Tactics and Technique of Cavalry

U. S.

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS,
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

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

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of the present study is two-fold. First, to present in a concise manner and under one cover the general principles of the use of Cavalry, with extracts from reports covering its work during The World War. Second, to serve as a guide for the instructors and members of the classes at The General Service Schools in acquiring a general outline of the employment, power and limitations of the Cavalry, operating independently and with other arms. With the above in view, the role of Cavalry; its operations in connection with reconnaissances; the principles that govern advance guards, rear guards and outposts; the Cavalry offensive combat; its defensive action; the subject of marches; and the guiding principles covering pursuits are discussed in the seven chapters prepared by the instructors of The General Service Schools, reviewed by the Cavalry Board, and approved by the War Department as a text-book for The General Service Schools.

H. E. ELY,
Commandant.

CHAPTER I

Role of Cavalry

The dictionary gives as the definition of the word "role":

"A part, or character performed by an actor in a drama; hence, a part or function taken or assumed by any one."

In determining the roles of the combatant arms, the question is much simplified by recognizing in the beginning that the infantry is the dominant or basic arm in war, and that it is the function of all other arms to assist it in fighting the battles of the war.

By keeping the above general principle in mind, we will have little difficulty in determining the true role of any arm, or the methods by which it can best perform its true functions.

There are always a few enthusiasts who honestly believe that this or that device or this or that new arm can supersede the infantry. If these enthusiasts attempt to use the device or arm for this purpose, or attempt to use it entirely independently of the infantry, its life is usually very short. So far, history shows that the value of any device, mechanical or otherwise, or of any arm or service, is in direct proportion to the assistance it can render the infantry.

It has long been the accepted doctrine of our cavalry that it must be able to fight mounted or dismounted. Mounted action except in squadrons or smaller units will generally be associated with a dismounted fight. That this doctrine is correct has been proved in The World War. We find now that all European nations have accepted this principle as true and have reorganized or are in the process of reorganizing their cavalry along these lines.

The uses of cavalry are many and varied; but it must be accepted that the cardinal principles are mobility and fire power, of which mobility is the more important. Cavalry organized with these two principles in view becomes a potent factor and a powerful weapon in the hands of the commander.

To get the proper relation of cavalry with the other arms, it must be remembered that it is an auxiliary to infantry. It must play its part in the work of the machine as a whole. Teamwork is the thing that counts; and the jealousies and rivalries of the various arms must be submerged in the common good of the team. Each has a part to play and the greatest success will be attained only when each understands its function and its relation to the others.

The cavalry therefore, like the artillery, the air service, the engineers and the signal troops, is an auxiliary to the infantry. Its "part or function" in war is to assist the infantry by:

(a) Tactical and strategical reconnaissance.
(b) Screening or covering the movements of its infantry.
(c) Seizing and holding important points or positions until the arrival of the infantry.
(d) Providing a mobile reserve—fighting mounted or dismounted in the line with infantry or on a flank, or exploiting a break in the enemy's line.
(e) Pursuing a defeated enemy.
(f) Covering the retreat or withdrawal of its infantry, in case of defeat.
(g) In guerrilla or irregular warfare, relieving the infantry of the burden of hunting out and defeating the enemy.
(h) Conducting raids.

(a) Tactical and Strategical Reconnaissance.

One of the important duties of cavalry is reconnaissance. With small bodies or patrols we frequently refer to this duty as scouting or patrolling, but the underlying principle is the same in either case, *i.e.*, the object is to gain information. The reconnaissance necessary at the beginning may be divided into two classes, strategical and tactical.

The army cavalry, one or more divisions, is pushed far to the front, often several days' march in advance of the remainder of the field army, to drive back the covering forces of the enemy and to gain information of his dispositions, strength and movements. This is the most valuable use of the cavalry in the opening stages of a campaign.

The employment of these cavalry divisions, reconnoitering far ahead of the remainder of the field army, is sometimes called the strategic employment of cavalry, because the strategic dispositions made by the army commander will be based on information obtained by his cavalry.

The development of aviation has modified to a large extent the strategical employment of cavalry. The distant

strategic reconnaissances, which formerly fell to the lot of the cavalry, will now be performed in part by the air service. The air squadrons on this duty will be under the direct control of the army commander. The air service and the cavalry strategical reconnaissances must go on hand in hand. One cannot replace the other. They supplement each other.

In the past, we had only one means of strategical reconnaissance, while now we have two. Both are needed and should be employed in close teamplay. The air service can be charged with determining the depth and the cavalry the width of the hostile concentrations, in addition to their other general reconnaissance functions. It is as necessary now as formerly to cover the front of an army with a cavalry force, well in advance, for strategic and for tactical reconnaissance. The air service cannot always maintain contact. Many situations will arise when the work can be done only by cavalry patrols. It is essential that the cavalry in front of the army obtain early information as to the movements and dispositions of the enemy's forces. This is its strategic mission. It should have air squadrons to assist in the work; they augment the ground reconnaissance of the cavalry by more distant tactical reconnaissance. These air squadrons are in addition to those operating under the army commander.

The getting into touch with the enemy's cavalry with the view of bringing on the necessary fight to drive him from the field lies within the domain of tactical reconnaissance.

(b) Screening or Covering the Movements of Its Infantry.

The cavalry seeks early the opposing cavalry and drives it off. The reason is two-fold: First, to defeat and drive it from the field as early as possible, thus obtaining a moral superiority and facilitating the getting into touch with the enemy's infantry as soon as possible; second, by driving the enemy's cavalry from the field as early as possible our cavalry is able to place a screen in front of our own forces through which the enemy should not be able to penetrate. The same principle applies to the work of the air service.

(c) To Seize and Hold Important Points or Positions Until the Arrival of the Infantry.

In an advance, aside from its ability to reconnoiter over a larger extent of territory, and allow the unimpeded advance of the infantry, cavalry can render invaluable service by quickly seizing and holding important points until the arrival of the infantry. The Germans in their advance in 1914, by utilizing their cavalry well in advance were able to proceed, almost uninterruptedly, because of the prompt and early seizure of important points, notably river crossings. When bridges were found destroyed they were repaired before the arrival of the infantry.

(d) As Mobile Reserve.

As the hostile forces approach each other, the cavalry in front is gradually squeezed out and retired to the rear or to a flank, where, generally, it is held as a mobile reserve that can be rapidly moved to any part of the line or flank to stop a gap, to seize and hold a critical point until the arrival of the infantry, to relieve and assist hard pressed infantry, to exploit a success, to take up promptly the pursuit in case of success, or to cover the retreat in case of defeat. The cavalry was so used on various and sundry occasions during The World War.

One of the most important uses of cavalry in the hands of an able commander is as a mobile reserve. To place such a weapon so far to the rear that it cannot be readily called upon, to immobilize it, or to fail to utilize it would show at once a lack of conception as to the powers and limitations of the arm. On a large battle front, in no two parts of the field are conditions the same. A gap may be opened. An energetic enemy will at once attempt to rush a force through. If a mobile cavalry force is at hand, it can be quickly thrown in to save the situation.

A good example is the work of the II Cavalry Corps (French) near Luneville in August, 1914. Field Marshal Haig says, "Frequently when it was impossible to move forward other troops in time, our mounted troops were able to fill gaps in the line and restore the situation."

Or again, a gap may be made in the enemy's line. If now a mobile force is available, it may be quickly thrown

into this gap to push ahead and to exploit the advantage gained. Marshal Haig further says: "The absence of hostile cavalry at this period was a marked feature of the battle (The German advance of March, 1918). Had the German command had at their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been driven between the French and British Armies."

Had we had a sufficient cavalry force in the Meuse-Argonne operation there is no question that both in the early stages of that fight and in the closing stages such cavalry could have pushed through and rendered invaluable service. There is no doubt that a cavalry force pushed through to Sedan on the 1st of November could have cut off a large part of the German force to the west.

(e) To Pursue a Defeated Army.

To reap the most from a successful battle demands that there be at hand a body of fresh troops able to take up a prompt and energetic pursuit. For this a mobile cavalry command is the ideal force. If the command is large enough and energetic enough, the pursuit may be developed into a rout. An example of a successful pursuit may be seen in that by General Allenby's Mounted Desert Corps of the IVth Turkish Army and its practical annihilation. Marshal Haig says, "Finally during the culminating operations of the war when the German armies were falling back in disorganized masses, a new situation arose which demanded the use of mounted troops. Then our cavalry, pressing hard upon the enemy's heels, hastened his retreat and threw him into worse confusion." General Kavanagh, commanding the British Cavalry Corps, states that had the war lasted a few days longer his corps would have been able to capture thousands of prisoners and great quantities of material; that one body of Canadian cavalry was ten miles in front of the infantry on the morning of the 11th of November and picking up many prisoners.

(f) To Cover the Retreat or Withdrawal of Its Infantry in Case of Defeat.

In case our infantry becomes overwhelmed and is forced to withdraw, a mobile force to be utilized to stem the tide and to delay the pursuit until the infantry can with-

draw and organize in the rear is an absolute necessity. Our cavalry is particularly well fitted for work of this nature. With the fire power it has, it can hold position after position, thus delaying the enemy by forcing him to deploy, thereby gaining time. Having the horses near at hand, the cavalry can quickly withdraw and repeat the action in a new place. The difficulty of such an operation for a demoralized and exhausted, or defeated infantry is readily apparent. Both the French and the British made full use of their cavalry in this way in 1914.

(g) In Guerrilla or Irregular Warfare to Relieve the Infantry of the Burden of Hunting Out and Defeating the Enemy.

In guerrilla or irregular warfare, cavalry often plays a most important part. Its mobility enables it to hunt out the enemy which at times is almost impossible of accomplishment by foot troops. Cavalry has the fighting powers to defeat troops of the above mentioned type, after they have been located, without assistance from the infantry. In operations by a nation strong in cavalry against a weak military nation, the cavalry has always taken a most important part. In wars of this character there are generally at the beginning a few important engagements, conducted along the same lines as battles between two strong military nations, after which the weaker is forced to resort to irregular warfare. The cavalry of the stronger nation then takes up the burden of the fighting. Examples of this nature were plentiful in our Indian fighting between 1866 and 1896. Also in the latter part of the Boer War, in the Philippine Insurrection, and in the Mexican Punitive expedition in 1916.

(h) To Conduct Raids.

During the Civil War the cavalry of both sides was frequently used in raids. Raids may be defined as "isolated independent cavalry operations, conducted with secrecy, by rapid marches, usually avoiding general engagements. Their objects are various, but operations against the enemy's line of communications and depots and sources of supply are most usual." Whether or not raids will be advisable in any future war in which we may participate is problematical.

The improved telephone and telegraph facilities of the present day, to say nothing of airplanes, will make it difficult, if not impossible, to secure the secrecy considered essential to make a raid successful. It would seem that one of the first requirements would be the absolute supremacy of the air, otherwise it would be a comparatively easy matter to place troops so as to cut off the raiding party. On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that circumstances may arise which would make a raid a necessity, even at the sacrifice of the entire raiding force. The only question is whether the end justifies the means. War with a nation poorly supplied with an air service, or having none at all, may warrant raids on a large scale. While attempts on the enemy's distant communications may produce valuable results, they must not distract the cavalry from its true battle objectives. Many instances occurred in the Civil War where the absence of the cavalry on raiding expeditions seriously affected the success in battle. From the little literature available it appears that a number of raids were conducted on the eastern front during The World War.

To perform successfully the functions enumerated above our cavalry division is organized and given the means to act independently, *i.e.*, not in immediate conjunction with infantry. Therefore, while it is itself an auxiliary, in the sense that its primary function is to assist the infantry, it has as an integral part of its organization units of all the other auxiliaries and of all the services. It is the only auxiliary so organized. In this respect a cavalry division is similar to an infantry division, *i.e.*, both are organized for independent action and both have units of all the auxiliary arms and services as an integral part of their organization. They differ, therefore, only in *the part played in war* and in the technique of their methods of fighting.

An important point of difference between infantry and cavalry is in their different methods of fighting dismounted. Infantry formations provide great depth, the total being five or more men per yard of front, thereby enabling its units to continue the fight for several days, without relief. Cavalry on the other hand, has shallow formations, in many cases less than one man per yard of front, consisting only of the fighting line and local supports and reserves. The

firing line is made relatively strong from the beginning, and pushed with promptness and vigor against the enemy. The fight is won or lost in a few hours. This is an essential difference in their powers and limitations and should not be lost sight of. Much of the confusion connected with the role of cavalry is due to a misunderstanding of this characteristic of the arm.

In the utilization of cavalry, a clear distinction must be drawn between cavalry as such and mounted infantry. The present day cavalryman must be able to fight both mounted and dismounted. The mounted infantryman can fight only dismounted. He uses his horse merely as a means of transport. The history of The World War has proven that the days of mounted combat are not over. In the early days of a war when the opposing cavalry is trying for supremacy, mounted attacks, which may have deployments both in frontage and depth, by considerable forces of cavalry may be more or less frequent, usually in connection with a dismounted fight. There is no doubt that numerous occasions will occur for mounted attacks by small forces, even up to a force as large as a regiment. A combination mounted and dismounted attack is often advisable; and if circumstances are favorable, it will be successful. The attack, mounted and dismounted, of the British 2d Cavalry Division at Moreuil Wood on March 30, 1918, shows that the combination is still effective. In fact, it is more effective now than ever before.

One striking lesson of The World War is the complete education of the European nations to our American doctrine as to the use, armament, and handling of cavalry. Those countries that before the war had not accepted the doctrine of making a cavalry that would be effective mounted or dismounted have now accepted that doctrine and are reorganzing along those lines. To develop this doctrine to its maximum requires that the cavalry be armed not only with weapons for mounted combat, but also with weapons for dismounted attack which will put it on a par with foot troops. It is for this reason that machine rifles and machine guns have been added to the armament of our cavalry. The object sought is the increase in fire power to the highest degree. The balance between mobility and fire power must

be carefully preserved. If the fire power is increased beyond a certain point, mobility is lost, then cavalry loses its real function. Consequently, we insist that while fire power must be increased to the maximum, it must not be at the expense of mobility. Mobility is the deciding factor, and by that is meant not only mobility to move but also mobility to fight mounted when the opportunity presents itself.

Mobility demands careful training in horsemanship, ability to move across country, off roads, and over diversified terrain. Cavalry that upon arrival is unable to deliver an intense fire fails in its mission. If cavalry is tied down to roads, it then becomes a hindrance rather than a help.

Cavalry must also be able to move long distances in a short space of time and arrive at its destination fresh and able to fight at once. The French claim that large bodies of cavalry can move to distances up to 100 kilometers and be ready for action more quickly than infantry can be transported a corresponding distance by truck or rail. If all entrucking arrangements have been made and roads are clear and good, this claim might not be true; but owing to the frequent congestion of roads and the necessity for detrucking at a considerable distance back of the hostile position due to the enemy fire and to the long road space involved, the above conclusions are believed to be conservative. Another feature to be considered is that trucks are confined to roads whereas cavalry should be able to move off roads for days at a time.

In this connection, the view of Marshal Joffre, as indicating the changed views of the French, may be interesting. These were obtained from him in a personal interview by the A. E. F. Cavalry Board. The Marshal agreed with the guiding principles that "the usual method of combat will be dismounted. For this reason, fire effect, when dismounted, should be at least equal to that of a similar number of infantry. Mobility, involving the rapid execution of long marches, must remain unimpaired. Cavalry must remain, in armament, training and organization, capable of scouting cross country and capable of fighting mounted when opportunity presents itself. He expressed the view that the armament of cavalry must include a much larger allowance

of automatic rifles, machine guns and cannon, in addition to rifles. He stressed especially the importance of mobility, indicating that in order to preserve mobility the transport pertaining to the cavalry division must be very largely automobile. As to scouting, he expressed the opinion that cavalry masses could no longer reasonably be expected to achieve results in the service of strategic exploration, but that the airplane will have to be depended on largely for this duty. However, he emphasized the point that local scouting, particularly for the purpose of security and information, will always be a very important and necessary function of cavalry; that the tactical security of infantry cannot be obtained always by airplanes, as their observation is of necessity intermittent; but that with cavalry the enemy can be held under constant contact and observation. He also stated, as did Marshal Haig, that two or three German cavalry divisions would have been of incalculable assistance after the rupture of the allied lines in March and May, 1918." The thought seems never to have entered his mind that cavalry was a thing of the past. He considers merely that it must have a transformation. This, of course, is speaking only of the French cavalry which had not generally accepted our doctrine before the war.

As cavalry is provided with the means of engaging in a dismounted fire action, its tactical dispositions should correspond generally with infantry dispositions under similar circumstances. Cavalry should be thoroughly grounded in the methods of dismounted combat, and the cavalry dismounted instruction should correspond to that of the infantry. A few minor differences and changes are of course necessary due to the different organization, but these are immaterial or at least readily reconcilable. One striking difference is evident. Our experiences in Europe showed the necessity for disposition in depth for an infantry attack. The same reasons do not apply in the case of cavalry. Due to its mobility it can occupy a wider front which naturally means less depth. The danger of using shallow formations is counteracted by the presence of the infantry in rear which forms the ultimate reserve. Normally, then, cavalry will be employed on wide fronts with relatively little depth.

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CHAPTER II

Reconnaissance

In our *Field Service Regulations* reconnaissance is defined as "the military term used to designate the work of troops or individuals when gathering information in the field." This is a rather broad definition and would include all the activities of the Intelligence Section in obtaining information by means of secret agents, by the examination of prisoners and captured documents, etc. We are at present concerned only with the operations of bodies of cavalry and individual cavalrymen in acquiring information by personal observation.

In discussing cavalry reconnaissance it is usual to make a distinction between strategic reconnaissance and tactical reconnaissance. This distinction is based upon the kind of information that is sought and the purpose for which it is wanted rather than upon means and methods that are used in obtaining it. The main distinction is that implied by the terms themselves. *Strategic* reconnaissance seeks general information needed by higher commanders for making strategic plans. *Tactical* reconnaissance seeks detailed information needed by commanders of all grades for making tactical dispositions. Just as it is impossible to draw a clear dividing line between strategy and tactics, so is it impossible to make a clear cut distinction between strategic and tactical reconnaissance. The distinction here drawn must be considered as far from exact. It is intended to convey only a general idea.

