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# **GENERAL TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF RGER UNITS**

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**THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS**



**Revised, 1927**

**GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS PRESS  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS**

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**1927**

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*J. C. Smith* VI

# GENERAL TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

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# Preface

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## THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

*31 March, 1927*

The course of instruction at the Command and General Staff School is based upon the mission of training officers for command and general staff duties in divisions and corps. It begins with refresher studies in the tactics and technique of the various branches composing the division, in military organization, and in other fundamentals.

Following these, this study on the General Tactical Functions of Larger Units is introduced as a preliminary to the course of study devoted to Tactical Principles and Decisions, in order that the student may take up the latter studies with a thorough knowledge, not only of the organization of military forces and the tactics and technique of the separate branches, but also with a broad general picture of the relation, one to the other, of the division in the corps and the corps in the army.

A continuous army situation has been developed covering an advance of several days and culminating in an attack. The study discusses and illustrates the situations from the viewpoint of the army, corps, and division commanders, with regard to both tactics and supply. It also endeavors to present a picture of the cooperation and teamplay necessary for success. The study is necessarily general in nature and goes but little into details, as it is desired early in the course of instruction to present the subject in broad perspective.

H. J. BREES,  
*Colonel, Cavalry (D.O.L.),*  
*Assistant Commandant.*

APPROVED:

EDW. L. KING,  
*Brigadier General, U. S. Army,*  
*Commandant.*



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SECTION I

General Discussion

	Paragraph
Definition of an army .....	1
Organization of an army .....	2
Plan of operations .....	3
Plan of advance .....	4
Strategy and tactics .....	5

1. DEFINITION OF AN ARMY.—No precise definition of an army can be given. In general, however, it may be defined as an area command composed of fighting elements, with the necessary auxiliary and supply troops, so organized basically as to carry out a major tactical mission.

2. ORGANIZATION OF AN ARMY.—The task or mission which an army is to execute is the primary basis of organization. An army must be self-sustaining, completely equipped, and must contain within itself everything necessary to carry out the rôle assigned to it. An inflexible organization is basically wrong. There must be a nucleus around which the rest of the army is built and which is capable of expansion or contraction as circumstances may dictate. It, therefore, must contain a headquarters; supply, administrative, and technical troops; and a varying number of com-



batant troops. In addition to organic combat troops, other combat troops will be assigned, attached, or withdrawn, in accordance with the situation and the mission or task assigned. For purposes of legislation, administration, and forming a framework for mobilization, a type organization may be prescribed, but it must never be rigid.

3. PLAN OF OPERATIONS.—A plan of operations always should be formulated. This includes primarily a study of the theater of operations with regard to terrain, road and railroad net, availability or possibility of obtaining supplies, attitude of the inhabitants, probable plans of the enemy, and other pertinent factors. The nature of the terrain always will have a decided influence on prospective operations. The road net will influence the form of advance. The railroad net has a distinct bearing on the all-important question of supply. The possibility of obtaining supplies in the theater of operations may materially lessen difficulties that otherwise might arise in this respect. The mission and objective will determine the depth of advance. Generally speaking, a plan of operations will include five main phases, *viz.*, mobilization, concentration, advance, occupation of positions, and combat.

4. PLAN OF ADVANCE.—*a. General considerations.*—In planning an advance consideration must be given to the mission, the objective, the frontage of the advance, the form of the advance, concentration for battle, security, reconnaissance, and coordination.

*b. Mission.*—Before starting an advance, a definite, clear cut mission should be given the force. The means of accomplishing that mission should be left for the decision of the commander when the time arrives. The exact method of accomplishment seldom can be foreseen until contact with the enemy is gained. Every commander, of whatever grade, should view his mission from the viewpoint of the higher commander, and the method adopted for accomplishing the mission should be such as to further the plan of the higher commander. He also must view his mission from the viewpoint of his subordinate commanders in order



to insure that missions assigned subordinates can be accomplished. As a general statement, the mission assigned an army will be a major tactical task which is a part of a general strategical plan.

*c. Objective.*—The first principle of strategy is to “make the hostile main army the objective.” In planning the advance, therefore, the effort should be to strike the hostile main force in such place and in such manner as will be most disadvantageous to him. Decisive results are obtained only by the defeat or destruction of the hostile force.

*d. Frontage.*—Considerations of comfort and greater ease of supply indicate an advance on a broad front. An advance on a narrow front results in greater depth and consequent increased difficulties in supply and in readiness for battle. A suitable road net, both in the direction of march and laterally, is necessary and may frequently determine the width of advance regardless of other conditions. In advancing on a broad front, the various columns should be within supporting distance of one another.

*e. Form of advance.*—The mission, objective, terrain, road net, probable point of contact, and the tactical plan of action after contact is gained, are some of the factors which determine the form of advance. An army may advance (1) with a part of its force as an advance guard, the remainder following in parallel columns abreast or echeloned to the rear on one or both flanks; (2) with its major units (corps) in parallel columns abreast of each other and each covered by its own advance guard; or (3) in parallel columns echeloned to the rear on the center, or on one or both flanks.

*f. Concentration for battle.*—When battle is imminent, a concentration in preparation therefor is necessary. This concentration may occur before the battle begins (Napoleonic) or it may occur on the field of battle (von Moltkean). In either case the concentration should be such as to deliver the decisive blow at the selected vital or decisive point.



## 4 TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

*g. Security on the march.*—Troops on the march are vulnerable to hostile attack. Therefore, suitable provision should be made for the security of the main columns, both on the march and at the halt. This protection can be secured by detailing units to cover the front, flanks, and rear of the main column or columns and by the use of air and antiaircraft units. If the advance be made in several columns, abreast or echeloned in depth, each column usually is charged with providing for its own security.

*h. Reconnaissance.*—Information of the enemy is always essential and frequently vital. Reconnaissance should never cease. It should be kept up on the march, at the halt, and before, during, and after battle. All agencies, whether terrestrial or aerial, should be employed to the limit demanded by the situation.

*i. Coordination.*—Hopeless confusion and inextricable entanglement, with possible fatal results, will ensue if careful and frequently detailed methods of coordinating an advance are neglected. The larger the force and the greater the number of columns, the greater will be the need for coordination. When the command is advancing on a broad front, or in many columns, the length of the daily advances must be prescribed for each and provision made for connection between the several columns. When the advance is made in considerable depth, the advance of the leading elements must be so regulated as to prevent interference by them with elements following. When the advance is made in several columns, each column is given a zone or lane in which to advance,

5. STRATEGY AND TACTICS.—Strategy may be defined as “the art of moving an army in the theater of operations, with a view to placing it in such a position, relative to the enemy, as to increase the probability of victory, increase the consequence of victory, and lessen the consequences of defeat”; tactics as “the art of disposing and maneuvering troops upon the field of battle.” There is, in reality, no marked dividing line between the two. Commanders of smaller units are concerned almost entirely with tactics;



whereas, the commander of an army may be concerned largely with strategical questions as well as tactical ones. “Where tactical and strategical considerations conflict, tactical considerations must govern. The gaining of decision in combat is of primary importance.”

SECTION II

Situation and Requirement

	Paragraph
General situation -----	6
Special situation -----	7
Requirement -----	8

6. GENERAL SITUATION.—*a.* General Map, Gettysburg, 1 inch = 5 miles. Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Hanover, Gettysburg, Fairfield, Westminster, Taneytown, Emmitsburg, Ellicott, Mount Airy, and Ijamsville quadrangles. Topographical Map, Gettysburg-Antietam, (1925) 1:21,120; New Oxford, Hunterstown, Arendtsville, Newman, Sabillasville, Bonneauville, Gettysburg, Knoxlyn, Kingsdale, Taneytown, Emmitsburg, and Fairfield sheets.

*b.* The Susquehanna River is the boundary between two states, Red (east) and Blue (west), between which war has recently been declared. Blue inhabitants north of the Pennsylvania-Maryland state line have declared their independence and have formed an alliance with Reds.

7. SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a.* *Concentration.*—Blue armies are concentrating as follows:

- (1) First Army (three corps) in the area: Mount Airy—Frederick—Urbana. Concentration will be completed on 23 November, 1926.
- (2) Second Army (three corps) about Baltimore. Concentration will be completed by 24 November, 1926.
- (3) Third Army (two corps) about Hagerstown. Concentration will be completed by 24 November, 1926.



6 TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

b. *First Army.*—The composition and location of the First Army is as follows:

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Location</i>
Army headquarters	Command post: Frederick.
I Corps, consisting of corps troops, and 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Divisions	Command post: Mount Airy. Area: Winfield—Weldon—Mount Airy—Lisbon (all inclusive).
II Corps, consisting of corps troops, and 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions	Command post: Libertytown. Area: Unionville—Libertytown—McKaig—New Market—Bartholows (all inclusive).
III Corps, consisting of corps troops, and 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Divisions	Command post: Walkersville. Area: Walkersville—Yellow Springs—Shookstown—Mt Pleasant (all inclusive).
Army cavalry, consisting of 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions, organized as the I Provisional Cavalry Corps, with 701st and 702d Observation Squadrons attached	Command post: Woodsboro. Area: Englars Mill—Johnsville—Woodsboro—Oldfield (all inclusive).
Special troops: Headquarters and Headquarters Company 701st Military Police Battalion  701st to 708th (both inclusive) Service Battalions 701st Field Remount Depot 701st, 702d, and 703d Remount Troops 901st, 902d, 903d, and 904th Graves Registration Units (from GHQ Reserve)	Frederick Headquarters Frederick. Troops distributed. Distributed. } Indian Springs. Frederick.
Army signal service: Headquarters 701st and 702d Signal Battalion 701st Meteorological Company 701st Pigeon Company 701st Radio Company	} Frederick.
Army ordnance service: Headquarters and Headquarters Company 701st, 702d, and 703d Ordnance Companies (ammunition) 701st Ordnance Company (maintenance) 701st, 702d, and 703d Ordnance Companies (depot)	Frederick. West of Frederick.
Army artillery: Headquarters 701st Ammunition Train 701st Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) 951st Coast Artillery (AA) (from GHQ Reserve) Provisional Field Artillery Brigade (75-mm. gun, <i>portée</i> ) (from GHQ Reserve), consisting of 911th, 912th, and 913th Field Artillery 907th Field Artillery Brigade (from GHQ Reserve), consisting of 907th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 921st Field Artillery 922d Field Artillery 923d Field Artillery 931st Field Artillery 932d Field Artillery 907th Ordnance Company (heavy maintenance) attached	Frederick. Urbana. Frederick. Troops distributed. North of Frederick.     } Urbana.





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8 TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

from crossing SOUTH MOUNTAIN by the passes west of ARENDTSVILLE, CASHTOWN, and EMMITSBURG.

Zone of action:  
East boundary: PARRS RIDGE—HANOVER—EAST BERLIN, all inclusive.  
West boundary: CATOCTIN MOUNTAIN—SOUTH MOUNTAIN, both inclusive.  
South boundary: B & O RR, inclusive.

Supply:  
All railroads in the zone of action. Regulating station: FREDERICK JUNC.

b. The Second Army will have its advance guards on the PENNSYLVANIA-MARYLAND state line by the evening of 26 November, and will be prepared to extend the First Army's line to VALLEY JUNC and HANOVER JUNC. Its cavalry will reach the state line on 24 November.

\* \* \* \* \*

c. The Third Army will advance up the CUMBERLAND VALLEY. It will be prepared to cross SOUTH MOUNTAIN north and east of CHAMBERSBURG on 28 November. Its cavalry will screen the movement, reaching CHAMBERSBURG on 25 November.  
d. The 1st Air Division will at once assume a vigorous offensive against the Red air force, attacking Red airdromes, both by day and by night, and Red aircraft wherever met.

\* \* \* \* \*

8. REQUIREMENT.—The formal field order issued by General A for the advance of the First Army.

SECTION III  
A Solution

Field order ----- Paragraph 9

9. FIELD ORDER.—The following formal field order was issued by General A for the advance of the First Army:

First Army,  
FREDERICK, MD.,  
23 November, 1926, 2:00 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }  
No 10 }

Maps: General Map, Gettysburg, 1 inch = 5 miles. Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Gettysburg, Fairfield, Taneytown, Emmitsburg, Mount Airy, and Ijamsville quadrangles.  
1. a. Reds have concentrated east of the line: LANCASTER—HARRISBURG, and are advancing on HANOVER and GETTYSBURG. Red



## THE ARMY IN THE ADVANCE

cavalry and bands of secessionists were reported today at HANOVER and GETTYSBURG. No Red aircraft has yet appeared south of the PENNSYLVANIA-MARYLAND state line. The Red GHQ air force is inferior to our own. All railroads to the north are reported intact.

- b. Our armies will advance north. The cavalry of the Second Army will reach the PENNSYLVANIA-MARYLAND state line on 24 November; its advance guards by the evening of 26 November. The Third Army will advance up the CUMBERLAND VALLEY; its cavalry will reach CHAMBERSBURG on 25 November. The 1st Air Division assumes a vigorous offensive against the Red air force at once.
2. This army will advance tomorrow on the line: HANOVER—GETTYSBURG. See *Annex No 1, Operation Map*, and *Annex No 2, March Table*.
3.
  - a. The I Provisional Cavalry Corps, less 3d Cavalry Brigade, moving early on 24 November, will advance on GETTYSBURG and determine without delay the strength and location of the hostile concentration reported on the line: HANOVER—GETTYSBURG. Early information is desired concerning any hostile movements across SOUTH MOUNTAIN north of EMMITSBURG. Connection will be maintained with the cavalry of the Second and Third Armies.
  - b. The army air force will commence reconnaissance at once. It will determine without delay the strength and location of the hostile concentration reported on the line: HANOVER—GETTYSBURG. Prompt information is desired of any hostile movements by day or night north of the line: YORK—CHAMBERSBURG, including the nature, size, and direction of the movement. Special attention will be paid to passes through SOUTH MOUNTAIN north of the WAYNESBORO TURNPIKE, inclusive. Close cooperation will be insured with the I Provisional Cavalry Corps.
  - c. The I Corps will advance as per *March Table*. It will cover the right of the army and maintain connection with the Second Army.
  - d. The II Corps will advance as per *March Table*. At least two crossings (capacity all arms) over the MONOCACY RIVER, north of the mouth of TOMS CREEK, will be made available by 5:00 PM, 25 November.
  - e. The III Corps will advance as per *March Table*. Special reconnaissance will be made early to the line: FAIRFIELD—HIGHFIELD. Early information is desired of the roads and railroads in the area: THURMONT—EMMITSBURG—FAIRFIELD—HIGHFIELD. It will cover the left of the army and maintain connection with the Third Army.
  - f. For other troops see *March Table* and movement orders (omitted).
  - x. Each corps will maintain connection with the corps on its left.
4. See *Administrative Orders No 10*.
5.
  - a. See *Annex No 3, Plan of signal communication* (omitted).
  - b. Axes of signal communication:  
First Army: FREDERICK—WOODSBORO—TANEYTOWN.  
I Corps: MOUNT AIRY—UNION MILLS.  
II Corps: LIBERTYTOWN—TANEYTOWN.  
III Corps: WALKERSVILLE—ST JOSEPHS ACADEMY.

10 TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

c. Command posts: see *March Table*.

By command of General A:

X,  
Chief of Staff.

Official:

Y,  
G-3.

Annexes:

No 1—*Operation Map*.

No 2—*March Table*.

No 3—*Plan of Signal Communication* (omitted).

Distribution: (omitted).



Annex No 2 to Field Orders No 10, First Army

MARCH TABLE

Organization (1)	Zones of Action (2)	Location, 24 Nov, 1926, 6:00 PM (3)	Location, 25 Nov, 1926, 6:00 PM (4)	Remarks (5)
Army	East boundary: PARRS RIDGE —HANOVER—EAST BERLIN (all inclusive). West boundary: CATOCTIN MOUNTAIN—SOUTH MOUNTAIN (both inclusive).	Command post: no change.	Forward echelon: WOODS- BORO.	
I Corps	East boundary: same as army. West boundary: RIDGEVILLE (inclusive)—UNIONVILLE— UNION BRIDGE (both exclusive) —MARKERS MILL—PINEY CREEK (village)—St. LUKE'S CHURCH (all inclusive).	Advance guards to be north of UNIONTOWN ROAD. 4th Division: TAYLORSVILLE, in army reserve. Command post: no change.	Advance guards to be north of east and west line through LITTLESTOWN. 4th Division: WESTMINSTER via WARFIELDSBURG. Command post: UNION MILLS.	5th Cavalry, less 2d Squadron, attached, effective 6:00 PM, 23 Nov.
II Corps	East boundary: same as west boundary, I Corps. West boundary: MCKAIG (in- clusive)—Mt. PLEASANT (ex- clusive)—MCALEER—LE GORE BRIDGE—MONOCACY RIVER— TOMS CREEK—MIDDLE CREEK —GETTYSBURG ROAD—MARSH CREEK (all inclusive).	Advance guards to be north of BIG PIPE CREEK. 8th Division: LIBERTYTOWN, in army reserve. Command post: no change.	Advance guards to be north of east and west line through LITTLESTOWN and FAIRPLAY. 8th Division: DETOUR. Command post: TANEY- TOWN.	2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, 701st and 702d Engineer Auxiliary Battalions, and 701st and 702d Engineer Bridge Trains (heavy) attached, ef- fective 6:00 PM, 23 Nov.
III Corps	East boundary: same as west boundary, II Corps. West boundary: same as west boundary of the army.	Advance guards to be north of OWENS CREEK. 11th Division: army reserve, no change. 12th Division: LEWISTOWN, in army reserve. Command post: no change.	Advance guards to be north of grid line 740. 11th Division: WOODSBORO. 12th Division: GRACEHAM. Command post: ST JOSEPHS ACADEMY.	3d Cavalry Brigade, less 5th Cavalry, attached, effective 6:00 PM, 23 Nov.
I Provisional Cavalry Corps, less 3d Cav- alry Brigade	Same as army.	Near GETTYSBURG.	No change.	3d Cavalry Brigade, less 5th Cavalry, attached to III Cs, effective 6:00 PM, 23 Nov. 5th Cavalry, less 2d Squadron, attached to I Corps, effective 6:00 PM, 23 Nov. 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, attached to II Cs, effective 6:00 PM, 23 Nov. Battery E, 701st Cavalry Artil- lery (AA) and Battery E, 703d



TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

Organization (1)	Action (2)	1926, 6:00 PM (3)	6:00 PM (4)	Remarks (5)
Army artillery				
Provisional Field Artillery Brigade, Colonel L, 911th Field Artillery, commanding 911th Field Artillery } 75-mm. gun <i>poêle</i> 912th Field Artillery } 913th Field Artillery } Groupment A, Colonel M, 921st Field Artillery, commanding: 921st Field Artillery (155-mm. gun) 931st Field Artillery (240-mm. howitzer) Batteries A and B, 701st Ammunition Train 901st Balloon Company Groupment B, Brigadier General N, commanding: 907th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 922d Field Artillery } 155-mm. gun 923d Field Artillery } 932d Field Artillery } (24. howitzer) 701st Ammunition Train, less Batteries A and B 907th Ordnance Company (heavy maintenance) 901st Balloon Group, less 901st Balloon Company		Command post: no change.  No change.  No change.  No change.	Command post: Woodsboro  No change.  MAYBERRY via NEW MARKET, LIBERTYTOWN, NEW WINDSOR, and UNIONTOWN.  KEYSVILLE via REELS MILL, BARTONSVILLE, CERESVILLE, and WOODSBORO.	Head of column will pass RJ 493 in CENTERVILLE at 6:30 AM, 25 Nov.  Head of column will pass CR at (336.2-690.5) at 7:30 AM, 25 Nov.
701st Coast Artillery Brigade (AA), less two machine gun batteries, with 951st Coast Artillery (AA) attached			Command post: Woodsboro	Covers army troops and establishments during the advance. Battery E, 701st Coast Artillery (AA), and Battery E, 703d Coast Artillery (AA), attached to I Provisional Cavalry Corps, effective 6:00 PM, 23 Nov.
Army air force	Same as army.	Command post: no change.	Establish landing fields north of BIG PIPE CREEK.	901st Balloon Group attached to army artillery groupments, effective 6:00 PM, 24 Nov.
Army signal service				Under chief signal officer.
Army engineer service				Under chief engineer officer. 701st and 702d Engineer Bridge Trains (heavy) and 701st and 702d Engineer Auxiliary Battalions attached to II Corps, effective 6:00 PM, 23 Nov.
Army quartermaster train			One-half at KEYMAR. One-half at LE GORE.	To be held available for troop movements.
Other army troops (omitted)				

OFFICIAL:  
Y.  
G-3.

By command of General A,  
X,  
Chief of Staff.

## SECTION IV

## Discussion

	Paragraph
Organization of First Army -----	10
Mobilization and concentration -----	11
Plan of commander-in-chief -----	12
Theater of operations -----	13
Plan of advance -----	14
Strategy and tactics -----	15
Orders -----	16

---

10. ORGANIZATION OF FIRST ARMY.—The organization of the First Army is based primarily upon the type organization prescribed by the War Department.\* The organization of the corps, however, varies in that each corps has four divisions instead of three. For purposes of convenience in handling, the two cavalry divisions have been organized into a provisional cavalry corps, and it is assumed that a suitable staff has been assigned. Inasmuch as the contemplated operations of the First Army will be such as to demand a considerable degree of mobility, only mobile artillery, in such amount as the situation seems to warrant, has been attached from the General Headquarters Reserve. There have been attached also from General Headquarters Reserve such other units as it appears will be necessary in the prospective operations.

11. MOBILIZATION AND CONCENTRATION.—Mobilization and concentration do not enter in a consideration of this problem as they have been already accomplished. It should be noted that the form of concentration has been such as to further the contemplated operations with the minimum of confusion.

12. PLAN OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.—The plan of the commander-in-chief should be studied with care in order that a clear idea may be obtained of the part the First Army plays in carrying out that plan. It will be seen that the group of armies is to advance echeloned to both flanks from

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\*See *Reference Data*, G.S.S.



## 14 TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

the center; that the First Army is to engage the enemy, aided later by the Second Army; and that the decisive blow is then to be struck by the Third Army. So far as the group of armies is concerned, the plan is practically an envelopment of the enemy's main force. The plan follows the first principle of strategy, in that the enemy's main force is the objective. The mission of the group of armies is definite and clear cut and the mission of each army is likewise definite and clear cut and such as to further the mission of the group of armies. Each army commander must, therefore, plan his actions and operations so as to carry out as fully as lies within his power the decision of the commander-in-chief. This insures the teamwork so essential.

13. THEATER OF OPERATIONS.—The theater of operations of the First Army is a comparatively narrow valley lying between a low range of hills on the east and a comparatively high mountain mass on the west. The west half of the valley is bisected longitudinally by a stream which may form more or less of an obstacle. The valley is liberally supplied with roads, both longitudinally and laterally, ranging from fair to excellent. It has also three lines of railroads leading to the front and two traversing it laterally, which insures comparative ease of supply. Except for a limited amount of forage and food supplies which may be obtained locally, supply must be from the rear. Active opposition may be expected as soon as the state line is crossed. The enemy situation is still vague, but it seems fairly reasonable to assume that the opposition will assume definite proportions in the vicinity of the line: Hanover—Gettysburg. A map study of the terrain shows a hill mass to the south and west of Gettysburg with a comparatively open and rolling country east thereof. Bearing in mind the plan of the commander-in-chief, it seems incumbent on the First Army to make its decisive blow at or near the enemy's west flank in order to secure at least the hill mass in the vicinity and aid in covering the uninterrupted debouchment of the Third Army across South Mountain from the Cumberland Valley.





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of each day's march if the march extends over a number of days, or by assigning objectives and leaving the matter to corps commanders. In this case it is evident that the probable line of serious opposition is about two days' march distant and that all leading elements should reach that line at approximately the same time. Coordination is thus assured in this situation by prescribing certain definite lines that similar elements in each corps will reach at approximately the same time. Further details of coordination are prescribed by directing what connection shall be maintained between the advancing columns and by whom.

*d. Security and reconnaissance.*—(1) For the security and reconnaissance of the army as a whole during the advance, the army commander has three agencies, *viz.*, the army air force, the army cavalry, and the army and corps antiaircraft units. The vigorous offensive against the Red air force, to be undertaken on 23 November by the superior Blue air division, should result in neutralizing the Red air force to a marked extent. It should provide security for the First Army against assaults from the air, except for sporadic and comparatively ineffective attacks. The army can, therefore, undertake day marches almost unmolested by hostile aircraft. Moreover, the offensive of the Blue air division allows great freedom of action to the First Army air force, particularly to the observation and attack groups, and lightens the task of the pursuit group. Observation aviation is the arm, *par excellence*, for distant reconnaissance. By prompt reports of enemy dispositions and movements, the army commander is enabled to come to early decisions as to enemy intentions and to make the necessary arrangements to forestall or guard against such enemy movements, and to plan his subsequent actions. At the beginning of a march, the primary mission of the army cavalry is distant reconnaissance which eventually merges into counterreconnaissance or screening. Reconnaissance demands dispersion; whereas, protection calls for concentration in order to provide for fighting power when necessary. However, the duties of reconnaissance and security by the army cavalry covering an advance cannot be disassociated.



With the enemy situation as vague as it is at the time the forward movement begins, provision must be made to insure that both the air corps and cavalry secure and transmit to the army commander, without delay, every bit of enemy information they can procure, in order that the situation may be cleared up for him and in time for him to come to definite conclusions and make the necessary preparatory moves to bring the weight of his force to bear at the selected decisive point at the proper time. An army is a large force, and movements of large bodies require time. Antiaircraft artillery units have no reconnaissance missions, but they should be fully utilized in the protection of the army and its establishments from hostile air activity.

(2) Notwithstanding the fact that the entire front of the advance is covered by army cavalry, the corps must make suitable provisions for their own security, both in front and in flank. The front of each corps may be covered by one advance guard, or each column may be charged with its own security. In this situation the necessity for clearing the concentration area and the fact that the probable line of action can be foreseen, indicate rather clearly that the advance must be made in a number of columns. The simplest method, therefore, is to require each column to provide for its own security. The army has coordinated this by requiring that advance guards reach certain designated lines by certain specified times. Some advance guards will be somewhat in advance or in rear of others. The terrain will determine this. Additional reconnaissance, other than that provided by army agencies, flank protection, and connection between columns demand the attachment to corps of cavalry units for this purpose.

*e. Concentration for battle.*—As has been stated before, the probable line of contact and the probable resulting action can be foreseen to a certain extent. Plans should be made accordingly, but until definite information is available, provision must be made to assure a concentration at any part of the line the situation demands. For these reasons certain divisions are detached from the three corps,



designated as army reserves, and moved so as to be available when necessary. This illustrates, too, the flexibility of the corps and army organization. As a further precaution the army train is so located and given such orders as will make it available promptly to transport troops to localities where they are needed. In view of the fact that the probable place where the main effort of the army will be made will be on the west flank and because of the further fact that the branches of the Monocacy River may be obstacles, provision is made by giving to the corps, within whose zone these streams lie, certain engineer units to insure that these obstacles may be promptly overcome. The inevitable question of supply is also foreseen by requiring a special reconnaissance of roads and railroads well on the west flank so that timely provision may be made for repair in case of necessity. Even though serious combat may be some days distant, plans must be made for all contingencies, and must be in readiness so that prompt action may be taken when the necessity arises.

15. STRATEGY AND TACTICS.—The army commander is concerned but little with strategy in this situation. The strategical plan is that of the commander-in-chief. So far as the army commander is concerned he has to deal only with tactical considerations and use his command tactically in such manner as will insure the success of the strategical plan.

16. ORDERS.—For this advance the army commander could have issued orders daily for the advance of the next day only. However, because of the small likelihood of any serious opposition until late the second day, and because of the advantage to every one concerned of being able early to make fairly definite plans looking to the future, orders covering two days' march were issued. With large units a march table is a convenient means of giving details of a march in a simple and condensed form.

SECTION V

Army Administrative Orders for the Advance\*

	Paragraph
General discussion -----	17
Situation and requirement -----	18
A solution -----	19
Discussion -----	20

17. GENERAL DISCUSSION.—*a. The combat zone.*—(1) The maintenance of the fighting forces depends on the efficiency of the supply services. Since supply depends directly upon transportation, in the planning of large operations it is necessary that the organization of the road and railroad systems in the proposed combat zone be carefully considered. Should such study reveal that the facilities for communication are inadequate, it will usually be necessary to modify the plan of operations.

(2) The combat zone is divided into army areas and these in turn may be subdivided into army service areas and army combat areas. The army combat area embraces the areas of the front line corps and other army troops such as cavalry on the flanks, in contact with the enemy. The army service area covers the territory between the rear boundaries of the corps and the forward boundary of the communications zone. The bulk of the army troops and establishments are usually located in this area. Corps areas are divided into areas for corps troops and division areas. Each army, corps, and division area is under control of the commander thereof. As these units advance, their rear boundaries are moved forward.

*b. Administrative functions of the army.*—(1) The army has organically both combat and service troops. The army commander is responsible for the administration and supply of all troops in the army area, including such troops

\*See map at end of this section.



belonging to the communications zone as may be stationed in the combat zone, when so directed by higher authority. He assumes direct responsibility for the supply, evacuation, sanitation, discipline, police, and quartering of army troops not attached to corps, and for the control of traffic in the army service area. In matters of supply, he is responsible for the assignment of railheads to corps, for the Class I supply of army troops, and for the establishing of depots containing the necessary reserve Class II, III, and IV supplies for the entire army. The general policy of the commander having been announced, the detailed plan is prepared by his staff and published to the command in the form of administrative orders. These orders give full administrative details for all army troops. They are distributed to army troops, corps, and divisions.

(2) Depending on the military situation, the army may have the following establishments, in whole or in part:

(a) Quartermaster corps:

Supply depot.

Remount depot.

Motor transport depot.

(b) Ordnance department:

Supply depot.

Ammunition depot.

Aircraft armament depot.

Small arms depot.

(c) Chemical warfare service:

Gas defense depot.

(d) Corps of engineers:

Supply depot.

(e) Medical department:

Supply depot.

Evacuation hospital, active or reserve.

Surgical hospital.

Convalescent hospital.

Veterinary evacuation hospital.

Veterinary convalescent hospital.

(f) Signal corps:  
Supply depot.

(g) Air corps:  
Air depot.

(3) The principal functions of the army service troops are the traffic control, police, guard, transportation, labor, and the operation of the establishments listed in subparagraph *b* (2), above.

*c. Army supply principles.*—The principles governing the organization of an army area for supply are as follows:

(1) The communications zone exists primarily to supply the armies. Supplies from the communications zone are delivered, through regulating stations, to railheads, depots, and other refilling points in the combat zone.

(2) The army maintains only such reserve of supplies as the military situation demands be kept nearer the front than the depots of the communications zone. Such reserve usually is limited in character and quantity to that essential to maintain the combat efficiency for a period not exceeding three days.

(3) Class I supplies normally are not collected in army depots but are delivered daily to the railheads of the various units. A reserve of one or two days may however be accumulated at railheads by railhead officers.

(4) The army provides for the Class I supply of all army troops and troops in army reserve. The supervision of supply of troops attached to corps rests with the corps to which they are attached.

(5) Class II, III, and IV supplies.—(a) Army depots are normally branch depots, located as far to the front as practicable. They are established for the reception and temporary storage of army reserve supplies.

(b) The depots of the communications zone and the reserves in army depots can be used in the following combinations for providing Class II, III, and IV supplies:

(i) Supplying the troops directly from the communications zone and holding supplies in army depots as emer-



gency reserves. This method is particularly applicable to the supply of troops out of contact with the enemy, where speed in supply is not of great importance.

(ii) Using all supplies in army depots freely and replenishing the army stocks from the communications zone. This method is particularly applicable to the supply of troops in combat, where speed in supply is of great importance.

(iii) A combination of (i) and (ii) is normal in an army area and is particularly applicable in semistabilized situations.

(c) Army depots usually are maintained separately by each supply service. The quantities of supplies maintained in branch depots will naturally vary with the requirements of the tactical situation. This applies particularly to ammunition, barbed wire, and construction materials. Branch depots are located on lines of communications leading from the communications zone and on good roads leading to the front, in order that troops may be supplied from depots by motor transport if possible.

(6) (a) The application of these principles to an advance will vary with the length of the proposed advance, the rapidity of the advance, and the proximity of the enemy. When the army contemplates a long rapid advance, and the enemy is distant, the supplies consumed will be mainly Class I, and practically all supplies can be drawn from the communications zone. There is, therefore, little necessity for army depots in such a situation. When the enemy is close, it is necessary that the army have reserve supplies within reach of the troops. When the army is to advance only a short distance and the enemy is close, certain branch depots can be established before the advance commences.

(b) As contact with the enemy becomes imminent, ammunition depots should be established to act as refilling points for the leading divisions. These depots need not be as numerous as those required when the opposing forces have become closely engaged.





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*e. Traffic circulation and reserved motor roads.*—(1) The army, either by means of a circulation map, or by paragraphs in the army administrative order, provides for traffic circulation within the army area and may restrict the use of certain specified roads. These restrictions usually relate to roads reserved by the army for motor traffic only. When so restricted, they are termed *reserved motor roads*.

(2) In view of the fact that, during an advance, most of the roads will be used by troops moving in accordance with a march table, the control of traffic by means of a circulation map usually will be impracticable. However the army will usually require at least one reserved motor road for the use of its supply trains and the motor transport of corps and divisions.

18. SITUATION AND REQUIREMENT.—*a. Situation.*—(1) For general and special situations, see Section II, above.

(2) The locations of the administrative, technical, and supply troops of the First Army are as shown in the location table, 23 November, 1926, in Section II, above.

(3) The location of railheads for 23 November, 1926, are as follows:

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Railheads</i>
I Corps	Woodbine, Watersville, Parrsville, and Mount Airy
II Corps	Tollgate, Bartholows, Monrovia, and Ijamsville
III Corps	Walkersville, Harmony Grove, and Yellow Springs
Army cavalry	Woodsboro
Army artillery	Reels Mill
All other army troops	Frederick

(4) Army depots have been established at the following places:

- Engineer Depot No 1-----Frederick.
- Field Remount Depot No 1-----Indian Springs.
- Motor Transport Depot No 1-----Frederick.
- Air Corps Depot No 1 (minor repairs)Harmony Grove.



## THE ARMY IN THE ADVANCE

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All other supplies are being drawn directly from the communications zone.

(5) The army is evacuating men to hospitals at Frederick, and animals to the veterinary hospital at Indian Springs.

*b. Requirement.*—The administrative order (No 10), to accompany *Field Orders No 10*, First Army, 23 November, 1926.

19. A SOLUTION.—*a.* The following administrative order was issued by the First Army:

First Army,  
FREDERICK, MD.,  
23 Nov 26, 2:00 PM.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS }  
No 10 } To accompany *Field Orders No 10*, First Army.

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Gettysburg, Frederick, Taneytown, Emmitsburg, Mount Airy, and Ijamsville quadrangles.

