves the stage of non-regression in virtue of his first production of the *bodhicitta*,²⁹⁷ and the link between the technique of leaping and innate purity of mind (*prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā* of *citta*).²⁹⁸ Demiéville has in addition investigated Saṃgharakṣa's own connexion with the Maitreya traditions.

As for Buddhāsena (early fifth century),²⁹⁹ he was in fact the author of the so-called *Dharmatāla-Dhyānasūtra (*Ta-mo-to-lo ch'an-ching*, Taishō 618) translated into Chinese by his disciple Buddhābhadrā,³⁰⁰ who also translated the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* with Fa-hsien (Taishō 376)³⁰¹ and was himself connected with a Maitreya-tradition.³⁰² And from what is recorded in the Chinese sources, it appears that the teachings associated with the name of Dharmatrāta – identified as a Yogācāra who lived in Kasmīr c. 410 CE – were also closely linked with the idea of the immediate Sudden Way.³⁰³

²⁹³ See also Z. Tsukamoto, *History of early Chinese Buddhism* (Tōkyō, 1985), p. 214.

²⁹⁴ Demiéville, *loc. cit.*, p. 349. ²⁹⁵ Demiéville, *loc. cit.*, pp. 340–1, 429 n. 1.

²⁹⁶ Demiéville, *loc. cit.*, p. 429–31. ²⁹⁷ Demiéville, *loc. cit.*, p. 430.

²⁹⁸ Demiéville, *loc. cit.*, p. 432. Compare the notions of the *tathāgatagarbha* and *prakṛtiśthagotra*.

²⁹⁹ Cf. Lin Li-kouang, *L'aide-mémoire de la vraie loi* (Paris, 1949), pp. 342–350.

³⁰⁰ See Lin Li-kouang, *op. cit.*, pp. 341–51; Demiéville in M. Soymié (ed.), *Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang*, pp. 1 ff., and in Jao Tsong-yi, *Peintures monochromes de Dunhuang*, i, pp. 46–47; S. Yanagida in W. Lai and L. Lancaster (eds.), *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet*, p. 27. See further Z. Tsukamoto, *History of early Chinese Buddhism*, pp. 452–3, 814, 879–88, 893–4; R. Shih, *Biographies des moines éminents* (Louvain, 1968), pp. 90–98.

³⁰¹ See Tsukamoto, *History*, pp. 438–9.

³⁰² See Demiéville, *BEFEO* 44 (1954), pp. 377–8.

³⁰³ See Lin Li-kouang, *op. cit.*, pp. 315–51 (esp. pp. 317, 347). — On Dharmatrāta, see P. Yampolsky, *The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch* (New York, 1967), pp. 6–8; S. Yanagida in W. Lai and L. Lancaster (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 27–28; P. Demiéville in Jao Tsong-yi et al., *Peintures monochromes de Dunhuang I*, p. 43.

In other words, questions concerning the immanent, immediate, spontaneous, and sudden were evidently already an issue in Kāśmīr and Serindia by the early fifth century. Indeed, differences between the *tun* and *chien* approaches have been noticed in the preface to Taishō 618 ascribed to Hui-yüan (334–416).³⁰⁴

Dharmatrāta, to whom the above-mentioned Taishō 618 was wrongly attributed, has often been conflated with a certain Dharmatāla (?), and also with the great Ch'an patriarch Bodhidharma/Bodhidharmatrāta.³⁰⁵ In a Chinese tradition there is a curious record of the latter's leaving behind one of his shoes as a token of the future spread of his teaching,³⁰⁶ a motif found also in the Tibetan traditions which relate *inter alia* that a certain Chinese Master (*rgya nag mkhan po*) – i.e. one of the Ho-shangs active in Tibet in the eighth century – left one of his boots behind in Tibet after being defeated in a controversy as a sign that his teaching would survive and later spread in that country.³⁰⁷

In the Tibetan iconographic and ritual traditions, moreover, the Upāsaka (*dge bsñen*) Dharmatāla/Dharmatrāta figures, together with a certain Hva šaṅ counted also as an Upāsaka, alongside the sixteen Arhats in a well-known group that thus consists of a total of eighteen figures.³⁰⁸ The Hva šaṅ in this group is often identified with the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna, even though the latter is usually regarded as a monk; and an identification is made in addition with Pu-tai/Mi-lo (Maitreya) of the Chinese tradition.³⁰⁹ Dharmatāra/Dharmatāla/Bodhidharma figures in Tibetan sources as an authority of the *sTon min pa/Cig car ba* tradition, or of the *Tsun men*, that originated with Kāśyapa,

³⁰⁴ See Lin Li-kouang, *op. cit.*, pp. 342–3.

³⁰⁵ On the *Ta-mo ch'an shih lun* discovered in Dunhuang, see P. Yampolsky, *op. cit.*, p. 21, and in W. Lai and L. Lancaster, *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet*, p. 3; B. Faure, *Le traité de Bodhidharma* (Paris, 1986).

³⁰⁶ See Yampolsky, *Platform Sutra*, p. 41.

³⁰⁷ See *sBa bžed*, G, p. 75.8; G, p. 9 and S, p. 8; and the other sources cited above, n. 170.

³⁰⁸ For the history, iconography and iconology, see S. Lévi and É. Chavannes, *Journal asiatique* 1916/ii, pp. 189–304, especially pp. 288–90, 297; G. Roerich, *Tibetan painting* (Paris, 1925), pp. 29, 31–32; F. Lessing, *Yung-ho-kung* (Stockholm, 1942), pp. 35–37; P. Demiéville, in Jao Tsong-yi, *op. cit.*, p. 45 f; Z. Yamaguchi, *Acta indologica* 6 (1984), pp. 393–422.

³⁰⁹ For Pu-tai/Mi-lo (Maitreya), see Demiéville, *Concile*, p. 12 n.; R. Edwards, 'Pu-tai Maitreya', *Ars orientalis* 14 (1984), pp. 5–50.

passed through Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva and culminated, in the seventh generation of the Chinese lineage, with the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna, i.e. the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen.³¹⁰

In the traditions outlined above we thus find mixed together reasonably tangible historical and doctrinal material and more or less vague associations or recollections. Tenuous though the latter may be, they still reflect connexions that have been made by the traditions in question; and they accordingly deserve mention beside the properly historical data.

Gradual Understanding and Single-moment Understanding according to the Abhisamayālaṅkāra

When considering the background to the controversy that opposed Kamalaśīla and the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen, it is of the greatest interest to turn to Haribhadra – a contemporary of Kamalaśīla, and also a follower of Śāntarakṣita, who flourished in the latter part of the eighth century – to see what light he can throw on the question.³¹¹

³¹⁰ See *bSam gtan mig sgron*, f. 8a: *rgya nag por bdun brgyud tha ma ha šaṅi Ma hā ya na la thug*. Cf. *Blon po bka'i thaṅ yig* (in the *bKa' thaṅ sde lha*, lHa sa ed.), f. 19a: *rgya nag sprul bdun brgyud pa'i tha: hva šaṅ mahā yā na ṅid la thug* (a passage quoted by Tshe dbaṅ nor bu, *rGya nag hva šaṅ gi byuṅ tshul grub mtha'i phyogs sṅa bcas sa bon tsam smos pa yid kyī dri ma dag byed dge ba'i chu rgyun* [collected works, Vol. V, Dalhousie, 1977], f. 7b4, as from the *Lo paṅ bka' yi thaṅ yig*). See also *Pelliot tibétain* 116 (164), 121 (40), 813; and compare *Pelliot tibétain* 996 and *Stein* 689, 710.

For the seven Ch'an patriarchs in China, see Yampolsky, *Platform Sūtra*, p. 7, and B. Faure, *Cahiers d'Extrême-Asie* 2 (1986), p. 123 ff. In his *Grub mtha' šel gyi me loṅ* (*rGya nag Chap.*, f. 12a), Blo bzaṅ Chos kyī ṅi ma speaks of a line of 28 patriarchs from Kāśyapa to Bodhi-Dharmottāra, perhaps following mGon po skyabs, *rGya nag chos byuṅ*, p. 118–19, or a closely related source, which may be based on the *Pao lin chuan* (for which see Yampolsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–48, 51). For the number 28, see Yampolsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 9 and 48 ff., and H. Schmidt-Glintzer, *Die Identität der buddhistischen Schulen und die Kompilation buddhistischer Universalgeschichten* (Wiesbaden, 1982), p. 46; S. Yanagida in W. Lai and L. Lancaster (eds.), *Early Ch'an*, pp. 27–28. Tshe dbaṅ nor bu, *rGya nag hva šaṅ gi byuṅ tshul*, f. 8b, appears rather to speak of the *logia* or traditions of 25 Masters down to Mo-ho-yen.

³¹¹ These masters have all been classified as Yogācāra-(Svātantrika)-Mādhyamika by the Tibetan doxographers. By some doxographers Haribhadra is further described as an Alikākāravādin; and his predecessor Ārya Vimuktisena (sixth century), whose *Vṛtti* is the earliest available commentary on the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, is further described as a Satyākāravādin. See for example, lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha'*, kha, f. 115b–116a, p. 401; D. Seyfort Rugg, *The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden, 1981), p. 101.

In his fundamental comments on the Prajñāpāramitā and on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* contained both in his shorter *Sphuṭārthā Vṛttiḥ* and in his very extensive *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka Prajñāpāramitāvyaḅhyā*, this master has discussed at length not only progressive activity (*anupūrvakriyā* = *mthar gyis pa'i bya ba*) – i.e. progressive intuition (*anupūrvābhisamaya*) – but also single-moment awareness (*ekakṣaṇāvabodha* = *skad cig ma gcig pa'i rtogs pa*) which is also known as *ekakṣaṇābhisambodha* and *ekakṣaṇābhisamaya*. This pair of understandings constitute the sixth and seventh main topics (*padārtha* = *dnos po*) in Prajñāpāramitā philosophy as expounded in Chapters vi and vii of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* ascribed by tradition to Maitreya(nātha).

In the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (vi. 1) it has been specified that progressive activity is comprised of a series of good qualities extending from generosity (*dāna*) up to discriminative understanding (*prajñā*), as well as of 'commemoration' (*anusmṛti*) of the Buddha, etc., and lastly of a nature consisting in non-existence of the factors of existence as hypostatized entities (*dharmābhāvasvabhāva*).

This *anupūrvābhisamaya* has then been explicated as thirteen-fold³¹² inasmuch as it covers the six Perfections (*pāramitā*), set out in terms of non-attachment to all factors of existence (*sarvadharmāsaṅga*) mentioned in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (p. 893); six 'commemorations' pertaining to the Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha as well as to discipline (*śīla*), renunciation (*tyāga*) and deities (*devatā*), set out in terms of the non-differentiation of all factors of existence (*sarvadharmāsambheda*) in the same Sūtra (p. 893); and the non-substantial nature of all factors of existence, set out in terms of the Sūtra's teaching (p. 893) concerning the non-existence of all these factors (*sarvadharmāsambhava*).³¹³ At the outset Haribhadra has pointed out that, as Perfections (*pāramitā*), the qualities of generosity, discipline, energy, and receptive perseverance are comprised in the Perfec-

³¹² See *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* i. 17; Ārya Vimuktisena, *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-Vṛtti*, P, f. 221b6.

³¹³ Cf. Ratnākaraśānti, *Sāratamā* (ed. P. S. Jaini) vi. i, pp. 163–5, referring to the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (ed. Wogihara), p. 893.

tion of discriminative understanding (*prajñāpāramitā*).³¹⁴ In consequence of this the three components of any of the relevant acts – viz. the agent, the intended beneficiary and the activity of giving, etc. – are relativized and cancelled as hypostatic entities through what is known as triaspectual purification (*trimaṇḍalaviśuddhi*).

Haribhadra has next explained that comprehension (*adhigama*) results, *inter alia*,

- (i) from ‘commemoration’ (*anusmaraṇa*) of the Buddha finding expression progressively in the factors of the three Paths of preparation (*prayogamārga*, i.e. the four *nirvedhabhāgīyas*), vision (*darśanamārga*) and meditative realization (*bhāvanāmārga*);
- (ii) from ‘commemoration’ bearing on Dharma, i.e. the factors that are categorized as wholesome (*kuśala*), unwholesome and undetermined (*avyākṛta*); and
- (iii) from ‘commemoration’ bearing on the Saṃgha, which Haribhadra here understands as the community of non-retrogressing (*avaivartika*) Ārya-Bodhisattvas.

Now, very significantly for the purpose of this study, Haribhadra has specified that, in reality (*paramārthatas*), *buddhānusmaraṇa* is characterized precisely by non-recollection (*asmarāṇalakṣaṇa*). And comprehension (*adhigama*) has been stated by him to consist in understanding that the very nature of all *dharmas* is precisely their ‘entitylessness’ (*dharmābhāvasvabhāva*), i.e. their non-substantiality as hypostatized entities.³¹⁵

Haribhadra has further explained that *anupūrvābhisamaya* consists in cultivation with a view to stabilization consequent on the progressive ordering of the matter, which is then understood both in disconnexion and in connexion (*vyastasamastatvenādhiगतान् अर्थान् अनुपूर्विकृत्या स्थिरिकराणया विभवायति*).

Such then, according to Haribhadra, is progressive compre-

³¹⁴ It is to be noted that – unlike Ratnākaraśānti (*Sāratamā*, p. 163.19) – Haribhadra does not here refer to *dhyāna* as comprised in the *prajñāpāramitā*; and he speaks (vi. 1, p. 908) of four Perfections (*pāramitācatuṣṭaya*) being comprised in *prajñāpāramitā*. The significance of this restriction, which distinguishes Haribhadra from Kamalaśīla for example, remains to be clarified in detail.

³¹⁵ Cf. Bhadanta Vimuktisena, *Vārttika*, P, f. 180a–181a.

hension, the sixth main topic in the *Abhisamayālamkāra*'s exposition of Prajñāpāramitā philosophy.

The next main topic in Prajñāpāramitā philosophy, which makes up Chapter vii of the *Abhisamayālamkāra*, is known as single-moment awareness (*ekakṣaṇāvabodha*). As comprehension in a single moment (*kṣaṇenāikenādhiḡamaḡ*), this awareness is known to Haribhadra in addition as *ekakṣaṇābhisambodha* and *ekakṣaṇābhisamaya*. Then, for one who has fully realized this *ekakṣaṇābhisambodha* there ultimately arises, in a second moment (*dviṡīye kṣaṇe*), the eighth awareness relating to the *dharmakāya* as the culmination of Prajñāpāramitā philosophy and practice, i.e. the final main topic treated in Chapter viii of the *Abhisamayālamkāra*.³¹⁶

In the philosophy of Prajñāpāramitā as expounded in the *Abhisamayālamkāra* and in Haribhadra's *Vṡtti* and *Ālokā* – works which are rightly regarded as veritable monuments of the 'Gradualist' current in Buddhist thought – what exactly is meant by single-moment awareness or understanding?

Following Chapter vii of the *Abhisamayālamkāra*, Haribhadra has explicated the concept under the following four headings.³¹⁷

- (i) *Ekakṣaṇābhisambodha* is to be understood first in terms of the fact that each pure factor (*anāsravadharma*) is included in the multitude of *dharmas*, and also of the fact that these *anāsravadharmas* are themselves all comprised in each single *dharma* extending from generosity (*dāna*) up to the eighty marks (*anuvyañjana*) of the Buddha. This is so in virtue of a particular Gnosis (*jñāna*) free from the error of grasping each object separately, and which is accordingly termed single-moment (*ekakṣaṇa*) Gnosis. The concept of a *jñāna* by which all is realized simultaneously and at once, in virtue of the Dharma-Sphere of totality (*dharmadhātu*),³¹⁸ has been illustrated in the *Abhisamayālamkāra* (vii. 2) by the image of the noria or Persian wheel (*araghaṡṡa* = *zo chun gyi rgyud* ~ *zo chun brgyud*) the entire mechanism of which is set in motion

³¹⁶ Compare also *Abhisamayālamkāra* i. 18.

³¹⁷ Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālamkāralokā* vii; cf. i. 17.

³¹⁸ The Sanskrit texts reads (p. 909): *pūrvaprañidhānādhanāvedha-dharmadhātusāmarthyāt* (Tib. *sñon gyi smon lam gyi 'phen pa'i šugs dan chos kyī dbyññs kyī mthus*).

simultaneously and at once (*sakṛt* = *cig car*, glossed as *ekavār-am* = *dus gcig tu*) by a single impulse of energy. In this way, in the first form of *ekakṣaṇābhisambodha*, the single pure Gnosis (*anāsravajñāna*) 'presents' (*abhimukhīkārāyati*), in one single moment, all that is in its scope as homogeneous (*sajātīya* = *ri[g]s mthun pa*). It is defined by Haribhadra as characterized by the single-moment comprehension of all pure, non-fruitful factors (*avipākānāsravadharma*).

- (ii) The next aspect of *ekakṣaṇābhisambodha* is described as consisting in the fact that, once all obstacles have been removed in the Bodhisattva's meditative realization of the appropriate counteragents (*pratipakṣa*), there arises the state of 'reality of fruition' consisting in the aspect of total purification (*sakalavyavadānapakṣavipākadharmatāvasthā*). And through comprehension of all *anāsravadharmas* that have therewith reached, in one single moment, this state of fruition, there arises the Gnosis that corresponds to *prajñāpāramitā*. This second aspect of *ekakṣaṇābhisambodha* has accordingly been defined by Haribhadra as characterized by the single-moment comprehension of all pure factors in the state of reality of fruition. Haribhadra's forerunner Ārya Vimuktisena (sixth century) had earlier specified that fruition (*vipāka*) through understanding (*abhisamaya*) in a single moment arises and ceases all at once (*cig car du* = *sakṛt* or *yugapad?*).³¹⁹
- (iii) The following aspect of *ekakṣaṇābhisambodha* is defined as being characterized by the single-moment comprehension of all *dharmas* as devoid of characteristic marks (*alakṣaṇasar-vadharmaikakṣaṇalakṣaṇa*), this marklessness also being known in one single moment. Indeed, as had been explained by Ārya Vimuktisena, were *dharmas* on the contrary differentiated from each other by distinct characteristic marks, their required inclusion within one single *dharma* would be impossible; and it would then wrongly follow that there could be no realization (*abhisamaya*) in a single moment.³²⁰ According to the later commentator Ratnākaraśānti (c. 1000), because of the absence of characteristic mark,

³¹⁹ Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, f. 225al.

³²⁰ Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, f. 225a3-4.

Gnosis at this level is of one value (*ekarasa*).³²¹ In this regard the *Abhisamayālamkāra* (vii. 4) refers to the Bodhisattva's taking his place in 'dream-like' *dharmas* through the practice of generosity and the associated series of other qualities.

- (iv) Finally, the fourth aspect of *ekakṣaṇābhīśambodha* is defined as being characterized by the single-moment comprehension of all *dharmas* as marked by non-duality (*advayalakṣaṇasarva-dharmaikakṣaṇalakṣaṇa*). With regard to this the *Abhisamayālamkāra* (vii. 5) compares the non-duality of what is dreamt (*svapna*) and its cognition in dream.

In all its many ramifications and applications this seventh topic is as important, and as complex, as any in the philosophy of Prajñāpāramitā; and a full explication and analysis of the above-mentioned four aspects of the *ekakṣaṇābhīśambodha* on the basis of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras and the extensive exegetical literature that relates to them could well fill a monograph. For our present purpose it will be sufficient to observe that single-moment comprehension here occupies a critical, and pivotal, position in the transition from the step-by-step cultivation of the Path by the Śaikṣa-practiser to the climactic comprehension of *dharmakāya* as a culminating awareness on the Aśaikṣa-level of a *buddha*.

At an even earlier stage of practice of the Path, following on the transition from the final moment of the mundane (*laukika*) Path of preparation (*prayogamārga*) of the worldling (*pṛthagjana*) – that is, from the *laukikāgradharmas* – to the supramundane Path of vision (*darśanamārga*) of the Ārya, mention has also been made in Haribhadra's *Ālokā* of this Darśanamārga as a single-moment understanding (*ekakṣaṇābhīśamaya*).³²²

This concept is to be understood in the following way. The Darśanamārga is regularly represented as consisting of sixteen thought-moments (*citta[-kṣaṇa]*). In it the following four factors are then identified: (i) a preliminary externally objectified receptive perseverance in knowledge (*dharmajñānakṣānti*) and (ii) a full externally objectified knowledge (*dharmajñāna*) bearing on

³²¹ Ratnākaraśānti, *Sāratamā* vii, 4, p. 171.1.

³²² Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālamkāreṅgālokā* ii. 12 (ed. Wogihara, p. 171; =P, f. 120b).

the objective (*grāhya*) factors of existence, beside (iii) a preliminary consequent receptive perseverance in knowledge (*anvayajñānakṣānti*) and (iv) a full consequent knowledge (*anvayajñāna*) bearing on the subjective (*grāhaka*). This set of four factors is brought into relation with each of the four Principles or Realities of the Nobles (*āryasatya*).

Quoting one view of this matter in his *Ālokā*,³²³ Haribhadra has explained that, in the exact moment when Ill (*duḥkha*, i.e. the first *āryasatya*) is eliminated following on its recognition, the other three *satyas* also are all simultaneously involved, viz. in the form of elimination of the origin of Ill (i.e. the second *āryasatya*), the realization of the cessation of Ill (i.e. the third *āryasatya*), and the practice of the Path (i.e. the fourth *āryasatya*). And the same applies *mutatis mutandis* in the case of each of the following three *satyas*. Hence, according to this view, the Mahāyānist intuition of the Darśanamārga is to be regarded in this respect as a single-moment intuition (*ekakṣaṇābhisamaya*) with respect to its intuition of a single effect (*ekakāryābhisamaya*).³²⁴ According to another view of the matter also mentioned by Haribhadra, intuition of the Darśanamārga is an *ekakṣaṇābhisamaya* because there here arises a pure knowledge (*anāsravajñāna*) making known the nature of all modes (*sarvākārasvarūpaprativedhakāriññāna*); and this knowledge has within its scope the totality of all factors (*sarvadharmaviśaya*), thus bearing a certain (at least formal) resemblance to the two aspects of the *ekakṣaṇābhisambodha* at the very end of the Path.

In sum, there are recognized in the tradition of Prajñāpāramitā philosophy to which Haribhadra belonged — a tradition very closely connected with the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka of Śāntara-kṣita and Kamalāśīla and ultimately with a Maitreya-tradition — both a progressive, serial form of understanding involving *inter alia* forms of commemoration which are characterized as being in

³²³ *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* loka ii. 12, p. 171 (=P, f. 120b).

³²⁴ *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* loka ii. 12, p. 171: *ity ekakāryābhisamayād ekakṣaṇābhisamayo mahāyāne darśanamārge draṣṭavyaḥ* (Tib., P, f. 120b: *de ltar 'bras bu'i mñon par rtogs pa la bltos nas theg pa chen po'i mñon ba'i lam la mñon par rtogs pa skad cig ma gcig yin no*). On the *kāryābhisamaya* see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 27 (below, pp. 177–8).

reality non-recollective (*asmaraṇalakṣaṇa*) and without mentation, and also a single-moment understanding aspects of which involve simultaneous (*sakṛt*) realization. This *ekakṣaṇābhisambodha* leads, in the following and culminating moment, to ultimate comprehension of the *dharmakāya*. In addition, at an even earlier stage of the Path, the pivotal transition from the mundane (*laukika*) Prayogamārga of the worldling (*pṛthagjana*) to the transmundane (*lokottara*) Darśanamārga of the Ārya, reference is made to a single-moment intuition (*ekakṣaṇābhisamaya*) on the Darśanamārga.