Formerly, strategic reconnaissance was almost exclusively the function of the cavalry. Now, a great part of it is done by the air service. In the early stages of a campaign, before the cavalry forces of the opposing armies have come into contact, airplanes capable of covering long distances are sent far in advance to get the same kind of information that is sought by strategic patrols. These planes

cover that portion of the country containing the best routes by which the enemy might invade our country or we might invade his. They note such things as concentrations of hostile forces, large quantities of road traffic, cantonments, camps, etc.

It is not likely, however, that the airplane can ever entirely supplant even strategic patrols. The airplane has the great advantage of getting its information quickly and getting it back quickly. It is able to get a great amount of information, but there are certain kinds that can only be obtained by reconnaissance on the ground. Such, for instance, would be the negative information that the enemy is not in a certain locality. The air observer could not report with certainty that a locality is unoccupied, for the enemy might be concealed. Another instance would be information obtained by questioning inhabitants or prisoners. The air observer can learn little at night or in a fog. The enemy may have mastery of the air and at the same time be weak in cavalry. The best results will be obtained by supplementing the strategic reconnaissance of cavalry by air reconnaissance.

Reconnoitering Cavalry

An important duty of cavalry at the beginning of a campaign, and at other times, when the enemy is at a distance, is to get and maintain contact with the enemy's main body and to keep the commander informed of its situation and movements. To obtain these results, the commander of the whole force may employ a strong body of cavalry, generally at least a division, to push far in advance of the main army. The main mission of this cavalry force is strategic reconnaissance, but it also endeavors to prevent reconnaissance by the hostile cavalry. Since the hostile cavalry will probably have a similar mission, it will sometimes be necessary to defeat it before contact can be gained with the hostile main body. To defeat the hostile cavalry is also the most effective way to prevent its obtaining information of the main body of our army. The cavalry endeavors to obtain mastery of the ground between the two main opposing armies just as the navy seeks mastery of the sea. Defeat of the hostile cavalry is necessary to gain this mastery. "Effective reconnaissance requires

breadth of front; decisive tactical action demands concentration. The cavalry commander must reconcile these conflicting influences according to the circumstances of the moment; he must decide their relative importance at each stage of his operations." The commander of this cavalry force, therefore, deploys a portion of his force to advance on a broad front as contact troops or squadrons and follows with the bulk of his command concentrated. Between these two are detachments of varying size, to back up the contact troops and assist them in breaking through the hostile screen or in stopping the advance of hostile detachments. The actual reconnaissance is done by patrols sent out from the contact troops.

The idea one is apt to get of a cavalry screen from some of the books that touch on the subject is that it is a symmetrical formation consisting of a line of contact troops or squadrons at more or less regular intervals, preceded by patrols and followed by the bulk of the cavalry concentrated in one mass. Like most normal formations diagrammed and described in the books, this formation must be understood as one that would only fit conditions that will seldom be encountered. The diagrams help one to get a general conception of a screen but do not present even an approximately accurate picture. Screening is a function or employment of cavalry, not a formation.

The formations to be adopted by cavalry on reconnaissance and the methods to be used in gathering information are questions that must be decided in each separate case. This is true whether the force involved is a large body of cavalry or a small patrol. A controlling consideration is usually the strength and dispositions of the hostile cavalry.

The more information there is on hand before the reconnaissance starts, the more effective the reconnaissance will be. With a well developed army intelligence organization, an army commander should be able to give his cavalry commander some idea of the enemy's general situation even at the beginning of a campaign. It goes without saying that every bit of information that has been obtained by airplane reconnaissance, the secret service or other intelligence agencies should be furnished the cavalry commander. This information should be thoroughly studied by him and dissemi-

nated throughout his command in order that the reconnaissance may be intelligently and effectively carried out.

The orders given to the cavalry commander should make his mission perfectly clear. If more than one mission is assigned, he should be informed which is the most important mission. Unforeseen conditions may make it necessary to abandon part of his mission, and he must know which part is vital. The old rule, "Give the cavalry a large order," is a very poor rule unless the order indicates what part is essential.

It may be possible for the cavalry to defeat the hostile cavalry, to get definite information by contact with the enemy's main body and to screen its own army. On the other hand, conditions may make it impossible to accomplish more than one of these missions. If the hostile cavalry is found directly between the two armies, it may be possible to drive it out of the way and detach a force to watch it and keep it on the move so that it will have no time to reconnoiter. The remainder of the force can then be used for contact reconnaissance of the enemy's main body. On the other hand, the cavalry commander may have reason to believe that the hostile cavalry is off to a flank and not directly protecting the flank of its army. If the main mission is reconnaissance, he should not permit himself to be drawn off to one side in order to seek out the hostile cavalry. He should get and keep contact with the hostile main army. It was a favorite strategem of Ashby, when screening Jackson's force, to appear off on a flank or even in an entirely different direction from Jackson's main force. The Federal cavalry was almost invariably fooled and drawn after Ashby. Jackson was then enabled to attack where he was least expected.

It may be that such full information has been obtained by airplane reconnaissance or from other sources that the cavalry's main mission is to dispose of the hostile cavalry; or, the hostile cavalry may be in such a superior force that there is no hope of beating it or breaking through its screen. In the latter case, it is probable that the best that can be done is to prevent hostile reconnaissance and trust to long distance patrols working around the flanks or through the hostile screen by stealth to get information of the enemy.

The commander of the cavalry, having received his orders and studied the situation, makes his plans for carrying out his mission. In most cases, if reconnaissance is to be carried out on a broad front, the plan generally followed is to divide the front to be covered into zones and to assign a definite force to advance in each zone and be responsible for reconnaissance therein.

The strength of the force to be assigned to each zone will vary and depends upon the resistance to be expected, the difficulties of the terrain, the force available for the operation, etc. With our large troops, contact troops will be used more often than contact squadrons. Use of the term "contact squadron" in our service is probably due to its use in foreign books. A European squadron is about equivalent to our troop. The width of the zones assigned also varies according to circumstances.

The main body of the cavalry is kept more or less concentrated and marches by one, two or several roads according to circumstances. It follows the contact troops at such distances as will enable the cavalry commander to use it to defeat the hostile cavalry or break through the hostile screen.

In addition to the long distance strategic reconnaissance by airplanes operating directly under army headquarters, a very important part of the reconnaissance of the cavalry division itself is carried out by the observation squadron attached to it. The air patrols from this squadron should reconnoiter several miles in front of the mounted patrols to get not only the strategic information that the division is endeavoring to secure for the army commander, but also the tactical information that the division needs to continue its reconnaissance and to defeat the hostile cavalry. Its principal function is tactical work with the division. The observation squadron will also be of great value to the division commander in keeping him informed of the location of his various units and in carrying messages to them.

Contact Troops

Within the zone assigned him, the commander of a contact troop should be allowed great freedom of action in conducting his reconnaissance. Orders from superior authori-

ty define the approximate boundaries of the zone, regulate the extent of the daily advance, and should state the kind of information that is specially wanted. The troop commander conducts his march, sends out his patrols and supervises their work so as to attain the objects of the reconnaissance.

A contact group will sometimes have three kinds of reconnaissance to perform: strategic reconnaissance by officers' patrols sent far to the front to get contact with the hostile main body; tactical reconnaissance by patrols sent to locate bodies of hostile cavalry and obtain the information needed by the cavalry commander for the further conduct of the operation; and protective reconnaissance carried out by security patrols corresponding to troop advance and flank guards.

The troop will generally advance by successive bounds upon the road which appears most important for reconnaissance. Halting places will be selected with a view to defense and observation to the front as well as to communication with the rear. Since the troop must remain out for several days, a more rapid advance than about 25 miles a day should not be attempted. Everything possible should be done to avoid wearing out the horses. In some cases light wagons carrying rations and some grain will be able to accompany the troop, but as a rule this will be impracticable. The wagons will usually have to follow under guard several miles in rear and be brought up when conditions are favorable.

The number of patrols sent out will depend upon the importance of the task and the difficulties likely to be encountered. The troop commander should be sure that he has sent out enough distant patrols to get the desired information. When economy of force is necessary, it is better to economize on security patrols.

The strength of distant patrols, both strategic and tactical, will depend principally upon the number of messages they are expected to send back. When the opposing armies are still at a distance from each other, two messages a day will usually be enough. When the enemy is close and the troop and the cavalry commanders need prompt warning of changes in the tactical situation, more frequent messages will be required. If a patrol is expected to overcome resis-

tance, it must be given sufficient strength for the purpose. At times a whole platoon may be used as a patrol.

Arrangements should be made in advance for the relief of patrols. Every patrol sent out should know when and approximately where it is to rejoin the troop. The relieving patrol should take over the duties of the incoming patrol before the latter starts in.

Everything must be done to facilitate communication both with the patrols and with the main body. This will be a difficult problem even under the most favorable conditions. Mounted messengers will probably be the chief reliance for getting messages from patrols. The difficulty of getting information back through a hostile screen will in most cases render it futile to send out strategic patrols to sneak through the hostile screen, if the only way to get information back is to send mounted messengers back through the screen. The best course will be at first to devote most of the energy of reconnaissance to tactical reconnaissance of the hostile cavalry with a view to defeating it or to breaking through its screen. In the meantime, the air service will have to be depended upon for strategical reconnaissance. After definite information of the dispositions of the hostile cavalry has been obtained, the best course to follow will depend upon the efficiency of the enemy's screen and other activities of his cavalry. As soon as the hostile screen is broken up or pierced, contact patrols will get their chance to observe the enemy and get their information back.

If the road situation permits, motorcyclists may accompany the troop and be used for communication to the rear. They will be used more frequently with squadrons and regiments. In friendly territory full use should be made of commercial telegraph and telephone lines. When messages must be carried for long distances by mounted men, relay posts should be established as the troop advances.

Lateral communication between contact troops should be kept up whenever it is practicable to do so. Continuous communication is out of the question in the usual case, but a troop commander should take advantage of every favorable opportunity to send patrols to learn the location and progress of troops on his right and left. It is desirable for troops to assist each other when this can be done without

the usual case, the troop commander's report will be a summary of the information received from the patrols on his whole front.

Contact Patrols

The success of the whole reconnaissance of the cavalry depends in a very large measure upon the success of the reconnaissance by the patrols that are sent to get contact with the enemy's main body. The main function of the contact troops is to support these patrols and to make their reconnaissance possible. The proper handling of the patrols is a matter of the greatest importance. A patrol leader, before starting out, should be thoroughly familiar with the situation so far as it is known. He should know exactly where he is to go, what information he is to send in and where and when he is to send it.

To gain time at first, the patrol should keep to the road and advance rapidly until it reaches a locality where the enemy is likely to be encountered. As soon as such a locality is reached the patrol should advance by successive bounds and take every precaution to avoid discovery. It is not expected to get detailed information of the enemy's tactical dispositions and so should avoid approaching too close to the enemy. It should not attempt to penetrate the hostile outpost line unless it is impossible to get the required information by observation at a distance. Often it will be possible to find a concealed position from which the enemy's main dispositions can be observed. From such a temporary observation post, a patrol leader can determine such things as the location and approximate size of bivouacs or the direction of march and approximate strength of marching columns, and this is the kind of information that is wanted.

If the enemy advances, the patrol should fall back and select new positions from which to observe. The leader must keep constantly in mind the necessity for getting information back, and avoid getting into a situation in which he can get information but cannot get it back.

If it is necessary to penetrate the hostile cavalry screen, in order to get contact with the main body, the patrol should endeavor to do so by stealth. If discovered by a hostile patrol, it may be necessary for the patrol to fight. It should not hesitate to do so if that course seems to afford the best

chance of getting through. Having gotten through the hostile screen, the chance of getting messages back will be slight. The patrol will either have to wait for its supporting troops to beat the hostile cavalry, or work its way back through the hostile screen after getting the information for which it was sent out.

As the two hostile armies approach each other the cavalry of one side or the other will gain the mastery. If our cavalry is defeated and driven off, further reconnaissance may be rendered impossible. Any patrols that may not have been involved in the fight should make every effort to continue the reconnaissance and send what information they can to the nearest troops. Each patrol leader will be thrown entirely on his own resources and his task will become extremely difficult.

If our cavalry succeeds in driving off the hostile cavalry, distant reconnaissance develops into close reconnaissance as the two main forces approach each other. More detailed information is now needed. More patrols are required and more reports must be sent in. Being more closely backed up by the infantry less caution is necessary. Every effort is now devoted to learning the tactical dispositions of the hostile infantry. The army cavalry withdraws to a flank and continues its reconnaissance toward the enemy's flank and rear. Its duties in front are taken over by the corps or divisional cavalry. Since reconnaissance must be kept up without a break, some of the contact troops must be left in place when the bulk of the army cavalry is withdrawn. It is usually better simply to add these troops to the strength of the corps cavalry. If too badly worn out, they may be withdrawn to the rear through the infantry. At any rate there will be many patrols that will be unable to rejoin their organizations. They will have to join the nearest troops of the corps cavalry.

Corps and Divisional Cavalry

Tables of organization make no provision for the assignment of cavalry to a corps or to an infantry division. Under the A. E. F. organization two regiments per corps were prescribed. Such part of the army cavalry as is necessary will be attached to corps and divisions as required.

The force of cavalry with an infantry division (that has any at all) will vary from one troop to one regiment.

Generally speaking, corps or divisional cavalry conducts its reconnaissance on the same principles as the army cavalry, but the situation and mission of the body to which it is attached will make a great difference in the work required of it. If not under the control of an advance guard commander, the bulk of the cavalry will usually be kept together as corps cavalry. If part of it is used with the advance guard, the part so used will be attached to the division whose troops constitute the advance guard. In certain situations when two or more divisions are advancing abreast, each division may have cavalry attached to it as divisional cavalry, and each division may use its cavalry either with its advance guard or as the situation demands.

If advancing with an interior corps of the line and there is other cavalry directly in front, the principal work of the corps cavalry will be to protect its infantry from the reconnaissance of hostile patrols. Under these circumstances it will generally form part of the infantry advance guards (as divisional cavalry). It must keep up communication with the army cavalry in its front and keep fully informed of the situation and intentions of the latter in order that it may be ready to take over the duties of contact reconnaissance at the proper time.

If there is no army cavalry in front, the work of the corps cavalry will be more important and more difficult. Much of its strength will be required for the local protection of the infantry. At the same time it is necessary for the infantry to have information of the enemy in its front. Conditions will usually make it impracticable for the main body of the corps cavalry to operate more than a few miles in front of its infantry. Such part as can be spared from the local protection of the infantry will be too weak to venture very far from infantry support, and it therefore can not back up its patrols or assist them to break through the hostile screen. Its patrols must operate almost entirely by stealth since they cannot expect support. In a country having good roads this situation could be remedied by sending infantry in trucks to accompany bodies of corps cavalry sent to reconnoiter at a distance. In this case the cavalry

would do the reconnoitering and the infantry would furnish the necessary resistance. In the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese habitually furnished infantry supports (afoot) for their reconnoitering detachments. However, the Japanese accomplished very little in the way of distant reconnaissance. Most of their information was obtained through Chinese spies. The Germans used cyclists units to back up their cavalry in 1914.

Cavalry with a flank corps must use a greater proportion of its strength for protective reconnaissance than is necessary with an interior corps, for it must protect both the front and flank of the infantry. At the same time, such troops as can be spared for distant reconnaissance will have better opportunities to succeed. They will have more space in which to operate and will have a better chance to reconnoiter toward the enemy's flank and rear. For these reasons it will be advisable to increase the strength of the cavalry assigned to a flank corps.

Patrols that are sent from the corps cavalry to reconnoiter at a distance employ the same methods as those explained for the distant patrols sent out by other cavalry on the same mission. The principal difference is in the degree of caution with which the reconnaissance must be conducted. There will be few occasions on which it will be advisable for a patrol to fight. Reports from these patrols will have to be brought back through the enemy's cavalry and should not be entrusted to single messengers. A patrol of two or three men commanded by an intelligent noncommissioned officer will often be required to carry back important information.

When the two opposing armies approach each other and a battle is imminent, the corps cavalry is responsible for tactical reconnaissance until the infantry comes into contact with the hostile infantry. The patrols are now more closely backed up by the main body of the cavalry which in turn is backed up by the infantry. It is no longer necessary for the patrols to move with such great caution. It will frequently be desirable for a patrol to capture a prisoner or two in order to get identifications or to learn more of the enemy's intentions. If necessary for a patrol to fight at this stage, it can do so without being exposed to such great danger of capture. The best reconnaissance will probably be done by

those patrols that are able to secure temporary observation posts from which the dispositions of the enemy can be seen, for they will be able to get information back more promptly and with more certainty than those patrols that have come into actual collision with the enemy.

Reconnoitering Patrols

There is much that might be said in general about the conduct of reconnoitering patrols; this subject belongs to minor tactics. The following notes on the conduct of reconnoitering patrols review the main points to be remembered. They are extracts from a paper issued by the Cavalry School.

Duties of Officer Sending Out Patrols

1. Studies his mission in accordance with orders received.
2. Determines number of patrols to be sent out and strength of each.
3. Determines time when information must be back at starting point of patrol or time and place where it shall meet command, if enroute. This time is determined entirely by tactical requirements.
4. Determines time when patrols shall start.
5. Issues warning instructions to patrol leader in plenty of time.
6. *Issues orders* in presence and hearing of all men of the patrol. Always *written orders* if possible. Orders must be *repeated or read* and *explained* so that every member of the patrol hears them and understands them.

Form of Order to Patrol

1. (a) Information concerning enemy (only such information as is necessary for patrol to know in order to perform intelligently its work).
   (b) Information concerning our own troops. This covers:
   Other patrols sent or to be sent out.
   Location of, or general situation of *our own troops*, as far as may be necessary or wise to give it.
2. Mission of the main body (that is the force from which the patrol is sent out) and what it is going to do. If it marches, state when, by what route, on what point, at what rate of travel. Everything that the patrol leader should know so as to have teamwork with his commanding officer.
3. *Mission of the patrols* to which these orders are given.
   (a) General direction to be followed, or where to go.
   (b) Purpose.
   (c) Information desired.
   (d) Where and when to return.
4. Equipment, rations and forage to be taken, unless already provided for.
5. Where messages are to be sent.

