

**Asanga's Chapter on Ethics  
With the Commentary of Tsong-Kha-Pa,  
The Basic Path to Awakening,  
The Complete Bodhisattva**

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Translated by  
**MARK TATZ**

Studies in Asian Thought and Religion  
Volume 4

The Edwin Mellen Press  
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**Asanga's Chapter on Ethics**  
**With the Commentary of Tsong-kha-pa**

## Introduction

Two works are translated here: one Indian, the other Tibetan. The former, or source work, is the Chapter on Ethics by Asanga (third to fourth centuries), an excerpt of some thirty leaves from his *Bodhisattva Stage*. The latter is the *Basic Path to Awakening* written by Tsong-kha-pa (A.D. 1357-1419), a hundred-leaf commentary to the Chapter on Ethics. Tsong-kha-pa incorporates a number of related writings of Indian provenance, as well as the views of Tibetan scholars. All these present the system of ethics of the Mahāyāna, the school of Buddhism known as the Greater Vehicle.

"Ethics" is used here to translate the Sanskrit *śīla*. "Morality" and "moral code" are also employed. Generally, "ethics" represents theory, and "morality" and the like stand for practice. So the latter are used in context of lists of practices--the first of three trainings, for example, and the second of six perfections. This distinction will not take us far in understanding buddhist doctrine, but represents a concession to Western usage, and to the presence in English of two terms with the same referent. This nearly exhausts our concern with definitions of ethics formulated in the moral philosophy of European tradition, e.g. Moore's "general enquiry into the good" (1954:2). Buddhism is a religion, first and foremost; its ethics is not a speculative endeavor, but a basis for achievement. Materials to be presented may be of use in comparative studies, but such investigations will be confined in the present work to establishing the Indian context within which the system first arose.

Nevertheless, the dictum of Plato and Aristotle that "virtue is happiness" may be taken as a starting point for buddhist discussions of ethics. Agreement may also be offered to the view of some Western thinkers

that the science of ethics is not descriptive of human behavior (which would make it anthropology), but normative: concerned with the ideal. <sup>1</sup> A description of buddhist ethics thus requires a definition of spiritual goals and ideals.

### THE INDIAN CONTEXT

The system did not arise full-blown from the mind of the Buddha, complete with institutions, technical terms, and metaphors. Many elements of buddhist ethics are continuous with those of earlier times, although earlier approaches are superseded or radically altered. Some important concepts are already present in Indian discourse. And more generally, Buddhism responds to questions as to the role of religion in society.

Scholars generally agree that Buddhism, as it arises in the sixth century B.C., mingles two streams of Indian religious endeavor: the orthodox *brahmanical* line, based upon the Vedas, and the non-(or even anti-) brahmanical *yogic* or *shramanic* tradition. The system of ethics of the early buddhists can be described in this manner just as fruitfully as their philosophy and meditational practices have already been. Brahmanical orthodoxy consists of participation in ritual actions prescribed in the four Vedas and derivative texts, beginning with sacrifice. The shramanic tradition of wandering yogins is obscure in its origins. The existence of these is suggested in later strata of the Vedas; they stand suspiciously outside of the ritual framework of society. They may represent an indigenous Indian phenomenon predating the aryan invasion and composition of the Vedas, or heterodox elements within the aryan population. The former possibility is suggested by seals discovered in the ruins of Harappan civilization that seem to depict the practice of yoga, whereas nothing like it is known from aryan settlements outside of South Asia.

From a time predating Buddhism by not more than a century or two, the streams of vedicism and shramanism begin to be conmingled, and in later centuries it is impossible to distinguish them. Although the elements of religious practice to be discussed are clearly present in

pre-buddhist India, their assignment to one or the other "stream" must remain tentative.

The core of earliest Vedicism is the sacrificial rite. Slaughter eventually disappeared in mainstream Hinduism within India, replaced by "non-injury" as a pillar of ethics, but the placement of offerings upon an altar remains a central act of hindu and buddhist worship, and renunciation is still the beginning of religious life. The Sanskrit term for the sacrificial rite, *karman*, is a part of most religious and philosophic discourse.

The sacrifice is a simulacrum of the creation of the universe by divinities or cosmic forces. The rite is performed by brahmans, members of a priestly class who transmit class lore from father to son. Brahmans act as intermediary between the patron of the sacrifice and the deities to whom it is directed. The universe is re-created by the deed in a form desired by the patron, who is in effect coercing the gods by prayer and austerity for boons such as male progeny, wealth, and success in warfare; paradise is another recompense of rites correctly performed.

As it develops over time, *karman* is tied to the hardening of the class system of orthodox Indian society. Aryans of the ancient period are divided into three groups: brahmans, rulers, and ordinary persons. The indigenous population is absorbed at the bottom of society as a fourth class, conceived as the feet of the body politic. When liberation is adopted (from shramanic tradition) as a goal, then *karma-yoga*, understood as "acting without expectation of reward," is conceived as a means by which each class may attain it. This philosophy reaches apotheosis in the *Bhagavad-gītā*; its message may be reduced to "find fulfillment within the caste system." In the same period as the *Gītā*, Buddhism also turns its attention to social responsibility by elaborating the previously-known bodhisattva ideal; but Buddhism avoids reference to hierarchical social organization. That side of brahmanism is repugnant to buddhists. In Buddha's response to it is discerned, by Indian nationalists and buddhist modernists of the present century, a buddhist reformism or even social radicalism. They point to the "democratic" statements that he made (as in the introduction to the *Mahāparinibbāna*

scripture, *Dīghanikāya* 16), and to the "republican" model upon which he organized the monastic community. These are insufficient evidence for ascription of a political philosophy to him. But the Buddha frequently insists that his followers replace birth with earned merit as a basis for respect. In the *Vāsetṭha* scripture, he says: <sup>2</sup>

Not by birth does one become an outcaste, not by birth does one become a brahman; by deeds one becomes an outcaste, by deeds one becomes a brahman.

Buddhism is, from this perspective, the most sustained attempt made by Indian society to purge itself of Vedicism, as manifest in ritualism, elitism, and rigid tribal and class boundaries. Even for buddhists, however, the principle of karma--that reward follows action correctly performed--remains a guiding principle of ethics. But the buddhist interpretation of karma belongs to shramanic, not vedic, tradition. Vedicism engenders the notion of God as enforcer of ethics.

Among vedic deities is found Varuna, counterpart of the Greek "Uranus", who like Heaven in ancient Chinese belief acts as guardian of natural and moral order (Sanskrit *ṛta*) and punisher of infractions. But Varuna does not outlast vedic pluralism to assume the mantle of theistic responsibility. First to rise above the other gods is Brahmā, who comes to be worshiped as creator of the universe and foremost member of the brahman class. Early Buddhism, generally respectful of local deities and tolerant of their worship, displays an uncharacteristic scorn for Brahmā and brahmanical Creationism, because Buddhism has committed itself to the theory of karma and rebirth as the basis for ethics. Speculation upon the creation of the universe it regards as a concern lacking spiritual value: unverifiable, Creationism only distracts one from the quest for liberation.

One might say that early buddhists "believe in god," but not as an ethical or religious principle. Karma is creator of the world. God is a ruler, the most powerful being in the universe perhaps, but belief in him is quite distinct from religion, which aims at transcendence of the world. In the *Bodhisattva Stage* we will see (at Ts. 92a) that the

ideal of renunciation held up for emulation is to relinquish the status of being God in order to undertake the religious life.

When Siddhartha, the future buddha, sets out in quest of awakening, abandoning home and country to flee into the forest, he seeks not the forest-dwelling groups of vedic origin (though it is doubtful that he, as a member of the "second" caste, would have been welcome among them), but the *śramaṇas* or *parivrājikas*. Early buddhists identified themselves with this alternative movement, applying the two names to themselves--those who live the homeless life, the seekers, the *religieux*.

The shramanas are mendicants, as are some among the brahmanical hermits, but they are not priests: they disengage themselves from class society. Pande remarks (1974:328) that difficult social conditions drove many persons into "despair of material life" and "vagrant beggary." This represents the brahmanical view of the movement. The distinction that Pande's analysis implies--between sincere seekers and unsuccessful dropouts--is not a convincing one, since the best impetus to the religious life is always disgust with the world. Nevertheless, it is clear that socio-economic insecurities heated the ferment of the age. Buddhist scriptures depict a society evolving rapidly from tribal forms into city-states under oppressive rule by the two higher classes. Forest teachers expounding transcendence seem to have had no shortage of disciples.

Brahmanical texts of the period record a distinction between ethics (*dharma*) as engagement and ethics as withdrawal (*pravṛtti*, *nivṛtti*). "Engagement" leads to the karma-yoga of orthodox Hinduism; the shramanic ethic of withdrawal leads to early Buddhism (and Jainism through all its history). In Chinese society, Confucianism and Taoism have been made to complement one another in much the same way. Like the Chinese but long before, brahmanical thinkers attempted to reconcile the opposing tendencies. Before the time of the Buddha, *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* were applied in Sāṅkhya cosmology to the evolution and devolution of the universe. To later hindus, karma is the ideological basis for social engagement; the quest for liberation is a matter of *jñāna*--knowledge. In response to challenges posed by heterodox jain and bud-

dhist movements, brahmanism adopts the theory of four stages of life. A man devotes his life half to personal development, half to social responsibility. (A woman is fully circumscribed, of course, by social duty). In the first stage, studentship, a boy lives with his teacher in a state of *brahmacarya*, celibate purity. When his education has been completed, he marries and becomes a householder to have sons of his own. During the third stage he yields to his sons but remains in the family to counsel them. In old age he is free to pursue higher goals; he breaks family ties to wander as a mendicant. Thus the shramanic movement is assimilated to orthodoxy. In classical China a like attempt is made to reserve the state of contemplative withdrawal for the years of retirement. Thus the national religions enjoin social involvement while granting scope for individual quest. The Greater Vehicle is a buddhist attempt to establish such a balance, but Buddhism emphasizes salvation to such a high degree that its efforts to combine engagement and withdrawal resemble the swings of a pendulum. Brahmanical movements that emerged at the time struck a balance with a success that was evident through the time of the movement for independence. In Brahmanism, withdrawal has come to connote celibacy, poverty, and non-injury combined with a quest for the peace of the absolute; ideally, it is conducted in such a way that it does not detract from social duty or disturb the functioning of caste society, and despite some modern innovations it is generally restricted to male members of the class that "owns" it by tradition.

The shramanas are more free than their brahmanical counterparts to experiment. Of lasting importance is their combination of karma with the theory of rebirth as the basis for ethics. Materialist doctrines are also attested in the ancient period; these deny the law of karmic causality and the possibility of a transcendent state. In formulating his own systems of theory and practice, the Buddha incorporates much from the shramanas, claiming at the same time to steer a middle way between absolutism and nihilism in philosophy, and between self-indulgence and asceticism in lifestyle.

The homeless ones share with the brahmins a concern for purity. The brahman student cultivates purity of lifestyle, *brahmacarya*. Ritual

purity is prerequisite for conducting the sacrifice; class purity shields one from pollution by dark-skinned aboriginals. These concerns are covered by detailed codes of touching, eating, and bathing. Buddhists refer to the brahmins as *tīrthikas*--those who frequent the sacred bathing places, *tīrthas*--because of their addiction to ritual bathing. Among the shramana it is widely believed that liberation from continued rebirth depends upon purification from karma, for rebirth in the world is the result of past deeds that have bound one to it: good deeds as well as bad. Practices based on such a view may lead to quietism and inactivity, because the yogin wishes not to create any karmic fruition for the future, and to asceticism, because he wishes to purify himself of karma from the past. This may be considered the extreme of sacrifice and renunciation: the sacrifice of all activity and, in meditation, of all thought. Among the Jains, karma is conceived as a subtle material that must be expunged by physical acts: in the highest instance, by starving oneself to reach nirvana upon death, depriving the process of rebirth of any sustenance. The early buddhists adopt karmic causality as a rational basis for individual and collective responsibility. The criticism that they make of the jain understanding of karma is that action, even when performed by the body, is motivated by mind: it is essentially mental. The vehicle by which deeds influence the future is not a material substance (for which one would need to postulate a "soul" as receptable) but a habit of thought.

Siddhartha is influenced by shramanic theories of purification, and engages for a long time in fasting. Finding it nothing but debilitating, he resumes eating and turns to meditation as a path. Losing his followers for his "slackness," he later regains them by formulating the middle way between asceticism and indulgence.<sup>3</sup>

Early buddhists are criticized by their peers for their relatively mild standard of living. In contrast to many others who went naked, the buddhist shramanas own several robes, not to mention sundries such as bowl, shaving mirror, and mat. Although never adopting nudity, buddhists are not insensitive to criticism. There are calls within the community to institute a more strict code of discipline. Unstated in such

disputes must lie concern for the public image of the buddhist religieus, for renunciation is a sign of worthiness to lay donors. Then again, the passage of centuries may see a slackening of austerity in real terms, with the adoption of fixed dwelling-places (the emergence of true monasticism) and attenuation of the mendicant lifestyle that was characteristic of buddhists in the shramanic age. The Buddha compromises the respectability of his order in another important way--and not without internal opposition--but establishing an unprecedented order for women.

#### LAY AND MONASTIC IN EARLY BUDDHISM

The forest-dwellers discussed above represent a proto-monastic stage of religious life. For their habit, they wear badges of renunciation such as matted hair or nakedness, corresponding to the non-renunciant hair tuft and sacred thread of the brahman. The buddhist monk displays humility with patched robes and shaven head and face.

Saddhatissa (1970:82) objects to the term "monk" as translation for *bhikkhu* (and implicitly, to "nun" for *bhikkhuni*), on the grounds that "he is not bound by any vow; he may, in fact, leave the order any time he pleases." But the buddhist monk is certainly bound by a vow to adhere to the disciplinary code, and although he may "return" his vow and leave the order, he is considered to be "defeated" if he does and may not rejoin. Saddhatissa suggests "mendicant"--a more literal, but limited translation that describes only one aspect of his lifestyle and fails to distinguish him from renunciates of other schools.

The reasons for Saddhatissa's objection to "vow" are unclear. Perhaps he follow other modern intepreters in seeking to ignore the formalistic side of early Buddhism. They point to the Buddha's designation of "adherence to rules and rites" as a false view, and to his counsel that the disciplinary code might be altered after his passing to suit changing circumstances. The sense of "adherence," however, is that rules and rites constitute falsity when they are considered to be a means to liberation by themselves. The Buddha's statement is a critique of brahmanical orthodoxy. Rites are not to be regarded as inherently erroneous;

early buddhists devised a number of them, beginning with ordination and fortnightly recitation of the disciplinary code. The Buddha himself ordained monks with the call, "Come with me, monk!" or with an instantaneous transformation of the individual into robes and shaven head. The miraculous nature of the latter act (in scriptural accounts) accentuates the change from one mode of life to the other. His followers underscored it with a ceremony.

Monastic rules of the buddhists and jains broadly resemble rules for the mendicant in the brahmanical law books of Gautama and Baudhāyana.<sup>4</sup> But the establishment of a renunciate's code cannot be dated earlier than the jains. In making a formal separation between monastic and lay--professional religieuses and their patrons--the buddhists and jains incorporate into new communities the contradictions of their society. Lay ethics, broadly speaking, derives from the vedic background: it is predicated on the simple desire for continuation of the good life after death, or its improvement on a paradisaical plane. This, the most powerful religious motivation of any age, is combatted energetically as a goal for the monastic, because he or she should inherit the tradition of liberation through knowledge. In the story of Nanda, half brother to the Buddha (Johnston 1975), the hero is induced to desert his wife and join the order by the promise of even more lovely female companionship as a karmic reward in heaven. He is thereafter guided to overcome attachment to sense-pleasure entirely, by being shown a further rebirth in hell. The moral: one should seek complete liberation from the round of rebirth. For monks, purity of lifestyle is not enough, for it will lead one only as far as paradise (and transic meditation will lead to a non-material plane of rebirth); they must bear in mind the shramanic goal of liberation, and practice forms of meditation that will lead to wisdom. Precepts offered to the laity for practice bear the promise of obtaining a higher state of rebirth as a human or divine being, and avoiding a lower state of rebirth as hell-dweller, ghost, or animal. Spiro (1970) distinguishes "kammic buddhism" from "nibbanic buddhism" based upon the observation of lay and monastic goals in modern Burma. Furthermore, the cardinal virtue for a layperson is generosity. The hea-

venly reward for it in Buddhism resembles the reward promised the patron of a vedic sacrifice, and much of the rivalry between brahmins and buddhist monks throughout history may be explained as competition for the same royal and wealthy patrons.

The laic takes a vow of five precepts: to refrain from murder, theft, sexual misconduct (basically: adultery), telling lies, and drinking liquor. This list has evolved from brahmanical listings such as the following: not stealing gold, drinking liquor, lying with the wife of one's guru, killing a brahmin, or associating with someone who does such things.<sup>5</sup> Buddhism has thus developed universal law out of guidelines for students of the priestly class. A later set of buddhist precepts shared by lay and monastic is the "ten unwholesome courses of action": prohibitions of murder, theft, sexual misconduct, lying, harsh speech, slander, idle chatter, covetousness, ill will, and false view. According to Asanga, these "shared precepts" comprise natural morality: to commit such deeds is "reprehensible by nature", inasmuch as they may be motivated by the three defilements, because they cause harm to others.<sup>6</sup> Most of the monastic code consists of prescribed, or legislated morality: it has evolved as case law from rulings made by the Buddha upon cases brought to his attention; to infringe these guidelines is reprehensible only "by precept."<sup>7</sup> Rules such as fasting in the afternoon, keeping celibacy, and owning only three sets of robes do not prevent injury to others; they have been prescribed by the Buddha to establish a style of life that is conducive to spiritual development.

The laity may participate in monasticism to some extent. Laypersons may undertake prescribed morality by the custom of *upavāsa*, adhering for one day (twice monthly) to what are essentially the rules of a novice monk.<sup>8</sup> Another instance of mingled lifestyles is the *gomi-upasāka*, who lives by lay precepts with the addition of celibacy.

The monastic code (*vinaya*) is highly exoteric, providing a public standard by which lay donors may know the value of a monastic. The monk who lives by the code is advertised by robes, and by the demure aspect that he wears during his morning begging round. Many items of the disciplinary code were introduced in response to criticism by laity:

Now at that time the nuns anointed their faces, rubbed ointments on their faces, put chunam on their faces, smeared red arsenic on their faces, painted their bodies, painted their faces, painted their bodies and faces. The people murmured, were indignant, and complained, saying: "As the women who are still enjoying the pleasures of the world do!" They told this matter to the Lord, [who declared,] "A nun is not to anoint her face..." etc. "Whoever does so, shall be guilty of a misdeed." <sup>9</sup>

The Vinaya as literature consists of rules for nuns and monks, prerequisites for ordination, and formal procedures. Paracanonical works include the *Prātimokṣa-sūtra*, a digest of infractions, and the *Karmavacānā*, formal acts. Vinaya also includes the ceremony for taking lay precepts; <sup>10</sup> it is preceded by "taking refuge" in the Precious Three: Buddha, Doctrine, and Community. From the lay state one may become a novice by ordination (*pravrajyā*); one is fully ordained by *upasam-padā*. <sup>11</sup> A novice is expected to live with his preceptor, learning to keep his vows, for a minimum of five years.

The *prātimokṣa* for monks contains eight categories of infraction: (1) defeat, entailing expulsion, which has four possible causes: sexual intercourse, theft, murder of a human being, or false claim to spiritual achievement; (2) suspension from the community: thirteen items beginning with wilful emission of semen; (3) indeterminate: two items bearing upon intimacy with a laywoman, for which the penalty depends upon circumstances; (4) forfeiture: thirty items concerning illegal acquisition of robes and other requisites; (5) transgression: ninety items (ninety-two in the Pāli version) beginning with ordinary lying (as opposed to defeat no. 4, above); these are purged by confession; (6) confessable: four items; (7) etiquette: from seventy-five to one hundred and thirteen items, beginning with proper arrangement of robes; and (8) seven ways to settle disputes.

\* \* \*

"There is more to religion than ethics," complained Conze of his German Protestant upbringing (1979:60). The early buddhists, on the other hand,

learned from the failures of other shramanic schools to begin with ethics and then to undertake experiments in yoga. According to *The Path of Purification* (VM ch.1), ethics is the beginning of the path to freedom from sense-desire. So morality is the first of three trainings (*śikṣā*), a gradation found in the earliest strata of scripture.<sup>12</sup> Morality in this context consists of guarding verbal and physical conduct by means of the precepts laid down in the disciplinary code, the "bases of training" (*śikṣā-pada*), and proceeding to restraint of the senses and thence to meditation. An example of the bases of training:

On seeing a visible object with the eye, he apprehends neither the signs nor the particulars through which, if he left the eye faculty unguarded, evil and unprofitable states of covetousness and grief might invade him, he enters upon the way of its restraint, he guards the eye faculty, he undertakes restraint of the eye faculty. On hearing a sound with the ear... On smelling an odour with the nose... On tasting a flavour with the tongue... On touching a tangible object with the body... On cognizing a mental object with the mind, he apprehends neither the signs nor the particulars through which, if he left the mind faculty unguarded, evil and unprofitable states of covetousness might invade him, he enters upon the way of its restraint, he guards the mind faculty, he undertakes restraint of the mind faculty. (Buddhaghosa, VM 1:42 from scripture, tr. Nānamoli)

One guards the mind, along with the five outer senses, "with mindfulness and awareness." This is virtually meditation; and success in meditation brings about mental concentration, a firm basis for study. Success in study brings wisdom, and in its train come destruction of defilement, psychic powers, understanding of doctrine, and liberation. Hence the three trainings build the path.

In the buddhist conception of karma, it is not the evil deed that causes an evil outcome for its perpetrator, but the motivation. Three basic drives, termed "defilements" (*kleśa*), motivate misdeeds: desire-attachment, aversion, and bewilderment; and there are variants such as

pride and rancor. So long as these remain latent, they produce no karma and are considered instinctual (*anuśaya*). When they give rise to action, they become "outflow" or "involvement" (*āśrava, paryavasthāna*). A wilful action implants a karma formation (*saṃskāra*) in the mind; these formations develop into habit or instinct that will provoke similar conduct in the future. Morality is understood as action not motivated by any defilement, but by wholesome elements of mind; moral conduct is fostering life in place of murder, generosity in place of theft, and other merit-producing deeds known as "good" or "wholesome" roots (*kuśala-mūla*).

Self-restraint is formalized by making a vow (*saṃvara*). The act of vow-making creates its own instinct. To act morally in accordance with a vow is considered more beneficial than to act morally without one, because the moral conduct is associated with progress toward a higher goal. <sup>13</sup>

#### BODHISATTVA ETHICS

The interpretation of "purity" is to some extent socially conditioned, and can be expected to vary. We have seen that the Buddha steered a middle way between opposing tendencies; it never was the intent of buddhists to renounce clothing or to starve themselves to death, nor to pass the years standing on one foot or lying on beds of nails. For the buddhist, celibacy and the other rules that determine the behavior of monastics are artificial constructs: real purification occurs in the mind.

Before the lapse of many centuries, however, important elements of the monastic community began to scout purity of lifestyle as a good in itself. The bodhisattva ideal is in part a reaction to that elitist attitude; in part also it represents a movement in Indian society to involve the masses more centrally in spiritual life, a movement that also gave rise to devotionalist (*bhakti*) cults within Hinduism. In Buddhism the pendulum swings toward the ethics of engagement. The distinction between lay and monastic is intentionally blurred; important new scriptures feature a layman or woman as protagonist (*Vimalakīrti, Queen Śrīmālā*). A striking development in the Greater Vehicle is the expectation that

the bodhisattva be soiled with samsara. (The Buddha himself associated with individuals who were ritually impure, according to prevailing social mores, such as the courtesan Āmrāpālī.) This is not the way of the lesser-vehicle monk. He is restricted to ethics that will effect self-purification as rapidly as possible, "as though his head and robes were set on fire." The bodhisattva exhausts the defilements (and "brings good roots to maturity") more gradually, because he or she must in the process develop qualities that enable him to help others (*Upāliparipṛcchā* scripture, cited Ts. 59b, 61a below). The bodhisattva does not expect to reach buddhahood for three "incalculable aeons."

A yet more radical rejoinder to cosmetic purity occurs later in Tantrism, where even celibacy is sometimes jettisoned, and we will see Tsong-kha-pa attempting to reinstate a distinction between lay and monastic that had broken down in Tibet.

The Greater Vehicle announces "more profound and extensive" goals. "Profound" refers to philosophy, "extensive" to ethics. Stridently in many scriptures, as typifies a minority movement struggling to establish its authenticity, adherents to what they themselves call the Greater Vehicle denigrate their predecessors, referred to as auditors (*śrāvaka*), disciples (*śiṣya*), or adherents to the limited vehicle (*prādeśika-yāna*). In this way they expose the narrowness of that path while acknowledging the validity of its scriptures and its closeness to the historical buddha. The path of independent buddhas (*pratyekabuddha*) is sometimes also counted as "lesser vehicle."

(Independent buddhas have a goal, independent buddhahood, that is slightly higher than the arhatship of the auditors. Like the auditors, they overcome defilement, both latent and manifest. But they do so without the aid of a buddha's instruction, at least in their last lifetime. Rather than listening to teachings of the four noble truths, they discover the law of karmic causation independently. They are described chiefly in the *jātakas*, composed two or three centuries after the time of the Buddha. There they are analagous to the rishis, mythic forbears, of brahmanical lore; their presence in the world before the appearance of the Buddha attests to the timelessness of the buddhist doctrine of

causality, independent of a buddha to proclaim it. The vehicle of the independent buddhas is not at issue in greater-vehicle controversy; in Asanga's compendium, the *Stages of Spiritual Practice [Ybh]*, they are disposed of in a page or two.)<sup>14</sup>

The bodhisattva vehicle is distinguished from others chiefly by its goals. From the Chapter on Ethics (Ts. 67b):

Then again, the bodhisattva does not train himself as do the auditors in what the Lord has established for auditors, beginning as they do with meager aims, few deeds, and dwelling in little concern, to be reprehensible by precept. Why so? The auditor excels in being intent upon his own welfare and in disregarding the welfare of others. In undertaking the welfare of others he has meager aims and few deeds; he dwells in little concern. The bodhisattva, for whom the welfare of others is paramount, does not excel in undertaking others' welfare with meager aims and few deeds, while dwelling in little concern.

The goal of a bodhisattva is nothing less than the liberation of all sentient beings (*sattva*), bringing them along with him to awakening (*bodhi*). One has become a *bodhisattva* by developing a resolve or aspiration (*prañidhāna*) An early Mahayana scripture that explores the implications of this for ethics is the "Skill in Means" (*Upāyakauśalya*). In it the bodhisattva is portrayed as a monk who dwells among his fellows while harboring an additional aspiration that alters the very nature of the endeavor. For him the four monastic defeats are not categorically defeats; so long as he maintains the resolve to reach "full buddhahood" (liberation with the capacity to liberate others), the most horrendous deed (i.e., uncelibacy) will not result in loss of station. Conversely, to lose the resolve is to cease to be a bodhisattva. The "skill in means" of a bodhisattva--his compassionate motivation--supersedes all other precepts.<sup>15</sup>

Ethics, in the broader view that is taken by the *Bbh*, is not merely the foundation of higher trainings: it encompasses all. The bodhisattva is ethically bound to engage in meditation and in studies leading to concentration and wisdom, because they are necessary to achieve full

buddhahood. The Chapter on Ethics is virtually a condensation of the whole of the *Bodhisattva Stage*; in it topics of other chapters are adduced as a bodhisattva's duty. The Indian commentators say (cited Ts. 8a): "For the auditors, the three trainings represent: wholesomeness at the beginning, the middle, and the end. For the bodhisattva, ethics by itself includes them all." And again (Ts. 13a): "Both [the other] trainings are fulfilled by ethics." At the same time, "ethics" is also used in its more limited sense of "moral conduct." The *Bbh* says (Ts. 15b): "He is not satisfied with the vow of ethics, but based upon and established within morality, he achieves the measureless concentrations of the bodhisattva." This limited sense, however, refers specifically to *prātimokṣa*--the first aspect of bodhisattva ethics. Ts. comments: "This shows that there is no successful ethics when you are satisfied with mere morality and fail to seek higher qualities." In the Greater Vehicle, mere restraint does not make for good character; it will lead to a higher rebirth or to individual liberation, but for the welfare of others to be effected, positive qualities are also required.

The term *prātimokṣa*, in *Bbh* usage, refers to lay and monastic precepts together; it constitutes the bottom third of bodhisattva ethics. So ethics has three aspects: the ethics of the vow (*saṃvara*), the ethics of collecting wholesome factors (*kuśaladharmasamgraha*), and the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings (*sattvārthakriyā*). The first is described as the bodhisattva's *prātimokṣa*; it constitutes the ethics of withdrawal and, in the words of the *Bbh* (Ts. 97b), "brings about mental stability." The second consists of the six perfections (giving, morality, patience, vigor, meditation, and wisdom) and other bases of training; it brings about the "maturation" of the bodhisattva to buddhahood. The third consists of service to others.

Tsong-kha-pa explains their order (9a): the first aspect is shared with the auditors, and forms a basis for the other two (the ethics of engagement) which are specific to bodhisattvas. The order of the latter two "is determined from the doctrine that it is impossible to save others when you are still bound and to calm others when you are not calm; therefore the welfare of others will not be effected until wholesomeness has first been accumulated."

Jetāri (tenth century) identifies the three as grades of practice. The beginner focuses on the ethics of the vow, someone who is on the stage of "coursing in devotion" focuses on collecting wholesomeness, and someone who has attained the [first of ten] stages concentrates on others' welfare. Tsong-kha-pa points out, however, that one must learn to help others from the very start--although he admits that actual assistance is problematic before one has attained a high stage (24a).

The candidate for receiving the bodhisattva vow, as by the ceremony given in the *Bbh*, is not necessarily doing so for the first time. One may well have taken the vow in a previous life, even if one does not remember having done so. Retaking it, the *Bbh* says (Ts. 62b), is only a refreshment of memory; so long as one's aspiration has not been relinquished, etc., it is not a new undertaking. One's inherent capacity for bodhisattvahood will be stimulated by hearing of the qualities of the bodhisattvas or by meeting with a spiritual adviser. Taking the vow in such a case is merely a verbal convention. Some persons (or even other sorts of creature) are born "natural" bodhisattvas, belonging to the family (*gotra*) of buddhas and bodhisattvas. They are impelled along the bodhisattva path by the power of past causes, the good roots they have planted in previous lives.<sup>16</sup> This is not true of prātimokṣa vows: they are taken for the duration of one's life, at most, and are relinquished upon dying. It is unimaginable that prātimokṣa vows may be carried into another life, because one might be reborn in a state--as an animal, for example, or a god--in which monasticism and prescribed morality are unknown.

Precondition for receiving the bodhisattva vow, therefore, is that the candidate has made an aspiration to attain buddhahood. The *Bbh* refers to the candidate as "either lay or monastic," and commentators discuss whether or not holding a prātimokṣa vow (as lay or monastic) is also a precondition. Differing views on whether prātimokṣa can be considered a basis for bodhisattva vow are discussed at length by Tsong-kha-pa (9a-12b) and Dragpa Gyaltzen (Tatz 1982a:22-23). In my opinion, the *Bbh* does not intend it to be. The phrase "either lay or monastic" is descriptive rather than normative; it indicates that bodhisattvas tend to be lay or monastic, whereas auditors are almost invariably monks or nuns. The

candidate need not even be formally a buddhist (by having taken the vow of refuge) before taking the bodhisattva vow, for in taking it he will in any case commit himself to prātimokṣa as the first part of bodhisattva ethics. During the ceremony, furthermore, the candidate will be questioned by the teacher as to his aspiration for buddhahood, but there will be no such interrogation as to whether he has taken and kept a prātimokṣa vow.

The candidate must be male, according to the *Mahāvastu* (Rahula 1978: 54). But this text is proto-Mahayana, not part of the mainstream. The *Bbh* states that the bodhisattva (after having taken the vow) belongs to one of the seven prātimokṣa classes, of which four are female (Ts. 9a).

Tsong-kha-pa ascribes invention of the ceremony for taking the bodhisattva vow to Nāgārjuna (second century), pointing to his *Ceremony for Generation of the Thought*.<sup>17</sup> According to its title, however, this is a ceremony for making the aspiration, not for taking the vow. This does indeed indicate its early date, for the two steps are distinguished only after ceremonies for taking the vow appear, formulating the bodhisattva code of conduct along the lines of monastic vinaya. The ceremony contained in the *Bbh* may be the first vow-ceremony proper. In distinguishing between aspiration and vow-taking, two aspects of the thought of awakening (*bodhicitta*) are adduced. The initial resolve is called the aspiration thought (*praṇidhicitta*), and taking the vow is the first step to implementation of that thought, called the implementation thought (*prasthānacitta*). Nāgārjuna in his ceremony mentions practice of the six perfections, and this indicates to Tsong-kha-pa that his ceremony comprises implementation as well as aspiration.

Tsong-kha-pa also points out that the *Bbh* does not provide a ceremony for making the aspiration. He regards this as a deficiency, and recommends aspiration ceremonies composed by later scholars. Notably, Atiśa (Dīpaṅkaraśrījñāna, A.D. 982-1054) presents a ceremony in two parts: generation of the thought and taking the vow. This includes the "seven limbs of religious service" (offerings, etc.) from the *Bhadracari* aspiration, and is followed by most ceremonies in Tibet. Masters of the Sakya (*sa skya*) tradition instruct the candidate to recite the *Bhadracari*

three times at the conclusion.<sup>18</sup> The *Bhadracarī*, a part of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* scripture, is the locus classicus for aspiration, and commentators have analyzed its ritual structure.<sup>19</sup> That it predates the *Bbh*, however, is doubtful, and it does not appear that Asanga considered the development of aspiration to be material for ceremony.

However that may be, the procedure of *cittotpāda* in two steps has become fundamental to Tibetan practice. According to Ngari Panchen (sp. Mnga'-ris Paṅ-chen, 1487-1542), each step entails trainings to which the candidate is obligated. The aspiration thought entails general training: to forswear abandonment of sentient beings and to be ever mindful of their welfare, to gather the resources of merit and gnosis that will result in buddhahood, to increase the thought of awakening by meditation upon love, compassion, etc., and to reject the "four dark factors" and adopt "four bright ones" that the *Kāśyapa Chapter* prescribes to enable the bodhisattva to remember the vow after he dies and is reborn. The implementation thought entails all the trainings prescribed by the *Bbh*.<sup>20</sup>

In ascribing the original ceremony to Nāgārjuna, Tsong-kha-pa must also establish that the system of the Mādhyamika philosopher is no different from that of Asanga, a Yogācārin. Without naming the proponents of the view that the systems do differ, he calls it "a horrendous misconstrual" (28b, see also 46a). The view belongs to Sakya Pandita (1182-1251) and his commentators.

According to Sakya Pandita (*Sdom gsum* 15a), the Greater Vehicle offers two systems of *cittotpāda*: the Mādhyamika, and the Cittamātra (or Yogācāra). They differ in philosophic view, in ceremony, in transgression, in rectification of transgression, and in rules of training. Go-ram-pa (1429-1489) traces both systems (*Spyi don* 26a1-6). The Mādhyamika system, he says, stems from Mañjuśrī and Nāgārjuna as original teacher and candidate, continuing through Śāntideva and Puṇyaśrī to the Sakya hierarchs; Sakya Pandita followed the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (abbrev. *BCA*) of Śāntideva in composing the ceremony that is used by his descendants. The Yogācāra system stems from Maitreya and Asanga through Candragomin down to Atiśa and the Kadampa *geshes*; Dragpa Gyaltzen (uncle to Sakya Pandita) followed the ceremony of the *Bbh*.

Further details, he says, may be gathered from the *Cittotpāda* of Sakya Pandita and the *BCA*-commentary of Rinchen Pay (Rin-chen-dpal, fifteenth century).

Go-ram-pa himself relates the differences briefly in a separate commentary.<sup>21</sup> As preparation for the vow, the Mādhyamika system provides the full seven limbs of worship from the *Bhadracari*; the Yogācāra offers only the first two (prostration and offering). Furthermore, the Mādhyamika has no inquiry as to impediments. In the vow itself, the Mādhyamika combines aspiration and implementation in a single formula repeated three times; the Yogācāra presents the aspiration first, then a study of the bodhisattva collection of scriptures and the trainings, and finally the implementation thought, recited by the master with the disciple listening. In the conclusion of the ceremony, the Mādhyamika candidate is made to meditate upon his own satisfaction and that of others; the Yogācāra has an announcement. As to seminal transgressions: the Mādhyamika has fourteen, which accords with the *Ākāśagarbha* scripture; the Yogācāra has four, according with the *Twenty Verses* of Candragomin. For rectification, the Mādhyamika has confession as it appears in the *AG*; the Yogācāra follows verse 8 of the *TV*. In rules of training, the Mādhyamika follows the *BCA* and the Yogācāra follows the *TV* with its forty-two (*sic*) misdeeds.

The two systems are intended for different types of person, according to the Sakyas, as the *prātimokṣa* has lay and monastic forms (Go-ram-pa, *Rnam-bshad* 68b.1-2). For example, the "seven limbs" of preparation in the Mādhyamika form are equivalent to taking the *pratimokṣa* as preliminary in the Yogācāra version (*Spyi-don* 28b.3-4), but the latter is a more difficult undertaking. Hence the Mādhyamika *cittotpāda* is more accessible to most sentient beings. Those who are sinful cannot create the thought of awakening by taking the Yogācāra form of the vow, just as seeds will not sprout in a cold climate. The Mādhyamika form is like a seed of barley: it will grow in any climate. Still, one should bear in mind that ultimate *bodhicitta* (that is to say, awakening itself) is produced by the power of meditative development, not by any ceremony. Neither ceremony is more than a verbal convention (Sakya Pandita, *Sdon-gsum* 15a-b).

The contention that there are two differing systems that correspond to Mādhyamika and Yogācāra is disputed by Tsong-kha-pa and the Gelugpa. They maintain that bodhicitta is everywhere the same. Furthermore, they say, Atiśa received the bodhisattva vow from Dharmakīrti, a Cittamātrīn, although he himself held the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika view. The lineage according to Gelugpas descends from Śāntideva to Dharmakīrti, Atiśa, Drōn-tōn and Geshe Po-to-ba.<sup>22</sup>

Teachers of his lineage prior to Tsong-kha-pa, however, do seem to distinguish the two systems. Atiśa recommends the *Bbh* ceremony for taking the vow from a lama, and the ceremony of Śāntideva for taking the vow by oneself.<sup>23</sup> And Shar-ba-pa, who follows Po-to-ba at A.D. 1070-1141, composes a ceremony to reconcile the two (BA 272). The conclusion presents itself that Tsong-kha-pa initiates the controversy, on less than solid grounds, as part of a general antipathy to the Sakya school.

The issue does not interest authors of Nyingma and Kagyu tradition. Dharmasrī (1654-1717) and Chökyi Wangchug simply state that the seminal transgressions of the *AG* and the *SS*, which they number at eighteen, are equivalent to the four of the *Bbh*, and that the system of Śāntideva should be followed.<sup>24</sup>

The ceremony for undertaking the bodhisattva vow that is outlined in the *Bbh* is patterned upon the ceremony for bhikṣu ordination. Many elements of the earlier form are adopted: for example, the preliminary Inquiry as to Impediments, the subsequent Announcement to the Community, and the Assent of the Community. As in monastic ordination, the candidate receives a code of obligations. The *Bbh* in this chapter refers to itself as the code to the collection of bodhisattva scriptures; it leaves a clear impression that the ceremony for taking the bodhisattva vow supplants that of monastic ordination. This has occurred in Japan, and to some extent in Tibet, where most "monks" remain novices life-long, and there is no tradition of higher ordination whatsoever for nuns.