The above-mentioned transitions appear to parallel what has in the Vijñānavāda school been termed *mārgāśrayaparivṛtti* (so long as one remains a Śaikṣa) and *cittāśrayaparivṛtti* (when one attains the *śaikṣamārga*).³²⁵

The notion of the momentary or instantaneous (*ekakṣaṇa*) as attaching to a crucial and pivotal point where a leap – a veritable *saut-de-plan* – is made from the conditioned level to the unconditioned – from the *saṃskṛta* level of the Bodhisattva under training (*śaikṣa*) to the *asaṃskṛta* level of the Aśaikṣa in Buddhahood (or Arhathood) – is thus a critical one. It is essential to underscore the fact that both these aspects, the Gradual and the Instantaneous/Simultaneous, have been recognized by the school that taught the progressive Path.

From the foregoing it therefore emerges that a classical school of Indian Prajñāpāramitā thought embraced a complex of typologically 'simultaneist' ideas and terms that figured also among the points at issue in the controversy that took place in Tibet at the end of the eighth century between the 'Gradualists' with Kamalaśīla at their head and the 'Simultaneists' with the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen as one of their leading proponents. That the issues are even older in Prajñāpāramitā thought than the second half of the eighth century is demonstrated by the fact that the *Abhisamayālamkāra* (of uncertain date) and its early commentator Ārya Vimuktisena (sixth century) already clearly recognized both these forms of understanding or awareness as complementary, and also by the fact that several of the problems in question are implicitly or explicitly touched on in the canonical sources quoted by

³²⁵ See *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (ed. N. Tatia), p. 93.

Kamalaśīla in his *Bhāvanākramas* and in his commentary on the *Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī*.

The Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna is recorded to have said that the simultaneous engagement (*gcig char 'jug pa*) he taught is like the tenth stage (*sa = bhūmi*).³²⁶ It may be that he was thus referring to a state comparable to what we have just seen recognized for the *ekakṣaṇābhīśambodha* in relation to *dharmakāyābhīśambodha* in Prajñāpāramitā thought.

It is moreover in connexion with the *buddhabhūmi* that the Mādhyamika master Candrakīrti has evoked the instantaneousness of the *buddha*'s Gnosis (*jñāna*). In his *Madhyamakāvātāra* we read (xii. 2, p. 356):

'Just as space is not differentiated according to differences in the containers [in which it may be enclosed], so there is in reality no differentiation whatever caused by things (*bhāva*) [i.e. by the *skandhas* such as matter and feeling]. Therefore, when correctly comprehending [this reality] as being of one single value (*ekarasa*) – oh Thou of highest understanding! – Thou didst understand the knowable (*jñeya*) in one instant (*kṣaṇa*).'

In his autocommentary Candrakīrti has explained that, once he achieved Awakening in the Akaniṣṭha-sphere (see *Madhyamakāvātāra* xii. 1), Bhagavat attained the Gnosis of the Omniscient (*thams cad mkhyen pa ye šes*) in one instant. And it is by this understanding, in just a single knowledge-moment (*mkhyen pa'i skad cig gcig kho na*), that Bhagavat attained the Gnosis of the Omniscient in precisely that single knowledge-moment (*mkhyen pa'i skad cig gcig kho nar*).

Here then the single-moment character of Gnosis on the stage of the *buddha* is explained in terms of the one value (*ekarasatva*) of reality, that is, the fact that on the supreme and final level of Buddhahood all is understood to be of one single value only. This single value is liberation along with Emptiness (*śūnyatā*).

³²⁶ See *sBa bžed*, G, p. 68.20 and S, p. 58.7; *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 117a2; *Chos 'byun Me tog sñin po*, f. 430b5.

This theme has been alluded to also in the *Triśaraṇasaptati* ascribed to (a) Candrakīrti (verse 14):

*chos rnamś nīd kyī rīo bo ni || thams cad yod pa ma yin te ||
de phyir skad cig gcig giś ni || bde gśegs thams cad mkhyen par
'dod ||*

'A nature does not exist at all for the *dharmas*. Therefore it is held that, in one single moment, the Sugata knows all.'

This treatise was known to Haribhadra, who has quoted its verse 33 in his *Abhisamayālamkārahālokā* (i. 3, pp. 8–9).

According to a much earlier source, the basic Commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga-Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra* (i. 25, pp. 21–22), the fact that stained Thusness (*samalā tathatā*) is simultaneously and at once (*yugapad ekakālam* = *cig car dus gcig*) both [naturally] pure (*viśuddhā*) and [adventitiously] Affected (*saṃkliṣṭā*), is to be regarded as an inconceivable matter (*acintyasthāna*), as is declared in the *Śrīmālādevīsīṃhanādasūtra*. And the further fact that stainless Thusness (*nirmalā tathatā*) is un-Affected by previous stains (*pūrvamalāsaṃkliṣṭā*), even though it is later purified (*paścād viśuddhā*), is also an inconceivable matter. Hence it is declared in the *Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra* that Mind (*citta*) is by nature luminous (*prakṛtiprabhāsvara*), and is knowledge 'just so' (*tathaiva jñānam* = *de kho na bñin śes so*). As a consequence, it is also stated that Perfect Awakening (*samyaksambodhi*) is Awakened to (*abhisambuddhā*) in virtue of that understanding which is endowed with the characteristic of being a single-moment one (*ekakṣaṇalakṣaṇa-samāyuktā prajñā*) (i. 25, p. 22).

A related idea is also expressed in another passage of the basic Commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (i. 15), where it is explained that the pair (*dvaya*) represented by what is termed 'natural luminosity of mind' (*cittasya prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā*) and its sub-defilement/affliction (*upakleśa*) is very hard to comprehend. For no second *citta* in fact intervenes (*anabhisamdhāna* = *mtshams sbyor ba med pa*) because of the single flow (*ekacaratva* = *gcig rgyu ba*) of both salutary and non-salutary *cittas* in the Pure Sphere (*anāsravadhātu*). Hence, as is declared in the *Śrīmālādevīsīṃhanādasūtra*, salutary thought (*kuśalacitta*) is instantaneous (*kṣaṇika*): it

does not become Affected by defilements/afflictions (*na kleśaiḥ saṃkliśyate*). And non-salutary thought (*akuśalacitta*) is instantaneous: it is not in a state of Affection by the defilements/afflictions, and no defilements/afflictions touch this *citta*.

Still another 'inconceivable matter', as pointed out in the *Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra*, is represented by the fact that Buddha-activity (*jinakriyā*) functions spontaneously (*anābhoga*) and without binary mental construction (*avikalpatas*) for sentient beings – in accordance with their predispositions and the way they are to be trained – simultaneously (*yugapat = cig car*), everywhere (*sarvatra = thams cad la*) and at all times (*sarvakālam = dus thams cad du*) (i. 25, p. 24; cf. *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* iv. 67).

Here in the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*-Commentary and in its Sūtra sources, then, the notion of instantaneousness and simultaneity marks not exactly a critical and climactic transition from one stage of the Path to another (such as from the Prayogamārga to the Darśanamārga) or from the Path to the Fruit of Buddhahood (as in the cases from Prajñāpāramita philosophy studied above), but instead the so to speak non-rational 'co-relationship' of the *buddha*-level with the level of sentient beings. This co-relationship (if such it may be called) is in effect that of bondage and liberation in the classical Buddhist perspective of the ultimate non-duality of Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa/Bodhi, or of *samalā tathatā* and *nirmalā tathatā*. And in view of the fundamental principles of non-substantiality (non-hypostatization) and non-duality (but *not* monistic identity), this 'relationship' is non-rational because, in reality, there exist no separate and opposed hypostatic entities, in other words no ultimately real *relata*. In the conventional discourse of philosophical analysis and of the description of the Path, the positions and sequences *sattva : buddha*, bondage: liberation, *saṃsāra : nirvāṇa*, *samalā tathatā : nirmalā tathatā* and so on no doubt all have their pedagogical and heuristic usefulness and legitimacy; but they lack any ontologically or gnoseologically real foundation as hypostatizable entities that could be related and opposed. This is why the ostensible terms of this non-rational 'relationship', which goes beyond the frames of space and time, are described as instantaneous, and also why the understanding that pertains to them is itself characterized as being a single-moment *prajñā*. Position in space and succession in time of the

two levels are thus neutralized and cancelled in philosophical description by atemporal instantaneity and simultaneity.

That Kamalaśīla was not unfamiliar with these ideas expounded in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and its Commentary and Sūtra-sources – and connected with the doctrines of the natural luminosity of Mind, the *tathāgatagarbha*, and the *prakṛtiśhaṅgotra* which is also a topic of Chapter i of the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* – is suggested by the fact that in his *Madhyamakāloka* he incorporated the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine in the *Yogācāra-Madhyamaka*.

Leaping and the Samāpatti or Samādhi called Avaskanda(ka), Viškanda(ka) and Vyutkrāntaka

Associated with various forms of rapid way and immediate access to Awakening, we find the Tibetan concepts of *thod rgal* and *khregs chod*.³²⁷ The latter is known from the rDzogs chen tradition, where it is described as *ka dag*; and no Sanskrit original for this term has so far been identified.³²⁸ On the other hand, the term *thod rgal*, well-known in rDzogs chen literature too, is amply attested elsewhere.³²⁹ In rDzogs chen literature it is glossed as *lhun grub* 'spontaneous' (Skt. *anābhoga*),³³⁰ but it actually means leaping or skipping. The Sanskrit words translated by *thod rgal* are *avaskanda(ka)* and *viškanda(ka)*, meaning jumping over, and *vyutkrānta(ka)*, used in the sense of striding over.³³¹

³²⁷ On these two terms, see H. V. Guenther, *Tibetan Buddhism in western perspective* (Emeryville, 1977), p. 151; G. Tucci, *Religions of Tibet* (London, 1980), pp. 85–87, 131; R. A. Stein, *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 179 (1971), pp. 23–28; and M. Broido, *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 8 (1985), p. 35 (concerning the types of person known as *cig car ba*, *thod rgal ba* and *rim gyis pa*). *Thod rgal* has often been regarded as an essentially gradual, even though accelerated, process as opposed to *khregs gcod*. But in some cases *thod rgal* too can be extremely rapid and for all intents and purposes sudden.

³²⁸ In the *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* (*Zang-Han daicidian*, Peking, 1985), *khregs chod* is defined as (1) *sia 'gyur ba'i lhaq mthon gi brda chad* (i.e. an expression used by the rÑin ma pas for *lhaq mthon* = *vipaśyanā*), and (2) *ka dag khregs chod kyi bsdu tshig*.

³²⁹ In Sakaki's edition of the *Mahāvvyutpatti* the spelling *thod rgyal* is found under no. 1496.

³³⁰ Cf. *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo*, s.v.

³³¹ It should be noted that *ava-skand-* means not only 'to jump down' but also 'to assault, storm'. The latter meaning would be appropriate when the *avaskanda(ka)* technique designates an accelerated and very rapid process.

As for the term *viškanda(ka)*, the word *viškanda* is attested in the meaning of 'dispersing, moving away'.

In the *Mahāvvyūtpatti* (no. 1496), the *vyutkrāntakasamāpatti* (or *vyatīkrāntakasamāpatti*) = *thod rgyal* (sic) *gyi sñoms par 'jug pa* follows on brief descriptions of the four Ārūpyas – i.e. the Samāpattis relating to the Ākāśānantyāyatana, the Vijñānānantyāyatana, the Ākimcanyāyatana and the Naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana (nos. 1492–5) – and it precedes the *vyāskandaka-* or *vyatyasta-samāpatti* (= *snrel ž'i'i sñoms par 'jug pa*, no. 1497).³³² It is usually contrasted with the nine Samāpattis of progressive and sequential residence (*anupūrvavihārasamāpatti* = *mthar gyis gnas pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa*, no. 1498) consisting of the four Dhyānas (nos. 1478–81) and four Samāpattis (nos. 1492–5 already mentioned together with, in addition, the *samjñāvedayitanirodha*, no. 1500).

The notion of leaping or skipping stages of the graded Path is known in the Dhyāna-tradition of Buddhism.³³³ And since it is relevant to the *ston mun pa* and *cig c(h)ar ba* techniques at issue in the Great Debate in Tibet, it will be of interest to see to what extent, and where, these ideas are attested in the main sources of the classical schools of Indian Buddhism and, especially, in those of Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalāśīla's school.

After briefly describing in both the forward (ascending, *anuloma*) and reverse (descending, *pratiloma*) directions the nine sequential Attainments in absorption (*anupūrvasamāpatti*) – i.e. the four Dhyānas relating to the *rūpadhātu* and the five Samāpattis relating to the four Āyatanas of the *ārūpyadhātu* and the Samjñāvedayitanirodha – the *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (ed. Conze, Ch. lxii, pp. 108–10) describes the *Siṃhavijṅmbhita Samādhi*, which is shown to consist in ascending through the four Dhyānas and four Āyatanas to the Nirodhasamāpatti and then descending from this high Samāpatti to the first Dhyāna in a progressive and sequential fashion. Next, this Sūtra takes up the *Viṣkandaka* ('jumping', or 'dispersing?') Samādhi, which is practised once the *Siṃhavijṅmbhita Samādhi* has been worked

³³² On *vyatyasta/yamaka* see É. Lamotte, *Artibus asiae* 24 (1961), pp. 307–10, and *L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti* (Louvain, 1962), pp. 33–34. In the *samādhi*-list of the *Mahāvvyūtpatti* (no. 534), the *vyatyasta* follows the *siṃhavijṅmbhita*.

³³³ See Demiéville, *BEFEO* 44 (1954), pp. 429–31; *Hōbōgirin*, s.v. *chōgyō*; above, p. 151.

through. This Concentration – otherwise referred to in the same Sūtra and elsewhere as the Avaskandaka ('jumping', and perhaps also 'storming') Samādhi – consists in the practiser's first ascending progressively through the Dhyānas and Āyatanas to the Nirodhasamāpatti, gaining (*samāpad-*) each stage in sequence. Then, from the Nirodhasamāpatti he jumps back to the second Dhyāna, thence again to the Nirodhasamāpatti and back down to the third Dhyāna, thence again to the Nirodhasamāpatti and back down to the fourth Dhyāna, thence again to the Nirodhasamāpatti and back down to the Ākāśānantyāyatana, thence again to the Nirodhasamāpatti and back down to the Vijñānānantyāyatana, thence again to the Nirodhasamāpatti and back down to the Ākimṇanyāyatana, and thence again to the Nirodhasamāpatti and back down to the Naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana. Then the practiser ascends once more to the Nirodhasamāpatti and descends back down to the Naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana, from which he this time arises to remain in a state of non-concentration (*asamāhitacitte*³³⁴ 'vatiṣṭhate). Next, the practiser arises from the state of non-concentration and gains (*samāpadyate*) the Nirodhasamāpatti, from which he arises to remain in a state of non-concentration. The same procedure is followed by the practiser in descending order for each of the four Āyatanas of the *ārūpyadhātu* and for each of the four Dhyānas of the *rūpadhātu*, so that having finally arisen from the first Dhyāna he remains in a state of non-concentration. This Sūtra-passage concludes by stating that standing (*sthita*) in the Avaskandaka Samādhi one thus achieves (progressively) the Equality of all factors of existence (*sarvadharmasamatām anuprāpnoti*), and that it is in this way that a Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva standing in the *prajñāpāramitā* takes up (*pari-grhṇāti*) the Perfection of *dhyāna*.

The *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (ed. Ghoṣa, i, pp. 272–3), using the expression *viṣkadya samāpadyate*, describes a process by which Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas cross (*saṃkrāmantī*) to a Buddha-field (*buddhakṣetra*) in virtue of their very first production of the Thought of Awakening (*prathamacittotpāda*). This procedure consists in such Bodhisattvas who achieve the four Dhyānas and

³³⁴ In his edition of the *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā* (Rome, 1962), Conze prints *asamāhitacitta* throughout. But the *Aṣṭasāharikā* and other texts have *asamāhita*^o.

Ārūpyasamāpattis attaining the first Dhyāna and then, having arisen from it, the Nirodhasamāpatti. Thence the practiser attains the second Dhyāna, thence again the Nirodhasamāpatti, thence the third Dhyāna, thence again the Nirodhasamāpatti, thence the fourth Dhyāna, and thence again the Nirodhasamāpatti. Next, attaining once again the Nirodhasamāpatti, and following a similar procedure, the practiser ascends through the four Āyatana-s. And arising from the fourth Āyatana – the Naivasamjñānā-samjñā – the practiser attains the Nirodhasamāpatti finally. The description of this procedure of jumping in the *Śatasāhasrikā* follows a statement (p. 272) as to how Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas awaken to supreme and perfect Awakening (*anuttarasamyaksambodhi*) in virtue of their very first *cittotpāda*.

A similar procedure is also described in the version of the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* published by N. Dutt (pp. 70–71), where it is stated that Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas attain *samādhi* by jumping (*avaskandaka*) and then awaken to supreme and perfect Awakening in the various Buddha-fields. One who proceeds thus is then referred to as a *kāyasākṣin* (p. 71).³³⁵

Pertinent to this matter too is the statement in the version of the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* published by Dutt that the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, having attained the Diamond-like Concentration (*vajropamasamādhi*)³³⁶ immediately after the Bodhicitta, acquires the Omnimodal Gnosis of a *buddha* by means of discriminative knowledge conjoined with a single thought moment (*ekacittakṣaṇasamāyuktayā prajñayā sarvākārajñatām anuprāpnoti*, p. 82).

Concerning the *kāyasākṣin* (Pali *kāyasakkhi[n]*), he is one of several kinds of psychological and spiritual types recognized in

³³⁵ See below, pp. 168–70.

³³⁶ On the *vajropamasamādhi*, see *Abhidharmakośa* vi. 44d (= *ānantaryamārga*, on the level of the *bhavāgra*, for a candidate for Arhatship, followed by the *vimuktimārga* and *āsravakṣayajñāna*), and Yaśomitra's *Vyākhyā* ii. 16c (where the *bhāvanāmārga* is described as extending from the *anvayajñāna* relating to *mārga* to the *vajropamasamādhi*, where the Fruit of Arhatship is attained). See also *Śrāvakabhūmi* iv, p. 506 f. (cf. L. Schmithausen's ed. in: L. Hercus et al. (eds.), *Indological and Buddhist studies* [Festschrift J. W. de Jong], Canberra, 1982, p. 460 f.), where (p. 510 [=p. 472]) the *vajropamasamādhi* consists in the *prayoganiṣṭha manaskāra*, one of the seven forms of the 'act of mentation' listed in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*. Cf. also L. de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa*, vi, pp. 227–9, and *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (Louvain, 1929), p. 667; below, p. 200.

the Buddhist traditions as being worthy of honour (*dakkehiṇeyya*),³³⁷ he is characterized by the faculty of concentration (*samādhindriya*).³³⁸ By extension (*pariyāyena*) the name Kāyasākṣin is used for one who has 'contacted' the four Dhyānas and the four Ārūpyas; and strictly (*nippariyāyena*) this designation applies to one who has attained the Saṃjñāvedayitanirodha, in which case the impurities (*āsava*) are exhausted by discriminative knowledge (*paññā*, which is to say that the Kāyasākṣin is then an Arhat).³³⁹ When his mental attention (*manasikāra*) focuses on Ill (*dukkha*) the *samādhindriya* predominates in him; and his realization, or 'attestation' (*sacchikar-*), is described as being by bodily contact, for he first 'contacts' Dhyāna and then Stoppage and Nirvāṇa (*jhānaphassaṃ paṭhamam phusati, pacchā nirodham nibbānam sacchikaroti*).³⁴⁰ Moreover, the designation Kāyasākṣin applies both to a person who attains the *sotāpattimagga* by the power of the *samādhindriya* and to the persons who by the power of this faculty of concentration attain the *sotāpattiphala*, the Paths and Fruits of the Sakadāgāmin and the Anāgāmin, the Path of Arhathood and the Fruit of Arhathood; while the *samādhindriya* predominates in this type, the other four faculties (*saddhā, paññā*, etc.) nevertheless play a subordinate part in his spiritual constitution.³⁴¹ The Kāyasākṣin is described as one who abides having contacted 'in the body' the tranquil Vimokṣas – the Ārūpyas beyond the Rūpas – and *some* of whose *āsavas* are exhausted by discriminative knowledge; the restriction 'some' (*ekacce*) is also applied to the *āsavas* in the cases of the spiritual types of the Dṛṣṭiprāpta, the Śraddhāvimukta and the Dharmānūsārin, but significantly it is not so applied in the cases of the Ubhayatobhāgavimukta (who also abides in bodily contact with the tranquil Ārūpya Vimokṣas) and the Prajñāvimukta (who however does not abide in bodily contact with the Ārūpya Vimokṣas).³⁴² In the

³³⁷ Dīghanikāya III 105; 253–4; Majjhimanikāya I 439, 477–8; etc.

³³⁸ Aṅguttaranikāya I 119. ³³⁹ Aṅguttaranikāya IV 451–2.

³⁴⁰ Paṭisambhidāmagga II 51–52. ³⁴¹ Paṭisambhidāmagga II 54.

³⁴² Majjhimanikāya I 478. (In the Nālandā edition, the negative *na* is missing before *kāyena phussitvā/phassitvā* in the case of the *paññāvimutta*.) On this and parallel passages, and on the relationship between *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* and *prajñā*, see L. Schmithausen in K. Bruhn and A. Wezler (eds.), *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus* (Gedenkschrift L. Alsdorf, Wiesbaden, 1981), p. 216 f.

Puggalapaññatti, the Kāyasākṣin is clearly connected with the eight Vimokṣas.³⁴³

The Kāyasākṣin thus figures alongside the person released through confidence (*śraddhāvimukta*, *saddhāvimutta*), the person released through discriminative knowledge (*prajñāvimukta*, *paññāvimutta*) and the Dṛṣṭiprāpta (*ditṭhippatta*). And in the Aṅguttaranikāya there is found an interesting discussion as to which of three psychological and spiritual types is superior; Saviṭṭha/Samiddha – who figures as the interlocutor of Musīla and Nārada in a comparable context (see pp. 191–2) – holds that the *saddhāvimutta* is best because of the predominance in him of the faculty of confidence (*saddhindriya*), Mahākoṭṭhita/Mahākoṭṭhika – a monk known elsewhere for his skill in *paṭisambhidā* – holds that the *kāyasakkhi(n)* is best because of the predominance of the faculty of concentration, and Sāriputta holds that the *ditṭhippatta* is best because of the predominance of the faculty of discriminative knowledge (*paññāindriya*). When approached to resolve this difference of opinion the Buddha is said, however, to have remarked that it is not possible to decide unilaterally (*ekamsena*); for any one of these three types may become not only a Sakadāgāmin and Anāgāmin but also an Arhat.³⁴⁴

In the *Abhidharmakośa* (vi. 43cd), the Kāyasākṣin has been defined as an Anāgāmin who reaches *nirodha*; and Yaśomitra has specified that the Anāgāmin in question may be either *śraddhāvimukta* or *dṛṣṭiprāpta*. According to the Vaibhāṣika theory summarized here by Vasubandhu, the Kāyasākṣin attests ‘in the body’ a *dharma* that is a simulacrum of Nirvāṇa; and he does this because the body serves him as his *āśraya* in the absence of mind (*citta*) in the state of *nirodha* (*Bhāṣya* vi. 43cd). According to Vasubandhu’s own (Sautrāntika) view, however, on arising from concentration the Kāyasākṣin attains a previously unattained conscious bodily tranquillity (*tasmād vyutthāyāpratīlabdhapūrvam savijñānakām kāyaśāntim pratīlabhate*), thinking: ‘Tranquil is the Nirodhasamāpatti, Nirvāṇa-like is the Nirodhasamāpatti’.³⁴⁵ It is in this way, then,

³⁴³ *Puggalapaññatti*, pp. 14–15, 29, 72.