In any case the mission must be stated in clear, definite, positive terms, leaving the patrol leader in no doubt as to exactly what is wanted or as to where he should go. The commander should assume himself the responsibility for the orders he gives, and should not resort to a hazy, foggy order, hoping that the patrol leader will in some way determine for himself just where the patrol is to go and what it is to look for.

After these orders are issued, the patrol leader should be allowed to ask questions. He should not hesitate to ask questions about anything he does not fully understand. He owes this to himself and to his mission. If the patrol leader asks no questions, the officer sending out the patrol may question him in order to be sure that he understands.

When there is time, the officer sending out the patrol should inspect it to verify the detail and inspect men, horses and equipment.

Duties of Patrol Leader

1. Upon receipt of warning instructions or of order, if no warning instructions are issued, he secures horses and men for patrol; inspects horses to see that they are in fit condition and well shod; replace those that are of conspicuous color or neigh when alone; has the horseshoer tighten loose shoes if there be any; has horses watered, and if time permits, fed before starting.

2. At assembly time he mounts the patrol and inspects it to see that no articles of equipment are carried other than those ordered.

3. He then organizes his patrol by designating a second and, if he considers necessary, a third in command.

4. If the officer who sends out the patrol is not present, the patrol leader reads his written orders or gives verbal orders to the patrol. *In all cases, however, the entire situation relating to the enemy and our own troops, the mission, when and where to return and place to which messages are to be sent must be explained and made perfectly clear to the whole patrol.*

5. A patrol leader should not send men on missions of reconnaissance far away from the patrol. For a small patrol the limit should be about 300 yards. If reconnaissance

to a greater distance from the line of march is necessary, it should be carried out by the whole patrol.

6. A patrol operating dismounted in "no man's land" in trench warfare situations must have a "get-away" man in rear. In open warfare situations, and especially for mounted patrols, no "get-away" man need be detailed. The patrol leader may need every man he has. At the smallest scrimmage a "get-away" man might, using his own discretion, gallop off, weaken the patrol, disclose its position or be captured and give away valuable information. In case of a sudden dash forward he may be lost.

The patrol must stay together and take the patrol's luck and chances. If it meets with a disaster, it is the duty of every man to fight and to escape the enemy. A small patrol should fight mounted. Somebody will almost certainly get away if all the others fall. Not until the leader is dead or captured and his successors meet a like fate, and there are no longer enough men left to perform their mission, should any man think of being a get-away man.

Conduct of The Patrol

1. Make it a rule never to send less than two men to make a reconnaissance to the flank.

2. While in general, a reconnoitering patrol avoids combat and operates under concealment, it fights if its mission demands it or if it can, without detriment to its mission, inflict loss upon the enemy or secure valuable advantages to its own troops. *In all cases the action of a patrol, so far as concerns fighting or avoiding a fight, is governed by its mission.* The patrol leader must consider that every hostile patrol in his rear makes his messenger service so much less secure.

3. The patrol and the parts thereof proceed by bounds. When crossing a ravine, stream or narrow valley, the two leading men should be on the farther side before the main body crosses. When approaching a crest the leading man should increase the gait and get up on it well ahead of the remainder of the patrol. Both men will then have time to look over the crest to the ground beyond before exposing themselves on the top.

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CHAPTER III

Advance Guards, Rear Guards and Outposts

The general principles that govern the operations of advance guards, rear guards, and outposts are applicable no matter what the composition of these bodies. We are at present concerned with the application of these principles to cavalry (a) when acting alone or as the predominating arm, and (b) when constituting a part only of an infantry organization on these duties.

Advance Guards

This subject will be considered under the headings:

(a) Cavalry advance guards, *i.e.*, when cavalry is the predominatmg arm.

(b) When cavalry constitutes a part only of an infantry advance guard.

Generally speaking, a cavalry advance guard is used with a cavalry command, although cavalry may constitute the predominating arm of an advance guard of an infantry command. The only important difference in its action is that in the latter case it must conform to the pace of the infantry.

Cavalry Advance Guards

Our *Field Service Regulations* define advance guard as follows: An advance guard is a detachment of the main body which precedes and covers it on the march.

Its duties are:

1. To guard against surprise and furnish information by reconnoitering to the front and flanks.
2. To push back small parties of the enemy and prevent their observing, firing upon, or delaying the main body.
3. To check the enemy's advance in force long enough to permit the main body to prepare for action.
4. When the enemy is encountered on the defensive, to seize a good position and locate his lines, taking care not to bring on a general engagement unless empowered to do so.
5. To remove obstacles, repair the road, and favor in every way possible the steady march of the column.

The primary function of an advance guard is to insure the uninterrupted advance of the main body and to give it time for deployment in case the enemy is encountered. It acts as a pivot of maneuver for the main body, and insures it freedom of action in its preparation for battle. This is the real reason for its creation, and the guiding principle in its composition, strength, formations, and operations.

In an advance a march order is issued, one paragraph of which prescribes the composition and special functions of the advance guard. Based on the march order the advance guard commander issues an advance guard order, under the provisions of which the advance guard is organized and operates.

The strength of a cavalry advance guard varies between one-twelfth and one-third of the entire force. The advance guard of a cavalry division generally consists of *all arms*, except infantry.

A cavalry advance guard, like an infantry advance guard, consists of a series of detachments increasing progressively in size from front to rear, each being charged with the duty of protecting from surprise, the body immediately following it, and gaining time for the latter to prepare for action. The leading elements are also charged with the duties of gaining and reporting early information of the enemy.

The advance guard is divided into two parts, a reserve and a support. The latter is divided into a support and an advance party. The advance party usually consists of from one-sixth to one-half of the entire support. The strength of each element from front to rear should be the minimum necessary to perform its functions of observation and resistance. The advance party must be strong enough to provide a point and also patrols for reconnoitering to the front and flanks.

The distance between the advance party and the support varies from 500 yards to 1 mile, depending on the strength of each and the character of the country. The advance party, like a patrol or flankers, must be able to see more than can be seen by the support. The distance will be less in a close country, in a fog or at night, than it would be in open country, in fair weather or in the daytime.

The support is the first body that possesses any real powers of resistance. It must be able to support its advance party and to hold the enemy long enough to give the reserve time to prepare for action. The relative strength of the support to the reserve depends on the character of the operations and the nature of the country. If the object is to force an engagement, the support will be relatively strong and will be followed at a short distance by the reserve. It is generally advisable to preserve, as far as practicable, the integrity of tactical units. If the support actually requires two troops to perform its functions it might be better to send the entire squadron. The same principle applies to larger or smaller units. All of the advance guard, except that portion actually needed with the preceding elements, marches with the reserve. The support usually consists of from one-fourth to one-half of the entire advance guard. Its distance from the reserve varies from 700 yards to $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

The commander of the support sees that the proper route is followed by the advance guard, and he should designate a qualified officer or man to perform this duty. This is important because if the advance party takes the wrong road it may throw the whole advance guard, or even the main body, off the prescribed route.

The distance of the reserve from the main body varies according to conditions, but generally it is from 800 to 1,500 yards for small forces, and from 1,000 yards to 2 miles for large forces. As forces become smaller the reserve, support and advance party, in turn, are omitted.

Flankers and patrols are detached from time to time from all elements of the advance guard to reconnoiter a designated point or area, and with orders to rejoin at a designated place or time. Unless there is a definite object to be gained, they should not be sent. When these detachments leave, they should be given a definite mission, with specific instructions where to go, what to do, and when to return. If conditions require that flankers remain out for considerable periods of time, their distances from the main body will depend on the character of the country. They must go where they can see better or get more information than can be seen or gotten by the column from which sent.

Patrols and flankers vary in strength from two troopers to a platoon. They usually consist of from two men to a squad. Generally speaking, a single patrol of two or three men can see as much as a single patrol of twelve men. However, in addition to their reconnoitering functions, they must be strong enough to provide messengers should the latter be required. A patrol may visit several successive places, from each of which a message is to be sent back to the column. In such a case troopers for messenger service must be included in the original strength. If, however, a patrol is to visit one point and return, no messengers are needed.

Patrols must also have strength to contend with hostile patrols. If the latter are strong, consisting of six to twelve troopers, the former must also be strong. The same rules as to strength apply to patrols that apply to other elements of an advance guard, *i.e.*, the strength should be the minimum consistent with a proper performance of their duties.

Signals prescribed in our drill regulations and service manuals should be freely used.

Because of the fact that considerable distances can be covered in short lengths of time, cavalry patrols are frequently sent to unnecessary points. This should be avoided. Such a use of the mounts soon breaks them down. The strength of the mounts should be conserved. It will be needed later.

There is no such a thing as a normal formation. The strength of the different elements, their composition, formations, distances and methods of operation depend upon the topography of the country, the character and intentions of the enemy, and the plans of the commander of the army.

The distances mentioned in the advance guard order are only approximations and are given as a general guide. For example, the advance party on approaching a crest of a ridge, should estimate the distance to the next crest and should if necessary increase its gait so as to reach it by the time the head of the support reaches the first ridge. The same rule applies to patrols and flankers. They must extend or reduce their distances so as to be able to see more than can be seen by the bodies from which they are sent. In other words, all elements of the advance guard advance by bounds. The bounds of the small elements are short and

frequent while those of the large elements are longer and less numerous.

If the advance guard contains as much as a squadron, machine guns should usually be attached. Their fire increases very materially the resisting powers of the support. In an advance guard consisting of a regiment, there usually will be attached units of all the auxiliary arms. Artillery is of great value to the advance guard in preparing the way for an attack and in compelling the enemy to deploy at a distance. Horse artillery has sufficient mobility for a cavalry advance guard.

Engineers, with necessary combat trains, should march with the support of large advance guards and with the reserve of advance guards of a regiment. Their principal function is to repair bridges, remove obstacles, etc.

The air service and cavalry should work in conjunction with each other. The planes must know the route of the cavalry and its subdivisions. They can communicate their information to the advance guard by radio, or failing in this, by dropping messages.

If a fight is imminent, the field trains of the advance guard are, as a rule, kept with the field trains of the main body. Conditions permitting, they march at the rear of the reserve. The combat trains of the support, especially in small forces, follow the reserve or may be farther to the rear. The combat trains are not as mobile as a cavalry advance guard. As a general rule, the trains of a cavalry advance guard are kept at least to the rear of the reserve, if not farther to the rear; thus preserving the maximum mobility of the troops.

Reliable means of communication must be maintained among all elements of the advance guard and between the latter and the main body. All of the prescribed methods should be available. Under our present organization, each unit from a squadron up has signal troops and equipment. These are sufficient to provide lines of information. It is usually practicable to use radio with the larger subdivisions of the advance guard. Squadrons and larger organizations are equipped with radio sets. By previous arrangement, they can be set up at certain designated times when all accumulated messages are sent and received. These sets can

then dismantle, pack and trot until they regain their place in the column. In large advance guards two or more sets may be used, one with the support and one with the reserve. Wire lines are not as a rule practicable during the march but may connect up all elements as soon as the day's march is over. Motorcycles are valuable when the roads are reasonably good, but on dirt roads, or in wet weather, they are not dependable. Pyrotechnics may be used under certain conditions. Pigeons are good especially for a few important messages from distant points. They can only be used, however, from the front to some fixed point in rear, and they are difficult to transport with the advance elements of an advance guard.

The mounted messenger is the most dependable and the most practicable means of communication during the march, and is faster than radio within 2 miles for uncoded messages and 5 miles for coded messages. Important messages should be carried by officers. Experience has demonstrated that a chain of connecting troopers is sometimes useful between elements of the advance guard. They should follow each other at distances of from 200 to 500 yards. The rule is that each trooper must be able to see the one next preceding and next following. By means of the usual signal they can quickly communicate orders for halts or starts, increase or decrease in gaits, and change of direction. Messages can be quickly passed from one body to another. For example, a trooper from the head of the reserve takes a message by increased gait to the connecting trooper next preceding, the latter to the next, and so on. Each takes the place of the man he relieves. As soon as a message goes back all the men are returned to their original places. This is not hard on the mounts as none of them cover additional distance. Messages between the advance guard and patrols and flankers have to be carried by messengers.

The marching message center should know all the means of communication at its disposal and should use those best suited to the conditions in each particular case. A resourceful message center will never fail to maintain, even under most adverse conditions, reasonably satisfactory lines of information.

As a rule, the different organizations of a command perform in turn the duty of advance guard. The advance guard also may be taken from a designated unit, say for instance, the leading brigade of a division or the leading division of a corps. In some cases the responsibility for providing the necessary advance guard is delegated to the commander of such a unit. In long columns it is impracticable to change daily the position in the column of the larger units as is done in the case of smaller units.

The advance guard commander is responsible for its formation and conduct. He should bear in mind that its purpose is to facilitate the march of the main body. Its own security must be effected by proper disposition and organization, not by timid or cautious advance. Its action when the enemy attempts to block it with a large force depends on the situation and plans of the commander of the whole force.

An advance guard should act aggressively. Timid or cautious action seldom gives decisive results. If the enemy is in the vicinity, patrols should be pushed well to the front to get and send back early information of his location and movements.

The use of patrols in front of the advance guard however is not to be adopted as a general rule. The situation should be studied and they should be sent out only when their use can assist in the accomplishment of the mission of the main body or the general functions of the advance guard.

The point, as stated above in discussing distances, moves forward by bounds from one point of observation to the next. On sighting the enemy, it should act at once. With cavalry especially, the body that acts first has a decisive advantage over a slower acting enemy. The former may gain a victory before the latter has made up his mind what to do. In a meeting engagement, the enemy's formation is generally more or less similar to our own. Patrols encounter patrols and the point encounters the point. When the enemy is sighted, a few men of the point usually remain in observation while the remainder attack mounted, either straight to the front or by a flank, depending on the hostile dispositions and the nature of the topography. An aggressive point invariably succeeds in driving back a less aggres-

the force moves against the hostile flank or rear. The same rule of action applies to the entire advance guard. In advance guard operations, even against infantry, so long as the advance guard is on the offensive, mounted action is of primary importance. A greater proportion of men may have to be dismounted than in a cavalry action; but the object of the dismounted fight should be to hold the enemy until the mounted troops can attack a flank or the rear. The enemy seeing himself about to be surrounded, will generally fall back unless support is near at hand.

If the enemy is in such a strength that an advance is impossible, the advance guard must take up the defensive, and each element of the advance guard must hold the enemy long enough to enable the following elements to prepare for action. If there is a good position for the main body near the front of the advance guard, the latter must endeavor to seize and hold it until the main body can occupy it.

The commander of each element of an advance guard, from the leading patrols to the reserve, inclusive, should continuously study the topography of the country and other conditions, have a plan of action always in mind, and be ready to put the plan into instant operation when the enemy is encountered. The commander who follows this line of action is always prepared for any emergency that may arise, he loses no time in considering what to do or how to do it, and he is thereby able to take advantage of any weaknesses in this respect on the part of the enemy. Moreover, prompt, decisive action inspires troops with confidence, and encourages them to act with boldness and aggressiveness. A spirit of this kind will often win where timidity will fail.

The commander of an advance guard must exercise judgment and make his dispositions in accordance with the nature of the ground and the character of the orders under which he is acting. There is no more important duty than that of an advance guard commander, and his responsibilities are very heavy. If he permits the main body to be delayed by inferior forces or surprised, or it is compelled to take action not in accordance with the plan of the commander, he has failed in his mission.

In a retreat, a small body of troops, called leading troops, is sent ahead. These troops are a substitute for an advance

guard. Their duties are to clear the road, to see that bridges, roads, and fords are prepared for the main body, and to disperse small parties of hostile inhabitants who may attempt to retard their march.

When Cavalry Constitutes a Part Only of an Infantry Advance Guard

In a composite advance guard, cavalry is especially well suited for the performance of the duties enumerated in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), and (5), *supra*. Its mobility enables it to reconnoiter to a distance and get its information back quickly. It has sufficient fire power to push back small parties of the enemy and to protect engineering parties engaged in repairing roads, etc.

The composition of the advance guard depends mainly on the size of the force, the plans of the commander, the distance separating the hostile forces, and the character of the country. Generally, an infantry advance guard should have cavalry attached for reconnaissance purposes. Artillery may not be necessary. In an open country, when the distances to be observed are great, the advance guard may consist in large part of cavalry. In a close, rough country, the proportion of cavalry in an infantry advance guard would usually be small. Experience has demonstrated that two or more factors, sometimes conflicting, have to be harmonized in the organization of an advance guard. The commander, therefore, must take all the conditions into consideration and so organize the advance guard as best to meet them.

The strength of the cavalry with an advance guard varies with the conditions previously discussed. In an open country with the enemy at some distance, cavalry might constitute one-half of the advance guard of a division. When the enemy is within a day's march and in close country, or with only a few roads to cover, the cavalry would probably consist of a squadron or less. The guiding rule is to have as much cavalry, and no more, as is needed to perform the legitimate functions of cavalry.

In a large advance guard, the entire support may consist of cavalry. As a rule, however, any such strength would justify using it on a separate mission rather than ty-

ing it to the advance guard. If there is sufficient cavalry the advance party may be composed of that arm only. This assignment would relieve the infantry of all, or almost all, the patrolling.

In the methods of operation, the same general principles apply to cavalry with an advance guard as to similar bodies in a cavalry advance guard. Due, however, to its being supported by infantry, the cavalry is not likely to have to offer as much resistance in a meeting engagement as a cavalry advance guard.

Cavalry Rear Guard

Covering a retreat is a special function of cavalry. It is preeminently fitted for this duty. A retreat of a cavalry force is covered by a cavalry rear guard. In a retreat of an infantry force, cavalry usually is assigned a special mission, but it may constitute a part of the rear guard. In covering a retreat, it is when acting directly under the orders of the supreme commander that the cavalry plays its most important role. As the subject of army and corps cavalry is covered in other studies, this discussion treats of:

(a) Cavalry rear guard, *i.e.*, when the rear guard is composed entirely of cavalry, or when cavalry is the predominating arm.
(b) Cavalry constituting a part of an infantry rear guard.