The obligations that the vow entails are described in a positive way when the Chapter elaborates the three aspects of ethics. Following the vow-ceremony, they are summarized by a single guideline: The bodhisat-

тва should deduce by reasoning, and learn by the study of scripture, what is fitting and what is not for a bodhisattva to do (Ts. 37b). Then the candidate is given a catalogue of infractions (the bodhisattva *prātimokṣa*): a set of interdictions that correspond to the injunctions previously described.

There are two classes of bodhisattva infraction: defeats (more precisely, deeds that are "analogous to monastic defeats"), and misdeeds. Defeats are four, beginning with "praising oneself and deprecating another out of desire for gain and respect" (Ts. 40a). There are three possible degrees of involvement in the act of defeat. "Lesser" and "medium involvement" do not result in relinquishment of the vow, so these are classified as misdeeds. Greater involvement consists of "making a regular practice of [the deed]..., being pleased with and glad of it and having a view for its good qualities." The four defeats are correlated with the four monastic defeats by the commentaries (Ts. 43a), but the *Bbh* specifies that unlike the monk who has been defeated, the bodhisattva may re-take the vow within the same lifetime. That is why they are only "analogous to monastic defeat."

The vow may also be relinquished by abandonment of the bodhisattva aspiration (understood also as adopting the lesser-vehicle aspiration), thus abandoning the welfare of others. If the bodhisattva neither relinquishes the aspiration, nor commits one of the four defeats, he or she will retain the bodhisattva vow wherever he may be reborn.

Misdeeds may be defiled or undefiled, depending upon their motivation; in addition, circumstances may render them innocuous. Mitigating circumstances consist of motivation by laziness, indolence, carelessness, and absentmindedness (as opposed to defiling enmity, resentment, envy, conceit, lack of faith, and disrespect); exculpatory circumstances are not having taken the vow, distraught thinking, and unanticipated suffering (Ts. 39b). There is no fault in any deed done out of desire-attachment, because this is allied with compassion and is therefore the very duty of a bodhisattva (Ts. 84a-b).

Misdeeds are presented in two categories. The first set consists of failures to collect wholesomeness, and is subdivided according to

the six perfections. The second set fails to accomplish the welfare of sentient beings. Three statements in context of the perfection of morality are of special interest in delineating the bodhisattva's relationship to prātimokṣa vow and to prescribed and natural morality. The summary lines of the *Twenty Verses* are (TV 11abc, Ts. 67a):

Not training for the sake of others' faith,  
 Doing little for the welfare of sentient beings;  
 With mercy there is no [deed] without virtue.

The first two lines indicate faults for a bodhisattva; the third is understood as a permission.

In the first instance, the bodhisattva must train himself just as the auditors do. When ordained as a monastic, he keeps the monastic rule as legislated by the prātimokṣa, living in accord with prescribed morality, so as to comply with the expectations of the laity as to how a monk should behave.

Even the auditors, intent as they are upon their own welfare, train themselves in trainings that do not fail to guard the minds of others, that create faith in the faithless and develop it further in the faithful. How much more so must the bodhisattvas, intent as they are upon the welfare of others!

The commentaries specify several monastic transgressions not to be broken, including drinking alcohol and eating at an improper hour.

In the second instance, the bodhisattva must not fail to break such rules when the welfare of others is at stake. For example, he will commit forfeiture infractions of the prātimokṣa, collecting more begging bowls, bedding, and the like, than he requires, or accepting donations of money. Śāntaraṣita says of this guideline, "By maintaining both vows, one should be understood to have relinquished the welfare of others, and to be intent on one's own."

The final point is the most striking. The bodhisattva may also transgress the precepts of natural morality in order to accomplish the welfare of others, provided that his intention be purely compassionate and he be acting with skill in means. So the bodhisattva has permission

to commit the seven unvirtuous courses of action that are done with body and speech. (The three of mind--covetousness, ill will, and false view--are not of course at issue, since they exclude compassion.) He will commit murder, overthrow (steal the power of) a government, commit adultery (provided that he is not a monastic), and the rest.

Ultimately, the philosophic relativity of the Greater Vehicle has its counterpart in ethics. The bodhisattva is expected to abstain from what is sinful and "unrestrained," but his over-riding concern is to help others even when it means committing what is "sinful" in terms of prescribed *prātimokṣa*, or even in terms of natural morality. Herein lies a paradox of the bodhisattva path that has been noticed before, by Ruegg for example in several scriptures (1969: 110-11): the auditor, fixed upon the ultimate goal of nirvana, bases himself upon conditioned things; the bodhisattva is not "impeccable" in his moral conduct, for his compassion leaves him free to act with defilement. The *Bbh* issues a warning in this regard (Ts. 73b): The bodhisattva must not maintain the view that he should not strive for nirvana, that he may ignore the necessity to eliminate defilement on the grounds that he is to remain in samsara in any case; he should look forward to nirvana, and be alarmed at defilement, even more than the auditor.

Tsong-kha-pa raises the question (69a) whether failure by the bodhisattva to break natural morality (*TV* 11c, cited above) is a fault. The *Bbh* does not label it so, nor does it number the set of misdeeds. Later commentators do number the misdeeds at forty-six, thereby implying that failure to murder, etc. when necessary is an infraction. Tsong-kha-pa does not answer this directly, but further on (87b) he refers to "the forty-five misdeeds." The point seems to go unnoticed by later commentators: even those of his own school continue to number them forty-six.<sup>25</sup>

The listing of infraction is followed by an injunction to respect the trainings so that no offense shall occur. As a contingency, however, means for rectification are suggested. For defeat with greater involvement, the vow must be taken again. For misdeeds of "defeat" with medium involvement, the bodhisattva should confess before three or more persons, just as the monk confesses misdeeds. "Defeat" with lesser in-

volvement and the misdeeds proper (defiled and undefiled) may be confessed before one person or, lacking someone suitable, by the bodhisattva "in his own mind."

There being no congenial person before whom to confess, the bodhisattva should generate the thought, from the bottom of his heart, that he will not commit it again, and restrain himself for the future. Having done so, he may be said to have disposed of that offense.

The vow itself may be taken or retaken by the candidate alone, according to the *Bbh*, if a person suitable to bestow it is not available, and a ceremony is provided (Ts. 36b).

The bodhisattva passes through a series of "paths" and "stages" to Buddhahood. This course is not described in the Chapter on Ethics, but arises in commentatorial discussion. The five paths (*mārga*), known from the older schools, are named accumulation, application, vision, developments, and graduation or arhatship.<sup>26</sup> This scheme is sometimes correlated with the ten bodhisattva stages (*bhūmi*) of the *Daśabhūmika* scripture. Stage one corresponds to the path of vision, stages two through nine to development, and stage ten to arhatship. This is the equivalency assumed by the commentators. To these ten stages are prefixed two others: the stage of class (*gotra*), at which the bodhisattva is born into the family of bodhisattvas and becomes destined to buddhahood, and the stage of "coursing in devotion" (*adhimuktīcaryā*), at which he makes progress by faith before gaining the path of vision and its actual understanding. The *Bbh* itself presents two systems in different chapters (2.4, 3.3): a set of stations (*vihāra*) and a set of stages.<sup>27</sup>

The bodhisattva makes progress by "gathering the two resources" (*sambhāra-upacaya*): merit and gnosis (*puṇya*, *jñāna*). Merit is the karmic fruition of good deeds; it results in the physical bodies of a buddha. Gnosis consists of understanding the nature of reality; it results in the Dharma-body of a buddha. The bodhisattva practices the six perfections, but in the *Bbh* they are not said to comprise all his duties, as in Mādhyamika systems; they constitute the second among three aspects of ethics.<sup>28</sup>

## THE LITERATURE: INDIA

The Chapter on Ethics is based upon scriptures of the Greater Vehicle. The author claims (Ts. 84b) to have unified scattered passages of *sūtra* into a comprehensive system. He names his source, however, only as "the collection of bodhisattva scriptures." Some clues to specific works he may have used can be gleaned from commentatorial literature. Several of the *sūtras* have been mentioned above. A curious set of citations illustrating permissible infringement of natural morality by the Buddha is presented by Jinaputra in the passage translated as Appendix D below. Lo-chen Dharmaśrī attributes the tripartite division of ethics to the Ratnakūṭa collection of scriptures;<sup>29</sup> they are implicit, at least, in paragraph 39 of the *Kāśyapa Chapter*. From the same collection comes the *Questioning of Daughter Sumati*, which like the *Kāśyapa Chapter* presents bodhisattva trainings in sets of four.<sup>30</sup> A ceremony for bodhisattva *prātimokṣa* is sketched at 10:6 of the *Saṃdhinirmocana*.

The Chapter on Ethics belongs to the *Bodhisattva Stage*, a section of the "Stages of Spiritual Practice" (*Yogācārabhūmi*, abbrev. *Ybh*) compiled at the third to fourth centuries. The *Ybh* is apparently a systematizing work in which the stage of the bodhisattva follows the auditor and independent-buddha stages. It is better viewed as encyclopedic, however, because it is not the case that one begins as an auditor and progresses to bodhisattvahood. Nor is the *Ybh* a lesser-vehicle work with the *Bbh* as a greater-vehicle appendix (Conze 1964:229). Even early sections of the *Ybh* cite greater-vehicle scriptures as authority (Wayman 1980: 251, 256). The work's presuppositions are those of the early Mahayana scriptures (i.e., those which antedate one-vehicle theory); in them the auditor and bodhisattva systems are viewed as mutually exclusive in many important respects. The key to the structure of the *Ybhs* is the concept of *gotra*, by which all buddhists are divided into spiritual class. The *Ybh* presents the practices and attainments of each class (many of which are shared), culminating in those of the highest class, the buddha.<sup>31</sup> Asanga did not invent the genre called *yogācārabhūmi*; his is the greater-vehicle version of earlier compendia with that title (Demiéville 1954: 339-436).

The *Ybh* is apparently the work of one school, although its bulk makes it difficult to view as the work of a single hand. It is in any case one of a set of works attributed to Maitreya and Asanga that form the basis of the Yogācāra school. According to some Chinese and Tibetan traditions, the *Ybh* is one among five works received by Asanga from Maitreya, a tenth-stage bodhisattva (and the coming buddha) in Tu-shita Heaven. The problem of authorship will not be resolved in this or any other study. Let us only note that the account of Asanga given by the *Mañjuśrī-mūlatantra* (cited Ts. 3b) does not allude to Maitreya. In its Sanskrit and Tibetan versions the *Bbh* names its author as Asanga, and he will be referred to in this present work as author of the *Ybh*, its summary appendices, the *Bbh* and the Chapter on Ethics.<sup>32</sup>

The *Bbh*, the longest "stage" of the *Ybh*, has been circulated as a separate work, as has its Chapter on Ethics. The *Bbh* presents the complete bodhisattva, his practices, progress, and attainments, beginning with the bodhisattva-in-potential (the chapter on *gotra*) and his first inspiration to strive for buddhahood (*cittotpāda*, ch. 2), and closing with the qualities of the mature bodhisattva--the *tathāgata* or buddha.

The colophon to the Dutt edition of the *Bbh* refers to the work as a "code to the bodhisattva collection [of scriptures, *bodhisattvapiṭaka-mātrkā*]," and as a "compendium of the Greater Vehicle" (*mahāyāna-saṃgrāha*) in that it enumerates all the modes of bodhisattva training and the goals of the paths, as well as teachings on all relevant topics. The designation "code" is also found internally (Ts. 38a), although there it might be taken to refer to the Chapter on Ethics alone. In China the *Bbh* is also known as the "instruction on the course of the bodhisattva (*bodhisattvacaryā-nirdeśa*, EB 3:233b)," certainly an apt designation in that the phrase "course of the bodhisattva" appears in the text from page one.

The sense of the terms "collection of bodhisattva scriptures" and "code to the collection" are plain, but a few words will point up their implications. "Collection of bodhisattva scriptures" refers to the canon of greater-vehicle scriptures spoken by the Buddha; its frequent occurrence in the *Bbh* shows that Asanga considers the scriptures in circula-

tion in his time to be a separate canon (*piṭaka*).<sup>33</sup> "Code" (*mātrkā*) is more literally "matrix." In earlier literature it designates an outline or digest of *vinaya* or *abhidharma* consisting of numerical listings or tabulated sections. Jinaputra says of the *Bbh* that it is a code because "it teaches the bases of training summarily." Bodhibhadra (229b1) and Tsong-kha-pa (38a) refer to "code" in the plural, the latter specifying the chapters on ethics of the *Bbh* and the *SS*.<sup>34</sup>

The *Bbh* is divided into three sections (*yogasthāna*) entitled Foundations, Supplement, and Conclusion. These three sections comprise ten topics, of which the first is coterminous with Section One. This "foundations" section and topic is the largest and includes the Chapter on Ethics as one of a set of chapters on each of the six perfections. The chapters of the *Bbh* total twenty-eight. They have been summarized by Wogihara (*Bbh*, "Synopsis"), by Dutt (*Bbh*, Introd.), and (through ch. 8) by Bendall and LVP (1905-11).

The *Bbh* survives in Sanskrit, having been published first by Wogihara (1930-36) from two Nepalese manuscripts, the lacunae filled by reference to the Tibetan. A more complete manuscript procured by Rāhula Saṃkṛtyāyana from Sha-lu (sp. Zhwa lu) monastery in Tibet in 1938 was the basis for the edition by Dutt. Wogihara's edition was consulted by Dutt, but needs to be consulted again for editing or study. There are four Chinese translations of the *Bbh*, beginning with that of Dharmakṣema in A.D. 418 and closing with that of Hsüan Tsang, a part of his *Ybh* project from A.D. 846-48.<sup>35</sup> (Tibetan translations of the literature will be discussed in the following section.) A portion of the Chapter on Ethics dealing with the vow ceremony is preserved in Sanskrit, from Nepal, as the *Bodhisattvaprātimokṣa-sūtra*; the *Bbh* passage is followed by citations from the *Questioning of Upāli*.

There survive, in Tibetan translation, two Indian commentaries to the *Bbh* and one to the Chapter on Ethics by itself (the only chapter to be thus distinguished). The *Ybh* "summaries" (*saṃgrahaṇī*) contain supplementary material; the *Ascertainment-Summary* (O 5539) contains 132 leaves on the *Bbh* and is used by Tsong-kha-pa (24a) as commentary. The seventh century vinaya-master Guṇaprabha authored a partial com-

mentary to the *Bbh* that includes the Chapter on Ethics. Guṇaprabha is apparently a grand-disciple of Vasubandhu (brother to Asanga), and is said to have been tutor to King Harṣavardhana.<sup>36</sup> His commentary seems to be the basis for a commentary by Jinaputra to the Chapter on Ethics (Jinaputra refers to "previous commentators," see tr. n. 476 below.) Jinaputra can be placed at the seventh to eighth centuries, between Guṇaprabha and Samudramegha (late eighth century),<sup>37</sup> author of the only complete *Bbh*-commentary to survive in Tibetan. Samudramegha's treatment of the Chapter on Ethics is identical to that of Jinaputra, allowing for variants due to manuscript transmission.

Samudramegha is considered the author of another commentary--no longer extant--to the Chapter on Ethics. Dragpa Gyaltsen cites it (Ts. n. 333, 454, etc. below) but not by name. Tsong-kha-pa refers to it as "the commentary attributed to Samudramegha" (name given in Sanskrit); he correctly infers (98a) that this Samudramegha is not the same as the author of the *Bbh*-commentary. We can go even further and deduce that the work in question is Tibetan in manufacture. In the citations made from it by Tsong-kha-pa we see "Samudra" engaged in discussion of questions raised in Tibet but unknown in India (e.g., Ts. 85b). In one place (see tr., n. 41) his explanation appears to be based upon a fault of the Tibetan translation of the *Bbh*.

Tsong-kha-pa makes reference to "other commentaries," as well as to the opinions of "some Tibetans." Both refer to the opinions of Tibetans outside his own school whom he deems unworthy of attribution.

Candragomin, a layman of Nālandā whose life spanned the last three quarters of the seventh century,<sup>38</sup> composed a mnemonic verse summary of the ceremony and code from the Chapter on Ethics, entitled *Twenty Verses on the Bodhisattva Vow*. A commentary to the *TV* by Śāntarakṣita (ninth century) is virtually a copy of the passages of the *Bbh* that are summarized by Candragomin. Śāntarakṣita's rare alterations of the *Bbh* seem to be addressed to an audience not fully conversant with vinaya, and it is tempting to suppose that he composed the commentary, along with a text on monastic precepts,<sup>39</sup> for the edification of the first Tibetan monks, of whom he was preceptor. This has been suggested

by Ueyama (1963). There is good evidence, however, that his commentary was known to Bodhibhadra in India. <sup>40</sup>

Bodhibhadra also composed a commentary to the *TV*. A layman, Bodhibhadra is a teacher of Atiśa (982-1054), who refers to him as "a great master of the vinaya of the bodhisattva scriptures" (Sherburne 1983:70).

A number of vow-ceremonies based upon the ceremony of the Chapter on Ethics are preserved in the Tibetan canon. Those to which Tsongkha-pa makes reference are noted s.v. In general, the system of bodhisattva trainings and the code of infractions devised by Asanga was locus classicus for instruction of the beginning bodhisattva until the eighth century, when it was to some extent superseded by the system of Śāntideva. The *Bbh* remained entirely authoritative in East Asia, where the works of Śāntideva did not reach. <sup>41</sup>

The *Brahmajāla* tradition, containing the three aspects of ethics combined with prātimokṣa precepts, is peculiar to East Asia. <sup>42</sup>

Śāntideva not only devises new ceremonies: he also (in the *SS*) alters the system of infractions. He has only one class, called seminal transgressions (*mūlāpatti*), numbered eighteen: the seminal transgressions of the *Ākāśagarbha* scripture combined with the four defeats of the *Bbh* and the "relinquishing the thought of awakening" of the *Skill in Means* scripture. The *AG* may be a scriptural source for Asanga as well; it lists transgressions of rulers, ministers, and beginning bodhisattvas (see Appendix B below; these seem to reflect difficulties encountered by the monastic community under hostile governments); Śāntideva develops them into a set that has general applicability. Abhayākaragupta (ca 1084-1130) <sup>43</sup> attempts to show that the eighteen seminal transgressions of the *SS* are essentially the same as the four defeats of the *Bbh* (Ts.45a). Ratnākaraśānti (late eleventh century) also compares the two systems (Ts. 47a). <sup>44</sup>

The late systematizers of the Mahayana attempt an even more fundamental reconciliation: between prātimokṣa and bodhisattva vows. In a system of three vehicles--lesser vehicle, greater vehicle, and tantra--the two vows constitute stages of practice. Individuals of greater capacity (that is to say, more firmly planted "roots") enter the path at a

more advanced level. The basis of three vehicle doctrine is laid, in part, by earlier "one vehicle" theory dealing with auditor, independent buddha, and bodhisattva.<sup>45</sup> A "three vows" text is introduced into Tibet in the eleventh century by Jñānaśrīmitra.<sup>46</sup> Of special importance to the modern schools of Tibet, especially that of Tsong-kha-pa, is the *Lamp of the Path* by Atiśa, composed in Tibet to reform Buddhism of indulgence in tantric practices performed without a proper grounding in the lower vows.

The Three Vows genre was developed further in Tibet as a vehicle for the instruction of beginners and for airing differences of opinion on the interrelationship of the parts of the path. Tantric pledges (*samaya*) need not be included in the present study, for each of the three vows depends upon the previous. So one need not study tantric pledges to comprehend bodhisattva vow, and Tsong-kha-pa only mentions them in passing. Nevertheless, here is Dharmaśrī citing Long-chen Rab-jam-pa as an instance of reasoning upon the three vows:<sup>47</sup>

Not transgressing the three vows--prātimokṣa, bodhisattva, and vidyādhara--bind your own self (*rgyud*) and let whatever you accomplish for the benefit of others be transformed into the path of purified appearance.

#### THE LITERATURE: TIBET

*Śāntarakṣita and the Early Spread.* During the period of Tibetan expansion from about A.D. 620 to 845, a number of monarchs of the central line attempted to consolidate the realm around buddhist doctrine and to establish themselves as "Dharma King." Śāntarakṣita enters the picture, under the auspices of King Trisong Detsan (sp. Khri-srong-lde-bstan), as preceptor of the first Tibetan monks. He visits Tibet twice during the period 762 to 779 when he dies from the kick of a horse.<sup>48</sup> Śāntarakṣita is first brought to the center by the minister Saynang of the Ba clan (Sba-gsal-snang). Saynang has been sent as governor to Mang-yul near Nepal to protect him from anti-buddhist colleagues.<sup>49</sup> Returning from a journey to Bodh Gayā and Nālandā, he meets Śāntarakṣita in Nepal, invites him to Mang-yul, and builds a temple for him.<sup>50</sup>

There, according to the histories, he requests bodhisattva vow. Saynang is first made to offer gold, silver, and precious objects. Afterward, a new name is bestowed upon him, Ye-shes-dbang-po (Skt. Jñānendra). Śāntarakṣita explains that this is no new creation of the bodhisattva resolve but a remembering, for the two of them and the king as well have made it together in the past, when they lived on the banks of the Ganges.<sup>51</sup> Jñānendra reports his arrival to the king, and preparations are made for his arrival at the center. (The hostile minister Mazhang Drompa-kyay is buried alive in a cave.)<sup>52</sup>

According to the historians, Śāntarakṣita speaks frequently of bodhisattva conduct. His first words to the king, in some accounts, are: "Worship the Precious [Three]. Maintain the pledges and the vows. Chiefly, do only what will benefit sentient beings."<sup>53</sup> In discussing the impending arrival of Padmasambhava, he asserts that to conquer demons is "the task of a bodhisattva."<sup>54</sup>

The king evidently adopted the bodhisattva ideal. He is said to have rejected the four dark and embraced the four bright factors described in the *Kāśyapa Chapter*.<sup>55</sup> One early source considers him to be a creation-body of the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, patron of Śāntarakṣita.<sup>56</sup> In an inscription at the bridge-head at Chongyay, the deeds of Trisong Detsen in uniting the realm of Tibet are described as those of a bodhisattva, and this is coupled with reference to him as a Dharma King.<sup>57</sup> The commoners under him are happy because of their moral conduct growing from feelings of universal love.<sup>58</sup> The king himself writes that moral law is now based upon karma, not upon rites.<sup>59</sup>

Who was the first translator for Śāntarakṣita in Tibet? The histories mention two names: Ananta and Paytseg (Dpal-brtsegs). The *Sba-bzhed* gives the honor to Ananta of Kashmir, and this is followed by later historians.<sup>60</sup> But the *Sba-bzhed* also mentions a Chinese translator with the name Ananta (10:4), and Sum-pa identifies Ananta as "a brahman from Nepal" (407.4-8). The *Blon-po-bka'-thang* identifies Ananta of Kashmir as a translator of scripture more than a century earlier, and the *Rgyal-po-bka'-thang* identifies Paytseg, who "knew Chinese and so forth," as translator for Śāntarakṣita upon the teacher's arrival.<sup>61</sup> That

Paytseg knew Sanskrit is attested by the numerous translations attributed to him as Dpal-brtsegs-rakṣita; he is also a compiler of the catalogue of Denkar.<sup>62</sup> The *rakṣita* appended to his name indicates that he became a monk under Śāntarakṣita, although he is not mentioned in listings of the original seven monks.<sup>63</sup>

Those credited for translating the *TV* and the commentary to it by Śāntarakṣita--the Indian preceptor Vidyākaraśiṃha and the Tibetan Mañjuśrīvarman--are probably not the original translators, but those entrusted with re-translating it, in conformity with advances in linguistics, two or three decades later.<sup>64</sup> The original translators may be Śāntarakṣita and Jñānendra, listed by *Sgra* among older translators whose work had to be re-done. The *Sba-bzhed* mentions (Stein 1961:52:8) a twenty-verse "source work" among earlier translations done at Samyay (Bsam-yas).

Śāntarakṣita may have taught the *TV* during his second visit to Tibet, while Samyay was under construction. His first mission ended in failure; he returned to Nepal in the face of powerful opposition to the introduction of Buddhism, first asking the king to invite Padmasambhava in his place. He later returned to join Padma in laying the groundwork for Samyay, on the model of Otantapuri Monastery in India.<sup>65</sup> The *Sba-bzhed* reports (23:11) that Padmasambhava caused the wrathful deities of Tibet to submit, while Śāntarakṣita, by teaching doctrine, converted the benign. Twelve monks of the Sarvāstivāda school were invited to participate in the ordination of Jñānendra and six others as the first monks to inhabit Samyay, and Śāntarakṣita's lineage of ordination was painted on the walls.<sup>66</sup> Pawo Tsuglag informs us that the five lay precepts were given prior to monastic ordination. He also provides a list of the buildings of Samyay during that period, including the translators' house, the center for vinaya studies, and the center for bodhisattva studies. Translation work, he says, was inaugurated by Śāntarakṣita and Jñānendra, who remained his chief disciple.<sup>67</sup> The *TV* commentary and a lost text on prātimokṣa attributed to Śāntarakṣita may be no more than lecture notes that were published later, re-written in accord with the official translations of the source texts.

After the death of Śāntarakṣita, Jñānendra assumed the abbotship of

Samyay.<sup>68</sup> When conflict developed between proponents of Indian and Chinese Buddhism, he retreated to the mountains to meditate and Payang (Dpal-dbyangs) took over (Bu-ston 2:191). Kamalaśīla was called from India to uphold the Indian side; like his teacher Śāntaraḥṣita he held Yogācāra for practice, emphatically teaching bodhisattva vow.<sup>69</sup>

The Sino-Indian, or sudden-gradual, or Ch'an-Mādhyaṃika debate took place before the king at A.D. 792-94. According to Tibetan sources, the main issue was the Chinese doctrine that moral vows may be disregarded from the supposed standpoint of ultimate reality.<sup>70</sup> There can be little doubt, however, that a major concern of the king in deciding for the Indian party was to minimize the influence of T'ang China through its unofficial envoys. In his own defense, the Chinese debator Māhāyana, reporting to the emperor later from Tun Huang, claimed to have administered the vow of renunciation (the prātimokṣa) and the discipline of the bodhisattva to his disciples in Tibet, and an independent source states that King Trisong Detsen received the bodhisattva vow from a Chinese monk.<sup>71</sup>

Attesting to its high importance during this period, which the lama historians term the Early Spread of Buddhism in Tibet, a fragment of the *TV* (in its canonical translation) is found in the *Lo-paṅ-bka'-thang*, that section of the five *Bka'-thang* purporting to chronicle the 108 pandits and 108 translators of the period.<sup>72</sup>

Another fragment of the *TV*, embedded in a commentary, has been unearthed in a cave at Tun Huang. An English translation is provided as Appendix A below.<sup>73</sup> On the reverse, in another hand, is a fragment of *bhikṣu-prātimokṣa* (Stein 633:2), also in Tibetan. The verses are canonical, but the commentary was probably composed at Tun Huang in the mid-ninth century--again, for the training of novice Tibetan monks--by Wou Fa Ch'eng, chief preceptor of the Sino-Tibetan monastery of Tun Huang. Besides doing translations from Chinese into Tibetan (for example, the *Skill in Means* scripture), Fa Ch'eng translated the *TV* and other works into Chinese.<sup>74</sup> His school flourished for several decades, unhindered by contemporary persecutions of Buddhism in China and Tibet, because of those nations' concurrent loss of power in Central Asia.

*Tsong-kha-pa and the Later Spread.* The dates of Tsong-kha-pa are 1357 to 1419. His hagiography may be consulted elsewhere.<sup>75</sup> Many of his works on philosophy and practice are deservedly famous; the corpus has formed the standard of orthodoxy and been the subject of exegesis for the Gelugpa school that he founded. His commentary to the Chapter on Ethics should be classified as practice. As such, it is equivalent to works of the Three Vows genre, and Tsong-kha-pa takes tantric practice into account when establishing the context. What he has to say on bodhisattva vow represents the culmination of Indo-Tibetan commentarial tradition, although his overall view of the three parts of the path is by no means the last word on the subject in Tibet.

Tsong-kha-pa bases his comments upon the Indian commentaries to the Chapter on Ethics and the *TV*. That of Jinaputra/Samudramegha is most often utilized for explication of terms. Śāntarakṣita, Atiśa, Ratnākaraśānti, Śāntideva and others are introduced in the course of discussing more complicated questions. The sources and approach are explained at the close of the work (Ts. 98a). Tsong-kha-pa has much of his own to contribute--in part, as continuation of Indo-Tibetan discussion of the issues, and in part to deal with issues of contemporary relevance to Tibetans. In the exegesis of texts, especially scripture, Tsong-kha-pa is hampered by not knowing Sanskrit. In places he is faced with divergent or even contradictory translations of the same text (at Ts. 88, for example, dealing with the *Upāli* as cited in the *SS* and as translated independently), and in such circumstances he must infer or even guess at the correct reading from what he determines to be the desirable one. His judgment is surprisingly accurate; his choice is almost always credible at least. Furthermore, his shortcoming in Sanskrit is in another way his strength. Tsong-kha-pa comes after the period of translation, at a time when the canon of Indian Buddhism is reasonably well established and available for synthesis in ways that will make it more relevant to Tibetans. The goal of authors such as Tsong-kha-pa is to consolidate the corpus of translations by demonstrating its greatness and consistency. This goal is to some extent inherited from late Indian systematizers, but too great an attention to linguistic detail might tend to

distract him from the broader viewpoint necessary to accomplish it. One predecessor of Tsong-kha-pa in systematic commentary who was not hampered by his mastery of Sanskrit is Śākya Pandita, and one can sense an intense rivalry in the oblique references made to him by Tsong-kha-pa.

The Early Spread of the doctrine in Tibet comes to an end with a Bön reaction and persecution at about A.D. 845. The internal struggle brings about the collapse of empire and loss of Central Asian domains. The buddhist community continues in the form of small, mostly non-monastic groups of tantrics until revived by a line of kings in the west. Then translation work is resumed by Rinchen Sangpo (Rin-chen-bzang-po, A.D. 958-1055) and others. Atiśa comes to Tibet in 1042. His chief Tibetan disciple, Dron-tön ('Brom-ston Rgyal-ba'i-'byung-gnas, 1005-1064) founds a movement called Kadampa (Bka'-gdams-pa) centered at Reting (Rwa-sgreng) monastery north of Lhasa.

The reforms instituted in connection with the coming of Atiśa amount to a return to Indian sources and a revival of monastic discipline in particular. Buddhism in Tibet has degenerated (as the reformers see it) into tantric practices not founded on vinaya and bodhicitta, including perversities such as ritual sex and murder. The teachings of Atiśa influence all three schools of the new movement: the Gelug (Dge-lugs, "system of virtue"), the Kagyu (Bka'-brgyud) and the Sakya (Sa-skya). In the same period the older tradition reforms itself into the Nyingma (Rnying-ma, "the ancients").

For Tsong-kha-pa, Atiśa and the Kadampa teachers (geshes) are high authority. Tibetan scholars not of this line whose opinions he cites, generally for refutation, go unnamed. Only his allusions to Śākya Pandita and his uncle Dragpa Gyaltzen (A.D. 1147-1216) have been identified. A final class of Tibetans referred to by Tsong-kha-pa might be called, without exaggerating his view of them, "tantric degenerates." It is not feasible to conceal this side of Tsong-kha-pa in the case of this text, because it is built around the moral path. Tsong-kha-pa is not the father of sectarianism in Tibet (the honor probably belongs to Drom-tön), but he carries it a long march forward into what passes in Tibet for Modern times, and which has been characterized not merely by vitriolic

exchanges between scholars, but by competition for taxes and patronage, confiscation of monastic property, forced conversion, and armed warfare.

The *Bbh* itself manifests a sectarian bias in attempting to establish the legitimacy of the Greater Vehicle and its superiority to other schools. The concerns of Tsong-kha-pa are in some respects the opposite. He shows little sympathy for the democratization of lay and monastic that was accomplished in the early Mahayana. For example, the *Bbh* suggests that the bodhisattva may confess misdeeds to a person who is either lay or monastic, but Tsong-kha-pa at this point (85b) insists that a monk should confess only to a monk--just the sort of narrow attitude that had inspired the founders of the Greater Vehicle to strike out on their own.<sup>76</sup> By his time the process has come full circle and his mission, following Atiśa, is to establish the primacy of monasticism among the modes of religious life.

That issue, however, is peripheral to this work. The sense of "basic" (*gzhung*) in the title, *The Basic Path to Awakening*, is "fundamental, mainstream, exoteric." The core of the Greater Vehicle, it says, is the bodhisattva path--the path of the six perfections. Tantra is to be considered a part of the Greater Vehicle, its accomplishments based upon the basic practice of bodhicitta. Tsong-kha-pa's most fiery venom is directed at those who maintain (according to the view he attributes to them) that practicing tantra permits one to "supersede" bodhisattva and prātimokṣa vows. This may be seen in the work's opening and closing verses, and in a passage at 68b. More mild refutation is directed at those who allow prātimokṣa precepts to be superseded on the grounds that "We are bodhisattvas."

In a minor key, it should be noted that Tsong-kha-pa will misquote a predecessor or interpret his writings narrowly in order to make himself shine. Nor is he above quoting selectively in order to bolster his own views. These petty faults, perhaps endemic to scholars, are noted at a number of points of the translation. His limits at Sanskrit have been mentioned; he consistently writes Jinaputra as<sup>4</sup> Jinasutra, and Abhayākara as Abhya.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT, METHODOLOGY, DESIDERATA

The *Basic Path* of Tsong-kha-pa was chosen for translation as the most recent, the most comprehensive, and the best work on the subject. I was first alerted to its existence in late 1975 by Professor Artsa Tulku of Magadh University in Bihar (the ninth A-rtsa sprul-sku, Bstan-'dzin-zla-grags-chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, Dge-bshes Lha-rams-pa of Se-ra). At the time I was preparing a dissertation on the life and works of Candragomin (Tatz 1978). Dr. Tulku (as he is known professionally) assisted me in translating the commentary by Śāntarakṣita to the *TV* of Candragomin, reading through it word-by-word and discussing the issues. We followed with relevant portions of the *Basic Path*--about one-third of the whole. The commentary to the *TV* by Dragpa Gyaltzen (Tatz 1982a) was likewise read in full with Kenpo Apay (Mkhan-po A-pad) of the Sakya Lama's College. All this was supported by a junior research fellowship from the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute.

Later, passages of the *TV* parallel to the commentary by Śāntarakṣita were read word-by-word by Professor Leon Hurvitz of the University of British Columbia, my dissertation supervisor. Dr. Hurvitz also consulted the Chinese translation by Hsüan Tsang. (The divergences are not sufficient to make the Chinese crucial for work on the *Bbh*, if one has the Sanskrit and Tibetan at hand.) Professor D. Seyfort Ruegg, then of the University of Washington, made helpful comments in his capacity of external examiner for the dissertation defense.

Although the *TV* and its commentary were useful, in context of a larger work, for presenting the basic principles of bodhisattva ethics and to illumine certain problems of Indian and Tibetan history, the results were cumbersome and unsuited to publication, with commentarial literature from many centuries incorporated into introduction and annotation. I decided to translate the *Basic Path* as a vehicle for presenting a full account of the subject.

Translation of the present works has been supported by a research grant from the American Philosophical Society and a senior research fellowship from the American Institute of Indian Studies. Several months have been spent at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharm-

sala, in writing upon the results. I am grateful to Khetsun Sangpo, Geshe G.G. Gyatso (of Delhi University) and other native Tibetan scholars for answering questions. I am of course responsible for any errors.

The Chapter on Ethics is presented here in a translation separate from the commentary because Tsong-kha-pa, in citing this source work, routinely paraphrases it, and in places he transposes topics. In addition, some of his concerns differ from those of Asanga, as I have attempted to show. All annotation, however, is attached to the *Basic Path*. In order to facilitate cross-reference, the translation of the Chapter is marked by references to its exegesis in the commentary.

To establish the text of the *Basic Path*, I have referred to the Pe-Tashilhunpo, and Cone editions. Variation among them is negligible, and the translation is marked according to Peking only.

The translation of the Chapter on Ethics is based on the Sanskrit of the *Bbh* as edited by Wogihara and Dutt both, and on the Tibetan as edited by myself from the Peking, Narthang, and Cone editions, the Peking having been first typed out in transliteration. Where the versions diverge, the preferable meaning (as indicated by commentaries and my own judgment) is adopted. Such divergences are noted when they effect the sense. Likewise, corrections to the Sanskrit or Tibetan texts are suggested when the meaning is in question. No attempt has been made to establish a definitive edition or earliest text of the Chapter. Perhaps this will be done for the full *Bbh* in future.

The commentaries of Guṇaprabha and Samudramegha were also typed out in transliteration from the Peking, and then variants from the Narthang edition were noted. This work was done at Tibet House in New Delhi by Mr. Norbu Samphel. In the case of Samudramegha, I then compared the text of Jinaputra (Peking ed.) to obtain the best reading. There are very few instances where Jinaputra and Samudramegha diverge in substance, and these are noted.

All passages cited from other works are translated anew, unless otherwise indicated. When cited by Tsong-kha-pa, they are translated according to the Tibetan even when the Sanskrit is available; any exceptions to this are noted.

The "sexist" bias of both the *Bbh* and the *Basic Path*, but especially the latter, is so pervasive that any attempt to redress it in translation would warp the text. But as far as I can determine, the points made in both works apply equally to bodhisattvas of both sexes.

I hope to have glossed all necessary technical terms--if not in the introduction, then in the notes. Please refer to the index.

Desiderata for further work in this area, as I see it, are the early Mahayana scriptures from Tibetan and Chinese sources, other works of Maitreya and Asanga with commentatorial tradition, the *SS* and other compendia of scripture, late Indian systematizing treatises (the *MMA* etc.), and Tibetan "three vows" literature, especially the work of Sakya Pandita and his descendants.

#### NOTES

1. Saddhatissa 1970:16-18.
2. After Tachibanda 1926:44, from the *Suttanipāta*.
3. In the *Dhammacakkapavattana-sutta*, Saṃyutta-nikāya 5.
4. Noticed by Jacobi, Sacred Books of the East 22:xxiii-xxx, cited Pande 1974:321.
5. From the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* and brahmanical lawbooks, cited Tachibana 1926:58. See also Pačhow 1951:79-82.
6. Definition of *prakṛti-sāvadya* by Asanga, O 554l:8b.4f.
7. Skt. *pratikṣepaṇa-sāvadya*, also *prajñapti*°, *pratiṣedha*°. See *AK* & refs. n. 1.
8. *Upavāsa*, Pali *uposatha* etc. may derive from brahmanical customs associated with ritual purity for the sacrifice (Tachibana 1926:65). See also Ts., tr. n. 38 below.
9. As translated by Rhys Davids & Oldenberg 1885:342.
10. The ceremony for lay ordination is given by Sherburne 1983:81, n. 13 from the *Vinaya-vastu*. This Chapter Three of Atiśa's *Lamp of the Path* is the best account of prātimokṣa ethics from the late Indian point of view. For the prātimokṣa code for monks see Prebish 1975, Thakur 1975. See Prebish 1979 for recent Vinaya scholarship.
11. Ceremony outlined by Sherburne 1976:237-38, other formal acts lis-

ted. 239-40. On higher ordination see also Banerjee 1949 for Skt; Banerjee 1957:101-42 for English; Lamotte 1958:58f.

12. For example the *Fruits of the Religious Life* (*sāmaññaphala*) of the Dīghanikāya.

13. On *saṃvara* see AK 4:43-51, AS 90, MSA 16:20 (Tib 219a6-8); also Régamey (1938) par. 80 & n. 389, VM1:18 (tr. "restraint"). On ethics in Theravāda Buddhism see also Frank Reynolds, et al in *Journal of Religions* 7:1 (1979).

14. *Pratyekabuddhabhūmi* ed. Wayman 1960:376-75 (sic); tr. Kloppenberg 1975.