# 1. SUPPLY.

## *a. Railheads.*

- (1) No change prior to 26 Nov.
- (2) Commencing 26 Nov:
  - I Corps: WESTMINSTER, AVONDALE, NEW WINDSOR, and LINWOOD.
  - II Corps: UNION BRIDGE, TANEYTOWN, and BRUCEVILLE.
  - III Corps: ST JOSEPHS ACADEMY, ROCKY RIDGE, LOYS, and THURMONT.
  - 4th Div: WESTMINSTER.
  - 8th Div: DETOUR.
  - 11th Div: WOODSBORO.
  - 12th Div: GRACEHAM.
  - I Prov Cav Corps: EMMITSBURG.
  - Groupments A and B, Army Arty: UNION BRIDGE.
  - All other army troops: WALKERSVILLE.
- (3) Corps commanders will report assignment of railheads by 8:00 AM, 24 Nov.

## *b. Class I supplies.*

Distributing points.

- (1) No change for 24 Nov and 25 Nov.
- (2) Beginning 26 Nov:
  - See *Annex No 1*, Assignment Table (omitted).

## *c. Ammunition.*

- (1) Arty, all kinds: Am Dep No 2, LE GORE.
- (2) Inf: Am Dep No 1, NEW MIDWAY.
- (3) Refilling point for I Prov Cav Corps, EMMITSBURG, commencing 26 Nov.
- (4) See *Annex No 2*, Ammunition Plan (omitted).

## *d. Engineer.*

- (1) All classes of supplies: Engr Dept No 1, FREDERICK.
- (2) See *Annex No 3*, Engineer Plan (omitted).



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*e. Signal.*

All classes of supplies: Sig Dep No 1, WALKERSVILLE.

*f. Medical.*

All classes of supplies: Med Dep No 1, FREDERICK.

*g. Ordnance.*

- (1) All material and supplies: Ord Dep No 1, FREDERICK.
- (2) Small arms depot: Ord Dep No 2, BRUCEVILLE.
- (3) See *Annex No 4, Ordnance Plan* (omitted).

*h. Quartermaster.*

- (1) 701st F Rmt Dep: INDIAN SPRINGS.
- (2) Spare parts and repairs for motor Vehicles (QM): MT Dept No 1, FREDERICK.
- (3) Reserve gas and oil: QM Dep No 3, MIDDLEBURG.
- (4) Other supplies: QM Dep No 2, FREDERICK.
- (5) See *Annex No 5, Quartermaster Plan* (omitted).

*i. Air corps.*

- (1) All supplies and repairs: Air Corps Dep No 1, HARMONY GROVE, after 27 Nov.
- (2) Minor repairs: Air Corps Dep No 2, HARMONY GROVE.

*x.* Chiefs of supply branches will reconnoiter with a view to recommending sites for advance depots.

## 2. EVACUATION.

*a. Casualties.*

By army.

- (1) Men:  
All army hospitals: FREDERICK.
- (2) Animals:  
Vet Evac Hosp No 1: INDIAN SPRINGS.
- (3) See *Annex No 6, Medical Plan* (omitted).

*b. Burial.*

- (1) During the march the number of cemeteries will be reduced to a minimum.
- (2) Army troops.
  - (a) Under supervision of the army quartermaster.
  - (b) Cemetery: MT. PLEASANT.

*c. Salvage.*

- (1) Units to report location of salvage to G-4 of army direct.
- (2) Collection by 701st, 702d, and 703d Serv Bns, under supervision of quartermaster, army.
- (3) Serviceable salvage to proper army depot by army.
- (4) Unserviceable salvage through railhead to Com Z.

*d. Captured material.*

- (1) Divisions in contact with the enemy will make daily reports as of 12:00 noon, direct to G-1, army (copy to corps concerned) covering the following:
  - Artillery, giving caliber.
  - Machine guns, giving make.
  - Transportation, other than wagons, giving description and location.
  - Other material of importance giving description and location.
- (2) Serviceable captured material may be retained for service by divisions on approval of the corps.



## THE ARMY IN THE ADVANCE

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- (3) Other captured material will be taken over by the supply branch concerned and disposed of in accordance with paragraph 2 c above.

*e. Prisoners of war.*

- (1) Army prisoner of war enclosure No 1, WOODSBORO.
- (2) EVacuation from corps and divisions by army.
- (3) Reports of captures will be made as of 12:00 noon daily, direct to G-1, army, by all divisions in contact with enemy. Copy of report to corps concerned.

3. TRAFFIC.

*a. Circulation.*

- (1) Restrictions:
  - (a) ReservEd motor road: FREDERICK—WOODSBORO—TANEY-TOWN, south of KEYMAR.
  - (b) The use of lights on motor Vehicles is prohibited north of LIBERTY TURNPIKE.
- (2) Control:
  - (a) By corps and divisions within their respective areas.
  - (b) By army in rear of corps rear boundaries.

*b. Construction and maintenance of routes.*

- (1) By army: reservEd motor road and in rear of corps rear boundaries.
- (2) Corps and divisions within their respective areas, temporary repairs during march.
- (3) All roads and headquarters will be posted with signs, the responsibility resting with respective area commanders.

*c. Boundaries.*

- (1) Rear boundary, Army Service Area: B & O RR, exclusive.
- (2) Corps rear boundaries:
  - Commencing midnight, 24-25 Nov: LIBERTY TURNPIKE, inclusive.
  - Commencing midnight, 25-26 Nov: WESTERN MARYLAND RR, exclusive.

4. TRAINS.

For locations and movements of army trains, see *Annex No 2 to Field Orders No 10*; First Army—*March Table*.

5. PERSONNEL.

*Stragglers.*

The army military police will arrest all stragglers in rear of corps areas, reporting such arrest to G-1, army, who will arrange for their return to organizations.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

The following units are attached as indicated:

To the I Corps:

704th Service Battalion and 901st Graves Registration Unit.

To the II Corps:

705th Service Battalion and 902d Graves Registration Unit.



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To the III Corps:

706th Service Battalion and 903d Graves Registration Unit.

By command of Gen A:

X,  
C of S.

OFFICIAL:

Z,  
G-4.

Annexes:

*Annex No 1—Assignment Table, Class I supplies (omitted).*

*Annex No 2—Ammunition Plan (omitted).*

*Annex No 3—Engineer Plan (omitted).*

*Annex No 4—Ordnance Plan (omitted).*

*Annex No 5—Quartermaster Plan (omitted).*

*Annex No 6—Medical Plan (omitted).*

Distribution:

(Same as *Field Orders No 10.*)

20. DISCUSSION.—*a. The railway system.*—In planning the operations of large forces, the organization of the railway system in the proposed theater of operations is a matter of first importance. In this situation, the First Army is to be supplied from the communications zone *via* the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, a double track line. The regulating station has been located at Frederick Junction because of the number of tracks available there. The railways in the zone of advance of the First Army consist of the Northern Central Railroad, extending diagonally across the zone from Frederick to Hanover; the Frederick Railroad, connecting with the Western Maryland at Thurmont and providing a line of supply between the Monocacy River and Catocin Mountain as far north as Emmitsburg; and a branch of the Western Maryland Railroad, crossing the zone from Westminster to Thurmont. Since contact with the Red forces is expected along the general line: Hanover—Gettysburg, the railways just named will provide satisfactory facilities until the Reds are driven farther north. Should the Reds be forced north as anticipated, the branch of the Western Maryland Railroad through Blue Ridge Summit will become an important line of supply.

*b. The administrative order.*—In general, tentative administrative plans, contingent upon the success or failure



of the tactical operation involved, constitute a part of every plan of campaign. The administrative order does not contain all of the details of the plan. It is general with regard to corps and detailed with regard to army troops. It usually covers the same period of time as does the field order which it accompanies. In this situation, the field order covers troop movements until 6:00 PM, 25 November, and the administrative order designates the railheads for 26 November.

*c. Railheads.*—In view of the proximity of the enemy, the railheads should remain in rear of the leading divisions. All railheads therefore remain unchanged until 26 November at which time the leading divisions will be far enough north to protect the new railheads selected. In selecting railheads, consideration must be given to siding facilities and roads. A siding should have a minimum capacity of ten cars in order to serve a division.

*d. Plan of supply.*—(1) Prior to 24 November, the date on which the First Army is to begin its advance, divisions, corps, and army troops have been receiving Class I supplies daily at railheads. Class II, III, and IV supplies are being obtained from depots in the communications zone on requisition. This method of supply allowed the reserves of the army to remain intact. This system of supply will continue until the army becomes generally engaged with the enemy. As soon as the plan for the advance is announced, the various supply services establish such supply establishments as will be required during the advance. An artillery ammunition depot is established at Le Gore and an infantry ammunition depot at New Midway to supply the advance divisions of the army during the early phases of contact with the Reds. These depots may be pushed farther forward as the situation develops. All establishments handling supplies in quantity should be located at points on the railroads where switching facilities exist and which are accessible for motor transport.

(2) At the time of issue of the army field order, it can be anticipated that on 26 November the provisional cav-



alry corps will be heavily engaged in a locality generally north of Emmitsburg. Since the ammunition depots at New Midway and Le Gore are too far away to serve the cavalry corps, the army arranges to establish an ammunition refilling point at Emmitsburg commencing 26 November.

*e. Evacuation.*—(1) Evacuation of men and animals from divisions and corps by army is normal. Since there are good roads and railways leading forward from Frederick, such army hospitals as are necessary to care for the sick and wounded during the advance are established in the vicinity of Frederick. The remainder of the army medical service will remain at Frederick until such time as the situation may require additional hospital facilities.

(2) While it may be expected that some prisoners of war will be captured during the advance, they will be few in number and their evacuation will not be difficult. The prisoner of war enclosure at Woodsboro will be sufficient to receive such prisoners as may be brought in. It is located in rear of that part of the front on which the greatest number of captures is expected.

*f. Traffic.*—(1) The army should have a reserved *motor road* leading to the front in order to insure the uninterrupted movement of its supply trains. The Frederick Turnpike is a paved highway, it leads forward from Frederick, a very important center, and it parallels a railway along which several army depots are to be located. Because of these considerations, it is the logical road for use by supply trains and is designated as a reserved motor road as far north as Keymar.

(2) Since the advance is to take place through an area in which there has been no fighting, the roads should be in very good condition. In order that the advance may not be delayed, corps and divisions are ordered to make only temporary repairs within their zones. Due to the importance of the reserved motor road, the army assumes responsibility for its maintenance.

*g. Trains.*—When an army is advancing, the traffic throughout the zone of advance is so dense that the move-





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FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS


he heavily engaged in a locality generally  
urg. Since the ammunition depots at New  
ore are too far away to serve the cavalry  
arranges to establish an ammunition re-  
mitsburg commencing 26 November.

(1) Evacuation of men and animals  
h corps by army is normal. Since there  
railways leading forward from Freder-  
als as are necessary to care for the  
ing the advance are established in the  
The remainder of the army medical  
Frederick until such time as the situa-  
onal hospital facilities.  
e expected that some prisoners of  
ing the advance, they will be few  
ation will not be difficult. The  
at Woodsboro will be sufficient  
may be brought in. It is lo-  
he front on which the greatest

e army should have a reserved  
otor road leading to the front in order to insure the un-  
interrupted movement of its supply trains. The Frederick  
Turnpike is a paved highway, it leads forward from Freder-  
ick, a very important center, and it parallels a railway along  
which several army depots are to be located. Because of  
these considerations, it is the logical road for use by supply  
trains and is designated as a reserved motor road as far  
north as Keymar.

(2) Since the advance is to take place through an area  
in which there has been no fighting, the roads should be in  
very good condition. In order that the advance may not be  
delayed, corps and divisions are ordered to make only  
temporary repairs within their zones. Due to the im-  
portance of the reserved motor road, the army assumes  
responsibility for its maintenance.

g. *Trains.*—When an army is advancing, the traffic  
throughout the zone of advance is so dense that the move-









## THE ARMY IN THE ADVANCE

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ments of all large columns must be coordinated and controlled. It is, therefore, advisable to prescribe the movements and locations of the larger elements of the army trains in the march table. The movements of such small elements as are engaged in the hauling of supplies are not prescribed in army orders but must be so planned by their commanders as not to interfere with the movements ordered in the march table.

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 SECTION VI\*

## The Army Cavalry in the Advance

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21. PRINCIPLES.—*a.* One or more cavalry divisions usually are assigned for duty with an army. Such cavalry forces are designated *army cavalry* and are employed under the direction of the army commander. The normal assignment of cavalry to a type army of the United States is two cavalry divisions. When two or more cavalry divisions constitute the army cavalry, and the mission assigned this force is of such nature that it can be executed best under the direction of a single commander, the cavalry divisions may be organized into a provisional cavalry corps.

*b.* The army cavalry is the principal agency available to the army commander for distant and close terrestrial reconnaissance. In the early stages of the advance of an army, when the opposing forces are some distance apart and information of the enemy's dispositions is meager, the army cavalry, working in conjunction with the army air force, is employed to determine the attitude, strength, dispositions, and movements of the enemy in the zone of re-

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\*See map at end of this section.



sponsibility of the army. While this reconnaissance is directed primarily at the hostile main forces, the operation early discloses the nature and extent of the activities of the enemy's covering and reconnaissance forces. In general, these operations of his reconnaissance and covering forces disclose the enemy's attitude at any particular time. As these attitudes are disclosed from time to time, the army commander may influence the operations of his cavalry in such way as to gain from its activities the maximum benefits for the army as a whole by assigning to it those missions, the accomplishment of which will advance most the mission of the army as a whole. During this phase of the advance, the army cavalry employs its attached air force and detachments from its larger tactical units to obtain the desired information. The maximum frontage that can be covered effectively by a cavalry division on reconnaissance is about twenty-five miles. So far as the mission assigned it, the hostile dispositions and reactions encountered, and the nature of the terrain will permit, the main mass of the army cavalry is kept concentrated, both when it is advancing and when it is halted.

c. Some of the missions that may be performed by the army cavalry after the general attitude of the enemy's covering and reconnaissance forces has been disclosed are:

(1) When the enemy's reconnaissance and covering forces are so disposed as to prevent further reconnaissance by the detachments which the army cavalry employs, further reconnaissance, designed to break through the enemy's advanced forces and determine what is taking place in rear, may be indicated. When this situation arises, the commander of the army cavalry, after careful consideration of all information furnished by his reconnaissance agencies and a study of his mission and the terrain, selects a point in the enemy's dispositions which seems best calculated to favor the operation, and attacks with the mass of his force to break through the hostile resistance at the point selected. Usually, the concentration of hostile reserves to meet such attacks lessens the resistance in front of reconnaissance de-



tachments to such degree as to permit them to continue with their missions. When they are unable so to proceed, new detachments are sent through the gap in the enemy's screen which has resulted from the action of the mass of the army cavalry.

(2) When the enemy's reconnaissance forces are particularly strong and aggressive, and concealment of the forces comprising the army is of paramount importance, counterreconnaissance to prevent the enemy's ground reconnaissance agencies from obtaining information as to the strength and movements of the main forces of the army may be indicated. This operation is performed while the army cavalry is advancing or when it is halted. When the mass of the army cavalry is advancing, it is preceded by a screen of strong detachments, the advance of which is carefully coordinated and the mission of which is the expulsion from the zone of the army of all small hostile reconnaissance agencies, and the delay of larger forces until the mass of the army cavalry can be brought into action. When the mass of the army cavalry halts, the screen of detachments is disposed so as to control the road net leading from the direction of the enemy in such way that small reconnaissance agencies are unable to penetrate it and that the advance of large hostile forces may be delayed until the mass of the army cavalry can be used at the threatened point.

(3) When the enemy's cavalry has been eliminated from the field or is so weak as to interfere but little with the operations of the army cavalry, delaying missions in front of the heads of hostile main columns may be indicated. By delaying action, time is gained for the forces advancing in rear of the cavalry. The delay of the enemy is brought about by causing him to deploy a part or all of one or more of his columns to attack one or more positions occupied by the cavalry in his zone of advance or by causing him to deploy a part or all of one or more of these columns to ward off attacks made by the more rapidly moving cavalry against the flanks of his columns of foot troops.



(4) When important terrain features exist in the zone of advance of the army, when these terrain features are not occupied by the enemy's covering forces or when they are but lightly held by them, and when the possession of such features will facilitate the advance or the subsequent operations of the army, their seizure, or capture and occupation by the army cavalry until the arrival of other elements of the army may be indicated. When the means available to the army cavalry, organically, are not sufficient for the operations to be carried out, higher authority may reinforce the cavalry for the operation by sending forward additional artillery and infantry in trucks and by ordering the army air force to assist the cavalry.

*d.* In carrying out any or all of its operations in front of the advancing army, the army cavalry is constantly in search of information which will assist it in its own operations and which will assist the army commander in making his decisions.

*e.* When, during the advance of the army, combat becomes necessary for the army cavalry in order that it may carry out any or all of the missions assigned it, attacks against hostile forces and positions are planned and carried out in such manner as to make maximum use of the ability of cavalry to move rapidly to envelop or turn hostile resistance. Purely defensive combat is resorted to only when the limitations as to time, space, and the terrain are such that the mission of the cavalry can be executed only by defensive action. Defensive positions occupied by the army cavalry during the advance of the army usually must be held for such short periods of time before the arrival of foot troops that the cavalry is able to deploy its strength on relatively broad fronts and dispose its forces in relatively little depth and to depend upon counterattacks by a highly mobile reserve to carry out the defense until the arrival of the infantry of the army.

*f.* At all times, during the advance of the army, all cavalry units seek concealment from hostile aerial observation and protection from hostile aerial attack during daylight hours by making maximum use of the facilities for





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First Army field and administrative orders for the advance were delivered to Lieutenant General C.

*c. Conference with corps commanders and with the commander of the First Army air force.*—At 2:30 PM, at the conclusion of the conference at headquarters of the First Army, Lieutenant General C conferred with the corps commanders and directed his chief of staff to transmit orders by telephone directing the following movements of troops: the 3d Cavalry Brigade, less 5th Cavalry and two troops of the 3d Machine Gun Squadron, to proceed at once to Walkersville and report to the commander of the III Corps at 6:00 PM; the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, with one troop of the 3d Machine Gun Squadron attached, to proceed to Libertytown at such time as to report to the commander of the II Corps at 6:00 PM; and the 5th Cavalry, less 2d Squadron, with one troop of the 3d Machine Gun Squadron attached, to proceed to Weldon at such time as to report to the commander of the I Corps by radio at 6:00 PM. He then conferred with the commander of the air force of the First Army and arranged the details for air corps cooperation with and assistance to the I Provisional Cavalry Corps during the advance.

*d. Corps commander's return.*—Lieutenant General C returned to his command post at Woodsboro during the afternoon of 23 November, 1926.

*e. First requirement.*—Prepare the formal written field order for the operations of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps on 24 November.

23. A SOLUTION OF FIRST REQUIREMENT.—The formal written field order for the operations of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps on 24 November is as follows:

I Provisional Cavalry Corps,  
WOODSBORO, MD.,  
23 November, 1926, 6:00 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }  
No 8 }

Maps: General Map, Gettysburg, 1 inch = 5 miles. Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Gettysburg, Fairfield, Taneytown, Emmitsburg, Mount Airy, and Ijamsville quadrangles.

1. *a.* The Reds have concentrated on the line: LANCASTER—HARRISBURG, and are advancing on HANOVER and GETTYSBURG. No Red aircraft has yet appeared south of the PENNSYLVANIA-MARYLAND



## THE ARMY IN THE ADVANCE

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state line. The Red GHQ air force is inferior to our own. Red cavalry and bands of secessionists were reported today at HANOVER and GETTYSBURG.

- b. (1) Our armies advance north. The cavalry of the Second Army will reach the PENNSYLVANIA-MARYLAND state line on 24 November; its advance guards by evening of 26 November. The Third Army will advance up the CUMBERLAND VALLEY; its cavalry will reach CHAMBERSBURG on 25 November.
- (2) Our First Army, with corps abreast in order from east to west, I, II, and III Corps, advances tomorrow, 24 November, on the line: HANOVER—GETTYSBURG.

Zone of action:

East boundary: PARRS RIDGE—HANOVER—EAST BERLIN, all inclusive.

West boundary: CATOCTIN MOUNTAIN—SOUTH MOUNTAIN, both inclusive.

- (3) Our army air force has assumed and will maintain a vigorous offensive against enemy aircraft and ground troops. It will reconnoiter in the zone of the army to the line: LANCASTER—HARRISBURG, rear boundary the line: HANOVER—GETTYSBURG, and will transmit information directly to the I Provisional Cavalry Corps.
2. The I Provisional Cavalry Corps, less detachment, will advance in the zone of the First Army to the line: LITTLESTOWN—GREENMOUNT, on 24 November, reconnoitering to the line: HANOVER—GETTYSBURG—CASHTOWN, and covering the advance of the First Army.

Formation: divisions abreast, 1st Cavalry Division on the left. Boundary between divisions: LIBERTYTOWN—TANEYTOWN—BONNEAUVILLE, all to 2d Cavalry Division.

3. a. The 2d Cavalry Division, less 3d Cavalry Brigade, will have its patrols along the line: HANOVER—BONNEAUVILLE, by dark, 24 November. It will gain connection with the cavalry of the Second Army during the night, 24-25 November. The main body of the division will be in the area: road junction 573 (360.0-736.5)—road junction 523 (356.0-735.5)—WASHINGTON SCHOOL, by dark, 24 November.
- b. The 1st Cavalry Division will have its patrols along the line: BONNEAUVILLE—CASHTOWN, by dark, 24 November. It will gain connection with the cavalry of the Third Army on 25 November. The main body of the division will be in the area: PALMER—road junction 444 (347.0-736.0)—road junction 438 (347.3-732.3), by dark, 24 November.
- x. (1) Early information on the following points is desired:
  - (a) Strength, composition, location, and disposition of all hostile forces located in the zone of action of the First Army.
  - (b) If hostile forces are moving across SOUTH MOUNTAIN north of EMMITSBURG, the strength, composition, location, and dispositions of such forces.
  - (c) If hostile forces are taking up defensive positions, the location, extent, and flanks of such positions.
- (2) Identifications will be made.
- (3) Locations of the main bodies of divisions will be reported every two hours, beginning at 9:00 AM.



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(4) Main bodies of divisions will clear the line: WESTMINSTER—THURMONT, by 12:00 noon.

4. See *Administrative Orders No 10*.

5. a. Axes of signal communication:

I Provisional Cavalry Corps: WOODSBORO—ROCKY RIDGE—BRIDGEPORT.

2d Cavalry Division: OLDFIELD—UNION BRIDGE—TANEY-TOWN—WASHINGTON SCHOOL.

1st Cavalry Division: WOODSBORO—KEYSVILLE—PALMER.

b. Command posts:

I Provisional Cavalry Corps: closes at WOODSBORO at 12:00 noon, 24 November, and opens at ROCKY RIDGE same date and hour.

2d Cavalry Division: en route.

1st Cavalry Division: en route.

C,  
Lieutenant General.

Distribution:

1st Cavalry Division

2d Cavalry Division

I Corps

II Corps

III Corps

First Army

First Army air force

Second Army

Third Army.

24. SITUATION, CONTINUED, AND SECOND REQUIREMENT.

a.—*2d Cavalry Division until 12:00 noon.*—The two reconnaissance detachments of the 2d Cavalry Division, which were along the general line: Fountain Valley—Otterdale Mill, advanced at an early hour on 24 November, one troop reconnoitering to the east of the line: New Windsor—Mayberry—Mt Pleasant School—Brushtown, and the other to the west thereof, in the zone of the division. At 7:00 AM, the main body of the division advanced in small columns to the area: Taneytown—crossroads 528—Copperville, where it was located in readiness for immediate action at 12:00 noon. The 702d Observation Squadron was operating from an airdrome at Oldfield with a landing field at Copperville. Information from reconnaissance detachments indicated that they had crossed the state line without encountering Red patrols.

b. *1st Cavalry Division until 12:00 noon.*—The two reconnaissance detachments of the 1st Cavalry Division, which



were along the general line: Franklin School—Graceham, advanced at an early hour on 24 November, one troop reconnoitering to the east of the line: Creagerstown—Emmitsburg—Fairplay School, and the other to the west thereof, in the zone of the division. At 7:00 AM, the main body of the division advanced in small columns to the area: Bridgeport—Fourpoints—Keysville, where it was located in readiness for immediate action at 12:00 noon. The 701st Observation Squadron was operating from an airdrome at Woodsboro with a landing field at Keysville. Information from reconnaissance detachments indicated that they had crossed the state line without encountering Red patrols.

*c. Command post.*—At 12:00 noon, the command post of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps opened at Rocky Ridge.

*d. The 2d Cavalry Division until 6:00 PM.*—(1) Early in the afternoon, reconnaissance detachments of the 2d Cavalry Division reported the presence of small cavalry patrols and armed bands of secessionists in the zone of the division, north of the state line. At 1:15 PM, information indicated that a Red cavalry squadron and a band of about one thousand armed secessionists located in and about Littlestown had prevented reconnaissance of that locality. At 1:30 PM, the army air corps commander was informed of the situation by radio. At the same hour, the air corps liaison officer was dispatched to Frederick with the plan of operation of the division. At 2:00 PM, the division moved on Littlestown and at 2:30 PM attacked the Red force, and dispersed it. The operation was covered by Battery E, 703d Coast Artillery (antiaircraft), and was assisted by the army air force. The Red cavalry squadron was driven to the northwest of Germantown.

(2) At 6:00 PM, due to the nearness of the main body of the division to the Red forces in its front, the left reconnaissance detachment of the division has been withdrawn from the vicinity of Whitehall and has rejoined the division. The right detachment is in the vicinity of crossroads 675 (372.5-742.0) with patrols operating to the line: Hanover—Brushtown, both inclusive. Through its patrols and



its attached radio, it is in contact with a reconnaissance detachment from the cavalry of the Second Army, which is located southeast of Hanover. The main body of the division is in the area: road junction 573—road junction 523—Washington School, with outposts along the general line: road junction 665 (363.5-737.0)—crossroads 638 (362.0-739.0)—road junction 598. The outpost is maintaining connection at road junction 598 with a detachment of the 1st Cavalry Division which is at that point, and its patrols are operating to the line: Brushtown, exclusive—Bonneauville, inclusive. The 702d Observation Squadron is operating from an airdrome at Oldfield with a landing field at Washington School. Reports from detachments and patrols, which have been confirmed by the air corps, indicate that the advance guards of large bodies of Red infantry have arrived on the line: Hanover—Brushtown—Bonneauville. These reports also indicate that most of the armed secessionists who escaped from Littlestown have retired behind the Red infantry advance guards, that only a few small Red cavalry patrols remain in the zone of the division, and that these patrols are gradually withdrawing behind the infantry and to the northwest.

*e. The 1st Cavalry Division until 6:00 PM.*—When reconnaissance detachments of the 1st Cavalry Division reported the presence of hostile cavalry patrols and bands of armed secessionists in the zone of the division, in increasing numbers, after the state line had been crossed, and that these forces were interfering with the reconnaissance activities of the detachments, the main body of the division moved forward in small columns at 2:00 PM, and drove all hostile patrols and detachments to the north. At 6:00 PM, due to the nearness of the main body of the division to the Red forces in its front, the right reconnaissance detachment of the division has been withdrawn from the vicinity of Willow Grove School and has rejoined the division. The left detachment is in the vicinity of Mt. Hope (331.5-747.0), with patrols operating through the passes of South Mountain and in the direction of Virginia Mills and Orrtanna.



The main body of the division is in the area: Palmer—road junction 444—road junction 438. A screen has been established along the general line: road junction 598—Barlow—Greenmount—road junction 650—Liberty Hall School—McKee Knob. Patrols from the counterreconnaissance detachments are operating to the line: Bonneauville, exclusive—Round Top, inclusive. A counterreconnaissance detachment located at road junction 598 is in connection with the outposts of the 2d Cavalry Division. The 701st Observation Squadron is operating from an airdrome at Woodsboro with a landing field near Palmer. From Greenmount to McKee Knob, the screen is in close contact with detachments of a Red cavalry force which are disposed along the general line: hill one-half mile southwest of road junction 562—McCleary School—nose southeast of road junction 705—McGinley Hill. Reports from detachments and patrols, which have been confirmed by the air corps, indicate that a strong force of infantry is in and about Gettysburg, with outposts on the general line: Bonneauville—Round Top. Numerous identifications have been secured from the Red 1st Cavalry Brigade, in the zone of action of the division. The air corps reports that a Red cavalry force, estimated as a brigade, is in bivouac in the vicinity of Mummasburg.

*f. Information up to 6:00 PM.*—At 6:00 PM, the command post of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps has closed at Rocky Ridge and has opened at Bridgeport. At this hour, Lieutenant General C is in possession of all information obtained through the activities of his divisions; he has been informed that the advance guards of the leading divisions of the army are bivouacked north of the line: Meadow Branch—Big Pipe Creek—Owens Creek, covered by the corps cavalry of the respective corps along the general line: Union Mills—Taneytown—Motters; he has recommended to the army commander that the I Provisional Cavalry Corps be relieved of further reconnaissance in the zones of the I and II Corps by the corps cavalry, and his recommendation has been approved.



*g. Second requirement.*—Give the decision of Lieutenant General C for the use of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps on 25 November.

25. A SOLUTION OF SECOND REQUIREMENT.—The decision of Lieutenant General C for the use of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps on 25 November is to concentrate the I Provisional Cavalry Corps in front of the left of the First Army on 25 November and push reconnaissance in the area between the line: Round Top—Gettysburg, and South Mountain.

26. DISCUSSION.—*a. Mission.*—The mission assigned the I Provisional Cavalry Corps by the army commander requires it to obtain information of the enemy in the zone of action of the First Army.

*b. Plan of reconnaissance.*—(1) In making his plan for reconnaissance, the principal factors considered by the commander of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps are the mission assigned to the cavalry, the nature of the terrain and the road net, the attitude of the inhabitants, and the strength, activity, and probable reaction of the enemy.

(a) The mission assigned the army cavalry requires it to advance its ground reconnaissance agencies in the direction of the enemy a distance of about twenty-five miles on 24 November and to cover, during this advance, a zone of action which is about thirty-five miles in width.

(b) The terrain in the eastern part of the zone of advance is rolling, wooded, and is cut by numerous streams, the most important of which is the Monocacy River. Catoc-tin and South Mountains extend along the western edge of the zone, occupying an average width of about twelve miles. The road net in that part of the valley of the Monocacy River in which the advance is to be made is highly developed, the most important road centers being Westminster, Taneytown, Emmitsburg, Littlestown, Hanover, and Gettysburg. Since all main highways which lead in the direction of the enemy and along which the enemy probably will advance his main forces pass through these road centers, their location will have considerable influence on the





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ing some provision for insuring that his force can be used as a whole in combat, should such action become necessary. Therefore, he requires his division commanders to report the locations of the main bodies of their units every two hours and orders them to be in specific bivouac areas, in which they will be within supporting distances of each other, on the night of 24-25 November. In order to insure that the reconnaissance activities of both divisions will be pushed far enough to the north on 24 November to meet the requirements of the army commander, orders issued to division commanders require that their patrols reach a definite line on that date.

(3) The division commanders are given specific instructions as to the information they must obtain.

(4) The army commander has ordered the advance guards of the infantry units of the army to be north of a specific line by 6:00 PM, 24 November. In order to avoid any possible conflict with these units on the part of the main bodies of the cavalry divisions, division commanders are ordered to have their divisions north of that line by 12:00 noon. This requirement serves also as a coordinating measure which may be of assistance to the corps commander in a concentration of his force for possible combat during the afternoon.

*d. The advance.*—(1) Both division commanders conclude that it will be necessary to detail numerous patrols for the purpose of keeping the main highways and the important road centers under constant observation. The distances at which patrols can operate from supporting troops vary with the strength of the patrols, the probable reaction of the enemy to the activities of the patrols employed, and the probable messenger requirements. The division commanders regulate the movements and actions of their divisions largely on the information furnished them by their patrols. If these patrols operate at such distances from the divisions that their strength will not permit them to gather and transmit the desired information when the enemy re-



acts vigorously, some provision must be made for the support of their activities. By sending forward units of considerable combat strength into the zones of reconnaissance, both division commanders provide against such contingencies. These units, called reconnaissance detachments, with definite zones for reconnaissance assigned, are the reservoirs from which reconnaissance patrols are drawn and serve as advance message centers through which the patrols communicate all information to the division commanders. Due to their strength and armament, they are able to conduct combat operations of considerable magnitude in furtherance of the activities of their patrols. From the information furnished by these detachments, the division commanders are able to determine, with some degree of accuracy, when their main bodies must be moved and the directions.

(2) During the advance, all elements of the divisions use the available roads and the cover afforded by the terrain to reduce the possibilities of hostile aerial observation and to avoid unnecessary exposure to aerial attack. All patrols, reconnaissance detachments, and columns of the main bodies provide for their own security.

*e. The reconnaissance at Littlestown.*—When, during the early afternoon of 24 November, the commander of the 2d Cavalry Division concludes, from the information furnished him, that the situation at Littlestown is beyond the combat capabilities of his detachments, and that if the hostile forces are allowed to remain in that vicinity, his detachments can not execute their missions, he acts with the remainder of his division in such way as to eliminate the hostile forces from his zone of reconnaissance.

*f. Counterreconnaissance.*—The action of both division commanders in pressing the activities of their reconnaissance agencies with vigor throughout the day results in giving to the Blue forces the benefits that usually come from counterreconnaissance, in that hostile ground reconnaissance agencies are pressed back in the entire zone of




action of the First Army and thus cease to be a threat to the main columns advancing in rear of the cavalry.

*g. Enemy intentions.*—The early part of the advance of the elements of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps shows the hostile cavalry in a reconnaissance attitude. Due to the vigorous action of the Blue cavalry divisions, their reconnaissance agencies are, at 6:00 PM, 24 November, in contact with the main Red force as well as with the Red cavalry division. The attitude of the entire Red force is definitely disclosed as a defensive one. At 6:00 PM, the location, dispositions, and activities of the Red cavalry division indicate that it has adopted a counterreconnaissance attitude in order to be able to protect the right flank of the Red army against further reconnaissance and attack.

*h. Decision, 24 November.*—At 6:00 PM, 24 November, patrols of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps, operating east of the Monocacy River, have reached the line designated by the corps commander. Those operating in the area between the river and the mountains on the west are being prevented from reaching the designated line by the counterreconnaissance measures of the Red cavalry. Vigorous offensive action is the only means by which the army cavalry can extend its reconnaissance activities between Round Top and the mountains. Due to the enemy's defensive attitude, the absence of his cavalry from the region east of the Monocacy River, and to the proximity to the hostile position of the cavalry attached to the I and II Corps, the commander of the army cavalry has taken the steps necessary to turn over to the corps cavalry his mission of reconnaissance in the zones of advance of the I and II Corps. This action permits the concentration of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps for pushing vigorous reconnaissance in front of the left of the First Army during 25 November.







[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



SECTION VII

The Army Artillery in the Advance

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Situation and requirement -----	28
A solution -----	29
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27. PRINCIPLES.—*a.* (1) The organic artillery prescribed for divisions and corps is the minimum essential for carrying out their ordinary missions on the battlefield. The organic units prescribed for army troops include no units containing artillery weapons, other than those of anti-aircraft artillery.