Cavalry Rear Guard

An infantry command in retreat generally uses its cavalry either on a special mission or as rear guard cavalry. It may use a part for one duty and a part for the other.

Generally speaking, a "cavalry rear guard" is used only with a cavalry command, but it may be used with an infantry force. Due to its mobility, a defeated cavalry force can withdraw more easily than infantry. If the pursuing force is infantry, the retreating cavalry can, within a few hours, clear itself of the enemy, so its rear guard functions soon cease to be of any great importance. If the pursuing force is cavalry, the retreat becomes more difficult and the rear guard duty of much greater importance. However, in this case, the rear guard duty is not so difficult as similar duty for an infantry force. This because the mobility of the retreating force is as great as that of the pursuing force.

When a commander decides to retreat he issues a retreat order, one paragraph of which prescribes the organization and duties of the rear guard. In the beginning of a retreat, the troops of a rear guard, when practicable, are selected from those that have had previous local successes, or have suffered little loss, and are comparatively fresh. After a retreat is once organized, the outpost of the night usually forms the rear guard of the following day. The composition of a rear guard is practically the same as that of an advance guard. A large rear guard generally contains units of all the auxiliary arms. There should be as many guns with the rear guard as can be effectively used and freely maneuvered. The effective use of artillery may obviate the necessity of deploying the other arms of the rear guard, the deployment of the enemy at a distance being compelled by the fire of the guns. The strength of a rear guard depends upon the nature of the country and the strength and character of the pursuing force. It cannot, like an advance guard, count on the support of the main body. As a rule, it corresponds to the strength of an advance guard on a forward march.

Based on the retreat order, the rear guard commander issues a rear guard order, prescribing the formation of the rear guard, its duty as a whole, and the duty of each element thereof. The rear guard order gives such detailed information as to formations and special methods to be employed as are necessary. Afterwards, instructions to fractions of the rear guard are generally brief and often must be verbal. They generally contain nothing more than the location of a position to be occupied by a unit; the designation and destination of troops whose withdrawal is to be covered; when to withdraw or break off the fight; route to be followed in withdrawal and whether it will be covered by other troops; where further instructions will be received and where messages will be sent. Reconnaissance of successive positions can generally be made by officers and troops detailed for the purpose. In addition, the rear guard commander should carry on such personal reconnaissance as time and situation permit.

The proximity and conduct of the enemy control, to a large extent, the formation of a rear guard. When it is

not necessary to withdraw in deployed lines, the greater part of the rear guard marches on the road in column of route, taking up a formation resembling that of an advance guard faced to the rear. The distribution of troops is therefore similar to that of an advance guard, namely:

Reserve.
Support.

The support, as in an advance guard, is divided into two parts. The part nearest to the enemy is called the rear party and marches with a rear point. Mounted engineers usually accompany the support and may be attached to the rear party. Machine guns are most valuable with a rear guard and should be freely used. The rear guard should, if possible, be entirely free from impedimenta, in order that, if separated from the main body by a considerable distance, it may close up by forced marches.

A rear guard, in its formations on the road, or on the line of march, is practically an advance guard reversed. It has from head to tail, its reserve, support, rear party and rear point. The same relative distribution of troops as an advance guard is maintained. The rear guard like the advance guard, does not work at fixed distances. It increases its distance from the main body in order to delay the hostile pursuit or to observe the enemy; and it then uses an increased gait to regain its distance.

The distances of the rear guard from the main body and between the fractions of the rear guard are about the same as in an advance guard. If marching at night, the rear guard draws nearer the main body. As the main body seeks to withdraw from the enemy as rapidly as possible, while the rear guard endeavors to delay him and watch his movements, it is clear that the distance between the two bodies cannot be definitely prescribed.

The commander of the rear guard should be a man of resolution and fertility of resources. He should constantly present a bold front to the enemy, and should ever be ready to fight, even to the extent of sacrificing himself and his entire command if necessary; but he should remember that the great duty of the rear guard is to gain time, and he should know when to withdraw. He should be able to distinguish the enemy's preparations for a serious attack from

insignificant demonstrations, and he should never allow the enemy to force him into a fight contrary to his own interests and intentions. No other situation in combat demands so high an order of skill in troop leading as does the withdrawal from action under the pressure of the enemy's attack.

The manner of withdrawing a rear guard from action depends entirely upon circumstances. As a rule, only a portion should withdraw at a time, taking up, if necessary, a new position, to cover the withdrawal of the rest. The guns, especially, must not all be withdrawn at once, as the total cessation of artillery fire would betray the movement. Whether the withdrawal should be by alternate squadrons or whether it should begin at the center or at a flank, depends upon the direction and progress of the attack and the topography of the field. Generally, a portion of the troops withdraw first, and when they are again in position or enroute, they are followed by the remaining troops. The withdrawal should never be a difficult matter if it has not been delayed too long.

Patrolling must be carried on with vigilance and energy, especially on the flanks. The enemy, finding a firm front opposed to all his direct attacks, will undoubtedly attempt to cut in on the flanks, where, in fact, always lie his most promising hope of success.

Cavalry Constituting a Part of an Infantry Rear Guard

Generally speaking, cavalry constitutes a part of a rear guard:

(a) When it is too weak to cover the withdrawal by acting alone.

(b) When the close proximity or aggressiveness of the pursuing force makes the combined operations of infantry and cavalry necessary to cover the withdrawal of the retreating force.

(c) When other conditions, such as the character of the operations or the nature of the topography, make combined action preferable, or make independent cavalry operations impracticable.

(d) When a retreat is covered by army cavalry and the divisional or corps cavalry is attached to the rear guard for local reconnaissance and to keep in touch with the army cavalry. For the performance of this duty, if the cavalry is not a part of the rear guard, it is assigned its mission by the division or corps commander.

In a mixed command, rear guard duty will usually fall to the lot of cavalry. For this duty cavalry is peculiarly

well fitted due to its ability to use fire power, to withdraw quickly from a dangerous situation, to use a variety of actions, and to strike at the flanks. This does not mean that cavalry should consider itself tied to the rear of a slowly moving column. No other duty calls for greater activity. The mission is to protect the rear of the main body, and rapid action against an overbold or incautious enemy or a blow against his flanks will have far more moral and material effect than purely defensive action. Cavalry must use the mobility that is characteristic of the arm.

The same general principles as to composition and strength govern in the organization of a composite rear guard as in a cavalry rear guard, with the exception that infantry is the predominating arm. If cavalry is available, it generally constitutes the entire support. In a large rear guard, units of all the auxiliary arms are attached. The distances between the different subdivisions of the rear guard are generally not as great as in a cavalry rear guard. However, in a composite rear guard the cavalry must be allowed great latitude in this respect, as it can close up without great difficulty. If in sufficient strength, the cavalry, assisted by the artillery and machine guns, is expected to offer the primary resistance to the advance of the pursuing force. The infantry of the rear guard only comes to the assistance when the cavalry is unable to hold the enemy at a safe distance. In the latter case the cavalry covers the withdrawal of the infantry and again takes up the burden of offering the first resistance to the pursuing force.

The cavalry must profit to the utmost by the defensive features of the ground, and at every opportunity take up a strong defensive position. The enemy will then have but two courses of action open to his choice, either to attack with the heads of his columns, or to deploy for action. If he chooses the former, his advanced troops should be easily repulsed; if the latter, he will be compelled to lose time in deploying, while the rear guard (which should wait until the enemy's dispositions for attack are about completed) should quickly ploy and disappear from his front, only to repeat the operation at the next favorable ground. In the meantime, the enemy, unable to advance quickly in deployed lines, again loses time in changing to a

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Artillery, especially horse artillery, is extremely useful for delaying the enemy. In mixed commands some should be assigned to the rear guard. It is usually with the reserve, although some may be with the support.

A mounted section of engineers generally accompanies the cavalry and completes demolitions after all friendly troops have passed. The destruction of bridges is a most efficacious way of delaying the enemy, but care should be exercised not to cut off the retreat of the rear elements. Also, important bridges should not be destroyed without orders from the supreme commander unless closely pursued, as to do so may cause interference with his plans. It is usually sufficient merely to disable the important bridges by removing planking.

The column is usually withdrawing from the enemy and reconnaissance is modified accordingly. The cavalry seeks to maintain contact with the enemy, not only with his advance troops but with *his main body* as well. Its special duty in the way of reconnaissance is to cover the rear of the main body, not only on the road by which it is retreating, but on parallel roads; so that the enemy while engaging the rear guard with a portion of its force cannot slip by it on a parallel road and strike the main body or cut off the retreat of the rear guard.

If it is necessary to make a stand, one determined stand in a good position is usually preferable to several half-hearted ones. The cavalry may not be able to deceive the enemy more than once as to its strength. If it has a good position it should hold fast as long as it is safe. The cavalry should be kept as well in hand as conditions permit. All movements should be as simple as possible, and as far as practicable, straight to the rear.

The spirit of the cavalry should be that of the attack. It should not confine itself to an indecisive passive defense but should assume the offensive whenever occasion offers, and should turn upon the pursuing enemy.

When the main body halts, the cavalry at once establishes itself as a *march outpost*. As a rule very little change of position or formation will be called for. The point, reenforced if necessary from the advance party, immediately ocupies commanding positions on or near the

line of march providing good observation and defense, and continues energetic patrolling.

When the pursuing force is composed of cavalry, the rear guard will fear especially for its flanks. The pursuing cavalry may push in vigorously against the rear guard on the line of march, but its chief concern will be to reach a flank position from which it can observe the main body of the retreating force and delay or disorganize it by sudden and determined attacks. It may further attempt to get between the main body and the rear guard and cut off the latter or drive it from the rear of the column. Therefore, the cavalry must reconnoiter well to the flanks and keep the commander of the forces informed of any movement toward that direction.

Cavalry can charge bodies of the enemy that have been thrown into confusion by the pursuit, or by the fire of the artillery; but its chief reliance will be on dismounted fire action or a combination of mounted and dismounted action. It can take up almost any position that the infantry can, and thus compel the deployment and retardation of the enemy, while its superior mobility enables it to regain rapidly distance lost. Good cavalry of the American type is the life of a rear guard.

Outposts

Outposts are detachments thrown out from a force when halted, for the purpose of protecting it from surprise. Like advance guards on the march, outposts are charged with the duties of observation and resistance. They prevent the reconnaissance of the position by the enemy's scouts and patrols, give warning of the approach of hostile bodies, and offer sufficient resistance to the enemy's attacks to enable the main body to prepare for action.

An outpost consists of stationary bodies of troops, occupying a defensive line for the purpose of covering its own main body while at a halt. The majority of the troops on this duty remain in one place. Those performing outguard duty go only from their supports or other central body to their posts. While on this duty they are practically stationary. Patrolling at night is more or less limited as to distance and can be better performed on foot. For short distances and

in a close country a mounted man is at a disadvantage because his horse can be seen and heard by the enemy at distances much greater than can a dismounted man. Furthermore, a mounted man can see no more than a dismounted man, and he cannot hear as much. Similarly, in daylight, a stationary post is somewhat handicapped by its mounts. The horses must be guarded and taken care of, and if possible, kept out of sight of the enemy's patrols, both on the ground and in the air, and protected from hostile air bombs and machine guns. If the enemy is near, the mounts cannot be used for close in patrolling.

It is a fundamental principle of the employment of cavalry never to use it for a duty that can be better performed by dismounted troops when the latter are available. Except as explained in paragraphs under "Outpost Cavalry," outpost duty for an infantry command is not a legitimate function of cavalry, and its employment on this duty is a misuse and a waste of its strength. It can therefore be asumed that it will not be so used in the American Army.

When cavalry is operating on an independent mission or is not under the protection of an infantry outpost, it must of course provide its own outposts. The discussion will, therefore, treat this subject under two headings:

(a) Cavalry outpost, *i.e.*, when covering its own cavalry.
(b) When performing limited duties as a part of an infantry outpost.

Cavalry Outpost

The halt order, issued by the commander of the main body, contains a paragraph prescribing the duties of the outpost. It generally prescribes the strength and composition of the outpost and designates the general line of resistance.

The principal duties of outposts are to give warning of the enemy's approach and to stop or delay his advance. They seek early information of the enemy's movements and endeavor to prevent reconnaissance by his patrols.

In a brigade or smaller force the detail for outpost duty is generally made from the main body. The new outpost may become the rear guard the following day. When, as in large forces, an advance or rear guard performs such duty for several days, the outpost during this period is furnished

by such covering detachment, and orders for the establishment of the outpost are issued by the advance guard or rear guard commander. When the command is small and stationary for several days, the outpost is relieved daily. In large commands, the outpost will, as a rule, be relieved at intervals of several days. The period of outpost duty will largely depend on the severity of the service.

The extent of the front and the strength needed for the line of resistance, as influenced by the nature of the country and other circumstances, usually determine the strength of the outpost. It must in any case be sufficient to furnish the troops deemed necessary on the line of resistance with sufficient additional strength to furnish the groups needed in the line of observation. It should be kept down to the lowest limits consistent with the performance of its duty, seldom exceeding one-sixth of the command.

The outpost commander issues the outpost order, in which is prescribed the subdivision of the outposts, the location of the line of resistance, the position of the reserve, if any, and such special provisions for security and reconnaissance as are deemed necessary.

An outpost is generally divided as follows:

(a) A line of outguards, or observation groups.
(b) A line of supports.
(c) A reserve (in large outposts).

The sentries, posted at favorable points but concealed as far as practicable, watch to their front and flanks and together with the outguards from which posted form the line of observation. The outguards, dismounted, are in the immediate vicinity, under cover. At night and in special cases double sentries may be posted.

The supports form the line of resistance. They are posted on roads or other avenues of approach from the front, are dismounted and under cover, and strengthen their position by obstacles and intrenchments.

When an outpost consists of a force larger than a squadron, it usually has a reserve. The reserve is generally in one body approximately in rear of the center of the line of supports. Its position is on a main road or avenue of hostile approach. It should be so located as to facilitate its deployment on the line of resistance.

The supports must each have sufficient strength to furnish the strength needed on the line of resistance and to provide men for patrol duty. Generally speaking, an outpost of one squadron or less would have no reserve. In forces larger than a squadron about one-third to one-half might be held in reserve.

The distances between fractions of outposts vary greatly according to circumstances, but ordinarily distances between the elements should not exceed those which can be covered by fire of the weapons of the outpost troops. In large commands the outpost should protect the main body from artillery fire. This is impossible in small commands, the outposts of which will seek to protect the main body from rifle and direct machine gun fire. The outposts are relieved every 24 hours, and the sentries every 2 hours or oftener.

Sections of the outpost line are usually assigned to commanders who are held responsible for constant readiness for action and also for timely warning to the troops in rear.

Machine guns and horse artillery with the outposts are located so as to sweep open spaces and lines of approach.

Suitable arrangements must be made for feeding, watering, and mess.

Facilities for intercommunication must be developed to the fullest extent, and information from different sources must be forwarded without delay to superiors. The lines of information are established and operated by the same means as in an advance and rear guard. Due, however, to an outpost being stationary, the difficulties to overcome are not so great. More use can be made of wire lines.

A large outpost is composed of all arms. Its functions are similar to those of an infantry outpost.

Whether cavalry can have its field trains with it when on outpost depends largely on the character of the work of the previous day. If it has pushed far to the front and has been maneuvering and fighting against an active opposing cavalry the chances are that its field and combat trains cannot reach it. Cavalry habitually carries one day's grain and two days' rations on its horses. Each troop also carries on a pack animal a light field kitchen equipment and its picket line. Fires would almost never be permitted in ad-

vance of the supports, and those allowed would have to be carefully masked. Light spring wagons are most convenient in delivering cooked food to the men on outpost. Whenever any wheels at all can reach the command, cooking can be done well in rear and the spring wagons can be pushed forward under cover of night if necessary, even to the supports. They can be withdrawn before daybreak and the men will have had two cooked meals. If the wagons remain during daylight, they must be placed under cover, particularly from air observation.

The main body, and the reserve should there be one, must find concealment and shelter if possible. In camp or bivouac, if the enemy has effective aircraft, the only concealment is woods. In Europe billets may be available. A village offers better concealment for men and horses, better shelter, more rest, and, as a rule, better watering facilities. Billeting means, however, that men and horses are scattered. Therefore, the interior alarm system must be more accurately worked out. Every man in the command must understand where his alarm post is, whether with the horses or in the close defense of the village.

Except for those patrols which are sent some distance in front of the line of observation and whose mission could best be performed mounted, the horses of cavalry on outpost duty should be assembled with the supports or reserve on troop picket lines where they can be unsaddled, groomed, and given proper feed and rest. Only when it is anticipated that the command will move before daylight is it justifiable to keep the animals saddled throughout the night. Usually cavalry in the field is anchored to its horses. The picket lines should therefore be so situated as to be behind the line of defense which the commander intends to hold in case of enemy attack.

When Performing Limiting Duties as Part of an Infantry Outpost

The support of an infantry outpost may consist of infantry or cavalry, or both, or of cavalry and artillery, or of all three arms. The proportion of the different arms depends upon circumstances. In an open country, in daytime, the duty can be best performed by cavalry. In a

close country, at night, and when the enemy is near, infantry is preferable. The best performance of the duty requires a combination of the two arms. Cavalry occupies lookout stations too distant to be held by infantry, or patrols to a distance beyond the outpost that would be impracticable for the latter arm.

When cavalry is used with an outpost, it should be employed in constant and vigilant patrolling as far to the front as may be consistent with reasonable precautions for safety, but a squadron should not be used where a troop, or perhaps a few small patrols, could perform the duty equally well. If the duty of patrolling and occupying detached posts does not employ all the cavalry of the outpost, the rest should be held in hand by the outpost commander with, or near, the reserve, at a point on one of the main roads leading toward the enemy, whence it can be quickly sent forward in any emergency requiring its action.

three squads may be formed on the same general line; or, it may attack in three waves or echelons with one squad in each. An additional sergeant is provided to have charge of the led horses when the platoon dismounts to fight on foot, and an additional private is provided as orderly for the platoon leader.