15. See sections of scripture cited by Ts. at 58b, 69b, 90b below; a full translation is forthcoming by Tatz.

16. On *gotra* see *Bbh* ch. 1; MSA 4:7 & comm.; Ruegg 1969, esp. 84-85, 128-29.

17. Nāgārjuna O 5361, Ts. 28a-b. The association of Nāgārjuna with ethical theory is based on that ceremony and the *Sūtrasamuccaya*, O 5330. In a commentary to O 5331, Ratnākaraśānti outlines a ceremony (O 5330:282b7-283b4). The ascription of O 5330 to Nāgārjuna has been questioned; see Filloizat 1964:473-78. For Candrakīrti, ethics remains a matter of abstention from injurious activity (*Madhyamakavatāra* tr. 2:280-93, esp. v. 9a-c).

18. Oral communications: Sde-gzhung Rinpoche, Seattle, 26-June-1972; Sakya Khri-'dzin Rinpoche, Vancouver, B.C., 22-May-1978. The ceremony by Atiśa is outlined by Sherburne 1976:288; it is followed by Gags-pargyal-mtshan, Tatz 1978a:26-30. The cīttotpāda is also found in Theravāda tradition: at the close of religious ceremonies, the congregation may be enjoined by a *bhikkhu* to make a resolve to attain *bodhi*, whether as auditor, independent buddha, or fully awakened buddha (Walpole Rahula, "L'Ideal du bodhisattva dans le Theravāda et la Mahāyāna" in *JA* 1971:70). See also Sakya Pandita: there are two forms of cīttotpāda, that of the auditor and that of the bodhisattva. The former is threefold: the aspirations for arhatship, for independent buddhahood, and for buddhahood. Because auditor trainings have declined, however, very little is undertaken in their ceremonials (*Sdom gsum* 27a-b; for explication see Go-ram-pa, *Rnam bshad* 67blf). On the bodhisattva in auditor systems see also AK 7:108-111, AD 4:223-41.

19. Analysis of the *Bhadracari* at Tatz 1977a.

20. This account follows (Lo-chen) Dharmaśrī of Smin-gröl-ling (1654-1717) 297.5-300.6, commenting upon Mnga'-ris Paṅ-chen v. 111-12 (10a2-3). See also the comments of Chos-kyi-dbang-phyug 57b7-58a1. The four dark factors of the *Kāśyapa-parivarta* are (1) breaking promises, (2) inducing regret in others, (3) disparaging bodhisattvas, and (4) deluding others; the bright factors are the reverse; see refs. Ts. n. 581 below.

21. *Rnam-bshad* 67b.6-68a.6. See also '*Khru1-spong* item no. 45 ("Which Mahāyāna System for Cittotpāda is Used in Tantric Ritual?"), no. 46 ("Differences of Philosophic Viewpoints and their Relation to the Ceremony"), and no. 47 ("Transgressions of the *SS* and *Bbh* Systems and their Relationship to the Scriptures"). See also Śākya Mchog-Idan (1428-1507) vol. 17, item no. 15 for responses to objections to the *Sdom-gsum* of Sakya Pandita.

22. 'Brom-ston Rgyal-ba'i-'byuṅ-gnas, A.D. 1005-1064; Po-to-ba Rinchen-gsal, 1031-1105. This account by Geshe Ngawang Dhargyey, LTWA, 13-December-1975 (oral communication). On lineage see also Mnga'-ris Pan-chen v. 95b-96b (8b.6-9a.1), Dharmaśrī 250.6f, Chos-kyi-dbang-phyug 50b.6-51a.6.

23. See Ts. 28b. & n., below.

24. Dharmaśrī 306.3-309.4, Chos-kyi-dbang-phyug 59a.4-b.2.

25. For example, Tshe-dbang-bsam-grub (19th century) 16b.1-2; and *TV* 11c is labelled a misdeed at 18b.4-6. On the numbering of misdeeds in Chinese tradition see *EB* 3:243-44.

26. Skt. *saṃbhāra*, *prayoga*, *darśana*, *bhāvanā*, *aśaikṣa*. For further details see Tatz 1977:44-47 & refs.

27. For correlation of these with *Dbh* stages see *Bbh* ed. Dutt 40-41, *Dbh* ed. Rahder App. 1.

28. For previous work on bodhisattva ethics see LVP 1918, 1927, 1929; *Hōbōgirin* s.v. "Bosatsukai"; *EB* 3:2:240-46 (summary by Lung Lien of the Chapter on Ethics from the four Chinese translations); Robinson 1965-66; Python 1973, introd. 6-17; Sherburne 1983, ch. 4.

29. Dharmaśrī 283.2-4. According to Pachow (1951:59), the contractions (*uddāna*) used as topic markers in the *Bbh* are a style found in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, among other texts; see also Panglung 1980.

30. One passages tr. from the Chinese by Paul, 1979:201-11.

31. Sectional headings of the *Ybh* tr. Wayman 1961:251-52; work on the *Ybh* to that date noted by Conze 1964:227. See also the summary in Renou 1954:2:2142-43.

32. On problems of authorship see Ruegg 1969, introd.; Wayman 1961, ch. 1-3. For the life of Asanga according to tradition, and a discussion of the *Bbh* see Willis 1979, introd.

33. On *bodhisattva-pitaka* as the canon of Mahāyāna sutras (and vinaya) see Bendall & LVP 1911:175; *AS* Skt. 79, tr. 147; Lamotte 1958: 162, 549, 587; Bu-ston, *History* 1:33 & n. 311 (at 1:34 it is defined as

the *vaipulya* class of scripture). Wayman (1961:31, 45), citing a Tibetan commentator later than Ts., identifies it with the Buddha-avataṃsaka collection of scripture (cp. *MHV* 1329-30). This commentator, Ngag-dbang-rab-brtan (who claims only to be citing the opinion of another) may be alluding to earlier adjectival usage. See for ex. Jinaputra (269b.8=Samudramegha 211b.4): "The *bodhisattva-piṭaka* shows the path of the resources of merit and gnosis in abundance (*phal po che, \*avataṃsaka*)." Both *avataṃsaka* and *bodhisattva-piṭaka* seem to be early terms for *vaipulya*, e.g. Mahāyāna, scriptures. (Saṃkrtyāyana, *JA* 1934:206).

*Bodhisattva-piṭaka* is also the title of a section of the Ratnakūṭa collection (O 760:12).

34. Wayman points out (1961:45) that *mātrkā* also has the sense of "alphabet," and is to scripture what an alphabet is to letters: it orders them for the sake of clarity.

35. The *Ybh* project of Hsüan Tsang: "a marvel of exactitude and competence and the chief aim of his journey to India (Demiéville 1973: 310; see also Willis 1979:3).

36. On Guṇaprabha see Bu-ston, *History* 2:160-61; Tāranātha tr. 176 & refs. n. 1 (esp. ref. to I Tsing), 178-81; Stcherbatsky 1962 v. 32; Gokhale 1937:283 n. 2; Banerjee 1957:44-45.

37. \*Sāgaramegha? Tib. *rgya-mtsho-sprin*. See Tāranātha tr. 276.

38. On the date of Candragomin see Tatz 1976; 1978, ch. 1. On his life see Tatz 1982 & 1978, ch. 2.

39. Known only by its listing in the catalogue of Ldan-dkar (Lalou 1953, no. 512). Śāntaraṅgita may also have composed a *bodhisattva* aspiration (Beyer 1973:189).

40. See Ts. 39a, 84a, n. 165, 416 below. But the suggestion by Ts. at 86b that Bodhibhadra is criticizing Śāntaraṅgita on that point is unwarranted; the criticism is of Candragomin.

41. See for ex. discussion of the three aspects of ethics from Japanese tradition, including an interesting interface with Indian notions of purity, by Kennett 1977:96, 106, 198.

42. The *Brahmajāla-sūtra* is (according to Chinese tradition) Part One of the Avataṃsaka collection. Tr. de Groot 1893. See also Suzuki 1933; Erdman 1958; and Sangharakṣita 1967:232-33, from Erdman.

43. On Abhayākaraḡupa, a vinaya-master of Bodh Gayā, see Tucci 1949:657b; Tāranātha tr. 313-15; Lauf 1976:24 & pl. 11.

44. On Ratnākaraśānti see Taranatha tr. 295 & n. 14; Ruegg 1969:37 n.4; *BA* 206; Jaini 1979:3.

45. On one-vehicle theory see Wayman 1974:79-80, Kotatsu 1975:79-166, and Hurvitz 1976:xx-xxiii.

46. Jñānaśrīmita (author and translator), O 4546. He resided at Tabo; see BA 355; Taranatha tr. 430-31 & refs.; Bu-ston, *History* 2:215; Hada-no 1975:77-82; Ruegg 1969:37 n. 4.

47. Dharmaśrī 560.1-5, citing Klong-chen Rab-'byams-pa, A.D. 1308-64. For another translations of this verse see Guenther 1976:58-59; also: comments *ibid.* 55-56, 103-4 n. 9.

48. These dates are not certain. Richardson reckons the birth date of Khri-srong-lde-btsan to be A.D. 742 (*JRAS* 1952:138). An edict discovered at Bsam-yas indicates that several calamities that occurred during his twentieth year impressed upon him the importance of re-establishing Buddhism; hence the date of 762. See also Tucci 1950:47-48. Dpa'-bo-gtsug-lag says that he turned to Dharma at age 13 (1962:72b.2), but that would be the age of his ascension to the throne. The death of Śāntarakṣita is placed by Tucci before 779, the year at which he dates the completion of Bsam-yas.

49. He was sent to establish Tibetan sovereignty at Mang-yul? The region is part of what is later known as Mnga'-ris-skor-gsum, in western Tibet near the border with Nepal (Wylie 1962:55-56).

50. Two temples were constructed, according to some sources; this was most likely a residence-cum-temple (see Dpa'-bo-gtsug-lag 1962:76b.6, Ye-shes-rgyal-mtshan 203.1-2; Bu-ston *History* ed. 882.7, Gzon-nu-dpal 41). Gsal-snang is accompanied on his journey, according to Dkon-mchog-lhun-grub (237.3-4), by Sang-shi, another pro-buddhist minister, but this may represent a confusion with a previous visit to China. The historians' primary source for this period is the *Sba-bzhed*, the testament of Gsal-snang, see esp. 11-16.

51. Ye-shes-rgyal-mtshan 203.4-204.1; see also Dkon-mchog-lhun-grub 238.3-5, Dpa'-bo-gtsug-lag 1962:77a.4. The most complete account of Śāntarakṣita's early years is found in Ye-shes-rgyal-mtshan (198.1f), but it contradicts data of the *Blon-po-bka'-thang*. For example, the former has him ordained a monk under "the preceptor Jnanagarbha" (198.4-5), the latter under "the great preceptor \*Vimalakīrti" (O-rgyan-gling-pa 885.6).

52. Ma-zhang Grom-pa-skyes. See Bu-ston *History* 2:188.

53. Ye-shes-rgyal-mtshan 206:2-3; cp. accounts of the first meeting of king and pandit at Gzhon-nu-dpal 42-43, Bu-ston *History* 2:188, Dkon-mchog-lhun-grub 283.3-4, *Lha-'dre-bka'-thang* (O-rgyan-gling-pa) 115.4, Dpa'-bo-gtsug-lag 1962:81b.3-4, Ngag-dbang-blo-bzang-rgya-mtsho 32-33.

54. The statement follows TV 20a; see Toussaint 1933:239, no. 58.

55. *Blon-po-bka'-thang* (O-rgyan-gling-pa) 871.6-872.1.
56. Ibid. 871.4. For Mañjuśrī as patron of Śāntarakṣita see TV comm., dedicatory verses (Tatz 1978:313).
57. Sp. 'Phyong-rgyas. See Richardson, *JRAS* 1964:6, 11, 27-28.
58. Richardson 1977:221. See also Tatz 1978a:7-9.
59. Blondeau 1971:367-73, Tucci 1958:122; on the new law see also Blondeau 1971:377f, Stein 1972:141-45.
60. *Sba-bzhed* 16:11; Dpa'-bo-gtsug-lag 1962:81a.4, 81b.3; Bsod-nams-rgyal-mtshan 167:11; Dkon-mchog-lhun-grub 238:2; Bu-ston *History* 2:188f.
61. *Rgyal-po-bka'-thang*, *Blon-po-bka'-thang* (O-rgyan-gling-pa) 232:1-2, 797:2, 831, 806:6.
62. Lalou 1953:319; see also Tucci 1958:47-48n.
63. On the seven monks see Tucci 1958:12-26; on works by Dpal-brtsegs in the canon see *ibid.* 139-41.
64. See Bu-ston *History* 2:196-97, Tucci 1958:50.
65. Ye-shes-rgyal-mtshan 208.6-209.1.
66. Ibid. 209.2-210.2.
67. Dpa'-bo-gtsug-lag 1962:90a.7, 95b-96a, 105a.
68. Ibid. 114a-b, Ngag-dbang-rnam-rgyal 168.5-6. On further deeds of Jñānendra see Richardson *JRAS* 1952:135, Tucci 1958:41-43.
69. Kamalāśīla, *Bhāvanākrama*; see Beyer 1974:102-3, Tucci 1958:157-58.
70. On the issues as seen in Tibet see *ibid.* 99; Lamotte 1949:861, Tatz 1978a:15-20.
71. Demiéville 1952:162, 164, 200.
72. Fragment described at Tatz 1982a:3. On the antiquity of the *Bka'-thang* see Blondeau 1971:40, Tucci 1950:39-41, Vostrikov 1970:226-29,237f.
73. LVP 1962, no. 633:1; microfilm provided by the British Museum. Transliteration at Tatz 1978 ch. 4, n. 107.
74. On Fa Ch'eng see Ueyama 1963, Inaba 1977, Tatz 1978a.
75. See for ex. Thurman 1982, Dhargyay 1977.
76. See also Ts. 34a, from whom to take the bodhisattva vow.

## The Chapter on Ethics

[*Bbh* Skt. ed. Dutt 95-129, Wogihara 137-88; Tib. O 5538, P Zhi 84b.6-112b.8, N Zhi 82a.3-113a.4, C Wi (vol. 50) 73b.6-101b.7; cited Ts. 5b.4:]

The contraction:

Essence and completeness,  
 Difficulty and universal gateway,  
 Endowment of a holy person,  
 As well as all the modes;  
  
 Endowment of distress and wishing,  
 Well-being here and there,  
 And purified: these nine aspects  
 Constitute ethics in brief.

What is ethics for the bodhisattvas? It has nine aspects: the essence of ethics, complete ethics, difficult ethics, universal gateway ethics, the ethics of a holy person, ethics as all modes, ethics as distress and wishing, ethics as well-being here and there, and purified ethics.

(Ts. 6a.3) What is the essence of ethics? Briefly, to possess four qualities constitutes the essence of the ethics of the bodhisattva. What are the four? To correctly receive it from someone else, to have a quite purified intention, to make correction after failure, and to avoid failure by generating respect and remaining mindful of that.

Because he has correctly received it from someone else, when the bodhisattva fails in his training, then dependent upon the other, embarrassment will be born. Because of his quite purified intention, when the bodhisattva fails in his training, then dependent upon himself, a sense of shame will be born. Correcting the bases of training after fail-

ure, and generating respect so that failure will not occur in the first place, are both causes for a bodhisattva's freedom from regret. So dependent upon a correct reception and a purified intention, shame and embarrassment are produced. With a sense of shame and embarrassment, the correct reception of ethics will be preserved. Preserving it, he will be free of regret.

These two phenomena--the correct reception and the purified intention--are what induce the other two phenomena--correction after failure and respect that avoids failure.

These three phenomena--the correct reception from someone else, the quite purified intention, and respect to avoid failure--should be understood to effectively prevent the failure of bodhisattva ethics. The correction of failure should be understood to constitute rectification and recovery from breakage.

(7b.2) To undertake and proceed to train oneself in the essence of ethics endowed with these four qualities, should be understood as "wholesome," because of benefit for oneself, benefit for others, benefit for many people, pleasure for many people, mercy for the world, and welfare, benefit, and pleasure for divine and human beings. Because "measureless" comprehends the bodhisattva bases of training, they should be understood as "immeasurable." Because they are lived for the benefit and pleasure of all sentient beings, they should be understood to be "favorable to all sentient beings." Because they acquire and bestow the result of supreme, right and full awakening, they should be understood to be "a great result and advantage."

(8a.5) What is complete ethics? Briefly, bodhisattva ethics is comprised by the lay side and the monastic side. This is known as "complete ethics."

Furthermore, based upon the lay side and upon the monastic side there are, briefly, three sorts: the ethics of the vow, the ethics of collecting wholesome factors, and the ethics of benefiting sentient beings.

(9a.3) Among them, the ethics of the vow refers to undertaking the prātimokṣa vow as one of the seven classes: monk, nun, nun-probationer, male and female novice, layman and laywoman. Furthermore, it may be suitably understood as the householder side plus the monastic side.

(12b.5) The ethics of collecting wholesome factors: The bodhisattva, subsequent to undertaking the ethics of the vow, for the sake of the great awakening accumulates, with his body and his speech, anything that is wholesome, all of which is called, briefly, the ethics of collecting wholesome factors.

What then is it? The bodhisattva who is based upon and maintaining ethics applies himself to hearing, to contemplation, to the cultivation of calm and insight, and to delight in solitude. Accordingly, he makes respectful address to his gurus from time to time, prostrating himself, rising promptly, and joining palms. Accordingly, he does respectful service to those gurus from time to time. He does service to the sick, out of compassion nursing their illnesses. Accordingly, he gives a "Well done!" to what has been well spoken. He assigns genuine praise to persons endowed with good qualities. Accordingly, he generates a satisfaction, from the bottom of his heart, at all the merit of all sentient beings of infinity; he appreciates it, describing it in words. Accordingly, he investigates all the transgressions done by others and is forbearant. Accordingly, he dedicates everything wholesome he has done with body, speech, and mind, and all that he has yet to do, to supreme, right and full awakening. He sows various sorts of correct aspiration from time to time, and makes all sorts of extensive offerings to the Precious Three. He is always engaged and constantly making vigorous initiatives in wholesome directions. He remains vigilant. He guards himself by practicing the physical and verbal bases of training with mindfulness and awareness. The gates of his senses are guarded and he is aware of moderation in food. He applies himself to wakefulness in the earlier and later parts of the night. He attends to holy persons and takes recourse in spiritual advisers. He also recognizes his own mistakes and looks at his faults; cognized and seen, they will be relinquished. And any mistake is confessed, as a lapse, to the buddhas, the bodhisattvas, and co-religionists. Ethics that procures, preserves, and increases wholesome factors such as those, is known as the bodhisattva's ethics of collecting wholesome factors.

(14b.3) What is the bodhisattva's ethics of benefiting sentient beings?

Briefly, it should be understood to have eleven modes. What are the eleven modes? He ministers to the needs of sentient beings in various useful ways. He renders assistance, for example, by nursing any sufferings, such as illness, that may have occurred to sentient beings. Likewise, he shows what is relevant to worldly and transcendent goals, backed by the teaching of doctrine and backed by the teaching of means. He remains grateful to sentient beings who have helped him and furnishes proportionate assistance in return. He protects sentient beings from sundry fearful things such as lions and tigers, kings and robbers, water and fire. He dispels the sorrow in calamities to property and kinfolk. He provides all appropriate requisites to sentient beings destitute of requisites. He attracts a Dharma-following by correctly giving himself as a resource; he approaches from time to time accosting, addressing, and greeting them; he acquires food, drink, and the like for them from others. He complies with worldly convention; he comes and goes when called; briefly, he complies with the thought [of everyone] excepting those who are useless and disagreeable. He applauds the genuine good qualities of others, or reveals those that are hidden. This too: In order to move them from an unwholesome to a wholesome situation he humbles them, making them stop, he makes them perform an act of punishment or he banishes them, his inner attitude gentle and with beneficial intention. With wonder-working power he makes manifest hell and other places, by which he alarms them in their unwholesomeness, bending them to his will, pleasing them, surprising them in order to introduce them to the buddhist teaching.

(14b.6) The bodhisattva who is established in the ethics of the vow, who is established in the ethics of collecting wholesomeness, and who is established in the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings, how does he come to be possessed of ethics that is well restrained, of ethics in which wholesomeness is well collected, and of ethics in which the welfare of sentient beings is accomplished in all modes?

The bodhisattva established in the prātimokṣa vow renounces even the sovereignty of a universal monarch in order to go forth to the monastic

life. He disregards the sovereignty of a universal monarch as though it were grass or impurity. The bodhisattva, relying upon his purified intention, as a monastic disregards the highest of all human desires, the desires of a universal monarch. Lesser people, by contrast, do not disregard even the baser desires of a monastic; they "put aside their desires" thinking of the monastic livelihood. The bodhisattava sees those sensory desires as they really are, as though entering a dense jungle of sundry terrors. He does not anticipate future sense-pleasures either, including the realm of Mara. He does not sow aspirations and keep celibacy for the sake of those desires: What need to mention divine things other than that? In regard to the present time, the monastic bodhisattva sees, with wise understanding, that exalted gain and the respect of exalted sentient beings is like eating vomit, and will not taste of it: What need to mention the base gain and respect of base sentient beings? Alone, he delights in solitude, and even when living in the midst of the community, his thought dwells always apart. He is not satisfied with the vow of ethics, but based upon and established within morality, he achieves the measureless meditative concentrations of the bodhisattva, and strives to obtain the sovereignties. Even while dwelling in society he will not allow himself to engage in any demeaning conversation or demeaning talk. When dwelling in isolation, on the other hand, he allows not a bit of demeaning discursive preoccupation. He strongly regrets such behavior when, from time to time, it occurs out of absentmindedness, and considers the disadvantages. Dependent upon that continued regret and consideration of the disadvantages, as soon as demeaning conversation or demeaning preoccupation occurs, he quickly establishes mindfulness and arrives at the idea of not doing it, by which he withdraws from it. By familiarity with withdrawal from it, his former enjoyment of such behavior becomes enjoyment of not behaving so and the behavior becomes repugnant. His thought does not tremble, nor become depressed or bemused to hear that all the sublime, immeasurable bases of training of high-stage bodhisattvas are inconceivable, are far in the future, and are difficult to attain; rather, he thinks thus: "Being human, they have come to possess measureless, inconceivable restraints of body

and speech by training themselves gradually in the bodhisattva training. We are also human and if we train gradually, we will undoubtedly come to attain the good fortune of restrained body and speech."

The bodhisattva established in the ethics of the vow worries about his own faults and errors, not those of others. He has no thoughts of enmity or resentment for sentient beings who are violent and immoral; based upon great compassion according to the doctrine, the bodhisattva furnishes for them a predominance of mercy and desire-to-do.

The bodhisattva established in the ethics of the vow does not become angry at others because he has been struck by hand, clump of earth, club, or weapon. How then could he emit an evil word or return the blow? And what need to mention [anger] because of the slightly painful injuries of scolding, anger, and reproach?

The bodhisattva established in the vow is endowed with vigilance comprised by five limbs: endowed with the former limit, endowed with the latter limit, endowed with the mean, the prior duty, and the subsequent combined practice. The bodhisattva training in the bodhisattva trainings, when any fault has developed in the past, has remedied it according to the doctrine: This is vigilance endowed with the former limit. Any fault that will develop in future he will remedy according to the doctrine: This is vigilance endowed with the latter limit. Any fault that develops in the present he remedies according to the doctrine: This is vigilance endowed with the mean. Before any fault has yet developed, the bodhisattva thinks, most conscientiously, "Let me live and act in such a way that faults will not develop": This is the bodhisattva's vigilance as a prior duty. Based upon this same vigilance as a prior duty, to live and act in such a way that faults do not develop is the vigilance of subsequent combined practice.

The bodhisattva established in the ethics of the vow does not show off his virtues; he makes a clean breast of his vices; he is easily satisfied and content; he thinks nothing of suffering and his nature is free from anxiety; he is not frivolous nor is he wavering; his deportment is calm; and he is free from all the factors of wrong livelihood, beginning with hypocrisy.

With these ten branches, the bodhisattva established in the ethics of the vow possesses an ethics that is well restrained: disregarding sensory desires of the past, not anticipating those of the future nor longing for those of the present, to enjoy dwelling in isolation, perfect purity of speech and preoccupation, not underestimating oneself, tenderness, forbearance, vigilance, and purity of lifestyle and of livelihood.

(17b.2) Furthermore, the bodhisattva established in the ethics of collecting wholesome factors will not allow himself to pay even scant regard to body and enjoyments: What need to mention a great deal? He will not allow any occurrence of defilement or subsidiary defilement, such as anger and rancor, which are the foundations of immorality. He will not allow himself enmity, resentment, and spite towards others. He will not allow laziness and indolence to arise. He will not allow himself to savor the taste of the equalization process, nor allow defilements of equalization. He wisely knows the five topics, exactly as they are: He wisely knows the advantages of the effects of virtue, exactly as they are. He wisely knows, exactly as they are, the causes of virtue, the distortions in regard to the effects caused by virtue, the nondistortions, and the impediments to collecting virtue. Seeing the advantages of the effects of virtue, the bodhisattva searches out the causes of virtue in order to collect wholesomeness. The bodhisattva wisely knows, exactly as it is, what is distorted and what is not distorted. He does not expect to find permanence in the impermanent when the fruition of virtue has been obtained, nor pleasure in the painful, purity in the impure, or a self in what is self-less. He comes to wisely know the impediments to collecting wholesomeness and he eliminates them.

With this set of ten aspects, someone established in the ethics of collecting wholesome factors will collect virtue quickly, and all aspects will be collected. That is to say, they are collected by the common grounds of giving, morality, patience, vigor, and meditation, and by the five aspects of wisdom.

(18a.3) Furthermore, there are eleven modes by which the bodhisattva is established in the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings in all its modes; he is possessed of each mode, and he is possessed of all.

The bodhisattva renders assistance by assessing the needs and deciding what is to be done to minister to the various needs of sentient beings, by being a travelling companion, by employment in good work, by guarding property, by reconciling the divided, by festivity, and by meritorious deeds.

Furthermore, the bodhisattva ministers to the suffering. He nurses sentient beings stricken by illness. He guides the blind and shows them the way. The deaf he makes to understand by hand language, teaching them signs as names. Those without limbs he transports on top of him or by conveyance. He dispels the suffering of involvement in sense-desire for sentient beings who suffer involvement in sense-desire. He dispels the involvement of sentient beings who suffer involvement in ill will, langour, drowsiness, excitedness, regret, and doubt. He dispels the preoccupation with objects of desire of sentient beings who suffer involvement in preoccupation with objects of desire. As with preoccupation with objects of desire, so one should understand preoccupation with ill will, injury, kinfolk, fellow countrymen, and deities, as well as preoccupation connected with repudiation and family prosperity. He dispels the suffering of humiliation and defeat by others from sentient beings who suffer humiliation and defeat by others. He dispels the suffering of exhaustion from those who are road-weary, by giving them a place to stay and a seat, and by massaging their limbs.

(19a.2) Furthermore, the bodhisattva teaches sentient beings with relevancy. To eliminate misbehavior in sentient beings who course in misbehavior, he teaches them doctrine with literary expression that is fitting, connected, congruent, coherent, skilful, appropriate, compliant, and painstakingly resourceful.

Looking at it in another way, he teaches with skill in means. To eliminate misbehavior in sentient beings who course in misbehavior he will, for example, to eliminate stinginess in the stingy, [teach them with skill in means] how to correctly and with little difficulty acquire and keep goods in this life. Those who are hostile to this [buddhist] teaching, he causes to obtain faith, to obtain vision and, by purifying their views, to rise above a bad rebirth and eventually to transcend all suffering by making an end of all fetters.

(19b.7) Furthermore the bodhisattva, seeing an occasion for showing gratitude to sentient beings who have helped him, treats them with respect. He accosts, addresses, and greets them, saying, "Come here, you are welcome." He receives them offering a seat and a place to stay. He waits upon them with gain and respect that is either greater than or the equal of theirs, but not less. If he tends to their needs unsolicited, what need to mention when he has been asked? And as with those whom he tends to in this case, so also does this apply to those who suffer, and to showing the right way, guarding from fear, relieving the sorrow of calamities, providing requisites, giving himself as a resource, mental compliance, applauding good qualities, putting a stop though inwardly gentle; and frightening and bending to his will by working wonders.

(20a.1) Furthermore, the bodhisattva protects frightened sentient beings from fear. He protects sentient beings from fear of harm by beasts of prey, from fear of sharks and the deeps, from fear of kings, from fear of robbers, from fear of adversaries, from fear of landlords and overlords, from fear of loss of livelihood, from fear of defamation, from fear of public bashfulness and from fear of inhuman beings and zombies.

(20a.5) Furthermore, the bodhisattva relieves the sorrow of sentient beings who have suffered a calamity, beginning with calamities involving relatives and friends. That is to say, he relieves the sorrow of the death of parents. He relieves the sorrow of the death of children and spouse, of female and male servants, of staff and employees, of friends, counsellors, paternal and maternal relations and of such persons as teachers, preceptors, and gurus.

Furthermore, he relieves a set of sorrows beginning with calamities of property: for example, should someone's property be confiscated by the king. The bodhisattva correctly relieves the minor, the medium, and the major sorrows of sentient beings based on their property which, because of clumsiness, brings about a calamity for them: by being stolen by robbers, for example, carried off by fire or water, gone to waste by being badly stored in the treasuries, resulting in ruin because the work was misapplied, carried off by unfriendly inheritors, or internal family squandering.

(20b.7) Furthermore, the bodhisattva provides requisites for those who want requisites. He gives food to those who want food. He gives drink to those who want drink, transport to those who want transport, clothing, ornaments to those who want ornaments, utensils to those who want utensils, perfume, garlands, and unguent to those who want perfume, garlands, and unguent, shelter to those who want shelter, and illumination to those who want illumination.

(21a.3) Furthermore the bodhisattva, with the ethics of gathering, performs an act of gathering by attracting a crowd of sentient beings. With no thought of self-interest, backed only by a thought of mercy, he gives himself as a resource. He subsequently seeks, in accord with the doctrine, robes, food, bed and bedding, medicinal drugs, and other requisites from faithful brahmins and householders for their sake. His own robes, food, bed and bedding, medicinal drugs, and requisites, which he obtains in accord with the doctrine, he uses in common, and not privately. From time to time he gives appropriate advice in eight modes, and instructs them with the five sorts of lesson. The advice and lessons are as found in the *Balagotra* chapter.

(21b.3) Furthermore the bodhisattva, with the ethics of mental compliance, complies with the expectations of sentient beings. Firstly, he knows the dispositions, the nature, and the elements of sentient beings. Knowing their dispositions, nature, and elements, he lives together with sentient beings as one should live with them; he acts toward sentient beings as one should act toward them.

When the bodhisattva, desiring to comply with the expectations of any sentient being, sees that doing something involving body or speech will result in pain and unhappiness, and the bodhisattva reflects that the pain and unhappiness will not move him from his unwholesome to a wholesome situation, he will reject that action of body or speech conscientiously, and not perform it. If, on the other hand, he sees that the pain and unhappiness will move him from his unwholesome to a wholesome situation, he will reflect upon it holding only to mercy and not comply with the other's inclination [to be free from pain].

When something of body or speech done to someone else would result

in pain and unhappiness for a third party, whereas neither party would be moved from an unwholesome to a wholesome situation, the bodhisattva will reflect upon it and reject that act of body-speech on the grounds that it would not comply with the inclinations of the third party. If, on the other hand, he sees that either party, or both would be moved from an unwholesome to a wholesome situation, the bodhisattva will reflect upon it adopting nothing but a thought of mercy, and perform the action of body-speech so as not to comply with the inclination of those sentient beings.

If the bodhisattva correctly sees that some action of his involving body-speech will result in pain and unhappiness for others, while the action of body-speech is not part of his bases of training, nor part of [the gathering of] the resources of merit and gnosis, and that the pain and unhappiness will not remove others from an unwholesome situation--and so forth, as above--the bodhisattva will reject the action of body-speech in order to guard the thought of others. The reverse behavior should be understood as above.

The details of pleasure and happiness may be understood by analogy with pain and unhappiness.

The bodhisattva who complies with the expectations of others makes no express praise of someone else who is possessed by involvement in anger, until the anger is gone. What then to say of dispraise? Nor does he apologise.

Furthermore, the bodhisattva who complies with the expectations of others will accost and greet someone else even when not accosted. What then to say when he has been accosted and greeted? The bodhisattva who complies with the expectations of others does not cause others to be upset; he only desires to rebuke them out of mercy, rebuking them with calm faculties. The bodhisattva who complies with the expectations of others does not ridicule someone else, nor make himself sarcastic and intimidating. He does not make someone regret not putting him at ease. When someone has already been punished and humbled, he does not accuse him with a punishable topic. He does not show himself to be grand before those who are downcast.

The bodhisattva who complies with the expectations of others does not fail to cultivate others, nor does he cultivate others excessively, nor cultivate them unseasonably. He does not censure someone before his friends, nor praise him before his foes, nor does he confide in someone who is unfamiliar. He does not beg continually; he knows the proper measure to be taken and does not ignore an invitation to food, drink, and the like, or he excuses himself in the right way.

(22b.6) Furthermore the bodhisattva, with the ethics of applauding genuine good qualities, applauds sentient beings. He applauds those endowed with the quality of faith, by discussing the quality of faith. He applauds those endowed with the quality of morality, by discussing the quality of morality. He applauds those endowed with the quality of learnedness, by discussing the quality of learnedness. He applauds those endowed with the quality of renunciation, by discussing the quality of renunciation. He applauds those endowed with the quality of wisdom, by discussing the quality of wisdom.

(22b.8) Furthermore the bodhisattva, with the ethics of suppression, puts a stop to sentient beings. Minor fault and minor transgression he rebukes with mild rebuke, his attitude gentle and free of bad feeling. Medium fault and medium transgression he rebukes with medium rebuke. Major fault and major transgression he rebukes with major rebuke. Acts of punishment should be understood by analogy with rebuke. In cases of minor and medium fault, and minor and medium transgression, the bodhisattva will, as a lesson to them and to others as well, with a thought of mercy and a thought of the benefit, banish them for a certain period of time in order to subsequently regain them. In cases of major fault and major transgression he will banish them, out of mercy, so as not to regain them for as long as they live, never associating or sharing property with them again, in order that they not acquire even more demerit in regard to this [buddhist] teaching, and as a lesson to others whom he desires to benefit.

(23a.5) Furthermore, the bodhisattva desires to frighten<sup>\*</sup> sentient beings and to bend them to his will by the power of working wonders. He takes those sentient beings who course in misbehavior and shows them at

close range that the ripened fruits of misbehavior are the states of woe--the hells, the great hells, the cold hells, and the temporary hells. "Look you," he says, "upon the unbearable ripening of unpleasant results of accumulated misbehavior, severe in the highest degree, that are being experienced by those who were once human." And they, having seen it, will be frightened and alarmed, and they will reject that misbehavior.

In the case of some sentient beings seated in the great assembly who wish to cast ignominy upon the bodhisattva with humiliating questions, the bodhisattva will magically recreate himself as Vajrapāṇi or some other yaksha of heroic station who is great in body and power and frighten, terrify them, for by this means belief will be born and they will cherish and respect him; he will be made to respond only to legitimate questions and, by his various responses, that great crowd will be converted.

He may employ various types of wonder that he manufactures: having been one, there are many; having been many, there is one; going straight through a wall, through a rocky hillside, through an enclosure, moving with his body unobstructed and exercising further control over his body up to the world of Brahmā. He may display the combined miracle [of water and fire] and absorption into the element of fire. Or, one might say that he demonstrates wonder-working power that he shares with the auditors. With this he bends them to his will, he pleases them, he causes them to rejoice; whereupon those without faith he projects into the blessed state of faith; the immoral, the unlearned, the miserly, and those of defective understanding he projects into the blessed states of morality, learnedness, renunciation, and wisdom.

This is how the bodhisattva comes into possession of the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings in all modes.

(24a.6) The threefold aggregate of bodhisattva ethics, those aggregates of ethics that comprise the ethics of the vow, the ethics of collecting wholesome factors, and the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings, is a measureless aggregate of merit.

(29a.8) The bodhisattva, whether lay or monastic, who aspires to train himself in this threefold aggregate of ethics that is the bodhisattva

training, who has made the resolve for supreme, right and full awakening, should first fall at the feet of a bodhisattva who is a co-religionist in that he also has made the bodhisattva resolve, who has taken and knows the vow, and who is capable of grasping and understanding the meaning of its verbal communication, and then entreat him as follows: "I seek to receive from you, *kulaputra*, the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics obligation. If it be no importunity, may it suit you to hear me for a moment and to grant it, out of pity."

(31a.2) Then that capable bodhisattva, having described to the aspirant bodhisattva in detail the advantages of the bodhisattva vow, should also correctly describe to the vow-aspirant the [relatively] grave and trivial bases of training, and encourage him, speaking thus:

"Listen, *kulaputra*! Do you aspire to cross over the stranded, to release the bound, to revive the breathless, to bring to nirvana those not yet in nirvana, and to continue the lineage of the buddhas? For that, you must be firm in the generation of the thought, and firm in the obligation."

Having observed that he belongs to a class unaware of such things, he should speak thus, so as to encourage him.

(33a.8) Then the aspirant, having made a good entreaty, throws his upper robe over one shoulder and does worship to lord buddhas of past, present, and future and to bodhisattvas advanced to a high stage--attaining great gnosis and majesty--who abide in the ten directions. And while making their qualities evident, he generates a thought of serene faith from the bottom of his heart or, at least he generates a little, as well as he is able, with whatever power of [past] causes he may possess. Setting up before himself an image of the *Tathāgata*, he does proper worship and in a humble manner, kneeling on his right knee or in a squatting position, he should thus address the learned bodhisattva:

"*Kulaputra*!" or, "Long-lived one!" or, "Reverend! Please grant me the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics obligation."

(34a.5) Adopting one-pointed mindfulness, he promotes a thought that is nothing but serene: "Now my obtainment of the great treasury of merit--supreme, inexhaustible, and measureless--is not far off." Contemplating that goal, he should keep silence.

The learned bodhisattva, who may be standing or seated, shall say, with an unwavering thought, to the entering bodhisattva:

"Kulaputra!" or, "Dharma brother so-and-so! Are you a bodhisattva? Have you made the resolve for bodhi?"

And this he must affirm, saying, "It is so."

(34b.2) Thereupon, he should be addressed thus: "Will you, kulaputra so-and-so, receive from me all the bodhisattva bases of training and all the bodhisattva ethics--the ethics of the vow, the ethics of collecting wholesome factors, and the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings--whatever the bases of training and the ethics of all bodhisattvas of the past, whatever the bases of training and the ethics of all bodhisattvas of the future, and whatever the bases of training and the ethics of all bodhisattvas presently abiding in the ten directions may be--whatever the bases of training and the ethics in which all past bodhisattvas have trained, all future bodhisattvas will train, and all present bodhisattvas are training?"

And he must affirm, "Yes, I will."

The learned bodhisattva should speak so a second and a third time, and when asked, the recipient bodhisattva should, all three times, affirm it.

(35a.2) The learned bodhisattva, thus having three times imparted to the recipient bodhisattva the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics obligation and received the affirmation, should, with the recipient bodhisattva not yet risen, before that same image of the Tathāgata, fall at the feet of all buddhas and bodhisattvas alive and flourishing in the ten directions and, joining his palms, make an announcement:

"This bodhisattva, named so-and-so, has three times received from me, the bodhisattva so-and-so, the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics obligation. I announce myself witness to those highest of nobles in the boundless, infinite realms of the universe in the ten directions who, though not visible, have intellects to which all sentient beings are entirely visible: This bodhisattva, named so-and-so, has from myself, named so-and-so, undertaken the bodhisattva vow of ethics."

This he should declare a second and a third time.

(35b.1) As soon as the act of undertaking the vow of ethics has been thus completed, the very nature of things is that a sign will appear to buddhas and high-stage bodhisattvas, alive and flourishing in the boundless, infinite realms of the universe in all directions, by which it comes to their notice that "A bodhisattva has undertaken the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics obligation." Thereupon, that bodhisattva comes to their notice. From that notice proceeds their intuitive vision. Because of their intuitive vision the realization enters their hearts, exactly as it is, that "The bodhisattva so-and-so, in a certain realm of the universe, has received the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics obligation from the bodhisattva so-and-so." And they all, with their good hearts, love him variously as a son, and as a brother.