(2) For a particular operation usually the organic artillery of divisions and corps must be reinforced, and additional artillery suitable for the special mission of the army must be added. The general headquarters reserve artillery is maintained under the control of the commander of the field forces for the purpose of reinforcing the various armies with artillery units and staffs in accordance with their relative needs.

*b.* (1) In preparing for a special operation, it is the duty of the army chief of artillery, working with a thorough understanding of the army commander's plan, to make detailed studies of the artillery needs. Based on these studies, request is made by the army for ammunition and for units of the general headquarters reserve artillery.

(2) While an army can hardly receive too much fire support from its artillery during combat, there are practical factors which limit the amount of artillery required for a particular operation. The principal factors are:

(a) The number of roads available, and the road space the artillery will probably be permitted to occupy during movement.

(b) The probable extent of front, and the depth and intensity of the contemplated action.



(c) The number of roads, railroads, and other facilities for the supply of ammunition.

(3) To attempt to employ artillery which will not be able to get forward into the action, which cannot be supplied with ammunition, or the fire of which cannot be intelligently conducted, is an inexcusable waste of resources.

(4) Of the various types of artillery which may be procured from the general headquarters reserve, some will be retained for combat under army control, while others will be attached to corps. Until passed on to corps by the army, however, all artillery received from the general headquarters reserve, together with the organic artillery of army troops, is classed as army artillery.

c. (1) Army artillery units, including those intended to reinforce corps or divisions in combat as well as those to be retained under army control, will seldom be able to take part in the engagements which immediately precede the engagement of the army as such, since an attempt to move such artillery forward at that time usually will be neither necessitated by the nature of the action nor permitted by the congested condition of the roads. Consequently, in an advance, such artillery will ordinarily move by bounds in rear of the combatant elements of the corps.

(2) Since the means of transporting this artillery are usually such that the units are capable of covering a relatively great distance in a small amount of time, either because of their rapid rate of movement or their ability to make long-sustained marches, these units can be held well to the rear out of the way of other traffic until needed for combat.

d. Within tractor-drawn artillery units, the speeds of the different types of vehicles vary. There are three main classifications: the light motor column of passenger cars, reconnaissance cars, motorcycles, and light trucks; the heavy motor column composed of trucks; and the tractor column, which consists of the tractors with their loads. When tactical considerations permit, it is usually advisable to divide the units for march purposes into heavy motor columns and tractor columns, one or more of each. This





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artillery can be made. The army antiaircraft artillery should be employed not only to cover elements in the army service area, but also with a view to meeting the immediate and future requirements of the corps. As far as can be foreseen, the army antiaircraft artillery should be so disposed as to facilitate later rear area defense, and to be available for the necessary support or reinforcement of the corps.

*h.* Army cavalry operating in advance or on a flank of the army may be furnished antiaircraft protection by the attachment of units of the army antiaircraft artillery.

28. SITUATION AND REQUIREMENT.—*a.* By 23 November, the First Army has been reinforced from the general headquarters reserve by three regiments of 75-mm. guns, *portée*, one regiment of antiaircraft artillery, and one brigade of heavy field artillery. The *portée* regiments are bivouacked just north of Frederick under the command of the senior regimental commander; the antiaircraft artillery regiment is attached to and employed with the organic antiaircraft artillery brigade of the army; and the brigade of heavy field artillery is bivouacked in the vicinity of Urbana.

*b.* At this time (23 November) units of organic army artillery are located as follows: army artillery headquarters, that is, the command post of the army chief of artillery, is at Frederick; the 701st Ammunition Train is in bivouac near Urbana with its transport batteries loaded with ammunition for the 155-mm. guns and 240-mm. howitzers of the army artillery; and the 701st Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) has its headquarters at Frederick and its batteries distributed throughout the army service area prepared to furnish protection against hostile aircraft.

*c.* The First Army has been allotted credit by General Headquarters for an amount of additional artillery ammunition estimated as sufficient for the needs of the contemplated operation. The ammunition which this credit represents is stored in ammunition depots of the communications zone whence it will be shipped, upon demand of the army, to railheads or army ammunition depots in the amounts desired.



*d.* In preparation for the contemplated operation of the First Army, the army chief of artillery, in conjunction with the army ordnance officer, prepared a plan for the supply of artillery ammunition, which was approved by the army commander. This plan provided in part for the following:

(1) Artillery ammunition, totaling four days of fire for all the artillery with the army, to be maintained within the army or quickly available.

(2) This ammunition to be maintained as follows:

(a) Division, corps, and army artillery to maintain the equivalent of the normal loads of all ammunition-carrying vehicles.

(b) Each corps to maintain, in addition to that provided for in (a) above, one-half day of fire for the corps artillery and for the division artillery of not to exceed three divisions.

(c) The remainder to be held initially in Brunswick on railway cars subject to army orders. This amount to be placed in army ammunition depots as the situation develops.

(3) Artillery ammunition within the army to be maintained normally in the following proportions:

	<i>Shell*</i>						<i>Shrapnel</i>
	<i>Chemical</i>					<i>Smoke</i>	
	<i>HE</i>	<i>CG</i>	<i>HS</i>	<i>CN</i>	<i>DM</i>	<i>WP</i>	
75-mm. gun	50		10	5		10	25
155-mm. howitzer	70	10	7		3	10	
155-mm. gun	88	5	5		2		
240-mm. howitzer	100						
3-inch gun, AA	100						

\*HE = high explosive.  
 CG = phosgene.  
 HS = mustard gas.  
 CN = tear gas.  
 DM = toxic smoke.  
 WP = nontoxic smoke.

(4) Reports of artillery ammunition expenditures to be rendered daily as of 9:00 AM, and to reach the office of G-4, army, by 12:00 noon, commencing 26 November.



## 52 TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

(5) Ammunition to be allotted in accordance with reports of expenditures.

e. (1) In preparation for the advance, the army chief of artillery, in his capacity as a staff officer and artillery adviser to the army commander, recommended an organization and routes of advance for the heavy army artillery, which he considered most suitable after a careful study of the contemplated operation. These recommendations were incorporated in the march table appended to the army field order for the advance.

(2) The orders to units of the army artillery contained in this field order and the accompanying march table were in sufficient detail to permit subordinate commanders of units of army artillery to issue their own orders for the advance without further instructions from the army chief of artillery. Consequently, having assured himself that copies of *Field Orders No 10*, First Army, with annexes, were transmitted to his subordinate commanders, there was no necessity for the army chief of artillery, as tactical commander of the army artillery to issue a field order to his command for the advance.

f. (1) During the afternoon of 23 November, Brigadier General N, commanding the 907th Field Artillery Brigade, received copies of *Field Orders No 10*, First Army, at his command post at Urbana. He had previously been advised by the army chief of artillery as to the decision to organize two groupments of heavy artillery for the coming operation and as to the composition of these groupments. General N, in turn, had similarly advised his subordinate commanders.

(2) Upon receipt of the army field order, General N notified the commanders of units thereby detached from his command, got in touch with the commanders of units which were to remain or come under his command, and then proceeded with his preparations for the advance.

g. At this time the units pertaining to Groupment B, First Army Artillery, were bivouacked in the following locations:



## THE ARMY IN THE ADVANCE

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907th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, in Urbana.

922d Field Artillery, northwest of Urbana.

923d Field Artillery, southwest of Urbana.

932d Field Artillery, west of Urbana.

701st Ammunition Train, less Batteries A and B, in Urbana.

907th Ordnance Company, in Urbana.

901st Balloon Group, less 901st Balloon Company, south of Frederick.

*h.* Prepare the formal field order issued by Brigadier General N for the advance of Groupment B, First Army Artillery.

29. A SOLUTION.—The following formal field order was issued by Brigadier General N for the advance of Groupment B, First Army Artillery:

Groupment B, First Army Artillery,  
URBANA, MD.,  
24 November, 1926, 10:00 AM. .

FIELD ORDERS }  
No 1 }

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Hanover, Gettysburg, Taneytown, Emmitsburg, and Ijamsville quadrangles.

1. *a.* The Reds are advancing on HANOVER and GETTYSBURG.  
*b.* The First Army is advancing today on the line: HANOVER—GETTYSBURG.
2. *a.* This groupment will march to KEYSVILLE tomorrow. See *Annex No 1, March Table*.  
*b.* Composition of groupment:  
907th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Battery.  
922d Field Artillery (155-mm. gun).  
923d Field Artillery (155-mm. gun).  
932d Field Artillery (240-mm. howitzer).  
701st Ammunition Train, less Batteries A and B.  
907th Ordnance Company (heavy maintenance).  
901st Balloon Group, less 901st Balloon Company.
3. Representatives of the above units will report to groupment headquarters at KEYSVILLE at 9:30 AM, 25 November, for the assignment of bivouac areas.
4. The command post of this groupment closes at URBANA at 9:00 AM, 25 November, and opens at KEYSVILLE at same hour.

N,  
Brigadier General.

*Annex No 1—March Table.*

Distribution: (omitted).







30. DISCUSSION.—*a.* The question of the supply of artillery ammunition is vital not only to the artillery but to the whole command as well. The army should be assured of an adequate supply before setting out on an operation. With a sufficient credit established, the army, especially when recently organized, should announce a plan for the supply of artillery ammunition for the information and guidance of all concerned. The plan adopted in this situation not only lists the types of ammunition that will be available, but also definitely divides and assigns the responsibility for the maintenance of the indicated amounts.

*b.* In drawing up plans for the advance in this situation, it is evident that the army artillery will not be needed in combat until after the leading divisions have encountered serious opposition which probably will be in the vicinity of the line: Hanover—Gettysburg, a distance of about two days' march for foot troops. Consequently, the army artillery, all of which is motorized, can be left some distance in rear of the corps as it can move forward without delay, when needed, at an economical speed faster than that of foot troops. This is especially true in the case of the *portée* regiments which require a relatively small amount of road space and which move at the rate of heavy motor columns.

*c.* (1) In determining his recommendations for the organization and routes of advance for the heavy army artillery, the army chief of artillery considered first the localities where the bulk of the fire of this artillery probably would be required. A map study of the terrain in the vicinity of the line: Hanover—Gettysburg, shows that the hill mass to the south and west of Gettysburg will doubtless form the strongest point of the hostile position and that these hills will have to be overwhelmed by artillery fire if a decisive blow by the army at or near the enemy's west flank is to be successful. The interdiction of the roads radiating from Gettysburg also appear to be important from the army point of view. At the same time, however, it is desirable that the army artillery be able to concentrate some of its fire at critical points anywhere along the front of the army.



(2) A careful consideration of these points and of the road net, led the army chief of artillery to recommend a division of the heavy army artillery into two groupments, one of which is to advance towards the east of the hill mass and the other towards the west thereof; the two groupments to be close enough together to place effective cross-fire on the hills south and west of Gettysburg, but far enough apart to be able to place some fire at selected points anywhere along the army's front; each groupment to contain both guns and howitzers in order that in each groupment each type of weapon will be available to supplement the fire of the other; and the groupment nearer to the decisive blow of the army to be the more powerful and to be furnished with the greater part of the auxiliary units.

*d.* (1) The employment of the antiaircraft artillery during the advance depends upon the proposed movements of the corps and of the divisions in army reserve, the present and contemplated locations of army establishments, and the means of antiaircraft defense available. Ordinarily, each corps will provide antiaircraft defense for its own elements.

(2) No army establishments are to be located in the zone of action of the I Corps. Consequently, no reinforcing antiaircraft artillery is necessary for the protection of elements in this zone. On the other hand, the corps, while covering its own elements, can protect at the same time such army troops as may be in its zone, and it should be charged, therefore, with the protection of the 4th Division, in army reserve, and of Groupment A when in its bivouac area near Mayberry.

(3) The width of the zone of action of the II Corps and the number of army troops and establishments to be located therein indicate that this corps can not furnish sufficient protection, with only its organic antiaircraft artillery, for its own elements and all of those of the army within its zone. Consequently, a regiment of army antiaircraft artillery should be designated to protect the 8th Division, in army reserve, during its movement to, and the army troops and establishments in, the area: Bruceville—Detour—Middleburg.





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guns on the road in order that a possible blocking of traffic by the guns need not delay the howitzers.

(3) The tractors will require a resupply of fuel during a march as long as the one called for in this situation. If the motor column and the tractor column were to march on separate roads, special provisions should be made to effect this resupply, but when they are to march on the same road, as in this situation, the regimental commanders can arrange to drop off from the motor column at convenient points, trucks loaded with gasoline and oil with instructions to await the arrival of the tractors.

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## SECTION VIII

### The Army Air Force in the Advance

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Situation and requirement -----	32
A Solution -----	33
Discussion -----	34

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31. PRINCIPLES.—*a.* The army air force comprises an attack wing consisting of one attack group and one pursuit group; ~~the latter comprises~~ a group of four observation squadrons. The mission of the army air force is determined by the needs of the army. However, both the character of the mission itself and its manner of execution may be influenced by the air situation. The most important factors in the air situation are the relative combat strength of the hostile and of the friendly general headquarters air forces, and the missions assigned to these units.

*b.* When the army is advancing to gain contact with the enemy, the principal duties of the army air force are as follows:

(1) To provide distant reconnaissance.—In accomplishing this mission, the army air force operates both directly and indirectly. In the former case, air observers obtain in-



formation of the enemy of both a tactical and strategical nature by visual or photographic reconnaissance. This is executed by the army observation group, the zone of action of which usually extends beyond that of the corps observation groups, to include the entire territory for which the army commander is responsible, or in which he is particularly concerned. The army air force also operates indirectly with a view to assisting the army cavalry in distant reconnaissance. This aid is given both by observation aviation, which keeps the cavalry informed of both friendly and hostile dispositions and so enables it to conduct more effective reconnaissance, and also by the units of the attack wing, which may support the army cavalry when combat becomes a necessary means to the desired end.

(2) To provide for the security of the army against air observation and attack.—The burden of security against air attack is not borne by the air force alone. It is essential that ground troops reduce their own exposure to air attack as far as practicable by movements under cover, and by suitable fire of anti-aircraft weapons. It also must be remembered that the defensive in air warfare labors under many inherent disadvantages, so that complete immunity from air attack cannot always be secured, even by an air force superior in numbers to that of the enemy. So far as the army air force is concerned, the mission of providing security against air attack falls to the attack wing. But in the general case, the broad outlines of the problem of security are drawn, not by the army units, but by the general headquarters air force. Dependent upon the degree of success attained by the latter in its operations, the army in the advance may be assailed by formidable air attacks, and compelled to move almost entirely by night, or else, under the indirect protection of the friendly general headquarters air force, it may be free from serious air attacks, and unrestricted in its movements. In the former case, the army air force must concentrate its entire energies on the protection of the army. Occasionally this may best be afforded by defensive action, but in general, vigorous of-



fensive action produces the best results. When, however, the general headquarters air force has attained air superiority, and has greatly restricted hostile air activity, the work of the army air force is facilitated. Its rôle of protection becomes simplified, and may be reduced to the attack of isolated hostile units bent on reconnaissance. Under such circumstances, protection is no longer of primary importance, and the army air force becomes available for other duties.

32. SITUATION AND REQUIREMENT.—*a. Conference at First Army Headquarters on 23 November.*—At 2:00 PM, 23 November, 1926, Brigadier General D, commanding the First Army Air Force, attended a conference at the headquarters of the First Army at which he was given a copy of *Field Order No 10*, First Army, and the plans for the advance of the army were discussed. Upon the termination of this conference, he issued orders by telephone to the 701st Observation Group to commence reconnaissance at once in the army zone of action to determine the strength and location of the hostile concentration reported on the line: Hanover—Gettysburg; to report promptly the nature, size, and direction of any hostile movements west of the line: York—Chambersburg; and to pay special attention to the passes through South Mountain north of the Waynesboro Turnpike. Thereafter, he conferred with the commander of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps and with the commander of the 701st Coast Artillery Brigade (AA), and arranged the details of cooperation between those organizations and the First Army Air Force.

*b. Field Order.*—Upon return to his headquarters near Frederick, Brigadier General D directed the preparation of the field order for the operations of 24 November, which is as follows:



## THE ARMY IN THE ADVANCE

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First Army Air Force,  
FREDERICK, MD.,  
23 November, 1926, 6:00 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }  
No 10 }

Maps: General Map, Gettysburg, 1 inch = 5 miles. Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Gettysburg, Fairfield, Taneytown, Emmitsburg, Mount Airy, and Ijamsville quadrangles.

1. See *Field Orders No 10*, First Army.
2. This command, on 24 November, will conduct reconnaissance and cooperate with the I Provisional Cavalry Corps.
3. *a.* The 701st Observation Group, less the 701st and 702d Observation Squadrons, will continue the reconnaissance ordered. Rear boundary, the line: HANOVER—GETTYSBURG, both inclusive.  
*b.* The 701st Attack Wing will remain on alert, beginning at 6:10 AM.
4. No change.
5. No change.

D,  
Brig. General.

## Distribution:

1st Air Division.  
First Army.  
Second Army.  
Third Army.  
701st Coast Artillery Brigade.  
I Provisional Cavalry Corps.  
I Corps.  
II Corps.  
III Corps.  
701st Observation Group.  
701st Attack Wing.

*c. Events of 24 November.*—During the morning of 24 November, the First Army Air Force carried out the reconnaissance ordered. No attacks were made by Red aircraft on Blue columns. Several times during the morning reports were received from the 701st Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) of the presence of Red observation aircraft. Patrols from the 701st Pursuit Group were sent out to intercept these, whenever the time and space factors made the success of such procedure possible. These patrols shot down Red observation aircraft in approximately half of the sorties. At 10:00 AM, telephone messages from the 1st Air Division stated that the offensive operations of the latter had so far proved successful, and that little fear of Red air attacks on the First Army need be felt, at least for some hours. Therefore, pursuit patrols of the strength of a flight were



maintained continuously over the army zone of action. At 1:30 PM, Brigadier General D received information by radio from the 2d Cavalry Division, confirmed shortly after by the air force liaison officer with the 2d Cavalry Division (who flew to Frederick for that purpose), that a squadron of Red cavalry and a band of about one thousand secessionists, in and about Littlestown, were preventing reconnaissance of that territory, and that the 2d Cavalry Division would attack this force at 2:30 PM. Air force support was requested. At 1:30 PM, the 1st Attack Group was on alert at its airdrome near Frederick; the 1st Attack Group, less one squadron on patrol, was on its airdrome near Frederick.

*d. Requirement.*—Give the orders as actually issued by Brigadier General D.

33. A SOLUTION.—At 1:40 PM, Brigadier General D, from his command post near Frederick, telephoned, in the presence of his operations officer, the following orders to the commanding officer, 701st Attack Wing:

“A Red force of one squadron of cavalry and about one thousand armed secessionists, in and about Littlestown, is preventing cavalry reconnaissance.

“The 2d Cavalry Division attacks this force at 2:30 PM.

“The 701st Attack Group will take off so as to arrive over Littlestown at 2:25 PM, and will support the attack. Upon return from this sortie, it will rearm and reservice and remain on alert.”

34. DISCUSSION.—*a. Missions.*—The missions assigned the First Army Air Force are of two kinds: those to be executed by the observation service, and those to be executed by the air force of the attack wing.

*b. Service of observation.*—Reconnaissance is, in a certain sense, routine. It would be carried out continuously by the 701st Observation Group, in the army zone of action, even without orders. It is desirable, however, that the army commander indicate the points of special interest so that the army air service may concentrate its effort on obtaining this information. In addition to the army units, there are observation squadrons with both divisions and corps. In order to have responsibility for reconnaissance definitely



placed, it is desirable to prescribe a rear boundary for the activities of the army observation group, behind which the corps and division observation units take up the duties.

*c. Missions of the attack wing.*—In view of the proposed employment of the 1st Air Division, the First Army commander does not consider that the 701st Attack Wing need be concentrated on the defense of the army from air attack. He accordingly directs that it operate closely with the I Provisional Cavalry Corps. This duty will be performed primarily by the 701st Attack Group, which will support the cavalry corps, in case of combat. The 701st Pursuit Group has its normal functions greatly lightened by the activity of the 1st Air Division. Usually it would support sorties of the attack group. But in this situation, the danger of air attack is too remote to necessitate this. Accordingly, the 701st Pursuit Group may be employed for local security purposes, not against air attack, but against air observation. The fact that the danger of attack from the Red air force is small warrants the 701st Pursuit Group in seeking out Red observation airplanes by small patrols, a course which might prove disastrous if Red sorties in mass should occur.

*d. Cooperation with the I Provisional Cavalry Corps*—The air corps and cavalry form a natural team in the service of information. The reports furnished cavalry from time to time by the air corps enables the former to gather information in greater abundance and with greater ease. Moreover, when combat becomes necessary, the units of the air force may render timely support to the cavalry. In order to insure this, the commanders of the two organizations hold a conference. The air corps attaches liaison officers to the cavalry corps and to each of the cavalry divisions. Radio communication is assured, and a code agreed upon. The 701st and 702d Observation Squadrons, which are attached to the two cavalry divisions, are instructed to keep the First Army Air Force informed of the cavalry situation, and are authorized in certain emergencies to call for air service support, by radio and dropped message. Telephone



communication is also arranged. After making these provisions, Brigadier General D decides to keep his Attack Wing on the alert until reconnaissance indicates further action. Upon receipt of information from the 1st Air Division, in regard to the air situation, he decides that the pursuit group may be profitably employed in attacking Red observation, without endangering the execution of his mission of supporting the cavalry. When the latter, at length, encounters opposition in some strength at Littlestown, the attack group is dispatched immediately to its support. In this situation, Brigadier General D also might have sent the greater part of the 701st Pursuit Group, but this would have been an exceptional use of that arm, justifiable only in emergencies. Accordingly, the pursuit group is kept on its mission of combatting Red observation aviation.





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








communication is also arranged. After making these provisions, Brigadier General D decides to keep his Attack Wing on the alert until reconnaissance from the 1st Air Division, in regard to the air situation, he decides that the pursuit group may be profitably employed in attacking Red observation, without endangering the execution of his mission of supporting the cavalry. When the latter, at length, encounters opposition in some strength to its support. In this situation, Brigadier General D also might have sent the greater part of the 701st Pursuit Group, but this would have been an exceptional use of that arm, justifiable only in emergencies. Accordingly, the pursuit group is kept on its mission of combating Red observation aviation.





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## CHAPTER II

# The Corps in the Advance

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### SECTION I

## General Discussion

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1. CORPS ORGANIZATION.—*a. Organic elements.*—The corps is provided with certain organic elements that enable it to sustain itself in continuous operations. These organic elements consist of:

- (1) Corps headquarters.
- (2) Special troops.
- (3) Corps artillery.
- (4) Corps air service.
- (5) Corps engineer service.
- (6) Corps medical service.
- (7) Corps train.

*b. Divisions.*—Divisions are not an organic part of the corps. They are assigned to the corps by the army. Both the number of divisions and the time such divisions remain with a corps are variable. The corps mission and army plan govern the former; the wastage within the divisions governs the latter.

*c. Attached units.*—When the situation is such that it is apparent that the corps may not be able to accomplish



its mission by the means normally available, the army provides the necessary additional means. Depending upon the situation, these may consist of cavalry, artillery, air service, tank, medical, engineer, or labor units. Such units usually come from the general headquarters reserve through the army, but, in certain situations, the army may use some of its own organic elements to reinforce the corps.

2. THE CORPS ON THE MARCH.—*a. Formation.*—(1) General limiting conditions.—The formation that a corps may adopt for the march will depend on whether it is operating as an integral part of an army or as a detached corps, and whether combat is remote or imminent.

(2) Specific limiting conditions.—The first requirement of a corps on the march is roads; hence, regardless of the desirability of a certain march formation in a particular situation, the road net may force the adoption of some other formation.

(3) Formation selected.—Within the limitations imposed by the road net, the march formation selected should be that which will best meet the tactical situation. Such formations range from a single column, through the square and the diamond formations, to parallel columns. The single column, in which all of the elements of a corps of three divisions require more than one hundred and fifty miles of road space, can be justified only in a situation where there is but a single road available.

*b. Security and information.*—In addition to keeping its elements within supporting distance of each other, both in width and depth, the corps provides for its security on the march and in bivouac by means of the advance guards and outposts of its divisions and by its cavalry, air service, and antiaircraft elements. All of these agencies are also sources of information—a vital necessity to the corps commander.

*c. Regulating the march.*—(1) The corps coordinates the march by indicating daily bivouac areas or by specifying certain control lines which elements of the leading divisions will clear by specified hours, and by maintaining



connection between the leading divisions, and between such divisions and the corps cavalry. Rear divisions are marched from area to area, by specified routes. Periodical reports from the corps air service furnish a means by which lack of coordination can be detected.

(2) The corps endeavors to assign to each division exclusive use of certain roads. Where this is not possible and mixed traffic of two divisions must follow a certain road, the corps regulates traffic by specifying the hours for each division, or the precedence of columns entering from one direction over those from another direction, or by limiting the length of column of one division that can enter on the road when there is a column of the other waiting. In any case, the presence of corps military police and a corps staff officer on the governing road junctions or cross-roads is essential. Frequently it happens that trains of one division must pass through the area of another to reach their railhead; the duty of coordinating such movements devolves upon the corps.

*d. Bivouacs.*—Bivouacking or billeting in depth, whenever practicable, is preferable to closing up the columns each day. The former method enables a command to make long marches, and consequently permits rapid progress.

*e. Command post.*—The command post of a corps on the march is located where supervision and control can best be exercised. The commander is in no sense tied down to the command post, however, as he has at his disposal rapid means of transportation which enable him to go quickly to any part of the command. In a continuous march, a corps usually moves its command post at least every two days and requires division command posts to be moved every day. Unless this is done, inspection and supervision of the march by the staffs concerned is difficult, and march discipline suffers. The movement of corps and division command posts on the march is executed by echelons, as in other operations. The forward echelon is open and in communication, before the rear one closes.



## SECTION II

## Situation and Requirement

	Paragraph
Situation -----	3
Requirement -----	4

---

3. SITUATION.—*a. First Army.*—For the situation, First Army, see Chapter I, Sections II and III.

*b. II Corps.*—The II Corps, on 23 November, is in the area: Unionville—Libertytown—McKaig—New Market—Bartholows, and is disposed as follows:

(1) 5th Division, in the area: Unionville, inclusive—Libertytown—junction of Dollyhyde and Linganore Creeks—Linganore, all exclusive, with command post at Unionville.

(2) 6th Division, in the area: Libertytown, inclusive—crossroads 610 (345.0-706.0), exclusive—road junction 517 (348.0-702.0), inclusive, with command post at Libertytown.

(3) 7th Division, in the area: crossroads 610—crossroads 532 (342.5-704.0)—McKaig—New London, all inclusive, with command post at New London.

(4) 8th Division, in the area: Linganore, inclusive—road junction 363 (348.0-703.0)—New London—Woodville, all exclusive, with command post at Linganore.

(5) II Corps Headquarters, at Libertytown.

(6) II Corps Special Troops, less detachments, at Libertytown.

(7) II Corps Air Service, near Frederick.

(8) 201st Field Artillery Brigade, near New Market.

(9) 205th Coast Artillery (antiaircraft), covering the corps, with command post at New Market.

(10) 201st and 202d Ordnance Companies, near New Market.

(11) 201st Engineers, near Bartholows.

(12) 201st, 202d, and 203d Engineer Auxiliary Battalions, near Bartholows.





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## TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

## Zone of action:

East boundary: RIDGEVILLE, exclusive—UNIONVILLE—UNION BRIDGE, both inclusive—MARKERS MILL—PINEY CREEK (Village)—ST LUKES CHURCH, all exclusive.

West boundary: MCKAIG, inclusive—MT. PLEASANT, exclusive—MCALEER—LE GORE BRIDGE—MONOCACY RIVER—TOMS CREEK—GETTYSBURG ROAD—MARSH CREEK, all inclusive.

3. a. The 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, moving at 7:00 AM, will reconnoiter the corps front and maintain connection with the army cavalry, the corps cavalry on its right and left, and with advance guards of the divisions in its rear. It will select two crossings (capacity all arms) over the MONOCACY RIVER north of TOMS CREEK and report the same by 5:00 PM, 24 November.
- b. The 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions, each with one machine gun battery, 205th Coast Artillery (AA), attached, will advance, each in not less than two main columns, maintaining connection with the divisions on their right and left. Heads of advance guards will cross the line: OLDFIELD—LIBERTYTOWN—WALKERSVILLE, at 7:30 AM.

## (1) Zones of action:

## (a) 5th Division:

East boundary: same as east boundary of II Corps.

West boundary: LIBERTYTOWN—MIDDLEBURG, both exclusive—eastern half of TANEYTOWN—TWO TAVERNS, both inclusive.

## (b) 6th Division:

East boundary: same as west boundary of 5th Division.

West boundary: CENTERVILLE, inclusive—LADIESBURG—NAILORS MILL, both exclusive—BRIDGEPORT—TANEYTOWN ROAD, both inclusive.

## (c) 7th Division:

East boundary: same as west boundary of 6th Division.

West boundary: same as west boundary of II Corps.

The road north from MUMMA FORD (343.5-724.5), through road junction 418 to FOURPOINTS, is assigned to the 7th Division until 6:00 PM, 25 November.

- (2) The advance guards and rear elements of each division will reach the lines designated on the dates specified below:

## (a) 24 November:

Advance guards: north of BIG PIPE CREEK by 6:00 PM.

Rear elements: north of the LIBERTY TURNPIKE and NEW WINDSOR ROAD by 2:30 PM, and north of the line: PRIESTLAND SCHOOL—THE HILL SCHOOL—TRONTVILLE, by 6:00 PM.

## (b) 25 November:

Advance guards: north of the line: LITTLESTOWN—FAIRPLAY, by 6:00 PM.

Rear elements: north of the line: GALT KUMP P.O.—ST JOSEPHS ACADEMY, by 6:00 PM.

- c. The 8th Division will move on 24 November to the area: OLDFIELD—LIBERTYTOWN—UNIONVILLE. Heads of its columns will remain south of LINGANORE CREEK until 1:30 PM, after which



## THE CORPS IN THE ADVANCE

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hour all roads east of the road: LIBERTYTOWN—NEW LONDON, exclusive, will be available for its movement. On 25 November it will move to the area: south of LITTLE PIPE CREEK—east of the road from WOODSBORO to DETOUR—west of NORTHERN CENTRAL RR. The 8th Division passes to army reserve at 6:00 PM on 24 November.

- d. The II Corps Air Service will commence its reconnaissance at daybreak tomorrow and will maintain constant observation of the enemy movement on the corps front south of the line: GETTYSBURG—HANOVER, and north of PINEY CREEK. It will observe and report upon the corps advance each day at 8:00 AM, 12:00 noon, and 5:00 PM. It will select a landing field near TANEYTOWN and be prepared to move thereto on 25 November.
  - e. The 205th Coast Artillery (AA) will cover the corps in the advance. One machine gun battery is attached to each of the 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions.
  - f. For other corps troops see *Annex No 2, March Table*.
  - α. Division commanders, in their zones of action, are charged with taking all necessary means of security, both on the march and while halted.
4. See *Administrative Orders No 11*.
  5. a. See *Annex No 3, Plan of signal communication* (omitted).
  - b. Axes of signal communication:
 

II Corps: LIBERTYTOWN—TANEYTOWN.

5th Division: UNIONVILLE—CLEMSONVILLE—UNION BRIDGE—OTTERDALE MILL—TANEYTOWN—WASHINGTON SCHOOL—GERMANTOWN—BONNEAUVILLE.

6th Division: LIBERTYTOWN—JOHNSVILLE—MIDDLEBURG—BRUCEVILLE—TANEYTOWN—HARNEY—MT VERNON SCHOOL.

7th Division: MCKAIG—MT PLEASANT—WALKERSVILLE—WOODSBORO—NEW MIDWAY—KEYSVILLE—FAIRPLAY—GETTYSBURG.

8th Division: LINGANORE—LIBERTYTOWN—JOHNSVILLE—LADIESBURG.
  - c. Command posts:
 

II Corps: closes at LIBERTYTOWN at 4:00 PM, 25 November, and opens at TANEYTOWN at same hour and date.

5th Division: UNION BRIDGE, after 4:00 PM, 24 November; WASHINGTON SCHOOL, after 4:00 PM, 25 November.

6th Division: MIDDLEBURG, after 4:00 PM, 24 November; HARNEY, after 4:00 PM, 25 November.

7th Division: NEW MIDWAY, after 4:00 PM, 24 November; BOLINGER SCHOOL, after 4:00 PM, 25 November.

8th Division: LIBERTYTOWN, after 4:00 PM, 24 November; LADIESBURG, after 4:00 PM, 25 November.

By command of Lieutenant General C:

D,  
Chief of Staff.

Official:

E,  
G-3.

Annexes:

- No 1—Operation Map.*  
*No 2—March Table.*  
*No 3—Plan of Signal Communication* (omitted).



MARCH TABLE

Serial	Organization and Commander	Present Location	Zone of Action or Route	Location by 6:00 PM, 24 Nov	Location by 6:00 PM, 25 Nov	Remarks
1	Col A 201st Engrs 201st Engr Aux Bn 202d Engr Aux Bn. 203d Engr Aux Bn 201st F Rmt Dep	Near BARTHOLOWS	PLANE No 4—WOODVILLE—UNIONVILLE—CLEMSONVILLE—UNION BRIDGE—OTTERDALE MILL—TANEY TOWN	Along stream one-half mile south of CLEMSONVILLE	Along stream one mile south of TANEY TOWN	Field Remount Depot leaves columns at CR 511 (356.5-722.0) and proceeds to RJ 363 (one mile east of SHARRETTS).
2	Capt B 201st Wag Tn Animal elements 201st Med Regt	Near NEW-MARKET	Follows serial 1 to CLEMSONVILLE	Along BEAVER DAM CREEK one and one-half miles east of JOHNSVILLE	FUES MILL	Serial 2 follows serial 1 on the morning 25 Nov from CR 652 (three miles northeast of JOHNSVILLE) to CR 511 (356.5-722) and then proceeds to FUES MILL.
3	Lt Col T 201st Corps QM Tn, less 201st Wag Tn 201st Ord Co (maintenance) 202d Ord Co (ammunition) 201st Serv Bn 201st Med Regt, less animal elements	Near NEW-MARKET	BARTHOLOWS—UNIONVILLE—UNION BRIDGE—FUES MILL	No change	FUES MILL	201st Ordnance Company to TANEY TOWN on afternoon 25 Nov.
4	Brig Gen B 201st FA Brig	Near NEW-MARKET	NEWMARKET—LIBERTY TOWN—JOHNSVILLE—MID-DLEBURG—TANEY TOWN; and NEW-MARKET—MCKAIG—LIBERTY TURNPIKE—LIBERTY TOWN—CENTERVILLE—LADIESBURG—CRABSTER—BRIDGEPORT	JOHNSVILLE—creek running northwest from JOHNSVILLE—CENTERVILLE (all exclusive)	In the area: TANEY TOWN—LONGVILLE—BRIDGEPORT (all exclusive) and in the vicinity of CLEARVIEW SCHOOL	Units will not use LIBERTY TURNPIKE until 2:30 PM, 24 Nov. Rear elements will be in bivouac areas by 9:00 PM, 24 Nov. All units, less ammunition train, will be north of the road: TANEY TOWN—BRIDGEPORT, by 9:00 PM, 25 Nov. On 25 Nov, the ammunition train will bivouac in the vicinity of CLEARVIEW SCHOOL.
5	Maj X 701st Engr Bdg Tn (Hv) 702d Engr Bdg Tn (Hv) 701st Engr Aux Bn 702d Engr Aux Bn	East of FREDERICK	River crossing two miles northeast of FREDERICK—Mt PLEASANT—road east of LAUREL HILL—WOODSBORO—LEGORE—DETOUR—KEYSVILLE	LE GORE	701st Eng Tn (Bdg) and 701st Eng Aux Bn to BRIDGEPORT. 702d Eng Tn (Bdg) and 702d Eng Aux Bn to mouth of PINEY CREEK	Serial 5 to be at its destination on 25 Nov by 3:30 PM.
6	Sp Trs, II Corps, less dets	LIBERTY TOWN	LIBERTY TOWN—UNION BRIDGE—COPPERVILLE—TANEY TOWN	No change	TANEY TOWN	All troop movements to be completed by 5:00 PM, 25 Nov

OFFICIAL:  
E.  
G-3.