³⁴⁴ Aṅguttaranikāya I 118–20.

³⁴⁵ Cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ii. 44d (p. 72) and 61d (pp. 98–100) on the *samantaraprataya* for the *vyutthānacitta* when a meditator arises from the *nirodhasamāpatti*.

that tranquillity (*śāntatva*) is 'attested'. 'Attestation' has been defined (*Bhāṣya* vi. 43cd) as immediate perception by the attestation of 'connexion' or 'knowledge' (*prāptijñānasākṣāt-kriyābhyaṃ pratyakṣikāro hi sākṣāt-kriyā*). According to Yaśomitra, at the time of *samādhi* there is attestation through *prāpti* of a suitable *āśraya*, and on arising from *samādhi* there is attestation through *jñāna* that is awareness of the preceding. Alternatively, it is through having attained conscious 'bodily tranquillity' that *prāpti* 'connexion' with this state is understood in the state of unconscious bodily tranquillity (*savijñānakakāyaśāntipratilambhena vā avijñānakakāyaśāntyavasthāyāṃ tatprāptir gamyata iti*).³⁴⁶

In Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (p. 88), the Kāyasākṣin has been defined as a Learner (*śaikṣa*) who meditates in the eight Vimokṣas.

The process of jumping stages is further treated in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (v. 24–25) and its commentaries just after the *Siṃhavijṃbhita Samādhi*. These texts have not hitherto been examined in connexion with the notion of skipping stages of the Path, presumably because these works are not included among the sources of the Sino-Japanese Buddhist tradition on which discussion has so far been mainly concentrated.

In *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* v. 23, the *Siṃhavijṃbhita Samādhi* is mentioned in connexion with the *Darśanamārga* that involves the vision of the twelve members of the chain of origination in dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*) in both the forward direction (*anulomam*), beginning with nescience (*avidyā*) as the condition for the arising of the constructions (*saṃskāra*), and in the reverse direction (*pratilomam*), beginning with the cessation of ageing and death as a consequence of the cessation of birth.³⁴⁷

Then, on the level of the highest supramundane Path of meditative realization (*bhāvanāmārga*), mention is made first of the nine successive Attainments in absorption (*anupūrvvasamā-*

³⁴⁶ As noted by Vasubandhu (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* viii. 34), *sākṣātkaṛaṇa* 'attestation, realization' is connected specifically with the third Vimokṣa (of *śubha*) and the eighth Vimokṣa (of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*).

³⁴⁷ In the *samādhi*-list of the *Mahāvūyutpatti* (no. 533), the *siṃhavijṃbhita* immediately precedes the *vyatyasta* (*snrel* *ṣi*).

patti = *mthar gyis gnas pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa*) and then of the Avaskanda-Samāpatti (v. 24–25):

*kāmāptam avadhīkṛtya vijñānam asamāhitam/
sanirodhāḥ samāpattīr gatvāgāmya nava dvidhā//
ekadvitricatuhpañcaśaṣṭāṣṭāvayatikramāt/
avaskandasamāpattīr ā nirodham atulyagā//*

'Having taken as a terminal the unconcentrated consciousness belonging to [the level of] desire, and having gone [upwards] and returned [downwards], doubly, through the nine attainments including the Nirodha[samāpatti], by passing over one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, and [finally] eight [stages in the series of the nine successive Samāpattis] the Attainment of Jumping, without even(ness), proceeds up to Cessation.'

According to Haribhadra, the Avaskanda-Samāpatti comprises the nine successive Samāpattis that make up the Bhāvanāmārga. The procedure of jumping consists to begin with in ascending in sequence from the first Dhyāna to the Nirodha and then descending in sequence back to the first Dhyāna, thus describing a forwards and backwards sequence (*anulomapratiloma-krama*) through the four Dhyānas, the four Ārūpyas and the Nirodha(samāpatti). Next, the practiser attains (*samāpadyate*) the first Dhyāna and then, arising from it, he attains the Nirodha. And he follows this method through the Dhyānas and Āyatana until from the Naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana he at last attains the Nirodha once again. Next, after arising from the latter, he takes as his support (*ālambya*) the 'adjacent attainment'³⁴⁸ and, fixing (*avasthāpya*) as his terminal (*maryāda*) the consciousness in the sphere of desire (*kāmāvacāraṃ vijñānam*) and then arising from Samāpatti through the strength of his expertness in means (*upāyakauśalya*), the practiser 'faces' (*āmukhīkṛ-*) the unconcentrated consciousness (*vijñānam asamāhitam*). Then, from this state of non-concentration he attains the Nirodha, thence again the non-concentrated state, and thence – leaving out (*parityajya*) only the Nirodha – the Naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana. Thence he again

³⁴⁸ *anantarasamāpatti* = Tib. *de ma thag pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa* (P, f. 382b).

reaches non-concentration and – leaving out this time two stages – he attains the Ākiṃcanyāyatana, and thence non-concentration once again. Finally, leaving out eight stages, he attains the first Dhyāna, and thence non-concentration once more. Thus, by the leaving out (*parityāga*) of from one to eight stages, the practiser proceeds as far as the Nirodha. And it is in this way that one wishing to take up the Avaskanda-Samāpatti which is without even progression (*atulyagā*) – and which is characterized by the practiser's mastery (*vaśitva*) and has as its nature the Bhāvanā-mārga and expertness in means – should course in *prajñāpāramitā*. Haribhadra cites the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* with regard to this procedure.³⁴⁹

Haribhadra then compares and contrasts the related theory of the *Abhidharmakośa* where, instead of *avaskanda(ka)samāpatti*, the term used is *vyutkrāntakasamāpatti* (viii. 18c–19b):

*gatvāgamyā dvidhā bhūmīr aṣṭau śliṣṭaikalaṅghitāḥ||
vyutkrāntakasamāpattir visabhāgatṛṭiyagā|*

‘Having gone [upwards] and returned [downwards], doubly, through the eight stages, [either] consecutively [or] jumping one [at a time], the Vyutkrāntaka-Samāpatti proceeds to a third [stage from the starting one] of a heterogeneous kind.’

According to Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the word ‘doubly’ relates to the stages that are either impure (*sāsrava*) or pure (*anāsrava*). The word ‘consecutively’ (*śliṣṭa*) refers to a progressive sequence (*anukrama*), whilst the word ‘jumping one’ (*ekalaṅghita*) refers to the skipping of one stage in each movement. The meditator who proceeds thus has been called a *vyutkrāntakasamāpattī*.³⁵⁰

The procedure (*prayoga*) in question consists, according to the *Bhāṣya*, in the practiser's first passing over in ascending and descending sequence eight *sāsrava* stages, and then seven *anāsrava* stages.³⁵¹ Next, he attains the third *sāsrava* Dhyāna from the first,

³⁴⁹ Cf. the analysis of the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* in *Hōbōgin*, pp. 356–7.

³⁵⁰ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* viii. 15c (p. 444.2).

³⁵¹ According to La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa*, viii, pp. 145 and 175, the *naivasamjñānāsānjñā* (*bhavāgra*) level is never *anāsrava*, so that only the seven preceding

and thence the Ākāśānantiyāyatana (i.e. the first Samāpatti), and thence the Ākiṃcanyāyatana (i.e. the third Samāpatti), thus skipping one stage in each movement. And having next passed over these stages in a backwards and downwards direction (*pratilomam*), the practiser goes on to attain the *anāsrava* stages first in a forwards and then in a backwards movement, skipping one stage in each movement. But when, starting from the first *sāsrava* Dhyāna, he gains the third *anāsrava* Dhyāna, thence the *sāsrava* Ākāśānantiyāyatana, and thence the *anāsrava* Ākiṃcanyāyatana, and then descends once more, owing to the fact that one proceeds to a third stage from the starting point which is of a heterogeneous kind (*visabhāgatṛṭṭiyadravya*), the attainment is complete (*abhiniṣpannā*). One does not, according to the *Bhāṣya*, attain a fourth stage from the starting point (thus skipping two stages instead of one), for it is too distant. It is, moreover, only the Asamayavimukta – i.e. the Arhat who is unconditionally released³⁵² – who proceeds in this way; for he is without defilements/afflictions (*kleśa*), and he has mastery over concentration (*samādhau vaśitvam*). Sequentiality as opposed to skipping is on the contrary the rule (*niyama*) that applies for the beginner (*prāthamakalpika*); and only those who have acquired mastery at will (*prāptakāmavaśitvāḥ*) can gain the stages by skipping one.³⁵³

In the Pali tradition, the technique of skipping one stage at a time in the sequence of Concentrations and Attainments is attested under the name of *jhānukkantika* in Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* (xii. 2 and 5) and in the *Aṭṭhasālinī* (§ 3.388, p. 187), which also mention the *jhānānuloma* and the *jhānapaṭiloma*. The technique of skipping one stage only is known in addition from a number of further Śrāvakayānist sources, and also from the *Yogācārabhūmi*.³⁵⁴

levels may be counted as *anāsrava*; see below, pp. 195, 200.

In the *bhavāgra* the *bodhimārgāṅgas* are lacking (*Abhidharmakośa* vi. 73a). In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (p. 69) and its *Bhāṣya* (p. 81), this level is stated to be exclusively mundane (*laukika*) and not to belong therefore to the *āryamārga*; the reason given is that the Buddha has declared that there is *ajñāprativedha* only so long as there is *saṃjñāsamāpatti* (see below, pp. 199–200).

³⁵² *Abhidharmakośa* vi. 57a.

³⁵³ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ii. 44d (p. 72), a passage which also mentions the *vyuterānta-samāpattis*.

³⁵⁴ See *Hōbōgirin* s.v. *chōjō* and *chōotsushō*.

The *Vyutkrāntaka-Samādhi has been discussed in the *Ta-chih tu-lun* ascribed to Nāgārjuna in the context of the Perfection of *dhyāna*.³⁵⁵ Since in this treatise the practiser is not a Śrāvakayānist but a Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva of the Mahāyāna, he is considered able to skip not only from the first to the third Dhyāna-level for example, but from the first to the fourth Dhyāna-level or to one of the last five Samāpattis including the Saṃjñāvedayitanirodha. In other words, unlike the Śrāvakayānist, the Mahāyānist is not restricted to skipping only one stage at a time as is prescribed in the *Abhidharmakośa* (*ekalaṅghita*, viii. 18d).³⁵⁶

In sum, in the Mahāyāna the notion of leaping over a large number of stages of the Path can be followed fairly far back in the Vijñānavāda school and even further in the Madhyamaka. As already noted, the concept is attested also in the Mahāyānist supplement to Saṃgharakṣa's *Yogācārabhūmi* (Taishō 606) dealing with the practice of the Bodhisattva. And very interestingly the **Vimuttimaggā* (Taishō 1648) also recognizes the possibility of skipping more than one stage at a time.³⁵⁷

It thus appears that a standard Śrāvakayānist method of skipping differs in an important respect from the Mahāyānist ones in so far as the technique taught in the *Abhidharmakośa* as well as in the Pali tradition allows a practiser each time to jump over only one stage in the sequence of stages, whereas the technique mentioned in the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* for example allows for up to eight stages to be skipped at a time. This possibility that exists for the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva may be connected with his ability, mentioned in the *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, to awaken to *anuttarasamyaksambodhi* in virtue of his very first production of the Thought of Awakening (*prathamacittotpāda*). However, the Mahāyānist methods noted above differ among themselves in certain significant respects. Not only are some clearly more rapid

³⁵⁵ See Lamotte, *Le traité de la Grande Perfection de Sagesse*, II, p. 1048. Cf. La Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, pp. 733 and 779 f.; May, *Hōbōgirin*, p. 358.

³⁵⁶ This important difference has been discussed in the *Hōbōgirin*, in the articles *chōjō* and *chōtsushō*, by J. May, who has also pointed out (pp. 358, 369) that the leap over several stages is attested in the *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*. May considers that the notion of the attestation of the Fruits by leaping prefigures the idea of Sudden Awakening (*tongo = tun wu*) in Ch'an (pp. 356 and 371).

³⁵⁷ See N. R. M. Ehara, Soma Thera and Kheminda Thera, *The path of freedom of the Arahant Upatissa* (Colombo, 1961), pp. 130-31; cf. *Hōbōgirin*, p. 356.

than others, but one involves the Bodhisattva's returning, in a final series of movements, to a state of non-concentration (*asamāhitacitta*) while the other does not. The former method of leaping – known sometimes also as Viṣkandaka Samādhī – appears to emphasize the Bodhisattva's resolve to remain in an ordinary, unconcentrated state of consciousness in Saṃsāra (compare the Bodhisattva who refrains from entering Nirvāṇa, *apra-tiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*);³⁵⁸ whereas the latter method is directed toward the highest Samāpatti culminating in the cessation of notions and feelings (*saṃjñāved[ay]itanirodha*). The Mahāyānist method of leaping moreover differs from that of the Śrāvakayāna by including this ninth stage of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*, which the Śrāvakayānist technique has left aside.

It has furthermore to be noted that in Haribhadra's comment on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, as well as in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa*, the procedure of leaping seems to have less to do with a way of instantaneous and immediate access to the highest than with a particular technique in meditation. In the *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* on the contrary, the notion of rapidity and instantaneous access seems to be implicit in what is said about the Bodhisattva's very first *cittotpāda* bringing on *anuttarasamyaksambodhi*.

The comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of the four Principles or Realities of the Nobles (*āryasatya*) and the acquisition of the four Fruits (*phalaprāpti*) of the Noble's religious life – viz. those of the Stream-winner (*srotaāpanna*), the Once-returned (*sakṛdāgāmin*), the Non-returned (*anāgāmin*), and the Arhat – are said by some Buddhist schools to be sequential and by others to be simultaneous.

In many passages of the old canon, the gradualness of training (*anupubbāsikkhā*), spiritual activity (*anupubbakiriya*) and of the Path of insight (*anupubbapaṭipadā*) has been affirmed.³⁵⁹ And it is stated that the wise person proceeds gradually and little by little

³⁵⁸ On the question of dispersal beside concentration, compare Demiéville, *BEFEO* 44 (1954), pp. 397 n. 3 and p. 429 n. 1; *Hōbōgirin*, pp. 357 and 359.

³⁵⁹ See *Cullavagga*, Vinaya II 238; *Udāna*, p. 54; *Majjhimanikāya* I 479–80, III 1; and *Ānguttaranikāya* IV 198, 201, 207; cf. below, p. 180.

in each moment, in the same way that a metal-worker would remove impurities from silver-ore.³⁶⁰ The comprehension of the *āryasatyas* is furthermore compared with the gradual construction, storey by storey, of a lofty mansion (*kūṭāgāra*).³⁶¹

A theory of both the gradual development and then the final instantaneousness of the Path of preparation (*prayogamārga*) has been set out in Chapter vi of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*. There mention has specifically been made of the gradualness of the Salutory Root (*kuśalamūla*) of Heat (*uṣmagata*) – i.e. the first of the four factors of penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*) – which is said to be nurtured in progressive stages (*kramābhivṛddha*) in its three degrees, viz. the slight (*mṛdu*), the middling (*madhya*), and the superior (*adhimātra*);³⁶² and the *uṣmagata* is further described in terms of serial prolongation (*prākaraṣikatva = prābandhikatva*) when having as its object the four *satyas*.³⁶³ A similar gradualness is stated to apply to all three degrees of the Head-stage (*mūrdhan*), the second of the four *nirvedhabhāgīyas*.³⁶⁴ As for the third *nirvedhabhāgīya*, receptive perseverance (*keṣānti*), in contradistinction to its middling degree where Ill (*duḥkha*) is the object of mental attention lasting through two moments (*keṣaṇa*), its superior degree is stated to comprise one single moment only (*keṣaṇikā*) and not to be serially prolonged (*prākaraṣikī*).³⁶⁵ Finally, the fourth factor of penetration, the *laukikāgradharmas*, are all described as momentary (*keṣaṇika*).³⁶⁶

In the section of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* treating of the sequential process of comprehension (*abhisamayakrama*) of the four *āryasatyas* – each of which has four aspects (*ākāra*) making a total of sixteen mind-moments (*ṣoḍaśacittaka*) – this *abhisamaya* has been specifically described as taking place gradually (*krameṇa*). Accordingly it is stated that a Sūtra-reference to single-

³⁶⁰ See *Dhammapada* 239; cf. *Suttanipāta* 962cd.

³⁶¹ See *Samyuttanikāya* V 452. For the Sanskrit version, see Yaśomitra, *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* vi. 27, where two further relevant Sūtras from the *Samyuktāgama* are also cited.

³⁶² *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 15b–17.

³⁶³ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 17b.

³⁶⁴ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 18b.

³⁶⁵ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 19ab; *duḥkham dvābhyaṃ keṣānbhyaṃ manasi karoty eṣā sarvāiva madhyā, keṣāntir yadāikam eva keṣaṇam tad adhimātrēti keṣaṇikā cāsau, na prākaraṣikī*.

³⁶⁶ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 19c. Compare Vasumitra's view mentioned below, p. 179.

comprehension (*ekābhisamaya*)³⁶⁷ will need to be understood with regard to an (unexpressed) intention (*abhiprāya*) of the Buddha.³⁶⁸ Such a mention of *ekābhisamaya* may then have to be interpreted by taking this comprehension to concern the effect (*kāryābhisamaya*) of the four *satyas* – viz. *parijñāna*, *prahāṇa*, *sākṣātkaṛaṇa* and *bhāvana* – in contrast to comprehension as vision (*darśanābhisamaya*) achieved through pure discriminative knowledge (*anāsravā prajñā*);³⁶⁹ for when it is stated in a Sūtra that *abhisamaya* is gradual this is what was really aimed at (*lakṣyate*) in respect to *darśanābhisamaya*. (Yet another Sūtra-reference to *ekābhisamaya* might according to some involve an allusive utterance (*abhisamādhivacana*)³⁷⁰ to singleness, as when absence of uncertainty concerning *duḥkha* is stated to include absence of uncertainty in respect to the Buddha.³⁷¹)

The transition from the stage of a worldling (*prthagjana*) on the mundane (*laukika*) level of the Prayogamārga to that of a Noble (*ārya*) on the transmundane Darśanamārga depends on receptive perseverance with a view to *dharma*-knowledge concerning Ill (*duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣāntiḥ*) – that is, the stage of entry into determination (*niyāmāvakrānti*) in view of Exactness (*samyaktva* = *nirvāṇa*) – in association with the *laukikāgradharmas* at the culminating point of the Prayogamārga. Here the *laukikāgradharmas* may be seen as fulfilling the function of an *ānantaryamārga*, the *anāsrava dharmajñānakṣānti* having then the function of a *vimuktimārga*.³⁷²

The Darśanamārga proper has been described by Vasubandhu as consisting in fifteen moments (*kṣaṇa*) beginning with this *dharmajñānakṣānti* concerning Ill and culminating in the *anvaya-jñānakṣānti* concerning the Path (*mārga*). For the sixteenth and final moment – i.e. consequent knowledge concerning the Path

³⁶⁷ As with the Dharmaguptas, according to Yaśomitra.

³⁶⁸ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 27a. On the notion of *abhiprāya*, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 13 (1985), pp. 309–25, and 16 (1988), pp. 1–4, with the literature cited there.

³⁶⁹ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 27bc.

³⁷⁰ On the notion of *abhisamādhi*, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Allusiveness and obliqueness in Buddhist texts', in C. Caillat et al. (ed.), *Formes dialectales dans les littératures indo-aryennes* (Paris, 1989), p. 299 ff.

³⁷¹ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, vi. 27bc.

³⁷² *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 26a.

(*mārge 'nvayajñānam*) – represents the pivotal instant of transition from the Darśanamārga to the Bhāvanāmārga.³⁷³ And it is reckoned to belong to the Bhāvanāmārga because, *inter alia*, it cultivates (*bhāvanāt*) the eight *jñānas* of the Darśanamārga and the sixteen aspects (*ākāra*) of the *satyas*, and because it pertains to continuation (*prābandhikatvāt*).³⁷⁴

Vasubandhu has specified that the Bhāvanāmārga is like the Darśanamārga in respect to the gradualness of reflection on the sixteen aspects of the *satyas*.³⁷⁵ Nevertheless, a reference has been made by both Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra to acquisition by single attainment (*ekaprāptilābha*) of the total elimination of all that is to be eliminated by vision (*darśana*) when the Srotaōpanna achieves the Fruit of entry into the stream; and to the acquisition simultaneously (*yugapad*) of the eight *jñānas* – viz. the four *dharmajñānas* pertaining to the Kāmadhātu and the four *anvayajñānas* pertaining to the Rūpa and Ārūpya levels – when the Fruit of the Once-returned (*sakṣdāgāmiphala*) is achieved by eliminating what is to be eliminated by *darśana* as well as all that is to be eliminated by the Bhāvanāmārga.³⁷⁶

In his comment on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* Haribhadra has also explained how, by force of proper method (*nyāyabalāt*) in virtue of a specific intention (*abhiprāya*), the Darśanamārga, even though it consists in single-moment *abhisamaya*, has nevertheless been stated to consist of sixteen discrete moments from the point of view of the Candidates for and the Achievers of the Fruits of the Ārya (*pratipannakādi*), in contrast to comprehension as effect (*kāryābhisamaya*).³⁷⁷

As was observed by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (vi. 27), opinions have differed in the Śrāvaka schools (*nikāya*)

³⁷³ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 28–29. The eight *ksāntis* have the function of *ānantaryamārgas*, and the eight *jñānas* that of *vimuktimārgas*, according to *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 28a.

³⁷⁴ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 28cd. Compare *prākaraṣikī* as the antonym of *ksaṇikā* in vi. 19b (above, p. 176).

³⁷⁵ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 27bc.

³⁷⁶ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Vyākhyā* vi. 52–53c. Cf. vii. 22.