The wholesome factors of that bodhisattva, thus loved variously by good hearts, should be expected only to grow, and not to decrease.

The announcement of the vow-of-ethics undertaking should be understood to have reached them.

(36a.2) Having completed that act of undertaking the bodhisattva vow of ethics, both those bodhisattvas should do worship to buddhas and bodhisattvas of the boundless, infinite realms of the universe in all directions, fall at their feet, and then rise.

(35b.6) The bodhisattva vow-of-ethics undertaking is the most distinguished of all vow-of-ethics undertakings; it is supreme, it is endowed with a measureless aggregate of merit, it is generated by the most wholesome attitude of mind, and it functions as the antidote to all types of misconduct on the part of all sentient beings. No prātimokṣa vow-undertaking can approach even a hundredth part of this vow-of-ethics undertaking, nor a thousandth, nor any number, fraction, calculation, example, or comparison, in regard to the acquisition of merit.

(37b.6) The bodhisattva who has been established in the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics obligation should on the one hand deduce again and again for himself, "This is the fitting thing for the bodhisattva to do; this is not the fitting thing for the bodhisattva to do," and he should thenceforth perform his actions and train himself in accord with just that. Listening conscientiously, on the other hand, to the collection of bodhi-

sattva scriptures, or to this contraction that is the code of the bodhisattva collection, he should train in accord with just that, in order to accomplish the many thousandfold bases of training promulgated by the Lord for bodhisattvas in those various scriptures.

(30a.3) The bodhisattva should not take on the vow-of-ethics obligation from just any bodhisattva, although he may be learned. Do not receive it from someone who is without faith, who has no devotion to this vow-of-ethics undertaking, nor participation in it, nor preparedness for it. Do not take it from someone possessed of greed, nor someone overwhelmed by attachment, nor someone insatiable or discontented. Do not take it from someone whose morality has failed or who has no respect for the training, who is slack. Do not take it from someone angry or rancorous, generally impatient or intolerant of others' faults. Do not take it from someone lazy or indolent, who generally makes a practice of the pleasures of sleeping day and night, lying on his side and staying in bed, or who passes the time with socializing. Do not take it from someone whose thought is wandering, who cannot develop a one-pointed thought of the virtuous even for the space of time it takes to milk a cow. Finally, do not take it from someone dull-witted or stupid by nature, who is exceedingly disheartened and repudiates the collection of bodhisattva scriptures or the code of the collection of bodhisattva scriptures.

(36a.3) Although the bodhisattva has grasped and mastered this ceremony for undertaking the vow, he should not rashly announce it and make it known to sentient beings who are hostile to, and without faith in the bodhisattva collection. Why so? Having so heard, those who are disinclined, who are obscured with the great obscuration of unawareness, will repudiate him. And, as to that repudiation: To the extent that the bodhisattva established in the vow has become endowed with a measureless aggregate of merit, so long as he has not entirely eliminated all of those evil words, evil views, and evil representations, to the same extent he will become possessed of nothing more than a measureless aggregate of demerit.

(29b.2) The bases of bodhisattva training and the grounds for offense

that are set forth in this code for the collections of bodhisattva scriptures should be proclaimed before the aspirant to the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics obligation. If he has the fortitude, based upon sincere examination and analysis by wisdom, and neither based upon instigation by someone else nor competition with someone else, then he may be known as a steadfast bodhisattva. The vow-of-ethics obligation should then be received by him, and imparted to him, in accord with this ceremony.

(40a.8) Accordingly, there are four events that function in likeness to [prātimokṣa] grounds for defeat for a bodhisattva established in the vow. What are the four? With a longing for gain and respect, to praise himself and deprecate another is the first event that is "grounds for defeat" for the bodhisattva. While the goods exist in his possession, to coldheartedly fail to donate material things, because he has a nature of attachment to them, to those who are suffering and indigent, who have no protector and no recourse, who have approached in a properly suppliant manner; and, out of stinginess in doctrine, not to teach doctrine to those who have approached in a proper manner eager for doctrine, is the second event that is "grounds for defeat" for the bodhisattva. The bodhisattva develops such involvement in anger that he cannot resolve it with the mere utterance of harsh words, but overwhelmed with anger he strikes, hurts, damages sentient beings with hand, clump of earth, or club; while focusing on just that aggravated angry attitude he does not heed, he does not accept even the others' apology; he will not let loose that attitude. This is the third event that is "grounds for defeat" for the bodhisattva. To repudiate the bodhisattva collection and, on his own or echoing someone else, to devote himself to counterfeits of the good doctrine, and then to enjoy, to show, and to establish those counterfeits of the good doctrine, is the fourth event that is "grounds for defeat" for the bodhisattva.

(53b.4) These are the four events that are "grounds for defeat." Should the bodhisattva commit any one of them--not to mention committing them all--his opportunity to gather and grasp the vast resources that he needs for awakening will disappear for the moment. For the present, there is no opportunity for a purified intention. He is a counterfeit, not a genuine bodhisattva.

(54a.5) On the other hand, the bodhisattva will not relinquish the vow-of-ethics undertaking with medium or lesser involvement in these four events that are "grounds for defeat." Relinquishment is the result of a greater degree of involvement--by which the bodhisattva makes a regular practice of these four events that are "grounds for defeat," generates not the slightest sense of shame and embarrassment, is pleased with and glad of it, and has a view for its good qualities. This should be understood as greater involvement.

(60a.7) The bodhisattva does not relinquish the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics undertaking by only once committing an act that has the quality of being "grounds for defeat," as the monk does [relinquish] his prātimokṣa vow with his events of defeat. And even when the undertaking has been relinquished, the bodhisattva still has an opportunity to receive the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics undertaking in the same lifetime. The monk established in the prātimokṣa vow for whom a defeat has developed has no such opportunity.

(61b.3) To summarize, relinquishment of the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics undertaking comes from only two causes: complete relinquishment of the aspiration for supreme, right and full awakening, and action with greater involvement in an event that is "grounds for defeat."

(62b.5) If the bodhisattva has neither relinquished the aspiration nor acted with greater involvement in events that are "grounds for defeat," then even when he has changed lives, the bodhisattva born anywhere--up, down, or on a level--does not abandon the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics undertaking. Even if he is robbed of his memory upon changing lives, the bodhisattva coming into contact with a spiritual adviser may make the reception again and again in order to rouse his memory, but it is not a fresh undertaking.

(63a.1) Accordingly, one should know what is a fault for a bodhisattva established in the bodhisattva vow of ethics and what is not a fault, the defiled and the undefiled, the minor, the medium, and the major.

<sup>\*</sup>(63a.5) Should the bodhisattva established in the bodhisattva vow of ethics pass a day and a night without having done something, be it great or small, as his office of daily worship to the Tathāgata or to

a shrine that represents him, to the Doctrine or to doctrine in the form of a book--the collection of bodhisattva scriptures or its code--or to the Community--the community of high-stage bodhisattavas of the ten directions--not even so much as a single prostration with his body, not even so much as a single four-line verse composed on the qualities of Buddha, Doctrine, or Community, not even so much as a single act of faith guided by recollection of the qualities of Buddha, Doctrine, and Community with his mind--then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction [to his vow].

If developed out of lack of respect, laziness, or indolence, the fault is a transgression with defilement. If developed out of forgetfulness, the fault is a transgression without defilement. In the case of a distraught mind, there is no fault. For someone who has reached the stage of purified intention there is no fault, for in this case he is a bodhisattva whose attitude is pure. By analogy, the monk who has attained "faith through understanding" is always serving the Teacher, the Doctrine, and the Community by the nature of things, and doing worship with the highest offerings.

(64a.7) If the bodhisattva allows insatiability, discontent, and attachment to gain and respect to occur, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. There is no fault if he has a will to eliminate it, takes the initiative in doing so, and continues to oppose it by keeping hold of the antidote, but nonetheless commits it over and over because he is by nature overwhelmed with a great share of defilement.

(64b.3) The bodhisattva who sees a co-religionist deserving deference to his more advanced age and endowment of qualities and, repressed by pride or with a thought of enmity or resentment fails to rise and provide a seat, and who makes no reply in a suitable manner when accosted, addressed, and greeted by someone else and asked a question, being repressed by pride alone or with a thought of enmity or resentment, is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault.

If he is not repressed by pride nor seized by a thought of enmity or resentment, but acts so out of laziness and indolence or an indeter-

minate thought, or absentmindedly, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction, but the fault is not defiled.

If he is critically ill or his mind is distraught, there is no fault. If he is met, accosted, addressed, and greeted, and asked a question with the notion that he is awake when he has fallen asleep, there is no fault. In cases of teaching doctrine to others or diligence in conducting a discussion, there is no fault. If he is engaged in greeting someone else there is no fault. If he is listening to the teaching of doctrine or overhearing others conduct a discussion, there is no fault. In guarding against inconvenience in a discussion of doctrine, and in guarding the mind of the person speaking doctrine [against a slight], there is no fault. In taming and disciplining the sentient beings in question by that means, and raising them from an unwholesome situation to place them in a wholesome situation, there is no fault. In keeping an internal rule of the community, there is no fault. In guarding the thought of the majority, there is no fault.

(65a.8) If the bodhisattva, upon being invited by others to a home, to another monastery, or to other homes for requisites such as food, drink, and clothing, does not go, does not accept the invitation, repressed by pride or with a thought of enmity or resentment, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. To stay away under the influence of laziness and indolence is a fault that is not defiled.

If he is sick and incapacitated, or if his mind is distraught, there is no fault. If the place is remote and the road dangerous, there is no fault. In desiring to tame and discipline by that means while moving them from an unwholesome to a wholesome situation, there is no fault. If he has already promised someone else, there is no fault. If he stays away in order to guard against interference with a wholesome direction [of his practice] in which he has been continuously diligent, there is no fault. If he stays away because he suspects that he will miss hearing a useful topic of doctrine he has not heard before, there is no fault. And conducting a discussion should be understood by analogy with hearing a topic of doctrine. If the other has called with malicious intent, there

is no fault. In guarding against thoughts of enmity on the part of the majority, there is no fault. In keeping an internal rule of the community, there is no fault.

(65b.6) Should the bodhisattva obtain from others--that is to say, have the opportunity to be provided with--a great deal of fine wealth of various specifications such as gold and silver, jewels, pearl, and lapis lazuli, and he not take it, but refuse with a thought of enmity or resentment, he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault, because it shows disdain for a sentient being. Not taking it out of laziness and indolence, he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction, but the fault is not defiled.

In the case of a distraught mind, there is no fault. If he sees that by taking it his mind will grow enamored of it, there is no fault. If he suspects that the other will come to regret it, there is no fault. If he suspects that the other has made an error in giving [it to him], there is no fault. If he suspects that the donor, by reason of having renounced all that he owns, will be impoverished and ruined, there is no fault. If he suspects that it belongs to the community or shrine, there is no fault. If he suspects that it has been improperly carried off from a third party, and might be the occasion for some harm such as slaying, bondage, fine, or condemnation, there is no fault.

(66a.6) Should the bodhisattva fail to give doctrine to those who seek doctrine, with a thought of enmity or resentment or being envious by nature, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he fails to give it out of laziness and indolence he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction, but the fault is not defiled.

In the case of some tīrthika seeking an opening, there is no fault. If he is critically ill, or if his mind is distraught, there is no fault. In desiring to tame and to discipline by that means, while moving them from an unwholesome to a wholesome situation, there is no fault. If he does not know doctrine, there is no fault. In failing to give it to someone who would receive it disrespectfully, discourteously and with bad deportment, there is no fault. If he suspects that by teaching the awe-

some doctrine to someone of weak faculties, his obtaining it will end in trembling, wrong views, wrong adherence, impairment, and decay, there is no fault. If he suspects that coming into his hands, the doctrine will be diffused to third parties who are not fit vessels for it, there is no fault.

(66b.7) If the bodhisattva neglects or discounts violent and immoral sentient beings on the grounds of the violence and immorality, with a thought of enmity or resentment, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. To neglect them out of laziness and indolence, or to discount them absentmindedly, is to be possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction, but the fault is not defiled. Why so? The bodhisattva has a thought of mercy and a desire-to-do furnished for sentient beings who are violent and immoral, who dwell in the cause for suffering, such as he does not have for those who are righteous and at peace in the performance of their physical, verbal, and mental activities.

In the case of a distraught mind, there is no fault. Desiring to tame them by that means, there is no fault, as before. Guarding the thought of many others, there is no fault. Keeping an internal rule of the community, there is no fault.

(67a.4) The bodhisattva trains himself as do the auditors--making no distinction--according to what has been established by the Lord, in the *prātimokṣa* disciplinary code, to be reprehensible by precept, in order to guard the thought of others--that is to say, in order that those without faith may have faith, and those with faith may develop it further. Why so? Even the auditors, intent as they are upon their own welfare, train themselves in trainings that do not fail to guard the minds of others, that create faith in the faithless and develop it further in the faithful. How much more so must the bodhisattvas, intent as they are upon the welfare of others!

(67b.3) Then again, the bodhisattva does not train himself as do the auditors in what the Lord has established for auditors, beginning as they do with meager aims, few deeds, and dwelling in little concern, to be reprehensible by precept. Why so? The auditor excels in being intent

upon his own welfare and in disregarding the welfare of others. In undertaking the welfare of others he has meager aims and few deeds; he dwells in little concern. The bodhisattva, for whom the welfare of others is paramount, does not excel in undertaking others' welfare with meager aims and few deeds, while dwelling in little concern. So the bodhisattva, for the sake of others, should seek as many as a hundred, a thousand robes from unrelated brahmins and householders. If any occasion presents itself, he should examine whether or not these sentient beings have enough, and accept what they require. As with robes, so also with begging bowls. And just as he should seek [robes], so also he should have them made, by unrelated weavers, out of yarn he has accepted. He should also furnish as many as a hundred beds of silk for the sake of others, and a hundred rugs for sitting. He should accept more than a million-million in gold and silver. If the bodhisattva established in the bodhisattva vow of ethics does train himself, in these and other matters, in accord with the legal improbity of the auditors, beginning with meager aims, few deeds, and dwelling in little concern, if he dwells in little concern, meager aims and few deeds with a thought of enmity or a thought of resentment, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he dwells in little concern, with meager aims and few deeds out of laziness and indolence, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction, but the fault is not defiled.

(69a.3) Even in the case of what is reprehensible by nature, the bodhisattva acts with such skill in means that no fault ensues; rather, there is a spread of much merit.

Accordingly, the bodhisattva may behold a robber or thief engaged in committing a great many deeds of immediate retribution, being about to murder many hundreds of magnificent living beings--auditors, independent buddhas, and bodhisattvas--for the sake of a few material goods. Seeing it, he forms this thought in his mind: "If I take the life of this sentient being, I myself may be reborn as one of the creatures of hell. Better that I be reborn a creature of hell than that this living being, having committed a deed of immediate retribution, should go straight

to hell." With such an attitude the bodhisattva ascertains that the thought is virtuous or indeterminate and then, feeling constrained, with only a thought of mercy for the consequence, he takes the life of that living being. There is no fault, but a spread of much merit.

Accordingly the bodhisattva, if he has the capability, acts with a thought of mercy or the intention of doing benefit to overthrow kings or high officials from the power of ruling the dominion, stationed in which they spread great demerit by being generally violent and pitiless toward sentient beings, and engaged in absolutist oppression of others. The bodhisattva confiscates property from robbers and thieves--those who steal the property of others--who take a great deal of the property of community and shrine by theft for their own enjoyment. He thinks, "Let not this enjoyment of property result in extended harm and misfortune for them." Upon that condition only, he steals it back and restores that of the community to the community, and that of the shrine to the shrine. The bodhisattva investigates storekeepers or park custodians who clumsily waste the property of the community or shrine, and those who use it for themselves. He thinks, "Let not that deed and that misuse result in extended harm and misfortune for them," and removes them from power. In this way the bodhisattva, while taking what has not been freely given, incurs no fault; but there is a spread of much merit.

Accordingly, the lay bodhisattva comes to a woman with the *dharma* of sexual embrace, she being single and her thought subjected to an agony of desire to end her celibacy. He thinks, "Let her not develop a thought of enmity, and much demerit spread. Rather, let her come under my influence for abandonment of the unwholesome, and whatever is desired be employed as a root of good." Adopting a thought that is nothing but merciful he resorts to an uncelibate *dharma* of copulation, and there is no fault, but a spread of much merit. (For the monastic bodhisattva, who guards against breaking the auditors' training, to resort to uncelibacy is entirely out of the question.)

Accordingly the bodhisattva, in order to save the lives of many sentient beings, to save them from bondage, to save them from mutilation of hand, foot, nose, and ear, and to protect them from gouging of eyes,

will speak a false word, whereas a bodhisattva will not knowingly speak a false word for the sake of his own life. In short, the bodhisattva sees only what [will accomplish] the welfare of sentient beings, not the reverse. Having no thought of self-interest, no basis but a desire for the benefit of sentient beings, he changes his [expressed] opinion and knowingly speaks a word that diverges from it. There is no fault in thus speaking, but a spread of much merit.

Accordingly the bodhisattva, relying upon a thought of mercy towards sentient beings who have been captured by an unwholesome adviser, speaks as well as he is able, as well as he can, words to divide them from the unwholesome adviser. He thinks, "Let not extensive harm and misfortune come to those sentient beings through contact with a sinful companion." He enjoys it, and even delights in it. In that way, although he creates discord among friends, there is no fault, but a spread of much merit.

Accordingly, the bodhisattva rebukes sentient beings who are taking the wrong path, who are doing wrong, with words harsh and severe, by which means to move them from an unwholesome to a wholesome situation. Although there is harsh speech on the part of the bodhisattva there is no fault, but a spread of much merit.

Accordingly the bodhisattva, for sentient beings inclined to dance, song, and instrumental music, and for those inclined to tales of kings and robbers, food and drink, prostitutes and street scenes, is learned in varieties of dance, song, music, and narrative. With a merciful intention he pleases them with varieties of narrative containing dance, song, and music, and endowed with idle chatter. He bends them to submission to his will and influence. Having drawn them in to listen to his words, he moves them from an unwholesome to a wholesome situation. So although there is idle chatter on the part of the bodhisattva, there is no fault, but a spread of much merit.

(72b.8) The bodhisattva who allows the occurrence of events of the wrong ways of getting livelihood--hypocrisy, sweet talk, hint, extortion, and seeking to profit from possessions--feeling no constraint at them and failing to remove them, is possessed of fault, possessed of contra-

diction; there is defiled fault. If he has generated the will and begun to attempt to remove them, but continues to act so because his mind is overcome by a great share of defilement, there is no fault.

(73a.5) If the bodhisattva is restless, with his mind caught up by excitement, and he enjoys that restlessness, showing his excitement and distractedness with a horse laugh, sporting and clamoring and wishing others to share his laughter and merriment, then on those grounds he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. Done absentmindedly, the fault is not defiled.

There is no fault if he has generated the will to remove it, as before. If he desires by that means to remove enmity that has been created in others, there is no fault. If he desires by that means to dispel sorrow that has arisen in others, there is no fault. If he does it to attract others who have that sort of nature, who enjoy it, or to guard those who have taken the lead, or to comply with them, there is no fault. If he does it to show his pure intention with cheerful countenance towards others whom he suspects might take a dislike to the bodhisattva, or whom he suspects might come to have an enmity and aversion towards him, there is no fault.

(73b.1) Any bodhisattva who holds and espouses the view that "The bodhisattva should not look forward to nirvana, but should remain averting his face from it. Nor should he fear the defilements and the subsidiary defilements. He should not set his mind too far apart from them, for the bodhisattva must accomplish bodhi in this way, revolving through samsara for three incalculable aeons"--is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault.

Why so? The auditor must devote himself to anticipating nirvana, his thinking alarmed at the defilements and the subsidiary defilements, and the bodhisattva must devote himself to anticipating nirvana and develop a sense of alarm at the defilements and the subsidiary defilements a million-millionfold more. For the auditor has an interest in only his own welfare, whereas the bodhisattva is striving for the welfare of all sentient beings. So he must carry out exercises that will free his mind of being defiled. He is no arhat, but he is distinguished from

them in that he may course in things that are bound up with outflow without being defiled.

(74a.7) The bodhisattva who does not guard against, who fails to dispel a stench of ignominy about himself, an insult and a bad report, when it is a matter of fact, is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. To fail to guard against and to dispel what is not a matter of fact is a fault and contradiction, but the fault is not defiled. If the other is a tīrthika, or anyone else who is prejudiced, there is no fault. If he utters the insult on the basis of [the bodhisattva] being ordained, living on alms, or living virtuously, there is no fault. If he utters it because he is overcome with anger or because his thinking is distorted, there is no fault.

(74b.6) If the bodhisattva sees that some caustic means, some use of severity would be of benefit to sentient beings, and does not employ it in order to guard against unhappiness, he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is fault that is not defiled. If little benefit would result for the present, and great unhappiness on that basis, there is no fault.

(75a.2) The bodhisattva, abused by others, responds with abuse; he returns anger for anger, blow for blow, cavil for cavil. Thus he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault.

(75a.5) If the bodhisattva has given offense, or is suspected of having given offense to others and if, with a thought of enmity or repressed by pride he makes no suitable apology, thus neglecting them, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he makes no apology out of laziness, indolence, or carelessness, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction, but the fault is not defiled.

If he wishes by that means to discipline and to tame them, to move them from an unwholesome to a wholesome situation, there is no fault. If [the other person] is a tīrthika, there is no fault. If he is someone improper, who desires to induce an apology by acting reprehensibly, there is no fault. If he is someone contentious by nature and given to dispute, whom the apology will greatly agitate and cause to be aggress-

sive, there is no fault. If [the bodhisattva] expects that the other has a patient disposition and a disposition without enmity, and if [the other] is someone who will be embarrassed to receive an apology that involves someone else's transgression, there is no fault.

(75b.2) If the bodhisattva, with a thought of enmity and a malicious intention, will not heed an apology, when the apology has been made in the right way by others who have offended in the course of some dispute, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. There is no fault if he wishes to tame someone else by that means, and all the rest may be understood as before. If the apology is made in what is not the right way and it is not compatible, there is no fault.

(75b.6) If the bodhisattva develops and harbors an attitude of anger towards others, readily allowing it to occur, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he has generated the will to remove it, there is no fault, as above.

(76a.2) If the bodhisattva, under the sway of a yearning for service and honor, attracts a following with a thought of self-interest, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. To accept service and honor with no thought of one's own interests is without fault.

(76a.4) The bodhisattva for whom laziness and indolence have arisen who succumbs, unseasonably and intemperately, to the pleasure of sleep, the pleasure of staying in bed, and the pleasure of lying on his side, is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he is sick and incapacitated, there is no fault. If he is fatigued from travelling, there is no fault. If he has generated the will to remove it, there is no fault, as before.

(76a.7) If the bodhisattva passes the time with his mind enamored of social intercourse he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he passes the time absentmindedly, there is fault that is not defiled. If someone is continuing to speak and he listens but a moment, stationed in mindfulness, to comply with his expectations, there is no fault. If he is only questioning, or only answering a question, in regard to something curious, there is no fault.

(76b.4) Whereas to settle his mind in equilibrium is desirable for the bodhisattva, if he does not go, because he is possessed of a thought of enmity and repressed by pride, to receive instruction on undertaking mental stability, he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he does [not go] out of laziness and indolence, there is fault that is not defiled. If he is sick and incapacitated, there is no fault. If he suspects that the instruction will be distorted, there is no fault. There is no fault if he himself is erudite and capable of settling his mind in equilibrium, or if he has already carried out the instruction that is to be given.

(76b.7) The bodhisattva who allows the hindrance of sense-desire to occur, who fails to dispel it, is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he has generated the will and endeavored to remove it, but it continues because he is overwhelmed with severe defilement, there is no fault. Ill will, languor-drowsiness, excitedness-regret, and doubt should be understood in the same way as sense-desire.

(78a.3) If the bodhisattva experiences the taste of meditative trance and looks for good qualities in the taste of meditation, he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. Where he has generated the will to eliminate it there is no fault, as before.

(78a.7) Any bodhisattva who holds and espouses the doctrine that, "A bodhisattva should not listen to doctrine that is associated with the vehicle of the auditors, nor learn it by heart, nor train himself in it. Why should a bodhisattva listen to and learn doctrine that is associated with the vehicle of the auditors? He need not train himself in it"--is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. That is to say, if the bodhisattva need apply himself even to tīrthika scriptures, how much the more to the exalted word of the Buddha? In deterring a one-sided devotion, there is no fault.

(78b.5) If the bodhisattva, while he has the bodhisattva collection, fails to apply himself to the bodhisattva collection, entirely neglecting the bodhisattva collection and applying himself to the auditors' collection, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault.

(78b.7) If the bodhisattva, while he possesses the exalted word of the Buddha, does not apply himself to it, applying himself to treatises of the tīrthikas, to heterodox treatises, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he is very judicious, quick of apprehension, capable of not forgetting over a long period, able to contemplate and to penetrate the meaning, if he is endowed with an intellectual understanding that is unalterable because it is accompanied by investigation of buddhist scripture through reasoning, and so long as he makes twice as much daily application to the exalted word of the Buddha, there is no fault.

(79a.5) If the bodhisattva, while not infringing that guideline, becomes proficient in tīrthika, heterodox treatises, and does so in a manner anticipating it, taking pleasure in it, and being gratified by it (that is to say, if he does not do so as though resorting to strong medicine), then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault.

(79b.1) If the bodhisattva, having heard the profound topics found in the bodhisattva collection, the most profound topics dealing with principles of reality or with the might of the buddhas or bodhisattvas, has no inclination for them and repudiates them, saying, "These are not meaningful, they are not the doctrine, they are not the declaration of the Tathāgata, and they will not bring benefit and pleasure to sentient beings"--whether he be repudiating them out of unskilful attention of his own, or following someone else's lead, he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault.

If the bodhisattva has heard the profound topics and the most profound topics and his thinking is disinclined, in that [circumstance] the bodhisattva should, with faith and free of pretense, train himself to think thus: "It is not fitting for me, eyeless and blind, who can only function in accordance with the eye of the Tathāgata, to reject what the Tathāgata has declared with [enigmatic] intention." The bodhisattva counts himself ignorant and rightly regards the Tathāgata himself as being visible in those doctrines. In that way he will make progress.

If he has no inclination but does not repudiate them either, there is no fault.

(80a.5) If the bodhisattva, with a thought of self-interest and a thought of resentment, publicly praises himself and deprecates others, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he wishes to overcome tīrthikas out of a desire to maintain the teaching, there is no fault. There is no fault in desiring to discipline that person by this means, and so forth as before. If he does it so that those without faith may have faith, and those with faith may develop it further, there is no fault.

(80b.1) If the bodhisattva, repressed by pride and with thoughts of enmity and resentment, does not go when doctrinal discourse and discussion of the good doctrine are being held, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he stays away out of laziness and indolence, there is fault that is not defiled. If he is unaware of it, there is no fault. If he is sick and incapacitated, there is no fault. If he suspects that the teachings will be distorted, there is no fault. If he is guarding the thought of the person speaking doctrine, there is no fault. If he knows it involves discussion of topics that he already knows, having heard them over and over and learned them by heart, there is no fault. If he is erudite, and has learned and assimilated what he has heard, there is no fault. If he is continuing to keep his mind upon a meditative visualization, applying himself to consummating a bodhisattva concentration, there is no fault. In the case of someone very dull in wisdom--who is weak in grasping doctrine, weak in retaining it, and weak in settling the mind upon the visualization--there is no fault.

(80b.6) If the bodhisattva deliberately discounts the person speaking doctrine and pays no respect to him, ridiculing him, making sarcastic remarks, and making his reference the letter rather than the meaning, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault.

(81a.4) If the bodhisattva maintaining the vow does not, because he has thoughts of enmity and resentment, minister to the needs of sentient beings, whether it be deciding what is to be done, being a travelling companion, employment in good business and work, guarding property,

reconciling the divided, festivity and meritorious deeds, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he fails to render assistance out of laziness and indolence, the fault is not defiled.

If he is sick and incapacitated, there is no fault. If the seeker is capable of doing it by himself, or if he already has some protector and recourse, there is no fault. If the deed is connected with some harm and unconnected with doctrine, there is no fault. If he desire to exert discipline by that means, there is no fault--and so forth, as before. If he is already promised to someone else, there is no fault. If he has entrusted it to someone else who is capable, there is no fault. If he is continuing application in some wholesome direction, there is no fault. If he is dull-witted by nature and not qualified to impart the tradition, there is no fault, as before. If he desires to guard the thought of the majority, there is no fault. In keeping an internal rule of the community, there is no fault.

(81b.2) When the bodhisattva encounters someone stricken with illness, and with thoughts of enmity and resentment does not render service and attendance, he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he fails to do so out of laziness and indolence, the fault is not defiled. If he himself is sick and incapacitated, there is no fault. If he has appointed someone else who is capable and congenial, there is no fault. If the patient already has a protector and recourse, there is no fault. If he has been stricken with a long-standing illness and is about to be healed, there is no fault. If he does not do so in order to guard against interference in some sublime, wholesome direction in which he has applied himself, there is no fault. If his wisdom is too dull and he cannot properly expound the doctrine, nor properly bear it in mind, nor settle his mind upon an image, there is no fault. If he is already promised to someone else, there is no fault.

(81b.7) Ministering to remove suffering in the suffering should be understood in the same way as nursing illness.

(81b.8) If the bodhisattva sees sentient beings proceeding in a manner not conducive to present and future welfare, and with thoughts of enmi-

ty and resentment does not point out to them what is relevant, what is conducive, then he is faulted, he is contradicted; there is defiled fault. If he fails to teach them out of laziness and indolence, the fault is not defiled. If he himself, not knowing, is incapable, there is no fault. If he has entrusted it to someone else who is capable, there is no fault. If the other is capable, there is no fault. If he is associated with another spiritual adviser, there is no fault. If he desires to exert discipline by that means, there is no fault, and so forth as before. If the one to be taught with relevance has a thought of enmity, if he misconstrues out of obduracy, if he has a wild nature with no respect or affection, there is no fault.

(82a.5) If the bodhisattva is ungrateful to sentient beings who have helped him, if he has no feeling for the deed and with a thought of enmity fails to return the favor with proportionate assistance, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he fails to do so out of laziness and indolence, the fault is not defiled. If, while conscientious, he is unable, incapable, there is no fault. If he desires to exert discipline by that means, there is no fault, as before. If the object does not want assistance in return, there is no fault.

(82b.1) If the bodhisattva with a thought of enmity does not relieve sorrow that has developed in sentient beings who have suffered a calamity having to do with relatives or property, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he fails to relieve it out of laziness and indolence, the fault is not defiled. The cases without fault should be understood as before, in the case of not ministering to needs.

(82b.2) If the bodhisattva, with thoughts of enmity and resentment, does not give requisites such as food and drink when they are begged for correctly by those who seek food, drink, and the like, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he fails to give out of laziness, indolence, and carelessness, the fault is not defiled. If the goods do not exist in his possession, there is no fault. If something improper and unsuitable is being begged, there is no fault.

If he desires to tame and to discipline by that means, there is no fault, as before. In guarding against an offense to the king, there is no fault. In keeping an internal rule of the community, there is no fault.

(82b.6) If the bodhisattva, having drawn a following does not, with a thought of enmity, advise them well and instruct them well from time to time, and does not search out, from faithful brahmins and householders, requisite robes, food, bed and bedding, and medicinal drugs for those of them who are destitute, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. Failing to advise and instruct, and failing to search out [requisites] out of laziness, indolence, or carelessness, the fault is not defiled. In desiring to tame and to discipline by that means, there is no fault, as before. In keeping an internal rule of the community, there is no fault. If he is sick and incapacitated, there is no fault. If he has entrusted it to someone else who is capable, there is no fault. If his following possesses great merit, or he knows it is capable of searching out its own robes and so forth, and he has already done the advising and instruction with which they should be advised and instructed, there is no fault. In the case of someone who was previously a tīrthika and has come as a Dharma thief, who has a nature which there is no opportunity to tame, there is no fault.

(83a.4) If the bodhisattva, with a thought of enmity, fails to comply with the expectations of others, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he does not comply out of laziness, indolence, and carelessness, the fault is not defiled. If any wish of others would be unsuitable, there is no fault. If he is sick and incapacitated, there is no fault. If he is keeping an internal rule of the community, there is no fault. If his wish is suitable, but it is not the wish of, and does not suit the majority, there is no fault. If [it is done] to suppress tīrthikas, there is no fault. If he desires to tame and to discipline by that means, there is no fault, as before.

(83a.7) If the bodhisattva, with a thought of enmity, does not mention and speak genuine praise of the genuine good qualities of others, nor give a "Well done!" to what has been well spoken, then he is possessed

of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he fails to speak so out of laziness, indolence, and carelessness, the fault is not defiled. If he judges that [the other] is by nature unprepossessing and complies with him, there is no fault. If he desires to tame and to discipline by that means, there is no fault, as before. In keeping an internal rule of the community, there is no fault. If he suspects that upon that basis defilement in general, self-conceit, arrogance, and harm would result, and [does not speak] to avoid it, there is no fault. If the qualities are artificial qualities and not genuine, and the good speech is not a genuine good speech, there is no fault. In [not speaking] to suppress tīrthikas, there is no fault. If he he awaiting the final outcome of the narration, there is no fault.

(83b.4) If the bodhisattva, in regard to sentient beings who deserve to be rebuked, who deserve punishment, and who deserve banishment, with a defiled thought fails to rebuke them, or rebukes them but fails to correct them with an act of punishment, or corrects them but fails to banish them, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is defiled fault. If he fails out of laziness, indolence, and carelessness to rebuke, punish, and banish them, the fault is not defiled. In neglecting someone whose nature is corrigible--who is closed to discussion and obdurate, who has a great share of enmity--there is no fault. In awaiting the proper time, there is no fault. If he foresees conflict, caviling, fighting, and disputation on that basis, there is no fault. If those sentient beings, being free from pretense and endowed with an intense sense of shame as well as embarrassment, will comply as soon as possible, there is no fault.

(84a.1) If the bodhisattva endowed with various sorts of wonder-working power, miraculous transformation, and might does not employ wonder-working power to frighten sentient beings who deserve to be frightened, to bend to his will sentient beings who should be bent to his will, and to make them relinquish gifts of faith, then he is possessed of fault, possessed of contradiction; there is fault that is not defiled. There is no fault in not showing [his power] to sentient beings when they are strongly prejudiced tīrthikas who would be possessed of wrong views repudiating the noble one.

(39b.7, 84a.5) And for all of these, it is understood that one is quite without fault in cases of a distraught mind, being hardpressed by a feeling of suffering, and not having undertaken the vow.

(84b.2) These diverse bases of training of the bodhisattvas that appear separately, as promulgated by the Lord, in scattered passages of this and that scripture dealing with the ethics of the vow, the ethics of collecting wholesome factors, and the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings, are presented here, in the code to the bodhisattva collection, comprehensively. The bodhisattva should generate respect for, and train himself in them. He should take the vow, from someone else, with a quite purified intention of training himself in them, with an attitude desirous of awakening, with the intention of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings, and he should make it the most important thing.

(84b.7) He should generate respect from the very outset, so that offense will not occur. And if an offense should occur, he should heal the fault by treating it according to the doctrine.

"Fault" for the bodhisattva is understood to be everything included in this set of misdeeds. These may be confessed to anyone of the auditors' vehicle or the bodhisattva vehicle who is capable of cognizing and comprehending the verbal communication of them.

If an event that is "grounds for defeat" has occurred with greater involvement, the vow is relinquished by this and should be received a second time. If it has occurred with medium involvement it is a misdeed, and should be confessed to three or more persons. Seated before them, he should first describe the matter. Then he should say: "Please take notice, Long-lived ones. I, named so-and-so, have developed, from the matter that has been described, a 'misdeed' type of offense that constitutes an infraction of the bodhisattva disciplinary code." The remainder should be spoken just as in the monk's confession of misdeed. Should an event that is "grounds for defeat" have occurred with lesser involvement, it, and the other faults<sup>1</sup> as well, are understood to be confessable before one person. There being no congenial person before whom to confess, the bodhisattva should generate the thought, from the bottom

of his heart, that he will not commit it again, and restrain himself for the future. Having done so, he may be said to have disposed of that offense.

(36b.4) This is also the way to undertake the bodhisattva vow. If no person endowed with those qualifications is to be found, then the bodhisattva, before an image of the Tathāgata, should take the bodhisattva vow of ethics by himself. This is how ["it should be taken again"--Skt.]: Before it, throwing his upper robe over one shoulder and either kneeling on his right knee or in a squatting position, he should speak thus:

"I, given the name so-and-so, appeal to all tathāgatas and high-stage bodhisattvas of the ten directions. Before them I undertake all the bases of training of the bodhisattva and all bodhisattva ethics--whatever ethics of the vow, ethics of collecting wholesome factors, and ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings have been trained in by all bodhisattvas of the past, will be trained in by all bodhisattvas of the future, and are being trained in by all bodhisattvas presently abiding in the ten directions."

Having repeated this a second and a third time, he should rise. All the rest should be understood as above.

(89a.6) On the bodhisattva's path of fault there is nothing that is categorically a fault. In what the Lord has declared--"Know that the faults of a bodhisattva develop, for the most part, from aversion, rather than from desire-attachment"--the intention should be viewed thus: When the bodhisattva is ruled by love and affection for sentient beings, whatever he may do is the deed of a bodhisattva; there is nothing he can do that is not. Nor is it possible that there be any fault in doing what he should do. When the bodhisattva bears hatred toward sentient beings, he can do no good for himself or others, and this being what is not the duty of a bodhisattva, thus doing what he should not becomes, by extension, a fault.

(90b.3) Bodhisattva offenses should be known as minor, medium, and major. For this, refer to the *Topical Summary*.

(91a.8) Accordingly, the bodhisattva who applies himself to training in his own disciplinary code is blessed with a threefold good fortune--the

blessing of practice, the blessing of attitude, and the blessing of previous causes--and so maintains contact with well-being. What is the blessing of practice? The bodhisattva does not violate ethics; his behavior with body, speech, and mind is perfectly pure, he never commits an offense and evil deeds are disclosed. This is called the blessing of practice. What is the blessing of attitude? He is ordained a monastic while thinking of doctrine, not thinking of livelihood. He is eager for the great awakening, nor uneager. He is eager for the religious life and for nirvana, not uneager. With such eagerness he cannot remain indolent; his vigor is not feeble and he is not contaminated by unwholesome factors--evil, unwholesome deeds that are defiled, that will result in a future rebirth, old age, and death that is a suffering fruition and is compounded of fever. This is called the blessing of attitude. What is the blessing of previous causes? The bodhisattva, in other lives of the past, has performed acts of merit and acts of virtue. Because of this he never lacks requisite clothing, food, bed and bedding, and medicinal drugs for himself. In addition, he is able to share them with others. This is called the bodhisattva's blessing of previous causes. The bodhisattva who applies himself to training in his disciplinary code is blessed with a threefold good fortune: he dwells in contact with well-being. Cursed with three misfortunes that are the reverse of these, one maintains contact with suffering.

This is, briefly and in detail, what is called the complete ethics of the bodhisattva, comprising the lay side and the monastic side. The other sorts of ethics, the ethics of difficulty and the rest, should be understood as sections of this "complete ethics."

(92a.4) What is the bodhisattva's difficult ethics? This should be viewed as threefold. While the bodhisattva has great possessions and wields the great sovereignty of the Ruler, he renounces the possessions and he renounces the great sovereignty of the Ruler to take on the vow of ethics. This is called the bodhisattva's difficult ethics. The bodhisattva is troubled at having taken on ethics. He would not allow the vow-of-ethics obligation to weaken even at the cost of his life. How much less would he let it disappear! This is called the second difficult ethics

of the bodhisattva. So long as his life may last, not even the subtlest fault may arise, nor may he be in error regarding ethics. How much less so the grave! Thus the bodhisattva is established in mindfulness and careful in the attention he pays to all his actions and stations. This is the third aspect of what is called the bodhisattva's difficult ethics.