By command of Lieutenant General C,  
D.  
Chief of Staff.



SECTION IV

Discussion

	Paragraph
Corps plan for the march -----	6
Reconnaissance and security measures -----	7
Coordination -----	8
Command control -----	9

6. CORPS PLAN FOR THE MARCH.—*a. Factors.*—In planning the march, the corps commander must keep in mind the army plan, the mission of the corps, and the enemy situation. He must also consider the terrain, the march formation, the length of the march, reconnaissance and security measures, coordination, and command control.

*b. Terrain.*—From the corps viewpoint, there are no terrain features that are likely to have a decisive influence on the march. From the army viewpoint, however, a deficiency in crossings over the Monocacy River, above the mouth of Toms Creek, is liable to be a vital factor in future operations; hence, engineer bridge trains and troops are attached to the II Corps, and the II Corps is charged with the responsibility for installation of bridges.

*c. March formation.*—The zone of action assigned the II Corps averages slightly more than nine miles in width. Within this zone there are six good roads leading to the front. Since the road net, the width of the zone, and the tactical situation all point to a formation of three divisions abreast, this formation is adopted, the fourth division and corps troops following.

*d. Length of march.*—The march order should cover as many days as it is reasonably certain the corps will continue to advance. In this situation, it is apparent that contact will likely be gained on the second day of the advance; therefore, two days' march are provided for.

7. RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY MEASURES.—In addition to its organic means of reconnaissance and security, the II Corps has been given a squadron of cavalry. This squadron enables the corps to make a more detailed recon-



naissance than can be made by the army cavalry; to pick up hostile patrols that have escaped the army cavalry; and to maintain connection with the latter as well as with corps cavalry to the right and left.

8. COORDINATION.—*a.* In this situation, the army has prescribed certain control lines that regulate the rate and length of march of the leading divisions. In addition, the corps commander provides for connection between these divisions and connection between them and leading divisions of adjacent corps. The corps cavalry is charged with maintaining connection between its own elements and the front line divisions.

*b.* Coordination between the leading divisions and the troops that follow them is attained by specifying the hours when the rear elements of the former will clear a certain area or a certain line. The latter may then be moved forward at such time as will assure the avoidance of conflict on roads or in areas, and at the same time clear rear areas and roads for army troops. For marching purposes, all troops are formed into groups of the same marching speed.

9. COMMAND CONTROL.—The command post is centrally located at Libertytown. It need not be moved until the afternoon of 25 November, at which time the leading divisions will have cleared Taneytown. So far as the development of the situation can be visualized, these two locations are sufficient.

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SECTION V

Corps Administrative Orders for the Advance

	Paragraph
General discussion .....	10
Situation and requirement .....	11
A solution .....	12
Discussion .....	13

---

10. GENERAL DISCUSSION.—*a. Administrative functions of the corps.*—(1) The corps, being primarily a tactical unit, has but few supply responsibilities. However,



the corps commander is responsible for police, discipline, sanitation, quartering, traffic control, and maintenance of roads within the corps area. On receipt of the army administrative order, the corps commander makes known his general policy, and his staff prepares the detailed plan which is published to the command in the form of administrative orders.

(2) The corps ordinarily has the following establishments:

(a) Remount depot.

(b) Corps parks of the loads of the corps quartermaster train.

(c) Ordnance heavy repair shop.

(d) Motor repair agencies for repair of motor transport of corps troops.

(e) Distributing points for corps' troops.

(f) When the situation demands, a hospital station for the hospitalization of corps troops.

(3) The above establishments are operated by the corps service troops.

*b. Corps supply principles.*—(1) The corps provides for all supply of corps troops. This includes the establishing of distributing points for Class I supplies.

(2) The corps is responsible for allocation to division and corps troops of such Class IV supplies as are closely related to the tactical mission of the corps.

(3) The corps, by means of its corps quartermaster train, carries reserves of food, forage, gasoline, oil, and ammunition, which are kept intact for an emergency. When vehicles of the corps quartermaster train are needed for the transportation of other supplies, the reserves may be unloaded and placed in corps parks which usually are at the bivouac of the corps train. The capacity of the corps train is such that it is capable of transporting the foot troops of a division.

(4) Divisions in the corps are normally supplied directly from the army. While railheads are usually assigned to corps troops and divisions by the army, the situation may require that the army assign a block of railheads to the



corps, the latter determining the units to be supplied from each.

(5) When the corps is acting independently, or where the distances to army depots are excessive, the corps takes over army supply responsibilities.

(6) The corps supervises division supply to see that it is satisfactory.

*c. Maintenance of communications.*—(1) In moving situations, the principal function of the engineer troops of the corps is the maintenance of roads. When the road situation is such that additional labor or bridge equipment is required, suitable engineer units are attached to corps by army.

(2) The principle governing the repair of roads is that divisions maintain roads within their areas and the corps within that part of the corps area not occupied by divisions. In an advance, divisions and corps make only temporary repairs, leaving the more permanent work for the army.

11. SITUATION AND REQUIREMENT.—*a. Situation.*—(1) For the general and special situations, see Chapter I, Sections II and III.

(2) The locations of the administrative, technical, and supply troops of the II Corps, are as shown in the following table:

LOCATION TABLE  
23 November, 1926

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Present Location</i>	<i>Command Post</i>	<i>Railhead</i>
Special Troops, less 201st Field Remount Depot	Near Libertytown	Libertytown	Bartholows
201st Field Remount Depot	Near Bartholows	Bartholows	Bartholows
II Corps Medical Service	Near New Market	New Market	Bartholows
II Corps Engineer Service	Near Bartholows	Bartholows	Bartholows
II Corps QM Train	Near New Market	New Market	Bartholows
201st Ammunition Train	Near New Market	New Market	Bartholows

(3) The following administrative details are in force for 23 November:





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*c. Ammunition.*

Refilling points.

(1) Artillery:	Am Dep No 2	LE GORE
(2) Infantry:	Am Dep No 1	NEW MIDWAY

*d. Engineer.*

Refilling point:	Engr Dep No 1	FREDERICK
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*e. Signal.*

Refilling point:	Sig Dep No 1	WALKERSVILLE
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*f. Medical.*

Refilling point:	Med Dep No 1	FREDERICK
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*g. Ordnance.*

Refilling points:

(1) All classes	Ord Dep No 1	FREDERICK
(2) Small arms depot	Ord Dep No 2	BRUCEVILLE

*h. Quartermaster.*

Refilling points:

(1) Animals	F Rmt Dep	INDIAN SPRINGS
(2) Truck spare parts and repairs	MT Dep No 1	FREDERICK
(3) Reserve gas and oil	QM Dep No 3	MIDDLEBURG
(4) Other supplies	QM Dep No 2	FREDERICK

*i. Air service.*

All supplies and repairs: AC Dept No 1	HARMONY GROVE after 27 Nov
--	-------------------------------

- x.* (1) Divisions will draw all supplies except Class I direct from army depots.  
 (2) Supplies will be drawn from corps reserve only in emergency. Any supplies drawn from corps reserve will be replaced without delay.

## 2. EVACUATION.

*a. Casualties.*

## (1) Men:

(a) Hospital station for corps troops:

(i) No change prior to 8:30 PM, 25 Nov.

(ii) Commencing 8:30 PM, 25 Nov, FUES MILL.

(b) Ambulances of the 201st Med Regt will be attached to columns of corps troops during the advance.

## (2) Animals:

Veterinary collecting station for corps troops:

LIBERTYTOWN, to include 25 Nov.

FUES MILL, effective 26 Nov.

*b. Burial.*

- (1) The number of cemeteries employed by divisions will be reduced to a minimum.  
 (2) Corps troops.  
 (a) Under supervision of the corps quartermaster.  
 (b) Cemetery: JOHNSVILLE.



## THE CORPS IN THE ADVANCE

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## 3. TRAFFIC.

*a. Circulation.*

## (1) Restrictions:

- (a) Reserved motor road: FREDERICK—WOODSBORO—TANEY-TOWN, south of KEYMAR.
- (b) The use of lights on vehicles is prohibited north of LIBERTY TURNPIKE. Motor transport will use dimmed lights in the area between LIBERTY TURNPIKE and the BALTIMORE AND OHIO RR.

## (2) Control:

- (a) By divisions within their respective areas when halted and by corps in rear of division boundaries.
- (b) The corps provost marshal will take over traffic control within the corps zone as divisions move forward.

*b. Construction and maintenance of routes.*

- (1) Maintenance of reserved motor road by army.
- (2) During the march, corps and divisions will make only temporary repairs within their zones.

*c. Rear boundaries.*

## (1) II Corps:

- (a) LIBERTY TURNPIKE, inclusive, commencing midnight, 24-25 Nov.
- (b) WESTERN MARYLAND RR, inclusive, commencing midnight, 25-26 Nov.

## (2) Divisions:

- (a) LIBERTY TURNPIKE—WINDSOR ROAD, exclusive, commencing 2:30 PM, 24 Nov.
- (b) East and west line through GALT KUMP P. O.—ST. JOSEPH'S ACADEMY, exclusive, 6:00 PM, 25 Nov.

4. TRAINS. (See *Field Orders No 9* and its attached march table.)

Motorized elements of division quartermaster trains are authorized to bivouac in vicinity of their respective railheads until 11:00 AM, 25 Nov.

## 5. PERSONNEL.

*a. Stragglers.*

Corps military police will arrest all stragglers and return them to organizations.

*b. Rear echelon:*

Closes at LIBERTYTOWN at 4:00 PM, 25 Nov, and opens at MIDDLEBURG at same hour and date.

## 6. MISCELLANEOUS.

Other details, no change.

By command of Lieutenant General C.

D,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

F,  
G-4.

Distribution: (omitted).



13. DISCUSSION.—*a. The administrative order.*—Since the corps, when part of an army, has few supply responsibilities, the corps administrative order contains only such data from the army order as is of interest to corps troops. It provides in detail for the Class I supply of corps troops, and makes known other corps decisions which are pertinent to corps troops and divisions. In this situation, the loads in the corps train are kept intact as reserves.

*b. Railheads.*—Three railheads were assigned to the II Corps, effective on 26 November, at which time the 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions will be abreast and in the order named from right to left. The sidings at Taneytown will provide ample facilities for two divisions and are conveniently located for both the 5th and the 6th Divisions. While Bruceville is located in the zone of the 6th Division, it is suitably located to serve the 7th Division. The remaining railhead, Union Bridge, is assigned for the use of corps troops.

*c. Evacuation.*—During the concentration, the corps medical service was operating a hospital station at New Market to care for the normal sick of corps troops. The few casualties that will occur during the advance on 24 and 25 November can be readily evacuated to New Market by motor ambulances, thus avoiding a movement of the medical regiment until the afternoon of 25 November when it is advanced to Fues Mill. In view of the fact that sick animals cannot be moved long distances, the veterinary collecting station should be established in the vicinity of the animal elements of the corps trains. Libertytown is a convenient location for 24 and 25 November, and Fues Mill for 26 November.

*d. Traffic.*—It is not necessary to issue a circulation map for the advance since all movements within the corps zone are prescribed in march tables. The reserved motor road gives all units ready access to army depots. It is normal for divisions to control traffic within their respective areas when halted. When divisions are marching, the corps military police follow them up closely in order to free the





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the organic division artillery includes no howitzers. Consequently, in an advance to battle, the corps artillery, at first, will move ordinarily by bounds in rear of the divisions, and later will be close in rear of the combatant elements of the divisions.

*b. The conduct of marches of motorized artillery.*—(1) Since the corps artillery is entirely motorized, the principles stated in Chapter I, Section VII, relative to the movement of motorized artillery are as applicable to corps artillery as to army artillery. As the advance progresses and the distance to the enemy decreases, the desire to facilitate the advance of the corps artillery usually results in a breaking up of long columns into several shorter ones. In each column, however, when tactical considerations permit, the separation of the heavy motor and the tractor elements is ordinarily continued.

(2) In the corps artillery brigade, the differences in the weight and general mobility of the 155-mm. howitzer (medium artillery) and the 155-mm. gun (heavy artillery), usually makes it advisable to give special consideration to the route selected for the 155-mm. gun. Ordinarily the best available route will be assigned to the gun regiment, and, if necessary, bridges and culverts over which it is to march will be examined beforehand and strengthened. In planning a march, consideration also should be given to the fact that the width of track and weight of the 155-mm. gun, usually compels the carriages to straddle the crown of the road and thus makes, for the time being, a one-way road out of what ordinarily may be a two-way road. Consideration should be given this in order that there may be no interference with more important movements.

(3) With motorized artillery, the places selected for halts must be such that tractors and motor vehicles can drive in and out. The 155-mm. guns cannot always be taken off the roads without enormous labor but must be left on roads headed in the direction in which they are next to move. When parked on roads, as they often must be, these guns may block the passage of other vehicles, and the selection of roads must be made so as to avoid interference with



other troops, as far as possible. The gun regiment should always be given early notice of all probable movements.

*c. Antiaircraft artillery.*—Although certain units within the divisions and among the corps troops are provided with antiaircraft machine guns for protection against low-flying hostile aircraft, these means of defense are reinforced by the corps antiaircraft artillery. In an advance, one or more machine gun batteries of the corps antiaircraft artillery regiment usually are attached to divisions in order to reinforce their organic means of defense against hostile aircraft, and the remainder of the regiment is employed to protect the corps as a whole. The gun batteries are advanced by long bounds from position to position as the situation demands.

*d. Ammunition.*—In addition to the artillery ammunition carried in the vehicles of artillery units, there normally is carried in the corps quartermaster train, a rolling reserve of one-half day of fire for all the organic corps artillery and for the organic division artillery of three divisions.

15. SPECIAL SITUATION, CONTINUED.—*a.* For the general and special situations, see Chapter II, Sections II and III.

*b.* In preparation for the advance, the corps chief of artillery, in his capacity as a staff officer and artillery adviser of the corps commander, was concerned with the preparation of the march table appended to the corps field order for the advance, to the extent of insuring that suitable routes were assigned for the use of the corps artillery, that the staging areas contained sufficient hard standings for the vehicles, and that the general location of the corps artillery at all times during the advance would be suited to possible demands of combat.

*c.* The order to the corps artillery, contained in *Field Orders No 9*, II Corps, and its accompanying march table, were in sufficient detail to permit the corps artillery brigade commander to issue his own orders for the advance without further instructions from the corps chief of artillery. Consequently, there was no necessity for the corps chief of artil-



lery, as tactical commander of the corps artillery, to issue a field order to his command for the advance.

*d.* The 201st Field Artillery Brigade, on 23 November, is in bivouac in the vicinity of New Market and is disposed as follows:

(1) The 201st and 203d Field Artillery, in the woods northeast of New Market.

(2) The 202d Field Artillery, southeast of crossroads 546.

(3) The 204th Field Artillery, in the vicinity of road junction 562.

(4) The remainder of the brigade, at New Market.

16. REQUIREMENT.—Prepare the march table appended to *Field Orders No 12*, 201st Field Artillery Brigade, for the march of the brigade on 24 and 25 November.

17. A SOLUTION.—The following is a march table for the movement of the 201st Field Artillery Brigade from the New Market area to the area just north of Taneytown on 24 and 25 November, 1926:





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18. DISCUSSION.—*a.* Upon receipt of the corps order for the march, the various units of the brigade were warned and arrangements were promptly made with the 6th Division to permit the brigade quartering parties to move forward early on the 24th and 25th to the new areas so that these could be occupied with a minimum of confusion. The reconnaissance of routes was undoubtedly attended to prior to the issuance of the corps artillery brigade order.

*b.* Upon consideration of the corps order with regard to the routes, areas assigned, and restrictions imposed on the march, together with the present location of the units, and to the fact that both routes were in equally good condition, the brigade commander decided to divide his command equally between the two routes, thus arranging to effect the march in a minimum of time. He considered that the road: New Market—Taneytown, was an important traffic route on which the 155-mm. guns might not have as much freedom during halts as on the west route, and consequently he assigned the 204th Field Artillery to the west column. There then remained the necessary provisions for coordination of the march. This coordination was obtained by designating suitable initial points and points which would be cleared, and also indicating definite times at which the various elements would reach or clear these points.

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SECTION VII

The Corps Air Service in the Advance

	Paragraph
Principles -----	19
Situation -----	20
Discussion -----	21

---

19. PRINCIPLES.—*a. The corps air service.*—The corps air service consists essentially of an observation group of two squadrons and a balloon group of four companies. The normal zone of action of the corps observation aviation ex-



tends from the corps front to a distance which covers the zone of responsibility of the corps commander. Ordinarily, the army prescribes a boundary between the reconnaissance activities of the army observation group and the corps groups; in a similar manner, the corps commander indicates the dividing line between corps and divisional air services.

*b. The corps air service in the advance.*—In an advance, distant reconnaissance is usually undertaken by army agencies. The corps concerns itself with events taking place in the immediate front, such as the location and activities of friendly and hostile advance elements, and the enemy activities in their immediate rear. Usually also, it is desirable that the corps air service keep the corps commander informed of the locations of friendly troops, particularly of the advanced elements. As the missions carried out by division and corps are in many instances of the same general nature, a close supervision by air service commanders over air service activities is necessary to avoid duplication and insure cooperation. This is often achieved by having both corps and division air services use the same airdrome; such an arrangement also facilitates supply and technical control. In an advance, when not in contact with the enemy, the observation balloons do not ascend.

*c. The air situation.*—While the missions assigned the corps air service are determined by the needs of the ground troops, the manner in which they are executed and the number of missions are influenced by the air situation. An active hostile air force may compel all observation missions to be executed by formations rather than by single airplanes, or may even necessitate the support of friendly pursuit units in order to accomplish the mission. When, on the other hand, the hostile air force is neutralized, the corps air service has almost complete freedom of action.

20. SITUATION.—The II Corps Air Service, on 23 November, was operating from an airdrome in the vicinity of Frederick. Upon receipt of the corps order, the air service commander gave the following plan to his operations officer, as a basis for field orders, for the action of the 201st Observation Group on 24 November:



(1) The corps air service to execute the missions assigned in paragraph 3 *d*, *Field Orders No 9*, II Corps.

(2) Reconnaissance missions to be executed by the 201st Observation Squadron from 6:10 AM to 8:00 AM, by the 202d Observation Squadron from 8:00 AM to 10:00 AM, and so on, alternating every two hours until 6:00 PM.

(3) All missions to be executed by single airplanes.

(4) An officer of the supply section to reconnoiter for a landing field near Taneytown.

21. DISCUSSION.—In this situation, due to the superiority of the Blue air force, the corps air service will have comparatively great freedom of movement. It will be unnecessary for the airplanes to fly in formation on every mission, and accordingly a greater number of missions may be executed. The area for reconnaissance is not extensive, and the conditions of operation are favorable. If necessary, the missions assigned could be executed by one squadron alone, but the corps air service officer desires, in view of future probabilities, to have all observers familiar with the zone of action. Accordingly, both squadrons of the group are required to reconnoiter the corps zone, at different times. Not to exceed three airplanes at a time will be out on reconnaissance missions.





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
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- (1) The corps air service to execute the missions assigned in paragraph 3 d, *Field Orders No 9*, II Corps.
  - (2) Reconnaissance missions to be executed by the 201st Observation Squadron from 6:10 AM to 8:00 AM, by the 202d Observation Squadron from 8:00 AM to 10:00 AM, and so on, alternating every two hours until 6:00 PM.
  - (3) All missions to be executed by single airplanes.
  - (4) An officer of the supply section to reconnoiter for a landing field near Taneytown.
21. Discussion.—In this situation, due to the superiority of the Blue air force, the corps air service will have comparatively great freedom of movement. It will be unnecessary for the airplanes to fly in formation on every mission, and accordingly a greater number of missions may be executed. The area for reconnaissance is not extensive, the conditions of operation are favorable. If necessary, missions assigned could be executed by one squadron but the corps air service officer desires, in view of the probabilities, to have all observers familiar with the action. Accordingly, both squadrons of the group will reconnoiter the corps zone, at different times, and no more than three airplanes at a time will be out on reconnaissance missions.





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tables when such are necessary. Particularly is this true when the division is operating in a situation where combat is imminent. So far as is practicable, units should be grouped for the march according to their march rates.

2. RELATION OF THE DIVISION TO HIGHER UNITS.—*a. Restrictions.*—When a division is operating as a part of a higher tactical unit, certain restrictions will be imposed by the higher commander on the freedom of action of the division commander. For example, in an advance by a corps or army, the corps commander usually will prescribe a zone of action for each of the divisions of the corps. This will restrict the division to the routes within its zone. The zone of action assigned to a division may be comparatively narrow and will influence to a considerable extent the march formations and supply arrangements in the division. The corps also usually prescribes, in a general way, a line which advance guards will cross at a given time at the beginning of the march, and the extent of the march. Also, where the situation requires the corps to march closed up, further restrictions are imposed on leading divisions, usually by requiring that the bivouac area be cleared by a given hour to make way for corps troops or divisions in rear. These latter restrictions influence the time of beginning the march by the rear elements of the division, usually the motors.

*b. Covering forces.*—The army or corps may provide a covering force of cavalry in advance of the divisions. This will influence the strength and composition of advance guards and outposts.

3. ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE DIVISION.—*a. Command functions.*—When the division is operating with the corps, the major tactical decisions are made by corps or higher commanders. The division commander is usually concerned with those matters which have to do with the coordination of the units composing the division in order that the division can play its part in the larger team, the corps. (Assume for the remainder of this discussion, except where otherwise indicated, that the division is one of the front line divisions of a corps in an army on the advance.)



*b. Assignment of zones of action or routes.*—If the number of available roads permit, the division commander may organize his command into two or more main columns and assign each column a zone of action. This permits each column commander to arrange his column as the roads and the tactical situation warrant. This method has the advantage that definite zones of responsibility include that for advance guard reconnaissance and also for the front covered by the outposts. It fixes the responsibility of the security forces. Another method of organizing the march of the division is to divide the various elements of the division into convenient march groups, depending on the arm of service and its rate of march, and to assign routes of march and priority to the marching groups. This method has the advantage of a centralized control over the marching units. The details of routes and the time of starting are placed in a march table. The method is particularly applicable in a situation where, to prevent interference with corps troops or other divisions marching in rear or to economize road space, a centralized control of the marching units is advisable. Tactically it is best suited to those situations where the march is in more than one column and combat is not imminent. The assignment of zones of action is better suited to the situation where combat is imminent. Where this latter tactical situation exists, and also restrictions in corps orders and the roads make it advisable to keep close control over marching units, a combination of the two methods discussed is probably preferable. So far as possible, the assignment of zones of action to the major combat elements is preferable in any case when the enemy is likely to be met on the march.

*c. Initial points.*—To coordinate fully the march of the elements of the division, and to assure compliance with corps instructions relative to the time of beginning the march, initial points should be prescribed, at least for leading elements. The time of reaching or clearing a given point should be given to insure that the various march serials are in column at the proper time.



*d. Time of clearing the bivouac area.*—When corps instructions direct the bivouac area to be cleared by a given time, the rear elements must be given a time of starting or for clearing the area so as to comply with corps orders. When the corps is marching well closed up, compliance with corps instructions will often require the rear elements of the division to begin their march before the time necessary for them to take their places in column. Such elements will be compelled to take side roads or even to double up columns when possible, until the bivouac area is cleared. These rear units may halt when the area is cleared, then take up the march at the proper time to follow the preceding element.

*e. Bivouacs.*—If possible, the general areas for bivouacs should be announced in the orders for the march. The corps order will usually designate in a more or less general way the forward and rear elements of the division area for the halt. The division commander must insure that the division bivouacs within this area. Also, the congestion of roads in the division zone of action and in rear of the division generally requires that the movement of supply elements be carefully coordinated with other traffic.

---

SECTION II

Situation and Requirement

	Paragraph
Situation -----	4
Requirement -----	5

---

4. SITUATION.—*a.* The general and special situations are the same as in Chapters I and II.

*b.* The 6th Division, on 23 November, is in the area: Libertytown, inclusive—crossroads 610, exclusive—road junction 517, inclusive, and is disposed as follows:

- Division headquarters, at Libertytown.
- 11th Brigade, south of Libertytown, exclusive, on both sides of the road to include the south edge of woods just south of Libertytown.





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## 94 TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

## Zone of action:

East boundary: LIBERTYTOWN—MIDDLEBURG, both inclusive—eastern half of TANEYTOWN—TWO TAVERNS, both exclusive.  
 West boundary: CENTERVILLE, inclusive—LADIESBURG—NAILORS MILL, both exclusive—BRIDGEPORT—TANEYTOWN ROAD, both inclusive.

3. *a.* The division air service will remain in its present location. Beginning at daybreak tomorrow it will maintain observation over the division zone of action as far north as PINEY CREEK, inclusive. On 25 November this observation will be extended north to include the line: MT VERNON SCHOOL—GETTYSBURG. Prompt report will be made of any enemy movements or locations. Commencing at 8:00 AM, 24 November, it will report each two hours on the progress of the march of the division. On 25 November it will be prepared to move to TANEYTOWN.
- x.* (1) Heads of advance guards will cross the line: LIBERTYTOWN—road junction 572, at 7:30 AM.  
 (2) Advance guards will be north of BIG PIPE CREEK by 6:00 PM, 24 November, and north of the line: crossroads 568—road junction 419, by 6:00 PM, 25 November.  
 (3) Infantry brigade commanders, in their respective zones of action, are charged with insuring the necessary security on the march and in bivouac.  
 (4) All elements of the division will be north of the LIBERTY TURNPIKE by 2:30 PM, 24 November.
4. See *Administrative Orders No 12*.
5. *a.* See *Annex No 2, Plan of signal communication* (omitted).  
*b.* Axes of signal communication:  
 6th Division: LIBERTYTOWN—JOHNSVILLE—MIDDLEBURG—BRUCEVILLE—TANEYTOWN—HARNEY—MT VERNON SCHOOL.  
 11th Brigade: same as division to TANEYTOWN, thence house at road junction 428.  
 12th Brigade: western exit LIBERTYTOWN—CENTERVILLE—KEYMAR—HARNEY.  
 6th Field Artillery Brigade: same as the division.  
*c.* Command posts:  
 6th Division: MIDDLEBURG, after 4:00 PM, 24 November; HARNEY, after 4:00 PM, 25 November.  
 11th Brigade: MIDDLEBURG, after 2:00 PM, 24 November; house near road junction 428, after 2:00 PM, 25 November.  
 12th Brigade: KEYMAR, after 2:00 PM, 24 November; HARNEY, after 2:00 PM, 25 November.  
 6th Field Artillery Brigade: same as division.  
 Command posts of other serial commanders will be reported daily prior to 6:00 PM.

A,  
Major General.

Official:

Y,  
G-3.

Annexes:

*No 1—March Table.*  
*No 2—Plan of Signal Communication* (omitted).







TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

Annex No 1 to Field Orders No 10, 6th Division  
MARCH TABLE

<i>Serial</i>	<i>Organization and Commander</i>	<i>Zones of Action</i>	<i>Location by 6:00 PM 24 November</i>	<i>Location by 6:00 PM 25 November</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1	Brig Gen B, commanding: 11th Brig 11th FA 1st Bn 6th Engrs 16th Amb Co, less one Plat, One Plat 16th Coll Co	Boundary between brigades: LIBERTYTOWN (to 11th Brig)—RJ 568 (348.5-712.7)—RJ 503—SHARRETT'S—NCRR—RJ 507—CR 491 (352.0-732.3)—RJ 478 (353.8-738.8)—RJ 489 (353.6-745.3) (all to 12th Brig)	Along the road between MIDDLEBURG (incl) and CR 489 (351.0-718.0) (excl)	Rear elements north of PINEY CREEK CHURCH. Bivouac area to be announced later	Heads of advance guards will cross the line: LIBERTYTOWN—RJ 572 (345.0-708.0), at 7:30 AM, 24 November; clear LIBERTYTOWN at 11:15 AM, 24 November; clear RJ 363 (352.0-723.1) at 11:15 AM, 25 November.
2	Maj FA, commanding: Motor elements of service trains, less motor elements Div QM Tn and 1st Tk Co	Serial 2 follows serial 1	Along road and crossroads from CR 489 (incl) to RJ one mile south of CR 489 (incl)	Bivouacs area to be assigned later	Clear LIBERTYTOWN at 1:35 PM, 24 November. Clear CR 489 at 1:45 PM, 25 November.
3	Brig Gen C, commanding: 12th Brig 6th FA Brig, less 11th FA and 11th Am Tn 6th Engrs, less 1st Bn 16th Coll Co, less one Plat One Plat 16th Amb Co		Area: KEYMAR—RJ 393 (347.8-721.5)—RJ 800 yards northeast of LADIESBURG	Rear elements north of PALMER. Bivouac area to be announced later	Heads of advance guards will cross the line: LIBERTYTOWN—RJ 572, at 7:30 AM, 24 November; clear west exit LIBERTYTOWN at 11:20 AM, 24 November; clear BRUCEVILLE at 11:30 AM, 25 November.
4	Capt QMC, commanding: Animal-drawn elements of service trains	Serial 4 follows serial 3	Vicinity of GOODINTENT SCHOOL	Bivouac area to be assigned later	Clear west exit of LIBERTYTOWN at 12:20 PM, 24 November; clear GOODINTENT SCHOOL at 11:10 AM, 25 November.





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SECTION IV

Discussion

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The motor elements of the division quartermaster train -----	13

7. SITUATION.—In this situation the II Corps is to advance as part of the First Army, with three divisions in line. Army and corps cavalry are to cover the march. The II Corps has prescribed a zone of action for the division, and has prescribed in a general way the limit of each day's advance and has placed daily a south limit on the location of the rear elements of the division. Also, the division must vacate its original bivouac by 2:30 PM, 24 November. The railhead remains at Monrovia for 24 and 25 November. Under the conditions as given, the division commander has no major tactical decisions to make. He is concerned for the present with coordinating the march of the units of the division so as to comply with orders of higher commanders and at the same time insure that the division is in a suitable formation for combat.

8. NUMBER AND COMPOSITION OF COLUMNS.—*a. Routes.* —There are only two routes in the division zone of action suitable for the advance. These are the road: Libertytown — Johnsville — Middleburg — Taneytown — Piney Creek Church—crossroads 568; and the road: west exit of Libertytown — Centerville—Goodintent School — Keymar—road junction 507—crossroads 472—Harney. The corps field order directs that divisions march in at least two columns. The division commander is thus forced to march in two main columns.

*b. Composition of march groups.*—Two main columns having been decided upon, these are further divided into groups in accordance with tactical and administrative neces-



## THE DIVISION IN THE ADVANCE

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sities. An important factor in determining the composition of groups is the economical speed of units. In the present situation, the probability of combat must be kept in mind. The division will probably take part in an attack after 25 November, and there is a reasonable expectation of contact with the enemy on 25 November. The two leading march groups are, therefore, composed of the major combat elements of the division. The 11th Brigade, together with the 11th Field Artillery, a portion of the engineers, and the necessary detachment of medical troops, constitutes one march serial, and the 12th Brigade with the remainder of the artillery and engineers and necessary medical troops constitutes another serial. A portion of the motor elements of the division quartermaster train will be needed to supply the troops daily with Class I supplies. The railhead remains unchanged for the next two days; therefore, this portion of the train is assigned to a separate serial. The remainder of the division, consisting of the tank company and the remainder of the service trains, is divided into two serials based on their march rates. The horsed elements are grouped in one serial and the motor elements in another. The motor elements are directed to follow the right (east) route for the reason that, except for a short distance north of Middleburg on the second day's march, this route is the best road for motors. To equalize time lengths of columns, the horsed elements of the service trains follow the left (west) route.

9. ZONES OF ACTION.—Since there are only two suitable routes within the division zone of action, it would have been satisfactory, so far as the arrangement of marching units is concerned, had the division commander assigned to each main column a definite route of advance rather than designating zones of action. In this situation, contact with the enemy can reasonably be expected on 25 November or at least on the next advance after that date. The corps field order places on the division commander responsibility for security during the advance; hence, each column will have its own advance guard and outpost. The division commander must coordinate the action of the outpost forces as well



as determine the zones of responsibility of the advance guards. Therefore, it is considered preferable in this situation to assign zones of action to the infantry brigades and to make brigade commanders responsible for security within these zones.

10. INITIAL POINTS.—The initial point for each column is selected so that no countermarching will be necessary for any unit. The east and west roads through Libertytown, road junction 363, and Bruceville are in the direction of march and are beyond the bivouac areas of the main bodies. They are suitable as initial points.

11. CLEARING BIVOUAC AREAS.—The corps field order restricts the time of beginning the march on 24 November, and also contains instructions which require the bivouac area be cleared by 2:30 PM the same date. When the division is operating independently, it is possible to hold march groups having a greater rate of march than foot troops until such time as would permit them marching at their regular rate to overtake the slower march group at the conclusion of the march. This is possible in this situation also. All troops of the division must be north of Liberty Turnpike by 2:30 PM. This can be done by 2:00 PM and yet permit the motor elements to move in one bound from their old bivouacs to the new bivouac area.

12. ASSIGNMENT OF NEW BIVOUAC AREAS.—It can be assumed that some general reconnaissance for probable bivouac areas was made prior to the preparation of the march table. Certainly this could have been done for the bivouacs for the night of 24-25 November. It will assist in the preparation of plans for the distribution of Class I supplies if the approximate bivouac areas can be known in advance. The actual bivouac areas for the night of 25-26 November will depend on whether contact is gained on 25 November. The corps field order assigns for that date a general area for the division. The division commander designates points for the leading serials to clear by 6:00 PM such as will insure that the division can bivouac within the general area as designated by the corps commander. The exact bivouac areas are left for future decision.





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SECTION V

Division Administrative Orders for the Advance

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14. GENERAL DISCUSSION.—*a. March supply principles.*  
—For a division on the march, supply is carried on according to the following principles:

(1) Until contact with the enemy has been gained, all supply is limited, as far as practicable, to rations, fuel, grain, gasoline, and oil.