³⁷⁷ Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* i. 12–16 (p. 171 = P, f. 121a4): *prativedhābhisamayād ekakṣaṇābhisamayo darśanamārga ity apare* (see above, p. 159).

concerning the gradualness as against the simultaneity of comprehension. These differences figure prominently among the doctrines the doxographers of these schools have ascribed in particular to the Mahāsāṃghikas and their branches, the Lokottaravādins and the Ekavyāvahārikas.³⁷⁸ And a connexion between the Mahāsāṃghikas (*phal chen sde*) and the Simultaneous Engagement (*cig car 'jug pa*) of Kāśyapa as transmitted by the school of (Bodhi-)Dharmottāra (*sic*) is seemingly suggested in a chapter of the *bKa' than sde lña*, the *Blon po bka'i than yig*.³⁷⁹

According to Vasumitra's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*, in the view of the Mahāsāṃghikas it is by a single thought that [a *buddha*] knows all (*sems gcig gis chos thams cad rnam par mkhyen to*); and it is through discriminative knowledge (*prajñā*) conjoined with single thought-moment that [a *buddha*] fully knows all *dharma*s (*sems keyi skad cig ma gcig dan mtshun par ldan pa'i šes rab keyis chos thams cad yonis su mkyen to*).³⁸⁰ A branch of the Mahāsāṃghikas, the Ekavyāvahārikas, are so named according to Bhavya's *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna* because they have in this way accepted one single procedure (*ekavyāvahāra*).³⁸¹

According to Vinītadeva's **Samayabhedoparacanacakra Nikāyabhedopadarśananāma-saṃgraha*, moreover, in the view of the Lokottaravādin-Mahāsāṃghikas, the four Principles of the Nobles (*āryasatyā*) are realized all at once (*bden pa ni cig car mthon' nio*).³⁸² And in the view of the two subschools of the Mahāsāṃghikas in

³⁷⁸ Cf. Lamotte, *Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, V (Louvain, 1980), pp. 2328–35.

³⁷⁹ IHa sa edition of the *bKa' than sde lña*, f. 19a: 'od srwis cig car 'jug pa phal chen sde: *mkhan po dharmottā ra la'i brgyud pa ni ...* 'the Simultaneous Entry of Kāśyapa, Mahāsāṃghika: the line of the Master Dharmottāra ...'. The standard Tibetan equivalent of Mahāsāṃghika is *dge 'dun phal chen po('i sde)*, and Tucci's translation in his *Minor Buddhist texts* (II, p. 81) differs from the one offered here. There is no correspondence in the parallel passage of the *bSam gtan mig sgron*, f. 8.

³⁸⁰ Vasumitra, *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (Tibetan translation ed. E. Teramoto and T. Hiramatsu, Kyōto, 1935), p. 5. For *ekacittakṣaṇasamāyuktā prajñā*, see *Mahāvastu* (ed. É. Senart), I, p. 229 and II, p. 133, 285, 416. Cf. *Lalitavistara* (ed. Lefmann), p. 350.13–14; *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, p. 278.12.

³⁸¹ Bhavya, *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna* (Tibetan transl., ed. E. Teramoto and T. Hiramatsu), p. 19: *saṅs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnam keyi chos thams cad thugs gcig gis rnam par mkhyen cin skad cig gcig dan ldan pa'i šes rab keyis chos thams cad yonis su mkhyen to žes tha snād 'dogs te/ des na tha snād gcig gis pa žes bya'o*. On the interpretation of the term *ekavyāvahāra* see A. Bareau, *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (Saigon, 1955), p. 78.

³⁸² Vinītadeva, **Samayabhedoparacanacakra Nikāyabhedopadarśana-nāma-saṃgraha* (Tibetan translation, ed. E. Teramoto and T. Hiramatsu), p. 41.

Bhavya's account – the Ekavyāvahārikas and Gokulikas – the Bodhisattva fully knows the four *āryasatyas* by a single *jñāna* (*ye šes gcig gis bden pa bži rnams yonis su šes so*).³⁸³

According to Vinītadeva's account of the doctrine of the Mahīśāsakas (an offshoot of the Vibhajjavādin Sthaviras and the Sarvāstivādins), too, the *satyas* are realized all at once (*bden pa cig car mthori no*).³⁸⁴ But according to Bhavya this view was rejected by the Sarvāstivādins, who taught that the four *āryasatyas* are known gradually (*rim gyis rtogs par 'gyur ro*); and the Sūtra-reference to simultaneous comprehension may then be non-definitive and require further elicitation (*dran ba'i don = neyārtha*).³⁸⁵ For the Sarvāstivādins, the *laukikāgradharmas* belong, however, to a single thought-moment.³⁸⁶

Controversy concerning simultaneousness as against gradualness is reported in the *Kathāvatthu* also. There (ii. 9) we find a lengthy discussion as to whether comprehension is gradual (*anupubbābhisamaya*) or not. According to the Aṭṭhakathā, the Andhakas, Sabbatthikas, Sammitiyas and Bhadrāyānikas maintained the thesis of the *anupubbābhisamaya* by Candidates for the four Fruits in virtue of their seeing the four Principles of the Nobles, etc. These schools are said to have done so on the basis of canonical texts such as the *Dhammapada* (239), *Udāna* (p. 54), *Cullavagga* (II 238), *Samyuttanikāya* (V 452), *Majjhimanikāya* (III 1), and *Aṅguttaranikāya* (I 162).³⁸⁷ On the contrary, according to the Theravādins – and notwithstanding what is stated in the canonical passages cited above – this comprehension is not gradual. Indeed, as is said in *Suttanipāta* 231, because of the attainment of vision (*dassanasampadā*) the three fetters (*saṃyojana*, namely *sakkāyadiṭṭhi*, *vicikicchita* and *sīlabbata[parāmāsa]*) are all simultaneously (*saha*) eliminated, a text corroborated by others that declare that the three fetters are all simultaneously (*saha*) eliminated by the Noble Śrāvaka with the arising in him of the

³⁸³ Bhavya, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

³⁸⁴ Vinītadeva, *op. cit.*, p. 43. See Bareau, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

³⁸⁵ Bhavya, *op. cit.*, p. 27. See above, p. 177, for Vasubandhu's references to *abhiprāya* and *abhisamādhī* in Sūtra-statements.

³⁸⁶ Vasumitra, *op. cit.*, p. 10. See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 19c (above, p. 176).

³⁸⁷ See also the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* II 105–07; and A. K. Warder's introduction to Nāṇamoli's translation, *The guide* (London, 1977), p. xxv.

'Dharma-eye', i.e. the knowledge that whatever originates (*samudayadhamma*) ceases (*nirodhadhamma*).³⁸⁸ A closely related point is made in *Kathāvatthu* i. 4, where there is a discussion as to whether Candidates for the four Fruits of the Nobles eliminate defilement (*kilesa*) piecemeal (*odhisodhiso*), through their vision of the *āryasatyas*. (According to the *Aṭṭhakathā* [p. 43] the doctrine discussed in i. 4 was that of the Sammitiyas and some others.) And according to another section of the *Kathāvatthu* (xxii. 8) and its *Aṭṭhakathā*, two branches of the Mahāsāṃghikas – the Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas – maintained that all *dhammas* belong to a single mental moment (*ekacittakkehanika*). The same two sources further mention (xi. 6) the opinion – ascribed to the Sabbatthivāda and Uttarāpathaka – that *samādhi* pertains to a single mind-moment (*ekacittakkehaniko samādhi*).³⁸⁹

According to Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya*,³⁹⁰ the Stream-winner (*śrotaāpanna*) – that is, the first of the four Nobles (*ārya*) at the pivotal point of the sixteenth moment of the Darśanamārga and the first of the Bhāvanāmārga – may be either one who obtains release gradually (*rim gyis pa*) or one who obtains release all at once (*sakṛnnairyānika = cig car nes par 'byin pa*). The first type is said to be of the kind described earlier (p. 89). The *sakṛnnairyānika* is on the contrary defined as one who, having achieved the comprehension of the four *satyas*, takes the threshold-meditation (*anāgama* = *mi lcogs pa med pa*)³⁹¹ as his base and eliminates all at once (*sakṛt = cig car*) all the defilements/afflictions of the three

³⁸⁸ Saṃyuttanikāya IV 47, 107; Aṅguttaranikāya IV 186.

³⁸⁹ Compare also the discussion in the *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā* v. 9 (p. 86).

³⁹⁰ *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (ed. Pradhan), p. 92 (Tibetan translation, D, f. 110a).

³⁹¹ Pradhan reads *apṛāptasamāpatti*. The four Dhyānas and the four Ārūpyas each have a threshold called *sāmantaka* (*ñes bsdogs*), the one before the first Dhyāna being known specifically as the *anāgama*. The *anāgama* is deficient in *śamatha*, while the Ārūpyas are deficient in *vipaśyanā* according to *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 66b.

On the *anāgama* see *Abhidharmakośa* iv. 18, v. 66, vi. 20, 47; viii. 22, as well as La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa* vi. p. 235 n. 3, and viii, pp. 166–7, 179 n. 6; P. Jaini, *Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 415 note; E. Lamotte, *Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, II, p. 1036 ff.; E. Frauwallner, 'Abhidharma-Studien iii', *WZKS* 15 (1971), p. 100; L. Schmithausen in K. Bruhn and A. Wezler (eds.), *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus*, pp. 240, 246. Cf. below, p. 190.

levels (*traidhātukāvacarāḥ sarvakeśāḥ*) by means of the transmundane Path (*lokottaramārga*). In his case only two (rather than the usual four sequential) Fruits are achieved, namely those of the Stream-winner and the Arhat. The person in question is then stated mainly to reach full liberating knowledge (*ājñā*, of the Arhat) in the present existence (*dr̥ṣṭa-dharma*) or at the time of his death.³⁹²

It thus emerges clearly that the *sakṣinnairyāṇika* type of Srotaāpanna can achieve his goal rapidly, without acquiring successively all four Fruits of the *āryamārga*.

4. THE CONJUNCTION OF QUIETING AND INSIGHT AND OF MEANS AND DISCRIMINATIVE KNOWLEDGE

One of the most important points repeatedly made by Kamalaśīla in his *Bhāvanākramas* is that Quieting (*śamatha*) and Insight (*vipaśyanā*) should be conjoined (*yuganaddha*), that they must operate so to speak in conjunction like a pair of oxen teamed together (*yuganaddhavāhibalīvardadvayavat*). The perfect Path is accordingly described as operating as a syzygy of Quieting and Insight (*śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddhavāhī mārgo niṣpannaḥ*).³⁹³

Quieting, defined as one-pointedness of mind (*cittaikāgratā*),³⁹⁴ involves observing the nine 'positions' or 'stations' of mind (*cittasthiti*) which are known from a number of sources such as the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.³⁹⁵ As for *vipaśyanā*, it is defined as exact analytical investigation [of the real] (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*, *Bhāvanākrama*, III pp. 3, 5). This *bhūtapratyavekṣā* consists in the analysis of the factors of existence (*dharmapratyavekṣā*), which is otherwise known as discriminative knowledge (*prajñā*) (III pp. 14–15). The *bhūta* is here explained as the non-

³⁹² When this is not so, the reason is one's resolve (*prañidhānavāśena*); in that case, being born in the Kāmadhātu because of this resolve, one becomes a *pratyekajina* at a time when there is no *buddha*.

³⁹³ Kamalaśīla, *Bhāvanākrama* III (ed. G. Tucci), pp. 1, 9–10. Compare the discussion in G. Bugault, *La notion de 'Prajñā' ou de sagesse selon les perspectives du 'Mahāyāna'*² (Paris, 1982), pp. 56 ff., 75 ff.

³⁹⁴ *Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 3.

³⁹⁵ *Śrāvakabhūmi* (ed. Shukla), pp. 363–5; Asaṅga, *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, p. 75; cf. *Peṭakopadesa*, p. 122, for an expanded list.

substantiality or essencelessness of both an individual self and the factors of existence (*pudgaladharmanairātmya*, III, p. 5).

The process of analytical investigation is no doubt associated with recollective attention (*smṛti*) and mentation (*manasikāra*) (cf. III, p. 16); but when brought to its highest point, *bhūtapratyavekṣā* is the necessary condition for the absence of both recollection (*asmṛti*) and mentation (*amanasikāra*) in the sense of non-constructive Gnosis (*nirvikalpaṃ jñānam*) and the ceasing of all mental and verbal proliferation (*prapañcopaśama*).³⁹⁶

If *śamatha* is in excess, the mind of the meditator will be blunted and dull and *prajñā* will then have to be especially cultivated. But if *prajñā* is in excess, his mind will be agitated and *śamatha* will then have to be cultivated in particular. When *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* are on the contrary in balance, the mind is in equilibrium (*samapavṛtta*). And in view of the absence then of both dullness (*laya*) and agitation (*auddhatya*) *citta* proceeds naturally of itself (*svarasavāhin*). It is then also stated to be in its natural state.³⁹⁷

It cannot therefore be maintained that the Perfections (*pāramitā*) are all comprised in *dhyāna*, and that by cultivating the latter all of them are cultivated (III, p. 25). All the Bodhisattva's virtues inclusive of *dhyāna* are in fact to be controlled by *prajñā*, and it is because of this *prajñā* that these qualities become true *pāramitās*. To proceed in accordance with this principle is referred to by Kamalaśīla as being *prajñottaradhyāyin*.³⁹⁸ Such *dhyāna* in which *prajñā* is supreme is opposed to the 'Dhyāna' which is said to subsume all *pāramitās* in itself (III, pp. 25–26) – in other words, apparently, the 'Dhyāna' of Kamalaśīla's opponent Mo-ho-yen. And the exclusive observance of non-recollection (*asmṛti*) and non-mentation (*amanasikāra*) – i.e. the method advocated by Mo-ho-yen – would merely lead to a state like that of the cataleptic cessation of thinking (*cittanirodha*) by the worldling (*prthagjana*) on the level of the fourth Dhyāna (III, pp. 16–17) – i.e. the attainment of unconsciousness (*asamjñīsamāpatti*) which is, how-

³⁹⁶ *Bhāvanākrama* III, pp. 15–17; cf. pp. 94–95.

³⁹⁷ *Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 9–10. Here Skt. *praśaṭhavāhin* is translated by Tib. *rnal du 'jug pa*.

³⁹⁸ Tib. *ṣes rab mchog gi bsam gtan (pa)*. See *Bhāvanākrama* II (ed. K. Goshima), p. 47; III, p. 8; above, p. 95.

ever, not to be practised by the Buddhist Ārya.³⁹⁹

Kamalaśīla has supported his teaching concerning the co-ordination of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* by quoting a large number of Mahāyānasūtras. Among them is the *Samdhinirmocana*, Chapter viii of which is devoted to a detailed discussion of the subject. It was this Sūtra that the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna cast aside according to a Tibetan tradition recorded in the *sBa bžed*.⁴⁰⁰

Beside this syzygy of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* (or *dhyāna* and *prajñā*), and in a position of no less importance, Kamalaśīla has placed the conjunction of Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and Means (*upāya*) and of discriminative knowledge (*prajñā*) and practice (*caryā*) through means. Practice (*caryā*) is stated to consist in generosity (*dāna*) and the other virtues, as does salvific means (*upāya*).⁴⁰¹

Now, when *śūnyatā* is thus correctly and indissolubly bonded with *upāya*, it is known to Kamalaśīla as Emptiness endowed with all excellent modes (*sarvākāravaroṣeta-śūnyatā*). This notion is contrasted with an isolated emptiness, that is, an 'emptiness-method' (*śūnyatānaya*) that makes of *śūnyatā* something that is a self-sufficient and independent principle (*ekanaya*).⁴⁰² Because of such a method of isolation, however, practice (*caryā*) would no longer be purified; and those who thus cultivate *śūnyatā* in isolation 'fall' in Nirvāṇa, like an Auditor (*kevalam śūnyatām eva sevamānāḥ śrāvakavan nirvāṇe patanti*).⁴⁰³ When the need for conjoining *prajñā* and *dhyāna* is not appreciated and *dhyāna* is overemphasized, the meditator's practice would, moreover, be like that of a Śrāvaka who attains the concentration of cessation (*nirodhasamādhi*).⁴⁰⁴

The correct method for a practiser involves then a gradual (*kramaṇa*) procedure of purification (*viśuddhi*, III, p. 2), one in which the mind-continuum (*cittasamṭati*) is purified in a way compared with the purification of gold by a metal-worker (III,

³⁹⁹ See below, p. 202–03. Compare *sBa bžed*, G, p. 69; S, p. 58–59; *Ñān Āi ma 'od zer*, *Chos 'byun Me tog sñiñ po*, f. 431a–b; dPa' bo gTsong lag phreñ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, f. 117a.

⁴⁰⁰ See above, pp. 114–15.

⁴⁰¹ *Bhāvanākrama* III, pp. 14, 27–29.

⁴⁰² *Bhāvanākrama* I (ed. G. Tucci), p. 196; II, pp. 59–61; III, pp. 27–28.

⁴⁰³ *Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 27.

⁴⁰⁴ *Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 26.

p. 25). In this way one enters the *buddha*-stage (*tathāgatabhūmi*) after having progressively cleansed the preceding stages (*pūrvabhūmi*) (III, p. 25), each of which is purified (*parisuddh-*) in a way similar to gold (III, p. 30). It has been noted above that the idea of the gradualness of the process of spiritual development is well attested in texts from the old canon, where it is sometimes compared with the metalworker's treatment of his material.⁴⁰⁵

The idea of the yoking together of Quiet (*samatha*) and Insight (*vipassanā*) is also well attested in texts of the old canon,⁴⁰⁶ and in Pali treatises such as Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* (xxiii. 43).

Thus, in its description of the practiser who perfects the eight-fold path, the constituents of Awakening, etc., the Majjhimanikāya (III 289) states that for him *samatha* and *vipassanā* are yoked (*yuganaddhā*).^{406a} And in his comment on this passage in the *Papañcasūdanī* Buddhaghosa has defined this pair as yoked in a single-moment syzygy (*ekakkhaṇikayuganaddhā*), for concentration (*samāpatti*) and insight belong on the *ariyamagga* to one single moment (*ekakkhaṇikā*). This case he contrasts with the one where the two belong to different moments (*nānākkhaṇikā*).^{406b} In the same commentary Buddhaghosa has also spoken of the serial (*paṭipāṭiyā*) attainment of the three marks (viz. *dukkha*, *anicca* and *anattā*) and production of *vipassanā* whereby the practiser attains the path of Stream-winning; at this moment, he then adds, the practiser penetrates the four *saccas* by a single penetration (*ekapaṭivedha*) and comprehends by a single comprehension (*ekābhisamayā*).^{406c}

⁴⁰⁵ See above, pp. 175–6, 180.

⁴⁰⁶ See for example *Dīghanikāya* III 213 and 273; *Majjhimanikāya* I 494 and 289. For *Anguttaranikāya* II 156–7, see below, pp. 187–8.

^{406a} So read, instead of 'yuganandhā' in the Pali Text Society edition.

^{406b} *Papañcasūdanī* V 104: 'yuganaddhā' ti ekakkhaṇikayuganaddhā. ete hi aññasmim̐ khaṇe samāpatti aññasmim̐ vipassanā ti evaṃ nānākkhaṇikā pi honti, ariyamagge pana ekakkhaṇikā. For *nānākkhaṇa* and *nānārammaṇa* opposed to *ekakkhaṇa* and *ekārammaṇa*, see also Buddhaghosa's commentary on the *Samyuttanikāya* (*Sāratthappakāsinī* I 158), and *Dhammapāla*'s on the *Itivuttaka* (*Paramatthadīpanī* [II], I 132). The *Paramatthadīpanī* II also deals with *samatha* and *vipassanā* as *yuganaddhā* (II 29).

^{406c} *Papañcasūdanī* I 73: evaṃ tīṇi lakkehaṇāni āropetvā paṭipāṭiyā vipassanaṃ pavattento sotāpattimaggaṃ pāpunāti. tasmim̐ khaṇe cattāri saccāni ekapaṭivedhen' eva paṭivijjhati, ekābhisamayena abhisameti. For *ekābhisamaya* see also pp. 176–7.

The *Peṭakopadesa* has defined (p. 122) *samatha* in terms of *samādhi*, non-distraction and non-dispersal of thought, as well as of calming and one-pointedness of *citta*. And *vipassanā* has been defined there as analysis bearing on the *dharmas*, analytical reflection (*vīmaṃsā*), weighing, *nāṇa*, *vijjā* and *paññā* as well as various forms of illumination (*obhāsa*, *āloka*, *ābhā*, *pabhā*). This text then goes on to remark (pp. 123-4) that by developing *samatha* one comprehends the material (*rūpa*), thereby eliminating desire (*taṇhā*) and so realizing *cetovimutti* by detachment from passions (*rāgavirāga*). And by developing *vipassanā* one comprehends the 'mental' (*nāma*), thereby eliminating nescience (*avijjā*) and so realizing *paññāvimutti* by detachment from *avijjā*. Correlations on the one hand between Quieting, cultivation of *citta*, elimination of the passions, *rāgavirāga* and *cetovimutti*, and on the other between Insight, cultivation of *paññā*, elimination of *avijjā* and *paññāvimutti* are also to be found in the *Āṅguttaranikāya* (I 61), where both *samatha* and *vipassanā* are described as pertaining to knowledge (*vijjābhāgiya*). In the *Visuddhimagga*, *nāma* is associated with the person whose Vehicle is Quieting (*samathayānika*, xviii. 3-4); and *rūpa* is linked with the person whose Vehicle is pure Insight (*suddhavipassanāyānika*), this correlation being however possible also for the *samathayānika* (xviii. 5). It is further stated in the *Peṭakopadesa* (pp. 134-5) that *samatha* and *vipassanā* together constitute the fourth *ariyasacca*, the Path. And the *Nettipakaraṇa* (pp. 110-11) has specified that *samatha* consists in both the *śīlakhandha* and the *samādhikkhandha* of the Eightfold Path, whilst *vipassanā* is made up of its *paññākkhandha*.

It is also explained in the *Peṭakopadesa* (pp. 133-5) that the intuition (*abhisamaya*) of the four *ariyasaccas* takes place in a single time (*ekakāla*), a single moment (*ekakkhaṇa*) and a single thought (*ekacitta*). In a single time, moment and thought, too, the syzygy of *samatha* and *vipassanā* accomplishes four functions, namely comprehension of Ill (by *pariññābhisamaya*), comprehension of its origin (by *pahānābhisamaya*), comprehension of its stoppage (by *sacchikiriyaḥbhisamaya*), and comprehension of the Path (by *bhāvanābhisamaya*). This is followed by the stage of vision (*dassanabhūmi*) where the Stream-winner (*srotāpanna*) does not fall back (*avinipātadhamma*) and is fixed (*niyata*, in Rightness).

In the *Peṭakopadesa* (p. 249) it is moreover explained that

vipassanā preceded by *samatha* is for one who understands through a mere mention (*ugghaṭitaññū*) – i.e. for the person receiving the ‘soft’ (*mudukā*) teaching and training in higher discriminative knowledge (*adhipaññāsikkhā*); that *samatha* preceded by *vipassanā* is for one to be trained gradually (*neyya*) – i.e. for the person receiving the ‘sharp’ (*tikkhā*) teaching and higher training pertaining to *citta* (*adhicittasikkhā*); and that the conjunction of *samatha* and *vipassanā* is for one who understands through expatiation (*vipañcitaññū*) – i.e. for the person receiving a teaching that is both ‘sharp’ and ‘soft’ (*tikkhamudukā*) and training in higher ethics (*adhisīlasikkhā*).