(92b.5) What is the bodhisattva's universal gateway ethics? This should be understood as fourfold: adopted, natural morality, habituated, and conjoined with means. Adopted is that by which the threefold bodhisattva ethics--the ethics of the vow, the ethics of collecting wholesome factors, and the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings--has been taken on. Natural morality is undertaking physical and verbal activity that is perfectly pure because of the natural goodness of a mental continuum that is established in the bodhisattva family. Habituated ethics is that by which the bodhisattva has grown accustomed to the above-described threefold ethics in his previous lives. Impregnated with the power of that previous cause, he does not like sinful behavior in any way whatsoever--his mind recoils from sin--whereas he likes virtuous behavior; he welcomes only virtuous behavior. Ethics conjoined with means is this: the bodhisattva's reliance upon the four means of attraction to introduce sentient beings to wholesome physical and verbal activity.

(93a.3) What is the bodhisattva's ethics of a holy person? This should be understood as fivefold. The bodhisattva is himself endowed with ethics. He induces others to undertake ethics. He sings praise of ethics. He is glad to see a fellow in the doctrine. He treats any fault that arises according to doctrine.

(93a.6) What is the bodhisattva's ethics as all modes? This should be understood as sixfold and sevenfold--and, to total them, as thirteenfold. Extensive, because it acquires extensive bases of training, and because it acquires extensive bases of training, and because it is dedicated to the great awakening. An unrepensible basis for delight, in order to avoid the two extremes of indulgence in sense-desire and self-exhaustion. Permanent, so as not to abjure the training so long as one lives. Steadfast,

never to be overcome and robbed by gain and respect, disputants, defilement and the subsidiary defilements. Adorned with ethics, which may be known according to the *Auditor Stage*. Ethics as disengagement, to avoid murder and the rest. Ethics as engagement, to collect wholesomeness and accomplish the welfare of sentient beings. Guardian ethics, to protect the ethics of engagement and disengagement. Ethics that matures in the characteristics of a great personage, that matures in higher thinking, that matures in pleasant destinies, that matures in the welfare of sentient beings.

(94a.4) What is the bodhisattva's distressed and wishing ethics? This should be understood as eightfold. The bodhisattva thinks to himself in this way: "I would not wish myself to be deprived of life by anyone, nor stolen from, nor behaved wrongly towards in matters of sexuality, nor spoken to falsely, slanderously, harshly, or idly, nor behaved towards with the unwanted contacts of being beaten and hurt by hand, clump of earth, and whip. According to my own wishes, if someone else should misbehave so, that would distress me; that would be disagreeable to me. Furthermore, just as I wish not to be murdered by someone else..." etc., up through "the contact of being hurt... so it is also the wish of others. According to the wish of others, should I behave wrongly, they would be distressed; it would be disagreeable to them. So why should I behave toward others in a way that is disagreeable both to myself and to them?" The bodhisattva investigates the matter in this way, and for the sake of his life does not behave in the eight ways that are disagreeable to others. This is the bodhisattva's distressed and wishing ethics.

(94b.1) What is the bodhisattva's ethics of well-being here and there? This should be seen as ninefold. The bodhisattva forbids sentient beings situations that should be forbidden. He permits situations that should be permitted. He attracts sentient beings who should be attracted. He stops sentient beings who should be stopped. The bodhisattva undertakes physical and verbal deeds in this regard that are perfectly pure. This much constitutes four modes of ethics. Beyond this are the five modes of ethics endowed with giving, with patience, with vigor, with meditation, and with wisdom. Totalling up these two sets, we have nine modes of

ethics. Inasmuch as they result in well-being for the bodhisattva and for others in present and future lives, they are called "well-being here and there."

(94b.8) What is the bodhisattva's purified ethics? This should be understood as tenfold. [Ethics] is correctly undertaken in the first place, out of a desire for the religious way of life and for full awakening, not seeking a livelihood. There is no excessive discouragement, because one is free of sluggish regret at an infraction. There is no overdoing it, because one is free of groundless regret. One is free of indolence, not making a practice of the pleasure of sleeping, the pleasure of lying on one's side, and the pleasure of staying in bed, but persevering in wholesome directions day and night. One is sustained by carefulness, because of reliance upon five-limbed vigilance as described above. One is correctly aspiring, being free of yearnings for gain and respect, and not consenting to live celibate out of aspirations to divinity. One is sustained by a blessed lifestyle, with physical and verbal conduct that is very blessed and exemplary in deportment, incidental duties, and wholesome practices. One is sustained by blessed livelihood, avoiding all the faults of wrong livelihood such as hypocrisy. One avoids the two extremes, avoiding indulgence in sense-desires as well as self-exhaustion. It is conducive to deliverance, avoiding the views of all tīrthikas. One is unflinching in the obligation of bodhisattva ethics, not allowing it to weaken and disappear. This tenfold ethics of the bodhisattvas is called "purified."

(96a.5) This great aggregate of bodhisattva ethics bears the fruition of great awakening. Based upon it, the bodhisattva fulfills the perfection of morality and completely awakens to supreme, right and full awakening. And so long as he has not yet become a buddha he will, in training himself in this measureless aggregate of bodhisattva ethics, obtain five sorts of advantage. He comes to the notice of the buddhas. He dies in a state of great elation. After his physical dissolution, wherever he is reborn those with the same higher ethics are found, bodhisattva colleagues with the same doctrine who function as spiritual advisers. He is endowed with a measureless aggregate of merit that fulfills the perfec-

tion of morality in this life. And there is a natural morality of which, in future lives, he inherits the very essence.

(97a.6) All of the ethics thus described, the nine modes beginning with the essence of ethics, should be understood to be included by the three sorts of ethics: the ethics of the vow, the ethics of collecting wholesome factors, and the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings. And these three sorts of ethics, to put it briefly, accomplish three sorts of bodhisattva work. The ethics of the vow brings about mental stability. The collection of wholesome factors brings about the maturation of the factors of buddhahood for oneself. The ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings brings about the maturation of sentient beings. These constitute all the work of a bodhisattva that is to be done: to stabilize the mind in order to establish well-being in the present, to ripen the factors of buddhahood without physical or mental fatigue, and to bring sentient beings to full maturity. This is bodhisattva ethics. These are the advantages of bodhisattva ethics. And this is the work of bodhisattva ethics. There is nothing beyond and there is nothing more. Past bodhisattvas desiring the great awakening have trained in it. Those of the future will train in it. And those presently abiding in the boundless, infinite realms of the universe are training in it.

The tenth chapter, on ethics, of the Foundations section of the

*Bodhisattva Stage*

The Basic Path  
to  
Awakening

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THE BASIC PATH TO AWAKENING:

AN EXPLANATION OF HOW TO TAKE THE BODHISATTVA VOW

AND PURIFY THE AGGREGATE OF ETHICS

Salutation to Mañjuśrī in youthful form, the great bodhisattva! (3a)

[Homage to the Buddha]

Whose mind serves to protect with a great wave of compassion,  
Who takes up for measureless ages the burden of difficult deeds,  
Who reaches the ultimate rank, and then with exalted speech  
Rouses the world from the sleep of ignorance: him I reverently  
salute.

[Homage to Maitreya]

The viceroy, the lord of doctrine  
On whom the Buddha has conferred sovereignty,  
Ruler of the stages, protector Ajita:  
Let him with stainless deeds sustain the world.

[Homage to Asanga]

I bow my head to the feet of noble Asanga,  
Disciple of the viceroy, bearing reverently a crown,  
The dust of his beloved lotus feet  
Touching which brings increase of good fortune.<sup>1</sup>

[The subject]

(3b) Listen reverently, you who seek a better-vehicle feast,  
For herein is explained the eminent counsel of Ajita,  
On staking a claim to the bodhisattva career,  
And proceeding to accomplish it astutely.

[The argument]

Among those who claim to be Greater Vehicle,  
Some wink at the dos and don'ts

Prescribed for the *jinās'* disciples;<sup>2</sup>  
 Others intone the words but neglect the sage's laws,  
 Gaining no conviction in the best advice,  
 The only path travelled by *jinās'* sons  
 Who are intent upon better-vehicle achievement,  
 And then undertake the topics with such laxity,  
 Like an elephant without a goad,  
 That they fail to reach the heart.

But those whose aptitude for the better vehicle is not weak--  
 The joyfulness of such fortune ones will increase.<sup>3</sup>

The *Mañjuśrī-mūlatantra* says of him:<sup>4</sup>

A monk by the name of Asanga  
 Will know the principles<sup>5</sup> of the treatises;  
 He will classify the scriptures in many ways  
 As definitive versus provisional.<sup>6</sup>  
 His nature being to teach the world what is relevant,  
 He will have a prolific disposition;  
 The achievement of his knowledge  
 Will be known as Sala's envoy.<sup>7</sup>

By the power of his mantras  
 His thinking will grow even better;  
 He will assemble the principles of the scriptures  
 So that the dispensation may last a long while.

After living for a century and a half  
 He will leave his body and go to heaven;  
 In continuing his rebirths in *samsara*  
 He will long experience happiness.

And in due course this great one  
 Will come to attain awakening.<sup>8</sup>

Such is the [Buddha's] prediction. He made broad resolves to uphold the holy doctrine, and through many lives devoted himself to the exercises

for gathering measureless resources.<sup>8</sup> Attaining the "flow of doctrine" concentration,<sup>9</sup> he crossed a veritable ocean of his own and others' (4a) philosophic systems. He became known as the noble "unobstructed one" (*thogs-med, asanga*) whose capability in the classification of doctrine is difficult for others to fathom.

This Asanga heard, from the venerable Maitreya, measureless systems of doctrine in general, and in particular he heard from him the full details of the better-vehicle path and result, the sense of which he abstracted in composing the treatise entitled *The Bodhisattva Stage*.

I have observed, however, that those of little previous experience, who have inferior powers of apprehension and little power of diligence, are not able to train themselves in it [the *Bbh*]. For their sake I will teach the sense of the Chapter on Ethics alone of the *Bbh*, for it is easy for those of inferior intellect to understand.

The basis for any bodhisattva activity is, first of all, to generate the thought of awakening according to instructions, and then to take the vow in terms of promising to train oneself in the bodhisattva trainings. For there is no way to reach supreme awakening without training oneself in the preliminary bodhisattva trainings.

This is, therefore, the only path travelled by all bodhisattvas of the three times. As the *Bbh* says, just after completing its explanation of the three types of ethics [Skt. 129:16-18]: "Bodhisattvas of the past desiring the great awakening have trained in it. Those of the future will train in it. And those presently abiding in the boundless, infinite realms of the universe are training in it." And the *Commentary to the Chapter on Ethics*<sup>10</sup> says: "Any human beings who have generated the intention of reaching awakening and arrived at the door of the Greater Vehicle, any persons desiring benefit for themselves and for others and desiring to strive for the resources of merit and gnosis, all those who claim to be Greater Vehicle, should establish themselves in the bodhisattva vow. Inasmuch as the training of the bodhisattva is formulated as the [six] perfections and so forth, if one does not train in nor have faith in it, one may call oneself Greater Vehicle, but the mere claim is only a nominal pursuit, and highly questionable."

(4b) If one has generated the thought of awakening but fails to follow through with the training, the attainment of awakening is impossible. So the aspirant to bodhi should prize the practice of training himself in the trainings. The noble *Teaching on the Three Vows*<sup>11</sup> says: "Kāśyapa, any son or daughter of the family participating in the bodhisattva vehicle who fails to follow through with those doctrines as soon as they have been heard, cannot fully awaken to supreme, right and full awakening. Why so? Because, Kāśyapa, supreme, right and full awakening is to be obtained by assiduity, and not without it. Kāśyapa, if supreme, right and full awakening could be obtained without assiduity, then rabbits and cats could awaken to supreme, right and full awakening. Why so? Because, Kāśyapa, those without assiduity would already be supremely, rightly and fully awakened; in which case, Kāśyapa, they could be awakened to supreme, right and full awakening just by the word. By saying, 'I will become a buddha,' immeasurable sentient beings would come to buddhahood."

(5a) To think, "To take the bodhisattva vow and put its training into practice is to participate in the vehicle of the perfections, but it is not necessary in order to undertake the tantra,<sup>12</sup> which is not a path common to all bodhisattvas," is a serious misconception. In such [tantric scriptures] as the glorious *Samputa*,<sup>13</sup> the *Vajradākinī* and the *Vajrasīkhara*, we read:

Let me generate the holy,  
 The supreme thought of awakening;  
 Let me hold steadfastly to each  
 Of the three branches of ethics: to moral training,  
 To the collection of wholesome factors,  
 And to the welfare of sentient beings.

In other words, when taking the vajrayāna vow, it is necessary to generate the thought [of awakening], then to secure yourself to train in the three aspects of ethics, and only thereafter to take the [tantric] vow of the five families.<sup>14</sup> For one thing, numerous mandala ceremonies that are primary sources state the necessity to hold both the shared and the unshared vows, and the "shared" is the bodhisattva vow.<sup>15</sup> For

another thing, there is no path in the great vehicle of the perfections apart from generating the thought and undertaking the training--that is to say, training in the three sorts of ethics or in the six perfections, according to the promise you have made.

Furthermore, the generation of the thought and the path of the six perfections are necessary to enter the gateway of any of the four classes of tantra. Although they are only "shared" by the vajra vehicle and the vehicle of the perfections, no vajrayanist should neglect them in any way whatsoever.

Accordingly, the *MMT* says: "The possession of three factors will complete the practice of mantra: non-relinquishment of all sentient beings, keeping the bodhisattva vow of ethics, and non-relinquishment of one's (5b) own mantra." And the *Vajrasīkhara* says:

In the practice of the six perfections,  
You should train in them in order;  
Do your bodhisattva practice  
For the sake of sentient beings.

And the twelfth chapter of the *Vajrapañjarā* says:

Generating the thought of best awakening,  
Oh let me be host to all sentient beings!  
Making bodhisattva conduct my favorite practice,  
Let me become buddha for the sake of the world!<sup>16</sup>

Although the two classes of vehicle do have certain differences in what they enjoin and forbid, they are broadly similar. So whether entering the vehicle of the perfections or the vehicle of mantras, know this vow to be an absolute necessity.

\* \* \*

Now to explain the Chapter on Ethics. There are two parts: (1) the contracted summary, and (2) expanding the contraction.

1. What is ethics for the bodhisattvas?<sup>17</sup> Here we have the contracted summary or summary condensation of ethics into nine aspects.

Essence and completeness,  
Difficulty and universal gateway,  
Endowment of a holy personage,  
As well as all the modes;  
Endowment of distress and wishing,  
Well-being here and there,  
And purified--these nine aspects  
Constitute ethics in brief.

The "essence" of ethics is its general definition. Complete ethics is the detailed classification of its actuality. The ethics of difficulty is the particularity of its being undertaken as a difficult practice. Ethics as a universal gateway is the classification of whence or how it is received. The ethics of a holy person is the particularity of the performer, or "basis."<sup>18</sup> Ethics as all modes is the division of its modes. The ethics of distress and wishing is the act of dispelling suffering, according to the great commentary.<sup>19</sup> Alternatively, these last two distinctions (6a) distinguish object and action. Ethics as well-being here and there, and purified ethics, are distinctions of result. They are distinguished as rejection and acceptance respectively.

2. Expanding the contraction. Six parts: (1) summary teaching by means of the essence, (2) detailed explanation with completeness, (3) the sections of that explanation, (4) advantages of ethics, (5) the summary of ethics, and (6) the functions of ethics.

2.1 Summary teaching by means of the essence. Two parts: the essence, and its greatness.

21.1 The essence. Four points.

211.1 Enumeration of its qualities. What is the essence of ethics? Briefly, it is to possess four qualities: the quality of correctly receiving it from someone else, the quality of having a quite purified intention, the quality of correction after failure, and the quality of avoiding failure by generating respect and remaining mindful of that.

211.2 Function of the qualities. Because he has received it from someone else, when the conditions occur for him to fail in his training,

he will think, "Let not the other person condemn me," and generate the constraint of embarrassment at the misdeed. Because of his purified intention, when the conditions occur for him to fail in his training, then by reason of himself or his own doctrine, he will generate the constraint of shame at the misdeed. Because of the pair "correction after failure" and "avoidance of failure," he is free of regret. So if he possesses embarrassment and shame produced in dependence upon the correct reception and a purified intention, ethics will be kept, in the sense of failure being avoided or subsequently corrected. As to its being kept: Seeing himself to be free from transgression, he will be free from regret.

(6b) These demonstrate the following: Those who have taken the vow will examine, with the insight of critical investigation, their own mental continuums and, to the extent that they are found to be free of any transgression, be it subtle or coarse, they must also be utterly clean and free of regret. If they strive from the beginning not to infect themselves with offenses, but nonetheless do infect themselves with an offense in a rare moment of absentmindedness, etc., they must make rectification by means of confession--not deciding to think nothing of it--and by finding themselves [for the future]. For this to come about, they need to possess tremendous shame and embarrassment [at the offense]; and for these to be created, the vow must have been taken before a spiritual adviser who is endowed with the characteristics of a [suitable] source, and the attitude of taking it must have been sincere, not a matter of keeping up with someone else, and it must have been taken with a holy intention, not an inferior intention of earning a livelihood or the like. So the former pair of causes should be emphasized.

Certain commentaries explain that the first quality acquires [the vow]; then the latter three preserve it.<sup>20</sup> But the source [i.e., the *Bbh*] specifically declares the former two to be causes for preservation, and the *Twenty Verses* [by Candragomin] says [2b-d]:

With it as your lofty intention,  
 From a lama maintaining and learned in the vow  
 Who is capable, you should take it.

Therefore the former two qualities are a matter of taking [the vow], and the latter two are part of the preservation side.

This vow may be successfully taken, a lama not having been found, before a mental image of the buddhas and bodhisattvas. The statement that it is to be taken from someone else covers the case where someone can be found. It indicates the restriction that one should seek a spiritual adviser. Taking it before him, it will be easy to generate joy and respect for keeping the training, and your ethics will consequently remain pure. So the *Compendium of Training [Śikṣā-samuccaya, SS]* (7a) also says:<sup>21</sup> "On taking the vow as well, you should receive it from someone in possession of the vow who takes it seriously and is familiar with the bases of bodhisattva training. Having done so, should you then overstep that training, you will be quite ashamed, and you will fear to break faith with the guru--or, joy and respect will come about with no special emphasis on them being required. That is why bodhisattvas who desire to achieve any one among these trainings will undertake it before the tathāgatas."

211.3 How they are cause and effect. The former two qualities induce the latter two; so the former two should be understood as cause and the latter two as effect. The manner of inducement is what we have just explained.<sup>22</sup>

211.4 Determination of the number of qualities. "How are the qualities determined to be four?" The purification of ethics is determined to have two aspects: not infecting oneself with transgression in the first place, and clearing oneself when infected. So the threesome--the reception from someone else, the purified intention, and the resort to mindfulness to avoid failure--represent non-failure, whereas the fourth, the correction of failure, constitutes rectification and recovery from downfall.

In the commentaries [Jinaputra, Samudramegha] how to collect them in four qualities is explained in four ways. (1) It is taken by the first, and guarded by the latter three.<sup>23</sup> (2) One point represents attitude, and three are application. (3) Receiving it with a purified intention, plus three essences of ethics. Within the reception, moreover, it is taken in order that (a) one's own words be made acceptable, (b) one may

become a field for someone else's merit, and (c) when one has obtained the sovereignty of the Ruler, any injury to sentient beings will be avoided (7b).<sup>24</sup> The three [essences of] ethics are ethics as undertaken, as corrected, and as kept. (4) There are two causes and two effects of purified ethics.<sup>25</sup>

21.1 The greatness of ethics. It is wholesome, immeasurable, favorable, and a great result and advantage.

212.1 Wholesome. "What are the qualities of undertaking and proceeding to train oneself in ethics endowed with those four qualities?" Benefit for oneself, and the rest.

The self-benefit of auditors and independent buddhas achieves only self-pacification and self-discipline, in meager aims and deeds, in order to attain the elimination of defilement and of suffering by means of knowledge of the [four noble] truths. The self-benefit of bodhisattvas is the two eliminations and the two gnoses.<sup>26</sup>

"Benefit for others": At the time that one generates the thought, one sets out to benefit those who have a spiritual class, as well as those who have not.<sup>27</sup> Benefit for those without class is to be explained, firstly, by "benefit for many people": to protect them from what would doubtless be a lower state of rebirth by not creating any unwholesomeness that has not yet been created, and be eliminating that which has already been created. "Pleasure for many people" is to project them to a higher state of rebirth by creating wholesomeness that has not yet been created, and by increasing that which has already been created.<sup>28</sup> "Mercy for the world": Among those persons without class, there are those who are hostile, who are without the opportunity and who, although worthy vessels,<sup>29</sup> fall into distress and go to lower destinies; he awaits the proper time for these his "guests," not relinquishing the thought of [achieving] their benefit and pleasure.

Benefit for those with class is to be explained, firstly, by "welfare for divine and human beings": to project them into the religious (shraṁana) style of life. Their benefits are the paths of accumulation and application that induce the religious style of life. Their pleasure is to remain in a state of well-being in this life: out of tranquility, they

experience exhilaration of body and mind, as well as the pleasure of spiritual deliverance.

(8a) For these reasons, it is wholesome and undeceptive. The commentaries give other accounts as well, but I shall not commit them to writing.<sup>30</sup>

212.2 Immeasurable. Bodhisattva bases of training are comprehended by the term "immeasurable."<sup>31</sup>

212.3 Favorable. At the time of the implementation and at the time of the result, they are lived for the benefit and pleasure of sentient beings.

211.4 A great result and advantage. The great result in one's situation as a bodhisattva is to acquire full awakening. The great advantage for a situation of buddhahood is to give that result to others.

For the auditors, the three trainings [ethics, concentration, and wisdom] represent "wholesomeness at the beginning, the middle, and the end." For the bodhisattva, ethics by itself includes them all. From the time of the first generation of the thought there is benefit for self and others,<sup>32</sup> together with the detailed explanation [as below]:<sup>32</sup> This is wholesomeness at the beginning. "Favorable to sentient beings" is wholesomeness in the middle. "A great result and advantage" is wholesomeness at the end.

2.2 The detailed explanation with completeness. Three parts: explanations of the ethics to be undertaken, how to take it, and how to keep it.

22.1 Explanation of the ethics to be undertaken. Four parts: the divisions, the essential nature, the causes for success, and the summary meaning.

221.1 The divisions. What is the ethics of the bodhisattvas? There are two parts to this.

221.1.1 Classification of the bases. There are numerous subsets of basis [upon which to undertake ethics], but only two summary classes: the party of lay bodhisattvas and that of monastic bodhisattvas. Ethics having both of these as its basis is termed "complete ethics," because it is ethics to be trained in anywhere, by all bodhisattva bases whether lay or monastic.

Beyond this, Jinaputra explains that lay ethics is found in all three destinies of rebirth [lower states, human, and divine]. In lower and divine states it is obtained in the nature of things, while only in the (8b) world of humanity are both sorts of ethics [lay and monastic] to be found.<sup>33</sup>

The commentary attributed to Samudramegha would have it that there is a natural obtainment in the lower states and in the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*), where it is impossible to receive it from someone else, and that this represents lay ethics. Among the gods of the realm of sense-desire (*kāmadhātu*) and among human beings, both are found--natural obtainment and reception from someone else; therefore [these realms] have both the lay and monastic sides. The bodhisattva vow is not relinquished even upon changing lives, so wherever one is reborn there is a natural obtainment of [bodhisattva] ethics.

In general, it is tenable to suppose that the bodhisattva vow follows you even when you change lives, and so is found in all three worlds. At the same time, "lay side" versus "monastic side" refers to whether or not a bodhisattva possesses the vow of one of the five monastic classes--novice and the rest.<sup>34</sup>

2211.2 Classification of the essential nature. Furthermore, ethics based upon the two sides is, briefly, threefold: the ethics of the vow, of collecting wholesome factors, and of benefiting sentient beings.<sup>35</sup> Because the complete ethics to be kept by bodhisattvas is comprised by this set of three.

Why is ethics made threefold? The commentaries would have it that in the vehicle of the auditors there is the defilement-blunting *prātimokṣa*, the never-arising-even-when-conditions-are-present vow of meditation, and the interruption vow of being free from outflows, and that the numbers here correspond.<sup>36</sup>

But the needs of a bodhisattva are only two: to bring his own mental continuum to maturity and to bring to maturity the continuums of others. The first, being necessarily twofold--the limitation of misbehavior and the collection of good behavior--is a matter of (1) the vow and (2) the collection of wholesome factors. The maturation of others

requires (3) the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings. (9a) So there are necessarily three. This explanation is the correct one.

"How is the order of the three aspects of ethics determined to be thus?" As the commentary attributed to Samudramegha quite tenably puts it, the ethics of withdrawal (*nivṛtti-śīla*), which is held in common with the auditors, is the cause of the latter two, and the ethics of engagement (*pravṛtti-śīla*) is not shared. The order of the latter two is determined from the teaching that it is impossible to save others when you are still bound, and to calm others when you are not calm; therefore the welfare of others will not be effected until wholesomeness has first been collected.

221.2 The essential nature. Three points.

221.2.1 The ethics of the vow. This refers to the seven prātimokṣa classes<sup>37</sup> --namely, male and female bhikṣu, nun-probationer, and male and female novice as the monastic party, plus male and female layperson as the householder party.

There are in fact eight prātimokṣa classes, but the *upavāsa*<sup>38</sup> is not mentioned for, as the explication [by Bodhibhadra] to the *TV* states, "To undertake something for a single day is not an austerity, nor does it represent living in seclusion from sense-desire; it is not adhered to for an extended period. For these reasons, it is not worthy [of being counted] here."<sup>39</sup>

In the commentary attributed to Samudramegha, they are called "laypersons who dwell closely to *upavāsa*",<sup>40</sup> and they are not mentioned because they are included among the set of laypersons. Alternatively, it says, the nun-probationer vow is included in the nun's vow.<sup>41</sup> This does not appear to be tenable.

Objection: "Is there, or is there not anything in bodhisattva ethics besides the seven classes? If there is, it contradicts the non-formulation by the *Bbh* of anything besides the seven classes. If there is not, then since the prātimokṣa is relinquished upon changing lives, the holder of a bodhisattva vow would lose his "ethics of the vow" when he changes lives; furthermore, the bodhisattva based as a god would find it impossible to take the bodhisattva vow, promising to train himself in all three sorts of ethics."

(9b) Response: If the holder of the bodhisattva vow is a monastic, his [or her] "ethics of the vow" is that of one of the five prātimokṣa classes, whereas if the bodhisattva vow-holder is a householder, such as a male or female layperson, he [or she] holds the ethics of the vow as one of the two [lay] prātimokṣa classes. If someone such as a god (*deva*) whose state makes him an unsuitable basis for the prātimokṣa should hold the bodhisattva vow, he in effect renounces the ten unwholesome, or the seven of body and speech, rejecting what is reprehensible by nature as do the seven prātimokṣa classes; he has the ethics of the vow, but without having actually taken the prātimokṣa vow.

So the *Lamp of the Path* also says:<sup>42</sup> "In regard to these, 'ethics of the vow' is the vow held by the seven prātimokṣa classes to guard against what is reprehensible by precept, as well as guarding against what is reprehensible by nature--against the ten unvirtuous [courses of action]." The former is the real prātimokṣa, whereas the latter is only what the seven prātimokṣa classes have in common.

Again, the [*Muni-*]matālaṅkāra [of Abhayākaragupta] says: "In regard to these, 'ethics of the vow' is an ethics of withdrawal. Furthermore, the abstinences are defined as being of seven sorts, and freedom from desire, freedom from aversion, and right view are the three factors that function as their motivation." And it goes on to say, "Ethics together with motivation makes ten virtuous courses of action."<sup>43</sup>

The explication to the *TV* says, in context of explaining the *Bbh* statement that "ethics of the vow" refers to the seven prātimokṣa classes:<sup>44</sup> "The prātimokṣa functions as a branch of the bodhisattva vow; it should be understood to be an integral part of it. Therefore, someone who holds the other, the prātimokṣa vow, is a vessel fit to receive the bodhisattva vow, and the point [of the statement] is to give him this mes- (10a) sage of training: 'There is no separate ceremony for disengagement from murder and the rest. Without having already disengaged from them, you are not a vessel fit to receive the bodhisattva vow.'" Without the desire to disengage yourself from murder and the rest, it is impossible to be a vessel for creation of the bodhisattva vow. The way to disengage yourself from them is found in the statement of the *Bbh* that the seven

prātimokṣa classes, considered to be shared with the prātimokṣa [vow], are a part of the bodhisattva vow.

For the bodhisattva vow-holder, as will appear below,<sup>45</sup> occasions may arise on which the seven of body and speech--murder and the rest--are permissible, yet there is not the problem of failing to share the prātimokṣa disengagement from murder and the rest. By analogy, individual enactments [of the monastic discipline], except for liquor, are permitted [a monk who is] ill,<sup>46</sup> but in general they must be avoided by a holder of the monk's vow, and when taking the monk's vow one must take it with a desire to avoid them all, without restriction as to which branch [of the code] it may be. So it is taught that aside from exceptional situation, you must keep from engaging in the seven of body and speech, as in the prātimokṣa, even at the cost of your life.

Hence the *Lamp of the Path* [v. 20] declares:

Only someone continually holding the other vow,  
 Belonging to one of the seven prātimokṣa classes,  
 Has the opportunity to [take] the bodhisattva vow;  
 And there is no other way it can be.

For the beginner who is not a member of the one of the seven prātimokṣa classes, there is no opportunity to create the special vow of ethics. If he also lacks the natural disengagement that is shared with the seven prātimokṣa classes, he has no opportunity to create the bodhisattva vow by itself. This is what the teacher says. Nevertheless, this is not to claim that the bodhisattva vow will not be created when one (10b) lacks some particular characteristic of the seven prātimokṣa classes. Because the commentary to the *Lamp of the Path* says this only in making the transition [from Chapter Two, on prātimokṣa, to Chapter Three, on bodhisattva vow]. The transition goes: "Now, desiring to indicate the special basis for the vow of ethics..."<sup>47</sup>—making this statement in summarizing the previously cited commentary by Bodhibhadra.

Two systems arose in past times in regard to this topic: (1) the "It is a basis [party]," which postulates that the prātimokṣa is, in this way, a necessary basis for creating and for maintaining the bodhisattva vow,

and (2) the "It is not a basis [party]," which postulates that to hold the *prātimokṣa*, because it belongs by definition to the auditors, is an obstacle to the bodhisattva vow.

The "It is a basis" party argues: "The phrase '*prātimokṣa* of the bodhisattva' indicates that both vehicles, the greater and the lesser, each has a set of seven *prātimokṣa* classes and that as a general rule the seven *prātimokṣa* classes are necessary as a basis upon which to disengage oneself from harming others, because disengagement from doing harm is necessarily included in doing benefit. Furthermore, the *prātimokṣa* of the two vehicles are distinguished--in fact, they are opposite--in their continuation, their protection of others' thoughts, their possibility of being corrected, and their eagerness for others' welfare. Because it cannot be general and free from particulars, the lesser-vehicle *prātimokṣa* is a contradiction as a basis [for bodhisattva vow], whereas the greater-vehicle *prātimokṣa*, because it is itself the bodhisattva training, cannot have the fault of contradicting itself as a basis. As the *Ratnamegha* [O 897] states: '*Prātimokṣa* restrictions and bodhisattva trainings are distinct.' The seven greater-vehicle classes function like those of the monastic discipline in their reception, preservation, and so forth."

This is incorrect. If the seven-class *prātimokṣa* were necessary as a basis for creation of the bodhisattva vow, it would be impossible for gods to create it. If it were necessary for maintaining it, and if it continued unrelinquished upon changing lives, it would be possible to (11a) have gods and animals who were monks and the like. That the *prātimokṣa* is not necessary as a basis for creation of the bodhisattva vow, appears even in the *MMA* [83a.6-b.3]: "Some say <sup>48</sup> that 'Only those who maintain some *prātimokṣa* vow among the seven lifelong *prātimokṣa* vows--divided as layman, laywoman, male and female novice, nun-probationer, monk, and nun--should receive the bodhisattva vow. Others should not, because the bodhisattva vow will not be created in anyone else.' To say this is to not take great pains for the sake of the Greater Vehicle. If the bodhisattva vow were not to be created in the absence of the *prātimokṣa* vow, then the latter would be described, in the bodhisattva

collection and its associated texts,<sup>49</sup> as its source. The purpose [in mentioning *prātimokṣa* in context of *bodhisattva* vow, as does the *Bbh*] is to speak definitively. By analogy, one says, 'I take refuge in the Three until awakening [has been achieved].'" Hence in the *Bbh* mention is made of the seven *prātimokṣa* classes, in context of identifying "ethics of the vow." Their mention may be understood in two ways: as referring to the actual seven *prātimokṣa* classes, and as referring to disengagement from what is reprehensible by nature, a disengagement which those seven *prātimokṣa* classes share with the *bodhisattva* vow. Mentioning them does not imply that the *bodhisattva* vow is to be held only by members of those seven classes.

Ethics of the vow, which is shared with the *prātimokṣa*, eliminates what is reprehensible by nature. Since it is created jointly with the taking of the *bodhisattva* vow, there is no computable meaning in [designating] it and the *bodhisattva* vow as "basis" and "what is supported."

The fact is that even if you have not already received [the *prātimokṣa*] as an actual member of the seven *prātimokṣa* classes, the *bodhisattva* vow can be created. However, if you are a suitable basis for *prātimokṣa* [i.e., a human being] you should take the *prātimokṣa* in some form, be it lay or monastic, beforehand. Otherwise you will transgress the order of the Jina's teaching. By analogy, you may take the monk's (11b) vow without having taken the novice vow, and it will be created, but it is wrong in practice.

Some of the "It is not a basis" party argue: "It is an obstruction to the creation [of the *bodhisattva* vow], because if you fail to avoid the attitude of 'my own welfare,' the *bodhisattva* vow will not be created. At the same time it is an obstruction to its maintenance, because if the *bodhisattva* vow-holder should generate the attitude of 'my own welfare,' that vow will fail."<sup>50</sup>

This makes the mistake of failing to distinguish the *prātimokṣa* vow from the lesser-vehicle attitude. In creating the *bodhisattva* vow you must relinquish the lesser-vehicle attitude, but you need not relinquish the *prātimokṣa* vow. If someone holding the greater-vehicle vow should generate a lesser-vehicle attitude, he will fail in the Greater Vehicle

but without relinquishing the prātimokṣa. The reasons for this are as follows: (1) The prātimokṣa is shared by both vehicles. (2) That [inferior] attitude is not, strictly speaking, a cause for relinquishing the prātimokṣa. And (3) the prātimokṣa vow-holder who receives the higher vow becomes a basis for the good fortune [of achieving buddhahood]. Therefore, to give up the lower vow on the grounds that you are maintaining the higher vow, cutting the root of the Jina's dispensation, is a great hailstorm to their crop of benefit and pleasure for many generations; it is a misconception that entirely misconstrues the quintessence of the higher as well as the lower texts, so put it far away.

In order to prevent such misconception from arising, the noble *Teaching on the Three Vows* [O 760:1] says: "Therefore you should comply with the prātimokṣa taught here. Kāśyapa, beings who fail to comply with the prātimokṣa are beings who fail to comply with the powers and confidence of the Buddha.<sup>51</sup> Any beings who fail to comply with the powers and confidence of the Buddha are beings who fail to comply with the awakening of buddhas of the past, the future, and the present. The karmic maturation of that does not approach a hundredth part of the suffering experienced in hell by as many sentient beings as inhabit a universe system of a thousand-million worlds. It does not match a thousandth, a hundred-thousandth, a million-millionth, or any number, fraction, calculation, example, or comparison. Desiring to avoid such suffering and unhappiness, you should avoid such behavior on the part of (12a) monks by a thousand miles. If the mention of it is to be avoided, what of regarding and heeding it? They should be avoided."

And the *Questioning of Subāhu Tantra* [O 428] says:

All crops depend on the earth  
Two grow without problem;  
Good white factors depend upon ethics,  
Watered by compassion for their growth.

All the pure ethics of the prātimokṣa  
That I the Jina have spoken as vinaya,  
Should be taken to heart by lay tantrics,  
Except for the signs and the ceremonies.

What this says is that excepting the monastic signs, ceremonial acts, and unshared precepts, what the disciplinary code teaches that one should accept and reject should be taken to heart even by lay tantrics. What need to mention monastic tantrics and holders of the bodhisattva vow?

The great scholar Jñānaśrīmitra, crest jewel of Kashmiri *sūgatas*, has forbidden such misconceived doubts with several emphatic statements. From his *Consistency of Ethics, Vows, and Pledges*:<sup>52</sup>

First basing yourself as a monastic,  
 Maintain the paths of tantra and the perfections;  
 If you later become confused by them,  
 Maintain the vow of the auditors', etc.,  
 From the treatises of the disciplinary code,  
 The prātimokṣa, and the rainy season retreat.  
 (12b) When you cannot keep a majority  
 Of the trainings taught in it,  
 Eliminate those that contradict  
 Holding the bodhisattva vow,  
 And carry on.

And,

Having rejected the monastic vow,  
 Neither the tantric vow nor that  
 Of the perfections will be held.

And,

The most distinguished intellectuals  
 Are bodhisattva monks;  
 Being skilled in means, they do not dream  
 Of transgressing in any way.

With such statements he explains the matter in detail.

In various scriptures as well, statements are made concerning universal monarchs, great heroes who, remaining in the home life, have long trained themselves in the bodhisattva career, who then leave home to

go forth to the monastic life, eager for ordination.<sup>53</sup> Therefore those who maintain the better vehicle must hold the *prātimokṣa* generally, and the monastic vows within it, to be especially dear.

2212.2 The ethics of collecting wholesome factors. Three parts.

22122.1 The brief instruction. The bodhisattva, subsequent to undertaking the ethics of the vow, accumulates, for the sake of the great awakening, with his body and his speech, anything that is wholesome, all of which is called, briefly, the ethics of collecting wholesome factors.

The phrase "having undertaken the ethics of the vow" appears in many texts.<sup>54</sup>

There are three points to this. (1) Time. "Subsequent to" is said in order to indicate the creation, maintenance, and increase of wholesome factors only in someone who maintains ethics--because, as the scriptures put it, "any factors at all that are wholesome are maintaining ethics..."<sup>55</sup> The sense is that having undertaken the bodhisattva vow, you should turn to collecting that which is wholesome. Furthermore, you should base yourself (13a) upon the previous "ethics of the vow."

(2) Objective. "For the sake of the great awakening": with reference to bringing to maturity, in your own mental continuum, the factors of buddhahood.<sup>56</sup> Hence the collection of wholesomeness bears upon the maturation of one's own continuum, whereas accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings brings others to maturity: That is the difference.

(3) Definition or essential nature. "Accumulates...with his body and his speech." Mind is not mentioned, the other commentaries suggest, because the context is collecting wholesomeness, and this ethics is a matter of body and speech.<sup>57</sup> In the detailed explanation [that follows], however, various sorts of mental wholesomeness are mentioned, and in the commentary by master Gunaprabha it is correctly observed that the mental is not mentioned because to mention body and speech implies the impact of mind. The explication to the *TV* and the *Lamp of the Path Commentary* present systems in which mind is present in the text.<sup>58</sup> So we have the ethics of collecting virtue with each of the three gateways [body, speech, and mind], with two at a time and with all three.

22122.2 The detailed explanation. Eight points.

2.1 Generating the three sorts of wisdom. The bodhisattva based upon and maintaining the ethics of the vow listens, without mental wandering, to sacred science, seeking the wisdom of hearing. From the resources of hearing that he gathers, comes deliberative concentration. From that he undertakes meditative cultivation--the development of calm and insight. Furthermore, with physical seclusion from society and mental seclusion from unwholesome preoccupation comes delight in solitude.