(2) The motor transport of the division quartermaster train is used between the refilling point (usually a railhead) and the successive bivouac areas of the division. Since the total tonnage of the division quartermaster train exceeds the tonnage of the reserve loads by 104 tons, the surplus tonnage available is sufficient to transport one day of Class I supplies without dumping reserve loads.

(3) The wagon companies of the division quartermaster train accomplish the daily march with the division and carry such part of the division reserve or other supplies as the division commander may direct.

(4) The method of forwarding Class I supplies from the railhead to the troops depends on the situation, and involves consideration of the hour of arrival of the daily train, distance to be covered, roads available, restrictions as to daylight movements, and the proximity of the enemy.

(5) In marches in the presence of the enemy, the division reserve should be kept intact and the field trains should be refilled daily. The above procedure should be departed from only in an emergency.

(6) When contact with the enemy is imminent, arrangements should be made for the supply of ammunition.



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(7) When a division is operating as a part of an army, all supplies other than Class I are normally drawn from army depots.

*b. Evacuation.*—(1) In marches, the medical service will usually have to consider the following:

- (a) Sanitary survey of camps and water supply.
- (b) Medical service for possible combat.
- (c) Collection and care of march casualties and normal sick.
- (d) Movement of the medical regiment.

(2) The sanitary survey of camp sites and water supply is covered in the division routine of attaching medical officers to quartering parties. March casualties may be collected either by attaching animal-drawn ambulances to units or by establishing march collecting stations along the routes of march. The former method is to be preferred in situations in which a sufficient number of animal-drawn ambulances are available to transport all march casualties. At the end of each day's march, a hospital station is established to receive march casualties and sick requiring evacuation. If possible, this hospital station is cleared each day by evacuation to army hospitals prior to the hour of march of the medical regiment. A detachment of the veterinary company may be attached to each column for the collection of animals unable to accompany the column.

*c. Traffic.*—When a division is marching by roads not being used by other troops, little traffic control is necessary except at camp sites, railheads, and distributing points. However, when a division has priority on the routes which are being used by the vehicles of other troops, the military police should precede the columns, clear the roads if necessary, and stop cross traffic which may interfere with the march of the troops.

*d. Trains.*—In marches when contact with the enemy is imminent, the field trains of each column usually are combined and formed into animal-drawn and motor sections, the vehicles of each section being arranged in the same order of march as that of the troops to which they belong. The animal-drawn elements follow the troops at such a distance



as the tactical and supply situations permit. The motor sections advance by bounds, generally in rear of the animal-drawn sections. The field trains usually join their organizations at the completion of each day's march. The service trains, less certain elements needed with the troops, such as ambulances, are combined and formed into animal-drawn and motor sections. They may either follow the field trains or march by separate routes.

15. SITUATION AND REQUIREMENT.—*a. Situation.*—(1) For the general and special situations, see Chapters I and II.

(2) The 6th Division has been receiving Class I supplies daily from its railhead. The daily train arrives at Monrovia at 7:00 AM. The supply status of the division is normal.

*b. Requirement.*—Prepare the administrative order (No 12) to accompany *Field Orders No 10*, 6th Division, 23 November, 1926.

16. A SOLUTION.—The following administrative order was issued by the 6th Division:

6th Division,  
LIBERTYTOWN, MD.,  
23 November, 1926, 8:00 PM.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS }  
No 12 } To accompany *Field Orders No 10*.

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Gettysburg, Fairfield, Taneytown, Emmitsburg, Mount Airy, and Ijamsville quadrangles.

# 1. SUPPLY.

## *a. Railhead.*

(1) No change prior to 26 November.

(2) Beginning 26 November, TANEYTOWN. Daily train arrives 7:00 AM.

## *b. Class I supplies.*

Distributing points:

(1) On 24 November:

Road junction 489 (351.0-718.0):

11th Brigade 3:15 PM

11th Field Artillery and 6th Ammunition Train 4:15 PM

Special troops, less 6th Division Service Company 4:45 PM

Crossroads 502 (348.0-718.0):

12th Brigade 3:15 PM

6th Field Artillery Brigade, less 11th Field Artillery and 6th Ammunition Train 4:15 PM

6th Engineers 4:45 PM

6th Medical Regiment 5:15 PM





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*c. Rear boundaries.*

- (1) LIBERTY TURNPIKE—WINDSOR ROAD, exclusive, after 2:30 PM, 24 November.
- (2) East and west line through GALT KUMP PO—ST JOSEPHS ACADEMY, exclusive, after 6:00 PM, 25 November.

4. TRAINS.

*a. Service.*

Bivouacs: see *Annex No 1 to Field Orders No 10—March Table.*

*b. Field.*

Bivouacs:

On 24 November, with organizations.

On 25 November, to be announced later.

5. PERSONNEL.

*a. Stragglers.*

Military police will patrol bivouac areas as soon as evacuated by troops. Stragglers will be arrested and returned to organizations.

*b. Mail.*

To be distributed at the end of each day's march.

*c. Surplus baggage.*

Surplus baggage will be assembled in each regiment and separate unit and will be turned over by 7:00 AM, 24 November, to the division quartermaster at its location for safe keeping.

*d. Rear echelon.*

- (1) Closes at LIBERTYTOWN at 3:00 PM, 24 November, and opens at GOODINTENT SCHOOL at same hour and date.
- (2) Closes at GOODINTENT SCHOOL at 3:00 PM, 25 November, and opens at TANEYTOWN at same hour and date.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

Other details, no change.

By command of Major General A:

X,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Y,  
G-4.

17. DISCUSSION—*a. The plan of supply.*—(1) The administrative order provides, so far as possible at the time of its issue, for the supply of the division for two days, *i.e.*, 24 and 25 November. Since contact is expected on 25 November, provision is made for a supply of ammunition on that date.

(2) Since the division is carrying its normal reserve loads, 104 tons can be made available in the motor section of the quartermaster train for the delivery of Class I sup-



plies. On 24 November, this part of the quartermaster train will go forward as prescribed in the march table and will reach the bivouac area of the division at about the time that all troops will have gone into bivouac. Since the division zone is rather restricted, Class I distributing points are selected in the rear part of the division bivouac area, and field trains are instructed to fall out of column in the vicinity of distributing points. After distribution, the trucks of the quartermaster train return to the railhead at Monrovia to pick up the Class I supplies which will arrive on the daily train at 7:00 AM, 25 November. On 25 November, the entire motor section of the quartermaster train moves forward to the new railhead as prescribed in the march table. Since the roads in this area are being used by corps and army troops, it is necessary to prescribe the movements of the quartermaster train in the march table. No distributing points are announced for 25 November in view of the fact that the disposition of the division on that day cannot be foreseen.

*b. Evacuation.*—Since the casualties during the march are expected to be few, they may be collected by ambulances attached to the columns. The 16th Ambulance Company (animal-drawn) and the 16th Collecting Company are attached to columns for this purpose. A hospital company is ordered to establish a hospital station at the end of the first day's march, for the care of march casualties. This hospital will be cleared during the night of 24-25 November by evacuation to army hospitals.

*c. Traffic.*—On 24 and 25 November, the army will be establishing a number of depots on the Western Maryland and Northern Central Railroads. It may, therefore, be expected that there will be considerable traffic in the zone of advance of the 6th Division on 24 November. In order to insure the uninterrupted march of the division, the military police are instructed to precede the columns on 24 November in order to control traffic at road intersections along the route of march. Control posts are established at points where columns will begin to break up and at ration distributing points.



*d. Trains.*—(1) Order of march.— Since it is normal for field trains to march with the columns to which they belong, it is unnecessary to specify in the administrative order how the field trains are to march. The movements of service trains are specified in the march table.

(2) Bivouacs.—The 6th Division will not be in contact with the enemy on 24 November, and field trains will bivouac with their organizations on the night of 24-25 November. Since contact with the enemy is expected on 25 November, the field train bivouacs are not announced for that date. Service train bivouacs are prescribed in the march table. The bivouac of the motor elements of the quartermaster train remains at Monrovia until the morning of 25 November when they move forward to Taneytown, the new railhead.

---

SECTION VI

The Division Artillery in the Advance

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---

18. GENERAL DISCUSSION.—*a. Influence of the large units.*—The principles applicable to the march of the division artillery are no different in the case of the division operating as a part of a larger unit than when the division is acting alone. The division artillery when present with the division is always operating with a larger unit, *i.e.*, the division.

*b. Influence of rates of march.*—The organic field artillery brigade of an infantry division is composed of units which have, in the main, different normal rates of march. All units except the ammunition train are horsed units and on good roads normally march at about three and one-half miles per hour. In the ammunition train there are a number of motor vehicles which have a normal rate on good





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division by 6:00 AM, 25 November. Therefore, there is a probability of contact on that date.

*b. Formation of march columns.*—In the present situation, the restrictions placed on the division do not prevent the marching of the field artillery brigade, less ammunition train, in one single march serial. Even should the infantry brigades advance abreast as the leading serials, a consideration of the time lengths of these serials together with that of the artillery brigade, less ammunition train, will show that the artillery in one column could follow either serial and still clear Liberty Turnpike by 1:20 PM. The other animal-drawn and motor elements of the division still have time to clear by the hour directed by the corps commander. However, when we consider the other division troops following, and particularly the corps artillery (see march table, Section III, Chapter II) it will be apparent that the division artillery would not be able to delay its march until such time as would warrant it taking up its normal rate of march for the entire day's march. Such delay would interfere with troops in rear. The division artillery will have to march in the column with the foot troops. The tactical situation makes it desirable to march the infantry brigades abreast on the two available roads. In view of this, the most satisfactory solution is to march the artillery, by placing one regiment with each infantry brigade. This arrangement will not interfere with the supply of the artillery units during the advance.

*c. The brigade ammunition train.*—The ammunition train is one of the division service trains, and during a march, except when released for operation, it normally is marched in rear of the combat elements. A suitable solution in the present situation is to march the ammunition train grouped with other service trains having similar rates of march (see march table, Section III, this chapter).



## SECTION VII

## The Division Air Service in the Advance

	Paragraph
General discussion -----	20
Situation -----	21
Discussion -----	22

---

20. GENERAL DISCUSSION.—When a division is advancing, the reconnaissance to be executed by the division air service differs not at all in principle, and very little even in the details of execution, from the reconnaissance undertaken by the corps air service. Both are concerned primarily with events taking place in the immediate front. The chief difference lies in the area of responsibility. Generally the corps commander prescribes boundaries between corps and divisional activities, so as to insure that the entire zone of action is covered adequately. Ordinarily, the division air service reconnoiters to such a distance as to embrace the area for which the division commander is particularly responsible, and in which he is especially interested. Beyond this, the corps air service assumes responsibility. In general terms, it is the duty of the division air service to give the division commander definite and accurate information of the location and nature of his own and of the enemy's forces, as well as information as to the nature of the terrain. Usually, the division air service operates from the same air-drome as the corps air service.

21. SITUATION.—The 6th Division is to begin its march on 24 November. So far as air reconnaissance is concerned, there are three separate echelons of command, each provided with observation aviation, which precede the 6th Division: the army, the I Provisional Cavalry Corps, and the II Corps. The corps has prescribed Piney Creek as a boundary line between the activities of the air services of the II Corps and the 6th Division, for 24 November. In this zone, the division air service conducts reconnaissance. It also is charged with maintaining liaison during the march,



between the elements of the command and division headquarters. Upon receipt of the division field order for the march, the division air service commander issues his own field order, and the squadron commander in turn issues his order, which includes a schedule of flights, detailing the pilot and observer for each mission on the following day.

22. DISCUSSION.—Due to the operations of the army cavalry, as well as of the army and corps air services, it is not probable that contact with the enemy will be gained on 24 November. Local reconnaissance by the divisional agencies is not, however, dispensed with on this account. Accordingly, the division air service is required to cover the divisional zone of action to include Piney Creek. In as much as the Blue general headquarters air force is undertaking vigorous offensive measures, there is little likelihood of interference with the division air service on the part of Red pursuit aviation. Missions can, therefore, be undertaken by single airplanes, and the scope of the activities of the division air service can be enlarged, if it becomes desirable. Under the present circumstances, however, the missions assigned the division air service will not call forth its full powers, which can be reserved for the probable combats of the near future.





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3. CHARACTERISTICS OF ATTACKS.—All attacks have certain characteristics in common. In broad general terms they may be described as frontal or enveloping. Frontal attacks which result in penetrations may become local envelopments and enveloping attacks may develop into purely frontal attacks. For the smaller units all attacks are essentially frontal. All attacks have certain common steps, whether they are a result of meeting engagements or are delivered against defensive zones. They are reconnaissance, artillery preparation, advancing the attack (fire and movement), the assault, and the pursuit.

4. FORMS OF ATTACK.—The form of attack of the unit as a whole will be determined mainly by the decision as to the point of decisive effort. The attack may be a frontal attack, a penetration, the attack of a wing, an envelopment, a turning movement, or an attack of flank and rear.

*a. Frontal attack.*—A frontal attack is one delivered against the entire front of a hostile force with or without a concentration of effort at a selected decisive point.

*b. Penetration.*—A penetration is a form of frontal attack where a concentration is made at a selected point with a view to rupturing or penetrating the hostile line at that point.

*c. Attack of a wing.*—This is a form of frontal attack where the decisive effort is made against a wing of the hostile force. It may result in a penetration or an envelopment.

*d. Envelopment.*—An envelopment is a form of attack where the attempt is made to overlap a flank while holding the hostile force in place in front.

*e. Turning movement.*—A turning movement is a wide form of envelopment, the attempt being made by the turning force to get in rear of the hostile force, or to strike its line of communications, while the force is held in front.

*f. Attack of flank and rear.*—This is an attack made squarely against the flank or rear of a hostile force, either frontally or combined with an envelopment.

5. MAIN AND SECONDARY ATTACKS.—In any attack it is essential that the entire hostile front be engaged in order



to hold the enemy in position and to veil the intentions of the attacker. To attain decisive results, however, a concentration of effort must be made at a selected point, or points, where a consideration of all factors which enter, indicates that decisive results can best be obtained. Offensive action, therefore, develops into main and secondary attacks.

6. DEFINITE MISSIONS.—Definite missions must always be given to subordinate units. These missions must be such as will insure, by appropriate teamplay, the carrying out of the decision of the commander. The form of attack of the unit as a whole and the prescribed actions of the subordinate units constitute the scheme of maneuver of the higher unit.

7. SELECTION OF POINT OF DECISIVE EFFORT.—In the selection of the point of decisive effort many factors enter. The mission of the unit, the terrain, the strength and location of the enemy, morale, and the state and difficulties of supply are some of the factors which must be considered. The point selected should be such as will insure the maximum success.

8. CONCENTRATION AT POINT OF DECISIVE EFFORT.—An equal distribution of troops along the entire front will never produce decisive results. The requisite force, both in troops and fire power, should be concentrated, before and during the attack, so as to insure the success of the decisive effort. This may involve a reorganization of the larger units, a shifting of troops, and a reassignment of zones of action.

9. SIMPLICITY OF EFFORT.—Best results are usually obtained by the simplest means. Complicated maneuvers generally fail because of the difficulties involved. The larger the force, the greater the need for simplicity.

10. SURPRISE.—Surprise is attained by one or more of the following: concealment of the point of attack, the time of attack, the direction of attack, the strength of attack. Such concealment usually will be obtained under cover of darkness.

11. COOPERATION.—Cooperation of effort is essential. The efforts of each and every unit must be that of mutual cooperation and such as to insure the success of the unit



as a whole. Commanders of whatever grade must be trained to view the situation from the viewpoint of both the higher and lower commanders and to initiate action within their units which will further the mission of the higher units and be capable of accomplishment by the lower units.

---

SECTION II

Situation and Requirement\*

	Paragraph
Special situation, continued .....	12
Requirement .....	13

---

12. SPECIAL SITUATION, CONTINUED.—The First Army advanced according to plan.

*a. Events, 24 and 25 November.* (1) On 24 November, the I Provisional Cavalry Corps, after passing the state line, encountered Red cavalry which gradually withdrew to the north. By night, information received from all sources showed that a Red force, estimated to be two corps of three or four divisions each, and one cavalry division, had arrived from Lancaster and Harrisburg on the general line: Hanover—Gettysburg.

(2) During the night of 24-25 November the army cavalry in front of the I and II Corps was relieved by corps cavalry, the army cavalry concentrating to the north of Emmitsburg on the 25th in close contact with the Red cavalry which held Carr Hill.

(3) On 25 November the advance guards drove in the hostile covering detachments and by evening it was definitely learned that the Reds were constructing a defensive position with main line of resistance along the general line: south of Midway—Whitehall—north of Two Taverns—Round Top—Pitzer School, and that a second position was also being constructed along the north bank of Conewago Creek. Columns of hostile troops had been located march-

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\*See map at the end of this chapter.





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mount. The main bodies of these divisions are going into bivouac on the general line of the state boundary. Corps headquarters and corps troops are in and about Taneytown.

(4) III Corps. The advance guard of the leading division (9th) holds the McCleary School ridge. The main body is bivouacking on Middle Creek, north of Emmitsburg. The corps reserve division (10th) is bivouacking on Toms Creek, west of St. Josephs Academy. The corps cavalry has reached Highfield and is in touch with the right of the Third Army. Corps headquarters and corps troops are at and in the vicinity of St. Josephs Academy.

(5) Army reserve divisions: 4th Division at Westminster; 8th Division at Detour; 11th Division at Woodsboro; 12th Division at Graceham.

(6) Other army troops, as given in the march table accompanying *Field Orders No 10*, First Army.

*c. Decision.*—General A, commanding the First Army, decided to attack at 6:00 AM, 27 November, enveloping the hostile right, and drive the enemy north of Conewago Creek.

*d. Conference and plan.*—The corps commanders and the principal army staff officers were summoned to a conference at advanced army headquarters at Woodsboro at 11:00 PM, 25 November. At this conference a warning order was issued giving the general plan for the impending attack and directing that the necessary preliminary arrangements be inaugurated at once. They were also informed that the I Provisional Cavalry Corps would, on 26 November, secure Carr Hill by attack or maneuver, and that, for the attack on 27 November the 7th, 8th, and 12th Divisions would pass to the III Corps, and the 4th Division to the II Corps.

13. REQUIREMENT.—The formal field order for the attack issued by General A.



SECTION III

A Solution

Paragraph

Field order ----- 14

14. FIELD ORDER.—The following formal field order for the attack was issued by General A:

First Army,  
WOODSBORO, MD.,  
26 November, 1926, 8:00 AM.

FIELD ORDERS }  
No 12 }

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Gettysburg, Fairfield, Emmitsburg, Hanover, Ijamsville, Taneytown, and Mount Airy quadrangles.

1. *a.* The enemy, estimated at two corps (six to eight divisions and one cavalry division), is organizing a position with main line of resistance along the general line: south of MIDWAY—WHITE-HALL—north of TWO TAVERNS—ROUND TOP—PITZER SCHOOL. His cavalry holds CARR HILL. Other Red forces are approaching and organizing a second position along the north bank of CONEWAGO CREEK. See *Annex No 1, G-2 Report*, of 25 November (omitted).
- b.* The Second Army last night reached the line: MONKTON—WESTMINSTER. The Third Army is advancing, opposed only by cavalry. The I Provisional Cavalry Corps today secures WILSON HILL. Our advance guards hold the general line: MT PLEASANT—crossroads 613—TWO TAVERNS—WILLOW GROVE SCHOOL—MC-CLEARY SCHOOL. The 1st Air Division continues its offensive.
2. The First Army will attack at 6:00 AM, 27 November, enveloping the hostile right, and drive the enemy north of CONEWAGO CREEK. See *Annex No 2, Operations Map*.  
Zone of action: no change.
3. *a.* The I Corps, making its main effort in the direction: FELTY SCHOOL—CEDAR RIDGE, will gain the high ground south of CONEWAGO CREEK between PINE RUN and PINE CHURCH. It will protect the right of the army and maintain contact with the Second Army.  
Zone of action:  
Right boundary: no change.  
Left boundary: TREVANION, inclusive—STUMPTOWN, exclusive—PINEY CREEK (Village)—crossroads 613—ST LUKES CHURCH—MORITZ SCHOOL—PINE CHURCH—OAK-GROVE SCHOOL, all inclusive.
- b.* The II Corps, with 913th Field Artillery (75-mm. gun *portée*) attached, making its main effort in the direction: TWO TAVERNS—GRANITE HILL, will gain the high ground south of CONEWAGO CREEK between PINE CHURCH and PLAINVIEW.



## 120 TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

## Zone of action:

Right boundary: same as left boundary, I Corps.

Left boundary: KEYSVILLE—BRIDGEPORT—BARLOW—TANEY-TOWN ROAD—HARRISBURG ROAD, all inclusive.

- c. The III Corps, with 911th Field Artillery (75-mm. gun *portée*) attached, making its main effort in the direction: MCCLEARY SCHOOL—TABLE ROCK, will gain the high ground south of CONEWAGO CREEK, west of PLAINVIEW. It will cover the army's left, maintain contact with the Third Army, and reconnoiter SOUTH MOUNTAIN as far north as the CHAMBERSBURG ROAD, inclusive.

## Zone of action:

Right boundary: same as left boundary, II Corps.

Left boundary: no change.

- d. (1) The 4th Division, reaching STUMPTOWN during the night of 26-27 November, passes to the II Corps as corps reserve.  
 (2) The 7th Division passes to the III Corps at 2:00 PM today.  
 (3) The 8th Division passes to the III Corps at 4:00 PM today.  
 (4) The 12th Division passes to the III Corps at once. Army trucks will reach GRACEHAM at 7:30 PM today for movement of this division.  
 (5) The 11th Division will move during the night of 26-27 November to DETOUR in army reserve.
- e. (1) Field artillery regiments are attached to corps as follows:  
 II Corps, the 913th Field Artillery.  
 III Corps, the 911th Field Artillery.  
 I Provisional Cavalry Corps, the 912th Field Artillery.  
 (2) Groupment A, Army Artillery, from positions in the vicinity of OAKGROVE SCHOOL (361.0-738.0), will fire on the objectives indicated in *Annex No 3, Artillery*. In addition it will be prepared to reinforce the fires of the artillery with the I and II Corps.  
 (3) Groupment B, Army Artillery, from positions in the vicinity of FAIRPLAY, will fire on the objectives indicated in *Annex No 3, Artillery*. In addition it will be prepared to reinforce the fires of the artillery with the III Corps.  
 (4) The 701st Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) will cover troops and establishments south of the general line: SILVER RUN (Village)—GALT KUMP PO—EMMITSBURG.  
 (5) The artillery preparation will commence at 5:00 AM.  
 (6) ROUND TOP, LITTLE ROUND TOP, POWERS HILL, WOLF HILL, and ST LUKES CHURCH will be neutralized by gas and smoke under corps directions. Gas and smoke may be employed on other parts of the front by corps orders.  
 (7) For details see *Annex No 3, Artillery*.
- f. The I Provisional Cavalry Corps, with the 912th Field Artillery (75-mm. gun, *portée*) attached, will secure CARR HILL today. It will screen and protect the movements of the III Corps and assist its attack. It will secure the high ground north and east of ARENDTSVILLE and observe the passes of SOUTH MOUNTAIN north of ORRTANNA.
- g. (1) The army air force will reconnoiter north of CONEWAGO CREEK and south of the line: HARRISBURG—CARLISLE, and maintain constant observation of the Red troops advancing from HARRISBURG and CARLISLE. It will make photographic reconnaissance of the positions north of CONEWAGO CREEK, both the morning and afternoon of 26 November. It will delay the movement of the Red troops advancing





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army commander to enable him to reach a decision and to take the steps necessary to carry that decision into effect. An enemy force of about eight divisions is in a position covering some sixteen miles of front, with a cavalry division covering its right flank. Other forces are organizing a second position on the north bank of Conewago Creek; the two positions thus forming a defensive zone about ten miles in depth.

16. BLUE FORCES.—The First Army is in contact with the hostile forces all along the line from Hanover to the west of Gettysburg. The Second Army is practically two days march from the line held by the enemy and cannot make its influence felt until late 27 November at the earliest. The Third Army likewise cannot arrive on the field much before the 28th.

17. TERRAIN.—Due to the hill mass south and east of Gettysburg the right of the enemy's line is naturally strong. This advantage of terrain is partially counteracted by the possession by the First Army of the hill to the westward of Gettysburg. Between Hanover and the hill mass south of Gettysburg the country is less rugged.

18. SELECTION OF DECISIVE POINT.—From the standpoint of the First Army alone and from a strategical standpoint, an envelopment of the enemy's left flank, or a penetration of his line west of Hanover, appears to be the preferable point to be selected, both from the nature of the terrain and the fact that, if successful, either one imperils his lines of communication and retreat. However, the First Army is but one of a group of three armies and the plan of the commander-in-chief, announced prior to the advance, must be taken into consideration. An envelopment of the enemy's left will force the Second Army to change the direction of its advance and may disrupt its supply system. A concentrated attack on his left wing west of Hanover and a penetration of that part of the line, while practicable, may be costly and difficult. The hill mass south and east of Gettysburg is the key to the entire position. Its capture will force the evacuation of the entire position. An envelopment of the enemy's right will tend more quickly to



cause an evacuation of this hill mass. Furthermore, this form of attack is more in keeping with the plan of the commander-in-chief. For these reasons it is selected as the point for the decisive effort. From the standpoint of the First Army the mission is tactical rather than strategical.

19. CONCENTRATION FOR THE ATTACK.—*a. Divisions.*—Having decided on the point of attack, the forces of the First Army must be concentrated so as to assure the success of the plan decided upon. Of the twelve divisions in the army, six are in contact with the enemy, two in corps reserve, and four in army reserve. Inasmuch as the III Corps is to deliver the main blow, it must be furnished an adequate number of troops for the purpose. The I and II Corps must also have a sufficient number of divisions for the missions to be given them, and provision must be made for the necessary reserves for the army. It is apparent that a reassignment of divisions becomes necessary. This shifting should be done in the simplest way possible. The possession of Round Top will have an important bearing on the outcome of the attack by the III Corps. Responsibility for its capture should be placed upon that corps. In view of the fact that the 7th Division is confronting that hill, that division should be assigned to the III Corps. This can be done, not by shifting the position of the division, but by changing the III Corps east boundary. The II Corps will need a reserve. The 4th Division is most conveniently located. A large army reserve is not necessary. The 11th Division, being the rearmost division, is most conveniently located for this purpose but should be moved to a suitable locality convenient to any part of the front necessary. The 8th and 12th Divisions are both conveniently located and can be shifted without undue trouble. As a result the III Corps is composed, for the attack, of five divisions, of which four should be in the attack and one in reserve.

*b. Artillery.*—The army artillery consists of two groupments of heavy artillery and three regiments of 75-mm. guns, *portée*. The light artillery regiments are attached to the corps for use in accordance with the estimated require-



ments, and the heavy groupments are moved to localities from which they can best carry out their assigned missions.

20. OBJECTIVE.—The objective is set as the high ground south of Conewago Creek. It would have been just as well to have assigned the high ground north of the Conewago Creek, or even to have placed no limit at all on the extent of the advance. However, in view of the fact that an advance north of the Conewago Creek means an attack on another defensive position, and, as the distance between the two positions is about ten miles, it is probable that, even if successful everywhere, the attack will not advance much farther than the Conewago Creek on the 27th. By that time units will no doubt be more or less disorganized. Furthermore the Second and Third Armies will be in position by the 28th to play their part. For these reasons a limit was set with a view to a reorganization and a fresh coordinated attack, in conjunction with the other armies, against the second position, on the 28th.

21. CORPS MISSIONS.—Each corps should be assigned a mission, each with a view to a coordination of effort to render successful the task of the army. The hill mass south of Gettysburg is the strongest feature of the hostile position. A direct assault would be costly. The efforts of the I and II Corps are so directed as to effect a penetration by each corps which tend to unite near the Conewago Creek. The ultimate effect of the efforts of the three corps will be the pinching out of the hill mass south of Gettysburg.

22. SECRECY.—The necessary surprise effect as to time, place, and weight of assault can be obtained only by moving troops into position at night. With modern means of observation, daylight movements will be disclosed early and the surprise effect lost. The difficulties inherent to movements by night must be overcome by careful reconnaissance of routes and positions and careful planning.

23. TIME OF ATTACK.—A decisive or successful attack on the 26th is obviously out of the question. Time is not available for the securing of jump-off positions sufficiently close to the enemy's position, for the necessary troop move-





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tions and as to the time required for supplies to reach the troops. The question of supply will not only dictate the time that an attack may be launched but it will dictate the nature and extent of the operations.

*b.* The provisions for Class I, II, III, and IV supplies are quite similar in an attack to those in an advance. The number of army depots is increased and they are located for the convenience of the troops that will draw supplies from them and of the railroad net.

*c.* Depots for the supply of ammunition and engineer supplies are placed well forward, and frequently it is desirable to provide one depot of each type for the use of each corps engaged as a front line unit. The depots for other supplies may be retained in the locations given for the advance, or moved to more forward locations. The principle to be followed is that the burden of supply must not be placed on the combat troops nor must corps and division supply agencies be required to travel unnecessary distances to obtain their supplies. The impetus in the movement of supplies should be given from the rear.

*d.* The army utilizes its medical service to direct the evacuation and hospitalization system throughout the army area, to furnish the necessary medical attendance to army troops, to reinforce the medical service of corps and divisions, and to provide for the movement and hospitalization of casualties between the hospital stations of divisions and the rear boundary of the army area. The evacuation of patients from the army area is ordinarily effected by means of hospital trains or improvised railway transportation.

*e.* The prompt salvage of equipment and material, which are partially worn out or abandoned, together with the use of captured material, makes available considerable quantities of supplies for issue to troops. Salvage operations in the army area are organized and executed under army headquarters. Corps and divisions are relieved of this work except during periods of stabilization. Army service troops, operating in the corps zone, collect the property to be salvaged. Articles which can not be repaired



within the army and which are not needed for reissue to troops are evacuated to railheads.

*f.* The heavy and continuous traffic to which roads in the army area are subjected requires complete and thorough traffic control. This control is exercised by a plan of traffic circulation based upon a thorough study of the capacity and condition of available roads. For purposes of supply and evacuation, traffic circulation forward and rearward is regulated with reference to the location of the front line divisions and the supply and evacuation establishments upon which the operations are based. The plan of circulation must conform to the principle that the requirements of the combat troops predominate. Tactical necessity may demand the utilization of roads without regard to the circulation enforced for supply and evacuation purposes.

*g.* The duties of the army engineer service include the procurement, storage, and issue of engineer supplies; the construction work involved in all projects within the army area, except telephone and telegraph lines; the operation of the general facilities for light and power; the maintenance of roads and railways; and the construction and operation of light railways. Just prior to and during an attack, the army engineers take over from the corps the maintenance of road work to well within the corps area.

*h.* The army quartermaster service procures, stores, and issues quartermaster supplies. It has available eight service battalions which are utilized as a general labor pool and to supply personnel for the operation of quartermaster depots. The army quartermaster train may be used as a link in the chain of supply or to move troops in connection with the attack.

*i.* The army ordnance service procures, stores, and issues ammunition and other ordnance supplies. In addition, it maintains and operates the ordnance repair agencies pertaining to the army.

*j.* The army signal service is charged with the procurement, storage, and issue of signal supplies, and with the con-



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struction, operation, and maintenance of army signal communication.

27. SITUATION.—See Section II of this chapter.

28. REQUIREMENT.—Prepare the administrative order of the First Army for the attack.

29. A SOLUTION.—The administrative order issued by the First Army for the attack is as follows:

First Army,  
WOODSBORO, MD.,  
26 November, 1926, 8:00 AM.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS }  
No 14 } To accompany *Field Orders No 12*, First Army.

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Gettysburg, Fairfield, Taneytown, Emmitsburg, Mount Airy, and Ijamsville quadrangles.

## 1. SUPPLY.

## a. Railheads.

Commencing, 7:00 AM, 27 November:

## (1) I Corps:

WESTMINSTER  
AVONDALE  
NEW WINDSOR  
KINGSDALE

## II Corps:

GALT  
TANEYTOWN  
UNION BRIDGE

## III Corps:

EMMITSBURG  
ST JOSEPHS ACADEMY  
BLUE RIDGE SUMMIT  
MONTEREY

## 11th Division:

DETOUR

## I Prov Cav Corps:

JACKS MOUNTAIN

## Army Troops:

UNION BRIDGE  
THURMONT  
WALKERSVILLE

## (2) Corps commanders will report assignments of railheads by 1:00 PM, 26 November.

## b. Class I supplies.

Distributing points for army troops. See *Annex No 1, Assignment Table* (omitted).

## c. Ammunition.

All classes:





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- (2) The number of cemeteries established by corps and divisions will be reduced to a minimum.

*c. Salvage.*

- |                   |                          |
|-------------------|--------------------------|
| (1) 701st Serv Bn | I Corps zone of action   |
| 702d Serv Bn      | II Corps zone of action  |
| 703d Serv Bn      | III Corps zone of action |
- (2) Reports of all salvage, to G-4, army, direct.

*d. Captured material.*

No change.\*

*e. Prisoners of war.*

- (1) Army enclosures:
- |           |                |
|-----------|----------------|
| I Corps   | No 2 LINWOOD   |
| II Corps  | No 1 WOODSBORO |
| III Corps | No 3 LOYS      |
- (2) Railheads:
- |      |           |
|------|-----------|
| No 1 | WOODSBORO |
| No 2 | LINWOOD   |
| No 3 | LOYS      |
- (3) Prisoners of war captured by I Prov Cav Corps will be turned over to most convenient infantry organization or to I Prov Cav Corps Rhd.
- (4) Evacuation from corps, divisions, and I Prov Cav Corps Rhd, by army.
- (5) Reports of captures will be made as of 12:00 noon daily, direct to G-1, army, by all divisions in direct contact with the enemy. Copy to corps concerned.

3. TRAFFIC.

*a. Circulation.*

- (1) Restrictions:
- (a) Army reserved motor roads: FREDERICK—WOODSBORO—TANEYTOWN;  
WESTMINSTER—TANEYTOWN—EMMITSBURG—ZORA—HIGHFIELD;  
FREDERICK—LIBERTYTOWN—NEW WINDSOR—WESTMINSTER;  
FREDERICK—THURMONT—EMMITSBURG.
- (b) The use of lights on vehicles is prohibited north of the LIBERTY TURNPIKE.
- (2) Control:
- (a) By army after 2:00 PM, 26 November, in the area south of the road: WESTMINSTER—EMMITSBURG—HIGHFIELD, inclusive.
- (b) By corps in their respective areas north of the road: WESTMINSTER—EMMITSBURG. Circulation along corps boundaries will be coordinated by mutual arrangement between corps concerned.
- (c) Troop movements by motor transport have priority on the army reserved roads after noon, 27 November.

*b. Construction and maintenance of routes:.*

- (1) By corps and divisions within their respective areas north of the road: WESTMINSTER—EMMITSBURG—HIGHFIELD, exclusive.

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\*Instructions pertaining to captured material were given in the administrative order for the advance of the First Army. There is no necessity for repeating them in this order.



## THE ARMY IN THE ATTACK

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(2) By army south of the road: WESTMINSTER—EMMITSBURG—HIGHFIELD, inclusive.