The troop is composed of three rifle platoons and a machine rifle platoon. The machine rifle platoon is similarly divided into squads, each of which is composed of two machine rifle crews. The machine rifle platoon may be employed as a unit to afford fire power while the remainder of the troop maneuvers mounted, or in conjunction with one or more of the dismounted rifle platoons. When the entire troop engages in dismounted combat, the machine rifle squads habitually join the rifle platoons, one machine rifle crew joining each flank squad of the rifle platoon.

The troop may be formed in line, line of platoons or squads, or as foragers; or in column of platoons, fours, twos, or troopers. It may deploy all three rifle platoons in one echelon, or with two platoons in the leading echelon and the other in a second wave or in support; or in three waves or echelons with a platoon in each.

All deployments are made fanwise, and the elements are led directly from their place in column to their position in line. Similarly all assemblies are quickly made by leading the elements directly to their positions in the designated formations. All such changes can be quickly accomplished by increases of gait.

The changes in formation can be made quickly, especially at increased gaits. The great beauty of the system is that the leader is truly a leader. He should never have to look over his shoulder, but he should always be watching his chief, the enemy, or the ground in front of him. In this way cavalry in the approach can take advantage of every concealment and defilade the ground affords.

Formations to Decrease Vulnerability Under Fire

Whenever it is necessary to cross a fire swept zone the commander of a body of troops must decide what formation will have the minimum vulnerability consistent with the necessary control of his unit. Regarded as an abstract propo-

sition (without considering terrain, space available, convenience of subsequent employment, etc.), the formation which gives the minimum vulnerability will permit only the minimum control and vice versa. To illustrate—A line of foragers with wide intervals, is the least vulnerable of all battle formations and the most difficult to control. A solid column is the most vulnerable and the easiest to control. When under the fire of artillery, machine guns or rifles, a formation that has (continuous) depth is more vulnerable than one without depth, because a single bullet or projectile may go through several men and the enemy's errors in range are greater than his errors in deflection, making the dispersion of his fire greater in depth than in breadth. Under artillery fire, a main consideration is to prevent the possibility of many men being put out by a single shell-burst. In many cases this has led to the adoption of a line of small columns with intervals between them. Even under artillery fire alone this formation is more vulnerable than a line of foragers, for it is easier to hit and a hit would put out more men. When used, it is because it is easier to control than a line of foragers and not because it is less vulnerable. Under *observed* fire, a body of troops, if advancing, is less vulnerable in echelon of columns than in line of columns, because it requires the enemy constantly to change both elevation and deflection. Under unobserved zone fire, the two formations are equally vulnerable, while the line of columns is easier to control and therefore preferable.

Taking all these things into consideration we may list mounted battle formations in reverse order of vulnerability as follows:

1. Line of foragers.
2. Echelon of columns.
3. Line of columns.
4. Columns.

In 2, 3 and 4 the vulnerability obviously increases with the strength of the columns.

Mass is not considered because it is not a battle formation. It is the most vulnerable of all. Line is not considered because the terrain will seldom permit its use for any considerable distances. If used, it would be less vulnerable than column and more vulnerable than foragers. Its comparative vulnerability to line of columns would de-

pend upon the length of the columns and the intervals between them.

In the formations just discussed we have been considering the front line only. If the command were deployed in a succession of lines (formations), the same remarks as to vulnerability would apply to each of the successive lines.

Speed is one of the main factors that lessen the vulnerability of all these formations, but it does not affect their *comparative* vulnerability one to another. The greater the speed, the fewer the casualties. It also increases the enemy's difficulties of ranging.

In order to simplify the discussion of the comparative vulnerability of different formations, it has been necessary to leave out of consideration such things as cover afforded by the terrain, difficulties caused by the terrain, space available for the command, the tactical mission of the command, etc. These are factors in every situation. The decision as to what formation to adopt is part of the tactical decision of the commander. The only general rule that can be followed is to move with as much speed as possible, and, especially if under observed fire, use as irregular a formation as is consistent with proper control in order to outguess the enemy.

The Mounted Attack

Mounted action is used either in extended order or close order depending upon the character and formation of the enemy and the terrain.

Extended order, that is, a formation as foragers, is usually used against dismounted troops, artillery and trains. It may also be used against mounted troops that are themselves in extended order, or, with very small groups using pistols, against the hostile flanks.

Close order is usually used against a mounted enemy in close order.

When attacking dismounted troops the effect of the hostile fire is lessened by the extended order deployment. Such an attack is always made in successive waves or lines of foragers when it is possible. Small forces may have to attack in one line of foragers instead of in several successive lines, but a single line is never as effective as several lines.

The reasons for selecting the mounted attack against dismounted troops, instead of the dismounted attack, must be based on the probability that the rapidity of movement across the fire swept area, thus reducing the time of exposure and the probability of hits on the swiftly moving targets, will result in less losses than would occur in a dismounted attack on the same objective. This must always be a matter of judgment made more accurate by experience. The character and condition of the enemy, as well as the distance from him and the nature of the terrain, will have much weight.

Against mounted troops dismounted action is dangerous if the command is isolated. It permits the enemy to take full advantage of his mobility and to proceed by avoiding combat, or to gain the flanks or rear of the command. If these conditions are not considered disadvantageous, dismounted action may be resorted to when there is time, but it must be remembered that this method takes on the nature of defense instead of attack. If a mounted enemy does not choose to attack, nothing can be gained by attempting to attack him dismounted, because he will not wait to receive such an attack.

In the *mounted attack against a mounted enemy*, successive lines or waves are not practicable unless they follow preceding lines at such distances that they retain the power to maneuver so as to avoid piling up on the preceding lines. If a preceding line charges and is successful, the enemy retires and there is no need for succeeding lines to charge over the same ground. If the preceding line is unsuccessful, it must retire to a flank and must have space to be able to do this without blocking the advance of a succeeding line over the same ground. A sufficient distance must be provided, therefore, to give succeeding lines room to maneuver, or unsuccessful lines room to retire. This applies especially when attacking with the pistol, but is also important when using the saber. It does not apply when attacking dismounted troops.

The several units may be echeloned on each other, and the whole attacking echelon may be followed by a reserve at such distance that it can retain freedom to maneuver in any direction.

In narrow spaces such as inclosed roads or defiles, it may be necessary to attack with extremely narrow fronts. In such cases it is better to launch to the attack very small units in succession rather than to charge with a large force in a single column. The size of the force selected for each successive charge will depend upon the space for deployment. The succeeding units should march well on one side of the road or defile so as to allow the charging units if repulsed to retire without throwing succeeding units into disorder. If a unit is successful in its charge there is no need for succeeding units to do more than follow it up closely.

As to the pistol and saber, recent developments have shown the pistol to be a very powerful and useful weapon in close order as well as in extended order. It is probable, therefore, that the saber will be employed as a sort of reserve weapon, to be used if the pistol cannot be utilized or if ammunition is exhausted. When attacking in successive lines, with distances less than 150 yards, it will be necessary to use the saber in the succeeding lines, the first line only using pistols. In units as large as a troop or larger, the distances between the several lines or waves would seldom be less than 150 yards, so that either pistol or saber could be used. The state of training and confidence of the men in one or the other of the two weapons should determine which is more advantageous.

Undulating ground, if not too broken by serious obstacles, is the best for mounted attacks as it affords shelter and does not impede the force of the attack. But cavalry can attack mounted over almost any kind of ground not covered with artificial obstacles such as wire entanglements. If the ground is too broken for close order movements, extended order may be and usually is quite feasible. Ground that is too rough or broken for saber attacks is often quite suitable for pistol attacks.

The front required for the attack as foragers will limit such an attack to forces no larger than a troop because of the difficulty of control. The troop extended as foragers will cover nearly 300 yards of front. If the terrain permits the deployment of more than one troop in line, all the major can do is leave the control of each troop to its captain, indicating to him his objective and mission. With the squadron

the simplest form of open order attack will be in successive lines of foragers, each line composed of one troop led by its captain. The major indicates the objective and the distance at which the successive lines are to follow the leading troop. In such an attack each line after attacking rallies to a flank as quickly as possible to avoid the fire of the line which follows or continues on to other assigned objectives in rear. In every case, though, the major holds out a reserve, which retains close formation as long as possible.

In the charge the horse really becomes a weapon if the enemy is not protected by some obstacle preventing violent collision. To be successful in the pistol attack, the troopers must be trained in accuracy in firing to the front, in rapidity of loading, and in withholding their fire until within close range of the enemy. The ability to handle and control their horses is essential to either case. Pistol attacks in close order are quite as feasible as saber attacks, and with trained troops are very formidable.

Cavalry Against Cavalry

Let us consider first the action of cavalry against cavalry. This will usually consist of mounted and dismounted action, although combats of small forces, squadrons or less, will more frequently consist of mounted action.

There is no such thing as a normal attack. The situation in each case will determine the formation and method. However, in every mounted attack there will be a primary articulation into an attacking echelon and a reserve. The relative strength of the attacking echelon and of the reserve will depend upon the situation, the size of the force attacking, whether acting alone or as part of a larger force. In the case of a platoon, one or more squads may be held in support; in a troop one or more platoons may be held in support; in a squadron one or more troops may form the reserve. Ordinarily, the bulk of the troops will be in the attacking echelon.

The attacking echelon may attack in one line or in successive lines or waves. The method will be indicated as a rule, but in many cases the leader of the unit designated for the attacking line may have to use his own judgment

and so conduct his unit as to meet the particular situation. The reserve will follow the attacking echelon at from 100 to 400 yards. No set rule can be laid down. The distance will vary in every case depending upon terrain, condition of the horses, position of the enemy and so forth. Its function is to follow in such a position in rear as to support best the attacking line, to meet a counter-attack, or to press a pursuit as the occasion demands.

In mounted attacks the endeavor should be to strike the enemy in flank. For this purpose a unit may be specifically designated for the flank attack. This is in addition to the reserve. Its leader should so conduct it as to fall opportunely upon the enemy's flank. At times a unit may be designated to guard against a flank attack or an enveloping attack by the enemy, when either can be definitely foreseen. This, too, is in addition to the reserve. If no unit is assigned the duty of guarding against flank attacks, it devolves upon the reserve.

Except in small forces it will be usual that the best success against mounted troops can be attained by deploying the attacking echelon into two or more waves with sufficient distances to permit maneuver, or the several waves being echeloned on each other. The succeeding waves, being echeloned or following the preceding ones at maneuvering distances, protect the flanks of preceding waves and outflank enemy resistances, which may check the advance of the leading wave. The reserve will be charged with protecting the flanks of the entire attacking echelon, of striking the deciding blow in a close contest, of engaging in the pursuit of a defeated enemy, or of forming the rallying point about which the assaulting echelon may reorganize in case of defeat.

In units larger than the platoon the leader can generally only indicate the objective, unless the latter is obvious, designate the limits of the attack and state the special missions assigned to each line or wave, and in some cases the weapon to be employed. There is scarcely time for more detailed orders. Under some circumstances only commands or signals can be utilized. In any case not specifically covered each leader must use his own discretion. This applies to the elements of the attacking line as well as to the support and reserve.

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through to the led horses, either by direct attack or by maneuver, and placing the dismounted enemy afoot.

Every effort should be made to keep the enemy in doubt as to the direction of the main attack, to strike him in flank or in an oblique direction combined with envelopment. Favorable opportunity for mounted attack will be presented if the hostile cavalry can be caught while emerging from a defile, when it can be caught in column, in the act of changing formation, when it can be taken in flank and in general when it cannot quickly deploy equivalent forces to meet an attack.

The led horses of the opposing dismounted cavalry are always a desirable objective. However, the leader must always consider whether the capture or driving off of the led horses will be of greater advantage than the damage that may be done to the dismounted opponent by attacking him in front or flank. In other words, the attack of the led horses must not be allowed to assume undue prominence to the neglect of the dismounted elements. It may be advisable at times to seek out the led horses thereby placing the enemy afoot if such an action will nullify the future efforts of the opposing cavalry. However, generally speaking, efforts should not be concentrated on the led horses unless their whereabouts are known definitely and their loss to the enemy will have a decisive effect. The protection of his led horses is always a source of worriment to the dismounted cavalry leader, frequently needlessly so. Their capture may have as much effect as an attack on the dismounted elements and much less loss. The effect which will be produced must be the controlling factor.

SCOUTS. — During the approach march and the advance, cavalry should be preceded by covering patrols or scouts who will observe for the enemy, select suitable route according to the terrain, open fences and otherwise assist and expedite the forward progress of the assaulting units. When the final advance begins which will terminate in the collision of the opposing forces, these scouts or covering patrols are absorbed in the assaulting echelon. The distance at which they will precede the command will vary with the terrain, the proximity of the enemy, and the nature of the attack which is to be delivered. Specially trained scouts

from the leading elements of the command should be employed for the purpose.

COMBAT PATROLS. — In addition to the scouts, cavalry about to engage in combat will need combat patrols to provide for the immediate security of the flank or rear. They are limited in numbers and strength to the minimum. When required it is the duty of the immediate commander of the attacking line to see that combat patrols are provided.

In the squadron or larger forces it will be necessary to combine mounted action with dismounted fire action; the mounted action being the deciding factor and the dismounted action forming a pivot of maneuver. Similar action may be taken with the troop. In the combined mounted and dismounted attack, the dismounted elements form a pivot of maneuver which holds up the enemy or causes him to deploy, while the mounted attack strikes him in flank. Machine guns are especially valuable in this use as also are the machine rifles.

Dismounted Action

Cavalry can dismount from one-fourth to all of its strength depending upon whether its horses are to be left mobile or immobile. By mobile is meant that the horses can be moved from one place to another rapidly and without confusion by leading. This means that sufficient personnel must be left as horse-holders to handle the animals and lead them. One man can easily handle and lead three horses besides his own. Horses are immobile when they cannot be moved rapidly or quickly from one place to another. Mobility enables the horses to be quickly moved from one place to another, but it has the objection that it involves withdrawing a large percentage of the troops from the dismounted firing line. The advantages and disadvantages of immobility are just the reverse.

As a rule troops are dismounted for dismounted action from column of fours, although they may be dismounted from any formation. The leader either gives instructions as to the dispositions of the led horses and the men still remaining mounted, or in the absence of such instructions, the noncommissioned officer in charge of the led horses disposes of them in such a manner as to facilitate rapid mount-

ing and in the best cover available in the immediate vicinity. Frequently they will have to be moved, but, unless it is necessary, they must not be moved beyond the immediate protection of the firing line. The horses should be kept as close to the firing line as cover and concealment will permit.

When the horses are left mobile only 75% of the total number of rifles is made available, but this method will be adopted invariably where it is desired to form a firing line hastily, or when the leader desires to be able to maneuver quickly. This demands that the horses be kept close up so as to be available quickly, also that they be so faced as to facilitate quick mounting and movement away; that is, they should be so faced that a unit can at once be moved in the desired direction upon mounting. In offensive action this method of dismounting will be almost invariably the rule.

On the other hand if it is desired to use the entire fire power of the unit, it will be necessary to immobilize the horses. This may be done by coupling horses head and tail or by linking them in circle. Either method enables the leader to place his entire strength on the firing line but reduces the maneuvering ability. The disadvantages are that the horses are tied down to one place. They form a prominent target, especially to aircraft, unless carefully hidden. If discovered, they cannot be moved readily. This method will be adopted more frequently in the defensive but there is no invariable rule. The situation itself will determine the method in every case.

In almost every case a guard will be necessary for the led horses. This is true especially in the action of cavalry against cavalry. The cavalry leader must always consider the protection of his led horses. In the case of a troop operating alone the troop commander is responsible. If the troop is in squadron, this duty develops upon the squadron commander. The size of the guard is so dependent upon the situation that no rule as to its size can be laid down. Only a few men may be required in one case whereas another case may demand a proportionately greater strength.

Constant reconnaissance both to the front and flanks is essential. Where possible this should be done mounted.

The reconnaissance should be pushed well out to the front and flank rather than to the flank and rear.

The dismounted action of cavalry will approximate closely that of infantry. It may almost be said that cavalry dismounted action can be divided into two characters; one the cavalry character and the other the infantry character. In the first instance cavalry may find itself on the flank of a column, opposed by a light detachment holding a defile or an approach, opposed by hostile dismounted cavalry, or in any situation in which speed and quick fire power are necessary to make up for its lack in numbers. In any such situation it should deploy on a comparatively wide front, putting as many rifles into the firing line as it can, while keeping its horses mobile. Only small local supports are held out and the greatest possible fire power is developed in the shortest time possible. The reserve is kept mounted and mobile. If this is not sufficient to drive the enemy in the direction chosen, it can disengage itself and try from another direction. Or it can develop as much fire power as possible utilizing a mounted fraction to gain the flank or rear. Its main value, that of rapid maneuver, due to its mobility, should never be lost sight of. Cavalry should be impressed that it should never deliberately enter into a fire fight if there is any possible chance of accomplishing its task by maneuver.

Every cavalry leader of whatever grade must always view each tactical situation that confronts him with the idea of maneuvering to accomplish his task. The endeavor should always be made to gain the flank or rear of his opponent, be he cavalry or infantry.

Cavalry can operate on a wider front relatively and in a more dispersed formation than infantry. The main reason for this is that it will not be called upon for the long sustained effort that usually falls to the infantry. Therefore, there is not the same need for reserves. The bulk of its forces should be placed in the attacking line. The infantry, when present, must be considered as the ultimate reserve. Cavalry's lack of depth must be compensated for by its mobility and power of maneuver. The effort should be made to deploy so as to bring a converging effect to its fire and a consequent divergence to that of the enemy. Com-

manders should not hesitate to leave wide intervals in their lines in the initial deployment, provided conditions are favorable and a mounted reserve can be kept close at hand.

It is almost an invariable rule that cavalry attacking dismounted should hold out a mounted reserve. This is true especially in the dismounted action of cavalry against cavalry. This reserve is necessary to meet a mounted attack of the hostile cavalry, if one should develop, and to take prompt advantage of any success that may be attained.