"Delight in solitude" [is no textual corruption, for it] appears in the explication of the *TV*.<sup>59</sup> "Calm" refers to training in contemplation; it covers the wisdom of hearing and contemplation. "Insight" is training in wisdom. Both trainings [concentration and wisdom] are fulfilled in ethics.<sup>60</sup>

(13b) 2.2 Gathering resources in a special field. Seeing the lamas, he does not slight them; gladly he addresses them first, saying "Welcome!"--in other words, making respectful address; he prostrates himself physically and rising, provides a seat; rising from his seat, he gets up to show respect--in other words, rising promptly; he salutes them--in other words, joining his palms at least; he does the respectful service of tending them; he sympathetically nurses the illnesses of the sick.

There are three fields here: those to be assisted, the lamas, and the suffering. First are one's parents, second are one's preceptors and teachers, third are the sick. They are "fields" because for bodhisattvas both monastic and non-monastic they constitute bases for the creation of merit.

2.3 Satisfaction in good qualities and in their possessors. He gives a "Well done!" to the exalted word unerroneously spoken and to well-spoken praise of the Precious Three; he speaks praise of persons endowed with qualities of learning and so forth; he appreciates, from the bottom of his heart, and describes in words the virtues of all sentient beings.

Furthermore, knowing that someone is considered by someone else to be a suitable beneficiary [of offerings], you come to appreciate him, and eliminate your own envy, and although you have not made [the offerings] yourself, you will obtain merit as though you have. And in order to comply with those good deeds, you take satisfaction in them as though they were your own.

2.4 Resorting to forbearance. He investigates injuries done him by others, regards them as past deeds and generates compassion, not being angry in return nor returning any injury.

2.5 Dedication and sowing of aspirations. In order that what he has done not go to waste, and to generate various sorts of merit, the wholesome things he has done with body, speech, and mind,<sup>61</sup> and those that he will do,<sup>62</sup> he dedicates to best awakening. And to procure measureless (14a) good qualities, he sows the ten aspirations explained in the *Ten Stages* from time to time, or the "Resolve of Benevolent Conduct."<sup>62</sup>

2.6 Offering to the Precious [Three]. All sorts of offerings to the Precious Three, both material things and the offering of spiritual achievement, as well as extensive offerings without stint.

2.7 Recourse to vigilance. He is always, constantly engaged with great diligence in wholesome directions of the six perfections. This wholesomeness, which means taking the path of [accumulating] resources, amounts to guarding oneself by practicing the physical and verbal bases of training while endowed with mental mindfulness and awareness,<sup>63</sup> as well as guarding the gates of the faculties of action in guarding one's thoughts from the generation of attachment and aversion in the pursuit of agreeable and disagreeable objects with one's faculties unrestrained. And, to keep his body from falling into either of the two extremes--excessive satiety and excessive hunger--with the consequent incapacity for vigorous initiatives, he is aware of moderation in food eaten judiciously. And of the three watches made of the night, he sleeps in the middle; in the former and latter parts, as well as by day, he does recitation and yoga, applying himself, in the earlier and later parts of the night, to the yoga of wakefulness. And he attends to holy persons, companions who initiate him into virtue and divert from from vice, and takes recourse in spiritual advisers who do such things as impart the tradition to him.

[2.8 Confession.]<sup>64</sup> And he acts as his own adviser, investigating his own transgressions and making himself understand the future disadvantages of their results, then correcting them by resorting to the antidote. And mistakes or transgressions that have developed, he announces to the

buddhas with their disciples, should he have the good fortune to encounter them, or in their absence to the buddhas with their disciples before images of them, candidly confessing and doing so as well before (14b) companions who practice the same doctrine.

[22122.3] The summary meaning. Ethics that procures, preserves, and increases wholesome factors such as these, is known as the bodhisattva's ethics of collecting wholesome factors.

"Procures" refers to fresh growth--for example, generating the three sorts of wisdom. "Preserves" refers to not allowing what has grown to go to waste--for example, having recourse to forbearance, because unchecked annoyance will destroy the wholesomeness you have accumulated. "Increases" refers to renewed diffusion, expansion, and inflation--for example, dedication and sowing aspiration.

2212.3 Accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings. What is the bodhisattva's ethics of benefiting sentient beings? Briefly, it should be understood to have eleven modes. It is achieved, in relation to the needs of those to be converted, by dealing with the purpose of the proposed assistance, delusion as to means, [return] of benefit, affliction by fear, derangement by sorrow, destitution of requisites, desire to set oneself up as a resource, desire for mental compliance, participating correctly, participating wrongly, and working wonders. <sup>65</sup>

221.3 Causes for success.<sup>66</sup> Three parts.

2213.1 Causes for success in the ethics of the vow. How does the bodhisattva who is established in the ethics of the vow come to be possessed of ethics that is well restrained? Ten points to this.

1.1 Disregarding sensory desires of the past. The highest human sense-pleasures of the bodhisattva are renounced for the monastic life. And having gone forth to the monastic life, he pays no more regard to them than, for example, he would to grass or impurity.

Inasmuch as they are desirable, they constitute a "sensory desire." That is to say, there are sensory desires that are things, or "goods," and there are desires that are defiled, or "craving,"<sup>9</sup> inasmuch as they (15a) are the desire itself. Here we are referring to the former. <sup>67</sup>

On the one hand, he sees that objects of attachment are hollow and

puts them aside with no further regard, as though having no further regard for grass that has been put aside with the notion that it is rubbish. On the other hand, he sees that those desires are connected with future "rotten" defilements and has no further regard for them, as though having no further regard for something that will rot, which he has put aside as impure.<sup>68</sup>

Accordingly, one first puts aside the enjoyments of the home life. If you have any further regard for them, then even though you are a monastic, your vow will not be perfectly pure. So you must be firm in further nonattachment. That is to say, you must establish the notion according to the two similes explained just above.

1.2 Not anticipating sensory desires of the future. If he is not celibate out of an aspiration for enjoyments created by the magical power of others, including the realm of Mara, what need to mention [being so] for the sake of desires other than that?<sup>69</sup> His lack of anticipation of that is like not desiring to enter a dense forest full of tigers and leopards and the like.

Human sense-pleasures were mentioned in context of disregarding past [desires], but divine were not mentioned, because the context was monasticism, in which ethics of the vow is the chief thing, and there is no monasticism in the divine state. Divine sense-pleasures are mentioned in context of not anticipating the future, but human are not mentioned, because the context is to show that one should not aspire for objects of desire for the future, and as far as objects of desire go, there is nothing beyond the realm of Mara. In short, for the monastic vow to be pure, or "well restrained," one must not be living a celibate life for the sake even of future sense-pleasures; it is not sufficient to disregard sensory pleasures you have already put aside.

(15b) 1.3 Not longing for those of the present. He has no taste for the sense-pleasure of gain and respect even by exalted sentient beings such as kings and ministers. What need to mention gain and respect by base sentient beings? This is to see with wise understanding the resemblance it bears to not making oneself taste vomit simply in order to be eating food.

The chief thing here is that celibacy out of an aspiration for future sense-pleasure functions as nothing more than well-wishing, and not as the *prātimokṣa* vow. For the ethics of the vow on the lay side it is not impossible to do without the renunciation of previously obtained objects of desire and detachment from them in the present, but on the monastic side this [renunciation] is an absolute necessity. Therefore, you will not possess "ethics that is well restrained" without having meditated upon the disadvantages of *samsara* in general, and of desires in particular, and reversed the idea [of a future reward] as above. You must be certain of this.

1.4 To enjoy dwelling in isolation. To enjoy being alone in physical isolation and, even when dwelling among many, to live keeping a distance from preoccupation with desires and so forth.

Furthermore, he is not satisfied with ethics, but based upon it he achieves afresh the measureless meditative concentrations (*samādhi*) of the bodhisattva and, once that has been achieved, he strives to obtain the sovereignties. <sup>70</sup>

This shows that there is no successful ethics when you are satisfied with mere morality and fail to seek higher qualities.

1.5 Perfect purity of speech and preoccupation. Even while dwelling in society he does not engage in demeaning talk, in defiled conversation. Even dwelling in isolation, on the other hand, he is well restrained in generating not the slightest bit of demeaning discursive preoccupation with desire and the like. On the rare occasion when it occurs out of absentmindedness, he immediately considers the disadvantages and generates strong regret. If that is done continually, then dependent upon (16a) it, as soon as something demeaning in speech or mind occurs, mindfulness arises, he arrives at the idea of not doing it, and he withdraws from it. With familiarity in withdrawing from it, a lack of enjoyment in subsequent indulgence in those two things will arise that is the equal to his former enjoyment of it. That is to say, the two ideas are like a change of clothes.

To strive that it not occur in the first place, and to consider the disadvantages if it should occur, rather than deciding to think nothing of

it, and to generate strong regret, thus changing the basis of your ideas from former to latter [as described], is to prevent what should not be done and the supreme advice for the complete purification of ethics.

1.6 Not underestimating oneself. The three sorts of ethics of those who have attained the stages are broad and sublime; the bases of training are immeasurable, transcending enumeration; they are inconceivable, not the object of logical reasoning; they are practiced for aeons beyond reckoning or for extended periods of progress that are not short-term; the deeds are difficult--renunciation of one's body and so forth--and others are incapable of them. To be frightened and timid at hearing these things, and to think, "I cannot do it," is to underestimage oneself. He stops that. How he stops it: He encourages himself, thinking, "Being human, they have come to possess those trainings by training themselves gradually, although one could not possess them from the outset. I also,<sup>71</sup> if I do not give up my efforts of gradual training, will undoubtedly come to obtain them."

To listen to those measureless based of training and neglect them, thinking, "Who is able to train in such a way?" and abandon them, thinking, "They may belong to other bodhisattvas, but they are not for me" is a great obstacle to the increase of one's hereditary aptitude. Therefore, as has been explained, he puts a stop to depression and makes every effort to be able to implement the real thing. Those who lack the ability should develop a great deal of energy, thinking, "When (16b) in future I train myself in this way..." preparing themselves by accumulating the causes for it and making grand resolves.

1.7 Tenderness. He worries about his own faults, not those of others, not creating suffering.

Objection: "Are the faults of others left out?" Not so. He generates compassion, envisioning him as subject to defilement.<sup>72</sup> This is how to generate it: Think, "It is not the fault of this person. He has been rendered helpless by defilement." Not generating enmity and resentment towards those who are violent and immoral, generate mercy in great measure and besides that, generate a desire-to-do. Generate the corresponding thought of awakening in any case, thinking, "As soon as he is

no longer under the influence of defilement, he will obtain supreme awakening." And desire to become his spiritual adviser.

1.8 Forbearance. He does not become angry because he has been struck by the other with hand, clump of earth, club, weapon, and the like. How then could he emit an evil word or strike a blow? Hence he purifies mind, speech, and body respectively.

If he bears a great injury in this way, what need to mention that he will not do anything that would result in mental pain with an injury the likes of uselessly scolding the other person, verbal abuse with anger, or promising, "Just you wait!"

That is what appears in the commentary attributed to Samudramegha. In the text, it says, What need to mention because of the slightly painful injuries from scolding, anger, and reproach?<sup>73</sup> That is to say, "If he does not generate anger in response to being struck, what need to mention [his reaction to injury] because of these? He demonstrates that his mind is not upset by slight injuries by someone else; he bears the four qualities of a religious person."<sup>74</sup>

(17a) 1.9 Vigilance. There are five aspects to vigilance: endowed with the former limit, the latter limit and the mean, prior duty, and subsequent combined practice. These are, respectively, (1) to remedy past faults according to the doctrine, (2) to think seriously about acting so in future,<sup>75</sup> (3) to act thus non-forgetfully in the present, (4) to think most conscientiously, "Let me live and act in such a way that faults will not develop," and (5) based upon this last, to live and act in such a way.<sup>76</sup>

This is, chiefly, the care of the bases of training that is taken in the prātimokṣa.<sup>77</sup>

Among these five, the fourth is the root; where it is found, the fifth will be created, while in the rare instance in which it has not been created and a fault has occurred, it will be treated in due course according to the doctrine.

1.10 Purity of lifestyle and of livelihood. These are combined in one. Purity of lifestyle or conduct, however, is constituted by the set of not showing off one's virtue out of a desire for fame; not dissembling but

reporting your vices, being easily satisfied, not unhappy at inferior and meager gain; being content, not overeager at the prospect of obtaining something good and plentiful; being patient in the face of sufferings such as cold, hunger, and thirst; being not afflicted by unhappiness at not getting [what you want]; being disciplined in one's faculties; being not frivolous, because one is calm;<sup>78</sup> being unwavering, because one does not follow after sensory objects; and being calm in one's deportment, with attractive postures and wise attentiveness. Purity of livelihood is constituted by freedom from the five wrong means of livelihood--hypocrisy and the rest. <sup>79</sup>

Master Guṇaprabha explains that one may be vowed, but not "well restrained," for six reasons: being satisfied with that [vow of ethics] alone, impure speech with [demeaning] motivation, underestimation, failing to hold one's followers, not amending one's faults, and impure lifestyle and livelihood. The first has two parts: (1) Body and speech may (17b) be restrained but thought not be restrained from desires of the three times, and (2) it [thought] may be restrained but fail to desire the achievement of meditative concentration on top of ethics. "Failing to hold one's follower" refers to failure to hold to forbearance, the follower of ethics. <sup>80</sup>

2213.2) Causes for success in the ethics of collecting wholesomeness. There are two sets of five.

22132.1 The first five perfections as its common ground. Taken in order, they counteract these antagonistic factors: (1) not allowing oneself the subtlest attachment to body and goods, (2) not allowing any occurrence of defilement or subsidiary defilement, such as anger and rancor, which are the foundations of immorality,<sup>81</sup> (3) not allowing the occurrence of enmity, anger, and rancor, (4) not allowing the occurrence of laziness that fails to engage in the wholesome, and of disrespectful indolence such as staying in bed, lying on one's side, and reclining, and (5) not allowing oneself to savor the taste of meditative trance, nor allowing the occurrence of the defilements<sup>4</sup> of its stages,<sup>82</sup> nor of depression, excitedness, and the rest.

Briefly, antagonistic factors that occur are stopped by resorting to

their respective antidotes, and one never puts oneself under their influence.

22132.2 Wisdom as the common ground. Knowing, exactly as they are, these five: the advantages of virtue, the causes of virtue, distortions and nondistortions in regard to the effects of virtue and the impediments to collecting virtue--he then proceeds to eliminate the five ignorances and the impediments.

(1) The advantages of three: divine and human [rebirth], plus awakening. (2) The causes are ten virtuous [deeds] and so forth, which are the causes of elevation [in rebirth] and [spiritual] sublimity, as well as such things as depending upon a spiritual adviser and hearing, contemplating, and meditating upon the doctrine. (3-4) To look for permanence, pleasure, purity, and self in obtaining the fruits of virtue is distortion, so its reverse is non-distortion. With the thought of awakening, there will (18a) be no distorted view of the fruits that are to be obtained from the practice of virtue. (5) Accordingly, one knows the good qualities of the effects of wholesomeness, of the six perfections, and one is aware of their causes. Being also aware of the factors antagonistic to the six perfections, the impediments mentioned above, one gathers good roots--the six perfections--by eliminating them. This is the collection of everything wholesome, and it is to be gathered quickly, because there is nothing wholesome, be it worldly or transcendent, that is not included among the six [perfections], and because the elimination of factors antagonistic to those six makes it easy to collect.

The term "common ground" gives the sense of this being a cause for the easy achievement of generosity and the rest.<sup>83</sup>

2213.3 Causes for success in the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings. There are eleven modes by which he is established in the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings in all its modes. Furthermore, he is established in each one as well as in all the modes.

This last may be interpreted in view of the assistance to be given--in a single act he fulfills all sentient beings who need help--or in view of all the modes of assistance. Alternatively, it is spoken in context of the

one to be helped: He performs the eleven [modes of] welfare that are to be accomplished, appropriate to each of eleven [modes of] sentient being.<sup>84</sup> [The eleven modes follow.]

22133.1 Accomplishing the welfare of those who need help. Two parts: rendering assistance as fulfilling needs, and ministering to the suffering.

221331.1 Rendering assistance as fulfilling needs. Eight points.

1.1 Assessing the needs. Considering the thick and thin that may result from what is done or not done.<sup>85</sup>

1.2 Deciding upon what is to be done. An accurate determination of what is to be done from this time forth.

These two represent considering the way to render assistance, and taking responsibility for doing it.

1.3 Being a travelling companion. For those with neither escort nor follower, he renders the assistance of being company on the road.

(18b) 1.4 Employment in work. Showing them means, such as farming, that are unreprehensible.<sup>86</sup>

1.5 Guarding property. Showing them means by which property they have procured will not be carried off by thieves and the like.

1.6 Reconciling the divided. Resolving disputes.

1.7 Festivity. Meritorious activity restricted to one day.

1.8 Meritorious deeds. Undertaking what is meritorious for an unrestricted period of time--helping them to do so.

Master Guṇaprabha explains that the first two of these effect the obtainment of hitherto unobtained property and numbers four and five increase and protect it; the last two present what has been increased to a suitable beneficiary.

221331.2 Ministering to the suffering. Two parts [physical and mental].

2213312.1 Four physical sufferings. (1) To the ill he gives medicine and nursing. (2) Those of weak faculties: For the blind, he shows them the road that will take them where they want to go.<sup>87</sup> For the deaf, he shows with sign language what to avoid and what to rely upon. (3) Those without limbs he conducts to where they want to go with his own body or by conveyance. (4) For the road-weary he massages their limbs in such ways as providing a place to stay and a meal.<sup>88</sup>

2213312.2 Three mental sufferings. (1) The suffering of hindrances: By giving meditation instruction, he dispels involvement in the five hindrances--sense-desire and the rest.<sup>89</sup> (2) Uninterrupted suffering: By teaching doctrine as the antidote, he dispels the suffering of involvement in the eight preoccupations. The eight preoccupations are preoccupation with objects of desire, ill will, injury, kinfolk, fellow countrymen, deities, as well as preoccupation with repudiation by someone else and preoccupation connected with family prosperity--under the sway of a desire for good fortune in possessions and class, one makes the claim, (19a) "I am high-class"<sup>90</sup> (3) The suffering of humiliation and defeat by others: By teaching what is relevant in worldly terms, as well as transcendent Dharma such as the doctrine of self-lessness, he prevents defeat in altercations.

22133.2 Accomplishing the welfare of those who are deluded as to what is relevant. Teaching doctrine to those who are defiled as the karmic result of misbehavior, he induces them to reverse their misbehavior. The way in which he teaches doctrine is with literary expression that is eight things--"fitting" and so forth.<sup>91</sup> In addition, he teaches with responses endowed with four qualities to three sorts of question. To a question out of ignorance, he responds with literary expression that is fitting and connected--that is to say, he responds with a meaning that is undistorted and with expressions that combine with it. To a question that is inconsistent, his response is congruent and coherent--that is to say, it corresponds with the nature of things and the thinking is consistent from beginning to end. To a question that is both, he gives an answer that is skilful and appropriate--that is to say, an answer that is an informative means, and one that makes a communication appropriate to the disciples, as well as an answer that is compliant and painstakingly resourceful--that is to say, compliant in achieving worldly qualities, and bearing resources for the noble path.

"Painstakingly" (*'grus skyong, nipaka*) means sustaining effort continually and conscientiously in order to guard one's thoughts from outflows with constant care (*rgyun du gus par, \*nipaka/niyaka*).<sup>92</sup> Such is the explanation of Guṇaprabha, and that of Jinaputra accords with it.

The last two, Guṇaprabha explains, respond to a request for meditation instruction, and refer to intellectual mastery (*rtogs pa*, \**adhigama*). Jinaputra would have them refer to attainment (*thob pa*, \**prāpti*). According to both there are three types of question, whereas four actually appear.

"Looking at it another way," explains Guṇaprabha [followed by Jinaputra], 'fitting' is explained by 'connected,' because it is consistent from beginning to end. 'Congruent' is glossed by 'coherent,' because it is appropriate to the disciple. 'Compliant' is glossed by "painstaking," because (19b) it is compliant with celibacy. By analogy, the five features of [the Buddha's] voice--deep, beautiful, agreeable, distinct, and worth hearing--are glossed by thunder, euphonious, pleasing, crystal clear, and free from incongruity.<sup>93</sup> By glossing the former by the latter in each pair of terms, he [Asanga] shows that for all questions there are answers endowed with four qualities: consistency from beginning to end, consistency with the nature of things, consistency with the disciple, and connection with the highest meaning."<sup>94</sup>

At this point the text says: Looking at it in another way, he teaches with skill in means. In the course of teaching doctrine by means of literary expression with eight [qualities] in order to reverse the misbehavior of those possessed of immoral behavior as mentioned above, he teaches so as to prepare the stingy for generosity and so forth.

"Skill in means" may also be interpreted as teaching doctrine in a way that will not give rise to hostility and cynicism.

He shows the means to correctly and with little difficulty acquire and keep goods in this life.<sup>95</sup> Those who are hostile to this [buddhist] teaching he induces to generate faith and to participate, while to participants he teaches the dignified doctrine for the elimination of defilements that are eliminated by [the path of] vision and, by purifying their views, how to rise above a bad rebirth; and to those who have obtained the path of vision he teaches the means to eliminate the remaining fetters.<sup>96</sup>

22133.3 Accomplishing the welfare of those who have helped him. When he sees them he treats them with respect. He accosts and greets them with a "Come here, you are welcome." He receives them offering

a seat and a place to stay. He assists them with gain and respect that are greater than or equal to the assistance they have done him, but not less. If he tends to their needs even unsolicited, what need to mention when he has been asked? The rest of his deeds, up to frightening (20a) and bending to his will by working wonders, are to be viewed in the same way.<sup>97</sup>

22133.4 Giving refuge to those afflicted by fear. He makes himself a refuge from fear of the following: fear of animals living on land such as lions and tigers, as well as the watery deep itself, or the sentient beings living in it, animals living in water such as sharks (the two fears of animals); fear of kings possessing legal and judicial powers,<sup>98</sup> of robbers who steal property by force or by stealth; of adversaries or enemies who interfere with one's property and so forth; and of landlords and overlords who rule a limited territory (the four fears having to do with human beings); from the three fears of being deprived of something dear--fear of loss of livelihood, fear of defamation, and fear of public bashfulness by reason of deprivation of requisites, of good conduct, and of something to say; and from fear of the two sorts of inhuman being--those born inhuman from the beginning with that specific sort of rebirth, and those who have become so because a specific spell has been cast to achieve it properly.<sup>99</sup>

22133.5 Relieving the sorrow of those afflicted with sorrow.<sup>100</sup> Two parts: the sorrow of parting from relatives and friends, and the sorrow of parting from property.

221335.1 Parting from relatives and friends. Five parts: (1) parting from relatives who were the causes for one's birth--the death of parents; (2) parting from relatives who are acquired and are results--the death of spouse and children; (3) parting from associates who listen to our words--the death of servants, male and female, of workers and personnel; (4) parting from associates who benefit and love us--the death of friends, counsellors, other kinsmen, and the older generation;<sup>101</sup> and (20b) (5) parting from<sup>4</sup> associates who show us the good--the death of celibates such as preceptor, teacher, and lama.<sup>102</sup>

2213352.1 Parting from property. Two parts: causes of suffering for everyone and causes shared only by some.

2213352.1 Those shared by everyone. Theft by kings and robbers, consumption by fire, and being carried off by floods.

2213352.2 The unshared. Two parts: one's own clumsiness, and coming from someone else.

2213352.2.1 One's own clumsiness. Two points. (1) Clumsiness in keeping property--gone to ruin by being badly stored in the treasury. (2) Clumsiness in acquiring property--resulting in ruin because of misapplication to the work of acquisition.

2213352.2.2 Coming from someone else. Two points as well. (1) Calamity through inheritors--carried off by unfriendly inheritors. In some commentaries this appears as "carried off by unfriendly relatives," and this would seem to be the case. (2) Calamity through those of one's own home--internal family squandering. Some commentaries interpret this as only the creation of family corruption [a prātimokṣa offense] <sup>103</sup> and the dispersal of its inheritance out of ignorance.

Such sorrows--minor, medium, and major--that are created on the bases of associates and property, he relieves by teaching impermanence.<sup>104</sup> "Major" is interpreted as the [sorrow] developed from the death of one's mother and so forth, "medium" as that which develops from the death of servants, etc., and "minor" as that which develops from deprivation of property. Seen another way, it may be understood [according to Jinaputra] in terms of need and dearness.

22133.6 Accomplishing the welfare of those who are destitute of requisites. Six points. (1) For the suffering of poor livelihood, he gives food and drink to those who want them. (2) For the suffering of fatigue, he gives vehicles and transport to those who want them. (3) For the (21a) suffering created by shame, he gives clothing and ornaments to those who want them, if they will be ashamed at not owning clothes and ornaments. (4) For the suffering of lack of requisites, he gives utensils to those who want them. (5) For the suffering of bad smell, he gives perfume, flower-garlands, and unguents to those who want them. (6) For the suffering of poverty of shelter and light, he gives shelter, such as a place to stay, and gives the illumination of lamps to stimulate vigor in those who desire them.

22133.7 Accomplishing the welfare of those who want a resource upon which to depend.<sup>105</sup> Two parts.

221337.1 With what attitude to gather a following. Without a thought for fame and fortune, but backed only by a thought of mercy--that is to say, with no thought of self-interest--he gives himself as a resource.

221337.2 With what application to gather it. Two parts: attracting them with material things, and attracting them with the doctrine.

2.1 Attracting them with material things. Two points. (1) What is sought from others: For the sake of the followers he has attracted he seeks, according to the doctrine, from donors who have faith, clothing, food, bed and bedding, medicinal drugs, and [other] requisites. (2) Sharing one's own requisites: His own clothing and so forth, obtained in accord with the doctrine, he uses in common with them.

2.2 Attracting them with the doctrine. Two points. He gives advice in eight [modes], and five [sorts of] lesson to stabilize unstable thinking during meditative visualization.<sup>106</sup> [As to the eight modes of advice:] To those with a preponderance of desire-attachment, aversion, bewilderment, pride, and discursiveness there are, in order, recollection of the repulsive, of love, of dependent origination, of the classification of elements, and of breathing. One mode of advice teaches the middle way (21b) as antidote to absolutist and nihilistic philosophic views, in order to cause [the disciple] to obtain his own welfare in the form of mental stability. Two sorts of advice induce him to abandon spiritual conceit, thinking, "I have evinced the path," when he has not, and thinking, "I have obtained results," when he has not. These are summarized by [mental stability], overturning, and abandonment.<sup>107</sup> Five points to giving lessons: the prohibition, "This is wrong," in the case of [behavior] that is reprehensible; the permission, "This is all right," in the case of what is unrepensible; persuasion to reverse it, in the case of doing what has been prohibited;<sup>108</sup> putting a stop to it, in the case of his not desisting from such behavior; and appreciation of the permitted and prohibited performed unerringly.

22133.8 Accomplishing the welfare of those who desire mental harmony. Two parts.

8.1 Summary teaching. The bodhisattva complies with the welfare of sentient beings. Having made himself aware, first of all, of the dispositions, the nature, and the elements of sentient beings, he lives together with sentient beings as one should live with them; he acts toward sentient beings as one should act toward them.

Here "dispositions" means "thinking"--that is to say, dispositions that are virtuous or unvirtuous, full of aversion or of love. "Nature" means "inclination"--that is to say, he examines to which vehicle they are inclined. Then he complies with that inclination and those "elements," or instincts. <sup>109</sup>

8.2 Detailed explanation. Considering benefit and harm: If it appears that any act of body or speech that complies with a sentient being will result in pain and unhappiness for that sentient being, he will reflect thus: If that pain and unhappiness will not move him from his unwholesome to a wholesome situation, a bodhisattva should conscientiously reject that action, complying with the inclination of that [other person to be free from pain]. If, on the other hand, he sees that the pain and unhappiness is capable of installing the other person in wholesomeness, he (22a) must hold only to mercy for the other, and perform the action, declining to comply with the other's inclination because of the long-term benefit for him.

Likewise, when it appears that the action will not create pain for the sentient being to be complied with, but will create it in a third party, the criteria for rejecting it or not are as before. When it appears that some act of body-speech, which is not an action achieving compliance with the other, will create pain in someone else, and it is not included among his own guidelines [for practice], nor is it a part of the two resources, nor will it result in raising the other from nonvirtue to install him in virtue, it is to be avoided, in order to guard the thought of the other. At the same time, in a case where those three are reversed, he will adopt nothing but mercy and not conform with the thought of the other who is to be converted.

Likewise, when it appears that any act of body-speech will create short-term pleasure and happiness for someone else, the long-term bene-

fit and long-term harm in doing it should be assessed in terms of not conforming, etc., with the other.

While the bodhisattva is bringing himself into compliance with sentient beings, when the other is possessed by involvement in anger, he does not speak praise of him until the anger has been calmed. What then to say of dispraise? Nor does he apologise. He will accost and greet someone who scowls, who knows not the ways of the world, who does not accost him: What need to mention someone who approaches and greets him? When he rebukes someone else he does not upset him; he only rebukes him out of mercy for him, doing so with calm faculties. He does not ridicule someone in the midst of many people simply because there is reason for ridicule, nor does he make himself sarcastic and intimidating. He does not make someone regret putting him at ease. When someone has already been punished and humbled, he does not accuse him with a punishable topic, because of the mortification. He does not show himself to be grand before those who are downcast, lest it become a cause for depression.

He does not fail to cultivate others, for that would result in his being unfriendly and unfamiliar with them. Nor does he cultivate others excessively, because others do not enjoy the interference with their activities that comes of continual companionship. He does not cultivate others unseasonably either, in order, along with the other two alternatives, to avoid termination of the relationship.

He does not speak censure of someone before his friends, nor praise of him before his foes, because that would result in dislike. He does not confide in someone who is unfamiliar, because he might think in some other way. He does not beg continually outside, and he knows the proper measure to be given within, lest it result in alarm, its being scorned from lack of faith, no further giving, being incensed and, despite his generosity, condemnation.<sup>110</sup> Nor does he ignore an invitation to food, drink, and the like, lest it interfere with someone's good intention. Nevertheless, he may excuse himself in the right way, saying, without any lack of appreciation, that he is to do a recitation, meditation, or higher ordination.<sup>111</sup>

The application is that on top of these items, the bodhisattva complies with others' expectations.<sup>112</sup>

22133.9 Accomplishing the welfare of those proceeding correctly. Those endowed with the qualities of faith, morality, learnedness, renunciation, and wisdom he extols by discussing it [the quality] and them.<sup>113</sup>

Morality and renunciation are the causes for good fortune in body and possessions--in other words, the cause for elevation.<sup>114</sup> Wisdom is the cause for sublimity. Its leader is learnedness. Faith is the gateway to both.

22133.10 Accomplishing the welfare of those proceeding wrongly. In the three cases of minor, medium, and major fault and transgression he (23a) gives minor, medium, and major degrees of rebuke, with his mind not distraught and free of bad feeling.<sup>115</sup> Acts of punishment are similar. In cases of minor and medium fault he will, with merciful intention towards them and others, banish them for a certain period, for one or two months or for some years, in order to regain them. In cases of major fault he will banish them, out of mercy for them, in a way that will not bring them back for as long as they live, never associating or sharing property with them again, in order that they not acquire even more demerit, and desiring to benefit others.

This "demerit" refers to his acceptance of property donated with misdirected faith, honor from celibates, and the like.<sup>116</sup>

Master Guṇaprabha explains "fault as failing to do the right thing, and "transgression" as doing what is wrong.

22133.11 Accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings who need to be disciplined by working wonders.<sup>117</sup> Two points.

(1) Frightening by working wonders. He will magically emanate the hot and cold hells and alarm them,<sup>118</sup> saying, "Look you upon this, the unpleasant result of accumulated misbehavior as a human being," inducing them to reject their misbehavior.

Again, in the case of some sentient beings seated in the great assembly who wish to cast ignominy upon the bodhisattva with humiliating questions, the bodhisattva will magically recreate himself as Vajrapāni or some other yaksha of heroic station who is great in body and power,

and frighten and terrify them.<sup>119</sup> By this means belief will be born and they will respect him; he will be made to answer only legitimate questions and by his various answers that great crowd will be converted.

Jinaputra and others [namely, Samudramegha] interpret this as, "In (23b) order that those in the great assembly not speak,<sup>120</sup> because they intend harm to the bodhisattva, he terrifies them by creating a wonder to answer questions."<sup>121</sup>

(2) Bending to his will by working wonders. He demonstrates [wonders] such as those [known as] having been one, there are many; having been many, there is one; exercising sovereignty over one's body, from going straight through a wall and enclosure<sup>122</sup> up to the world of Brahmā; displaying the combined miracle of fire burning from above while water flows from below and so forth; absorption into the element of fire; and so forth.<sup>123</sup> Thus he bends them to his will, pleases them, and causes them to rejoice; the immoral, the unlearned, the miserly, and those of defective understanding he projects, respectively, into the blessed states of morality, learnedness, renunciation, and wisdom.

Listings of the eleven aspects of accomplishing welfare differ from one commentary to another. We have followed the account of [Bodhi-bhadra, in] his explication of the *TV*. In this text the triad of rendering assistance as fulfilling needs, and tending the ill and the suffering, are counted as a single item, which is very *à propos*.<sup>124</sup>

Jinaputra says: "The collecting of wholesome factors is done to increase one's merit. With the intention of helping others, however, it functions as the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings." Actually, if you have done anything with the welfare of others in mind, then even if it fails to accomplish their welfare, it is considered the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings. However, here we are speaking of what really effects the welfare of sentient beings. In that sense, when you are not really accomplishing the welfare of (24a) sentient beings, to admit that you do not possess the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings is to avoid the logical defect of overinclusion. [Jinaputra's contention] is like saying, "Actually, my mind wanders elsewhere and I am without a thought for the vow of

withdrawal, then when I fall asleep or something, I possess the ethics of the vow."

The *Ceremony for Generating the Thought and Taking on the Obligation* says: "For the beginner the ethics of the vow is chief, so he 'takes the course of obligation.' For someone on the course of devotion (*adhimuktacaryā*) the ethics of collecting wholesome factors is chief, so he 'takes the course of concentration.' For someone advanced to the stages, to accomplish the welfare of sentient beings is the chief thing, so he 'takes the course of pleasing sentient [beings].'" <sup>125</sup> Thus he describes the matter in terms of major and minor "chief things," although it is incumbent upon one to train oneself in helping sentient beings from the very moment that one has taken the vow. So long as you lack the superknowledges, complete accuracy in accomplishing others' welfare is somewhat problematic. So this master speaks clearly of the distinctions between sentient beings as objects of benefit, and ways of helping them. These are very important: Make yourself well aware of them and act accordingly in helping others. This is how the bodhisattva comes into possession of the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings in all modes.

221.4 The summary meaning [of ethics to be undertaken.] The three-fold aggregate of bodhisattva ethics, those aggregates of ethics that comprise the ethics of the vow, of collecting wholesomeness, and of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings, are collectively infinite; therefore, those who train in them are endowed with a measureless aggregate of merit. <sup>126</sup>

These are the explanations of the *Bbh*. In the *Ascertainment-Summary of the Bbh* they (the threesome "ethics of the vow" and so forth) are summarized as the three aspects of the disciplinary code. He "the vow" refers to training oneself according to what has been promulgated in the (24b) *Prātimokṣa* with its detailed explanation [O 1031-2]. "Collecting is to investigate and practice six thoughts.

The *Summary* says [O 5539, P 'I 40a.1-8]: "Vinaya, in brief, should be understood to have three aspects. [1] There is, firstly, what was summarized by the Lord in the Vinaya of the auditors constituted by

ethics of the vow. This should be regarded as a summary vinaya. [2] What has been summarized by the vinaya constituted by the ethics of collecting wholesome factors? The bodhisattva applying himself to the ethics of collecting wholesome factors, to be brief, investigates each of six thoughts. What are the six? They are the underestimating thought, the lazy thought, the hindered thought, the thought worn out by effort, the injured thought, and the interfered-with thought.

"(1) The very thought of forfeiting wholesome bodhisattva factors, the very disinclination for them, or the very thought of [not] obtaining them, is considered the 'underestimating thought.' (2) Thought involved with indolence, apathy, and carelessness is the 'lazy thought.' (3) The 'hindered thought' is thought involved with any hindrance, beginning with sense-desire, among the defilements and the subsidiary defilements. (4) The 'thought worn out by effort' is thought weary of vigorous initiatives and of physical position, and overcome by mental agitation. (5) The 'injured thought' is thought overcome by some injury and incapable of bearing any application. (6) The 'interfered-with thought' is thought with an interference such as love of talking."

(25a) When these thoughts have arisen, there may or may not be an acquiescence in them, and to allow them may or may not be a fault. The same source says [40a8-b8]: "The bodhisattva should investigate those six thoughts in this way: 'Do any of these six thoughts frequent my mind?' Even if he thinks not, he should investigate. Among them, the bodhisattva should not allow the first three. To allow and fail to eliminate them is completely reprehensible. In the case of 'thought worn out by effort,' there is nothing reprehensible if he thinks, 'Such thinking will supplant my application to wholesome factors; I should, by all means, dispel this weariness and confusion of body and mind, and reapply myself to wholesome factors.' To think, 'Any application of mine will result in suffering for me in the present, so why should I bother?' undermining [the effort] entirely, is reprehensible. When up against injured thought there is no point in wishing to apply yourself to bodhisattva virtue, so to allow it is unrepensible. When up against an interfered-with thought, it is not reprehensible to allow it if wishing [to

act] is pointless, or if he perceives a greater benefit [in not acting]. If wishing for it is not pointless, or he perceives that there is no benefit (25b) or less benefit, to allow it is reprehensible. Among those six, to allow the former three thoughts is categorically reprehensible. To allow only an injured thought is unrepensible. To allow the remaining two thoughts is reprehensible or not, as specified."

[3] When undertaking to accomplish the welfare of sentient beings, one must investigate six topics. The *Summary* says [40b.8-41a.5]: "The bodhisattva applying himself to the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings should investigate six topics that need to be thought about. The six topics are oneself, others, material poverty, material prosperity, spiritual poverty, and spiritual prosperity."

"(1) 'Material poverty' refers to not obtaining such things as robes and alms for which one has no source already, as well as the interruption of those for which there has been a source. (2) 'Material prosperity' is the reverse. (3) 'Spiritual poverty' refers to being without the opportunity to hear verbalizations of the highest doctrine, spoken by the Tathāgata, that you have not previously heard, nor for contemplating what has not yet been contemplated, as well as interferences to hearing and interferences to contemplation, forgetting what has been heard and contemplated, failure to obtain the wholesomeness that comes of meditative cultivation that one has not previously obtained, and the loss of what was previously obtained. (4) 'Spiritual prosperity' is the reverse." Oneself and others are the bases for material and spiritual prosperity and decline.

Having examined these six topics, questions arise as to how to implement or avert them, as the case may be, and how they result in fault or not. The same source states [41a.5-b.5]: "The bodhisattva who is himself spiritually poor, will not try to make others materially prosperous. And [trying to make them] spiritually prosperous is analogous to [trying to make them] materially prosperous. In this interpretive context, 'spiritual poverty' is understood to be comprised by failure of training, by everything implied by that, and by the loss of doctrine that has been obtained.<sup>127</sup> He himself being materially poor, he will endeavor to make

others materially prosperous, so long as that material prosperity will not create spiritual poverty. If he were to create spiritual poverty, there there would be no [sense to the] endeavor. [Creating] spiritual prosperity is analagous to [creating] material prosperity. Being materially prosperous himself, he will also endeavor to create material prosperity for others. [Creating] spiritual prosperity is analagous to [creating] material prosperity. He himself being rich in doctrine, he will endeavor to make others rich in property. Spiritual prosperity is analagous to material prosperity.

"So not to apply himself is reprehensible, while applying himself is not. That being the case, this is included within the disciplinary code of someone who has undertaken the bodhisattva vow. The bodhisattva should attend to and train himself in it at all times."