The correlations thus made of *samatha* with *rūpa* and the *adhipaññāsikkhā* and of *vipassanā* with *nāma* and the *adhicittasikkhā* are noteworthy.

The *Nettipakaraṇa* confirms (p. 125) the correlation of *samatha* with the *ugghaṭitaññū* and of *vipassanā* with the *neyya* type of person. And it specifies (p. 100–01) that *samatha* was taught by Bhagavat to the person of sharp faculties (*tikkhindriya*, who receives the *adhipaññāsikkhā*), *vipassanā* to the person of dull faculties (*mudindriya*, who receives the *adhisīlasikkhā*), and both *samatha* and *vipassanā* to the person whose faculties are middling (*majjhindriya*, who receives the *adhicittasikkhā*). The three teachings in question are perhaps to be understood here as serving as antidotes for the use of the three types of person mentioned. However this may be, the question arises as to how these correlations might relate to Mo-ho-yen’s view that his teaching of understanding Mind, with its quietistic and non-analytical tendency, is especially suited to advanced disciples whose faculties are sharp.

In its typology of persons (*puggala*) the *Puggalapaññatti* has proposed a fourfold categorization according to which some persons achieve *cetosamatha* without achieving *adhipaññādhamma-vipassanā*, some do the reverse, some achieve both together, and others achieve neither.⁴⁰⁷

An interesting classification in the present context is the one found in the *Yuganaddhasutta* of the *Āṅguttaranikāya*.⁴⁰⁸ There Ānanda says that whenever a monk or nun declares having

⁴⁰⁷ *Puggalapaññatti* iv, pp. 61–62.

⁴⁰⁸ *Āṅguttaranikāya* II 156–7.

achieved Arhathood, he or she is endowed with one of four Paths (*magga*), namely the Path cultivating *vipassanā* preceded (*pubbañgama*) by *samatha*, the Path cultivating *samatha* preceded by *vipassanā*, the Path cultivating *samatha* and *vipassanā* yoked together (*yuganaddha*), and the Path where the monk's 'mental' is seized by agitation with respect to the *dhammas*.⁴⁰⁹ In his translation of the *Visuddhimagga* Ñāṇamoli has translated: 'A bhikkhu's mind is seized by agitation about highest states';⁴¹⁰ but in his translation of the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* the same writer has rendered this by 'A bhikkhu's mind is agitated by overestimation of ideas [manifested in contemplation]'.⁴¹¹ While the first three *maggas* are obviously based on the principle that Quieting and Insight are cultivated either successively or together, the last *magga* poses a problem. Yet, with regard to this fourth Path too, the text continues by saying that there exists a time when (the meditator's) mind internally comes to rest, settles, becomes one-pointed and is concentrated.⁴¹² For him the Path is then produced. And (just as with the first three Paths) for the person who observes, cultivates and practices this fourth Path, the fetters (*samyojana*) are thrown off and the traces (*anusaya*) cease.

These four Paths are reproduced and explained in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (II 92–103), and then commented on in the *Saddhammappakāsinī* (pp. 585, 589 f.) and Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* (xx. 105–12). According to the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (II 101–03), in the description of the fourth Path the word *dhamma* refers to an illumination that arises when one reflects on things as impermanent (*aniccato manasikaroto obhāso uppajjati*), Ill (*dukkhato*) and not-self (*anattato*). And in each case agitation (*uddhacca*) – that is, distraction (*vikkhepa*) – results from adverting to this illumination. Hence, a 'mental' that is thus seized, or 'seduced', by agitation does not correctly know what is presented (*upatṭhāna*) as impermanent, Ill and not-self. This 'illumination' is counted as

⁴⁰⁹ The PTS ed. reads *dhammuddhaccaviggahītamānā*, and the Nālandā ed. reads *dhammuddhaccaviggahitaṃ mānasam*.

⁴¹⁰ Ñāṇamoli, *The path of purification* (Colombo, 1964), p. 739 n. 33.

⁴¹¹ Ñāṇamoli, *The path of discrimination* (London, 1982), pp. 287, 294.

⁴¹² *Aṅguttaranikāya* II 157: *taṃ cittaṃ ajjhataṃ eva santiṭṭhati sannisīdati ekodi hoti samādhīyati*. Compare for example *Mahāsuññātasutta* and *Cūlasuññātasutta* (*Majjhimanikāya* III, pp. 105 ff., 111 f.).

one of the ten 'Sub-Afflictions of Vipassanā' that are said to affect an inexperienced meditator. Buddhaghōsa has explained this *obhāsa* as *vipassanobhāsa* 'illumination from Insight'.⁴¹³

Although the full implications of this fourth Path are perhaps not altogether clear, the obstacle formed by agitation with respect to the *dhammas* (*dhammuddhacca*) may be relatable to the case where, in meditation, discriminative knowledge (*prajñā*) becomes excessive and overwhelms *śamatha*. This situation – which could affect the person described as *dhammayoga* in the *Ānguttar-anikāya* (III 355), as opposed to the *jhāyi(n)*, and also the *sukkhavipassaka* or 'dry inspector'⁴¹⁴ – has of course been fully and explicitly recognized by Kamalaśīla, for example in his *Bhāvanākrama* III (pp. 9–10). Nevertheless, Mo-ho-yen's depreciation of analytical investigation may be a later example of the attitude just mentioned of meditators who were especially on their guard against the mental agitation that can arise in a person given to analysis of the *dharmas*. Although this danger has been noted in the Pali texts just cited, there is in them no rejection or condemnation of analysis and inspection in favour of *dhyāna* and Quieting alone.⁴¹⁵

This yoking together of Quieting and Insight is known equally from Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* (viii. 1d; cf. v. 59). And in the four (*maula*)*dhyānas* the Path (*pratipad*) is described as being easy (*sukhā*) owing to the effortless procedure (*ayatnavāhitvāt*) that is due to equilibrium of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*; but it is

⁴¹³ *Visuddhimagga* xx. 107.

It is possible that it is such a light-experience that was criticized by the Hva śān Mahāyāna, quoted in the *bSam gtan mig sgron*, as being characteristic of the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha, and as being linked with a condition of notionlessness (*asaṃjñā*) that a practiser should not fall into through his practice of non-objectification (f. 83a: *mi dmigs bžin du snai žiñ/ gsal bar šes pas ñan thos dai/ rañ sañs rgyas ži ba phyogs par mi lhuñ/ ci yañ šes pa mi dmigs pas 'du šes med par mi ltuñ/ mi g-yo žiñ yoñs su gsal lo sñam pa' i rtog pa med pas rtog par mi 'gyur/*).

⁴¹⁴ See *Visuddhimagga* xxxiii. 18.

On the *sukkhavipassaka* (and *suddhavipassanāyānika*), see *Visuddhimagga* viii. 237 and xviii. 5; *Saddhammapakkāsini*, pp. 563, 584. Cf. Nyanatiloka-Nyanaponika, *Buddhist dictionary*⁴ (Colombo, 1980), p. 215; and S. Z. Aung, *Compendium of philosophy* (London, 1910), pp. 55, 75. On *vipassanā* as 'rough' or 'brittle' (*lūkhabhūta*), in contradistinction to *samatha* as 'soft' or 'malleable' (*siniddhabhūta*), see *Saddhammapakkāsini*, p. 281.

⁴¹⁵ On *samatha* and *vipassanā* in Pali sources, see L. Cousins in *Buddhist studies in honour of H. Saddhatissa* (Nuregoda, 1984), pp. 56–68.

difficult (*duḥkhā*) on the threshold-stage (*anāgamyā*) preliminary to the first *dhyāna*, on the interval-stages (*dhyānāntara*) between *dhyānas*, and, very significantly, in the (three) *ārūpyas* also (vi. 66).⁴¹⁶ In the *anāgamyā* and the *dhyānāntaras*, procedure requires effort because *śamatha* is deficient there; conversely, in the *ārūpyas* the need for effort is due to deficiency in *vipaśyanā* (vi. 66).⁴¹⁷

A related theory is found in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (p. 84) in connexion with the *viśuddhinairyāṇika mārga*, where a link is established between a deficiency in either *śamatha* or *vipaśyanā* and the difficulty of the Path based on either the *anāgamyā* or the *ārūpyas*. On the contrary, the Path based on *dhyāna* is easy owing to the fact that there *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* proceed in a syzygy (*yuganaddhavāhitvāt*).

The yoking of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* is similarly known from a number of further Mahāyānist treatises such as the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* (xiv. 8–10) and its *Bhāṣya* (iv. 19, xi. 8–12 and 67, xviii. 49 and 66), the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (xiii, p. 207), and Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (viii. 4).

The conjunction of Emptiness and Means is furthermore known under the name of *sarvākāravāropetā śūnyatā* to Śāntideva, who has quoted the *Ratnacūḍāsūtra* on the subject in his *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (xv, pp. 272–3). This Sūtra – which is quoted in this connexion also by Kamalaśīla (*Bhāvanākrama* II, p. 59, and III, p. 27) – emphasizes that *dhyāna* is to be accompanied by all modes – such as generosity and the other virtues and salvific means – and is realized through the mode of Emptiness (*sarvākāravāropetaṃ śūnyatākārābhinirhṛtaṃ dhyānaṃ dhyāyati*, p. 272.11).⁴¹⁸ In the Sūtra the *sarvākāravāropetā śūnyatā* is described as lacking neither in generosity (*dāna*) nor salvific means (*upāya*), etc.

This Emptiness endowed with all excellent modes is thus the opposite of the isolated emptiness-principle mentioned above (p. 184).

⁴¹⁶ See also the *Abhidharmadīpa* (ed. P. S. Jaini, Patna, 1959) vi. 4, n. 440.

⁴¹⁷ Or *vidarśanā*: *Abhidharmadīpa* vi. 4, no. 440, with the *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*.

For one whose faculties are sharp (*tīkṣṇendriya*), furthermore, super-knowledge (*abhijñā*) too is rapid (*kṣiprā*) since there is no procedure with effort (*ayatnavāhitvāt*). But when a person's faculties are weak (*mṛdvindriya*) super-knowledge is slow (*dhandhā*). See *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* on *Abhidharmadīpa* vi. 4, no. 440.

⁴¹⁸ For the parallel notion of *sarvākāradhyāna*, see *Bodhisattvabhūmi* i. 13, p. 209.

The theoretical contrast and the tension in practice between a scholar-philosopher who concerns himself with the analysis of the factors of existence – the *dhammayoga* – and the pure concentrated meditator – the *jhāyi(n)* – is one that has been made clear in a Sūtra of the Aṅguttaranikāya (III 355–6). It is parallel to, and at least in certain cases closely linked with, the distinctions made in the Buddhist tradition between a person concerned principally with philosophical and religious learning and teaching (Pāli *pariyatti*; cf. Tib. *bśad pa*) and a person who devotes himself above all else to spiritual practice and realization (Pāli *paṭipatti* and *paṭivedha*; cf. Tib. *sgrub pa*, etc.), between the teacher (*dhammakathika*) and the ascetic (*paṃsukūlika*, *tapassi(n)*), or even between the cenobitic monk dwelling in or near a village (*gāmvāsi(n)*); compare the *vargačārin*), and ministering also to the religious needs of laymen, and the reclusive and perhaps idiorhythmic forest-dwelling anchorite (*ārañṇaka*; cf. the type of the *khadgavi-ṣāṇakalpa*). (In one place, furthermore, the Aṭṭhakathā on the Aṅguttaranikāya has recorded a difference between Paṃsukūlikas and Dhammakathikas, in which the latter prevailed.⁴¹⁹)

Such contrasts reflect the antithesis, well known in Indian thought, between analytical thinking (*pratisamkhyāna*, *samkhyā*) and spiritual exercise (*yoga*, *bhāvanā*). It is related to the pair of spiritual types – identified by La Vallée Poussin after the Saṃyuttanikāya (II 115–18) – of on the one side the monk Musila (Musila, Mūsila) who silently assented to being regarded as an Arhat all of whose impurities are exhausted (*khīṇāsava*) after he had declared that he ‘knew’ and ‘saw’ that the cessation of existence (*bhavanirodha*) and Nirvāṇa are equivalent, and on the other side the monk Nārada who, even though he knew this equivalence, still did not agree to being regarded as an Arhat because he did not reside in actual and immediate ‘bodily contact’ (*kāyena phusitvā vihar-*) with the highest state of spiritual realization.⁴²⁰ The distinction between knowing *about* the highest and

⁴¹⁹ Cf. W. Geiger, *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval times* (Wiesbaden, 1960), pp. 201–03; W. Rahula, *History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (Colombo, 1956), pp. 158–61.

⁴²⁰ L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 5 (1937), pp. 189–222.

For the sense of ‘in the body’ (*kāyena*), see *Cūlasuññatasutta*, Majjhimanikāya III 107–08 on the *animitto cetosamādhī*. Cf. L. Schmithausen in K. Bruhn and A. Wezler (eds.), *Studien*

directly realizing it is compared in this Sūtra with the difference between a traveller in a wasteland who, when seeing a well, identifies what is in it as 'water' (that is, a concept or word) and a traveller who drinks the water.

A comparable tension and contrast (but not necessarily contradiction) between meditative enstasis and intellectual analysis is to be found in the discussion reported in the Aṅguttaranikāya between Mahākoṭṭhita/Mahākoṭṭhika, who held that the *kāyasā-ḷḷsin* is best because of the predominance in him of the faculty of concentration (*samādhi*), and Sāriputta, who held that the *ḍṛṣṭi-prāpta* is best because of the predominance in him of the faculty of discriminative knowledge (*prajñā*).⁴²¹

5. ABSENCE OF NOTION (*SAMJÑĀ*) AND NON-MENTATION (*AMANASIKĀRA*)

Another fundamental teaching ascribed by Kamalāsīla to an unnamed opponent in the passage of the third *Bhāvanākrama* quoted above,⁴²² namely that nothing at all should be thought on and that there should be neither recollective attention (*smṛti*) nor mentation (*manasikāra*) – a teaching attributed to Mo-ho-yen/Mahāyāna in the Chinese and Tibetan documents from Dunhuang and in the later Tibetan historical and doxographical tradition –, cannot fail to evoke types of meditation in the form of the *Samāpattis* and *Vimokṣas* that are well known from the Buddhist tradition. Some aspects of this topic have already been touched on above in connexion with the method of leaping with respect especially to the *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* and the *samjñāved[ay]itānīrodha*, the last two of nine sequential stages in meditation.⁴²³

zum *Jainismus und Buddhismus*, pp. 214, 223, 236; above, p. 168 f.; below, pp. 194, 198.

For the notion of 'contact' in connexion with religious 'wellness' (sometimes free of *vedanā* or *citta*), and the spiritual achievement of salvation (e.g. in *cetasamādhi* or *amata* 'immortality') in the context of the expression *phāsuvihāra* (= Skt. *sparsāvihāra*), etc., see C. Caillat, *Journal asiatique*, 1960, pp. 41–55, and 1961, pp. 497–502 (cf. R. L. Turner, *Collected papers* (London, 1975), p. 430 ff.).

In the *Majjhimanikāya* I 480 we find a juxtaposition of direct realization of supreme reality by the 'body' and the penetrative seeing of it by discriminative knowledge (*kāyena c'eva paramaṃ saccaṃ saccikaroti paññāyā ca naṃ ativijjha passati*).

⁴²¹ Aṅguttaranikāya I, pp. 118–20. See also above, p. 169.

⁴²² *Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 14–15 (above, p. 93).

⁴²³ The factors *samjñā*, *smṛti* and *manas(i)kāra* are classified as mental (*caitta* or *cetasika*),

In the first Ārūpya-attainment (*samāpatti*) corresponding to the fourth Liberation (*vimokṣa*) and the seventh Sovereignty-sphere (*abhibhvāyatana*), the meditator – who at this stage has transcended all apperceptive notions relating to the visible-material (*rūpasamjñāḥ*) and has ceased to take as his object of mentation (*manasikāra*) the apperceptive notions of multiplicity (*nānāvsaṃjñāḥ*) – reaches the sphere of the infinity of space (*ākāśānantyāyatana*).⁴²⁴ Later, in the fourth Ārūpya-Samāpatti corresponding to the seventh Vimokṣa, the meditator reaches the sphere described as comprising neither (distinct) notions nor total absence of (indistinct) notions (*naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana*) at the ‘peak of existence’ (*bhavāgra*).⁴²⁵ Finally – and of particular importance in the present context – the meditator reaches the Attainment of

along with e.g. *vedanā*; see *Abhidharmakośa* ii. 24.

An association of *manas(i)kāra* with *saññā/samjñā* is to be found in the old canon, as is also the *amanasikāra* of sets of *saññā* (e.g. *Cūlasuññatasutta*, *Majjhimanikāya* III 104–09). *Amanasikāra* of the notion of the multiple (*nānattasaññā*) is set forth as a goal in the *ākāśānañcāyatana* in the *Majjhimanikāya* (I 436) and *Ānguttaranikāya* (IV 425). In the Upasīva section of the *Suttanipāta* (1070–2), the person endowed with attention (*satīmā*) is associated with both *ākiñcañña* and *saññāvīmokkha*; and in the *Tuvaṭṭakasutta* of the *Suttanipāta* (916, 933), the *sato* is associated on the one hand with the eradication of *papañcasanikhā* (on which see 874) and on the other with examination (*vicinaṃ*) and knowledge (*aññāya*) of *dhmma*. Compare *Udānavarga* xxix. 3 for *mati* and *saññā*. The Sūtra quoted in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* iii. 12 (p. 273) places *manasikāra* in *dhyāna*; compare L. Schmithausen in *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus*, p. 226.

On the seven forms of *manasikāra*, see *Śrāvakabhūmi* (ed. Shukla), iv, pp. 439–510; ed. Schmithausen, in: L. Hercus et al. (ed.), *Indological and Buddhist studies* (Felicitation vol. for J. W. de Jong, Canberra, 1982), p. 460 ff. *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (ed. Pradhan), p. 68; *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (ed. Tatia), p. 80.

The *Suttanipāta* contains much that is relevant to the problem of *samjñā*, *smṛti* and understanding (*prajñā*). In addition to the passage from the Upasīva section just cited, see the *Māgandiyasutta* which associates the *saññāvīratā*, who is free from the *ganthas*, and the *paññāvīmutta*, who is free from *mohas* (: *ditṭhi*) (*Suttanipāta* 847); and the *Kalahavivādasutta* (especially 874, on *saññānidānā papañcasanikhā* and the avoidance not only of *saññā* but also of its negative). Some aspects of the question have been interestingly discussed, with reference to ‘proto-Mādhyamaka’ and Ch’an, by L. Gómez, *Philosophy East and West* 26 (1976), pp. 137–65.

⁴²⁴ While *Ratnākaraśānti*, *Sāratamā* viii. 2–6, describes (the first) three *vimokṣas* as *rūpin*, he characterizes (the last) five as *arūpin* (ed. Jaini, p. 175). The same author also states that while the first three are Liberations from the *nirmāṇavarāṇa*, the last five are Liberations from the *śāntavīhārasamāpattīvarāṇa*. (On the *samāpattīvarāṇa*, cf. *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* ii. 45 with iii. 29.)

On the eight *vimokṣas*, see L. Hurvitz in: A. K. Narain (ed.), *Studies in Pali and Buddhism* (Delhi, 1979), pp. 121–69.

⁴²⁵ This stage is sometimes described as involving *saññā*, as in the compound *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*; see *Ānguttaranikāya* IV 414 and *Majjhimanikāya* III 107. Compare L. Schmithausen in: K. Bruhn and A. Wezler (eds.), *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus*, pp. 224 n. 87, 225 n. 95, 229–32, 235 n. 130.

Stoppage or Cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), i.e. the ninth and final consecutive stage (*anupūrvavihāra*) in meditation corresponding to the eighth Vimokṣa,⁴²⁶ where he transcends that stage which was still bound up with notions, however subtle and indistinct, and realizes immediately – ‘in the body-aggregate’ (*kāyena*)⁴²⁷ – the stoppage of all notions and feelings (*saṃjñāved[ay]itanirodha*).⁴²⁸ In this final stage, then, the exercitant is regarded as one who has achieved a simulacrum of Nirvāṇa (*nirvāṇasadrśa*, *Bhāṣya* vi. 43).⁴²⁹

Now it is of very considerable significance that the *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*, together with the four preceding Samāpattis which make up the non-material (*ārūpya*) levels of the Bhāvanāmārga and follow on the four Dhyānas making up the material levels, is not regarded in the whole of the Buddhist tradition as leading directly to supreme and perfect Awakening and Nirvāṇa. Thus, in some standard accounts of his Awakening, the Buddha is stated to descend from the Ārūpya-Samāpattis (when he is even said to have attained them at all) and to achieve Awakening directly from the fourth Dhyāna belonging to the *rūpadhātu*.⁴³⁰ And according to the Mahāyāna and Mantrayāna, *anuttarasamyaksambodhi* is attained by a *buddha* on the level of the Akaniṣṭha-sphere (or Ghanavyūha) of the Śuddhāvāsa, the highest of the *rūpāvacāra*, where he then abides in his *sambhogakāya*, that is, in one of the two *rūpakāyas*. It is thus clear that the final five (or four) successive Ārūpya-Samāpattis – the last of the nine (or eight) consecutive stages – occupy a place somewhat apart in the plan of meditative exercises leading to the attainment of Nirvāṇa and the supreme and perfect Awakening of a *buddha*.

⁴²⁶ Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* viii. 33. For the *anupubbavihāras*, see *Dīghanikāya* III 265 f., 290; *Aṅguttaranikāya* IV 410 f.; *Samyuttanikāya*, II 210–12; III 235–8. Cf. F. Heiler, *Die buddhistische Versenkung* (München, 1922), p. 27 f.; É. Lamotte, *Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, iii (Louvain, 1970), p. 1308 ff.; L. Schmithausen, *loc. cit.*, p. 215.

⁴²⁷ For the meaning of *kāyena* see pp. 168, 191–2, 198.

⁴²⁸ For the meaning of *saṃjñā* see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub* (Paris, 1973), pp. 76 n. and 116 n. (‘notion différenciatrice, apperception’); L. Schmithausen, *loc. cit.*, p. 214 n. 51 (‘ideation’).

On the place of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* in Buddhist soteriology and gnoseology, see L. Schmithausen, *loc. cit.*, pp. 214–19, 230–9.

⁴²⁹ See L. Schmithausen, *loc. cit.*, p. 214 f.

⁴³⁰ Cf. L. Schmithausen, *loc. cit.*, pp. 203–04 (on the ‘stereotyped detailed description’ of the Path of liberation).