(3) The army engineers will relieve all corps troops on road work south of the road mentioned in paragraph b (1) above by 6:00 PM, 26 November, and will extend the railway sidings at the following points by 6:00 AM, 27 November: KINGSDALE, GALT, and DETOUR.

c. *Boundaries.*

Army service area:

North: WESTERN MARYLAND RR, inclusive.

South: no change.

4. TRAINS.

See *Annex No 5, Movement Order No 2* (omitted).

5. PERSONNEL.

*Stragglers:*

(a) The army provost marshal will coordinate straggler lines on corps boundaries.

(b) Frequent searches will be instituted in back areas of army and corps for stragglers.

By command of Gen A:

X,  
C of S.

OFFICIAL:

Z,  
G-4.

ANNEXES:

*Annex No 1—Assignment sheet, Class I supplies* (omitted).

*Annex No 2—Ammunition Plan* (omitted).

*Annex No 3—Engineer Plan* (omitted).

*Annex No 4—Medical Plan* (omitted).

*Annex No 5—Movement Order No 2* (omitted).

DISTRIBUTION: (omitted).

30. DISCUSSION.—a. *Railheads.*—A change in the assignment of railheads to corps and army troops for the attack is necessary due to a change in the locations of divisions and the forward movement of army troops. In assigning railheads to corps and army troops, it is desirable to provide a separate railhead for each division of the corps and one for corps troops. This was not possible for the II and III Corps due to lack of suitable railway siding capacity at a number of the railway stations.

b. *Class I supplies.*—The administrative order should inform the army troops as to the location of the distributing points from which they will draw Class I supplies. This may be accomplished by designating a definite locality and the hour for each service to draw supplies or this informa-



tion may be contained in an assignment table and published as an annex to the administrative order.

*c. Ammunition.*—In this situation, it is advisable to establish promptly an army ammunition depot for each corps and the army troops within the corps area. G-4 of the army would take action towards the location of these depots prior to the issue of the administrative order, so that the corps and divisions would not be delayed unnecessarily in starting the accumulation of ammunition in forward areas for the attack. The location of these depots is dependent upon the railway facilities available.

*d. Other supplies.*—(1) Engineer and medical depots are established forward of those given in the administrative order for the advance, as the need for these supplies by the divisions and corps will be such as to place an unnecessary burden on these units if required to use the depots previously established.

(2) The locations of the other supply depots are suitable for the early stages of the attack. As the attack goes forward, it will probably be necessary to establish additional depots at more forward locations.

*e. Evacuation.*—The points selected for the evacuation of men and animals are conveniently located with respect to the corps and divisions. One evacuation point for men is provided for each corps and for the army troops in that vicinity, to reduce the time required in evacuating wounded to the rear and the haul by army ambulances.

*f. Traffic.*—(1) Circulation.—With the excellent road net available in the army service area, there is no necessity for issuing an army circulation map.

(2) Restriction.—The designation of certain roads as army reserved motor roads provides restricted routes for motor vehicles and facilitates the supply and the troop movement by trucks within the army area.

(3) Control.—The responsibility for control of traffic is definitely fixed and is given to the unit primarily concerned.

(4) Construction and maintenance of routes.—The taking over by the army of the maintenance of roads to





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fensive combat. Reconnaissance around the enemy's flank serves to gain early information of hostile dispositions and movements on the flank and gains time for the other elements composing the army to make and execute plans to overcome these dispositions and to meet these movements. Counterreconnaissance serves to prevent hostile ground reconnaissance agencies from gaining early information of the dispositions made by the army and of the movements of its elements on that flank. Offensive combat accompanies either reconnaissance or counterreconnaissance activities in order to assure the efficacy of those operations. Defensive combat accompanies counterreconnaissance or is engaged in for the purpose of delaying movements of enemy forces which threaten the flank of the army. During the battle, the army cavalry applies the same principles in its reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, and combat activities that it applies in similar operations during the advance.

*c.* During the battle, the army cavalry which is protecting a flank frequently renders assistance to the infantry elements of the army on that flank by maneuvering against and attacking enemy resistance and movements. When the mission of assisting the attack of the infantry elements on the flank of the army during the battle is assigned to the army cavalry, it concentrates its strength in close proximity to those elements and operates in close tactical unity with them.

*d.* When, for any reason, a portion or all of the army cavalry is not needed as a covering force on the flank during battle, it is held in rear of the main forces in such location that it can be used to best advantage to support the attack of the army. Thus it becomes a reserve, which, due to its characteristics of a relatively high degree of mobility, is able to intervene in the battle at the most opportune time and places to assist the attack.

*e.* Whether it is covering a flank during battle, participating in the battle, or being held as a mobile reserve, the army cavalry constantly holds itself in readiness to assist the army in the exploitation of any success that may result from the battle. Plans for pursuit and for the ex-



exploitation of possible breaches in the enemy's dispositions are prepared in order that time may not be lost in following up a victory.

32. SITUATION, CONTINUED, AND FIRST REQUIREMENT.

—*a. The cavalry corps.*—At 7:00 PM, 24 November, the chief of staff of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps transmitted instructions to the division commanders directing that they turn over to the cavalry attached to the I and II Corps before daylight, 25 November, their missions of reconnaissance in the zones of the I and II Corps; that all reconnaissance agencies of the 1st Cavalry Division be withdrawn from the zone of the II Corps by daylight, 25 November; and that the 2d Cavalry Division move, at 7:00 AM, 25 November, to the area: crossroads 493—Liberty Mills—road junction 496, exercising the greatest care to prevent conflict with the leading elements of the infantry of the army whose advance guards would be north of the line: Littlestown—Fairplay, during 25 November.

*b. The 1st Cavalry Division until 12:00 noon.*—At 8:00 PM, 24 November, the commander of the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry (attached to the II Corps), visited the command post of the 1st Cavalry Division at Palmer, informed the division commander that his squadron was moving to the vicinity of Harney during the night, and arranged to send out from his new bivouac area at 4:00 AM, 25 November, patrols to take over reconnaissance along the line: St Luke's Church, exclusive—Greenmount, inclusive. By 6:00 AM, 25 November, all elements of the 1st Cavalry Division had been withdrawn from the zone of the II Corps and at that hour, the 1st Cavalry Division moved to attack the Red cavalry in its front. By 12:00 noon, it was in possession of the line: McCleary School ridge, exclusive—road junction 705—McGinley Hill. It was in contact with infantry elements of the III Corps which had arrived on the McCleary School ridge.

*c. The 2d Cavalry Division until 12:00 noon.*—At 10:00 PM, 24 November, the commanders of the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, and of the 5th Cavalry visited the command post of the 2d Cavalry Division at Washington School. The com-



mander of the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, informed the division commander of the location of his squadron at Harney, of his arrangements to relieve elements of the 1st Cavalry Division in the zone of the II Corps during the night, and arranged for the relief of units of the 2d Cavalry Division, less 3d Cavalry Brigade, in the zone of the II Corps by 6:00 AM, 25 November. The commander of the 5th Cavalry informed the division commander that his regiment, less 2d Squadron, was then en route to the vicinity of road junction 629 (365.8-737.0). He arranged to send out, from that vicinity, at 4:00 AM, 25 November, patrols to take over reconnaissance along the line: Hanover—St Lukes Church, both inclusive. By 7:00 AM, 25 November, all elements of the 2d Cavalry Division, less 3d Cavalry Brigade, in the zone of the I Corps were assembled in the vicinity of Washington School. At that hour, the division moved in small columns on Emmitsburg and at 12:00 noon, was in the area: crossroads 493—Liberty Mills—road junction 496.

*d. Afternoon, 25 November.*—During the afternoon, 25 November, the entire I Provisional Cavalry Corps was used in a further attack against the Red cavalry which was located between McCleary School and South Mountain.

*e. Situation at 5:00 PM, 25 November.*—At 5:00 PM, 25 November, Lieutenant General C was at his command post at Liberty Hall School. At that hour he was in possession of information as follows:

The Red cavalry opposing the I Provisional Cavalry Corps had been forced back to the general line: high ground just southwest of road junction 470—BM 558—Wilson Hill, and was intrenching along that line. Prisoners had been captured from the Red 1st Cavalry Division who stated that their division was the only cavalry unit on the Red right flank. The I Provisional Cavalry Corps held the line: McCleary School ridge, exclusive—road junction 668—crossroads 665, with divisions abreast; 2d Cavalry Division, less 3d Cavalry Brigade, on the right; boundary between divisions the line: road junction 543—crossroads 656—road junction 676—BM 558, all to the 1st Cavalry Division. The 2d Cavalry Brigade was in corps reserve in the area: cross-





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his chief of staff to prepare the orders for the operation of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps on 26 November:

*i. First requirement.*—Prepare the formal written field order for the operations of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps on 26 November, 1926.

33. A SOLUTION OF FIRST REQUIREMENT.—The formal written field order for the operations of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps on 26 November is as follows:

I Provisional Cavalry Corps,  
LIBERTY HALL SCHOOL, PA.,  
25 November, 1926, 9:30 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }  
No 10 }

Maps: General Map, Gettysburg, 1 inch = 5 miles. Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Fairfield quadrangle.

1. *a.* Hostile cavalry, identified as the Red 1st Cavalry Division, is intrenching along the general line: high ground just southwest of road junction 470—BM 558—WILSON HILL. Small patrols, only, are operating in the vicinity of ORRTANNA. Red infantry occupies the line: road junction 575—PITZER SCHOOL.
- b.* The advance elements of the III Corps hold the MCCLEARY SCHOOL ridge and are in contact with hostile infantry along their front. The cavalry of the Third Army has reached CHAMBERSBURG. The advance of our army continues. The air force of the First Army delays the advance of Red troops from HARRISBURG and CARLISLE, reconnoiters from the CONEWAGO CREEK to the line: HARRISBURG—CARLISLE, and transmits information directly to us.
2. The I Provisional Cavalry Corps, reinforced by the 912th Field Artillery (75-mm. gun *portée*), will attack at 6:00 AM, 26 November, to secure the line: road junction 470—road junction 516—crossroads 498—crossroads 647—road junction 632—ORRTANNA.  
Formation: divisions abreast, 2d Cavalry Division on the right. Right boundary: road junction 650—road junction 516, both inclusive.  
Boundary between divisions: road junction 543—crossroads 656—road junction 604—road junction 676—BM 558—KNOXLYN, all to 1st Cavalry Division.
3. *a.* The 2d Cavalry Division, less detachments, making its main effort with its left, will secure the line: road junction 516, inclusive—crossroads 647, exclusive. It will assist the 1st Cavalry Division on its left and maintain connection with the elements of the III Corps.
- b.* The 1st Cavalry Division, with the 912th Field Artillery (75-mm. gun *portée*) attached, will envelop the hostile right and secure the line: crossroads 647, inclusive—road junction 632—ORRTANNA, inclusive.
- c.* One squadron from the 1st Cavalry Division and one squadron from the 2d Cavalry Division will await orders along RATTLING RUN east of crossroads 613 as corps reserve.
- x.* All movements of troops in preparation for the attack will be completed by 5:00 AM, 26 November. Every precaution will be taken to insure secrecy.



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4. See *Administrative Orders No 12*.

5. *a.* Axes of signal communication:

I Provisional Cavalry Corps: LIBERTY HALL SCHOOL—road junction 676.

2d Cavalry Division: road junction 705—BM 558.

1st Cavalry Division: crossroads 613—road junction 668.

*b.* Command posts:

I Provisional Cavalry Corps: LIBERTY HALL SCHOOL.

2d Cavalry Division: road junction 705.

1st Cavalry Division: crossroads 613.

C,  
Lieutenant General.

Distribution:

1st Cav Div

2d Cav Div

III Corps

First Army

First Army Air Force

Third Army.

### 34. SITUATION, CONTINUED, AND SECOND REQUIREMENT.

—*a.* *Cavalry corps until 2:00 PM, 26 November.*—The I Provisional Cavalry Corps attacked the Red cavalry in its front at 6:00 AM, 26 November, 1926, and by 9:00 AM all units were in possession of the objectives assigned them. The elements of the III Corps which were on the McCleary School ridge assisted the attack and advanced with it to the vicinity of road junction 516. A stationary screen was then established by the cavalry corps with advance detachments along the general line: road junction 516, inclusive—crossroads 498—crossroads 647—road junction 632—Orrtanna, inclusive. The 2d Cavalry Division, less 3d Cavalry Brigade, with the 702d Observation Squadron, attached, was charged with screening between road junction 516, inclusive, and crossroads 647, exclusive. The 1st Cavalry Division, less 2d Cavalry Brigade, with the 701st Observation Squadron attached, was charged with screening between crossroads 647 and Orrtanna, both inclusive. At 2:00 PM, the main body of the 2d Cavalry Division is in the ravine south of BM 558. The 702d Observation Squadron is operating from an airdrome at Emmitsburg. At the same hour, the main body of the 1st Cavalry Division is along Muddy Run north of Sugarloaf. The 701st Observation Squadron is operating from an airdrome at Emmits-



burg. The 2d Cavalry Brigade, in corps reserve, is in the vicinity of crossroads 630. The 912th Field Artillery (75-mm. gun, *portée*) is on the roads in the vicinity of road junction 668. The command post of the corps opened at Fairfield at 12:00 noon.

*b. Reconnaissance.*—Prior to the attack of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps, the reconnaissance detachment which was at Mt Pleasant School at 6:00 PM, 25 November, covered the movement of the 2d Cavalry Brigade into an attack position northwest of Orrtanna. During the attack it continued reconnaissance in the direction of McKnightstown from the vicinity of road junction 713. At 12:00 noon, vigorous reaction of the Red cavalry to the presence of this detachment forced it to withdraw to the vicinity of crossroads 787 where it is located at 2:00 PM, with a large patrol operating towards McKnightstown.

*c. Red situation at 2:00 PM, 26 November.*—At 2:00 PM, 26 November, detachments of the Red cavalry division are disposed along the general line: road junction 527—Knoxlyn—high ground west of Tillie (McKnightstown Sta). These detachments are in contact with Red infantry on their left in the vicinity of road junction 527. A concentration, estimated as a brigade of cavalry, is in the vicinity of Seven Stars. Red artillery is in position southeast of road junction 617. The attitude of the Red cavalry is that of counter-reconnaissance.

*d. Conference at 2:00 PM, 26 November.*—At 2:00 PM, 26 November, 1926, the commanders of the III Corps and of the 12th Division conferred with the commander of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps at his command post at Fairfield. He was informed that the III Corps would begin its movement into attack positions at 6:00 PM, 26 November, and that the III Corps would attack on 27 November with divisions abreast, 12th Division on the left. The details of the movement of the 12th Division into its attack position were carefully arranged. It was decided that the line: road junction 516—crossroads 647, would be used as the line of departure of the 12th Division and that upon the arrival





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3. *a.* The 1st Cavalry Division with the 701st and 702d Observation Squadrons, the 2d Field Artillery Battalion (horse), and the 912th Field Artillery (75-mm. gun, *portée*), attached, will attack at 6:00 AM, 27 November, in conjunction with the attack of the III Corps. It will make its main effort with its right, cover the movements of elements of the III Corps, and assist the attack of the 12th Division. It will secure the high ground north and east of ARENDSVILLE and observe the passes of SOUTH MOUNTAIN north of ORRTANNA.
- b.* Upon the arrival of the leading elements of the III Corps upon the line: road junction 516—crossroads 647, the 2d Cavalry Division, less 3d Brigade and 2d Field Artillery Battalion, will move to the vicinity of crossroads 665 and there await orders as corps reserve. It will maintain contact with the cavalry of the Third Army at Chambersburg.
- x.* Special efforts will be made to keep the enemy in ignorance of troop movements in preparation for the attack and to prevent conflict with the movements of elements of the III Corps into attack positions.
4. See *Administrative Orders No 13*.
5. *a.* Axes of signal communication:
  - I Provisional Cavalry Corps: FAIRFIELD—MCKNIGHTSTOWN—ARENDSVILLE.
  - 1st Cavalry Division: road junction 668—TILLIE—crossroads 671—road junction 693.
- b.* Command posts:
  - I Provisional Cavalry Corps: FAIRFIELD.
  - 1st Cavalry Division: road junction 668.
  - 2d Cavalry Division: crossroads 665.

C,  
Lieutenant General.

## Distribution:

1st Cav Div  
2d Cav Div  
III Corps  
12th Div  
First Army  
Third Army.

36. DISCUSSION.—*a. Concentration.*—Although the detachments of the 2d Cavalry Division are relieved during the night of 24-25 November, the movement of the main body does not begin before 7:00 AM, 25 November, due to the necessity for rest for both men and animals. This movement, executed during the morning, is completed by noon, 25 November, in such manner as not to interfere with the advance of the elements of the III Corps.

*b. Reconnaissance and combat.*—Prior to the completion of the concentration of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps on 25 November, the 1st Cavalry Division, by maneuver and



combat, drives back the advance elements of the Red cavalry and captures terrain which materially assists the combat operations of the corps as a whole during the afternoon of 25 November. By 5:00 PM, this operation has ceased. By that hour, the leading elements of the III Corps have arrived on a line to the east of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps. While the operations conducted during the day have resulted in the capture of considerable terrain by the army cavalry, the Red cavalry is in possession of the most dominant terrain feature in the region east of the mountains. Blue reconnaissance is being seriously interfered with by the enemy's possession of this terrain. Reconnaissance and combat have disclosed that this terrain feature is being organized for defense by the Red cavalry division. A maneuver directed against the Red right flank by the Blue army may be impeded seriously or entirely stopped if the Red cavalry remains in possession of this high ground.

*c. Decision, 25 November.*—At 5:00 PM, 25 November, the commander of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps appreciates the advantages that may accrue to the First Army as a whole by the possession of the commanding terrain held by the enemy's cavalry. Recognizing, however, that the result of an operation of such magnitude as an attack to capture this terrain may have far reaching effects on the future operations of the army, which at this time are unknown to him, he takes the necessary steps to inform the army commander of his decision and to ask for approval thereof. Having received this approval, he asks for and receives such additional means as he considers necessary for the carrying out of his plans and arranges the details of the operation of his own force with those of other services concerned so as to obtain the maximum coordination of the efforts of all.

*d. Orders for the attack, 26 November.*—(1) The orders for the attack provide for a scheme of maneuver for the I Provisional Cavalry Corps and for a main blow to be delivered by one of its units. Schemes of maneuver are indicated for each subordinate unit and provision is made for the coordination of the efforts of all.



(2) Maximum fire support for the attack of the main blow is provided for by attaching to the unit ordered to make the envelopment the regiment of *portée* artillery.

(3) The scheme of maneuver adopted in this situation permits the use of the ability of cavalry to maneuver rapidly over considerable distances so as to strike the enemy at a time and in a direction which is most disadvantageous to him.

(4) Surprise is sought by requiring all troops to move into positions for the attack under the cover of darkness, thus attempting to conceal the nature of the operation and the place where and the time at which the blow will fall.

*e. Mission just prior to and during the attack of the army.*—The mission assigned the I Provisional Cavalry Corps by the army commander in his orders for the attack of the army requires it to screen and protect the movements of the III Corps and to assist its attack. Also, it is ordered to secure terrain from which it will be able to initiate future operations in furtherance of the activities of the army subsequent to the attack.

*f. Covering operations.*—The action of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps in securing the high ground between McCleary School and Orrtanna on 26 November placed it in a most advantageous position from which to execute the orders of the army commander. Its dispositions subsequent to its attack, made primarily to protect the III Corps against hostile ground reconnaissance agencies, partake much of the nature of an active defense since the forward elements consist of detachments with considerable resisting power, placed on terrain which is favorable to defense and so supported by the location of reserves that prompt and vigorous counterattacks can be made for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the screen. Through these dispositions and by opportune use of his reserves, the commander of the army cavalry screens and protects the movements of the III Corps into attack positions and assures to it the possession of a favorable line of departure for its attack.





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(2) Maximum fire support for the attack of the main blow is provided for by attaching to the unit ordered to make the envelopment the regiment of *portée* artillery.

(3) The scheme of maneuver adopted in this situation permits the use of the ability of cavalry to maneuver rapidly over considerable distances so as to strike the enemy at a point in a direction which is most disadvantageous to him.

It is sought by requiring all troops to move for the attack under the cover of darkness, to conceal the nature of the operation and the time at which the blow will fall.

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

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[REDACTED]



*g. Arrangement of details.*—Unless the details of the operations of the III Corps and of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps are carefully coordinated in advance, conflicting movements may result in inextricable confusion. The commanders of the two forces, by exchanges of ideas prior to the issuance of their respective attack orders, are able to embody in those orders such provisions as will assure cooperation.

*h. Orders for the operations on 27 November.*—(1) The orders for the operations of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps on 27 November contain sufficient information of the hostile force and of the locations and operations of neighboring elements of the First Army to enable subordinate commanders to plan their operations so as to give protection and assistance to the III Corps without conflicting with its operations.

(2) The unit designated to make the attack is given all the available fire power with the corps.

(3) By holding, with elements of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps, a favorable line of departure for the 12th Division, the movements of that unit prior to its attack are effectively covered and it is assisted in making its preparations for the attack.

(4) A consideration of the strength and dispositions of the Red cavalry in front of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps indicates the holding of a small reserve. However, the attack of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps is not the only factor to be considered at this time. The assigned mission requires it to cover the movements of the III Corps and to assist the attack of that unit. Although the attack is so planned and coordinated with the attack of the 12th Division that assistance will be given to that unit in the early stages of the action, unforeseen situations may arise later which may require that the commander of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps give active and prompt assistance to the 12th Division. For this reason, a brigade is held in reserve.



## SECTION VII

## The Army Artillery in the Attack

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Situation and requirement -----	38
A solution -----	39
Discussion -----	40

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37. PRINCIPLES.—*a. Artillery attached to armies.*—Artillery attached to armies from the general headquarters reserve may be used under the direct control of the army or it may be attached to corps. It is unusual for the army to retain any artillery under its direct control other than long range weapons which are capable of covering the front of more than one corps.

*b. Functions of army artillery.*—The army artillery, less antiaircraft artillery, is employed on missions of particular importance to the army and on those which necessitate the employment of heavy calibers. It executes long range missions of all kinds, including harassing and interdiction fires, fires for destruction on important points deep within the enemy's lines, and counterbattery beyond the range and capabilities of the corps artillery. Army artillery furnishes a means of fire reinforcement under control of the army commander and may be employed by him to obtain fire superiority through the concentration of its fire on such parts of the battlefield as he desires. Some units of army artillery which are retained under army control may be ordered to reinforce the fires of the artillery with designated corps.

*c. Positions.*—In general, on the offensive the army artillery is located as far forward as safety permits and suitable positions are available.

*d. Time element.*—Heavy artillery is of low tactical mobility and requires considerable time for emplacement. These are important considerations in all initial movements into or changes of position; hence, orders must be issued





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principal army staff officers, and was informed of the details for the attack which would appear in *Field Orders No 12*, First Army, 26 November, 1926. He was informed that the attack order would be issued at 8:00 AM, 26 November, and was directed to have the artillery annex to the attack order prepared in time for it to accompany the attack order.

*d. Requirement.*—Prepare the artillery annex (No 3) to accompany *Field Orders No 12*, First Army.

39. A SOLUTION.—The following artillery annex was prepared:

### ANNEX NO 3 TO *FIELD ORDERS NO 12*, FIRST ARMY ARTILLERY

First Army,  
WOODSBORO, MD.,  
26 November, 1926, 8:00 AM.

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Gettysburg, Fairfield, Taneytown, and Emmitsburg quadrangles.

1. *a. Corps artillery.*—(1) Attachments:

911th Field Artillery to the III Corps, effective at once.

912th Field Artillery to the I Provisional Cavalry Corps, effective at once.

913th Field Artillery to the II Corps. It will come under control of the II Corps, at HARNEY at 9:15 PM, 26 November.

(2) Contingent zones will include:

(a) For the I Corps artillery, three battalions of howitzers and one battalion of 155-mm. guns, to fire as far west as the line: WHITE RUN—GRANITE HILL.

(b) For the II Corps artillery, four battalions of howitzers and one battalion of 155-mm. guns, to fire as far west as MCPHERSON RIDGE.

(3) Flash ranging services of adjacent corps will be coordinated by corps commanders concerned.

(4) Corps antiaircraft artillery will cover troops and establishments north of the general line: SILVER RUN (Village)—GALT (KUMP PO)—EMMITSBURG. The II Corps will locate two gun batteries well forward on the general line: ASHGROVE SCHOOL—MOUNTJOY CHURCH. Corps on right and left will coordinate therewith.

*b. Army artillery.*—(1) Groupment A will execute the fires prescribed below from positions in the general vicinity of OAK GROVE SCHOOL. See *Annex No 1, Location of army artillery* (omitted). It will be prepared to reinforce the fires of the artillery with the I and II Corps. It will move into position *via* the road: MAYBERRY—MARKERS MILL—PINEY CREEK (Village)—OAKGROVE SCHOOL, under the control of respective corps commanders. Except as authorized in paragraph 1 *x* (1), movements will be restricted to south of PINEY CREEK (Village) until 5:45 PM, 26 November.



## THE ARMY IN THE ATTACK

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- (2) Groupment B will support the III Corps from positions in the general vicinity of FAIRPLAY. See *Annex No 1, Location of army artillery* (omitted). It will be prepared to reinforce the fires of the artillery with the III Corps. It will interdict the GETTYSBURG-HARRISBURG RR north of GETTYSBURG after 5:00 AM, 27 November. Its movement into position will be under the control of the Commanding General, III Corps. Except as authorized in paragraph 1 *x* (1), movements will be restricted to south of the road: TANEYTOWN—EMMITSBURG, until 5:45 PM, 26 November.
  - (3) Army artillery will assist corps in counterbattery work on call.
  - (4) For details of fires, see *Annex No 2, Objectives for army artillery*.
  - (5) The 701st Coast Artillery Brigade (antiaircraft), with the 951st Coast Artillery attached, will cover troops and establishments south of the general line: SILVER RUN (village)—GALT (KUMP PO)—EMMITSBURG, with particular attention to supply establishments in the vicinity of KEYMAR, WOODSBORO, and FREDERICK.
- x. General instructions.*—(1) Positions will be occupied during the night, 26-27 November. Reconnaissance parties and working parties preparing positions may operate during daylight, 26 November. These parties will be reduced to a minimum in personnel, and every precaution will be taken to avoid hostile observation.
- (2) The artillery preparation will commence at 5:00 AM. Prior to that time fires will be reduced to the most urgent requirements.
  - (3) Within their respective zones of action, corps commanders will place concentrations of persistent gas on ROUND TOP (hill), LITTLE ROUND TOP, POWERS HILL, and WOLF HILL from 3:00 AM to 6:30 AM, 27 November. Beginning at 6:30 AM, hostile observation from these hills will be blinded by smoke. Nonpersistent gas will be used on ST LUKES CHURCH.
  - (4) Corps commanders are authorized to employ smoke and nonpersistent gas within their respective zones of action.
  - (5) Care will be taken not to destroy by artillery fire roads and bridges that will be used by our troops in the advance.

2. *Command posts.*

First Army Artillery: no change.  
 Groupment A: OAKGROVE SCHOOL.  
 Groupment B: FAIRPLAY.

By command of General A:

X,  
 Chief of Staff.

Official:  
 Y,  
 G-3.

## Annexes:

No 1—*Location of Army Artillery* (omitted).  
 No 2—*Objectives for Army Artillery*.



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Annex No 2 to Annex No 3 to Field Orders No 12, First Army  
OBJECTIVES FOR ARMY ARTILLERY

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62,500, Special Map.

	No of pieces	Period of fire	General location of objectives (numbers refer to objectives on Special Map)		
Groupment A: 5-mm. guns	8	H—1 to H+1 hr	1	NEW OXFORD and points on W.M.R.R.	Interdiction
	4	H—1 to H+1 hr	2	BERLIN JUNCTION.	Interdiction
	4	H—1 to H+1 hr	3	BRUSH RUN (village).	Interdiction
	4	H—1 to H+1 hr	4	GRANITE HILL STA and points on W.M. R.R.	Interdiction
	4	H—1 to H+1 hr	5	GULDENS.	Interdiction
	4	H—1 to H+1 hr	6	MT. VERNON SCHOOL.	Neutralizati
	4	H—1 to H+2 hrs	18	CULPS HILL.	Neutralizati
	4	H+1 to H+1½ hrs	8	POWERS HILL.	Neutralizati
	8	H+1 to H+1½ hrs	16	WOLF HILL.	Neutralizati
	4	H+1 to H+2 hrs	11	ROCKY GROVE SCHOOL ridge.	Neutralizati
Groupment B: 5-mm. guns	4	H—1 to H hr	7	ROUND TOP (hill).	Neutralizati
	4	H—1 to H+1 hr	21	Hill 523.	Neutralizati
	4	H—1 to H hr	12	Hostile organization west of ROUND TOP (hill).	Neutralizati
	4	H—1 to H+½ hr	13	PEACH ORCHARD.	Neutralizati
	4	H—1 to H+1 hr	14	TANEYTOWN ROAD.	Interdiction
	4	H—1 to H+1 hr	15	EMMITSBURG ROAD.	Interdiction
	4	H+1 to H+2 hrs	17	CEMETERY HILL.	Neutralizati
	8	H+1 to H+3 hrs	20	HARRISBURG ROAD.	Interdiction
	4	H+1 to H+3 hrs	31	CARLISLE ROAD.	Interdiction
	4	H—1 to H hr	25	Hostile organization in vicinity of PITZER SCHOOL.	Neutralizati
	4	H—1 to H+½ hr	26	Valley of WILLOUGHBY RUN.	Neutralizati
	4	H—1 to H+½ hr	9	ROUND TOP (village).	Neutralizatio
	4	H—1 to H hr	27	Hostile organization in vicinity of RJ 473.	Neutralizatio
	8	H to H+1 hr	28	MCPHERSON RIDGE.	Neutralizatio
	8	H+½ hr to H+2 hrs	29	HERR RIDGE.	Neutralizatio
	4	H—1 to H hr	10	LITTLE ROUND TOP.	Neutralizatio
	8	H—1 to H+1 hr	22	GETTYSBURG.	Interdiction
	4	H—1 to H+1 hr	23	Ravine southwest of GETTYSBURG.	Neutralizatio
	4	H—1 to H+3 hrs	24	Woods northwest of GETTYSBURG	Neutralizatio
	4	H+½ to H+3 hrs	22	GETTYSBURG.	Interdiction
0-mm. how	4	H+1 to H+3 hrs	30	OAK RIDGE.	Neutralizatio
	4	H+1 to H+2 hrs	19	SEMINARY RIDGE.	Neutralizatio

40. DISCUSSION.—*a. Purpose of annex.*—The artillery annex to the army field order is prepared by the army chief of artillery in his capacity as a staff officer of the army commander. It amplifies the prescriptions of paragraph 3 *e* of the army field order, gives details of the employment of the army artillery, and places certain restrictions upon corps commanders in the use of the artillery with their corps.

*b. Form of annex.*—The annex may consist of maps, charts, tables, written annexes, or all of these. It should be as short as possible and should avoid repeating information and orders which appear in the field order.

*c. Organization.*—Since the organization of Groupment A and Groupment B has been in effect for some time, it is not repeated. The attachment of the *portée* artillery to





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these positions, due regard must be given to the needs of the corps and division artillery. In general, on the offensive the army artillery is located as far forward as safety permits and suitable positions are available. It must not be thought that the division, corps, and army artillery are found located in three lines, one behind the other. On the contrary, some of the units of army artillery may be well advanced, even as far to the front as some of the division artillery.

*g. Movement into position.*—(1) Unusually heavy demands are being made on the road system in order to prepare for the attack. The army commander has found it necessary to authorize daylight movement of all units except of divisions. It would not be desirable to occupy firing positions during daylight, but authority is given in the artillery annex to make the necessary reconnaissance and to prepare positions during daytime, and the regiments of army artillery are permitted to move out of their present bivouac areas before, but are required to remain in rear of designated points until after 5:45 PM. The placing of this amount of artillery in position in one night will be a difficult operation, but the arrangements which have been made should permit its accomplishment.

(2) The roads will be used during the 26th by corps troops and during the night of 26-27 November by corps and divisions. The movements of the army artillery must be coordinated with these movements. It has, therefore, been prescribed that the army artillery will move under the control of the corps commanders concerned. Groupment A is located in the zones of action of the I and the II Corps; the point where the movement of the 931st Field Artillery will come under control of the II Corps will be decided by agreement between the commanders of the I and II Corps.













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## SECTION VIII

## The Army Air Force in the Attack

	Paragraph
Principles -----	41
Situation and requirement -----	42
A solution -----	43
Discussion -----	44

---

41. PRINCIPLES.—*a. Attack aviation.*—So far as the employment of the army air force is concerned, it is governed essentially by the characteristics of attack aviation. The pursuit units normally support either the attack group or the observation group. This support usually is accomplished by offensive action of an unrestricted nature, but at times it may be given in the form of close support. However, it is the attack group which usually determines the rôle of the air force as a whole.

*b. Objectives of attack.*—In selecting the objectives of attack aviation, it is important that the situation be regarded from the point of view of the army as a whole. The assignment of attack aviation to subordinate units for specific battlefield missions may occur at times; but this should be done only when such a course meets the greatest danger threatening the success of the army commander's plan. In determining the missions suitable for the attack group, its characteristics must be borne in mind. It is especially valuable for the delay of columns and for the attack of assembled bodies of troops. Due to the great moral effect of mass attacks, the employment of the group as a whole should be the rule for all sorties.

42. SITUATION AND REQUIREMENT.—*a. Events of 25 November.*—On 25 November, the First Army Air Force continued its operations with the same general missions as on 24 November. Observation was carried out as ordered. The pursuit group continued its sorties in search of hostile observation aircraft. The attack group remained on the alert to answer calls by the cavalry for support. The ac-



tivities of the Blue 1st Air Division continued throughout the day, so that the air situation remained unchanged, and the First Army Air Force was not interfered with by the Red air force. During the afternoon, a call for support came from the I Provisional Cavalry Corps. The 701st Attack Group again took off and participated in the attack against the Red cavalry, which was located between McCleary School and South Mountain. During the day, the airdromes of the First Army Air Force were advanced north of Big Pipe Creek.

*b. Conference and plan.*—Brigadier General D, commanding the First Army Air Force, was present at the conference at Woodsboro at 11:00 PM, 25 November. He read the warning order for the pending attack, and received the information in regard to the contemplated attack of the I Provisional Cavalry Corps. He was then called upon for his recommendations for the employment of the army air force.

*c. Requirement.*—The recommendations of the army air force commander.

43. A SOLUTION.—The army air force commander recommends that the army air force:

*a.* Reconnoiter in the army zone of action, north of the line of Conewago Creek and south of the line: Harrisburg—Carlisle, and maintain constant observation of the Red troops advancing from Harrisburg and from Carlisle. Special photographic reconnaissance to be made of position north of Conewago Creek both on the morning and afternoon of the 26th.

*b.* Delay the movement of the Red troops advancing from Harrisburg and Carlisle, beginning the morning of 26 November.