The principal value of cavalry dismounted action is in its ability to form quickly a firing line by reason of its mobility and the speed by which it is capable of doing this. It should remain mounted as long as possible, dismounting as close to the front selected for the attack as the terrain permits. When dismounted it should advance to the attack as does infantry. It should move in column or line of columns until exposure to hostile fire demands a deployment. Small supports will be held out, but as a general rule the effort should be made to get as many rifles as possible on the firing line in order to secure the necessary fire power. This means a line of skirmishers at wide intervals with supports in column or line of small columns as long as possible, on until necessary to incorporate them in the firing line or to deploy as skirmishers to avoid losses.

In the infantry character, where cavalry finds itself opposed by heavy resistance and with little opportunity to maneuver, it can well take a page from the infantry note book and attack well distributed in depth, with its front lines thinly deployed and its supports and reserves in small mobile columns. It must have the same covering and supporting fire from artillery and machine guns as the infantry. If a deliberate attack is called for, its formation should be similar to that of the infantry. The line will be pushed forward by rushes or by infiltration, and every effort made to close with the enemy as soon as possible. The cavalry has no bayonet, but it is believed that the pistol can take the place of the bayonet when the time comes for its use. Ordinarily cavalry should not be called upon for this purpose. "One arm should never be used for a job for which another arm is better fitted if it can be avoided."

It must be remembered that cavalry cannot produce as many rifles as a corresponding body of infantry. For example, the troop can produce a little more than the strength of an infantry platoon, the squadron a little more than the strength of a company, a regiment a little less than the battalion.

The cavalry squadron is the attack unit that corresponds to the infantry battalion. The major designates the troops to form the assaulting echelon and those to constitute the reserve. He may designate the size of the troop supports to be held out. He orders the deployment and conducts the approach march to conform to conditions of mission and terrain. His reserve gives him a weapon to protect his flanks, to meet counter-attacks, to initiate pursuits, or to cover defeat. He makes provision to cover his flanks but this in no way lessens the responsibility of any troop commander who finds himself with an exposed flank.

The lack of depth and the necessity for surprise fire point to the vital necessity for careful training in musketry in order to obtain the maximum effect from the comparatively few rifles in the firing line. Vacillating skirmishing, which produces little effect, is to be avoided. The fire attack must be pushed forward with vigor.

Quickness in dismounting, in moving horses to shelter, and in opening an accurate, well distributed fire of the maximum volume, combined with mobility and maneuver, are characteristics of good cavalry in dismounted action.

In the attack it is sometimes necessary to designate a base unit. The other units conform but their penetration is not regulated by that of the base. The penetration of one must facilitate the advance of another, precisely as with infantry. In a similar manner reinforcements should be sent in where the going is good, not where it is difficult.

Large bodies of cavalry will have artillery attached to them. It may, by its fire, limit or hinder the maneuvering of hostile bodies in the rear which might endanger the attack. As artillery will only be attached to larger bodies of cavalry its greatest employment will be in the pivot of maneuver to support either the dismounted attack, the mounted maneuver, or both. In the conflict of cavalry against cavalry,

artillery will have greater need for immediate and close protection because of the mobility of the enemy and the gaps in the line. There will probably be many chances for small hostile bodies to filter through and approach close to the guns whose attention will be devoted probably to bigger things. The principal defense of cavalry against hostile artillery fire will be concealment and speed of movement.

Machine guns and machine rifles greatly augment the fire power of cavalry. There are many who believe that the number of automatic firing weapons should be increased materially. Both machine guns and machine rifles will be useful in forming pivots of maneuver which by their fire can cause the deployment or arrest the progress of the enemy while the mounted attack maneuvers to strike him in flank. Cavalry machine guns must fight well forward and without over regard to their loss. This is probably the main difference between infantry and cavalry machine guns. They must rely upon their mobility to get away or to move from one position to another when the time comes. If high ground can be secured, machine guns can be utilized for fire over the heads of the attacking line almost to the moment of the mounted clash. They can then be turned on the formed enemy bodies in rear which constitute the greatest menace to cavalry's mounted attack.

The combat trains of infantry are almost invariably with the unit to which they belong. With cavalry this disposition will be the case less frequently, especially if long and rapid marches are to be made. In such cases the combat trains are generally combined and directed to probable places of need. The individual cavalryman can carry a greater amount of ammunition that the infantryman, as part of it can be carried on the horse.

The advance of large bodies may be on one road or several roads, depending upon the ease of marching and conditions of subsistence, forage and water. In large bodies, parallel roads should be used whenever possible, but when combat is imminent the command must concentrate; that is, the columns must be near enough to each other to insure co-operation.

When combat is imminent the command should be closed up and so disposed as to be ready for instant action,

with the enemy; fire power to take full advantage of the situation in which its mobility has placed it. Maximum mobility and maximum fire power are incompatible. Of the two, mobility is of more importance.

This strongest and most useful attribute of cavalry—mobility—is easily destroyed by ill-considered, unnecessary and indefinite missions. Widespread tasks of reconnaissance to undetermined places to seek indefinite information, merely in accordance with some formula for the use of cavalry is certain to waste away the strength of the arm and to immobilize it without accomplishing any useful result. Care must be taken to avoid frittering away a cavalry command. The bulk should be held intact and used as a mass. While cavalry should be able to respond to any demand placed upon it, care must be taken that this demand will not be such as to exhaust prematurely the animals. Mobility and efficiency of a mounted organization depend upon the condition of the horses.

Personal reconnaissance by the commander is essential whether the contemplated action is to be mounted or dismounted. He should always be well to the front, accompanied by several staff officers and if possible by the leaders of the principal subordinate units. During the approach march he should go to some point where he can see the ground over which his command may be launched in the attack. Nothing can take the place of a personal reconnaissance. However, inadequate knowledge of the ground should never cause the commander to hesitate to send his troops into action in case of emergency.

It is no disparagement to the other arms to state that cavalry leaders must have special qualifications. The speedy course of a cavalry battle with its sudden changes requires special qualities. The leader must be vigorous and active; he must have good judgment, a firm will, sound tactical knowledge and be a man of quick decision. The latter is important for his decision must be made quickly or his chance is lost. Where the infantry leader has minutes to decide the cavalry leader has seconds. Furthermore he must be able to express himself in brief and clear orders.

CHAPTER V

Cavalry Defensive Action

The Field Service Regulations class defensive action as:

1. Passive defense.
2. The defense seeking a favorable decision.

A passive defense is defined as one in which the object is to avoid giving the enemy a decision, and in which the idea of offensive combat is absent. The term "defense seeking a favorable decision" is self-explanatory. There are two types of passive defense, each of which is frequently adopted by cavalry. As the method of handling the defensive in each case is in many respects different it is essential to understand the distinction. One—termed the purely passive defense—is that in which a stubborn and protracted resistance is contemplated. Examples of this type are; seizing and holding a position until the arrival of the infantry; holding the crossing over some obstacle—holding an isolated position. The other, which may be termed the temporary passive defense, is that in which the resistance contemplated is temporary, a withdrawal generally being made with the idea of taking up another position or positions further to the rear. The best example of this type is the delaying action.

Instances of cavalry acting on the defensive and seeking a favorable decision occur most frequently when one portion of the command takes the defensive (pivot of maneuver) while the other seeks an opportunity for offensive action.

A passive defense is of course undertaken only when circumstances force it. In the defense seeking a favorable decision, the defensive may be voluntarily assumed by a part of the troops while the remainder seeks an opportunity of assuming the offensive later, at the most advantageous time. Action against the flank or flanks of the enemy is then most often indicated.

In true defense, cavalry fights only dismounted. When cavalry is mounted, it knows only the mounted attack and has no defensive power. Instances of firing mounted to check advancing infantry or cavalry are quoted, but they are rare. The only conception of a mounted defensive is one in which troops, by withdrawing mounted, entice a pursuing enemy under the fire of machine guns, or of artillery or of a dismounted firing line.

The Defensive Position

A position defended by effective rifle, or rifle and machine gun fire, may be made so strong in front that it can be held by a comparatively small force against a frontal attack.

The weakness of the defense by dismounted cavalry lies in the flanks and in the necessity of protecting the led horses.

In a purely passive defense, an essential requirement of a good position is not only a clear field of fire to the front and exposed flanks for several hundred yards, but also that combat groups be so located that they can mutually support each other by effective flanking and cross fire. The length of front should be suited to the size of the command, and the location should be such that the enemy must attack or abandon his plans. Obstacles along the front, cover for supports and reserves, and good facilities for communication in rear are highly desirable. Impassable obstacles on the flanks add greatly to the strength of the position. Cover from view for the led horses as well as cover from hostile fire should be sought. Particularly is this so if the enemy possesses superiority in the air and it is desired to hold the horses immobile. In a temporary passive defense, as many of the above requirements as are possible should be secured. A good field of fire at long ranges is absolutely essential, and especial attention should be paid to obtaining cover for the led horses close to the firing line and to routes of withdrawal, good get-aways.

In the "defense seeking a favorable decision" all the foregoing requirements are desirable, except at times the obstacles. In the selection of a position it is well to have the position held by the troops on the defensive (the pivot

of maneuver) offer the troops acting on the offensive an opportunity to maneuver without coming under fire and under view of the enemy. If the position does not accomplish this, some concealment prior to the maneuver is desirable.

In the selection of a position in all the foregoing cases, proper places for the artillery and machine guns are to be considered. Frequently the securing of these places is the controlling factor in the selection.

Occupation of the Position

In considering the occupation of a defensive position by cavalry the following principles must be borne in mind:

(i) The squadron is a tactical unit best suited to independent assignment and to carry on the fire fight.

(2) The deployment is not in a continuous line but in groups, with wide and varying intervals, and with these groups so disposed as to utilize to the best advantage the inequalities of the ground. The better the field of fire, the wider is the interval between groups.

(3) The occupation is in relatively greater width and correspondingly less depth than in an infantry force of the same size.

An exception to number 3 above occurs in case stubborn resistance is contemplated; as for instance holding a position until the arrival of infantry (purely passive defense). Here the horses would normally be rendered immobile and held well to the rear, and the occupation would be similar to that of infantry.

If the action is to be broken off before the troops are seriously engaged, the horse furnishes a means of prompt abandonment of the position without the difficulty that would be experienced by infantry thus extended. The additional width of the position secures additional fire power, while the mounted reserve permits a quick reinforcement of a threatened point.

It is a recognized military principle that the number of men required to defend a position depends less on its front than on the facility of access to the various portions of it. Bearing this principle in mind, it is readily seen why cavalry, with the mobility the horse affords, is justified in occupying a much wider front than a corresponding force of infantry.

Time permitting—a reconnaissance to select the position, and afterward of the selected position, is made. This includes the determination of suitable locations for the machine guns and artillery. The commander then assigns to his subordinates the front to be occupied by their commands. These, in turn, subdivide the front among the next lower units of their commands.

In the larger commands the front is usually divided into sectors and a regiment assigned to each; the colonel assigning to squadrons portions of the sector allotted to regiments. The major locates such fire, communicating and cover trenches and obstacles as are to be constructed. He assigns troops to construct them and details troops to occupy them.

When time and means are available the position should be fortified. This work will usually be limited to the simplest means, such as demolitions, obstructions and construction of rifle pits or sections of fire trench. Buildings and walls heavy enough to afford protection against rifle fire and shrapnel may be included in the line of defense, especially if they extend the view and enlarge the field of fire.

The most effective protection against artillery fire is concealment. Every effort should be made to secure it and to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main defenses. If possible the position should be viewed from the direction of the enemy to ascertain whether the measures for invisibility and deception are effective. Ranges should be measured and marked, and troops made familiar with the distances.

The reconnaissance and assignments to position having been completed, the command is moved as close to the position as circumstances permit. The mounted command should not be exposed to view if avoidable, and the possibilities of becoming exposed to the indirect fire of hostile artillery or machine guns must be considered.

When the horses are to be held mobile, the command, having moved forward, is dismounted, and the horse-holders take the horses to the rear and place them under such cover from view and from fire as may be available. When the horses are to be held immobile, it is well to dismount at the points they are to be held and to march the rest of the way

to the position. If an immediate occupation of the position is necessary, the command may be moved mounted as close to the position as is advisable, and the horses may be led to the desired position in rear. Such of the horse-holders as are not needed with the immobilized horses then rejoin the command.

If cover from fire is not available in rear of the firing line, the led horses should be echeloned in rear of the flanks in order to escape the effects of hostile fire directed at the dismounted firing line. They should be held in groups corresponding to those of their riders and if mobile should be so disposed that when mounted they can be moved at once in what is presumed will be the desired direction. Locations readily accessible are sought for the led horses. These locations and the routes thereto should be definitely known by the group commanders and by the groups, and no change made in them without immediate notification being furnished to the group commander concerned. In the purely passive defense, the horses are normally held immobile and well away from the contemplated action.

The commander who decides to undertake a serious fire action must realize that by dismounting he has severed his connection with his horses for a very considerable time. He will find himself in error should he anticipate that after having become deeply engaged the fight can be readily broken off and the horses remounted without serious loss to the defending force. Experience in the Palestine campaign showed that when the enemy possesses airplanes, even without superiority in the air, immobilizing the horses by coupling or by circling is impracticable. Overhead cover must be secured or the horses held mobile.

In defensive situations, other than the purely passive defense, the led horses are usually held mobile unless the terrain favors holding them immobile close to the firing line. It is impracticable to lay down in figures the distance from the firing line that the led horses should be placed. The following must be considered in determining this distance; the terrain; the expected duration of the combat; the amount and the activity of the enemy cavalry; whether or not the enemy has machine guns and artillery.

Combat and field trains are held well to the rear and so disposed on a side road, the road situation permitting, as to enable them to move to the front or to the rear as the development of the situation may demand. In the defensive a plentiful supply of ammunition is a requisite. Under favorable circumstances this, as well as entrenching tools may be brought up by the combat trains and the trams then returned to the rear. If the combat wagons are not to be moved up, both the extra ammunition and the entrenching tools are carried up by the troops.

The provision of a sufficient guard for the led horses is a matter of moment to the cavalry commander. At times the ground features may be such that but a small guard is necessary. In fact only large enough to straighten out entangled horses. Again the situation may be such that a large fraction of the defending force is employed on this duty. When the enemy's cavalry is numerous and aggressive, a relatively large guard is desirable. When only infantry is present, the guard may be greatly reduced. The closer the led horses are placed to the firing line the smaller the guard required. Machine rifles with the led horses are of especial value as their fire can be readily brought to bear in any direction. When a mounted reserve is present it usually furnishes sufficient protection, although even then it is well to post around the led horses enough patrols for both reconnaissance and security. When immobile the horses are helpless and greater precaution against attack is necessary than when they are mobile.

Artillery is pushed well forward in concealed positions but affording an opportunity for direct laying with but little movement of the guns.

As with infantry, machine guns constitute the framework of the defense. In the purely passive defense they are normally distributed in some depth, but in other situations the bulk if not all of the machine guns are placed well to the front to permit a maximum of fire being brought upon the enemy at the opening of the engagement. If the direction of the hostile main attack is not clear, the machine guns are often held in reserve until this is determined. Enfilade fire is sought. Care should be taken to see that they cover the flanks of the position, the avenues

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arms to force an early deployment of the enemy, thereby creating additional delay. However, should the enemy have marked superiority in artillery, it is better to withhold fire until a specially favorable target appears rather than to subject the position prematurely to hostile shelling. Vigorous bursts of fire are then used.

The small arms also use bursts of fire. Having accustomed the enemy to these, a withdrawal may be commenced as one of the bursts ceases without exciting suspicion. It will often be of advantage to withhold the fire of machine guns and not to disclose their position until the enemy's main attack is under way.

When offensive action is to be taken by a part of the command, continuous reconnaissance should develop the time and the place to undertake it and should determine whether it is to occur mounted or dismounted. Should the commander desire to control this offensive, either as to time or place, definite orders should issue on the subject. If it is to be left to the discretion of the immediate commander, the latter is so informed prior to the initiation of the main action.

In the "defense seeking a favorable decision" the portion of the command taking up the defensive should be so disposed as to invite attack. Efforts are made, while dismounting but few men, to give the impression of strength in the firing line. Artillery and machine guns aid in accomplishing this.

These troops are so disposed that the enemy may expect a favorable decision provided he carries out the attack against them with sufficient force.

The force to be used in the counter-stroke is detailed from the first and kept in reserve concealed from the view and the fire of the enemy, in so far as is practicable.

When the situation clears, it is echeloned in rear of the flank from which the counter-stroke is to take place.

In situations in which this location is neither desirable nor possible, a base for attack should be selected which is out of range of the enemy's fire. Effort is made to have the attack come as a surprise. To accomplish this it is necessary to prevent the enemy from observing the conduct of the maneuvering mass—the reserve. Energetic

and aggressive action is used against his patrols. Points overlooking the field of maneuver are occupied early in the action.

Throughout the action in any class of defensive, patrolling must be thorough and constant. Any neglect of this may bring about disaster.

Breaking Off an Engagement and Leaving a Position

In breaking off an engagement and leaving a position it is most difficult to determine the exact time to disengage so that the led horses may be reached, the command successfully withdrawn, and yet the maximum possible delay and loss imposed on the enemy.

A premature withdrawal neither secures the requisite delay nor inflicts sufficient punishment.

On the other hand a withdrawal too long delayed results in unnecessary casualties to the defender and may even eliminate him from further effective action. Should the led horses and the troopers be subject during the withdrawal to serious hostile fire, not only are the horses liable to stampede, but the troopers who successfully mount and ride away are apt to become demoralized and a subsequent assembly of them difficult.

It is manifest that the difficulty of withdrawal increases with the progress of the action.

In determining how close a dismounted enemy should be permitted to approach before withdrawing from a position, the following must be taken into consideration: Distance away the led horses are held; amount of cover from fire and from view in the rear of the position; character of the routes of withdrawal; character of the terrain over which the enemy must pass to reach the position or to reach a suitable position from which he may bring effective fire on the retreating forces.

If the foregoing favor the defenders, the enemy may be allowed to approach to within 600 yards of the position before withdrawing; if the retiring force be a troop or less, to within 300 yards, and under especially favorable conditions to even a less distance.