The supreme degree of Samāpatti and Vimokṣa, the *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* which is recognized in classical Buddhist literature as belonging to the Ārya alone,⁴³¹ is moreover very clearly distinguished both from the attainment of unconsciousness (*asaṃjñīsamāpatti*, *asaṃjñāsamāpatti*) and from the unconsciousness of the *āsaṃjñīka* state, that is, from two states that are not counted as Vimokṣas forming part of the *āryamārga* and which are not cultivated by the Buddhist Ārya as components of his consecutive stages (*anupūrvavahāra*) of spiritual practice.⁴³²

As for the Bhāvanāmārga, in Buddhist soteriology it may be either mundane (*laukika*) or transmundane (*lokottara*), quite unlike the Darśanamārga which is always transmundane and pure.⁴³³ The transmundane Bhāvanāmārga is of course the pure (*anāsrava*) one practised by the Ārya, which includes the four Ārūpya Samāpattis culminating in the 'peak of existence' (*bhavāgra*) and then issuing in the *nirodhasamāpatti*. On the contrary, for the practiser of the mundane Bhāvanāmārga, detachment from the *bhavāgra* is not possible because he has no access to a state higher than it on the basis of which he could so detach himself.⁴³⁴ This mundane and impure (*sāsrava*) Bhāvanāmārga is accordingly one that is not specific to the Ārya, though it may once have been practised by him too; it can precede the Ārya's Darśanamārga and does not have as its object the four Noble Principles (*āryasatya*) as such (Bhāṣya, vi. 1). An Ārya may have acquired detachment (*vairāgya*) previously by means of this *laukikamārga*, but the acquisition of such detachment is then a mundane one (vi. 46ab). The fruits of asceticism (*śrāmaṇyaphala*) of a Sakṛdāgāmin and an Anāgāmin can even be obtained by this *laukikamārga* (vi. 53cd).

According to Yaśomitra, Quieting (*śamatha*) is characteristic of this *laukikamārga*, full liberating knowledge (*ājñā*) being on the

⁴³¹ *Abhidharmakośa* ii. 43.

⁴³² See *Abhidharmakośa* ii. 41–42; cf. É. Lamotte, *Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, iii, p. 1299; below, p. 196 f.

⁴³³ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi.1, 45c; and vii. 22. Cf. Asaṅga, *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, pp. 68–69; L. de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa*, ii, p. 117; viii, pp. 144–6; Lamotte, *Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, ii, p. 1027; iii, p. 1274. See however *Kathāvatthu* i. 5, which denies that the worldling (*puṭhujjana*) eliminates *kāmarāgavyāpāda*. It is to be recalled also that the *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* is not counted as *anāsrava* and *lokottara*; see above, note 351 and below, p. 200.

⁴³⁴ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Vyākhyā* vi. 45; cf. viii. 20.

contrary a distinctive feature of the supreme transmudane Path.⁴³⁵

The practiser of the Path then either acquires its fruits consecutively in the manner of the *ānupūrvika*, attaining in order (*kramāt*) the Srotaāpatti-phala (when the Darśanamārga turns into the transmudane Bhāvanāmārga) and the Sakṛdāgāmiphala (on the Bhāvanāmārga).⁴³⁶ Alternatively, before entering the Darśanamārga, he may have practised a mundane Bhāvanāmārga in the condition of a worldling (*prthagjanāvasthā*) and have thus freed himself from the defilements/afflictions (*kleśa*) of the Kāmadhātu, becoming either a Bhūyovītarāga or a (Kāma-)Vītarāga.⁴³⁷ The Buddha himself is cited as an example of one who has followed the latter procedure.⁴³⁸

In Buddhism three distinct states are characterized by the absence of notions, or unconsciousness.

The factor termed 'the notionless' (*āsaṃjñika*) is classified in the *dharma*-theory of the Vaibhāṣika-Abhidharma as a *cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra* that brings to a stop both mind (*citta*) and the mental factors (*caitta*) for beings known as *asaṃjñīsattvas* (*Abhidharmakośa* ii. 41bc).⁴³⁹ Its fruition (*vipāka*) is located in the sphere of the Bṛhatphala-deities (ii. 41d) – i.e. on the level of the fourth Dhyāna (*Bhāṣya* iii. 2cd and 6c) – and it is described as one of the nine residences of beings (*sattvāvāsa*, iii. 6d). Another factor, also classified as a *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra* and located on the level of the fourth Dhyāna (iii. 6c), is the *asaṃjñīsamāpatti*; and it too has

⁴³⁵ *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* ii. 16d and vi. 46ab. For *śamatha* and *manaskāra* on the *laukika* level according to Aśaṅga, see *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, p. 68.

⁴³⁶ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* vi. 33; cf. ii. 16 and viii. 14 on the *ānupūrvika*.

⁴³⁷ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ii. 16cd, vi. 30cd, 55. Cf. L. de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa*, ii, pp. 117, 134–6, 180, 205; iii, p. 196 note 3; v/vi, pp. vi–ix, 119, 194, 233, 243, 266, 288; *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 5 (1937); p. 192 ff.; *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* on *Abhidharmadīpa* ii. 2 [92] (ed. Jaini, pp. 57–58).

⁴³⁸ Cf. L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 5, pp. 197 note 1, 219–22; Lamotte, *Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, ii, p. 1035 n. 1.

⁴³⁹ In the *Mahāvīyutpatti* (Sakaki's ed., § 104, nos. 1987–9), the *āsaṃjñika*, together with the *asaṃjñīsamāpatti* and the *nirodhasamāpatti*, appears in the list of *caitasika-dharmas*. This may be an error of redaction, for they are preceded by the *viprayuktasaṃskāras prāpti* and *aprāpti* and followed by *jīvita* and *nikāyasabhāga*, etc. However, the question as to what

the function of stopping both *citta* and the *caittas* (ii. 42). The difference between these two forms of unconsciousness is that the *āsaṃjñika*, as fruition (*vipāka*), is neutral (*avyākṛta*), whereas the *asaṃjñisamāpatti* is wholesome (*śubha* = *kuśala*, ii. 42). The latter is cultivated by ordinary worldlings (*prthagjana*), who take it to be release (*nihsaraṇa*) and liberation (*mokṣa*), whereas the Āryas consider it a *vinipātasthāna* (ii. 42d). It is furthermore described as being the product of great mental effort (*mahābhisamskārasādhya*, ii. 42d). These two states are in the Buddhist tradition clearly not thought of as being characteristic of the Buddhist Path.

These two forms of notionlessness are accordingly carefully distinguished from the *cittaviprayuktasamskāra* already mentioned above termed 'attainment of cessation of notions and feelings' (*[saṃjñāved(ay)ita]nirodha-samāpatti*) – the ninth of the *Samāpattis* which follows on the four Ārūpyas after the 'peak of existence' (*bhavāgra*) and the eighth *Vimokṣa* – which also has the function of stopping both *citta* and the *caittas*.⁴⁴⁰ It differs from the two forms of notionlessness just mentioned by being cultivated only by the Ārya. Following on the fourth Ārūpya – the *naivasamjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana* sphere where notions are so subtle that it can be described as neither with nor without notions – it is defined as 'born of the peak of existence' (*bhavāgrajā*), and as good (*śubhā* = *kuśalā*, ii. 43bc). This stage is attained through a mental act relying on the notion of residence in quietude (*śāntavihārasamjñā-pūrvaka manasikāra*, ii. 43b). However, even though it is described as a simulacrum of *Nirvāṇa* (*nirvāṇasadṛśa*, vi. 43cd),⁴⁴¹ one can still fall away from the *nirodhasamāpatti* (ii. 44d); for it is acquired by effort (*prayogalabhyā*) rather than by pure dispassion (*vairāgya*,

kind of consciousness may subsist in the *nirodhasamāpatti* is an old one (see n. 440).

The *Mahāvīyutpatti* also evidently counts (no. 2297) the *asaṃjñisattvas* in the ninth *sattvāvāsa* – i.e., apparently, on the level of the *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* – rather than in the fifth *sattvāvāsa* pertaining to the fourth *Dhyāna* of the *Rūpāvācāra* (cf. *Dīghanikāya* III 263). See also *Abhidharmakośa* iii. 6. (The *Mahāvastu* (I, p. 127.5) seems in addition to imply a criticism of the *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*. See Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, s.v.)

⁴⁴⁰ *Abhidharmakośa* ii. 43a; cf. ii. 44d, vi. 43cd, 64a and viii. 33. On the persistence of subtle thought in this *nirodhasamāpatti*, see L. de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa* viii, p. 207 n. 6, and ii, p. 211 n. 3; *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, *La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang*, pp. 204 ff., 400 ff.

⁴⁴¹ Cf. *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* on *Abhidharmadīpa*, p. 93.5.

ii. 44a).⁴⁴² And only in the case of a *buddha* – for whom there is nothing produced through effort (*prāyogika*) – is the *nirodhasamāpatti* acquired in virtue of Awakening (*bodhilabhyā*, ii. 44a). According to the Vaibhāsikas, furthermore, because in the *nirodhasamāpatti* there is no *citta*, the Non-returner (*anāgāmin*) Ārya who attains this *Samāpatti* takes a ‘body-aggregate’ (*kāya*) as support; and he is then termed a *kāyasākṣin* in so far as he realizes this Nirvāṇa-like factor through a ‘body-aggregate’ (*kāyena*, vi. 43cd).⁴⁴³

The *nirodhasamāpatti* has also been defined in Asaṅga’s *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (pp. 10–11), where it is distinguished from the *asaṃjñīsamāpatti* on the ground that the latter issues from a mental act relying on the notion of release (*nihsaraṇasaṃjñāpūrvaka manasikāra*) on the part of one free from passion (*vītarāga*) on the Śubhaktṣna level of the third Dhyāna, but not yet free from passion above this level; whereas the *nirodhasamāpatti* issues from a mental act relying on the notion of residence in quietude (*śāntavihārasaṃjñāpūrvaka manasikāra*) for a *Vītarāga* on the level of the Ākiṃcanyāyatana. As for the *āsaṃjñīka*, it differs according to the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (p. 9) from both the *asaṃjñīsamāpatti* and the *nirodhasamāpatti* in so far as it lacks *manaskāra*; whereas the latter are both specified with respect to several factors one of which is *manaskāra*.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴² In the *Cūlasuññītasutta* (Majjhimanikāya III 107–08), the *animitto cetosamādhī* – which (like the *nirodhasamāpatti*) follows on the *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana* and is the object of *manasikāra* – is said to be deliberately constructed (*abhisankhata*) and intentionally formed (*abhisāñceta*), so that it is impermanent (*anicca*) and subject to cessation (*nirodhadhamma*). But it nevertheless leads to pacification and stabilization of *citta*, and finally to the freedom of *citta* from the *kāmasava*, *bhavāsava* and *avijjāsava*, and thus to liberation. Compare the *Aṭṭhakanāgarakasutta* (Majjhimanikāya I 350–2) on the contemplation of the successive stages up to and including the *ākiñcaññāyatana* as *abhisankhata* and *abhisāñceta*, and accordingly as *anicca* and *nirodhadhamma*.

The *Mahāmālunkyasutta* (Majjhimanikāya I 436–7) lists neither the *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana* nor the *saññāvedayitanirodha* as a basis for liberating knowledge; and it mentions the *amatā dhātu* as the final goal.

In Majjhimanikāya I 333, one who has entered this state of *saññāvedayitanirodha* is said to look like one who is dead (*kālakato*). Cf. N. Hakamaya, *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* (IBK), 23/2 (1975), p. 1083.

⁴⁴³ See above, pp. 168–70, 191–2, 194.

⁴⁴⁴ On the *nirodhasamāpatti* in the *Vijñānavāda*, see Hakamaya, *loc. cit.*, pp. 1081–1074, where attention is called (following Asaṅga’s *Mahāyānasamgraha* i. 7) to the absence of the *manovijñāna* and the *kliṣṭamanas*, and to the presence of the *ālayavijñāna*, in this *samāpatti*.

In a Sūtra of the old canon found in the Anussativagga of the Aṅguttaranikāya, it is furthermore stated that the expert, 'thoroughbred' person (*purisājānīya*) does not rely in his meditation on the elements earth, water, air and fire and on the four Ārūpya-spheres. For such a meditator, each notion (*saṃjñā*) – beginning with that of earth and extending to the *nevasasaññānāsaññāyatana* – is dissolved (*vibhūtā*) in earth and so forth.⁴⁴⁵

It is worthy of notice that although the Samāpatti and Vimokṣa attainments have been accepted by Mahāyānasūtras in their treatment of Dhyāna,⁴⁴⁶ they are in no way specifically linked with the Mahāyāna. They are also acknowledged in such Mahāyānist treatises as the *Ratnagotravibhāga* – where the tranquil Dhyānas and Samāpattis are mentioned in passing (i. 73) – and in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* – for example in the section (viii. 2) dealing with the qualities of the *advayajñānātma dharmakāya* (where it is specified that the nine Samāpattis are successive) and in the commentaries on Chapter ii.

In certain respects the final Samāpatti of the Stoppage of notions and feelings (*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*), not to speak of the lower states of 'notionlessness' known in the Buddhist tradition as the *asaṃjñīsamāpatti* and the *āsaṃjñīka*, seems to correspond to what is known in Pātañjalayoga as *cittavṛttinirodha* (*Yogasūtra* i. 2), in other words to what Erich Frauwallner termed the Yoga of suppression (Unterdrückungsyoga) in contradistinction to the eight-membered (*aṣṭāṅga*) Yogic path described in other parts of the *Yogasūtras*.⁴⁴⁷

Now it is to be observed that in the old canon it has been explicitly stated that penetration with full liberating knowledge is

⁴⁴⁵ Aṅguttaranikāya V 353–5; cf. *Bodhisattvabhūmi* i. 4, pp. 49–50. Compare also *Samyuttanikāya* II 153–4.

⁴⁴⁶ See for example *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (ed. N. Dutt), p. 19; *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (ed. Ghoṣa), pp. 58, 1445.

⁴⁴⁷ See E. Frauwallner, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, i (Salzburg, 1953), p. 436 f. On connexions between Pātañjalayoga and Buddhism, see L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 5 (1937), pp. 223–42.

achieved only to the extent that there is meditative absorption involving an apperceptive notion (*yāvataḥ saññāsamāpatti tāvatā aññāpaṭivedho*).⁴⁴⁸

This principle has been specifically invoked in Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and its *Bhāṣya*, where it is concluded that the *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* – viz. the fourth Ārūpya described as neither involving the total absence of all notions nor as comprising (distinct) notions – is mundane (*laukika*) rather than transmudane (*lokottara*), and that the *āryamārga* is not to be found at its level. While the *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* is thus not regarded as transmudane, the *samjñāvedayitanirodha* is classified as *lokottara* in so far as it is the outcome of the *āryamārga* involving liberating knowledge.⁴⁴⁹

According to the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the Ārūpya-attainments are totally infused with Quieting (*śamathaikaṛasa*). Yet, according to this same source and its commentary, a set of seven mental acts (*manaskāra*) makes for the attainment not only of the four Rūpa-Dhyānas but also of the four Ārūpyas up to and including the sphere where ideation subsists in a form that can be described as neither total absence of notions or as containing (distinct) notions (*naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana*). The *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* moreover specifies that the second of these seven forms of mental act, the *ādhimokṣika manaskāra*, transcends learning (*śruta*) and reflection (*cintā*) and realizes both Quieting (*śamatha*) and Insight (*vipaśyanā*) having as object the phenomenal sign of the characteristic of gross quiet (*audārikaśāntalakṣaṇanimitālambanā*).⁴⁵⁰ In the relevant summary verse (*uddāna*) of the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the Dhyānas and Ārūpyas are connected with mental acts; and the *vajropama-samādhi* is identified as the sixth kind of mental act, the *prayoganiṣṭha manaskāra*.⁴⁵¹ This placing of *vipaśyanā* as well as *śamatha* in the four Ārūpyas is noteworthy.

⁴⁴⁸ Aṅguttaranikāya IV 426. For the Sanskrit version of this Sūtra-text, see Asaṅga, *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, p. 69, and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, p. 81. And for a discussion of this, and of the meaning of the compound *aññāpaṭivedha*, see L. Schmithausen, *loc. cit.*, p. 224 and p. 229.

⁴⁴⁹ See Asaṅga, *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, p. 69; *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, p. 81.

⁴⁵⁰ See *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, p. 68; *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, p. 80.

⁴⁵¹ *Śrāvakabhūmi*, ed. Shukla, p. 510; ed. Schmithausen in: L. Hercus et al. (ed.), *Indological and Buddhist studies* (J. W. de Jong Felicitation vol., Canberra, 1982), p. 472.

As mentioned above, the state of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* has been described as being perceived as a simulacrum of Nirvāṇa (*nirvāṇa-saḍḍā*) and as tranquil (*śānta*) on the level of the Anāgāmin and Kāyasākṣin. Now Buddhist tradition knows of a path which, independently and taken all by itself, leads exclusively to quietude (*śamaikāyana*).

In the old canon, the *ekāyano maggo* was of course the way of the four Applications of mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhāna* = *smṛtyupasthāna*) that, uniquely, leads to the realization of Nirvāṇa.⁴⁵² In some places, however, the term *śamaikāyana* came to be used in connexion with a class of persons who seek a more or less cataleptic calm, that is, with persons attached, in terms of the Three-Vehicle (*triyāna*) theory, to the *śrāvaka*gotra considered as a 'genus' fundamentally different from the *bodhisattva*gotra. A Śrāvaka of this particular class would therefore be unable ever to attain the supreme Awakening (*anuttarasamyaksambodhi*) of a *buddha*, unlike the type of Śrāvaka who on the contrary turns towards *bodhi*.⁴⁵³

Now, according to the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (ii. 58–59), those persons who, being established on the path of calm, conceive the notion that they have achieved Nirvāṇa (*prāptanirvāṇasaṃjñin* = *myan 'das thob 'du šes can*) are deflected from their earlier postulation (*pūrvagraha*) by the teachings of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*; and being thus made to mature in the supreme Vehicle (*uttama yāna*, viz. the Mahāyāna), they receive the prophecy (*vyākaraṇa*) that they are to achieve supreme *bodhi*. Furthermore, according to a text quoted by Haribhadra in his commentary on the section of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* that treats of the Single Vehicle (*ekayāna*) – a text close to the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* ascribed to Nāgārjuna – those persons whose minds are tormented by Saṃsāric existence (*bhavād uttrastamānasāḥ*), and who conceive the notion that they have achieved Nirvāṇa (*prāptanirvāṇasaṃjñin*) once their life-span is spent, have in fact not really achieved Nirvāṇa but merely the cessation of birth in the three realms of

⁴⁵² See for example Dīghanikāya II 290; Saṃyuttanikāya V 167, 185.

⁴⁵³ See *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* (ed. Lamotte) vii. 14–15.

existence. They therefore require to be awakened by the *buddhas* so that they may eliminate undefiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*) and thus also finally become *buddhas*.⁴⁵⁴

Mo-ho-yen's teaching, which lays so much emphasis on the elimination of discursive thinking (*sems pa*), recollective attention (*dran pa*) and mentation (*yiḍ la byed pa*), presents some very noteworthy parallels to what a practiser achieves in the Samāpattis and Vimokṣas, and in particular in the Samāpatti where notions and feelings have come to a stop (*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*). For clarifying the background to his teachings, and in order to appreciate the criticisms that Kamalaśīla and his school have directed against what they considered to be an unbalanced and disproportionate stress on eradicating any and every trace of analytical thinking, the above-mentioned theories of meditative practice need to be borne in mind.

Kamalaśīla and his school may in addition have feared that the Hva śāṅ's meditative methods approached perilously closely the cataleptic state of notionlessness (*asaṃjñīsamāpatti*) that arises for a worldling (*prthagjana*) on the level of the fourth Dhyāna, as a result of his desire for deliverance (*mokṣakāmatā*) when he conceives the idea of release (*niḥsaraṇasaṃjñin*), but which (as already noted) has not been accepted by Buddhist tradition as forming an integral part of the Ārya's Path of meditative realization.⁴⁵⁵ What Kamalaśīla has stated in his *Bhāvanākrama* regarding the resemblance between his unnamed opponent's view concerning the absence of recollective attention (*asmṛti*) and mentation (*amanasikāra*) and the suppression of thinking (*cittanirodha*) which a worldling can achieve on the level of the fourth Dhyāna seems indeed to have to be understood in this way.⁴⁵⁶ Kamalaśīla has furthermore called attention to the resemblance

⁴⁵⁴ Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālamkāralokā* ii. 1 (ed. Wogihara, p. 134). See D. Seyfort Rugg, *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra* (Paris, 1969), pp. 178, 189 ff., 194, 242.

⁴⁵⁵ See above, p. 195 f.

⁴⁵⁶ *Bhāvanākrama* III, pp. 15–17. This can refer to the state of the Bṛhatphala-gods of *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ii. 41 and iii. 2 (cf. above, p. 196). See also *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ii. 41bc on the *āsaṃjñika* as cessation of *citta* and the *caittas* among the *asaṃjñīsattva* (cf. i. 28 and iv. 84) gods.

that would apparently arise between a Śrāvaka absorbed in the meditation of cessation (*nirodhasamādhisamāpanna*), where no phenomenal signs (*nimitta*) are present, and a Bodhisattva who would accomplish together all six Perfections (*pāramitā*) without cultivating generosity (*dāna*) and the like when undue emphasis is placed on *dhyāna* alone as embracing in itself all other *pāramitās*.⁴⁵⁷

In the account of the Great Debate given in the *sBa bžed* and related sources, moreover, Kamalāśīla is reported to have objected against the Hva šaṅ's teaching the argument that if one were entirely to eliminate thinking, etc., one would not differ from a person who has fainted or fallen into senselessness, or from certain gods of the higher spheres (*kham sgori ma'i lha*), so that it would be necessary to conclude that, if not thinking really were to lead to Awakening, beings in these states of unconsciousness would equally have to be considered as liberated.⁴⁵⁸

In one respect this question of *nirodha* and the suppression of all notions recalls the distinction made in the *Abhidharma* between *nirvāṇa* as *pratisamkhyānirodha* – that is, liberation consciously achieved through knowledge defined as a specific *prajñā* (cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* i. 6a) – and *apratisamkhyānirodha*, which is mere cessation due to the absence of the necessary conditions (*pratyaya*). This point arises in the theory of meditation of the *ānimittānimittasamādhi* with respect to *apratisamkhyānirodha* in the aspect of quietude (*śāntākāra*, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* viii. 26cd).

A further basic teaching of Mo-ho-yen, frequently mentioned in the *Cheng-li chüeh* as well as in the Tibetan Dunhuang documents, was that all (false) notions (*hsiang*, *wang hsiang*) should be abolished.⁴⁵⁹ The expression '(false) notion' is explained in the *Cheng-li chüeh* as designating all movements of

⁴⁵⁷ *Bhāvanākrama* III, p. 26.

⁴⁵⁸ See *sBa bžed*, G, p. 69; S, p. 59; *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 117a–b. Compare Nān Ńi ma 'od zer, *Chos 'byun Me tog sñin po*, f. 431a–b (with variants). Cf. for example Vasubandhu, *Triṃśikā* 16.