44. DISCUSSION.—*a. Observation aviation.*—Reconnaissance by the army air force, which has, of course, been maintained during the advance, should be continued. Its zone of action will ordinarily be conterminous with the area in which the army commander is primarily responsible for gathering information, and in which he is particularly interested. In this situation, the army commander is es-





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to the First Army is apt to come from that direction. Moreover, the advance of the Third Army on 26 November may be expected to neutralize all Red activity in the Cumberland Valley. Accordingly, the first plan may be dismissed without further consideration.

(3) The plan of supporting the III Corps has the obvious advantage that it will add weight to the main blow, which can never be too strong. However, it fails to take advantage of the peculiar characteristics of attack aviation, which is especially effective against columns and troops in mass.

(4) The Red troops advancing from Harrisburg and Carlisle can reach the battlefield, if unmolested, by the afternoon of 27 November. The First Army commander can scarcely hope to finish the battle which he is beginning at 6:00 AM, 27 November, before the evening of 28 November. Accordingly, these Red troops may intervene in the fight, if permitted freedom of action. Their exact strength is not as yet known, and the determination of this, together with a continuous surveillance of these columns, is an important mission for the observation group. However, the Blue army's margin of superiority in divisions is not very great. If these two columns should consist of a division each, they would reduce the Blue margin by one-half, and might bring the Blue attack to a halt. For these reasons, it appears that the best employment of the attack group consists in using it to delay these divisions. Furthermore, such action is particularly suited to the powers and limitations of attack aviation.

(5) The plan of supporting the cavalry operations would, of course, interfere with the delaying attacks on the Red infantry columns. Furthermore, in this situation, the I Provisional Cavalry Corps has adequate means for executing its mission, without the support of the First Army Air Force.

(6) It should be remembered in this connection that a decision to employ the attack group for delaying the Red troops from Harrisburg and Carlisle is not irrevocable; it does not bind it to this mission for the entire duration of













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the battle. One of the advantages of attack aviation as a reserve lies in the fact that when committed to action, it is not removed for days at a time from the army commander's immediate control. Thus, if it should develop that the III Corps needed the support of attack aviation in the battle, the latter could be diverted to this mission within an hour or two.

*c. Pursuit aviation.*—The offensive of the 1st Air Division has removed the gravest danger to successful Blue air operations. Nevertheless, it may be anticipated that the Red pursuit units, even though badly crippled, will attempt to combat the assaults of the Blue attack group. Great pressure will assuredly be brought to bear by the advancing Red troops on the Red higher command to secure protection from air attacks. Accordingly, the 701st Pursuit Group should support the attack group in all of its operations, to prevent interference by Red pursuit aviation. In many of the sorties, especially the earlier ones, it is probable that Blue attack aviation will be unopposed. Under these circumstances, the Blue pursuit group might itself profitably attack ground troops upon completion of its mission of protection. This employment of pursuit aviation, though admissible in this situation, must be regarded as exceptional. The pursuit group will, of course, continue to attack Red observation airplanes wherever found.



CHAPTER V

The Corps in the Attack\*

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III.—A Solution -----	8
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SECTION I

General Discussion

	Paragraph
Army plan of attack -----	1
Corps plan of attack -----	2
Scheme of maneuver -----	3
Coordination of the attack -----	4
Security -----	5

1. ARMY PLAN OF ATTACK.—The army plan, as embodied in the army attack order, indicates the army mission and missions for its corps, and prescribes for the latter the direction of the main effort, the time of attack, line of departure, zone of action, artillery support, and such other matters as may be pertinent to the situation.

2. CORPS PLAN OF ATTACK.—The corps is so designed as to further the army plan in the fullest measure. This involves the organization of a scheme of maneuver that is calculated to give the greatest results, initially from the corps viewpoint, and ultimately from the army viewpoint.

3. SCHEME OF MANEUVER.—To comply with the *principle of mass*, the corps provides for a main blow by utilizing the weight of its means on a certain portion of its front.

\*See map at end of this chapter.





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roads 613 (one and one-half miles northeast of German-town)—Two Taverns—Willow Grove School—Greenmount. The main bodies of these divisions are going into bivouac on the general line of the state boundary. The command post is in Taneytown. Corps troops are in the vicinity of Taneytown. The 4th Division is in army reserve at Westminster.

*c. Army warning order.*—(1) At the conference at army headquarters at 11:00 PM, 25 November, the II Corps commander received the following warning order for the attack:

First Army,  
WOODSBORO, MD.,  
25 November, 1926, 11:00 PM.

To Commanders:

I Corps.  
II Corps.  
III Corps.

This army will attack morning of 27 November, enveloping hostile right. The field order for attack will be issued at 8:00 AM, 26 November.

I Corps attacks in its present zone of action; main effort direction: FELTY SCHOOL—CEDAR RIDGE; 4th Division to II Corps.

II Corps attacks on front: WHITEHALL, exclusive—TANEYTOWN ROAD, inclusive; main effort direction: TWO TAVERNS—GRANITE HILL; 7th Division to III Corps.

III Corps attacks with 7th, 9th, 10th, and 12th Divisions on the front: TANEYTOWN ROAD, exclusive—HAGERSTOWN ROAD, inclusive, enveloping hostile right; 8th Division corps reserve; 11th Division to army reserve.

By command of General A:

X,  
Chief of Staff.

(2) The corps immediately transmitted the information contained in the warning order to the divisions.

*d. Army order for the attack.*—At 8:30 AM, 26 November, the corps received *Field Orders No 12*, First Army.\*

7. REQUIREMENT.—The field order of the II Corps for the attack.

---

\*See Chapter IV, Section III.



## THE CORPS IN THE ATTACK

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## SECTION III

## A Solution

Paragraph

Order ----- 8

8. ORDER.—The following field order was issued by the II Corps for the attack:

II Corps,  
TANEYTOWN, MD.,  
26 November, 1926, 11:00 AM.

FIELD ORDERS }  
No 10 }

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Gettysburg, Fairfield, Taneytown, and Emmitsburg quadrangles.

1. *a.* The enemy, estimated at two corps (six to eight divisions and one cavalry division), is organizing a position with main line of resistance along the general line: south of MIDWAY—WHITEHALL—north of TWO TAVERNS—ROUND TOP—PITZER SCHOOL. His cavalry holds CARR HILL. Other Red forces are approaching and organizing a second position along the north bank of CONEWAGO CREEK.
- b.* (1) This corps holds the line: crossroads 613 (northeast of GERMANTOWN)—TWO TAVERNS—WILLOW GROVE SCHOOL—GREENMOUNT; and is in contact with the enemy's main forces. The I Corps holds the line: MOUNT PLEASANT—crossroads 613. The II Corps holds the line: GREENMOUNT—north of PLUM RUN—MCCLEARY SCHOOL.
- (2) The Second Army reached the line: MONKTON—WESTMINSTER, last night.
- (3) The First Army attacks tomorrow, enveloping the hostile right, driving the enemy north of CONEWAGO CREEK. The I Corps drives in the direction: FELTY SCHOOL—CEDAR RIDGE; the III Corps in the direction: MCCLEARY SCHOOL—TABLE ROCK. The I Corps neutralizes ST LUKES CHURCH by gas and smoke; the III Corps ROUND TOP and LITTLE ROUND TOP. For objectives to be fired upon by the army artillery see *Annex No 2, Artillery*.
2. This corps attacks with two divisions in line, 5th Division on the right. It will exert its main effort in the direction: TWO TAVERNS—GRANITE HILL, and will seize the high ground south of CONEWAGO CREEK from PINE CHURCH, exclusive, to PLAINVIEW, inclusive. See *Annex No 1, Operation Map*.

Time of attack: 6:00 AM.

Line of departure: line held by front line troops.

Zone of action:

East boundary: TREVANION, exclusive—STUMPTOWN, inclusive—PINEY CREEK (village)—crossroads 613—ST LUKES CHURCH—MORITZ SCHOOL—PINE CHURCH—OAKGROVE SCHOOL, all exclusive.

West boundary: KEYSVILLE—BRIDGEPORT—BARLOW—TANEYTOWN ROAD—HARRISBURG ROAD, all inclusive.



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3. *a.* The 5th Division, with the 4th Field Artillery Brigade and one machine gun battery, 205th Coast Artillery (AA), attached, making its main effort on its left, will promptly secure the high ground north of the WESTERN MARYLAND R.R., and will assist the 6th Division in taking the heights west of GRANITE HILL. It will then secure the high ground west of PINE CHURCH. Connection with the I Corps will be maintained.

## Zone of action:

East boundary: same as east boundary of II Corps.

West boundary: road junction 526 (southeast of LONGVILLE)—crossroads 528—TWO TAVERNS—GRANITE HILL—HUNTERSTOWN—BELMONT SCHOOL, all exclusive.

- b.* The 6th Division, with the 913th Field Artillery and one machine gun battery, 205th Coast Artillery (AA), attached, will exert its main effort on its right, and, with the assistance of the 5th Division, will quickly seize the heights west of GRANITE HILL and northeast of GETTYSBURG. It will then secure the high ground southeast of PLAINVIEW. Connection with the III Corps will be maintained.

## Zone of action:

East boundary: same as west boundary of 5th Division.

West boundary: same as west boundary of II Corps.

- c.* The 7th Division passes to III Corps at 2:00 PM today.
- d.* The artillery with the corps will support the attack as follows:
- (1) Division artillery:
    - (a) The 913th Field Artillery (75-mm. gun, *portée*) is attached to the 6th Division to fire from initial positions only. It will come under control of the 6th Division at HARNEY at 9:15 PM today.
    - (b) The 4th Field Artillery Brigade is attached to the 5th Division to fire from initial positions only. It will come under control of the 5th Division at PINEY CREEK (Village) at 10:00 PM today.
  - (2) Corps artillery:
    - (a) The 201st Field Artillery Brigade will support the attack as follows:
      - (i) The 201st Field Artillery will support the 5th Division from positions along PLUM CREEK southeast of GERMANTOWN.
      - (ii) The 202d Field Artillery will support the 6th Division from positions along the stream south of crossroads 491 (about two miles southwest of TWO TAVERNS).
      - (iii) The 203d and 204th Field Artillery will support the attack from positions in the vicinity of crossroads 549 (one mile west of GERMANTOWN).
      - (iv) POWERS HILL and WOLF HILL will be neutralized by persistent gas and smoke between 3:00 AM and 6:30 AM. Nonpersistent gas will be placed in the woods between crossroads 516 and MT. VERNON SCHOOL from 5:00 AM to 6:00 AM.
    - (b) The 205th Coast Artillery (AA) will cover the corps in the attack. Two gun batteries will be established along the general line: road junction 585 (one and one-half miles east of GERMANTOWN)—BARLOW. One machine gun battery will be attached to each front line division at 7:00 PM today.





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Annexes:

- No 1—*Operation Map.*
  - No 2—*Artillery.*
  - No 3—*Air Service* (omitted).
- Distribution: (omitted).



SECTION IV

Discussion

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Artillery support -----	12
Results expected from the attack -----	13
Reserve -----	14



9. ZONE OF ACTION.—The zone of action at the line of departure is 10,500 yards in width. On the line: Pine Church—Plainview, it is less than 7,000 yards in width. Initially, two divisions can not cover the entire front in strength. As the attack advances, however, the disadvantage of a wide front will constantly decrease.

10. TERRAIN.—The terrain features that are likely to have an important bearing on the attack are Powers Hill, Wolf Hill, Granite Hill, and Rock Creek. With the exception of Granite Hill, these terrain features are all near the western boundary.

11. PLAN OF ATTACK.—*a. Providing troops for the main effort.*—By neutralizing Powers Hill and Wolf Hill with smoke and gas, it is possible to economize on troops in the western part of the zone and organize a main effort in the direction: Two Taverns—Granite Hill. With the advance of the 6th Division and the 7th Division on its left, it is contemplated to pinch out these two hills with a minimum of effort against them from the south.

*b. Scheme of maneuver for divisions.*—Since the axis of advance of the corps must be along the line: Two Taverns—Granite Hill, it is advisable to attack, in this situation, with one division east and one division west of that line. The right division can then be directed to make its main



effort on its left and the left division make its main effort on its right.

12. ARTILLERY SUPPORT.—By concentrating the bulk of the fire of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Field Artillery Brigades and the 913th Field Artillery (75-mm. *portée*), together with the bulk of the fire of the corps artillery and some support from Groupment A, Army Artillery, in support of the main blow, a rapid penetration of the enemy's position should be effected.

13. RESULTS EXPECTED FROM THE ATTACK.—As indicated previously, the attack of the II Corps should result in a rapid penetration of the hostile position. The immediate result of this operation will be the outflanking of Wolf Hill. As the attack of the III Corps on the left progresses, the entire Gettysburg area will be pinched out. In the meantime, the advance of the I Corps on the right will result in pinching out Red troops around and north of Whitehall. Once a penetration is effected, the breach will be widened by pushing back the flanks.

14. RESERVE.—*a. 4th Division.*—With a view to its probable use in flanking operations or to execute a passage of lines, the 4th Division should be moved on Two Taverns soon after the attack begins.

*b. 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry.*—The cavalry should be held ready to exploit the success if a complete rupture of the hostile line is effected.

---

## SECTION V

### Corps Administrative Orders for the Attack

	Paragraph
Principles -----	15
Situation -----	16
Requirement -----	17
A solution -----	18
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---

15. PRINCIPLES.—*a.* The principles of supply given in the chapter on the corps in the advance apply to the supply



of a corps in an attack. While not a link in the chain of normal supply to divisions, a corps supervises and aids their supply in every way that the facilities of the corps permit. The corps takes over active supply for divisions only when the army is unable to perform these functions.

b. When it is acting independently, a corps, charged with supply for divisions, utilizes enlarged corps parks containing more or less complete stocks of supplies required by all troops in the corps. These, in reality, are small army depots but the term park is given them. The supplies maintained therein are only such as the military situation demands be kept close at hand.

c. Class I supply of a corps is generally initiated by a daily strength report of corps troops to the army, together with such special information as may be necessary. Whenever practicable, the corps troops are grouped together for facility in supply and administration. Corps troops attached to divisions are supplied by them. Those not attached, but located within a division area, may be supplied by the corps or attached to the division for Class I supply. The former method is preferable. The same methods are employed with army troops located in corps areas.

d. The corps utilizes its medical service to furnish the necessary medical assistance to corps troops; to supervise, coordinate, and supplement the operation of the division medical personnel; and in rare instances to augment the medical service of the army. It is not normally a link in the chain of evacuation unless the corps is acting independently, in which case, its medical service, augmented by army medical units, functions similarly to that of an army. Evacuation is normally by the army to army evacuation hospitals.

e. The corps has no duties or responsibilities connected with salvage except in periods of stabilization.

f. The large amount of movement of troop columns and supply trains within a corps makes it necessary that there be a coordinated plan of traffic circulation. The corps prescribes a plan within its area in rear of the division





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## 168 TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

II Corps,  
TANEYTOWN, MD.,  
26 November, 1926, 11:00 A.M.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS }  
No 14 } To accompany *Field Orders No 10*.

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Gettysburg and Taneytown quadrangles.

## 1. SUPPLY.

a. *Railheads.*

Commencing 27 November:

4th Division, 11:00 AM

5th Division, 7:00 AM

6th Division, 7:00 AM

II Corps Troops (no change)

TANEYTOWN

GALT

TANEYTOWN

UNION BRIDGE

b. *Class I supplies.*

Distributing points for corps troops, no change.

c. *Ammunition.*

Refilling points:

(1) All classes

Am Dept No 4

KEYMAR

(2) Artillery, between

7:00 PM and 5:00

AM daily, effective

27 November

Am Dep No 7

TANEYTOWN

(3) Distributing point

201st Artillery Brigade, crossroads at (354.5-738.0).

d. *Engineer.*

Refilling point

Engr Dep No 3

BRUCEVILLE

e. *Medical.*

Refilling point

Second Med Sup Dep

UNION BRIDGE

f. *Quartermaster.*

(1) 201st Field Remount Depot, road junction 363 (352.0-723.0).

(2) All others, no change.

g. *Air service.*

Refilling point

AC Depot No 1

HARMONY GROVE

h. *Ordnance.*

(1) Corps heavy repair shop

TANEYTOWN

(2) All others, no change.

i. *All other supplies.*

No change.

## 2. EVACUATION.

a. *Casualties.*

(1) Men:

(a) Evacuation to UNION BRIDGE.

(b) Hospital stations for corps troops, LONGVILLE and road junction 528.

(c) One surgical hospital each will be placed at the disposal of the 5th and 6th Divisions at TANEYTOWN at 1:00 AM, 27 November. Transportation will be furnished by the corps trains to sites designated by divisions. Divisions will report locations.



## THE CORPS IN THE ATTACK

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- (2) Animals:
  - (a) EVacuation to LINWOOD.
  - (b) Veterinary collecting station for corps troops: FUES MILL.

b. *Burial.*

- (1) The number of cemeteries established by divisions will be reduced to a minimum.
- (2) Corps troops.
  - (a) Under supervision of the corps quartermaster.
  - (b) Cemetery, TANEYTOWN.

c. *Captured material.*

- (1) Serviceable material may be retained for use by divisions.
- (2) Other material, no change.

d. *Prisoners of war.*

- (1) EVacuation from divisions by army to WOODSBORO.
- (2) Report of captures will be made by divisions as of 12:00 noon daily, direct to G-1, army, copy to G-1, II Corps.

## 3. TRAFFIC.

a. *Circulation.*

- (1) See *Annex No 1, Circulation Map* (omitted).
- (2) Restrictions.
  - (a) Army reserved motor roads: WOODSBORO—TANEYTOWN; and OREGON SCHOOL—BRIDGEPORT.
  - (b) The use of lights on vehicles is prohibited north of the LIBERTY TURNPIKE.
- (3) Control.
  - (a) By army after 6:00 PM, 26 November, in the area south of the road: WESTMINSTER—EMMITSBURG, inclusive.
  - (b) By corps after 6:00 PM, 26 November, north of the road: WESTMINSTER—EMMITSBURG, and in rear of division rear boundaries.
  - (c) By divisions within their respective areas.
  - (d) Troop movements by motor transport have priority on the army reserved roads after noon, 27 November.

b. *Construction and maintenance of routes.*

- (1) By army south of the road: WESTMINSTER—EMMITSBURG, inclusive, effective 6:00 PM, 26 November.
- (2) The corps engineer will take over the maintenance of roads to the line: OAK GROVE SCHOOL—road junction 483—road junction 447, by 6:00 PM, 26 November, and to the line: road junction 618—TWO TAVERNS—LITTLES RUN, by 9:00 AM, 27 November; thereafter, as the situation warrants.
- (3) Axial road: TANEYTOWN—HARNEY—crossroads 568—TWO TAVERNS—BONNEAUVILLE—GRANITE HILL—HUNTERSTOWN.

c. *Rear boundaries.*

- (1) Corps: WESTERN MARYLAND R. R., exclusive.
- (2) 5th and 6th Divisions: PINEY CREEK (village)—crossroads 539—crossroads 528—PINEY CREEK CHURCH—PALMER—BOLLINGER SCHOOL, all inclusive.

## 4. TRAINS.

The movement of corps trains north of their present bivouac areas is prohibited between 6:00 PM and 10:00 PM, 26 November.

## 5. PERSONNEL.

a. *Stragglers.*

- (1) Division straggler lines will connect at the road junction at (356.0-740.0).



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(2) The corps military police will make frequent inspections of kitchens in rear areas for the purpose of arresting stragglers.

*b. Rear echelon of corps headquarters.*

COPPERVILLE.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

The following units are attached as indicated:

To the 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions each, a detachment from the 902d Graves Registration Unit.

To the 4th Division: Company A, 705th Service Battalion.

To the 5th Division: Company B, 705th Service Battalion.

To the 6th Division: Company C, 705th Service Battalion.

By command of Lieutenant General A:

D,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

F,  
G-4.

Annex:

*No 1—Circulation Map* (omitted).

Distribution: (omitted).

19. DISCUSSION.—*a. Railheads.*—Since only three railheads were assigned to the corps, it is necessary to assign two units to one railhead. The location of divisions and corps troops makes it advisable to assign the 4th and 6th Divisions to Taneytown. The railway siding capacity available at that place will accomodate only one daily train at a time, so different hours are designated for these divisions.

*b. Class I supplies.*—Since the corps troops can draw Class I supplies with their motor vehicles from the railhead at Union Bridge, there is no necessity for any change in the plan for distribution of Class I supplies announced in the administrative orders for the advance.

*c. Class II, III, and IV supplies.*—(1) Class II, III, and IV supplies are drawn by divisions and corps troops direct from army depots. The corps announces the location of depots that have not been previously announced in corps orders.

(2) No corps parks are announced as there is nothing in this situation to indicate that it will be necessary to unload the corps trains, also it is not desired at this time that divisions and corps troops draw supplies from corps reserves.





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mits division engineers to concentrate on the road work essential for the forward displacement of the division.

(5) Boundaries.—The rear boundaries of the 5th and 6th Divisions as announced definitely fix the responsibility for police and traffic control, and inform these divisions of the area available for bivouacs and other purposes.

*f. Trains.*—The movement of corps trains between 6:00 PM and 10:00 PM, 26 November, should be restricted in order that they will not interfere with the movement of combat troops of the divisions and the corps artillery in moving into positions for the attack.

*g. Stragglers.*—The coordination of the division straggler line is insured by designating a point on division boundaries where they will connect.

---

## SECTION VI

### The Corps Artillery in the Attack

	Paragraph
General considerations .....	20
Special situation, continued .....	21
Requirement .....	22
A solution .....	23
Discussion .....	24

---

20. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.—*a. Artillery attached to the divisions.*—The artillery of a division held out as a corps reserve may, according to circumstances, either be kept with its division or attached to one of the divisions engaged. When the corps is operating as part of an army, the latter will usually be the case. The tactical employment of fire of *portée* artillery, once in position, is the same as that of other 75-mm. guns. Consequently, reinforcing units of *portée* artillery are usually attached to divisions by the corps.

*b. Corps artillery missions and positions.*—The most important mission of corps artillery is counterbattery. In addition, it executes fires for destruction, neutralization,



and interdiction and harassing fires. It also assists the division artillery either by reinforcing the fires of such artillery or by firing on targets which are not suitable for the type of *matériel* employed by the division. In general, on the offensive, the corps artillery is placed as far forward as the mission, available positions, and reasonable safety will permit.

*c. Antiaircraft artillery.*—In the attack, it is the special function of the antiaircraft artillery regiment of the corps to cover the assaulting elements, the reserves, and the artillery which follows in close support. The width of the corps front determines the depth of the defense which can be furnished by the corps antiaircraft artillery regiment. The initial dispositions of the gun batteries are governed by the requirements for coordination with the general defense in the adjacent corps as prescribed by the army commander. Forward displacement as the attack progresses is then made, by battery, by long bounds. The gun defense is normally retained under corps control. The control of the machine gun defense is partially decentralized. The assaulting elements, brigade and division reserves, and the artillery are best covered by the attachment of machine gun units to front line divisions. The remaining elements in the corps zone requiring machine gun defense are covered by machine gun units retained under corps control. These are advanced when the situation demands.

*d. The artillery annex.*—The corps chief of artillery, knowing the army orders, the corps commander's plan for the attack, and the amount of artillery available, together with its present assignments and locations, prepares a general plan for the employment of the artillery with the corps. This plan is amplified by the addition of desirable details, and finally, after approval by the corps commander, is published in the artillery subparagraph of, and in the artillery annex to, the corps field order for the attack. Such a plan will usually cover the general assignments and locations of regiments; any special fire missions which are important from the viewpoint of the success of the corps as



a whole; and such other instructions as are necessary or desirable, and are applicable to the situation. The corps chief of artillery, in his plan, should contemplate nothing which would operate to deprive division commanders of their proper functions of control and employment of their artillery. He should include, however, such instructions as are necessary to insure proper coordination between the artillery of the several divisions and between the corps artillery and the division artillery.

21. SPECIAL SITUATION, CONTINUED.—*a. Disposition of the corps artillery.*—At 11:30 PM, 25 November, elements of the 201st Field Artillery Brigade were disposed as indicated in Chapter II. The 205th Coast Artillery (AA) was covering troops and establishments in the corps zone.

*b. Conference at corps headquarters.*—The corps chief of artillery attended a conference held at corps headquarters at Taneytown at 12:00 midnight, 25-26 November. He was informed of the general plan of the army for the impending attack and was directed to inaugurate the necessary preliminary arrangements at once.

*c. Information received prior to issuance of the corps field order.*—At 8:30 AM, 26 November, *Field Orders No 12*, First Army, were received at corps headquarters. (For the artillery annex to the army field order, see chapter IV, Section VII.) The corps chief of artillery conferred with the corps commander and the principal staff officers and was informed of the details for the attack that would appear in *Field Orders No 10*, II Corps, 26 November (see Chapter V, Sections II and III). He was informed that the attack order would be issued at 11:00 AM, 26 November, and was directed to have the artillery annex prepared in time for it to accompany the attack order.

22. REQUIREMENT.—Prepare the artillery annex (No 2) to accompany *Field Orders No 10*, II Corps.

23. A SOLUTION.—The corps chief of artillery prepared the following annex:





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## 176 TACTICAL FUNCTIONS OF LARGER UNITS

- (f) In addition to counterbattery, fires will include interdiction of roads in the vicinity of BONNEAUVILLE and concentrations to assist the advance of the divisions. For objectives of the army artillery and for assignment of objectives to corps artillery, see *Annex No 2* (omitted).
- (2) The 205th Coast Artillery (AA) will establish gun and machine gun defense to cover troops and establishments in the corps zone north of the general line: GALT (KUMP PO)—PALMER. Two gun batteries will be located on the general line: road junction 527 (one and one-half miles southeast of GERMAN-TOWN)—crossroads 549—MOUNTJOY CHURCH. One machine gun battery will be attached to each front line division at 7:00 PM, 26 November.

x. *General instructions.*

- (1) Positions will be occupied during the night of 26-27 November. Corps artillery units will be in position by 2:00 AM; division artillery by 4:00 AM, 27 November.
- (2) Reconnaissance and working parties preparing positions may operate during daylight, 26 November. These parties will be reduced to a minimum of personnel and will avoid exposure to hostile observation.
- (3) There will be an artillery preparation participated in by all the artillery with the corps beginning at 5:00 AM, 27 November. Prior to 5:00 AM fire will be limited to urgent requirements. From 5:50 AM to 6:00 AM, an intense bombardment will be placed on the enemy's front lines. See *Annex No 2, Objectives for Army and Corps Artillery* (omitted).
- (4) Nonpersistent gas and smoke may be used at the discretion of subordinate commanders. No persistent gas will be used except as otherwise ordered.
- (5) Care will be taken not to destroy by artillery fire, roads and bridges that will be used by our troops in the advance.
- (6) Arrangements for coordination of fire along boundaries will be made by units concerned.

## 2. Command posts:

II Corps Artillery: TANEYTOWN.

201st Field Artillery Brigade: church at road junction at (356.2-738.9).

205th Coast Artillery: TANEYTOWN.

By command of Lieutenant General C:

D,  
Chief of Staff.

## OFFICIAL:

E,  
G-3.

## Annexes:

*No 1—Routes to and Assignment of Areas* (omitted).*No 2—Objectives for Army and Corps Artillery* (omitted).

Distribution: (omitted).

24. DISCUSSION.—a. *The artillery subparagraph of the corps field order, and the artillery annex.*—The scheme of employment of the artillery with the II Corps is contained



in paragraph 3 *d*, *Field Orders No 10*, II Corps, 26 November. This paragraph is drawn with a view to presenting the corps commander's orders to the artillery with the corps. The instructions therein are based on the corps commander's scheme of maneuver together with a study of the general scheme of employment as outlined in the artillery annex to the army field order discussed in Chapter IV, Section VII. This paragraph should contain simply those instructions which the corps commander considers necessary to issue to the corps artillery and to subordinate units regarding the use of their artillery. Its purpose is to give a general picture of the plan of employment of the artillery with the corps. The details of such employment as are necessary for coordination and full understanding by all concerned is embodied in an artillery annex to the corps field order. The annex contains the complete plan of employment in detail as ordered by the corps commander.

*b. Attachment to divisions.*—In this situation, the light artillery passed on by the army to the corps, and the artillery of the 4th Division, in corps reserve, were attached to the front line divisions. The responsibility for command of these units was effected by showing at what time they would be attached to the divisions and when they would revert to control of the corps.

*c. Areas assigned corps artillery regiments.*—Areas were selected well forward from which the corps artillery regiments could perform their missions. This selection was made after considering the areas reserved for army artillery and those necessary for the division artillery. The routes to and the location of these areas are shown on the chart listed as *Annex No 1* (omitted). The movement of corps artillery into positions was simplified by directing the divisions to regulate the march of the regiments through their respective areas.

*d. Missions.*—The 201st and 202d Field Artillery were assigned to support the 5th and 6th Divisions, respectively. While these two regiments would deliver fires in support of the divisions, they still are under control of the corps



and would be employed on corps missions. In compliance with directions contained in the artillery annex to the army field order, contingent zones in the zones of action of ~~the I and III Corps~~ <sup>the I and III Corps</sup> were assigned these regiments. The 203d and 204th Field Artillery were held in general support. The artillery annex to the army field order contained a list and a map showing the objectives for army artillery. Upon receipt by the corps, these objectives were plotted and the preliminary study of corps artillery objectives was completed. An annex (No 2) was then drawn up showing both army and corps artillery objectives. This will be issued to the divisions in order that the artillery fires may be coordinated.

*e. Antiaircraft artillery.*—The army commander's instructions were amplified in the corps field order and its artillery annex. The actual locations of the gun batteries are not prescribed but are determined and announced by the antiaircraft artillery regimental commander. Two gun batteries are located on the general line prescribed by the army commander. The remaining battery will be emplaced about 6,000 yards in rear of the forward gun batteries to deepen the gun defense. One machine gun battery was attached to each front line division. The remaining machine gun batteries will be disposed where needed to cover troops and establishments in the corps zone north of the line which limits army antiaircraft artillery responsibility.

*f. Coordinating instructions.*—The general instructions contained in the artillery annex to the army field order which apply to the corps, together with such other instructions deemed necessary from a corps viewpoint, are set forth in the artillery annex to the corps field order. These instructions insure artillery coordination within the corps and with adjacent corps and the army.

*g. Miscellaneous.*—The work of the corps chief of artillery and his staff does not cease with the issuance of the corps field order and the artillery annex. If the attack is successful, where will the next objectives for the corps artillery be located and how far and by what roads will these





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





moved to Taneytown. Upon receipt of *Field Orders No 10*, II Corps, the corps air service officer issued a field order for the operations of the II Corps Air Service on 27 November. Due to the narrow width of the corps zone of action, the division of duties between the two squadrons of the corps group is based upon time, rather than upon squadron zones of action. Missions of an artillery character are also assigned the two squadrons. A balloon company is attached to each of the two divisions in line, while the remainder of the balloon group is kept under corps control.

27. DISCUSSION.—As the army observation group is observing north of Conewago Creek, the corps air service takes up the duties south of that line. To place responsibility for reconnaissance, the Western Maryland R.R., a well defined landmark, is prescribed as the boundary between corps and divisions. As the air situation still remains favorable to Blue operations, it is unnecessary for the corps air service to take advantage of sorties by Blue pursuit units, or even to fly in formations. Reconnaissance missions may be executed by single airplanes with little fear of molestation. This greatly simplifies the duties of the corps air service. Although not specified in orders, the corps air service furnishes airplane observers for the corps artillery whenever requested by the latter to do so. This is usually arranged, as a matter of routine, between the respective artillery and air service commanders.













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CHAPTER VI

The Division in the Attack

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II.—Situation and Requirement -----	3-5
III.—A Solution -----	6-7
IV.—Discussion -----	8-11
V.—Division Administrative Orders for the Attack--	12-13
VI.—The Division Artillery in the attack -----	14-18
VII.—The Division Air Service in the Attack -----	19-21

SECTION I

General Discussion

	Paragraph
Relation of the division to larger units -----	1
Coordination within the division -----	2

1. RELATION OF THE DIVISION TO LARGER UNITS.—*a. Mission.*—From the viewpoint of the commanders of larger units, corps and army, the division is the basic unit of organization. It is the largest unit to which all the auxiliary arms necessary for prolonged independent action are permanently assigned. In tactical operations, either offensive or defensive, divisions are assigned missions so that by coordinated action of all the divisions the mission of the larger units will be accomplished. The mission assigned a division may require that the division act directly with and adjacent to other divisions of the larger force, or that it operate at a distance from the remainder of the main force. In either case the action of the division is based upon the mission assigned and upon an intelligent cooperation in the accomplishment of the mission of the force as a whole.

*b. Scheme of maneuver.*—In addition to the mission the corps or army commander usually prescribes a zone of action



and a scheme of maneuver for each division acting directly with the larger unit. These schemes of maneuver are designed to produce the scheme of maneuver of the whole force and to insure the operation of the entire force along predetermined lines without confusion or duplication of effort. When the mission of the division requires it to operate at a distance from the larger force, though remaining a part of it, great latitude as to scheme of maneuver, zone of action, etc., is allowed the division commander of the detached division. But in reaching his decisions he must always bear in mind the effect of the actions of his division on the operation of the main force.

*c. Relation to auxiliary arms.*—In executing their missions divisions are assisted by the auxiliary arms of the corps and army. The latter usually remain under the direct command of the corps and army and assist the divisions by supporting actions. Close coordination between divisions and these supporting arms is necessary to insure maximum effect and to eliminate duplication of effort. At times it is necessary to attach units of the corps or army auxiliary arms to divisions, in which case they become a part of the division and operate under the direct command of the division commander. This necessity arises when the accomplishment of the division mission requires the direct and exclusive assistance of the unit concerned. It arises most frequently when the division operates at a distance from the main force. The tactical coordination between adjacent divisions and between divisions and the corps and army supporting arms is insured for the most part by the command over all exercised by the corps and army commanders. Nevertheless, close direct cooperation between commanders of adjacent divisions and between division commanders and the commanders of the supporting arms is essential.

*d. Supply.*—The proper functioning of the supply services is of great importance. In this the corps, being a tactical echelon and not a supply echelon, usually has no part except as regards its corps troops and artillery ammunition





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the advance of the infantry by action against hostile ground troops.

*f. Signal communication.*—Adequate means of signal communication for the transmission of information and orders is essential for proper coordination. Plans for the operation of the division should always provide for the coordination of the means of signal communication.

*g. Means of securing coordination.*—The necessity for coordination begins with the first intimation of impending operations and is continuous until their conclusion. The required coordination is secured by the formulation of plans for the employment of all elements of the division, by the promulgation of orders, by inspections to see that orders are being carried out, and by the prompt rendition of decisions by proper authority in case of confusion or failure of plans. In its larger aspect, the coordination of all elements of the division is assured by the direct command over all exercised by the division commander assisted by his staff. But this is not sufficient. In spite of the best of plans numerous questions of details which require coordinating will arise between adjacent subordinate units and between subordinate infantry units and their supporting auxiliary units. Such coordination is secured by the close cooperation of the commanders of the units concerned, supplemented, when necessary, by appeal to and decision by higher authority.

---

SECTION II

Situation and Requirement

	Paragraph
General situation .....	3
Special situation .....	4
Requirement .....	5

---

3. GENERAL SITUATION.\*—*a.* General Map, Gettysburg (1925), 1 inch = 5 miles. Geological Survey Map, 1:62,500;

---

\*Unless otherwise stated all map references refer to the topographical map, scale 1:21,120.