Therefore, in pursuing the welfare, whether spiritual or material, of another person, there is no fault in not acting upon it when it appears that the training you have promised will actually fail, or that it will (26b) not actually fail but be tantamount to failure, or that the factor in question has previously been obtained or will be freshly obtained. On the other hand, in pursuing the welfare of someone else, you will be at fault if you fail to act upon it when it appears that you yourself will be materially impoverished by it, if spiritual poverty will not result. If spiritual poverty will result, you should not act upon it. Likewise, when you are wealthy in doctrine and in goods, not to pursue the achievement of both for other people is a fault.

The *Summary* gives further ways in which one may be at fault or not in pursuing the welfare of others [42b.8-43a.5]: "Should the bodhisattva, pursuant to outward indications of assistance in sentient beings who might assist him, generate the attitude of a close friend with a thought of self-interest or in order to take sides, it is reprehensible. Should he, pursuant to outward indications of harmfulness in sentient beings who may be harmful, generate the attitude of an enemy, thinking of pollution and thinking of making enemies, it is reprehensible. If he generates an ordinary attitude, an indifferent attitude, toward sentient beings who are neither potentially beneficial nor potentially harmful, it is reprehensible. Should someone approach him with an entreaty for monastic

ordination (*pravrajyā*) and [the bodhisattva], pursuant to a defect of prematurity or the lateness of the time, fail to ordain him, there is nothing reprehensible. If he sets up a thought of mercy, then conferring it [despite the hour] is also unreprehensible. On the model of ordination, (27a) we can understand doing a higher ordination (*upasampadā*), giving oneself as a resource, and attracting a following. The three aggregates of bodhisattva ethics should be fulfilled in these ways."

Accordingly, the bodhisattva vow-taker must train himself in making the three branches of ethics the most cherished thing. The key point, however, is to strive to train oneself in the ethics of the vow that is shared by the seven *prātimokṣa* classes. The *Summary* says [41b5-7]: "Among these three aspects of ethics, this is the case: Ethics of the vow involves collecting and creating prosperity. Bound to and keeping it, one is bound to and keeping other vows as well; whereas not bound to nor keeping it, the others are neither bound to nor kept either. Therefore, failure of the bodhisattva's vow of ethics may be said to constitute failure of all his vows."

Objection: "[Does the above wording imply that] when taking the bodhisattva vow, one may take each of those three sections as a separate vow? Or must one take the vow as all three together?"

Response: The bodhisattva vow does not have several grades, as does the *prātimokṣa*. Rather, there is only a single genus, and when you take it you must take it in a way that commits you to train yourself in all of it, without subdivision. As we read in the *Ascertainment-Summary* [41b4-5]: "If any one of the three aspects of bodhisattva ethics is lacking, is one said to be bound by the bodhisattva vow or is one said to be not? One is said to be not bound."

(27b) Objection: "But the *SS* says:<sup>128</sup> 'Therefore you should undertake and hold on to only one good root, in accord with your capability. The noble *Kṣitigarbha* scripture says, "Buddhahood comes by means of these ten wholesome courses. Yet someone who does not keep to a single wholesome course of action during his entire life, nonetheless says, 'I am a member of the Greater Vehicle! I am seeking supreme, right and full awakening!' That person, that consummate hypocrite, that great liar,

is deceitfully breaking a promise to the whole world made before all the lord buddhas. He will die in delusion and fall into great distress." For as long as you are able, you should undertake and maintain what is wholesome. What this is, may be seen in the *Bhaiṣajyaguru-vaidūrya-prabharāja* scripture.<sup>1</sup> Why is the bodhisattva vow explained here as undertaking the training in sections?"

Response: This is not a matter of the bodhisattva vow, but of the aspiration thought that has been generated. What is being said is that if you are incapable of taking the bodhisattva vow, then familiarize yourself with it by practicing individual bases of training as long and as hard as you can--if only a little bit--in conformity with your capacities. Adapting the vow to your personal strength, you must undertake [at least one training]. To fail to do so is to incur disadvantages such as breaking faith with the whole world, including the buddhas with their disciples as well as gods. This is what the scriptural tradition that is cited means. What follows it is this:<sup>129</sup> "The great being who has heard such statements will nonetheless, wisely recognizing how difficult the course of the bodhisattva really is, be encouraged to take up the responsibility of guarding all people from suffering. He will..." This latter (28a) passage describes the taking of the bodhisattva vow by someone who has already committed himself to the training and heard the disadvantages of not keeping it. Knowing that the bodhisattva course is hard to pursue, he nonetheless is not discouraged from taking up the responsibility of bodhisattva training. The subject of the previous citation was someone incapable of being responsible for the training; hearing that the course is difficult, he trains himself in various individual practices, taking on the obligation by stages. When his intellectual capacity has expanded he will, in taking the vow, understand it by making the *Bhaiṣajyaguru* scripture his source for clarification.<sup>130</sup> This is what should be understood from that scripture.

22.2 Explanation of how to take [the vow]. Two parts: generalizations, and the rundown.

22.1 Generalizations. Master Nāgārjuna composed a ceremony for the generation of the thought; no vow-ceremony had previously been

composed. What his *Ceremony for the Generation of the Thought*<sup>131</sup> says is:

Let the thought of best awakening be created,  
 Let me be host for all sentient beings,  
 Let me course the pleasant course to best awakening,  
 Let me attain buddhahood for the benefit of the world.

"Reciting this three times, one generates the intention of awakening." And it says: "Whatever giving I bestow, morality keep, patience develop, vigor initiate, meditation, settle into, wisdom apprehend, and skill in means practice, will all start from supreme, right and full awakening for the sake of the welfare, the benefit, and the pleasure of all sentient beings. I will follow bodhisattvas of the past, the present, and the future, the great heroes, those with great compassion, who participate (28b) in the Greater Vehicle, who dwell on a high stage. I am now a bodhisattva, and I entreat the noble ones to recognize my bodhisattvahood."

Here one finds him promising to train in the practices and to follow bodhisattvas [of the past, etc.] The *SS* and the *BCA*, for their part, say that to generate the thought in conjunction with the practice itself constitutes taking the vow.<sup>132</sup> In this text [the *Bbh*] as well, promising to train oneself in the three ethics of bodhisattvas of the three times itself constitutes taking the bodhisattva vow.<sup>133</sup> Master Bodhibhadra, and Abhayākara as well, compose vow-taking ceremonies that blend the systems of the two great chariots.<sup>134</sup> And in his commentary to *Lamp of the Path*, our elder brother [Atiśa] states that his *Ceremony for Generating the Thought and for the Vow* is the system of Nāgārjuna, Asanga, and Śāntideva.<sup>135</sup> Therefore, there is no meaningful distinction to be made between the ceremonies of noble Nāgārjuna and noble Asanga for obtaining the vow; there are only some technical dissimilarities to distinguish them. Hence to label those two systems as the Mādhyamika system and the Cittamātra system and then speak of incongruities of source from which to take [the vow], ceremonies for taking in, and seminal transgressions, is a horrendous misconstrual.<sup>136</sup>

Noble Asanga mentions that one must have generated the aspiration

thought as a precondition for taking the vow, but he does not appear to have composed any ceremony for doing so apart from the ceremony for the vow.<sup>137</sup> Nor is such found in the works of Maitreya, nor in the texts of master Vasubandhu. Master Jetāri [in O 5363] places aspiration-implementation and vow-taking in two steps, whereas Śrī. Dīpaṅkara [Atiśa] composes separate ceremonies for the cittotpada and the vow.<sup>138</sup> In his *Sūtrasamuccaya* commentary and in his commentary to the *BCA*, Kṛṣṇapāda places aspiration and implementation in separate contexts.<sup>139</sup> In view of this, I do not consider it tenable to compose distinct ceremonies for implementation and for vow. At the same time, the system devised by the abovementioned advisers, in which one first takes an aspiration ceremony, proceeds to stabilize [the aspiration], and only then takes a ceremony for the vow, is a good means to ensure a firm vow.<sup>140</sup>

Objection: "The middle *Bhāvanā-krama* [O 5311] says: 'The relative level (*saṃvṛti*) of this [thought of awakening] is that one commits oneself, out of compassion, to rescue the universe of sentient beings. One generates the initial thought, whose aspect is the desire for supreme, right and full awakening: "May I become buddha for the benefit of the world!" Furthermore, one should generate it "from someone else," in accord with the ceremony taught in the Chapter on Ethics--someone established and learned in the bodhisattva vow.' How do you interpret this?"

Response: When one promises to train oneself in all the bases of training of bodhisattvas of the three times, it is not really a matter of the aspiration thought by itself. The reason it [the work by Nāgārjuna] is called a "ceremony for the generation of the thought" is that it includes an affirmation of the thought.<sup>141</sup>

222.2 Rundown. Two parts: the ceremony with lama, and the ceremony without.

222.1 The ceremony with lama. Three parts: the ceremony as preparation, principal, and conclusion.

2221.1 The ceremony as preparation. Five parts: entreaty, procuring resources, exhortation to [grant] the vow soon, generating enthusiasm, and the inquiry as to impediments.

222211.1 Entreaty. Two parts: particulars of the persons and particulars of the ceremony.

2222111.1 Particulars of the basis. Two points: particulars of the basis, and particulars of the source.

1.1 Particulars of the basis. What sort of basis is required to be a recipient of the bodhisattva vow? The bodhisattva,<sup>142</sup> whether lay or monastic, who desires from the bottom of his heart to train himself (29b) in the three ethics explained above to be the bodhisattva training, and who has made the resolve for full awakening--that is to say, has generated the aspiration thought according to instructions...<sup>143</sup>

The vow should not be given to someone who is only taking the vow without aspiring to train himself in bodhisattva practice, who has not generated the resolution thought.<sup>144</sup> So in order to make him firm as a bodhisattva who aspires to undertake the vow, the bases of bodhisattva training and the grounds for offense that are set forth in the code for the collection of bodhisattva scriptures (in this *Bbh*) should be proclaimed to him before he is given the vow.<sup>145</sup> In the course of such explanation, he may be known as a steadfast bodhisattva if he has the fortitude to take the vow based upon sincere examination and analysis by wisdom as to whether or not he is capable, and neither based upon instigation by someone else, against his own will, nor out of competition with someone else. This vow-of-ethics obligation should then be received by him, and imparted to him, in accord with the ceremony.

So this is not like monastic discipline: One is made to listen and to understand prior to taking the vow, and one takes the vow when one has developed a firm idea of keeping to the training.<sup>146</sup> With such thoughts the vow will be created; without them it will not. The *Summary* says [41b7-42a2]: "He sincerely investigates, with his own good faith, to what extent he is being made to take it, whether to make himself known to someone else, to comply with someone's expectations, or because of actual instigation by someone. He is not considered to be vowed without having taken it aspiring to virtue. That is to say, neither (30a) will he fulfill and come to employ virtue, nor obtain the benefit of its karmic fruition. The opposite of this should be understood to

result in being bound by the vow, fulfilling and employing virtue, and obtaining the benefits of its fruition."

1.2 Particulars of the source. What sort of person is required as a source from whom to take the vow? It is taken from a bodhisattva, someone who has made the resolve; from someone who has created the resolve, a co-religionist,<sup>147</sup> from someone<sup>148</sup> established in the bodhisattva vow, learned in the Greater Vehicle<sup>148</sup> and capable of grasping the terms being verbally communicated [by the ceremony], beginning with the [aspirant's] entreaty to receive the training.<sup>149</sup>

From what sort is it not to be taken? The bodhisattva should not receive the vow from just any bodhisattva, although he may be learned, for there are failings in attitude and application.<sup>150</sup> The failing of attitude is to be without faith--to have no devotion in a great way to the vow, nor participation in a middling way, nor "preparedness" or effort in a small way.<sup>151</sup>

Failings in application to the six perfections.<sup>152</sup> (1) He acquiesces in factors incongruent with giving: possessed of greed, he craves body and enjoyments and, under its influence, he is overwhelmed by attachment;<sup>153</sup> he is insatiable for what he has not and discontented with what he has.<sup>154</sup> (2) Defeat has occurred, by which morality fails, or he has committed what is not categorically a fault and is slack, with no respect for the training.<sup>155</sup> (3) He is impatient when adverse conditions are encountered, an anger that disturbs the mind momentarily; he is rancorous at the recollection of past injury, a repeated disturbance; he is intolerant of the four faults of others because of factors in him that are incongruent with the four qualities of a religious person.<sup>156</sup> (4) He is lazy, with (30b) no energy for the wholesome, and indolent, with a liking for negative directions. This is explained as making a practice of the pleasures of sleeping day and night, lying on his side and staying in bed, and passing the time socializing.<sup>157</sup> (5) His "thought is wandering," because during calming meditation and so forth he cannot stabilize his thought; he is incapable of developing a thought one-pointed upon the virtuous even for the space of time it takes to milk a cow. (6) Defective understanding has two points. First comes the behavior: dullwittedness, the

inability to know the principle by himself; stupidity, the failure to understand even when shown; and disheartenment, which is either overawedness--in effect, nonacceptance of the sublime--or inherent stupidity. Second comes the adjuvant cause for defective understanding: to repudiate the bodhisattva collection or the code of the collection, saying, "It is bad; it is wrong."<sup>158</sup> The vow should not be taken from these.

According to some commentaries: "Actually, his possession of such [faults] to a slight extent is a consideration, but the implication is that [the vow is] not [to be taken] from someone who has these problems to a large extent; it may be taken if he has them to no great degree."<sup>159</sup>

2222111.2 Particulars of the ceremony. Two points.

2.1 Ceremonial particulars for the basis. The above-described basis first makes a prostration, falling at the feet of that source, because without reverence the vow will not be created.<sup>160</sup> He should also offer a mandala first, as Jetāri and Abhayākara explain.<sup>161</sup> Then he says, "I seek to receive from you, kulaputra, the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics obligation. If it be no importunity, may it suit you to hear me for a (31a) moment and to grant it, out of pity." Thus he makes the entreaty, for the vow will be created only in someone who wants it.<sup>162</sup>

This is done three times, as mentioned by Jetāri, Atiśa, and Abhayākara.<sup>163</sup> Abhayākara and Jētari explain that he is squatting, hands folded, at that time, or kneeling on his right knee.<sup>164</sup> Any of the physical postures described below [sec. 222211.3, 34a] will suffice.

2.2 Ceremonial particulars for the source. Then that person who is "capable" of imparting the bodhisattva vow should give to the bodhisattva vow-aspirant a detailed account of the advantages of the bodhisattva vow. Then he should describe to the vow-aspirant the bases of training, the grave and the trivial, and encourage him, saying,

"Listen, kulaputra! Do you aspire to cross over the stranded, to release the bound, the revive the breathless, to bring to nirvana those not yet in nirvana, and to continue the lineage of the buddhas? For that, you must be firm<sup>4</sup> in the generation of the thought, and firm in the obligation."

If he observes that the one who wishes to take the vow is of an ig-

norant class, he will speak thus to encourage him to take the vow, and to make steadfast his intention of taking responsibility for the training.<sup>165</sup>

The advantages to be secured are those which will appear below. He should also explain them in accordance with this promulgation of the ŚS: <sup>166</sup>

"As has been declared in the *Praśāntaviniścaya-prātihārya* scripture (O 797): 'Mañjuśrī, someone might offer, to each of the buddhas many as the river Ganges has sands, buddhafiels as many as the sands of that same river, each full of highly precious gems of supernatural power, (31b) making such offerings for ages as many as the Ganges' sands. Mañjuśrī, some other bodhisattva might hear doctrine<sup>167</sup> of that sort and then, going to one side, train his mind upon it, thinking, "I shall train myself in such doctrine." Even if he be yet untrained, his desire to do the practice generates greater merit. The merit of the bodhisattva giving highly precious gems of supernatural power does not compare with it.'

"The bodhisattva who sees such advantages will never turn back. That same scripture says: 'Mañjuśrī, it is like this. If, for example, each sentient being among sentient beings as many as the atomic particles in a universe system of a hundred-million worlds were to become king, a ruler of Jambu Continent, and they were all to say, "I shall deprive of life anyone who accepts, holds, recites, and masters<sup>168</sup> the Greater Vehicle, by having five ounces of his flesh sliced off with fingernails every day," Mañjuśrī, the bodhisattva who does not become frightened and tremble in terror at hearing this said, who generates not a single fearful thought, who is free from discouragement, bemusement, and doubt, who furthermore perseveres in holding to the doctrine and perseveres in reading and reciting it, that bodhisattva, Mañjuśrī, is called a hero of mind (*citta-śūra*), a hero of generosity, a hero of morality, a hero of patience, a hero of vigor, a hero of meditation, a hero of wisdom, a hero of concentration. The bodhisattva, Mañjuśrī, who bears no (32a) no anger, who generates no thought that is harsh and hateful toward those murderous persons, that bodhisattva, Mañjuśrī, is like Brahmā and like Indra: he is unshakeable.'

"From this we see that 'respect for the training in the present will bear a great fruition.'<sup>169</sup> As the *Candrapradīpa* scripture says:<sup>170</sup>

For ages as many as the sands of the river Ganges,  
One hundred thousand millions of ten millions of buddhas  
I will serenely worship with parasols, flags,  
Rows of lamps, and food and drink.

When someone hinders the Sugata's teaching,  
Destroying the holy doctrine,  
To hold to a single training day and night  
Becomes the most distinguished act of merit.

Therefore one should cultivate respect for the training."

Grave and trivial bases of training. He describes the disadvantages of failure to guard against grave seminal transgressions and the other, more trivial faults. The *SS* declares:<sup>171</sup> "According to the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna* scripture [O 1957], 'One will be reborn a hungry ghost for refusing to give so much as a trifle, and go to hell for failing to give something one has promised.' How much more so then, if you fail to fulfill a promise involving the supreme welfare of the whole world? Therefore the *Dharma-saṅgīti* scripture [O 904] says: 'The bodhisattva, kulaputra, must take seriously the truth. To speak the truth, kulaputra, is to speak the doctrine. Kulaputra! What does "truth" mean in this context? (32b) When the bodhisattva generates the thought of supreme, right and full awakening and will not relinquish it for the sake of his life--will not mislead sentient beings--that is the bodhisattva's truth. When the bodhisattva generates the thought of supreme, right and full awakening and thereafter relinquishes it--misleading sentient beings--that is the bodhisattva's vile lie.'

"And as it says in the *Scripture of Noble Sāgaramati* [O 819]: "Sāgaramati, it is like this. Should a king or high government minister, for example, invite all the people of the city to a meal the next day, and then neglect to procure food and drink, he would have deceived all the masses of people. And they, not obtaining food and drink, would go away<sup>172</sup> sneering. In the same way, Sāgaramati, the bodhisattva who

inspires all sentient beings [with his promise] to cross over the stranded, release the bound, inspire the breathless, and bring to nirvana those not yet in nirvana, and fails to apply himself to learning and the other phenomena constituting good roots<sup>173</sup> of the wings of awakening, is a bodhisattva who is not acting according to his word; he is deceiving the whole world up to and including the gods. So gods who have seen bud-dhas of the past sneer to see him; they abjure and revile him. Patrons of the sacrifice who promise to perform a sacrifice and then carry it (33a) out, are rare. So the bodhisattva should not speak a word, Sāgarā-mati, by which the world including gods, human beings, and asuras would be deceived."

The disadvantages of not keeping the promise, then, are a lower state of rebirth, being the most vile of liars, having deceived the jinas, their disciples, and all the world, condemnation by the gods, and so forth.

Having been made to see such advantages and disadvantages, he will not relinquish the generation of the thought, and he will be firm in the obligation entailed by having affirmed the vow.

Śrī Dīpaṅkara omits the description of the advantages and of the grave and trivial in this context. Then, following the passage "Listen, kulaputra!... firm in the obligation" he puts the questions, "Are you in competition with someone else? Have you been instigated to take it under pressure?"<sup>174</sup> Lamas of old<sup>175</sup> also add, to the above four, "Do you desire [to cross over the stranded, etc.]," the questions, "Is your taking the vow not out of competition with someone else? Are you not dependent upon someone else's instigation? Are you able to maintain a little learning or knowledge or faith in the bodhisattva collection or its code?" And with the "Please hear me for a moment..." they have the customary response.<sup>176</sup>

As to "[cross over] the stranded..." master Bhavabhadra<sup>177</sup> explains: "To cross over the auditors and independent buddhas, stranded in the obscuration of the knowable; to release those who are bound by the bonds of both obscurations, by bewilderment and [the other defilements]; to revive hell-dwellers and others who are breathless with suffering; and to project to nirvana sentient beings not yet in unstationary nirvana."<sup>178</sup>

222211.2 Procuring resources. The prātimokṣa may be obtained only by (33b) respect as the resource to be gathered. This vow goes far beyond that: One obtains it backed by worship of all the buddhas and bodhisattvas.<sup>179</sup> Therefore, the vow-aspirant then throws his upper robe over one shoulder and makes an entreaty seated before an image of the Tathāgata. He then makes his object the lord buddhas of past, present, and future, and bodhisattvas advanced to a high stage--attaining profound gnosis and extensive majesty--who abide in the ten directions.<sup>180</sup> "The qualities of those who possess such a vow are such-and-such," he thinks, making a recollection of their extraordinary qualities as they are made mentally evident. In order that the vow be created with the most wholesome possible attitude he generates, from the bottom of his heart, a great thought of serene faith, making whatever effort<sup>181</sup> of which he is presently capable, and using whatever power he possesses from past causes. Or, one might say that he generates at least a little bit with those causes and conditions.<sup>182</sup>

Then he should do proper worship.<sup>183</sup> To be brief, cleanse the space and decorate it well. Then set out meditative supports, headed by images of the Teacher. Envisaging the jinas of infinity with their disciples as though they were actually present, create the intense preliminary faith of recollecting their qualities. Form the notion of "buddha" according to the exposition in the *Ceremonial Procedure for Entreating the Lama to Sit on the Lion's Throne*.<sup>184</sup> Make a beautiful display of flowers, scents, perfume, lamps, and the like, fine and plentiful. The lama will guide the disciple's intellect and induce him to make offerings, first of prostrations and praises, then of a mandala and specific offerings, to the individual Precious [Three] and to the lama.<sup>185</sup>

(34a) 222211.3 Exhortation to [grant] the vow soon. Then in a humble manner, kneeling on his right knee or in a squatting position, he makes the entreaty: "Kulaputra! (to a layperson) or, "Long-lived One!" (to a younger monastic) or, "Reverend!" (to an elderly monastic). "Please grant me the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics obligation."

Śrī Dīpaṃkara gives the phrase "Please grant it soon," and has it done three times.<sup>187</sup> The occurrence of the three [forms of address]

*kulaputra*, *āyuṣman* and *bhadanta* shows that one is not restricted [to receiving the vow] only from a monastic, or from one's senior in training.<sup>188</sup> So explains Guṇaprabha. The learned Jñānaśrī says:<sup>189</sup>

Paths such as Tantra and the Perfections  
Should be undertaken by a bhikṣu,  
From a learned bhikṣu  
And not from anyone else.

What is shown by this statement is that the higher two vows ought to be taken from a monk. If a monk is unavailable, do not take them from someone such as a layperson. But this is not to say that they will not be produced if taken from someone other.<sup>190</sup>

222211.4 Developing high enthusiasm. Adopting one-pointed mindfulness, promote a thought that is nothing but serene: "Now my obtainment of the great treasury of merit--supreme, inexhaustible, and measureless--is not far off." Contemplating that goal, stay silently seated, palms joined.<sup>191</sup>

222211.5 Inquiry as to impediments. The learned transmittor, standing or seated, shall make his thought unwavering and ask the recipient, "Kulaputra!" or, "Dharma brother so-and-so! Are you a bodhisattva? Have you made the resolve for bodhi? And this he must affirm, saying, "It is so."

(34b) The point of the two questions is to stimulate his hereditary aptitude and to make firm his resolve.<sup>192</sup>

Master Dīpaṅkara places the development of enthusiasm below the inquiry as to impediments. Then comes a question to the disciple: "Do you desire to receive from me the bases of training of all bodhisattvas, and the bodhisattva ethics?" and the disciple's answer, "I do seek to receive them." He proposes to have the vow imparted after this.<sup>193</sup>

22221.2 The ceremony as principal. For the contents to be properly communicated, he should be addressed thus: "Will you, kulaputra so-and-so, receive from me all the bodhisattva bases of training and all the bodhisattva ethics--the ethics of the vow, the ethics of collecting factors, and the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings--whatever the bases of training and the ethics of all bodhisattvas of the

past, whatever the bases of training and the ethics of all bodhisattvas of the future, and whatever the bases of training and the ethics of all bodhisattvas presently abiding in the ten directions may be--whatever the bases of training and the ethics in which all past bodhisattvas have trained, all future bodhisattvas will train, and all present bodhisattvas are training.?"

The question is asked him three times in full, and each time he affirms "Yes, I will." <sup>194</sup>

(35a) "Bases of training" are the foundations for training in something. "Ethics" is that in which one trains.<sup>195</sup> Furthermore, it is undertaken by presenting an affirmation to trainings here shown to be shared by bodhisattvas of the three times, to the description of how to train in them, and to the three modes of ethics comprising both of these.

2221.3 The ceremony as conclusion. Four parts.

22213.1 Announcement. Before that same image of the Tathāgata, he should fall at the feet of all buddhas and bodhisattvas alive and flourishing in all of space. Palms joined, he should say:

"This bodhisattva, named so-and-so, has three times received from me, the bodhisattva so-and-so, the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics obligation. I, named so-and-so, being witness, announce it to those highest of nobles in the boundless, infinite realms of the universe in all directions who, though not visible, have intellects to which all sentient beings are entirely visible: This bodhisattva, named so-and-so, has undertaken the bodhisattva vow of ethics."

He should say this three times.

The disciple as well, who has remained seated, does his devotions at the feet of the jinas and jinas' sons of the [buddha-] fields of all directions. Then he does three actual prostrations and strews flowers in each direction.<sup>196</sup>

At the end he joins palms, standing, and begins with "Let the buddhas and bodhisattvas dwelling in the ten directions please take note," followed by the actual announcement. The prostrations above and below are visualized; one should do those to the east and west.

(35b) "Invisible" to myself; "visible" to the buddhas with their disciples.<sup>197</sup>

222213.2 Jubilation for the benefits. As soon as the act (*karman*) of undertaking the vow of ethics has been completed, the very nature of things is that a sign, such as an earthquake, will appear to buddhas and high-stage bodhisattvas, alive and flourishing in the infinite realms of the universe in all directions, by which it comes to their notice that "A bodhisattva has undertaken the vow of the jinas' disciples." Thereupon, it comes to their notice where, by whom, and from whom it has been taken. And having been noticed, it enters their intuitive vision. With that intuitive vision the realization enters their hearts that "The bodhisattva so-and-so, in a certain realm of the universe, has received the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics obligation from the bodhisattva so-and-so."<sup>198</sup> And they love him variously, the jinas as a son, the jinas' sons as a brother, their good hearts feeling, "May he attain the goal without any hindrance."<sup>199</sup>

The virtues of a bodhisattva loved in that way will grow, and not decrease.

This bodhisattva vow-of-ethics undertaking is the most distinguished of all vow-of-ethics undertakings because it has four distinguished features.<sup>200</sup> (1) "It is supreme," because there is none higher. (2) "It is endowed with a measureless aggregate of merit," inasmuch as it comprises measureless merit as its result. (3) Inasmuch as it has been created by a good aspiration for the benefit and pleasure of all sentient beings, "it has been generated by the most wholesome attitude of mind." (4) It functions as the antidote to all types of misconduct entered through the (36a) three doors [body, speech, and mind] by all sentient beings.<sup>201</sup> To undertake the prātimokṣa vow does not approach a hundredth part of the merit of [undertaking] this bodhisattva vow of ethics--nor a thousandth, nor any number, fraction, calculation, example, or comparison.

222213.3 Thanks offering. Teacher and disciple both repeat the offerings made previously to buddhas and bodhisattvas of the boundless, infinite realms of the universe in all directions. Falling at their feet in devotion, they make a devoted prostration and arise.<sup>202</sup>

222213.4 [Warning] not to rashly publicize the vow. Though he may have grasped the sense of the ceremony for taking the bodhisattva vow

and mastered its technical terms, he should not rashly publicize the terms and communicate the sense to untried vessels--to sentient beings who may reject the bodhisattva collection out of hostility, who may lack faith and devotion to it. Why so? Those who lack devotion to it, who are obscured by the great obscuration of unawareness, may repudiate what they hear, saying, "It's bad. It's wrong. It's senseless." And as to that repudiation: To the extent that the bodhisattva established in the vow has become endowed with a measureless aggregate of merit, so long as he has not entirely eliminated all those evil words of repudiation, all those evil views that cling mentally to that [repudiation], and all those evil representations that make of it a habitual pattern of thought, to the same extent he will become possessed of nothing more than a measureless aggregate of demerit. Such is the statement.<sup>203</sup>

The ceremonial conclusion is made fourfold by Śrī Dīpaṅkara, and this is clear from the text as well. That master places the thanks offering below the announcement, whereas in the text it appears above.<sup>204</sup> Nevertheless, to place the thanks offering at the end is felicitous in practice.

(36b) The sense of all this is summarized in the *TV* [v. 1-3]:

- (1) Prostrating with reverence and offering what you can  
     To the buddhas with their disciple,  
     The moral code of the bodhisattvas  
     Who frequent all time and all space,
- (2) That treasury of all merit--  
     With it as your lofty intention--  
     From a guru maintaining and learned in the vow  
     Who is capable, you should take it.
- (3) At that time, because of the virtue in that,  
     The jinas with their disciples,  
     With their virtuous hearts  
     Forever consider you a beloved son.

The first two lines indicate the ceremony as it is applied. The next six point out what is to be undertaken, the intention with which to undertake it, and the source from whom it should be taken. Then four lines indicate the ceremonial conclusion--jubilation for the benefits.<sup>205</sup>

2222.2 The ceremony without lama. If no person endowed with the abovementioned qualifications is to be found, then the bodhisattva, before an image of the Tathāgata, should take the bodhisattva vow by himself. Throwing his upper robe over one shoulder and either kneeling on his right knee or in a squatting position, he should speak thus:

"I, known as so-and-so, appeal to all tathāgatas and high-stage bodhisattvas of the ten directions. Before them I undertake all the bases of training of the bodhisattva and all bodhisattva ethics--whatever ethics of the vow, ethics of collecting wholesome factors, and ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings have been trained in by all bodhisattvas of the past, will be trained in by all bodhisattvas of the future, (37a) and are being trained in by all bodhisattvas presently abiding in the ten directions."

Having said this three times, he should rise. All the rest should be understood as above.

The other ceremonial procedures, are said to be similar to those of the ceremony with lama. Upon what basis to omit or include the rest does not appear in the commentaries, but I consider it permissible to leave out the topics of inquiry, the announcement, and the warning against rash publicity.

As to the presence or absence of a lama: If going involves impediment to one's physical life or to spirituality (*brahmacarya*), then even if he is near, one should do without him, whereas without [any impediment] one must seek him even if he is far away. Such is the explanation of the *Sūtra-samuccaya* commentary [by Ratnākaraśānti, 287b]. The new commentary [to the *TV*] would have it that the ceremony without lama is not meant for those who are correcting failure [in a vow] previously taken, nor for those who would take the vow [by themselves] out of disrespect: They must rely upon the ceremony with lama.<sup>206</sup> In the latter instance--if someone is taking it by himself, although a lama is present, out of disrespect for him--this is true. In context of correcting [the vow], however, the old commentary acknowledges the propriety of taking it from a lama if one is present and, if not, of taking it by means of the ceremony without lama. He [Śāntarakṣita] proves this with

his very citation of the ceremony without lama from the *Bbh*. This is certainly the intention of noble Asanga, for he places the passage "If no person endowed with those qualifications is to be found..." in context of healing the vow.

Nowadays the teaching is very downtrodden and it is especially important that you take the high and low vows, the gateways into all vehicles, high and low, and then make your own training the most cherished thing, guarding it as though it were a daytime star.<sup>207</sup> There is no way to take *prātimokṣa* and tantric vows, in the initial ceremony, without a (37b) lama—quite apart from a source for their reception who has the complete set of characteristics described in the texts. If it appears difficult to find a lama in whom, among good qualities and flaws, the good qualities are predominant, then this bodhisattva vow, even if you are taking it for the first time, so long as a source with the proper characteristics cannot be found, may be taken with a pure ceremony before a meditative support, the characteristics being [mentally] created in full. In this it differs from the other two vows in the manner of its initial obtainment and those who are intelligent, having taken it correctly, will labor enthusiastically, with whatever human skill they may possess, at keeping it.

Furthermore, as the jinas' son Śāntideva says [BCA 3:25]:

Now my life is fruitful;  
 Having obtained a human rebirth,  
 I am born today in the buddha family  
 And become the son of the Buddha.

Having obtained the vow you should think, in line with this avowal, "Now my life has meaning; I have reached the core of this human existence I have assumed, and been admitted into the ranks of the buddhas' disciples." And [3:26]:

From now on, whatever I do  
 Must be in harmony with the family,  
 And render no pollution  
 To this faultless, noble clan.

Generate an attitude that thinks, "Now come what may, let me not soil it with the pollution of transgression."

The explanation of how to take it is completed.

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22.3 The explanation of how to keep it. Two parts: the general instruction on how to keep it, and the specific explanation.

223.1 General instruction. The bodhisattva who has been established in the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics obligation should on the one hand deduce again and again for himself, "This is the right thing for the bodhisattva to do; this is not a fitting thing for the bodhisattva to do"--knowing the grounds for involvement and the grounds for avoidance--and he should thenceforth perform and guard<sup>208</sup> his actions in accord with just(38a) what he has thus determined. Listening, on the other hand, to the collection of bodhisattva scriptures or to this contracted code of the collection, he should train in accord with just that, in order to accomplish the many thousandfold bases of training promulgated in those various scriptures.<sup>209</sup>

The *SS* says [v. 3ab],

The vow of the bodhisattva

Appears in the Greater Vehicle in detail.

And [6cd],

By not relinquishing the spiritual adviser

And always looking into the scriptures.<sup>210</sup>

Although the chief thing is to accustom oneself to the grounds of bodhisattva training, the best means for keeping [the vow] is not to relinquish the adviser. Furthermore, one must listen to the precious scriptures in general, and to the *Bbh* and the *SS* in particular. Anyone incapable of this much, who refuses to listen securely to one of the chapters on ethics [of the *Bbh* or the *SS*], will be exceedingly stupid as to how a bodhisattva should train. For such a one "Greater Vehicle" is a mere name; fools can delude themselves, but what scholar who has found the security of taking the great texts of the Greater Vehicle to heart would be satisfied with that?

Having listened to them, moreover, one must train oneself in the trainings with exertion, not like a poor man counting the wealth of the rich. The [*Udāna-*] *varga* says, <sup>211</sup>

People who say a great many relevant things  
But carelessly fail to act accordingly  
Are like a cowherd counting someone else's cattle:  
They have no share of the religious life.

Those who say but few relevant things  
And live and act according to the doctrine,  
Forsaking desire, aversion, and confusion,  
Gain their share of the religious life.

And the *Caryāvatara* states [*BCA* 5:109],

Practice <sup>212</sup> these physically:  
What will you accomplish reciting verses?  
Would patients be restored (38b)  
By reading medical theory?

"What of the beginner? In how many grounds of training from the scriptures should he train?" Some things the Jina actually forbids the beginner; others, though not forbidden, are in effect unsuitable for practice when one is a beginner. With these two exception, not to train oneself in all bodhisattva trainings is a fault. As the *SS* puts it, <sup>213</sup> "To speak generally with respect to the bodhisattva, he should train himself in all of them, with two exceptions: those unsuitable for cultivation, and those expressly forbidden to be trained in by a beginning bodhisattva." These two clarifications aside, no transgression will result either from an incapacity to perform some practice. From the same text: <sup>214</sup>

"There is no transgression in this regard when you are performing one practice and unable to keep up another. As the *Teaching of Noble Akṣayamati* scripture [O 842] says, 'At the time of giving, there may be indifferant observance of morality...' And the *Scripture of the Ten Stages* <sup>215</sup> says, 'Do not relax: Even if the remaining practices cannot be performed, do them as well as you suitably can.'"

When training yourself in those trainings, there are two criteria for

transgression. (1) To produce complete pleasure and happiness, and to placate all pain and unhappiness for all sentient beings requires steady, heartfelt application of body, speech, and mind. To neglect it, failing to sustain the effort, is a matter of transgression. To neglect it even for a single moment is the same. Even if your effort is sustained, failure to seek and to establish a favorable environment for it, and failure (39a) to take measures to remedy conditions contradictory to that effort, is likewise a matter of transgression.

Neglecting to remedy major pain and unhappiness for fear of relatively minor forms of them, and reluctance to forego a minor goal in favor of a major one--even for a single moment!--is a matter of transgression.

There is no offense in not performing a practice of which you are incapable--for in this case, no training is prescribed for you and the requirement does not exist. If you do make an effort in regard to it and transgression should ensue, the transgression may be included in the general confession of misdeeds--an express confession is not necessary for you to be absolved of it.

To fail to attempt practices of which you are capable is a fault. Incidentally, this is taught to be reprehensible by nature: It would seem to be included among the set [of misdeeds] that are undertaken in full awareness.<sup>216</sup>

(2) The second criterion for transgression involves two sorts of bodhisattva transgression in its turn: Briefly, they are (2.1) the transgression of proceeding without examination and (2.2) the transgression of examining the matter but then being beyond propriety.

(2.1) To undertake a deed of which you are capable, or not to undertake it, or to be indifferent to it, without having examined the right and wrong of it, is a transgression.

(2.2) To examine the right and wrong of the deed and then be beyond propriety, acting perversely in regard to whether or not you should do it or not or to be indifferent, being beyond the scorn of anyone down to the servant of the lowest untouchable--is a matter of transgression.

Such are the generalities of training implicit in the *SS*.

The things fit to be done and not to be done are summarized<sup>217</sup> in the *TV*:

- (4) For others, as for oneself, (39b)  
 What is painful may be beneficial;  
 Do beneficial, pleasant things  
 But not the pleasant, if not beneficial.

Here "beneficial" refers to a result that is pleasant in future because [its cause, the deed in question] is undefiled and unreprehensible. "Pleasant" indicates pleasurable feeling.

Limit yourself to what will achieve immediate pleasure and long-term benefit for yourself and others, and to what will not cause immediate pain and harm in the long run for yourself and others. Something beneficial for the future must be done despite any short-term suffering. For example, to block potential misbehavior may result in immediate unpleasantness. This is like strong, very distasteful medicine that appears harmful in the present but is resorted to ultimately because of its benefit for an illness.<sup>218</sup> Sexual misconduct, on the other hand, appears pleasurable in the short term, yet from it spreads great suffering in the future: One must block it as though it were a tasty rice pudding laced with poison.<sup>219</sup>

This should be considered in context of the *Bbh* discussion of the causes of welfare, benefit, and pleasure for oneself and others.<sup>220</sup>

221.2 Specific explanation. Six parts: transgressions to be avoided, how to guard the mind from them, the means to remedy failure, the intention behind declaring attachment to be a minor fault, the distinction between major and minor fault, and the causes for maintaining contact with well-being.

2232.1 Transgressions to be avoided. "Upon what sort of basis does transgression grow, and what categories of transgression does it produce?" As to the basis: The text states, And for all of these, it is understood that one is quite without fault in cases of a distraught mind, being hardpressed by a feeling of suffering, and not having undertaken the vow. So [transgression] requires a set of two factors: that the vow has been obtained and not relinquished, and a normal state of mind.<sup>221</sup>

As to the categories or factions of transgression: They are restricted (40a) to two. The old commentary to the *TV* says, "Hence there are

only two factions<sup>222</sup> of fault in the bodhisattva vow: those included among events that are 'grounds for defeat,' and those included among events that are misdeeds. This is dissimilar to the five classes of fault in the monk's vow." The new commentary and the *MMA*, furthermore, declare the "corpora" or "quora" of transgression to be "only two," and their reference is to none other than the sense of this text.<sup>223</sup>

Therefore the contention by some Tibetans and the explication by Kṛṣṇapāda that there are three species ("In the bodhisattva vow," they say, "one must guard against grounds for defeat, gross breath offenses, and misdeed offenses") is not tenable.<sup>224</sup> The only way to make it tenable would be to designate transgressions of lesser and medium outflow as gross breaches. But this text describes them as events that are "grounds for defeat" and misdeeds. That is to say, transgressions of lesser and medium outflow are misdeeds in essence, while their genus or category is the category of defeat. By analogy, [in the Vinaya] gross breaches and misdeeds in context of defeat are placed in the category of defeat.