⁴⁵⁹ *Cheng-li chüeh*, ff. 131a, 131a–132a, 133b–134b, 148a–149a, 150a (P. Demiéville, *Concile*, pp. 62, 66–71, 75–77, 130–41, 158). For *myi bden pa'i sems*, *myi bden pa'i 'du šes*, etc., see *Pelliot tibétain* 21 (1), 116 (245), 117, 812r; *Stein* 709 (14b), 710 (24a–25a, 33a, 35b, 52a). See also *Pelliot tibétain* 823 (cited by Y. Imaeda, *Journal asiatique* 1975, pp. 142–3), an old Tibetan text from Tun-huang closely related to the *Cheng-li chüeh*. Cf. L. Gómez in: R. M. Gimello and P. Gregory (eds.), *Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen*, p. 125.

thinking that grasp objects; while 'all' is explained as covering everything from infernal existences up to just below the level of a *buddha*.⁴⁶⁰ But by 'watching Mind' (*k'an hsin*), which eliminates the Impregnations, these notions are made to disappear according to Mo-ho-yen.⁴⁶¹

Apart from the scriptural sources cited in the *Cheng-li chüeh*, this doctrine could of course find support for example in a passage from the *Kāśyapaparivarta* (§ 144): 'For the monk absorbed in the attainment of the stoppage of notions and feelings, there is nothing further that needs to be accomplished'.⁴⁶²

Parallels to Mo-ho-yen's teaching are to be found in particular when a Sūtra is referring to the level of ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) and to non-duality (*advaya*). Thus, in Chapter viii of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, the Bodhisattva *Bhadrajyotis proposes a description of entry into non-duality in terms of the absence of both movement (of thinking, *g-yo ba*) and of (false) mentation (*rlom sems: manyanā*), and also in terms of the absence of any (karmic?) qualification/entitlement (*lhag par bya ba: adhikāra?*) and freedom from the same (*lhag par bya ba dan bral ba*). And further on in the same chapter the Bodhisattva *Siṃhamati proposes a description of entry into non-duality in terms of the non-production of any notion (*samjñā*), pure or impure, and even of the non-arising of absence-of-notion (*'du šes med par gyur pa*).

In reply to a question as to whether Auditors fond of quietistic cessation can have access to the Mahāyāna, Mo-ho-yen is nevertheless stated in the *Cheng-li chüeh* to have said that, for a person residing in the notionless, there is no seeing of the Mahāyāna, so that one should keep from attaching oneself to absorption without notions.⁴⁶³

⁴⁶⁰ Demiéville, *Concile*, p. 75 and n. 7.

⁴⁶¹ *Cheng-li chüeh*, ff. 129a, 135a f., 150a f. On *k'an hsin*, see P. Demiéville, *Concile*, pp. 43, 51, n. 52, 78, 125, 158. The corresponding Tibetan expressions are *sems la blta* (attested in the Tibetan Dunhuang documents, e.g. *Pelliot tibétain 823r* (1); *Stein 468* (1b), 689), *sems rtogs pa*, and *sems 'no 'phrod pa* (attested in dPa' bo gtsug lag phreñ ba's *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja. f. 120b6). See above, p. 100.

⁴⁶² *samjñāvedayitanirodhasamāpattisamāpannasya bhikṣor nāsty uttarīkeraṇīyam* (quoted e.g. in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* i., p. 48).

⁴⁶³ *Cheng-li chüeh*, f. 132a (Demiéville, *Concile*, p. 71).

It is furthermore to be noted that the *bSam gtan mig sgron* has also ascribed to the Hva šaṅ Mahā yan the teaching that notions (*saṃjñā*) are not to be stopped ('*du šes dgag par yaṅ mi bya*, f. 83a4). In the same context, the recognition through awareness of the nescience-related mental factors that (mental) instability is faulty and the stoppage of the latter are both described as the 'Śrāvaka's *nirodha*' (*ma rig pa'i sems byuñ ba tshor bas g-yo ba skyon tu rig ste bkag na ṅan thos 'gog pa'o*, f. 83a2). Hence one should not fall into notionlessness through objectification of the anoetic (*ci yaṅ šes pa mi dmigs pas 'du šes med par mi ltuñ*, f. 83a5-6). In a parallel passage from *Pelliot tibétain 117* the restriction 'of the Śrāvaka' is also to be found.⁴⁶⁴ According to statements reproduced in *Stein 709* (f. 4a-b), the Mahāyānist way of no-mind is said to be like that of neither the non-Buddhist nor the Śrāvaka.⁴⁶⁵

Wang Hsi's *Cheng-li chüeh* has moreover repudiated the suggestion that the state of not thinking taught by Mo-ho-yen could be legitimately equated with either the unconscious state of the Bṛhatphala-gods, who are placed immediately below the Śuddhāvāsa level in the fourth Dhyāna, or with any unconscious state reached by a worldling by means of a mundane, non-*lokottara* path.⁴⁶⁶

It is finally of special importance to observe that for Mo-ho-yen – and indeed for so much of the classical tradition of later Buddhism (whether or not it postulates either an *ālayavijñāna* or an *amalavijñāna*) – the Bhāvanāmārga and the state of cessation of notions and feelings (*saṃjñāvedayitānirodha*) is not strictly speaking entirely 'mind-less': the discursive and proliferating activity of thinking has indeed been brought to a stop at the highest level of the Path, but Mind (*sems [ñid] = citta[tā]*; Chinese *hsin*) subsists in some more or less fine form. According to Mo-ho-yen it is then discursive thinking (*sems pa*), as connected with recollective attention (*dran pa*) and mentation (*yiḍ la byed pa*), that is to be relinquished; but (innate) Mind is to be recognized in face-to-face confrontation (*sems la blta ba = Ch. k'an hsin; sems rtogs pa, sems ño 'phrod pa*).

⁴⁶⁴ Cf. Gómez in *Studies*, p. 112.

⁴⁶⁵ Cf. *Stein 710*, f. 5b.

⁴⁶⁶ *Cheng-li chüeh*, ff. 131a-b, 148a-b (Demiéville, *Concile*, pp. 62 ff., 130 ff.).

6. ON A *BHĀVANĀKRAMA* IN BHAVYA'S
MADHYAMAKARATNAPRADĪPA

After considering *śamathavipaśyanā-yoga* in Chapter vii of his *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (P, f. 351a) which is described as a *bhāvanākrama* – and in connexion with the statement taken from the *Bhavasamkrānti* ascribed to Nāgārjuna that the world proceeds from conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) which in its turn issues from mind (*citta*), and that mind proceeds from bodily-structure (*lus = kāya*) which has therefore to be analysed⁴⁶⁷ – Bhavya has observed (f. 352a–353a) that knowledge (*śes pa = jñāna*) rests nowhere, that [in reality] there is no mental construction as anything at all (*cir yari mi rtog*), no thinking on anything (*ci la yari sems pa med pa*), no dwelling in any extreme positions, no arising of cognition in the form of anything whatever (*śes pa ci'i no bor yari ma skyes pa*), and that non-predication as anything at all is to be realized in meditation (*ci yari ma yin par bsgom par bya'o*). This text specifies that analytical *prajñā* (*so sor rtog pa'i śes rab*) is itself free from appearance (*snañ ba med pa : nirābhāsa*).

To illustrate the point that at this level knowledge itself no longer exists (*śes pa ran nīd kyan med par gyur pa*), the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (f. 352b) refers to the *Kāśyapaparivarta*'s comparison of analytical investigation (*pratyavekṣā*) and the faculty of transcending discriminative understanding (*prajñendriya*) with fire produced from rubbing together two pieces of wood which both consumes the wood from which it is produced and is thus itself extinguished, a comparison cited also by Kamalaśīla. So the 'fuel' of philosophical theory (*lta ba = darśana, dṛṣṭi*) is declared to be consumed; and when theory thus comes to a stop, the fire of knowledge itself no longer arises, while all afflictions/defilements (*kleśa*) are then consumed.⁴⁶⁸ The *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* describes this process as a Gross Yoga (*rags pa'i rnal 'byor*) that it

⁴⁶⁷ *Bhavasamkrānti* 7. Compare Section ii of the *Ṭikā* ascribed to Maitreyanātha (ed. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Adyar, 1938, p. 89 f.). Cf. C. Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana* (Copenhagen, 1982), p. 13. On the relation between *citta* and *kāya*, see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ii. 44d (p. 72), as well as the sources on the *nāma-rūpa* concept.

⁴⁶⁸ *Kāśyapaparivarta* § 69, cited by Kamalaśīla in his *Bhāvanākrama* (III, p. 20). Also cited are the *Ghanavyūha* and *Mahāsukhanātha (on whom see C. Lindtner, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasien* 26 (1982), p. 176 and *Indologica taurinensia* 12 (1984), p. 178). Cf. above, pp. 94–95 note, 114.

contrasts with the Subtle Yoga based on *nirābhāsa* and *māyā*-like Mind, for which it refers to the *Lankāvatara-sūtra* (Sagāthaka 256–7).

Later the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* takes up again the themes of non-mentation (*amanasikāra*, f. 354b7), single-moment Awakening (*ekakṣaṇābhisambodhi*, f. 355a2) and single-moment understanding (ff. 358b–359a, 360a6), and refers as well to Awakening in the *vajropamasamādhi* (ff. 356a4, 359a1) and progressive engagement (*krāma-vṛtti*) on the Path of the Bodhisattva (f. 358a6, following the *Dharmadhātustava* ascribed to Nāgārjuna, verse 91). In particular, it is stated that *bhāvanā* should be cultivated by freeing oneself from both *smṛti* and *manasikāra* (f. 354b7). Consideration is given also to the question as to how one avoids becoming a person exclusively given to quiet (*ṣi ba phyogs gcig pa*) by taking recourse in the complete *rūpakāya* and in the *apratīṣṭhitānirvāṇa* (f. 360a, by which the Bodhisattva does not enter into Nirvāṇa in order to be able to work for the benefit of living beings by making use of salvific means or *upāyas*).

It thus appears that the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* belongs to the long line of treatises concerned with the question of *amanasikāra* and *asmṛti*, and that in its treatment of a Mādhyamika's *bhāvanā-krama* it addresses certain problems also discussed in Tibet at the time of the Great Debate of bSam yas.

The question thus arises of the date and exact authorship of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. In the bsTan 'gyur catalogues, this work has been attributed implicitly to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya, the (sixth-century) Mādhyamika author of the *Prajñāpradīpa* and *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās*; and this ascription has been explicitly made by some modern scholars.⁴⁶⁹ This attribution is however far from being certain. In the first place, the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* mentions favourably, and cites as authorities, Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti – two masters who have usually been placed in the seventh century – even though the latter was the chief

⁴⁶⁹ See C. Lindtner, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 26 (1982), pp. 172–84; *Indologica taurinensia* 12 (1984), pp. 163–84; *Adyar Library Bulletin* 50 (1986), p. 84 n. 65. See however the contrary opinion of Y. Ejima, *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (IBK)*, 28/2 (1980), pp. 37–43, and *Chūgan-shisō no tenkai – Bhāvaviveka kenkyū* (Tōkyō, 1980); D. Seyfort Rugg, *The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, p. 66, and 'Towards a chronology of the Madhyamaka school', in L. A. Hercus et al. (eds.), *Indological and Buddhist studies* (Felicitation vol. for J. W. de Jong, Canberra, 1982), p. 513.

opponent and critic of Bhāvaviveka, the author of the *Prajñāpradīpa*. Moreover, it quotes a verse (f. 354a3–4) to be found in the *Apabhramśa Dohākoṣa* of Saraha, and it describes the author of this *dohā* as ‘teacher’s teacher’ (*bla ma’i bla ma*);⁴⁷⁰ in other words, the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* may have been the grand-pupil of Saraha, the teacher (also known as Rāhulabhadrā) of Ārya-Nāgārjunapāda, who lived perhaps in the seventh century.⁴⁷¹ Finally, beside many other texts placed at the earliest in the seventh century such as the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* (also ascribed to Nāgārjuna), it quotes (f. 361b) a ‘prophecy’ on Nāgārjuna from the *Mañjuśrīmūlatantra*, whereas the Rājavyākaraṇaparivarta of the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* in its form now known to us contains – in addition to a differently worded *vyākaraṇa* on Nāgārjuna – another ‘prophecy’ relating to King Gopāla who founded the Pāla dynasty in Bengal (rg. c. 770–810 or 775–812).⁴⁷² In other words, it is possible that the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* was composed by an author who lived after the seventh century, and perhaps as late as the ninth century, and that he was either a contemporary or perhaps even a successor of Śāntaraḥṣita and Kamalaśīla.⁴⁷³ It was indeed in the eighth century that the *bhāvanākrāma*-theme attracted special attention among Mādhyamikas, as is demonstrated not only by Kamala-

⁴⁷⁰ P, mi, f. 77a2. This has been noted too by Lindtner, *Wiener Zeitschrift* ... 26 (1982), p. 175.

⁴⁷¹ See Seyfort Ruegg, in *Indological and Buddhist studies*, p. 511. If this is so, the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* could have been a disciple of the Deutero-Nāgārjunapāda since the latter was a disciple of Saraha = Rāhulabhadrā.

⁴⁷² *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* (ed. T. Gaṇapati Śāstri), liii. 628, 816 (= ed. Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana, verses 683 and 883, in K. P. Jayaswal, *An imperial history of India*, Lahore, 1934). The *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* was translated into Chinese by T’ien hsi tsai at the end of the tenth century, and into Tibetan in the eleventh century by Kumārakalaśa and Śākya blo gros at the command of Byaṅ chub ’od at Tho liñ. On the date of the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, and on earlier Chinese versions, see Y. Matsunaga, *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 20 (Mélanges R. A. Stein, iii, Brussels 1985), pp. 882–93.

It is of course possible that the version of the Tantra quoted in Bhavya’s *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* did not contain the *vyākaraṇa* relating to King Gopāla, which could be a later interpolation; and the date of Gopāla is not therefore necessarily a *terminus a quo* for dating the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. But the references to other texts, such as Saraha’s *Dohā* and the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*, as well as the citation of both Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti as authorities would seem to suggest a very late seventh-century date at the earliest, and more probably a date in the eighth or even ninth century.

⁴⁷³ This is the opinion of Y. Ejima, as quoted by Lindtner in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 26 (1982), p. 183.

śīla's three *Bhāvanākramas* but also by the **Bhāvanāyogamārga* (or **Yogabhāvanāmārga*?) of Jñānagarbha which insists too on the need to examine Mind alone (*rari gi sems kho na la brtag par bya'o*).⁴⁷⁴

Hence, although our knowledge of the history of Madhyamaka thought is admittedly fragmentary and partly based on hypothetical reconstruction, the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* might be thought to fit especially well into a period later than the sixth century when Bhāvaviveka, the author of the *Prajñāpradīpa* and *Madhyamakahrdayakārikās*, in all likelihood lived. (On the contrary, were it possible to demonstrate that this text belongs to the sixth century too, this would show that important points at issue in the Great Debate were being discussed in *bhāvanākrama*-form by Indian Mādhyamikas two or three centuries earlier than the time of Kamalaśīla and Mo-ho-yen.) Thus the *bhāvanākrama* section of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* is of very considerable interest in considering Indian views on the points being discussed at the Great Debate of bSam yas.

7. SILENCE

Following the example of Vimalakīrti to which he has explicitly referred,⁴⁷⁵ Mo-ho-yen was an advocate of the philosopher's silence: 'Tout ce que j'ai dit, avant comme après, n'était conçu que pour répondre aux questions, en me référant aux textes de *sūtra*; et ce n'était nullement le vrai système de ma méthode de Dhyāna. Mon système est sans attribut de parole, sans attribut de différenciation due à notre propre esprit; c'est la vérité vraie, qui ne se transmet et ne se confère que par le silence, le chemin du langage étant coupé. Si l'on se met à débattre du pour et du contre, du juste et du faux, il n'en résulte que dispute. Le recueillement est comme une eau de saveur unique, mais les vues de chacun sont différentes ...'⁴⁷⁶

According to the Mahāyāna as a whole, ultimate reality is in

⁴⁷⁴ D, f. 4a3. A *Bhāvanākrama* is also ascribed in the bTan 'gyur to (a) Nāgārjuna. A *Yogabhāvanāmārga*, or *Bhāvanāyogamārga*, by Kamalaśīla is included in the bTan 'gyur.

⁴⁷⁵ See *Cheng-li chüeh*, f. 143b (Demiéville, *Concile*, pp. 113–14). Cf. *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, Chap. viii.

⁴⁷⁶ *Cheng-li chüeh*, ff. 154b–155a (Demiéville, *Concile*, p. 156).

itself inexpressible discursively (*anabhilāpya*, *nirabhilāpya*) and conceptually unthinkable (*acintya*). Silence is thus so to speak the only adequate way of signifying reality. As said by Candrakīrti (*Prasannapadā* i. 1, p. 57), ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) corresponds to the silence of the Nobles (*āryāṇāṃ tuṣṇībāvaḥ*). And according to the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*, between the night of his awakening to supreme and perfect Awakening and his Parinirvāṇa, no syllable (*akṣara*) is uttered by the Tathāgata.⁴⁷⁷ This principle of inexpressibility and silence is mentioned in a number of texts such as the *Samādhirājasūtra* and Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikās*.⁴⁷⁸

In the old canon, Noble Silence (*ariyo tuṅhībhāvo*) is praised on the same level as speech relating to Dhamma (*dhammī kathā*);⁴⁷⁹ either one preaches the Dhamma, or one enquires of another, or again one does not disdain Noble Silence (*ariyaṃ vā tuṅhībhāvaṃ nātimaññati*).⁴⁸⁰ This Noble Silence – placed on the level of the second Dhyāna and described as resulting from the cessation of reflection and investigation (*vitakkavicāraṇāṃ vūpasamā*) – involves internal quiet (*ajjhataṃ sampasādanam*), concentration of mind (*cetaso ekodibhāvo*), freedom from reflection (*avitakka*) and investigation (*avicāra*), and origination from *samādhi*.⁴⁸¹ Moreover, the Dharma to which the Buddha awakened is so subtle and profound that it can barely be communicated, as a consequence of which the Buddha at first hesitated to teach it until requested by Brahmā for the sake of people.⁴⁸²

Not altogether unconnected with this principle of the conceptual and verbal inexpressibility – that is, the non-discursiveness – of reality may have been the idea that it was by a single sound only that the entire Dharma was communicated. The thesis of the 'univocality' of the Buddha's speech was maintained by all

⁴⁷⁷ See the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* quoted in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* xviii. 7 (p. 366) and xxv. 24 (p. 539). Cf. Prajñākaramati, *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* ix. 36.

⁴⁷⁸ *Samādhirājasūtra*, Chap viii and xxxii; Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamakakārikās*, Chap. xviii; cf. *Nirāupamyastava* 7 and *Acintyastava* 23. See also *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* iii, p. 142–4; *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra* (ed. Oshika), iii, p. 24 (Lamotte, *L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti*, p. 147); viii, p. 75 (Lamotte, p. 317); x, p. 86 (Lamotte, p. 342); Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā* i, p. 57; Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* ix. 35–36.

⁴⁷⁹ *Udāna*, p. 11. ⁴⁸⁰ *Āṅguttaranikāya* IV 153.

⁴⁸¹ *Samyuttanikāya* II 273.

⁴⁸² *Mahāvagga* pp. 4–5; *Majjhimanikāya* I 167–168; *Samyuttanikāya* I 136; *Āṅguttaranikāya* II 131; *Mahāvastu* III, p. 314. Cf. Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* xxiv. 12, and *Ratnāvalī* ii. 18.

branches of the Mahāsāṃghika school according to Vasumitra;⁴⁸³ it was rejected, however, by the Sarvāstivādins,⁴⁸⁴ who also (unlike the Mahāsāṃghikas who held the Buddha's speech to be in accordance with reality)⁴⁸⁵ did not accept that all the Buddha's Sūtras are definitive in sense (*nītārtha*).⁴⁸⁶ In a similar context, the idea of a single sound as 'expressive' of the Buddha's teaching is attested in the *Bhadracaripraṇidhānarāja* (verse 30: *ekasvara*) and in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (ix, p. 79: *ekaghoṣodāhāra*). In the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra* we find *gsuñ gcig* 'single utterance'.⁴⁸⁷

This notion of 'univocality' probably stands to that of silence, and to that of the inexpressibility or ineffability of absolute reality, as does the notion of the Single or Unique Vehicle (*ekayāna*) – so often alluded to by Mo-ho-yen – to that of the ultimate non-existence of any Vehicle at all (*ayāna*) in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*⁴⁸⁸ – also emphasized by Mo-ho-yen.⁴⁸⁹

In his preference for Noble Silence and for the Single Vehicle or even the Non-Vehicle, therefore, Mo-ho-yen clearly stands in one major line of Buddhist thought attested in older Sūtras and then stressed by the Mahāyāna.⁴⁹⁰ Assessments may differ as to

⁴⁸³ Vasumitra, *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (Tibetan translation, ed. E. Teramoto and T. Hiramatsu), pp. 4–5. (Cf. A. Bareau, *Journal asiatique* 1954, p. 239; *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, p. 58.) Compare Bhavya, *Nikāyabhedavibhaṅga-Vyākhyāna* (Tibetan translation, ed. E. Teramoto and T. Hiramatsu), p. 23.

⁴⁸⁴ Vasumitra, *op. cit.*, p. 12. Cf. A. Bareau, *Sectes*, p. 145 (no. 55).

⁴⁸⁵ Vasumitra, *op. cit.*, p. 5: *don ji lta ba bzin nīd du: yathārtha*; see also Bhavya, *op. cit.*, p. 23. Cf. A. Bareau, *Journal asiatique* 1954, p. 239; *Sectes*, p. 58 (no. 5).

⁴⁸⁶ Vasumitra, *op. cit.*, p. 12; Bhavya, *op. cit.*, p. 27. Moreover, according to Vasumitra's account, *buddhas* are always in absorption (*mñam par bžag pa*), which accounts for their not uttering any name (*miñi*, p. 5). But Vinītadeva states that according to the Lokottaravādin-Mahāsāṃghikas even one who is *samāhita* speaks; see his **Samayabhedoparacanacakra Nikāyabhedopadarśana-nāma-saṃgraha* (Tibetan translation, ed. E. Teramoto and T. Hiramatsu), p. 41. Compare *Kathāvatthu* xviii. 2 (Vetullavāda), p. 560, on *dhamma* being taught by an 'emanation' (*abhinimmita*) – i.e., so to say, by xenoglossy/xenophony. See also Höbögirin s.v. *bonnon*, *butsugo* and *button*.

⁴⁸⁷ *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra* i, p. 13; cf. Lamotte, *L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti*, p. 109–10. See also on the *pratibhānapratīsamvit* in the *Ta-chih-tu-lun* (Lamotte, *Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, iii, p. 1622).

⁴⁸⁸ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* ii. 131; iii. 1; vii. 1; Sagāthaka 188, 245 and 315.

⁴⁸⁹ Demiéville, *Concile*, pp. 66, 119, 151.

⁴⁹⁰ Since these doctrines are well known and have been frequently studied, there is no need to insist further on them here. See for example G. M. Nagao, *Studies in Indology and Buddhism* (S. Yamaguchi felicitation volume, Kyōto, 1955), pp. 137–51; Lamotte, *L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti*, pp. 44–46, 317–18; D. Seyfort Rugg, 'On the knowability and expressibility of Absolute Reality in Buddhism', *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* (IBK), 20/1 (1971), pp. 1–7; *The literature of the Madhyamaka school*, pp. 34–35.

the extent to which the current of thought which Mo-ho-yen represents adopted an extreme 'ideoclasm' and was essentially logophobic or misologic. Mo-ho-yen would seem in any case to have wished that his silence should on no account be some kind of 'learned ignorance'.