Gettysburg, Fairfield, Taneytown, and Emmitsburg quadrangles. Topographical Map, Gettysburg-Antietam (1925), 1:21,120; New Oxford, Hunterstown, Gettysburg, Bonneauville, and Taneytown sheets.

*b.* See preceding chapters.

4. SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a.* See preceding chapters.

*b.* By dark, 25 November, 1926, the advance guards of the two columns of the 6th Division, each consisting of a regiment of infantry, less one battalion, one battalion of field artillery, one company of engineers, and medical detachments, had gained contact with and driven in Red covering detachments, and had occupied the line: south bank of Littles Run—Willow Grove School.

*c.* Late in the afternoon, orders were issued directing the remainder of the division to bivouac as follows:

(1) 11th Brigade, less 21st Infantry, less one battalion, in the area: road junction 528-H (354.8-737.7)—road junction 529-C—road junction 528-J.

(2) 12th Brigade, less 23d Infantry, less one battalion, in the area: road junction 479-D (352.6-738.0)—road junction 442-G—crossroads 452-A.

(3) 6th Field Artillery Brigade, less one battalion, 11th Field Artillery, one battalion, 12th Field Artillery, and 6th Ammunition Train, along north bank of Alloway Creek.

(4) 6th Tank Company, in woods north and south of crossroads 482-D (354.3-736.6).

(5) 6th Engineers, less two companies, in the area: stream crossing 428 (354.2-735.8)—road junction 425-C—crossroads 507-B.

(6) 6th Medical Regiment, just west of Harney.

(7) Field trains, with organizations.

(8) Service trains, south of Alloway Creek. For detailed locations, see Section V, paragraph 13 *b* (2), of this chapter.

(9) Command posts:

6th Division and 6th Field Artillery Brigade: Harney.



11th Brigade: road junction 522-F (353.6-737.2).  
12th Brigade: Griffin (351.8-737.6).

d. (1) At 2:00 AM, 26 November, Major General A, commanding the 6th Division, received the following message at his command post at Harney:

II Corps,  
TANEYTOWN, MD.,  
26 Nov 26, 1:00 AM.

To Commanders:  
4th Division.  
5th Division.  
6th Division.  
7th Division.

Army attacks morning of 27 Nov, enveloping hostile right. II Corps attacks on front: WHITEHALL, exclusive—TANEYTOWN ROAD, inclusive, with 5th and 6th Divisions in line. Direction of main effort: TWO TAVERNS—GRANITE HILL. 7th Division passes to III Corps, 4th Division to II Corps. Front line divisions, less covering forces and reconnaissance parties, remain concealed in present locations until further orders.

D,  
Chief of Staff.

(2) At 12:30 PM, 26 November, the II Corps order for the attack was received by Major General A at his command post at Harney. See *Field Orders No 10*, II Corps, Chapter V, Section III.

5. REQUIREMENT.—The field orders issued for the attack of the 6th Division.

---

SECTION III

A Solution

	Paragraph
Warning message -----	6
Formal field order -----	7

---

6. WARNING MESSAGE.—At 3:00 AM, Major General A issued the following warning message:





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- (6) The corps artillery neutralizes POWERS HILL and WOLF HILL with smoke and persistent gas. It places nonpersistent gas on the woods between MT VERNON SCHOOL and crossroads 516-B (355.3-747.2) from 5:00 AM to 6:00 AM.

2. The 6th Division, with the 913th Field Artillery (75-mm. *portée*), the 202d Balloon Company, and Battery F, 205th Coast Artillery (AA) attached, making its main effort on the right, quickly seizes the heights west of GRANITE HILL and northeast of GETTYSBURG. It will then secure the high ground southeast of PLAINVIEW.

Time of attack: 6:00 AM.

Line of departure: line held by front line troops.

Zone of action:

East boundary: road junction 525-E (355.8-732.3)—road junction 528-C (355.6-734.1)—TWO TAVERNS—GRANITE HILL—HUNTERSTOWN—BELMONT SCHOOL, all inclusive.

West boundary: BRIDGEPORT—BARLOW—GETTYSBURG—TANEY-TOWN ROAD—HARRISBURG ROAD, all inclusive.

Boundary between brigades: road junction 480-C (353.0-738.9), to left brigade—road junction 529-C (353.3-740.5)—crossroads 522-D (353.3-741.6), both to right brigade—road junction 489-B (353.6-745.3), to left brigade—WHITE RUN—hill 627-d (355.0-752.1)—road junction 557-E (355.2-754.8)—road junction 530-M (356.2-757.8)—L. BUSH (357.4-760.3)—crossroads 601-B (359.3-764.3), all to right brigade.

3. a. The 11th Brigade, with 6th Tank Company and one battery, 11th Field Artillery, attached, will attack on the right making its main effort on the right. Assisted by the 5th Division it will seize the heights west of GRANITE HILL. It will then push on rapidly and secure the high ground south of CONEWAGO CREEK within its zone of action.
- b. The 12th Brigade, less 24th Infantry, less one battalion, and with one battery, 12th Field Artillery, attached, will attack on the left, making its main effort on its right. It will push on rapidly in its zone of action and secure the ridge south of CONEWAGO CREEK. It will maintain contact with the 11th Brigade and with the III Corps.
- c. The division artillery, less two batteries, will support the attack by a preparation and by successive concentrations.
- (1) The 11th Field Artillery, less one battery, will support the 11th Brigade from positions in the area: road junction 571-J (355.4-741.8)—road junction 546-D—crossroads 523-D—M. COLLINS, all exclusive.
- (2) The 12th Field Artillery, less one battery, will support the 12th Brigade from positions in the area: J. SCHWARTZ (352.6-743.3) road junction 421-B (351.5-742.2), both inclusive—crossroads 491 (353.1-742.7), exclusive.
- (3) The 913th Field Artillery will pass to the control of the 6th Field Artillery Brigade at HARNEY at 9:15 PM, 26 November. It will support the division from positions in the area: crossroads 546-D (354.2-742.6)—crossroads 491—road bend at (353.0-742.0)—F. KING, all inclusive. It will be prepared to place the fire of all batteries in the zone of action of the 11th Brigade. It will fire from initial positions only and will revert to corps control when the forward displacement of the 6th Field Artillery Brigade is completed.
- (4) An artillery preparation participated in by all artillery and directed against enemy front lines and known or suspected locations of supports and reserves will commence at 5:00 AM,



## THE DIVISION IN THE ATTACK

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- an intense bombardment being placed on the enemy's front lines, from 5:50 AM to 6:00 AM.
- (5) Prior to 5:00 AM artillery fire will be limited to the most urgent requirements.
  - (6) Battery F, 205th Coast Artillery (AA), will cover the division in the attack.
  - d. The 6th Division Air Service with the 202d Balloon Company attached, will continue intensive reconnaissance of hostile position to include the Western Maryland R.R., and will adjust for the artillery. Information of locations of enemy works and reserves is especially desired.
  - e. (1) One company, 6th Engineers, is attached to the 6th Field Artillery Brigade to assist in its forward displacement.
  - (2) For remainder of 6th Engineers, see *Administrative Orders No 15*.
  - f. The 24th Infantry, less one battalion, will await orders in the vicinity of road junction 529-C (353.1-740.5) in division reserve.
  - x. (1) All troop movements for the attack will be made between 5:45 PM, 26 November, and 5:30 AM, 27 November. All combat elements will be north of the road: road junction 589-F (355.8-740.0)—BARLOW, by 10:30 PM, 26 November. Special effort will be made to keep the enemy in ignorance as to all movements.
  - (2) Artillery has priority on roads in movement into positions.
  - (3) During the night of 26-27 November, the 11th and 12th Brigades will push their front lines up close to the enemy's lines.
  - (4) Brigades will arrange to relieve troops of other units now in their sectors early on the night of 26-27 November.
- 4. See *Administrative Orders No 15*.
  - 5. a. See *Annex No 1, Plan of signal communication* (omitted).
  - b. Axes of signal communication:
    - 6th Division: MOUNTJOY CHURCH (350.7-740.0)—ROCKY GROVE SCHOOL (353.7-750.3)—HUNTERSTOWN.
    - 11th Brigade: F. KING (353.7-741.8)—LOW DUTCH ROAD—GRANITE HILL—HUNTERSTOWN.
    - 12th Brigade: R. COSHUN (351.7-741.3)—ST MARY'S RF CHURCH—ROCKY GROVE SCHOOL—D. WIRT.
  - c. Command posts:
    - 6th Division: MOUNTJOY CHURCH after 10:30 PM, 26 November.
    - 11th Brigade: F. KING after 10:30 PM, 26 November.
    - 12th Brigade: R. COSHUN after 10:30 PM, 26 November.

By command of Major General A:

X,  
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Y,  
G-3.

Annexes:

*No 1—Plan of Signal Communication* (omitted).

Distribution: (omitted).



SECTION IV  
Discussion

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8. WARNING MESSAGE.—The bulk of the 6th Division is in bivouac with a covering force in contact with the enemy. The division has been marching several days and units will expect to move the next day. A warning message is necessary to insure that troops remain concealed in their present bivouacs during the next day. All available information as to the attack should be given in this message in order that advantage may be taken of all available time prior to the attack for reconnaissance and preparation for the attack by commanders of subordinate units.

9. MISSION.—The 6th Division is an interior division of an army which is about to attack. The II Corps, of which the 6th Division is a part, has the mission of penetrating the enemy's position in the direction: Two Taverns—Granite Hill, and seizing the high ground south of Conewago Creek within its zone of action. The direction of penetration by the II Corps is approximately along the boundary between the 6th Division and the 5th Division. Accordingly the corps prescribes the mission of the 6th Division to be the seizure of the ridge south of the Conewago Creek within its zone of action and prescribes the scheme of maneuver for the division, *i.e.*, a main blow on its right. Thus by coordination of the main efforts of the two attacking divisions the desired direction of penetration by the corps is secured and the accomplishment of the missions of the two divisions insures the accomplishment of the corps mission.

10. PLAN OF ATTACK.—*a. Terrain.*—The most important terrain features within the zone of action of the 6th Division are the Wolf Hill ridge, Granite Hill, and White





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To insure continuous artillery support throughout the advance, a battery of artillery is attached to each brigade to be used as accompanying weapons. These weapons should not be taken from the 913th Field Artillery because of the difficulty in closely following the advancing infantry due to the fact that only truck transportation is available to this class of artillery. Furthermore, this regiment probably will revert to corps control when accompanying weapons are most needed.

*d. Air service.*—Information as to hostile dispositions is rather vague. Therefore, the primary mission of the division air service is observation. Its work is coordinated with that of the corps air service by designation of the Western Maryland Railroad as the dividing line between the activities of the two. The 202d Balloon Company, which is attached to the division, is especially useful for adjustment of artillery fire but can also render valuable assistance by general observation of the division zone of action. It is attached to the division air service in order that all air activities may be coordinated.

*e. Engineers.*—The rapid movement forward of artillery, especially in the 11th Brigade zone of action, is of such importance that one company of engineers is attached to it to assist in this movement. The remainder of the regiment will be employed on communications for which instructions will be found in the administrative orders.

*f. Reserve.*—In this situation, the division is to make a long advance and detailed information as to hostile dispositions is lacking. Under these conditions a relatively large reserve is required. Since the 11th Brigade, making the main blow, is attacking on a fairly wide front, it should not be weakened. Therefore, the division reserve is taken from the left brigade.

*g. Signal communication.*—Command posts and axes of signal communication are designated as a basis for the installation of means of signal communication. The corps designates the division command posts and axes of signal communication, and the division designates those of the next subordinate units. Command posts are located so as to



facilitate command and, in the attack, they should be well forward. Cover and space for operation of the headquarters personnel are important considerations. Axes of signal communication are the routes along which command posts will advance. Their designation permits the making of detailed plans for the installation of means of signal communication.

11. MOVEMENT INTO ATTACK POSITIONS.—The bulk of front line divisions and all of the corps and army troops are bivouacked some distance from the line of contact. This requires a great deal of movement of troops prior to the attack. In view of the desired secrecy, all movements must be made during the night preceding the attack. It is essential that the 6th Division be moved forward early to allow time for movement of corps and army units. In the 6th Division sector, there are ample routes forward in each brigade sector to permit this without confusion. The designation of a line beyond which all combat units must be by 10:30 PM leaves the maximum time for movement of corps and army units into position. In the movement forward, infantry may move across country leaving roads available for the movement of artillery.

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SECTION V

Division Administrative Orders for  
the Attack

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---

12. PRINCIPLES.—a. *Supplies other than Class I.*—When a division is operating as part of an army, either in an attack or in preparation for an attack, all supplies, other than Class I, are normally obtained from army depots. The



division commander is responsible that the operations of combat troops are not delayed or hindered by lack of supplies. The requisitioning for supplies, other than Class I, and the arranging for their transportation forward to within the division area is a duty of the division technical and administrative staff, working under the supervision of G-4.

*b. Class I supplies.*—Class I supplies usually are placed at the disposal of a division at a railhead. The division quartermaster, under normal conditions, transports these supplies forward and distributes them to the field trains of the organization at Class I distributing points. These points are located conveniently with respect to the field trains that will draw supplies from them. Advantage is taken of the road net to reduce the necessary travel of trains to a minimum. Other methods for distribution of Class I supplies are given in *Command, Staff, and Logistics*.

*c. Ammunition.*—(1) The division quartermaster train carries, as a part of its normal load, eighty tons of infantry ammunition. Additional infantry ammunition is obtained from an army depot or other designated point. The division ordnance officer submits the necessary requisitions and arranges with the quartermaster for its transportation forward to infantry ammunition distributing points.

(2) There is carried with the artillery brigade approximately one and one-half days fire for each gun of the brigade. Additional ammunition is transported forward from the refilling point, under the direction of the field artillery brigade commander, by the ammunition train to one or more artillery ammunition distributing points.

(3) Ammunition is normally distributed to battalion combat trains at ammunition distributing points. The locations for these points are selected with a view to having them readily accessible to the combat trains that will draw ammunition from them, on roads from the rear which connect with roads leading to the posts of the combat trains, under cover and concealed as far as practicable from enemy ground observation. The posts chosen for the combat trains are near roads, under cover, and at points that permit of





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some control over the movement of the trains within the division area. The control exercised must permit the performance of those duties essential to the attack but must not permit interference with troop movements. A sound knowledge of the duties of all trains, together with an appreciation of the supply and tactical situation, is essential to the proper control of train movements.

(4) The division engineer regiment is concerned primarily with the repair of roads, including those necessary for the evacuation of wounded, the supply of ammunition to combat troops, and the forward displacement of artillery.

(5) A rear boundary for the division is normally prescribed in the corps administrative order. All units must be bivouacked and all establishments be located forward of this boundary unless other disposition is authorized by the corps.

*f. Trains.*—In order to prevent confusion, it is essential that field and service trains be assigned bivouacs. Each major unit of these trains should be assigned a separate area. Areas selected for bivouacs should provide water, cover, and concealment for the animal-drawn elements. Hard standings, with cover when possible, are desirable for the motor elements.

*g. Stragglers.*—It is the duty of the military police to arrest and return stragglers promptly to their organizations. During an attack, they maintain a straggler line, which generally is located just in rear of front line infantry regiments and artillery positions. This line is advanced as the attack progresses.

13. SITUATION.—*a.* The tactical situation is the same as that in Section II of this chapter.

*b.* (1) Field trains are bivouacked with their organizations.

(2) Service trains are bivouacked as follows:

(a) 6th Division Quartermaster Train, in the vicinity of road junction 417 (352.3-733.0).

(b) 6th Ammunition Train, northeast of Piney Creek Church.



## THE DIVISION IN THE ATTACK

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(c) 6th Engineer Train, with the 6th Engineers.

(d) 6th Medical Regiment, just west of Harney.

c. Authority has been obtained for the 6th Division Quartermaster Train to retain its present bivouac.

d. The distribution of Class I supplies for 26 November has been completed. The status of supplies within the division is normal.

e. All roads indicated by solid lines on the map are capable of two-way traffic.

f. The daily train will arrive at Taneytown at 7:00 AM, 27 November.

14. REQUIREMENT.—The administrative order (No 15) for the attack of 27 November. Annexes are not required but will be referred to where pertinent.

15. A SOLUTION.—The administrative order issued by the 6th Division for the attack is as follows:

6th Division,  
HARNEY, MD.,  
26 November, 1926, 2:00 PM.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS }  
No 15 } To accompany *Field Orders No 13*.

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Gettysburg, Fairfield, Taneytown, and Emmitsburg quadrangles. Topographical Map, Gettysburg-Antietam (1925), 1:21,120; Hunterstown, Gettysburg, and Taneytown sheets.

# 1. SUPPLY.

## a. Railhead.

No change. Daily train arrives at 7:00 AM.

## b. Class I supplies.

Distributing points:

Road junction 537-E (354.4-737.6):	
11th Brigade	11:00 AM
11th Field Artillery	12:00 noon
Just northeast of road junction 457-A (351.7-738.3): 12th Brigade	11:00 AM
Road junction 498-E (352.2-735.5):	
6th FA Brigade, less 11th Field Artillery and 6th Ammunition Train	11:00 PM
6th Medical Regiment	12:00 noon
6th Engineers	12:30 PM
Special troops, less detachments	1:00 PM
6th Ammunition Train	1:15 PM
6th Division Quartermaster Train	1:30 PM
All others	1:45 PM

## c. Ammunition.

(1) Refilling points:

(a) All classes

Am Dept No 4

KEYMAR



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- (b) Artillery, between 7:00 PM and 5:00 AM daily, effective, 27 November Am Dep No 7 TANEYTOWN
- (2) Distributing points:
 

M. COLLINS (355.1-740.9)	11th Brigade
J. B. SMITH (352.5-741.0)	12th Brigade
Stream crossing at (353.3-740.8)	6th Field Artillery Brigade

## 2. EVACUATION.

a. *Casualties.*

- (1) Men.
  - (a) Collecting stations: point at (353.8-741.6) and road junction 421-B (351.5-742.2).
  - (b) Hospital station, just southwest of HARNEY.
- (2) Animals.
  - Collecting station, road junction 479-D (352.6-738.0).

b. *Burial.*

- (1) Company B, 705th Service Battalion, will report to the division quartermaster for burial duty.
- (2) Cemetery, G. MILLER (353.2-740.5).

c. *Captured material.*

Reports will be submitted by organizations to G-1 as of 12:00 noon daily, covering the following:

- Artillery, giving caliber.
- Machine guns, giving make.
- Transportation, other than wagons, giving description and location.
- Other material of importance, giving description and location.

d. *Prisoners of war.*

- (1) By organizations to straggler line.
- (2) Collecting point, road junction 531-F (353.4-740.4).

## 3. TRAFFIC.

a. *Circulation.*

See *Annex No 1, Circulation Map* (omitted).

b. *Restrictions.*

- (1) Army reserved motor roads: WESTMINSTER—EMMITSBURG; WOODSBORO—TANEYTOWN.
- (2) No lights will be permitted at night north of the LIBERTY TURNPIKE.

c. *Control.*

- (1) An officer's control post will be established at HARNEY.
- (2) Field trains will be in their bivouacs by 11:30 PM and will so remain until further orders, except for the movement necessary to draw Class I supplies.
- (3) Service trains will remain in bivouac until 11:00 PM, 26 November, except for necessary vehicles moving to refilling points. The road: HARNEY—ALEXANDER, is the only road north of EMMITSBURG-TANEYTOWN ROAD available for movements to the rear prior to 11:00 PM, 26 November.

d. *Construction and maintenance of routes.*

Axial road: HARNEY—crossroads 460-A (352.3-739.2)—road junction 487-D—crossroads 522-D—road junction 489-B—road junction 425—road junction 540-A—road junction 546-C—road junction 632-A.





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*b. Ammunition.*—(1) In locating distributing points for ammunition, locations were selected that would permit of supply from the rear by either wagons or trucks. The distance of the army depots from the distributing points makes this desirable in this situation as it will permit the most efficient use of the transportation available for this work.

(2) The road net and the front of the division make it advantageous to use two distributing points for infantry ammunition. Infantry regimental commanders will very probably assemble their combat trains, after the issue of extra ammunition, along the line: M. Collins—crossroads 522-B—Barlow. The distributing points designated are conveniently located with respect to this line.

(3) One distributing point for artillery ammunition is sufficient in this situation as the light artillery regiments are not widely dispersed. The location selected, north of road junction 529-C, affords a good road circuit for the brigade ammunition train and is centrally located with respect to the regiments that will draw ammunition from it. The regiments of corps artillery located in the zone of action of this division will be supplied by the corps.

*c. Evacuation.*—(1) The location of the hospital station at Harney takes advantage of the favorable road net leading to the front as well as the one to the rear. Evacuation from collecting stations can be accomplished by motor ambulances. Locations along the line: road junction 548-E—crossroads 460-A, would unnecessarily expose the station to the enemy's artillery fire.

(2) The locations selected for collecting stations have water, cover, and concealment. Evacuation to the rear will be easy as good roads lead to both sites. Locations along the line: P. Rearers—road junction 418, would be too exposed to enemy observation and too difficult to evacuate.

(3) The animal collecting station is so located as to facilitate the evacuation of wounded animals from the artillery and combat trains, also to take care of sick animals among the field trains.



(4) Another suitable location for the division cemetery exists in the vicinity of D. F. Plank. As the attack progresses, a more advanced site will be designated to avoid the long haul of dead to the rear.

*d. Traffic.*—(1) Although there are a number of good roads leading to the front in the division zone of action, the heavy traffic towards and from the front within this zone makes the use of a circulation map advisable. Heavy traffic can best be controlled by restricting the direction of traffic, even though the roads are capable of two-way traffic.

(2) The restrictions as to use of lights and the army reserved motor roads should be announced for the guidance of train commanders.

(3) Some of the vehicles of the field trains must go forward after dark on the night of 26 November to furnish Class I supplies to troops on outpost. They will be able to return by 11:30 PM, 27 November. The control exercised after this hour permits drawing Class I supplies, also prevents field trains from interfering with the supply and evacuation of the division or their crowding forward into the zone of the attack at an earlier hour than the situation warrants.

(4) Commencing at dark, 26 November, there will be a very heavy movement of combat troops on practically all roads north of Alloway Creek. In addition, the corps artillery will be moving from its bivouac area to its positions for the attack. It is essential that the service trains do not interfere with this movement. This control insures non-interference with combat units, and permits movements to the rear to refilling points. Movement forward is authorized after 11:00 PM, which enables service trains to follow in rear of the last of the combat units.

(5) An axial road is designated to inform unit commanders which road will be in best repair, also to require the 6th Engineers to concentrate their efforts on this road.

*e. Trains.*—(1) There is no necessity for changing the bivouacs of trains for the attack.

(2) Service trains should be released, as train commanders will need to use them to their maximum capacity in preparation for the attack.



*f. Stragglers.*—The straggler line selected is a well defined landmark. It can be located easily and is in rear of combat units. It will be advanced as the attack moves forward.

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SECTION VI

The Division Artillery in the Attack

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17. PRINCIPLES.—*a.* The mission of the division artillery during the artillery preparation is the destruction or neutralization of the hostile personnel, machine guns, means of signal communication, and lighter works within the area assigned for the preparation. Usually the division artillery places the bulk of its fire on the forward elements of the hostile troops within a zone of approximately 2,000 yards depth, extending beyond the enemy's most advanced elements. The intention is to include within this fire, local reserves and all supporting points capable of bringing rifle or machine gun fire to bear on the assaulting troops at the beginning of the attack or in their approach to and capture of the enemy's most advanced defenses.

*b.* During the attack, the division artillery, by concentrations ahead of the advancing infantry, or by a rolling barrage or both, by counterbattery fire, and by interdiction fire, assists in overcoming resistance and endeavors to prevent the enemy from bringing up reserves or from launching a counterattack. Whatever the type of fire support used, it should be in sufficient depth to neutralize all hostile elements capable of bringing effective rifle or machine gun fire on the assaulting infantry at any phase of the engagement.





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mand, and the attachment of elements of the division artillery to subordinate infantry units.

*e.* In the offensive the division artillery is located as far forward as concealment and security will permit. Its initial positions should permit the artillery not only to support the infantry during the early stages of the attack but to continue this support to as great a depth as possible during later phases of the combat. While located to support both main and secondary attacks, it should at the same time be so disposed that the bulk of the fire can be concentrated in support of the main attack.

18. SITUATION.—*a.* The tactical situation is the same as that in Section II of this chapter.

*b.* On the morning of 26 November, 1926, General E, commanding the 6th Field Artillery Brigade, was informed of the division plan of attack.\* This information and such instructions as were necessary were given to the regimental commanders and the necessary reconnaissance caused to be made.

19. REQUIREMENT.—The formal field order issued by Brigadier General E for the attack.

20. A SOLUTION.—The following field order was issued by Brigadier General E:

6th Field Artillery Brigade,  
HARNEY, MD.,  
26 November, 1926, 2:30 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }  
No 5 }

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62,500; Gettysburg, Fairfield, Taneytown, and Emmitsburg quadrangles. Topographical Map, Gettysburg-Antietam (1925), 1:21,120; Hunterstown, Gettysburg, and Taneytown sheets.

1. *a.* The enemy, estimated at two corps (six to eight divisions and one cavalry division), is organizing a position with main line of resistance along the general line: south of MIDWAY—WHITEHALL—north of TWO TAVERNS—ROUND TOP—PITZER SCHOOL. Other Red forces are approaching and organizing a second position along the north bank of CONEWAGO CREEK.
- b.* (1) Our corps attacks on the front: WHITEHALL, exclusive—TANEYTOWN ROAD, inclusive, with its main effort in the direction: TWO TAVERNS—GRANITE HILL, to seize the high ground south of CONEWAGO CREEK from PINE CHURCH, exclusive, to PLAINVIEW, inclusive. The 5th Division attacks on our right making its main effort on its left and assists the 6th Division

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\*See Section III, paragraph 7.



## THE DIVISION IN THE ATTACK

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in taking the heights west of GRANITE HILL. The III Corps attacks on our left, it places smoke and gas on ROUND TOP and LITTLE ROUND TOP.

- (2) The 6th Division, with its main effort on the right, seizes the heights west of GRANITE HILL and northeast of GETTYSBURG and the high ground southeast of PLAINVIEW.

Time of attack: 6:00 AM.

Line of departure: line held by front line troops.

Zone of action:

East boundary: road junction 525-E (355.8-732.3)—crossroads 528-C—Two TAVERNS—GRANITE HILL—HUNTERSTOWN—BELMONT SCHOOL—(360.3-764.8), all inclusive.

West boundary: BRIDGEPORT—GETTYSBURG—HEIDLEBURG, all inclusive.

Boundary between brigades: road junction 480-C (353.0-738.9), to left brigade—road junction 529-C (353.3-740.5)—crossroads 522-D (353.3-741.6), both to right brigade—road junction 489-B (353.6-745.3), to left brigade—WHITE RUN—hill 627-d (355.0-752.1)—road junction 557-E (355.2-754.8)—road junction 530-M (356.2-757.8)—L. BUSH (357.4-760.3)—crossroads 601-B (359.3-764.3), all to right brigade.

- (3) The 11th Brigade, with 6th Tank Company and one battery 11th Field Artillery attached, attacks on the right making its main effort on its right. Assisted by the 5th Division it seizes the heights west of GRANITE HILL and secures the high ground southeast of PLAINVIEW.

The 12th Brigade, less 24th Infantry, less one battalion, with one battery, 12th Field Artillery, attached, attacks on the left making its main effort on its right. It will secure the ridge south of CONEWAGO CREEK within its zone of action.

- (4) The 202d Field Artillery supports the 6th Division from positions along the stream south of crossroads 491 (353.2-742.7).

The 203d and 204th Field Artillery will support the II Corps from positions in the Vicinity of crossroads 559 (356.3-742.0) (crossroads 549 on Geological Survey).

2. This brigade, with the 913th Field Artillery (75-mm. *portee*) attached, will support the division.

3. a. The 11th Field Artillery:

- (1) Positions, in the area: road junction 571-J (355.4-741.8)—road junction 546-D—crossroads 523-D—M. COLLINS, all exclusive.

- (2) Route: crossroads 428 (354.2-735.9)—crossroads 533-B (354.4-737.5)—DR. HESS—road junction 600-H (355.95-740.35)—road junction 580-H (355.3-740.8)—road junction 571-J (355.4-741.7).

- (3) Mission: support the 11th Brigade. It will be prepared to place the fire of ~~one~~ <sup>both</sup> battalion in the left half of the 5th Division's zone of action.

b. The 12th Field Artillery:

- (1) Positions, in the area: J. SCHWARTZ—road junction 421-B (351.5-742.2), both inclusive—crossroads 491 (353.1-742.8), exclusive.

- (2) Route: HARNEY—BARLOW—road junction 482-C (351.5-740.9)—road junction 421-B (351.5-742.2).

- (3) Mission: support the 12th Brigade. It will be prepared to place the bulk of its fire within the zone of action of the 11th Brigade.

c. The 913th Field Artillery:

- (1) Positions, in the area: crossroads 546-D (354.2-742.6)—crossroads 491—road bend at (353.0-742.0)—F. KING, all inclusive.



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- (2) Route: HARNEY—road junction 522-F (353.6-737.2)—road junction 480-C (353.0-738.9)—KEEFAUVER—D. F. PLANK. Head of column will not pass road junction 500-H (HARNEY) before 6:30 PM.
  - (3) Mission: support the division. It will be prepared to place fire of all batteries in the zone of action of the 11th Brigade. It will fire from initial positions only and will revert to corps control when the forward displacement of the 6th Field Artillery Brigade from initial positions is completed.
  - x. (1) Initial fires.—Prior to 5:00 AM, fires will be limited to that necessary for registration.
  - (2) Preparation.—Artillery preparation participated in by all batteries will commence at 5:00 AM, and from 5:50 AM to 6:00 AM, will be placed with maximum intensity on the enemy's front lines. For objectives, see *Annex No 1, Artillery Preparation* (omitted).
  - (3) Accompanying fires.—For details of accompanying fires, see *Annex No 2, Accompanying Fires* (omitted).
  - (4) Accompanying artillery.—The 11th and the 12th Field Artillery will arrange for one accompanying battery to be attached to the 11th and to the 12th Brigades, respectively, effective at 6:00 AM.
  - (5) Air service.—One battalion will be designated in each regiment to fire on targets reported by the air service.
  - (6) Rates of fire.  
In preparation: 400 rounds per battery per hour.  
During attack: 300 rounds per battery per hour.
  - (7) Occupation of positions.—Movement forward to positions will commence at 5:45 PM. Artillery has priority on roads.
  - (8) Secrecy.—Special effort will be made to keep the enemy in ignorance of the movement.
4. See *Administrative Orders No 15*, 6th Division.
  5. a. Axes of signal communication:  
Brigade: MOUNTJOY CHURCH—ROCKY GROVE SCHOOL—HUNTERSTOWN.  
11th Field Artillery: F. KING—LOW DUTCH ROAD—GRANITE HILL—HUNTERSTOWN.  
12th Field Artillery: R. COSHUN—ST MARY'S RF CHURCH—ROCKY GROVE SCHOOL—D. WIRT.
  - b. Command posts:  
Brigade: MOUNTJOY CHURCH, after 10:30 PM, 26 November.  
11th Field Artillery: F. KING, after 10:30 PM, 26 November.  
12th Field Artillery: R. COSHUN, after 10:30 PM, 26 November.  
913th Field Artillery: D. F. PLANK, after 10:30 PM, 26 November.

E,  
Brigadier General.

## Annexes:

- No 1—Tracing, Artillery Preparation* (omitted).  
*No 2—Tracing, Accompanying Fires* (omitted).

Distribution: (omitted).

21. DISCUSSION.—a. In this situation, an artillery annex to the division order is not considered necessary. Sufficient information for the proper coordination of the artillery





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e. The positions selected for the artillery, in this situation, are farther back than is desirable, particularly when the deep penetration that is expected of the division is considered. They are, however, as far forward as conditions of concealment and security will permit. From the positions designated, the artillery should be able to render effective support to the infantry in its advance to the general line: Mt Vernon School—Wolf Hill. To support the attack beyond that line will necessitate displacing the division artillery forward. It is particularly desirable to have the *portée* regiment well forward so that its fire may be effective as long as possible. Had suitable positions in the forward areas been limited, the *portée* regiment should have been given preference in the selection of positions. As there was sufficient space available, it was possible to locate the three regiments abreast. The area assigned to the 12th Field Artillery is somewhat exposed. This area can be observed by the enemy from Round Top and Little Round Top. However, as observation from these two hills is to be neutralized and the positions are to be occupied at night, it is believed that the batteries of the 12th Field Artillery will not suffer too great losses.

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SECTION VII

The Division Air Service in the Attack

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22. PRINCIPLES.—The reconnaissance conducted by the division air service is practically continuous by day, and is executed, when desirable, at night also. As the division advances towards contact with the enemy, the division air service keeps the commander informed of the activities both of friendly and of hostile troops in the divisional zone of ac-



tion. As contact is gained and battle begun, other duties also devolve on the division air service and a certain amount of specialization occurs. There are, in general, three classes of missions assigned the division air service during or just preceding combat:

*a.* Liaison missions, for the purpose of supplying the division commander with information of his own troops, particularly those in contact with the enemy.

*b.* Contact missions, for a similar purpose regarding the troops of the enemy in contact.

*c.* Artillery missions, for the purpose of locating and maintaining contact with artillery targets, and for the purpose of adjusting artillery fire.

These three missions are often grouped together for convenience, under the term "battle reconnaissance."

23. ACTION OF 6TH DIVISION AIR SERVICE.—The 6th Division gained contact with the enemy on 25 November. At 2:00 PM, on 26 November, orders are received for the attack on the following day. Prior to this attack, the division air service has been engaged in reconnaissance, executed continuously throughout the day, and at intervals during the night. When contact was first gained, battle reconnaissance also was begun. For the attack of 27 November, battle reconnaissance is again ordered. Since the division is greatly interested in the Red position, intensive reconnaissance of this is to be carried out, with particular attention to hostile works and reserves. The observation agencies of the division are reinforced for the impending battle by a balloon company.

24. DISCUSSION.—*a.* It is inherent in the nature of a service, that its work continues along the same general lines throughout any given operation by ground troops. This applies to the service of observation by aircraft. During active operations, observation is carried out as nearly continuously as the means permit. Ground troops will have periods of intensive activity followed by those of comparative repose. This attitude however is not always reflected to the same degree in the work of the division air service. The missions of the latter tend to become more or less



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routine, although, of course, they increase somewhat in intensity during periods of battle. In fact, changes in the air situation, and particularly in the activity of hostile pursuit aviation, will ordinarily have a greater influence on the execution of observation missions than will the needs of ground troops, which remain much the same throughout. Accordingly, the work outlined for the 6th Division Air Service for 27 November, differs very little from that of the preceding days.

b. The 202d Balloon Company is assigned to the division. Its work will consist primarily of observation for artillery. It is also an effective agent of general observation. On this account, it is held under divisional control, although its cooperation with the artillery must be close.