If conditions are not favorable, the withdrawal is made when the enemy is from 700 to 800 yards away.

Machine guns of the enemy which have been pushed well to the front will add to the difficulty of the defender's withdrawal.

The enemy should be kept in ignorance of the purpose to withdraw as long as possible, and having become accustomed to bursts of fire from the defenders, the withdrawal should commence immediately after one of these bursts.

Scouts may be utilized to locate the routes of withdrawal for their commands and to serve as guides to the led horses and from their locations to the next position to be occupied or to a previously designated assembly point in rear. If the defensive combat is to be continued in retreat with a view to delaying the enemy, the commander must keep his troops well in hand and place them in a succession of defensive positions which the enemy is compelled to attack or turn.

When the defending force has not become seriously engaged, the defenders may simultaneously evacuate the position. To accomplish this successfully conditions must be favorable. However if they are sufficiently so, even a large force may be withdrawn in this way. Again, part by part withdrawal from a defensive position under cover of bursts of fire from the parts remaining is advisable. The troops at the greatest distance from their horses and those having the least cover in their rear, should be among the first to be relieved, while those with horses close at hand and having cover immediately available should hold to the last.

In a withdrawal of the above character, consideration must be given to the order of withdrawal of the machine guns, machine rifles and riflemen.

The length of time required to withdraw a machine gun from its position is greater than that required for a machine rifle or rifle. In consequence of the above, the safe withdrawal of the whole command requires that the elements needing the most time to disengage be the first removed. At times however it will be advisable to leave a small number of machine guns along the front to conceal

the fact that the withdrawal has commenced and to assist in holding the attackers at a distance.

When the defending force has become seriously engaged, as before stated, successful withdrawal becomes difficult. If the action cannot be maintained until night and the withdrawal conducted under cover of darkness, some small detachments will have to be sacrificed to secure the retreat of the main body. The artillery keeps up its fire as long as possible and disregarding the hostile artillery turns its fire upon the advancing riflemen. Various especially strong supporting points in the position will be occupied, and the force withdrawn under cover of these. The defense of such supporting points, which are provided with machine guns, if available, must be conducted with the utmost obstinacy.

Frequently the defense ends in the capture of the strong points, but the end gained is worth the sacrifice. Experience has shown that the attacker is apt to make desperate efforts to overcome these points and in so doing to forget to pursue the withdrawing masses of the defender's troops.

The withdrawal is sometimes made under the protection of the reserve which may be used in rear, but preferably on a flank. Under protection of its fire the units engaged are withdrawn followed later by the reserve.

Under favorable conditions, a mounted charge from a flank may be made to disengage the firing line, the latter withdrawing during the confusion thus created.

Reserves

Whether the reserve is to be held mounted or dismounted or both is determined by the character of the action contemplated and by the terrain.

When the country is unsuitable for mounted operations or when a stubborn resistance is to be made and a counter-attack may become desirable the reserve is held dismounted. Its uses when so held are to protect the flanks against enveloping movements, to make a counter-attack or to cover a withdrawal of the firing line. It should be so posted as to be entirely free to act as a whole according to developments. Concealment and cover should be sought.

When the led horses and the artilllery need protection; when it is desired to threaten the enemy's flanks or his led horses, to undertake turning movements or to reinforce the fighting line, the reserve is held mounted. Normally at least a part of the reserve is mounted. Its size varies greatly. In certain cases no reserve may be held. When there is no intention of accomplishing more than to cause an early deployment of the hostile force it may be desirable to place every element on the firing line from the beginning. Again, when extension in width is very great it would weaken the actual front to hold out a reserve, as there would be no guarantee that it would reach the threatened point in time. In a passive defense the reserves can be reduced in proportion to the weakness of the enemy's cavalry and to the depth of the zone of security our patrols have secured.

In the defense seeking a favorable decision, the bulk of the command is ordinarily held in reserve awaiting a clearing of the situation.

Tanks

If the enemy is known to be provided with tanks, attachment of artillery is essential to the conduct of a sucessful defense by cavalry. The use of single guns to cover approaches is then desirable. Our cavalry is at present provided with no other weapon that will stop a tank, although machine guns, by opening heavy fire on approaching tanks, especially against the aperture through which the operator directs the movement of the tank, can at times prevent its maneuvering effectively. If, in any campaign, frequent encounters with hostile tanks is anticipated, it may become necessary to equip each squadron with one-pounder guns and to have each trooper carry one or two bombs for the purpose of attacking the tanks.

In the selection of a position, the fact that marshes, watercourses, thick woods and very steep slopes constitute obstacles to the advance of tanks should be considered. A stream with a firm bottom is no obstacle unless the water is at least four feet deep. A deep swamp, or a stream with a soft bottom, is an effective obstacle. Artificial obstructions may be utilized when time permits.

Artillery

While horse artillery is the type of artillery ordinarily employed with cavalry, light artillery may be, and frequently is, used to accompany it. While not as mobile as horse artillery, it is sufficiently so in many situations, and particularly so in defensive operations. With divisional cavalry, light artillery will be the only type available.

Artillery greatly increases the defensive power of cavalry. When both artillery and machine guns are present, the two, in fact, constitute the major portion of its defensive power.

By forcing early deployment, artillery adds materially to the cavalry's ability to delay an approaching enemy; and as it can reach the enemy at long ranges, it is especially valuable in securing surprise. To secure this and an early deployment of the hostile force it is placed as far to the front as security permits.

Its position is concealed when practicable but, especially if opposed to cavalry, should be such as to permit direct laying.

The artillery commander remains with the cavalry commander until assigned a definite mission. Thereafter the artillery commander maintains communication with the cavalry commander, who in turn, keeps the former informed as to his plans and intentions.

In a position from which withdrawal is contemplated, care in the selection of the command post with reference to the location of the artillery positions is necessary, so that the efforts of the cavalry and its supporting artillery may be co-ordinated.

The cavalry commander will in most cases control the opening of fire so that he may be the one to decide as to whether forcing an early deployment and inflicting early losses on the enemy is to be preferred to the liability of prematurely disclosing the defensive position. Once fire is opened, the artillery commander acts on his own initiative and must be ready to seize all opportunities for effective action against the enemy in accordance with the general instructions of the cavalry commander. On principle, fire should be directed against such parts of the enemy's force as have immediate influence on the outcome of the engage-

ment. Particularly favorable opportunities for firing on the enemy's artillery need not be neglected, however, in consequence of the foregoing.

Certain situations may require a separation of the battery into platoons or single pieces. It will be necessary in anti-tank defenses and at times in the close defense of isolated positions. In general, however, the breaking up of the battery should be avoided as it interferes not only with a proper control and concentration of fire but also adds to the difficulty of withdrawal.

In defensive combat, artillery seldom requires a special support. In ordinary cases the reserve or the nearest available troops assume this duty.

If the defense fails, artillery and machine guns will from successive positions cover the retreat by directing their fire against the pursuers without regard to the enemy's artillery fire.

In extreme cases the situation may call for the sacrifice of the guns to insure the withdrawal of the remainder of the command.

Machine Guns

The increase in both numbers and efficiency of the machine guns now issued to the cavalry has greatly strengthened its defensive power, while the machine rifle still further adds to it.

A cavalry force equipped with these two weapons and in a well selected defensive position across the line of march of a superior force of all arms, can greatly delay its advance unless this force is in turn possessed of an enterprising cavalry of sufficient strength to permit it to outflank the position. Numerous machine guns in well concealed positions are not readily silenced by hostile artillery. A more or less prepared attack is necessary if the enemy is to continue his advance. The prepared attack requires time. In many situations, by gaining this, the cavalry completely fulfills its mission. Furthermore, if additional delay is demanded, its mobility permits it to withdraw to another position farther in the rear to repeat the operation. Even though the enemy be possessed of superior cavalry the terrain is often such that the hostile cavalry is forced to make so wide a detour that the desired delay is accomplished before the outflanking movement can be completed.

CHAPTER VI

Marches

Relationship of Marching to Care of Animals and to Tactics

The subject of cavalry marches is closely related both to care of animals and to tactics.

A difficult problem that continually confronts a cavalry officer is that of bringing his command on the field of actual combat with one of its principal weapons, the horse, in serviceable condition, not only for the charge, but for the rapid movements required by the varied role of cavalry on the battlefield under modern conditions. Experience shows that when cavalry has been unable to respond to the demands of the action or to take advantage of opportunities presented, failure has been due to the exhaustion or to the injuries of the horses rather than to the fatigue of the men. Accordingly, attention is concentrated on minimizing the wear and tear of horseflesh. Incidentally, but none the less surely, the rider's condition is benefited by the good condition of his mount.

In many cases the *time element* is of primary importance. In other cases, the necessity for having the horses fit for service at the end of the march is the controlling consideration. Ordinarily, men and animals must arrive at their destination fit for either mounted combat or further rapid or extended marching. Proper training, use, and care of animals is therefore important as a means of securing tactical results. Cavalry officers must know the powers and limitations of their mounts in order that they may make logical tactical decisions and plan movements and actions.

Rates of march have an important bearing in all tactical situations preceding and following actual combat. A knowledge of possible rates and their effect on the animals is therefore of great importance to cavalry officers. Rate

tables that have been tried and found accurate are necessary in order to provide certainty in the calculations on which tactical plans and decisions are based. By the use of such rate tables, an idea of the terrain such as can be gained from a good military map, and the knowledge that every cavalry officer should have of the condition of his mounts, a leader will be enabled to base his deductions on facts rather than guesses, to state with certainty that he can march a given distance in a given time and to predict with confidence the condition of his animals on arrival at the destination.

TRAINING

Horse training is of tactical importance because the object of all military instruction is to train troops to employ their maximum powers and capabilities in campaign. To reach correct tactical decisions, an officer must know how far and how fast his command can march and also what its fighting power will be at the end of the march. This knowledge is gained from the preliminary training previously given. Horse training includes gaiting at the regulation 4-mile walk, 8-mile trot and 12-mile gallop.

It is inevitable that the proportion of cavalry recruits drawn from classes of horsemen who are accustomed to thinking of the needs of the horse will be almost negligible. Consequently, this instinct of the natural horseman must be replaced by an equivalent habit resulting from special and persistent training.

Supervision in actual service can at best correct only a few neglects or errors. The individual troopers must have been first trained into horse savers. The supervision of the officers and noncommissioned officers will then suffice to keep them up to their work under stress of hardship, fatigue, and excitement.

Although, in discussing marches, it is usually assumed that the animals are in condition, yet marches are often undertaken with horses that for various reasons are not in proper condition. Distances covered and time under saddle must then be very short until "condition" has been obtained. If forced by imperative military necessity to disregard this precaution, we must frankly face a loss of 50 per cent almost immediately, due to sore backs and exhaustion.

Preparation

Before starting, special instructions should anticipate everything that can be foreseen in the adjustment of saddlery and equipment and in the shoeing.

In the winter, the ice calks must be looked into and it must be certain that the men know how to apply and remove them quickly.

If there are extra horses, they should carry a few spare saddle blankets to replace those which will be destroyed by cutting to relieve saddle galls.

Of all tactical orders, the march order is the simplest. In small commands this is usually issued orally after the command has been formed. The actual march order should be preceded by a warning order, which should state as much of the following as may be known:—the hour of starting, the distance to be marched, the equipment, forage, and rations to be carried, and what transportation is to accompany the command. When possible, this warning order should be issued the evening before so that supply, stable and mess sergeants can make due preparation. It is generally wrong for a march order to prescribe gaits. If necessary, the time of arrival at destination or at intermediate points may be prescribed, but even this may interfere with the initiative of subordinates unless the tactical situation demands that time of arrival be fixed in order to co-ordinate the work.

The Start

Except for imperative military reasons, the start should not be made until an hour after daylight. In mixed commands the mobility of cavalry will allow it to move out in the morning still more deliberately without danger of prolonging its march too late in the day.

Night marches are slow and fatiguing and should not be undertaken unless required by the situation. However, under conditions of modern warfare, night marches in the theater of operations will be the rule rather than the exception. Under favorable conditions of road and moonlight, night marches present no great difficulties, but such desirable conditions are frequently lacking.

Formation

On the roads it will usually be impracticable to march with wider front than column of fours, and column of twos will often be necessary. When the situation permits lengthening the column, the habitual formation, in actual practice, is column of twos because of the greater comfort. In the vicinity of the enemy, every effort must be made to reduce the length of the column by closing up as much as is compatible with comfort and economy of effort and, with a large command, by utilizing parallel roads. If the width of roads will permit or the terrain off the roads is suitable, the march might be made in double column.

In commands larger than a regiment, the use of two or more roads is preferable to marching a long column on one road, but the tactical situation must determine this.

In order to avoid checks and irregularities of gait and to allow the dust to settle or blow away, distances must be left between platoons; these distances like those between larger units disappear when checks occur and are at times exceeded, but there is a constant tendency to recover them. Each element marches so as best to take advantage of the ground. Units do not change gait simultaneously but each takes up the trot or walk at the point where the preceding unit changed gait.

Cavalry should be able to march across country and should not be tied down to roads. However, progress on roads is more rapid than across country and is less fatiguing.

In campaign the roads will often be reserved for the infantry, artillery and combat trains, and the cavalry will find its way across country. It can then sometimes march in the maneuvering column with platoon front, a formation which permits each horse to see clearly the ground before him and gives relief from dust. This formation will probably not be practicable in many cases. The regiment may also use the double column.

Good footing for the horses must be sought whether on or off the roads. This is of more importance than the accurate preservation of regular formations. Good soft footing will often be found at the sides of the roads and the column can be spread out, traveling along both sides.

In going across country in platoon front the troopers take intervals to find good footing, and after a few platoons have passed, the horses of the succeeding platoons will be following smooth and well defined trails. By sending a party ahead to cut and roll up barbed wire, open the fences, and prepare crossings, the column can advance steadily. When a short defile appears in front, the leading unit, if the ground permits, increases the gait until it has passed well beyond it, so as to avoid checking the column.

Length and Rate of Marches

The length and rate of marches are dependent upon the mission of the command. Ordinary marches for cavalry are at about 20 to 25 miles a day with a marching rate of 5 miles per hour, including halts. This rate can be maintained indefinitely by a seasoned command under normal conditions as to forage, water and roads.

Emergency Marches may be much longer and at much faster gaits. The mission determines both. Cavalry can march 50 miles a day for a few days without loss of efficiency. A more rapid rate may be justified by the mission, but the combat efficiency of the command at the end of the march will probably suffer.

The longer the column, the less the speed. In peace time, commands can be broken into fractions and the entire command makes the time of the smaller units; but in time of war, tactical considerations usually forbid this division of a command into fractions. Larger commands than a troop cannot expect to make long, rapid emergency marches and be capable of sustained mounted combat without having had a period of rest. However, in Palestine, the 5th British Cavalry Division made a forced march of about 65 miles in 24 hours. At the end of the march, it galloped into Nazareth, fought a hot street fight, and captured the Turkish Army Group Headquarters and 2,000 prisoners.

The work to be demanded of the cavalry at the end of the forced march must be kept in view; this is presumably a mounted rôle, and the horses must be brought on the field in a condition to do their part. If it is not the intention to call for mounted action at the end of the forced

march, this fact must be clearly stated in the orders to the cavalry. Then the cavalry commander will be justified in sacrificing some of his horses.

The usual marching gaits are the walk and trot combined with leading. Officers unfamiliar with cavalry work are prone to gallop too much. While the gallop is feasible at times and under certain circumstances, it soon wears out the animals on a march.

RATE TABLES.—The following rate tables have been prepared and tested at the Cavalry School at Fort Riley. From them, one who knows the condition of his mounts and the nature of the roads over which the march is made, can prepare a march schedule with a degree of accuracy thought impossible by those who have not given the subject careful consideration.

3 miles per hour = 88 yards per minute = 1/20 miles per minute.

4 miles per hour = 117 1/3 yards per minute = 1/15 miles per minute.

8 miles per hour = 234 2/3 yards per minute = 2/15 miles per minute.

10 miles per hour = 293 1/3 yards per minute = 1/6 miles per minute.

By multiplying the distance per minute by the number of minutes in a period we get the distance we shall cover in that period. Then by adding these distances we get the total distance for all the periods in the hour and the number of miles per hour that our schedule will give us.

The 10-mile trot is not an authorized gait. Its use should be limited to emergencies for individual horsemen, such as specially mounted messengers.

RATE TABLE NO. 1—5 MILES PER HOUR

Ordinary conditions as to Road and Weather.
Alternate *Trotting and Leading.*

Total trotting—30 minutes at 8 miles per hour	= 4 miles.
Total leading—20 minutes at 3 miles per hour	= 1 mile.
Resting—10 minutes	
60 minutes	5 miles.

The 10 minutes for rest must include time lost mounting and dismounting.

Periods are determined by the ground and should approximate 10 minutes in length, but may be shortened to 5 or increased not to exceed 12 or 15 minutes.

For a command smaller than a platoon, such as a patrol, periods may be shortened still more, but under ordinary conditions trot periods should never exceed the maximum of 12 to 15 minutes.

Rate Table No. 2—5⅓ Miles Per Hour

Ordinary conditions of Road and Weather.
Alternate *Trotting* and *Walking*.

Total Trotting—	30 minutes at 8 miles per hour =	4 miles.
Total Walking—	20 minutes at 4 miles per hour =	1⅓ miles.
Resting—	10 minutes	
60 minutes		5⅓ miles.

The full 10 minutes' rest should be taken as there is no leading.

Periods of trotting or walking are determined as in Table No. 1.

Rate Table No. 3—5⅙ Miles Per Hour

Ordinary conditions of Road and Weather.
Trotting, *Walking*, and *Leading*.

Total Trotting—	30 minutes at 8 miles per hour =	4 miles.
Total Walking—	10 minutes at 4 miles per hour =	⅔ miles.
Total Leading—	10 minutes at 3 miles per hour =	½ miles.
Resting—	10 minutes	
60 minutes		5⅙ miles.

Rest and gait periods determined as in Table No. 1.

Rate Table No. 4—4½ Miles Per Hour

Ordinary conditions of Road and Weather.