When Mo-ho-yen cites the eschewing of disputes and learned strife as one motive for adopting silence,⁴⁹¹ he is also standing in a main line of Buddhist thought. Eirenicism is in fact already mentioned in passages of the old canon. Moreover, the Mādhyamika's rejection of any dogmatic assertion (*pratijñā*), in terms of the binary positions of conceptual thinking (*vikalpa*) or of the 'tetralemma' (*catuskoṭi*), was connected at least in part with his refusal to engage in vain disputes (*vivāda*) about entities.⁴⁹² Nevertheless, whilst the Mādhyamika seeks to eschew assertions of the kind just mentioned together with the related antagonistic positions without necessarily rejecting all philosophic expression,⁴⁹³ Mo-ho-yen appears to have been inclined to distance himself from all philosophical and religious discourse in favour of a form of quietism (verging sometimes on ataraxia) combined with the pure experience and non-discursive awareness of an ineffable and unanalysable reality (perhaps verging sometimes on pleasure in the empty).⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹¹ *Cheng-li chüeh*, f. 155a (Demiéville, *Concile*, p. 156).

⁴⁹² See for example Nāgārjuna, *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* 47, 51; *Ratnāvalī* ii. 4.

⁴⁹³ See D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'On thesis and assertion in the Madhyamaka/dBu ma', in E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (eds.), *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy* (Vienna, 1983), p. 205 ff.

⁴⁹⁴ On *ṣi ba phyogs gcig pa* and *ston pa bag la ñal (ba)*, and on the true Dhyāna (*bsam gtan*) of Ma ha yan, see for example Pelliot *tibétain* 117 as well as 116 (116 and 190), 121, 812r, and 813 (8a-b). (For the allusion to this theme in Bhavya's *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, see above, p. 207.) Mo-ho-yen and his followers no doubt intended to steer clear of any desire for mere tranquillity and of nihilistic emptiness. Cf. above, pp. 201-202

INDEX OF KEY TERMS IN SANSKRIT AND PALI

- Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra* 37, 38, 53
agada 5, 89, 101
acintya 44, 162, 210
ajñeya 44
atiyoga. See *Tib. rdzogs chen*
advaya 40, 42, 158, 199, 204
adhimukti 46-47
anabhilāpya 44, 210
anātman 23, 25, 34, 41, 51-55
anukrama 172
anupūrvakriyā/anupubbakiriya 154, 175
anupūrvavihāra 8, 165, 194
anupūrvasamāpatti 170-1
anupūrvābhisamaya 180
anusmaraṇa 155
anusmṛti 154
anta 24
abhidhā 29-31, 138
abhiprāya 18, 27, 29, 31, 121, 177, 178, 180
abhisamdhī 22-23, 33, 34, 52, 177, 180
Abhisamayālaṃkāra 53, 85, 153f, 170f, 174
Abhisamayālaṃkāralokā 153f.
abhyāsa 97, 131
amataṃ padam 43
amanasikāra 94, 99, 108, 115, 117, 137,
 183, 192f, 202, 207
ayāna 123, 211
araghaṭṭa 156
alakṣaṇa 157
avaskanda(ka) 164-7, 171-2
avācya 44
avikalpa 94-95, 97, 110, 161, 163
avinirbhāga 37
asamjñi (samāpatti) 183f, 195, 197, 199, 202
asmarāṇa 155, 160
asmṛti 94, 99, 115, 183, 202, 207

āgantukamala 44
ājīvika 82, 142
ājñā/āññā 173, 182, 195, 199-200
ātman 7, 19-26, 34, 35, 36, 40-44, 50-55,
 144, 146
ādikarmika 117
ādhāra 19, 45

ānupūrvika 196
ābhiprāyika 10, 22, 26-35, 38, 52
ārya 48-49, 158, 160, 178, 195, 200, 202,
 209
āsamjñika 196, 198, 199

icchantika 33, 47
indriya (tīkṣṇa^o, hīna^o) 49, 66, 84, 93, 98,
 117, 141-2, 149, 187

īśvara 40

ucchedadṛṣṭi 22, 105, 118, 124
upacāra 29-30
upāya 6, 10, 31, 85, 96, 100, 121, 126, 131,
 139, 171, 184, 190

ekakḥṇika 185
ekakḥṇika-yuganaddha 185
ekakṣaṇa/ekakḥṇa 161-3, 179, 186
ekakṣaṇābhisamaya 154, 158, 160, 178
ekakṣaṇābhisambodha 154, 157, 160, 207
ekakṣaṇāvabodha 154f.
ekaghoṣa 211
ekacaratva 162
ekacitta 186
ekacittakḥṇika 181
ekacittakṣaṇa 167, 179
ekanaṃya 184
ekapaṭivedha 185
ekaprāptilābha 178
ekayāna 49-50, 123, 201, 211
ekarasa 158, 161
ekasvara 211
ekābhisamaya 177, 185

obhāsa (vipassanā^o) 186, 188-9

karuṇā 10
karmakṣaya 142, 144
karman 93, 138f, 141-7
kalpanā 45, 100, 110, 113
kāya 168f, 191-2, 194, 198, 206

- kāyāśānti* 169-70
kāyāsākeṣin 167-70, 192, 198
kāryābhisamaya 159, 177-8
kālacakra 42
Kāsyapaparivarta 95, 114, 121, 204, 206
kuśala(caryā) 93, 142
krama 4, 12, 97, 120, 138-9, 176, 180, 181, 184, 196, 207
kleśa 121, 131, 142, 162-3, 206
kṣaṇa 154f, 158, 161f, 176-7
kṣaṇika 162, 176

gotra 18-19, 45, 133, 164, 201

catuṣkoṭi 34, 44, 54, 212
caryā 3, 93
citta 18-19, 23, 48, 93, 100, 113, 151, 158, 160, 162-3, 169, 176, 179, 183, 184, 196-8, 202, 205, 206, 209
cittanirodha 183, 202
cittavṛttinirodha 199

jaina 142f.
jñānakarmasamuccaya 138, 147

tathāgatakuḷa 96
tathāgatagarbha 4-7, 10-11, 17-55, 106-07, 123, 132-3, 137, 164
tathatā 22, 40, 42, 162-3
tapas 142
tīrthika 22f, 39, 55, 81
tuṣṭi[m]bhāva (ārya°)|tuṣṭihbhāva 209-12

darśana 3, 206
darśanamārga 155, 158-60, 163, 170, 177, 178, 181, 195f.
dāna (°ādi) 93f, 98, 121, 142, 146, 154, 156, 190, 203
dr̥ṣṭīkaśāya 105, 110, 140

dhammayoga 189, 191
dharmakāya 156, 158, 161, 199
dharmadhātu 37, 40, 42, 156
dharmapracicaya 96, 99, 182
dhātu (tathāgata°) 19, 46
dhyaṇa 9, 95, 134, 135, 150f, 155, 165f, 171f, 183f, 189-91, 197, 198, 200, 202, 205, 212
dhruva/dhruva 19, 43
dhvani 30, 32, 33, 138

nitya 19, 21, 43

nirodha (samāpatti) 8, 165f, 169, 171f, 183, 192f, 195, 196f, 198, 202, 203
nirgrantha 142f.
nirvāṇa 6, 40, 42, 43, 106, 163, 169, 194, 197, 201, 203
nirvikalpa(ka) 112-13
nūārtha 10-11, 31-35, 37-38, 52, 66, 107-08, 211
neyārtha 10-11, 27-35, 52f, 66, 108, 121, 180
nairātmya 25, 26, 28, 33, 35, 37, 38, 41, 43, 48-49, 52, 110, 112, 183

paramātma(pāramitā) 24-25, 50f.
paramārtha 3, 6, 37, 39, 41, 45, 46-48, 108, 204, 210
pariṇāmanā 7
parivṛājaka 22f.
pariyudāsa 41
prakṛtisthagotra 18-19, 45, 164
prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā (of citta) 18-19, 151, 162
prajñāpita 23, 34
prajñāpti 37
prajñā|paññā 6, 10, 25, 64, 85, 94f, 111, 114f, 126, 133, 148, 154-5, 163, 166, 168-9, 177, 179, 182f, 192, 203, 206
prajñōttaradhyaṇin 95, 183
pratijñā 57, 111, 114, 212
pratipakṣa 23, 25, 94, 110, 131, 157
pratītyasamutpāda 85, 170
pratyabhijñā 139
pratyavekṣā (bhūta°) 64, 94, 96, 110, 114
pratyekabuddha 46, 48-49
prapañca 41, 45, 48, 183, 193
prayogamārga 158, 163, 176, 177
prayojana 22, 29-32, 38
prasajyapratīṣedha 41, 66
prāthamakalpika 173
**prāsaṅgika* 80-81, 109

bhātphala 196, 202, 205
brahmacarya 24
brahman 20-21, 26, 39-40, 54, 138
bhāvanāmārga 9, 155, 170f, 178, 181, 194, 195f, 205
bhūtaḥkoṭi 28, 33, 40

madhyamaka|mādhyaṃika 80-81, 130. See also under Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti.
madhyamā pratīpat 24, 26, 41, 43

- manas(i)kāra* 94, 99, 144, 167, 168, 183,
 182, 192f, 196, 198, 200, 202, 205, 207
Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra 5, 17-18, 21-24, 36,
 39, 40, 50-51, 89, 101, 117, 133
Mahābherisūtra 36
mahāmudrā 12-13, 72, 89, 102f, 117. See
 also under *phyag rgya chen po*.
mahāsāṃghika 179-81, 211
mīmāṃsā 31
mukhyārtha(bāḍha) 29-32
mūrkhajana 93, 142
mūlasarvāstivāda 130

yatna 189
yathāruta 37, 118
yuganaddha 6, 85, 96, 115, 182-92
yugapadā 4, 12, 97, 111, 120, 162, 163, 178
yoga-madhyamaka 84
yogācāra-madhyamaka/mādhyamika 56, 93,
 153, 164

Ratnagotravibhāga (and Commentary)
 17-18, 24-25, 27, 36, 45, 46, 48, 53-54,
 85, 162-4, 199, 201

lakṣaṇa 25, 35
lakṣaṇā 29-31
Lankāvatārasūtra 20, 27, 33, 35, 38, 39, 40,
 120, 207, 211
lākṣaṇika 29
lokottara 160, 182, 195, 200
laukika 9, 158, 160, 173, 177, 180, 195, 200

vajrayāna 12, 121, 130, 132-3, 137
vajropamasamādhi 167, 200, 207
vikalpa 41, 44, 45-46, 48, 54, 93, 99-100,
 141, 144-5, 206, 212
vineyajana 34
viparyaya 25, 37
vipaśyanā/vipassanā 4, 6, 10-11, 64, 96,
 105, 110f, 114f, 126, 133, 138f, 164,
 182-90, 200, 206
vimokṣa 9, 99, 168, 192f, 202
vivakṣā 28-29
vivāda 212
viṣkanda(ka) 164f.
viṣṇu 40

vedānta 19-21, 40-42, 55, 138
vyāṅgya 32
vyāñjanā 30, 33
vyatyaya 165, 170
vyavahāra 45
vyuterāntaka 151, 164-5, 172-4

śamatha/samatha 4, 6, 10-11, 64, 96, 108,
 110f, 114f, 126, 133, 138 f., 146,
 182-90, 195, 196, 200, 206
śamaikāyana 201
śānta 170, 200
śāntavihāra 193, 197
śāntākāra 203
śāsvata 19
śūnya 4, 22. See also *rañi stonī*, *gṛaṇi stonī*
śūnyatā 4, 8, 10-11, 28, 33, 36, 37, 40, 43,
 47-49, 53-54, 115, 146, 161, 184, 190
śraddhā/saddhā 46-49, 148, 168f.
śrāvaka 46, 48-49, 201, 205

saṃvṛti 3, 6, 34, 37, 108
sakṛt 47, 157, 160, 181
sakṛnnairiyāṇika 181-2
saṃketa 29
saṃjñā 113, 124, 141, 189, 192-205
saṃjñāved(ay)itanirodha 8, 165f, 170,
 174-5, 192f, 195, 198, 200, 201, 202,
 204
saṃtrāsa (nairātmya^o) 38, 52
saṃdhāvācana 118
Samdhinirmocanasūtra 38, 114-15, 131,
 184
samapravṛtta 95, 115, 183
samathayānika 186
samasīsi(n) 147f.
samāpatti 9, 99, 170f, 192f, 197f, 202
sarvākāravaroṇeta 184, 190
sākeśin 57, 77
siṃhaviṅmbhita(samādhi) 165, 170
siddha 5, 12, 99, 117
sukkhavippassaka 189
sukha 19, 22
suddhavipassanāyānika 186, 189
sphoṭa 32, 138
smṛti 99, 183, 192
svarasavāhin 95, 115, 183

INDEX OF KEY TERMS IN TIBETAN

- ku sā li pa* 106
dkar po chig thub 4-5, 7, 13-14, 88,
 100-01, 103, 108-09, 137, 140
- kha tshom pa* 105
khregs gcod 164
'khrid tshul 116, 119
- glo bur* 97, 98
dgoñs gcig 109
dgoñs pa 22. See also *abhiprāya*
dgoñs pa can 26-27, 32. See also *ābhiprāyika*
dgoñs gži 18, 22, 28, 32, 38
dgos pa 22. See also *prayojana*
sgra ji bžin pa 37. See also *yathāruta*.
sgrub brgyud/pa 117, 134, 191
sgrub byed 112
- ño 'phrod pa (sems)* 4, 6, 88, 99, 100, 137,
 204, 205
- (g)cig c(h)ar (ba), cig char 'jug pa* 4-5,
 12-13, 63, 66, 67, 72, 79, 84, 96, 97,
 103, 109, 117f, 120, 125-6, 150, 152,
 157, 161, 164, 165, 179, 181
- 'jog sgom* 106, 111
- ñiñ po don (gyi brgyud pa)* 86, 117f.
- ston rkyan du lta ba* 105
ston pa ñid la dga' ba 124, 140
ston pa bag la ñal 212
ston pa had de 'jog pa 105
(s)ton/tun min/mun (pa) 63, 66, 72, 97, 117,
 125, 129, 150, 152, 165
- thod rgal* 119, 164
- dan po nas sais rgyas* 73, 86
bdun brgyud 66, 86, 153
bden par grub pa/yod pa 37, 112
bden med 112
'dul skal 73, 129
- rnam par gcod pa* 112
- dpyad sgom* 106, 111, 115
- phyag (rgya) chen (po)* 12-13, 72, 89, 102f,
 117f.
- bon po* 75, 81
Blon po bka'i thai yig 67, 84, 118, 137, 153,
 179
dbu ma 80. See also *madhyamaka*
dbus sde 80
sBa bžed 13-14, 56f, 67f, 75f, 78f, 87f,
 90-91, 100f, 121, 139f, 150, 184, 203
sbyor sgröl 120
- mas 'dzeg(s)* 13, 98
m(y)i bden pa'i 'du šes 141, 203
m(y)i bden pa'i sems 141, 203
mu stegs pa 81-82. See also *tīrthika*
mun sgom 115
me bisa 122
- tsi 'an men/tsi yan min* 63, 118
tsun men (pa) 86, 116-18, 125, 152
(br)tse(n) min/mun (pa) 63, 66, 72, 97, 150
tsom 'jog 115
tsod pa 57, 72, 77, 84
- rdzogs chen (pa)* 14, 62, 66, 67, 75f, 89-91,
 102, 109, 117f, 122, 125-6, 136-7, 164
- ži ba phyogs gcig pa* 207, 212
ži byed 118
žen pa'i yul 45
gžan ston 4, 8, 10, 36, 42, 54, 105, 107
gži 6, 36, 133, 136
- zab mo lta ba'i brgyud pa* 117f.
- yas babs/'bab* 13, 98, 102, 109
yoris su gcod pa 112
- rañ ston* 4, 8, 10, 54, 105, 107
riñ lugs 60
rim gyis (pa), rim gyis 'jug pa 5, 12-13, 63,
 66, 72, 97, 103, 117f, 125, 150, 164, 181

THE TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION OF BUDDHISM 217

(g)šags 57, 77

bšad brgyud|pa 117, 134, 191

sañis rgyas kyi ran bžin 5, 23

sems 100, 103, 141, 203-04

bSam gtan mig sgron 57, 62, 66-67, 72, 76, 85,
88, 102, 113, 121-2, 137, 153, 189, 205

hva šaṅ 56, 59, 102, 117-118, 123, 140,
152, 153

INDEX OF NAMES

- Abhinavagupta 30-31, 33
 Ānandavardhana 30-31, 33
 Āryadeva 25, 34, 86, 117, 145-6, 152
 Asaṅga 33, 34, 116, 170, 181, 198, 200
 Atiṣa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna 66, 76, 103, 104,
 111, 116, 121
 Avalokiteśvara 40
- sBa 59f, 68f, 79, 86, 89-91, 126
 Bhartṭhari 29
 Bhāvaviveka 21, 40-41, 112, 116, 207 (cf.
 Bhavya)
 Bhavya 114, 119, 179, 206-09, 212 (cf.
 Bhāvaviveka)
 Bodh Gayā 83, 86
 Bodhidharma (etc.) 66-67, 88, 117f,
 152-3, 179
 'Bro bza' 61, 127
 'Brug pa Kun legs 72, 102
 Buddhaghosa 173, 185, 188
 Buddhasena 151
 Bu cu Hva ṣaṅ. See Wu-chu.
 Bu ston Rin chen grub 21f, 27, 47, 59, 63,
 70, 72f, 81f, 84, 89, 90, 105, 124
 Byaṅ chub gliṅ (bSam yas) 60, 82, 86
- Candrakīrti 27, 33, 34, 107, 112, 116, 146,
 161-2, 207
- Dharmakīrti 29, 31, 112, 144, 207
 Dharmatāla/Dharmatrāta 132, 150-2
 Dignāga 117
 Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna. See Atiṣa
 Dol bu pa 107
 Dus gsum mkhyen pa 103
- sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen 102f,
 107-08, 137
 dGe lugs (pa) 36, 37
 mGon po skyabs 117f, 153
 Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge 104-05
 'Go(s) Chos grub (Fa-cheng) 131
 'Gos gZon nu dpal 73
 Grags pa rgyal mtshan 71, 76-77
 Gro luṅ pa 110-11
- Haribhadra 153f, 162f, 171f, 175, 178, 201
 Harivarman 27
- Jo naṅ pa 36, 42, 107
- Kamalaśīla 4, 13, 21, 56f, 63f, 82, 91, 93f,
 120, 124f, 130-1, 133, 135, 138f, 153,
 164, 165, 182, 184, 189, 190, 192, 202,
 208, 209
 Kambala (pāda) 117
 Kāśyapa 67, 117-18, 152-3, 179
 Khri Sroṅ lde btsan 59f, 69, 125, 127,
 128-9, 135
 Kim Hva ṣaṅ. See Wu-hsiang.
 Kloṅ chen rab 'byams pa 77, 102, 122, 136
- Mahādeva 56
 Mahākoṭṭhika/Mahākoṭṭhita 125, 169, 192
 Mahāyāna/Mahā yan. See Mo-ho-yen
 Maitreya 40, 116, 150f, 154, 159
 Maitrīpāda 99, 102, 108
 Makkhali Gosāla/Maskarin Gośāla 142
 Maṅḍanamīśra 138, 147
 Me 'go/Me mgo 56, 62, 69, 75, 87-88, 90
 Mes Ag tshom(s) 69, 125
 Mi bskyod rdo rje (Karma) 108
 Mo-ho-yen (Mahāyāna/Mahā yan) 4-6,
 13, 56f, 63f, 72f, 82-83, 86f, 93f, 102,
 108-11, 114, 116f, 123f, 127, 131, 135,
 137, 141, 146, 150-3, 160, 183f, 187,
 189, 192f, 202-05, 209, 211, 212
 Musīla (etc.) 125, 169, 191
 Myaṅ/Ñāṅ 60-61, 75, 89-90, 126
 Myaṅ Tiṅ ṅe 'dzin (bzaṅ po) 61, 90, 125,
 127
- Nāgārjuna 10, 34, 62, 72-73, 84-86, 102,
 108, 117, 126, 130, 145, 152, 174, 201,
 206-10
 Ñāṅ. See Myaṅ/Ñāṅ.
 Ñāṅ (ral/bdag) Ñi ma 'od zer 14, 57, 59,
 74-89, 100f, 125, 136
 Nārada 125, 169, 191
 Nāropa 102, 108
 Ne'u/Nel pa Paṅḍi ta 71f, 76, 84, 89, 102

- rNog Blo ldan šes rab 47, 110
 gNubs (chen) Sañs rgyas ye šes 66, 76, 91, 102, 125, 137
- Padma dkar po ('Brug pa) 74, 82, 83, 84, 137
 dPal dbyañs (sBa) 60f, 70f, 79, 86, 89, 127
 Pao t'ang 63, 119, 120, 132
 Patañjali 28, 142
 Pa tshab Ni ma grags 80-81
 Pha dam pa 118
 Phag mo gru pa 103
 Po to ba 110
- Ratnākaraśānti 31, 116, 154, 155, 157, 193
 Roñ zom Chos kyi bzañ po 81, 102
- Šākya mchog ldan 105-08
 Śaṅkara (ācārya) 21, 38-39, 147
 bSam yas 5, 14, 56f, 68-69, 86, 134f.
 Śāntarakṣita 40, 56f, 73, 81-82, 91, 93, 101, 129, 135, 140, 153, 165, 208
 Saraha 108, 208
 Śāriputra 125
 Sa skya Pañḍi ta Kun dga' rgyal mtshan 7, 12-14, 27, 68, 70f, 75, 89-90, 101f, 104f, 109-10, 118, 124
 Saviṭṭha/Samidḍha 169
 Shen-hsiu 119-20
 Shen-hui 119-20
 bSod nams rtse mo 71, 77
 Sog bzlog pa 66, 69, 102
 Śrīsiṃha 66, 102
- Sroñ btsan sgam po 56
 Sureśvara 147
- T'an-k'uaṅ 57, 128
 Tāranātha 117
 Thu'u bkvan Blo bzañ Chos kyi ni ma 63, 109, 116-19, 153
 gTsañ nag pa 47
 Tshal pa Kun dga' rdo rje 73, 76
 Tshe dbañ nor bu 67, 91, 102, 117, 118, 125, 137, 153
 Tsoñ kha pa 112-16
 gTsong lag phreñ ba (dPa' bo) 59, 70, 74, 90, 137
 Tsung mi 120
- Vairocana 60
 Vasubandhu 149, 169, 172, 175, 176f, 178, 189
 Vimalakīrti 209
 Vimalamitra 61, 66, 75, 79, 85, 120
 Vimuktisena (Ārya) 153f, 157, 160
 Vimuktisena (Bhadanta) 155
- Wang Hsi 57f, 64f, 79, 83, 89, 93, 97, 100, 203-05
 Wōn-ch'uk (Yüan-tse) 131
 Wu-chu (Tib. Bu cu) 120
 Wu-hsiang (Tib. Kim) 56, 62, 120
- Ye šes dbañ po (sBa) 60f, 69f, 79f, 89, 127
- Žañ tshal pa 12, 103-04, 108-09