Total Trotting—	20 minutes at 8 miles per hour =	2⅔ miles.
Total Walking—	20 minutes at 4 miles per hour =	1⅓ miles.
Total Leading—	10 minutes at 3 miles per hour =	½ miles.
Resting—	10 minutes	
30 minutes		4½ miles.

Rest and gait periods determined as in Table No. 1.

Rate Table No. 5—6 Miles Per Hour

Good Roads—Rapid Marching, Cool Weather.

Total Trotting—	35 minutes at 8 miles per hour =	4⅔ miles.
Total Walking—	20 minutes at 4 miles per hour =	1⅓ miles.
Resting—	5 minutes	
60 minutes		6 miles.

Periods at the different gaits are determined as in Table No. 1.

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a short trot in order to betray to the troopers any faulty adjustment of equipment. This halt gives an opportunity for the horses to stale, and for the troopers to tighten girths and adjust saddlery, equipment, and dress.

Other halts of 5 to 10 minutes should be made at hourly intervals. If the march is to be prolonged into the afternoon, a longer halt should be made at noon when the girths are loosened, horses fed, and the men eat their lunch.

On an unusually long march this long halt may be extended to admit of unsaddling, but this must not be done without the precaution of previous loosening of girths and cooling of backs, supplemented by hand rubbing. Some saddles may even then have to be immediately replaced to keep down swelling and prevent injury. In all commands there should be a recognized habitual hour for halting—for instance, 10 minutes before the hour.

March Discipline and Expedients for Saving Horseflesh

LEADING.—To avoid tremendous waste of horseflesh, much of the marching of cavalry in campaign must be by leading. This meets with strong prejudice on the part of the average cavalry officer and soldier. However, as the object is to win battles and campaigns regardless of prejudice and personal inconvenience, such an opposition must be laid aside if results justify. Actual tests both in peace and war show that both animals and men arrive at the end of the march in better condition if frequent leading is done than if the men remain continuously mounted while marching. Training is necessary to successful leading, or columns will be lengthened and distances greatly extended. Similarly, the fitting of the man's shoes and the care of the feet must have greater consideration by cavalry officers than at present or the command will arrive on the field too footsore to engage in dismounted combat.

Objection to leading is sometimes based on the claim that frequent mounting and dismounting disarranges the saddle and pack and tends to produce sore backs. Too frequent mounting and dismounting does have this effect, but a reasonable amount will have no deleterious effect, provided that manes have not been clipped. Clipping of

manes should never be permitted on animals that are to be used on campaign.

GAIT SETTERS.—Every command should have a non-commissioned officer with a well-gaited horse to set the gaits. The organization commander should delegate this duty. He himself, should be free to take whatever gait is advisable and to give his mind to tactical considerations, knowing that his command is progressing at the rate he has ordered. This gait setter should ride at the head of the command. Commands for change of gait are given by the officer in command, who determines the gait according to the nature of the road or the tactical requirements of the situation.

March discipline, all-important in practice marches in time of peace, has added importance in time of war. Par. 96, *Field Service Regulations*, states, "A successful march, whether in peace or war, is one that places the troops at their destination at the proper moment and in the best possible condition." This is impossible of accomplishment unless march discipline of the highest order is enforced.

Troopers must ride at the gaits ordered, keep proper distances, and maintain correct position in the saddle.

Troops must be informed of the length of all halts so that full advantage can be taken of the same. Saddles must be readjusted and the horses' feet examined. Saddles can best be adjusted if the men work in pairs, and this practice must be habitual. Noncommissioned officers must inspect animals and saddles at every halt. These things must be attended to immediately after halting. The lighting of cigarettes and the doing of other things for the trooper's comfort come *after*, *not before*, the care of saddles and animals. Otherwise the order to mount will find half the command with loosened cinchas. A minute's warning should precede the call to attention or the order to mount.

The command should be mounted only when the order to march is to follow immediately. No member of the command should be permitted to sit his horse at the halt.

All commands should be kept to the right of the road, leaving the left free. This is a matter of training. The discipline of the command can be judged largely by its practice in this regard.

Straggling should never be permitted. No one should be allowed to fall out without permission of proper authority, and this permission should be sparingly given. If a soldier has to fall out from necessity, another, preferably a N. C. O., should be designated to accompany him.

In case of checks due to obstacles, troopers and units should be trained to overlap when there is room and thus avoid the shock throughout the column.

Grazing should be permitted at the halts, especially on long marches and when forage is scarce.

Advantage should be taken of every opportunity to water horses during the march.

most effective means of inflicting loss after it has arrived there, that the cavalry is the most effective arm for the pursuit.

While we must recognize the limitations of cavalry in the battle itself, it is perhaps not overstating the case to say that its value in the pursuit alone would justify its existence. Certainly, the Germans had reason to regret in the spring of 1918 that they had dismounted their cavalry divisions on the Western Front. The best opportunity they ever had to end the war victoriously was lost, mainly because they did not have a strong mounted force available to send in pursuit of the defeated Fifth British Army.

In his final despatch, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig says, "On the morning of the armistice, two British cavalry divisions were on the march east of the Scheldt, and before the order to stop reached them they had already gained a line ten miles in advance of our infantry outposts. There is no doubt that, had the advance of the cavalry been permitted to continue, the enemy's disorganized retreat would have been turned into a rout."

There are certain general tactical principles which govern the conduct of pursuit by cavalry. These general principles are stated briefly in *Field Service Regulations*, and in *Cavalry Service Regulations*, 1914. They have been formulated as the result of long experience and are unquestionably sound. However, it is necessary to keep constantly in mind that these principles are only general principles and not invariable rules. Like any other tactical principles they must be applied with common sense and with due consideration of all the circumstances of each particular case. If accepted literally and without analysis or reflection, some of them are apt to be misunderstood. The general idea underlying all these principles is that the pursuit must be taken up immediately after the infantry battle and pushed with the utmost vigor and perseverance until the enemy is destroyed or every man and every horse is exhausted in the attempt. In getting this idea, it is necessary to avoid getting the impression that pursuit means the immediate launching of all the mounted troops available in a more or less helter-skelter fashion against the various portions of the retreating hostile force. Like

all other operations, a pursuit to be successful must be as carefully planned as time and circumstances will permit. The more carefully the pursuit is planned, the more successful it will be. If the direction and general plan of retreat of the hostile force can be foreseen, it will sometimes be possible to formulate and issue in advance to the commanders of the principal cavalry units a plan of pursuit to be put into effect when the retreat actually begins.

It is the purpose of this chapter to take up some of the principles laid down for the conduct of cavalry in pursuit and to go somewhat into detail in discussing the methods to be followed in carrying them out.

After a successful battle, all bodies of cavalry, large and small—including horse artillery attached and corps and division cavalry—should be used in the pursuit. After a victory, the mass of the army can dispense with the services of the cavalry temporarily.

The corps and divisional cavalry that has been reconnoitering out in front will be withdrawn to the rear or flanks at the beginning of a battle when the two opposing infantry forces come into contact. The cavalry belonging to interior corps of a long battle line will usually be withdrawn directly to the rear through the infantry. That belonging to flank corps will usually be needed for the close in protection of the flanks. In both cases it should be given every opportunity consistent with the situation to rest after its arduous duties of reconnaissance immediately preceding the battle. As soon as the battle appears to be drawing to an end, the cavalry must be pushed well toward the front so as to be immediately available to take up the pursuit or to cover the retreat.

The army cavalry will normally operate well out on one or both flanks during the battle. No matter what the outcome of the battle may be, the most advantageous position for the bulk of the cavalry at the end of the battle is well forward on a flank. When a pursuit is in prospect it must gain the mastery over the hostile cavalry if it has not already done so, and secure a position well forward. In certain cases the plans of the army commander may require that the cavalry remain inactive in order that the secrecy of an envelopment on that flank may be preserved.

In such cases the cavalry must push forward as soon as secrecy is no longer necessary.

Mastery over the enemy's cavalry is necessary to a successful pursuit. If it has not been gained before or during the battle, pursuit will probably be so hampered or delayed that the enemy will be able to make his retreat in good order. Of course, if the enemy has such an inferior force of cavalry that it has had to seek the protection of its infantry from the start, it may be considered that the mastery has already been gained.

Against the desire to get well forward before the pursuit begins, the cavalry commander must balance the necessity of having his horses in the best possible condition to take up a vigorous pursuit. The effectiveness of the pursuit will depend to a large extent upon the condition of the horses, and everything possible must be done to keep them fit. Great attention should be paid to giving them all the rest that circumstances will permit and every effort should be made to keep them on full rations of forage without using up the small reserve supply that is carried on the saddles. If it comes to decision between gaining a distinct tactical advantage or saving the horses, tactical considerations must govern. The best way to avoid such a difficulty is to eliminate the hostile cavalry as early in the campaign as possible.

The cavalry takes up the pursuit of a beaten or retreating enemy at once.

Whether the plan of the commander of the whole force has been communicated in the form of orders or not, it will usually comprise the following if a strong enough force of cavalry is available:

(1) Direct pursuit on the enemy's heels, including local envelopments undertaken on the initiative of subordinate commanders.

(2) An attack against the flank and immediate rear of the enemy's line. This attack in combination with the direct pursuit may be considered as an envelopment of the enemy's line as a whole.

(3) Parallel pursuit to operate against the flank of those portions of the hostile forces which are already in full retreat, or to seize a position ahead of the retreating enemy and cut him off.

STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL PURSUIT.—The first two are often referred to as the tactical pursuit because they

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tunities for the cavalry to attack rear guard positions in flank either with or without the assistance of the direct attack by the pursuing infantry.

The form of action (*i.e.*, mounted or dismounted) will depend upon the local situation in each case. A large factor in deciding this question will be the degree of demoralization of the enemy. Each cavalry leader must apply to the situation which confronts him the principles that govern cavalry combat in general. In applying them, however, it should be remembered that during the pursuit the cavalry will be called upon to attack again and again and that it is much easier to break off a fire fight than it is to reassemble after a mounted charge. By dismounting to fire into the retreating enemy from positions on the flanks, the cavalry also gives its horses much needed breathing spells. While these considerations are important they must not be permitted to diminish the boldness and aggressiveness with which the cavalry pursues. A leader must constantly weigh the advantages of striking hard with his whole force against the advantages of harassing the enemy by fire with a view to launching an attack later with bigger results. When in doubt, the boldest course is the best.

It will often happen at the end of a battle that the victorious infantry is too exhausted or demoralized to take up the pursuit, or that the retreating enemy has outdistanced it. Then, full responsibility for the direct pursuit devolves upon the cavalry. Even then, the proportion of cavalry assigned to the direct pursuit should be small, because it is the operations against the flank and rear of the hostile army that bring decisive results. Normally, it is the corps cavalry that is assigned to the direct pursuit. It is usually sent out at first by orders from the corps commanders, but it will soon have to act upon its own initiative, especially if the pursuing infantry falls behind. At times a portion of the army cavalry will be assigned to the direct pursuit, or all of the corps cavalry may be united under one cavalry commander for this duty. In any event the commander of the army cavalry that is operating on the flank cannot expect to retain control over that portion which is assigned to the direct pursuit. He may give it its original orders, or, in the case of corps cavalry, may

arrange to co-operate with it, but any plan that restricts the initiative of the commander on the spot is sure to reduce the effectiveness of the pursuit.

When acting without infantry support, cavalry in direct pursuit will seldom have sufficient strength to attack positions taken up by the hostile rear guards except in flank or rear. It will generally be more a question of harassing them and keeping them on the move than of destroying them.

Of the cavalry pursuing on the flank of a retreating army, a portion should be assigned the tactical mission of co-operating with the infantry in enveloping movements and of hanging on to the enemy's flanks. The bulk of the army cavalry should be assigned to the parallel pursuit with the strategic mission of striking the enemy's columns that are already in full retreat, or of cutting them off.

The cavalry that is assigned the tactical mission of hanging on to the enemy's flanks may be a part of the army cavalry, it may be corps cavalry concentrated on one flank of the army or it may be a composite force made up from both sources. It may operate under the orders of the commander of the army cavalry, but it should co-operate with the corps cavalry. It will frequently be advisable to detach part of the army cavalry and place it under the orders of the commander of a flank corps. It is the duty of this force to assist in the final breaking of the enemy's resistance on the battlefield by attacking his line in flank and rear. After the retreat has started it must never lose contact. It operates on the same general principles as the smaller groups assigned to the direct pursuit, except that its work is entirely on the flank. It should have artillery attached and should use both its artillery and its machine guns to the limit to inflict losses on the enemy and turn his retreat into a rout. It will often encounter the bulk of the cavalry force that is covering the enemy's flank and for that reason should be given considerable strength. If the hostile cavalry is too strong to be overcome and dispersed or driven back on its infantry, this hostile cavalry must be kept occupied with the idea of neutralizing it and keeping it from interfering with the parallel pursuit. At the same time, detachments must be sent to

get contact with the hostile infantry and harass it in every way possible. There must be no hesitation in subdividing the force if necessary to get results, even when opposed by a superior body of hostile cavalry. In the pursuit, cavalry is playing for high stakes and these cannot be won without taking corresponding risks.

The fighting tactics to be used in the close pursuit on the flank are in general the same as those described for the smaller detachments engaged in the direct pursuit. The enemy should be attacked whenever he is encountered. The leader can afford to give the minimum consideration to the safety of his command and the maximum attention to injuring the enemy. In this phase of the pursuit, cavalry will probably find use for all its methods of attack except that in which the men advance for considerable distances without using their horses. It is difficult to conceive of a situation when that kind of attack would be advisable. The action will consist chiefly of either the fire action of artillery, automatic arms and rifles, the mounted charge with pistols or sabers, or a combination of the two. It will seldom if ever, be advisable to send troops where they can not go mounted, that is to say, they must not dismount except where the horses can be kept close at hand. During the early stages of the pursuit before the enemy has suffered any considerable demoralization, the operations of the cavalry will consist principally of rapid movement mounted to a position from which an effective fire can be brought to bear upon the retreating enemy, then the delivery of as hot a fire as possible, followed by a quick mounting up and dash for a similar position farther along in the direction in which the enemy is moving. As the retreat continues and the enemy becomes worse demoralized, opportunities for a mounted charge will be more frequent. Finally, if the retreat is turned into a rout it will be possible to charge almost at will into the mass of fugitives, and it is by these charges that the big results in the capture of prisoners and guns are obtained. If the enemy is able to continue his retreat in good order while furnishing reasonable protection for his marching columns, the pursuit may not have decisive results until the main force of the army cavalry, which has taken up the strategic pur-

ing the decisive locality. One of the duties of the hostile cavalry will be to stop or delay this strategic pursuit. If encountered, the hostile cavalry must be attacked and dispersed or driven back. Failing in this, it should be contained by a portion of the force and the remainder used to overlap. Nothing must be permitted to interfere with the rapid advance. If practicable to do so, arrangements should be made to have infantry follow up, either in trucks or by marching, to seize positions along the lines of march and prevent the enemy from changing the direction of his retreat.

Having reached its objective, the further action of the cavalry will depend upon its specific mission. If it has been sent to hold the crossings of a stream or a defile, defensive action may be advisable at first; but even then, no opportunity should be overlooked to inflict losses upon the enemy by using a part of the force for offensive action.

Pursuit should be continued with the utmost energy until complete disintegration of the enemy's force is accomplished.

When, by the various methods that have been described, the pursuit has succeeded in demoralizing the enemy, every man and every horse must be used to the full limit of endurance to complete the destruction of the hostile army. The only danger to the pursuing force lies in giving the enemy time to reform his units. It is at this stage of the pursuit that the mounted charge by units of all sizes will get the maximum results. The masses of fugitives must be charged again and again until the horses are completely exhausted or the enemy's force is entirely destroyed or captured.

The commander-in-chief should be kept informed of the progress of the pursuit and the location and condition of the enemy's forces by messages from the cavalry commander.

During the excitement of the pursuit, the natural tendency will probably be for the cavalry leaders to become so intent upon the work at hand that they will get entirely out of communication with the infantry commander in rear. The importance of teamwork in keeping the latter informed of the progress of the pursuit is obvious. Mes-

sages should be sent by the most expeditious means available to inform the commander of the whole force of every important development.

In the foregoing discussion, the different phases of the pursuit have been discussed separately in an effort to bring out the principles to be followed in each kind of pursuit. To make as clear cut a distinction as possible in the missions of the different pursuing bodies, the force involved was assumed to be a large army deployed on a long battle line, each corps having corps cavalry assigned and there being a large force of army cavalry on the flank.

In a smaller force or in a force having less cavalry at its disposal, the division of duties would not be nearly so clearly defined. The tactical and strategical pursuit on lines parallel to the direction of the enemy's retreat might be merged into one. For example, the same body of cavalry might perform both functions by attacking the enemy repeatedly in flank and gradually reaching a position in which his retreat could be completely blocked. The action of the cavalry assigned to the direct pursuit would consist principally in keeping contact directly in rear with a small force while it attacked the whole rear guard in flank.

Whenever portions of the enemy endeavor to hold their ground they must be outflanked repeatedly. This constant overlapping must be kept up day and night, regardless of the fatigue of men and horses. A pursuit thus carried to the utmost may save the army another battle and terminate the whole campaign.

To repeat—The following principles probably come as near to being general rules for the conduct of a pursuit as any that can be laid down:

1. It is the duty of cavalry to devote every man it possesses to the pursuit and to press it without mercy, however tired its horses may be from previous fighting.
2. Use only a small proportion of the cavalry to follow the enemy's retreat directly, and turn the flank of the rear guard in preference to attacking it in front.
3. Outpace the beaten troops and attack them without intermission at several points at once, by artillery, rifle and machine gun fire and by mounted charges, either singly or in combination. Direct the principal attacks at the main retreating columns.

4. Cut off the enemy's retreat altogether, if possible, by seizing some strong position that directly blocks the roads on which the enemy is retreating.

5. Send a few troops to look for the enemy's trains, throw them into disorder and destroy them.

6. If possible, arrange to have infantry supports follow up and hold important points to prevent the enemy from escaping laterally.

7. Cavalry must not hesitate to subdivide its forces in the pursuit if necessary. The commander must explain to subordinates the general object to be attained and allow them to act on their own initiative.