So there are two parts to the transgressions to be avoided: the set of defeats and the set of misdeeds.

22321.1 The set of defeats. Five parts: the nature of individual defeats, their functioning, the division of three [degrees of] involvement, correction proper to each, and incidental causes for relinquishment [of the vow].

223211.1 The nature of individual defeats. Two parts: as presented in this text, and as presented in others.

2232111.1 As presented in this text. Accordingly, there are four events that function in likeness to [pratimokṣa] grounds for defeat<sup>225</sup> for a bodhisattva established in the vow. What are the four? There are two sets of features in their description: those that are shared [by all], and those that are particular [to each].

(40b) 22321111.1 Those that are shared. These will be described in context of distinguishing degrees of involvement [sec. 223211.1, 54a].

22321111.2 Particular features. There are four [defeats].

1. With a longing for gain and respect, to praise himself and depre-

cate another is the first event that is grounds for bodhisattva "defeat."

Three points to this: the target of the speech, what is said, and the motivation for speaking.<sup>226</sup>

1.1 The object. For it to be a defeat, these features must be present. [To begin with,] there must be a creature of the same species as yourself [i.e., a human being] who is, at the same time, a distinct [psycho-physical] continuum who cognizes the speech and understands the meaning--that is to say, he will get the message, even if it is not clear.

1.2 What is said. The speech involves your own good qualities and someone else's defects--and, moreover, praise of yourself and deprecation of someone else who has good qualities that are grounds for admiration by other creatures.

1.3 The motivation. Four points: the scale of the object of attachment, the gain and respect; the scale of the subject's attachment; distinguishing the objects, the gain and respect, that are to be obtained; and examining whether or not attachment to both gain and respect is required as motivation.

13.1 The scale of the gain and respect. There is, firstly, "gain": whatever may be gained, such as clothing, food, housing, and transport. Secondly, there is "respect": signs of respect such as throne and cushion.

13.2 The subject's attachment. This is not a worthy eagerness for gain and respect for the sake of worshipping the Precious Three and so forth, or an eagerness to dispel poverty stemming from sympathy for the lower classes, but a thirsty longing for fame and fortune for one's own sake.

13.3 Distinguishing the objects. In "gain," oneself and the wealth need be different. Were this not the case, "to praise oneself and deprecate another" would be pointless. In the case of respect, there need not be distinct wealth, because the eagerness is to have one's own retinue.

13.4 Whether or not both are required as motivation. One certainly (41a) needs an attachment to either gain or respect for the praise-condemnation pair to occur, but not both together.<sup>227</sup>

To speak either praise or deprecation with such motivation so as to be understood by someone else is the first "defeat."

It is the new commentary to the *TV* that explains "another" to be someone endowed with good qualities that are grounds for admiration by other creatures.<sup>228</sup> The [commentary] attributed to Samudra agrees with it in explaining "another" to be someone endowed with good qualities.

The explanation of the *Ākāśagarbha* scripture and the operation of this pair [of defeats] will be discussed further on.

"Gain and respect" and the attachment to them are glossed thus in the new commentary: "'Gain' is profit--clothing, food, and the like. 'Respect' is good service. 'Longing' is overattachment to them."<sup>229</sup> The [commentary] attributed to Samudra explains "gain" as varieties of food, clothing, valuables, and the like, "respect" as service such as bowing, attendance, throne and cushion.

2. While the goods exist in his possession, to coldheartedly fail to donate material things, because he has a nature of attachment to them, to those who are suffering and indigent, who have no protector and no recourse, who have approached in a proper manner; and, out of stinginess in doctrine, not to share doctrine with those who have approached in a proper manner eager for doctrine, is the second event that is grounds for bodhisattva "defeat."

Four points to this: the beggar, the thing begged, the object from whom it is begged, and with what sort of attitude it is not given.

2.1 The beggar. According to some commentaries, he is suffering from lack of money and so forth, indigent from lack of food,<sup>230</sup> with no protector to care for him as would an elder brother and no recourse for friendship or assistance. Briefly, he is poor in terms of these two types of good and has no one but the bodhisattva to relieve that poverty.

(41b) Furthermore, he comes before you properly, in sincerity and eagerness. The attribution to Samudra reads, "If the begging is obvious."<sup>231</sup>

2.2 The thing begged. It is nothing unsuitable, such as weapons, nor anything improper such as poison. Nor [may it be anything] that is harmful.<sup>232</sup>

2.3 The object from whom it is begged. "...while the goods exist in his possession." As the new commentary puts it, "when you have things to be given and are certain of the doctrine."<sup>233</sup>

2.4 Attitude. To decide not to give because you are overwhelmed by stingy avarice. The text applies "coldheartedly" to not giving material things, and "stingily" to not giving doctrine. But the new commentary, and the one attributed to Samudra, both explain it as the refusal, out of stinginess, of both goods and doctrine. The *TV* correctly takes this view as well. Some Tibetans say that your decision not to give is insufficient [for defeat]; you must also cut the hopes of the beggar. This is not substantiated by any Indian text, and misses the point.

3. The bodhisattva develops such involvement in anger that he cannot resolve it with the mere utterance of harsh words, but overwhelmed with anger strikes, hurts, damages sentient beings with hand, clump of earth, or club; while focusing on just that aggravated angry attitude he does not heed, he does not accept even the others' apology; he will not (42a) let loose that attitude. This is the third event that is grounds for bodhisattva "defeat."

Two points to this: his attitude in striking and its application.

3.1 Attitude. The bodhisattva, angered at someone, speaks harsh words and, failing to resolve his anger with only that, causes it to increase until he has been overwhelmed by it.

3.2 Application. Under its influence he strikes the other person with his actual body, or with something thrown by it or connected to it;<sup>234</sup> he hurts by throwing into prison and so forth; he damages by whipping, bondage, and the like.

The object--what type of creature among sentient beings--is unclear. It would seem, however, that we must understand it as a creature whose species corresponds to one's own [i.e., a human being], for it appears to be an object of harsh speech,<sup>235</sup> and the *SS* declares that striking those who break their moral code is a seminal transgression.<sup>236</sup>

Not accepting an apology.<sup>237</sup> Four points: the apologisee and the manner in which it is made, the motivation for and the essence of not accepting the apology.

The agent. According to the new commentary and Jinaputra, it is someone who does one an injury and makes amends by confessing his fault. Having previously done some injury to the bodhisattva, he now makes a sincere apology.

His manner. Properly and in good season he communicates a plea for forbearance.

Motivation. Vengefulness: focusing on just that aggravated angry attitude of anger at the prior injury.

Essence. You neither heed the words nor promise forbearance; you will not let that anger loose.<sup>238</sup>

4. To repudiate the bodhisattva collection and, on his own or echoing someone else, to devote himself to counterfeits of the good doctrine, (42b) and then to enjoy, show, and establish them, is the fourth event that is grounds for bodhisattva "defeat."

Two points to this: the Greater Vehicle that is a basis for rejection and the manner of rejecting it.

4.1 The basis for repudiation is the general corpus of works that is the bodhisattva collection, both the profound and the extensive.<sup>239</sup>

4.2 The manner of rejection is repudiation, as will appear below.

There are two points to be made as well in regard to showing something that resembles it. Firstly, what is to be shown: This is not clear from the other [commentaries]. The attribution to Samudra explains it as the teaching of limited scope or heterodox teachings.<sup>240</sup> Although these do bear a resemblance to the good doctrine, they are not specifically resemblances of the Greater Vehicle. So one should take it as everything that accords with evil doctrines. Secondly, the way of showing it: Enjoying it yourself, you teach it to others and initiate them into its philosophy.<sup>241</sup>

The mnemonic summary of these defeats appears in the *TV*:

(5) That which, developed from severe defilement,  
Functions as destruction of the vow,  
The four transgressions of it,  
Are considered similar to defeats.

(6) With attachment to gain and respect,  
Praising oneself and deprecating another;  
Stingily not giving doctrine and wealth  
To the suffering, [poor] and forsaken;

- (7) Heedless of another's confession,  
 Striking him out of anger;  
 Rejecting the Greater Vehicle,  
 And showing what appears like the good doctrine.

"Severe defilement" refers to "total involvement," the usage of which term is peculiar to bodhisattva vow.

Having been "done away with" (*\*parājitya*), one is routed by them from the vow and it is destroyed--hence, the term "defeat" (*pārājika*).<sup>242</sup>

These are "similar to defeats" (*\*pārājayika*), at least inasmuch as they cause failure in the vow. But they are not completely similar, for with the occurrence of defeat for the monk, he loses the obligation, but such is not the case here. Such is the explication of Bodhibhadra.<sup>243</sup>

(43a) Samudramegha explains that the bodhisattva's disgrace of himself and others out of craving for gain and respect corresponds to the auditor's disgrace of himself and someone else, and his subsequent loss of the opportunity [to live the religious life], by attachment to sexual intercourse.<sup>244</sup> The defeat of refusal to give doctrine and material things that one possesses corresponds to the auditor going down to defeat by greedily stealing someone else's property. The auditor is defeated by slaying a human being, while here one is defeated by generating enmity toward a sentient being and proceeding to do him harm with one's hand and so forth, and by failure to heed his apology for an injury. And the auditor is defeated by boasting that he has obtained doctrines when he has not, while here one is defeated by not showing what one has, and by denigrating the good doctrine and teaching what is not Dharma. Other commentaries also consider *prātimokṣa* defeats to correspond in number and in motivation.<sup>245</sup>

How they result in defeat. Some Tibetans say: "The text reads, 'four events that are "grounds for defeat," and the *TV* reads, 'four transgressions of it.' So there are only four; to make them eight is untenable." This system implies that each defeat comprises a set of two factors--praise-deprecation and so forth.<sup>246</sup>

Other Tibetans say that each unit--praise, deprecation, and so forth--results in a defeat, making eight, with the four auditor defeats making

a total of twelve. They claim to prove it with statements such as the following: "If praising oneself and deprecating someone else out of attachment to gain and respect, which relate to each other like sticks and oilcakes, result in [separate] defeats, then what need to mention copulation?" This is the hypothesis of Samudramegha, they say. But there is no hint of it in the *Bbh* commentary, while in the commentary to the Chapter on Ethics attributed to Samudramegha, what he says is, "If he is not attached to gain and respect etc., what need to mention his (43a) nonattachment to sexual intercourse and the like?" This does indeed teach us to prevent *prātimokṣa* defeats. But it does not demonstrate that they are defeats for the *bodhisattva*. Nor is there any indication of it in any single text of the *Kagyur* or *Tangyur*, which are the primary sources. Hence it is mere invention. <sup>247</sup>

The statement that the defeats are four is made in the face of attitude. So there are four defeats of (1) attachment to gain and respect, (2) stinginess in goods, (3) thoughts of harm toward sentient beings, and (4) the stupidity of abusing the doctrine. They are eight, on the other hand, in view of their application. So there are defeats of (1-2) praising oneself and deprecating another, (3-4) not giving doctrine and not giving wealth, (5-6) striking sentient beings and not accepting an apology, and (7-8) rejecting the good doctrine and teaching a semblance of the doctrine. By the same token, the *MMA* explains on the one hand that there are only four seminal transgressions in the *bodhisattva* collection, <sup>248</sup> and on the other hand states that "The four seminal transgressions, 'praising oneself and deprecating another' and the rest are each twofold: that is to say, they are eight."<sup>249</sup> In this text [the *Bbh*] praise-deprecation and the rest are promulgated separately as eight. And Samudramegha [=Jinaputra], in dealing with the second defeat, says, "Not to give to a beggar in distress, not to share the doctrine, will result in defeat," describing each unit as a defeat--and this pertains as well to the other three. Not only does Abhaya [in the *MMA*] make them eight; this appears also in the commentary to the *Sūtrasamuccaya* as clearly being eight defeats." <sup>250</sup> And the advisers of old of Śrī Dīpaṅkara's tradition [i.e., the Kadampa geshes] propose them to be eight. So I take the number of defeats to be eight.

(44a) The *SS* and the *TV*, in dealing with the third defeat, appear to include [both parts] in one, but this is a peculiarity of translation. The sense is to make two of it. For the old commentary to the *TV* explains it according to the *Bbh*,<sup>251</sup> and in the commentary to the *BCA* by Prajñā-karamati the translation of the lines in the seminal *SS* reads as follows:

Striking sentient beings out of anger and,  
While conscientiously enjoying it,  
Intolerant of sentient beings.<sup>252</sup>

Objection: "To define each unit as a defeat contradicts the promulgation of the same thing as a misdeed in 'Not giving to those who seek doctrine' [*TV* 10c], 'Not giving to those who seek wealth' [19a], 'Abuse in return for abuse, and so forth' [13a], 'Rejecting someone's excuses' [13c], 'Rejecting the Greater Vehicle' [16c], 'Application only to outside treatises' [16a], and 'Taking pleasure in that application' [16b]."

Response: There is no problem. The defeat of not giving doctrine and wealth requires stinginess as motivation, whereas both misdeeds [10c, 19a] lack stinginess as their motivation. The new commentary explains "not giving doctrine" [10c] in this way, going on to assert that "The others as well can be distinguished by dissimilarity of motivation."<sup>253</sup> In "returning blow for blow" [13a] there is the return of a blow, whereas the blow as a defeat is not envisaged as a response. Not accepting an apology is designated a misdeed [13c] and in this case has no vengefulness, whereas such is present in the defeat.

The difference between the misdeed and the defeat of rejecting the Greater Vehicle is presented thus in the commentary attributed to Samudra: "'Objection: What difference is there [between this misdeed, 16c] and 'rejecting the Greater Vehicle' as the above defeat?' Response: Above, the entire greater-vehicle collection was involved; here the repudiation involves a disinclination for limited, more profound portions of the scriptures." Nevertheless, the text makes clear that repudiation of the profound alone is not required [for a misdeed to result].

In the first misdeed formulated for application to heterodox texts [16a], to fail to apply oneself to buddhist scriptural tradition in which

you should be diligent, when you possess it, while applying yourself to heterodox texts, is a misdeed. In the second misdeed [16b], it is permissible for someone of sharp faculties whose ideas will not change, who makes double the application to buddhist scriptural tradition, to apply himself to heterodox texts, but it is not permissible when he enjoys it-- if he enjoys and is gratified by it, this is considered a misdeed. The defeat of teaching what appears like the good doctrine is not just a matter of one's own enjoyment: while taking a personal pleasure in it, you put it into practice, initiating others into it as well. So Samudramegha states:<sup>254</sup> "[The auditor goes to defeat by announcing the obtainment of doctrines he does not possess. The bodhisattva] goes to defeat by [not teaching what he has, by repudiating the good doctrine, and] by teaching what is not the good doctrine. He 'enjoys it' because it is his desire to act so. He 'shows it' by teaching it to others in accord with that enjoyment. He 'establishes it' by initiating them into it in terms of practice."

Objection: "Why is 'praising oneself and deprecating another' designated a misdeed [at 16d]?" This differs in motivation [from the corresponding defeat], as will be shown [at 80a] below.

Do not try to avoid contradiction by distinguishing them in terms of lack of shame, embarrassment and the like. To do so is untenable, because these must be cases not of defeat [versus misdeed], but of lesser or medium outflow [of "defeat" actions themselves].

2232111.2 [The nature of individual defeats] as presented in other texts. The *SS* has "seminal transgressions."

Master Bodhibhadra claims (1) to prove that the seminal transgressions formulated by the *Ākāśagarbha* scripture are not seminal transgressions, (45a) and (2) that it would be detrimental if they were.<sup>255</sup> (1) His proof. They are not cause for destruction of a vow that has been obtained. That very scripture declares them to be causes for undercutting good roots planted previous to having taken the vow, the good fortune of divine and pleasant states of rebirth; it says, "Possessed of those five seminal transgressions, the anointed ruler destroys all the good roots he has previously planted and is defeated, [falling] from divine and human

well-being and going to a lower state of rebirth." (2) The detriment. If these transgressions of the vow-taking were also defeats, in the sense of being causes for destruction of the vow, then the *Bbh*, as the code for the bodhisattva collection,<sup>256</sup> would have reason to add, "A bodhisattva who possesses the vow will relinquish it with the occurrence of any one of these defeat-transgressions: What need to mention the occurrence of all?" But this is not stated. Furthermore, [if these transgressions were defeats of the vow, then] since [the scripture] speaks of five seminal transgressions for the ruler and eight for the beginner, it would be appropriate to distinguish different vows for ruler and beginner, so that each could have personalized seminal transgressions. But there is not the slightest hint of such distinction.

Such is the opinion of Bodhibhadra. In my opinion, it is not tenable. To take the scripture literally would mean that the five of the ruler do not function as seminal transgressions for the beginner, nor do the eight of the beginner function as seminal transgressions for the ruler. But we cannot hold that these two groups have different vows.

Master Abhaya, in resolving the discrepancies between the *AG* and the *Bbh* and their different seminal transgressions, makes distinctions among the transgressions, namely, "Five, eight, and four for medium, lesser, and greater personalities" (*MMA* 89a.2-3). "However," he adds, "for any particular personality there may be other transgressions as well" (89a.3). In other words, the five promulgated for the ruler apply to a medium personality, the eight promulgated for the beginner apply to a lesser personality, and the four promulgated in the *Bbh* apply to a greater personality. He nonetheless proposes to establish other transgressions as well for each of those personalities.

[*MMA* 89a.8-90a.8] "Objection: If such were the case, there would be seventeen downfalls for each of three personalities. The first of those of the *Bbh* is promulgated in the *AG* scripture as well; so together they make fourteen [sic], the remaining middle two of the *Bbh*, plus the last--teaching a resemblance of the good doctrine--make seventeen seminal transgressions.' Response: The four promulgated in the *Bbh* include the others; there are no seminal transgressions not included in those four."

How he collects them. "The set of eight--praising oneself and so forth--are the collecting agents. Those that appear in the *AG* scripture are collected, but not counting twice those among them that are also collecting agents: rejecting the Greater Vehicle and praising oneself and deprecating someone else for the sake of gain and respect. Those [thirteen], plus relinquishing the thought of awakening as promulgated in the *Skill in Means* scripture, make fourteen seminal transgression.

"How are they collected? Rejecting *prātimokṣa* [beginner's no. 3], holding that desire-attachment etc. will not be eliminated by the auditors' vehicle [beg. 4], and declaring falsely that one has obtained acceptance of the profound meaning [beg. 6], are all three included within 'praising oneself and deprecating another' [*Bbh* 1=beg. 5], because to praise the Greater Vehicle on the grounds that it belongs only to oneself, the bodhisattva, deprecating the lesser vehicle, and to make a false declaration, constitute praise of one's own personality type and deprecation of someone else's.

"Stealing the property of the Precious Three [ruler's 1], stealing robes [ruler's 3], and causing a levy of fines etc. upon the religious [beg. 7]--these three--as well as giving the property of those in retreat to those who only recite texts [beg. 8] are included within 'stingily not giving wealth' [*Bbh* 2=beg. 16], because to steal someone else's things for oneself because one is unable to bear his enjoyment of them, an attachment with intense stinginess, constitutes stinginess for certain personality types, as does causing them to be given away, [a transgression] for the taker as well as for the donor.

"Causing dissension within the monastic community [ruler's 4] and (46a) causing someone to abandon calming meditation [beg. 8] are included within 'stingily not giving doctrine' [*Bbh* 2=beg. 16], because in the former case one is unable to bear their prosperity in doctrine, a stinginess stemming from attachment to doctrine, and in the latter case one neither teaches nor allows someone else to teach out of intense meanness.

"Striking those who are immoral, etc. [ruler's 3], the other four of the [five] immediates [ruler's 4], and destruction of villages etc. [minister's 2] are included within 'striking sentient beings' [*Bbh* 3=beg. 17].

"Rejecting doctrines of the auditors and independent buddhas [ruler's 2], describing emptiness to those whose intellects are unprepared [beg. 7], and abandonment of the thought of awakening [beg. 15=the seminal transgression of the *Skill in Means* scripture] are included within 'rejecting the Greater Vehicle' [*Bbh* 4], because the vehicle of the auditors and independent buddhas is taught in the Greater Vehicle, and rejecting it, both are rejected; and for the unprepared intellect to reject emptiness would be one's own doing; and, finally, the thought of awakening is itself the Greater Vehicle.

"Holding to wrong view and engaging oneself and others in the ten unwholesome courses of action [ruler's 5], and diverting someone into the lesser vehicle [when he has been proceeding toward full awakening [beg. 2] are included within 'teaching what appears like the good doctrine' [*Bbh* 4=beg. 18], because in relation to the Greater Vehicle, the other two vehicles are only apparently the good doctrine."

Such is the thesis [of Abhayākara-gupta].

Some Tibetans say that individual scriptures are addressed to various sorts of disciple, and differing ceremonies are therefore to be followed. According to this view, if you take [the vow] with the ceremony expounded in the *SS* and the *BCA* you follow the system of seminal transgressions explained in the *AG* scripture, whereas if you take it with the ceremony expounded in the *Bbh* you follow the seminal transgressions explained there. And some define [the two systems] as creations of the differing Mādhyamika and Cittamātra schools.<sup>257</sup>

That system of the new commentary<sup>258</sup> is not regarded as tenable in this regard, for it would appear to contradict the system of Śāntideva, that great chariot who constitutes a standard of knowledge for commentary on the meaning of the scriptures.

Objection: "According to that master, are those rulers and beginners possessors of the bodhisattva vow or not? If they are, how can there be (46b) five [transgressions] for a ruler and a separate eight for a beginner? This is untenable. If they are not vow-possessors, why are transgressions legislated for them at all? They would be irrelevant: Are those offenses not faults of a vow-possessor?"<sup>259</sup>

Response: To project his response to your question, certain transgressions are designated by the name of those in whom they tend to occur, as a warning. They function as transgressions for everyone; to call them mutually exclusive has to contradict their exposition. Because of their magnitude as deeds that are naturally reprehensible, they undercut the opportunity and the good roots even of someone who has not taken the vow. For a vow-holder their effect is still greater. This is what he would say. In light of it, to say that they cut good roots that predate the taking of the vow, but do not cut the vow itself, certainly contradicts the exposition of them.

Objection: "If these were considered seminal transgressions, they would have to be expounded in the *Bbh*. But it is not certain that they are. If you ascertain that they are, furnish your evidence. If they [were seminal transgressions, but] were not taught there, a problem would occur. Practicing trainees would only know of four seminal transgressions. As they practiced, their vow would be conquered by other seminal transgressions of which they were unaware. They would not know the boundaries to be guarded."

Response: On the contrary! If they were not seminal transgressions, the *Bbh* would have to remove the suspicion by saying so, because one might hold something that is not a seminal transgression to be a seminal transgression, holding something that is not destructive of the vow to be destructive of the vow. Thus one would not know the boundaries to be guarded!

The guidelines laid down in the *AG* scripture are not mentioned here in the *Bbh*, while the misdeed-guidelines taught here are not mentioned in the *SS*. There is no set rule that they must explain all the trainings, which is why both the *Bbh* and the *SS* say that one must look into the scriptures.

Abhayākara proposes that those expounded in the *SS* are seminal transgressions. This is correct, but his recommendations for collecting them (47a) apparently fail to win the confidence of most readers. Collecting them in that way, the divisions upon which the particular characteristics are based, are collected by generalities which are themselves suffused

by the particulars. This is implausible, because most [of the particulars] would be left over.<sup>260</sup>

Some Tibetans suggest that a vow-holder in the system of the *SS* is best forbidden to answer questions as to whether individual transgressions are irrelevant as guidelines.

Comments of the following sort should be avoided, as contradictory to the teachings: that in the *Sūtra-samuccaya* commentary,<sup>261</sup> the five transgressions of a ruler are not characterized as seminal transgressions and the eight of a beginner are; that the systems of masters Nāgārjuna and Asanga are incompatible; that in the *SS*, transgressions are mingled at random. The fact is that the scriptures promulgate the seminal transgressions and master Śāntideva, in explicating the sense of those scriptures, also comments upon the seminal transgressions. In particular, he combines the senses of the *AG* scripture and the *Bbh*. The two systems should be blended precisely because his exposition of them is authoritative.

In the *SS*--the old translation<sup>262</sup>--we read: "The seminal transgressions are easily grasped and remembered; these summary verses should be recited as a unified theory."<sup>263</sup> In the new translation,<sup>264</sup> this appears as: "These summary verses should be recited in order to establish a certain system!"<sup>265</sup> The sense of the former is clearly the combining of both systems in one. In the latter, "a certain" alludes to noble Asanga: the sense is, "to establish or lay out his system."

These are taught to be seminal transgressions in the great commentary to the *BCA*;<sup>266</sup> and the commentary by \*Kṣemadeva says:<sup>267</sup>

The *Ākāśagarbha* scripture

Should be considered first of all:

Examine the seminal transgressions.

(47b) "Seminal transgressions," he goes on, "which are the 'transgression' sort of misdeed that destroy the vow, are expounded in the *AG* scripture. Consult them there." The commentary by Vairocanarakṣita [O 5277] agrees with this. So they should unquestionably be taken as seminal transgressions.

The verses that summarize the seminal transgressions are as follows in the *SS*:<sup>268</sup>

<u>SS list</u>	<u>AG list</u>	<u>Verse</u>
1	ruler's 1	(1) Stealing property of the Precious Three Is defined a defeat-transgression;
2	2	Rejection of the good doctrine Is declared by the <i>muni</i> as second.
3	3	(2) Disrobing and striking a monk, Even if he is immoral, Throwing him into prison, Casting him out of monastic life;
4	4	(3) Committing the five immediates;
5	5	Holding to false view;
6	minister's 2	To destroy a village and so forth; The Jina calls seminal transgressions.
7	beginner's 1	(4) Describing emptiness to sentient beings Whose minds are unprepared;
8	2	Diverting from full awakening Those proceeding toward buddhahood;
9	3	(5) Rejecting <i>prātimokṣa</i> In favor of the great vehicle;
10	4	To hold that the pupils' vehicle Will not eliminate defilements;
11	5	(6) Describing one's own good qualities For the understanding of others, While deprecating someone else For gain, respect, and reputation;
12	6	(7) To say, "I have attained acceptance of the profound," Thus telling an untruth;
13	7	To cause the levy of fines upon the religious (Generosity at the expense of the Precious Three)
		(8) And appropriating the donations;

- 14                    8                    Causing abandonment of calming meditation  
(48a) And giving the property of those in retreat  
To those who only recite texts.
- (9) These are the seminal transgressions,  
Causes of the great hell for sentient beings;  
Confess them to noble Ākāśagarbha,  
Standing before him in a dream.
- 15 *Skill in Means*    (10) Relinquishing the thought of awakening;  
16                    *Bbh* 2                    Refusing to give to a mendicant  
With unconscionable attachment and stingi-  
ness;
- 17                    3                    Striking sentient beings out of anger
- (11) While conscientiously enjoying it,  
Intolerant of sentient beings;<sup>269</sup>
- 18                    4                    Out of defilement, conforming to someone  
else  
To speak a counterfeit of the doctrine.

How to interpret them. 1. The defeat of stealing property of the Precious Three. Six parts to this.

1.1 The owner of the objects. The scripture only says,<sup>270</sup> "a shrine the local community, and the broader community." The Precious Three is meant, since "a shrine" stands for both Buddha and Doctrine. "Doctrine" would refer to canonical texts or personal discovery.<sup>271</sup> The "local community" is divided into seven [prātimokṣa] classes, while the "broader community" is not divided into classes. Beyond that, four or more monks form a community where ordinary persons are concerned, while each "noble one" constitutes a personal community.<sup>272</sup>

The phrase "Precious Three" is glossed as "the actual Buddha, the path of cessation without outflows, and the noble disciples" in other texts. But it will not hold in this case, as is clear from the above statement, "a shrine... and the broader community."<sup>273</sup>

Just because it says, "To steal objects belonging to a shrine, or...of-ferings belonging to the local community<sup>274</sup> the broader community,"

does not mean that all the Precious Three must own the objects; any one [will suffice for this to be a seminal transgression].

1.2 The objects that are taken. No information appears on this, so (48b) they may be understood as shelter such as huts, comestibles, conveyance, and the like. No information appears on the size of the things either, and it would be difficult to indicate the magnitude of the action by which the result [of defeat] is obtained. So these may be understood as taking that amount of something counted as a requisite beyond the minimum required for it to be considered the "taking of what has not been freely given" course of action.<sup>275</sup>

The phrase "belonging to the local community" shows that whether or not anyone specific seems to be responsible for the objects, they are deemed to belong to one of the Precious Three by virtue of having been dedicated to them.

1.3 The basis, or thief. When stealing within the community, you are not a part of its ranks.<sup>276</sup>

1.4 His attitude. Two points. 14.1 His conception. Inasmuch as it is engaged in a specific motivation, [his conception] must be unerring. Inasmuch as it is engaged in a general motivation, it must possess the unmistakable<sup>277</sup> aspect [of mind] that is beyond ambiguity, because the general texts on stealing state that stealing by mistake does not result in that [sinful] course of action. 14.2 His motivation. He thinks, "This belongs to the Precious Three and not to me, but I simply must deprive them of it." Circumstances in which it might possibly be without transgression, as in stealing for someone else's sake with a merciful, etc. attitude, will be discussed below. In this regard, something that is a transgression for one vow might be permissible for another vow, but to say that a specific vow contains permission for its own seminal transgressions, is absurd.<sup>278</sup> So for now, let us say that he must be stealing for his own sake, or that he has a defiled motivation.

Some [commentators] suggest that desire-attachment must be [his motivation], but it is not necessarily so.

1.5 The application. The phrase "to steal or cause someone to steal" seems to indicate both his own action and commissioning someone else.

There is a further distinction to be made between clandestine, unnoticed theft and robbery by force; the old translation reads "robbery-theft" of the Precious Three.<sup>279</sup>

1.6 The extent of the stealing depends on his ambition.

(49a) Incidentally, there are three defeats of stealing buddhist property in this list.<sup>280</sup>

2. The defeat of rejecting the good doctrine. Two points.

2.1 The good doctrine that is rejected. "The second seminal transgression is to reject and cause someone to deny teachings for the deliverance of the auditor, teachings for the deliverance of the independent buddha, or teachings for the deliverance of the Greater Vehicle." The word "or" shows that any scripture of the three vehicles is intended, because they have been promulgated so as to provide a selection. Beyond that, "Greater Vehicle" refers to scriptures teaching the profound plus scriptures teaching the extensive, as will be seen when "Rejecting the Greater Vehicle" [TV 16c] is glossed as the misdeed of rejecting either side of the Greater Vehicle: the profound meaning [of emptiness] or the literal truth of the might [of the buddhas and bodhisattvas]. For I submit that the *Bbh* [discussion of the misdeed] is analagous to [the discussion] here of the defeat of rejecting the Greater Vehicle. Likewise, "deliverance of the auditor" refers to such things as teachings of the four truths, and "deliverance of the independent buddha" to such things as the twelve links of dependent [origination]--the lesser-vehicle corpus [of doctrine].<sup>281</sup>

Objection: "Does this imply that to reject even a portion of their topics results in a misdeed, as is the case with the Greater Vehicle? If that were the case, rejecting a portion of the topics of greater-vehicle scriptures would be a misdeed, whereas rejecting teachings for the deliverance of the auditors and independent buddhas would be a defeat. This is absurd, since the former rejection is more reprehensible than the latter."

Response: There is no problem. Whether dealing with the higher or the lower vows, something more reprehensible has a higher designation as transgression, and something less reprehensible has a lesser designation.

In context of *prātimokṣa*, for example, to slay a common person is a defeat, and to draw blood from a *tathāgata* with the thought of causing his death is a gross breach [bordering on defeat].<sup>282</sup> In the Greater Vehicle (49b) cle as well, to steal the wealth of a common layperson is not designated a defeat, and to stingily fail to give one's wealth to a mendicant in distress is designated a defeat.

How it is rejected. In the *SS* and the *Sūtra-samuccaya* [of *Ratnākaraśānti*], the phrase "reject and cause [someone] to deny" [as it appears in the *AG*], reads "reject and deny the scriptures."<sup>283</sup> The *Bbh* only mentions rejection of the Greater Vehicle, not causing someone else to reject it. For these two reasons I propose that causing someone else to reject it is not a necessary factor. How you yourself reject it, therefore, is by repudiation, saying, "This has not been promulgated by the *Tathāgata*."

Objection: "'Rejecting the auditors' vehicle' [*TV* 15c] is explained to be a misdeed. Is this not a contradiction?" Response: This is not the same sort of rejection, but only discounting, as will be explained.<sup>284</sup>

Incidentally, rejecting the Greater Vehicle etc. has three [applications].<sup>285</sup>

3. The defeat of injuring a monastic. Two points.

3.1 The injured object. The scripture says, "Someone who has become a monastic, following the Buddha, whether or not he keeps the bases of training, and whether he be moral or immoral." The verse [3a above] has the term "even if," pointing to "only" an immoral monk.

(However the injury is done, it is motivated by an intent to do harm and injury to that object--that is to say, done with a defiled intention.)

3.2 Application. One steals his saffron robes and casts him out of the monastic life, in some way forcing him to dwell as a layperson. To inflict corporal punishment, cast him into prison, and deprive him of life are also mentioned in connection with this seminal transgression. These are to be included within the defeat of striking, hurting, and damaging [*Bbh* 3=*SS* 17].

As holders of monastic vows and owners of the stolen saffron robes, a quorum of four monks is not necessary. If there is a quorum of four, the first seminal transgression will ensue.

Incidentally, stealing saffron robes and casting out of the monastic life are two defeats. <sup>286</sup>

4. The defeat of committing the immediates. This constitutes five seminal transgressions of immediate [karmic retribution]: the slaying of mother, father, and arhat, sowing dissension in the community, and with an evil mind shedding the blood of a tathagāta. Four of them, apart from dissension, are included by the fifth defeat of the *Bbh*. <sup>287</sup>

5. The defeat of holding to false view. This constitutes repudiation, thinking that there is no such thing as activity (*karma*) and result, no past and future lives. Your good roots are cut by only this, so undertaking the ten unwholesome [courses of action] and causing others to undertake them are not necessary factors.

6. The defeat of destroying habitation. Two points. 6.1 The habitation destroyed: village, city, district, or country. (The motivation for causing this destruction is the defiled intention of destroying them.) 6.2 Application. Destruction, by whatever means.

The first five, according to their citation in the *Sūtra-samuccaya* commentary [321b.7f], are transgressions of a king; the sixth is the second of a minister, and [the remainder of] the five up to and including the immediates belong to the minister as well. This is also found in the scripture.

If this seminal transgression were a matter of conquering the sentient beings to be found within villages and so forth, it would be included within the defeat of striking, etc. [no. 3]. Were it a matter of conquering the goods found in them, it would be included within the first or the thirteenth defeat. So this is a matter of destroying habitation.

Incidentally, there are four seminal transgressions of conquering villages and the like. <sup>288</sup>

7. The defeat of explaining profundity to someone who is not a proper vessel. Three points.

7.1 The object who is taught: a sentient being who is seriously under- (50b) prepared, who will tremble if taught emptiness, and who has already generated the thought of full awakening.

7.2 What is taught: emptiness with no fabrication whatsoever.

7.3 What comes of the teaching. Being taught emptiness in that way, he trembles and turns away from the thought of full awakening, generating a lesser-vehicle thought of awakening.

My thinking is that this refers to an untried vessel. When a vessel has been tried and is aware of his fitness, is it a different matter? Is a defeat created then?

8. The defeat of leading someone away from the Greater Vehicle. Two points.

8.1 The person misdirected: someone proceeding toward buddhahood, who has generated the thought of full awakening and then entered the Greater Vehicle.

8.2 How he is misdirected: by saying, "You are incapable of coursing in the six perfections. You cannot attain buddhahood. So generate the thought of the vehicle of the auditors and independent buddhas, and you will be delivered from saṃsara."

Does misdirecting suffice by itself, or is it necessary that he be misled? According to the great commentary to the *BCA*,<sup>289</sup> it is apparently necessary that he be misled. It reads, "The second [seminal transgression for a beginning bodhisattva] is to lead someone away from supreme, right, and full awakening that is conjoined with skill in means, and to cause him to generate a thought of something found in the lesser vehicle."

9. The defeat of rejecting prātimokṣa. Two points.

9.1 The object who is made to understand: someone astutely training<sup>290</sup> in prātimokṣa and the ethics of the disciplinary code.

9.2 He is made to understand by telling him that he will be purified by only generating the thought and reciting the Greater Vehicle. One says, "Why should you keep pure the ethics of monastic discipline? Generate the thought of full awakening and read the Greater Vehicle, and all misbehavior of body, speech, and mind that has developed because of defilement will be purified."

The old translation [of the *SS*] has, "Turn away from prātimokṣa and (51a) the generation of the thought, and apply yourself to reciting the Greater Vehicle." The version that appears in the new translation and in

the *AG* scripture is correct, however, for the great commentary to the *BCA* declares,<sup>291</sup> "The third comes from teaching someone else to reject the vow of *prātimokṣa* training and to purify himself only by generating the thought of and reciting the Greater Vehicle."

Objection: "Why then is it said to be a misdeed to divert someone [from the lesser vehicle] by saying, 'The bodhisattva should not train himself in the vehicle of the auditors?'"<sup>292</sup> Response: Obviously, the misdeed involves only making him understand; for the defeat, it is necessary to mislead him while misdirecting.

10. The defeat of repudiating the auditors' vehicle. Two points.

10.1 The repudiated object. "The pupils' vehicle" [§S v. 5c] is the vehicle of the disciples--that is to say, the auditors' vehicle. That of the independent jinas is similar, however, so it may be taken as either of the two, or the two in general.

10.2 How it is repudiated. To repudiate it sincerely, saying, "However much you may train yourself in those vehicles, you will not be able to put an end to, or entirely eliminate defilement."

The scripture has one say, "Do not listen to discussions of the auditors' vehicle. Do not impart it to others. Defeat such discussion," and "Have faith only in discussions of the Greater Vehicle..." Nevertheless, this is not a necessary factor. For the scripture states, "When he speaks thus, his object, by merely listening to it and taking a similar view, incurs a seminal transgression for himself as well." Hence "For the understanding of others" [§S v. 6b] is not considered a factor here.

The object, it is explained, may also incur a seminal transgression. This is also the case in the seventh and eighth seminal transgressions. If the object is a vow-holder he may incur the seminal transgression of abandoning the thought of awakening. This one being taught further on, however [§S v. 10a], it is not counted a seminal transgression among these.

(51b) This defeat, and the second defeat that involves rejection of auditor and independent-buddha doctrines [no. 9 above], are dissimilar. The previous one is a matter of canonical texts, this one of personal discovery. The former constitutes rejection that says, "This was not

promulgated by the Jina"; this one constitutes rejection that says, "You cannot cut the root of renewed existence and extricate yourself from samsara."

11. The defeat of praising oneself and deprecating another. Four points.

11.1 The object or target of address. The *SS* citation reads, "And, by reason of envy of the prostrations done them, they praise themselves..." These are the persons whom he wishes to be the target of deprecation. "And" appears to mean "While making someone the object of deprecation they praise and deprecate, besides which, [by reason of envy of... them...]" Hence the person deprecated [is the one to whom the praise and deprecation are addressed].

"The prostrations done them" does not appear in the former translations of the scripture, but it clearly should be there.

11.2 What is spoken? He describes his own good qualities and disparages the other's.

11.3 How he describes them. For the sake of gain and respect, and for the sake of his reputation, he reads, recites, teaches, etc. the Greater Vehicle, meanwhile speaking with "forked tongue," saying, "Though I care not for such things as gain and respect, I am greater-vehicle and the other is not."

Self-praise is formulated summarily as "reporting the possession of superhuman doctrines." The following item deals with superhuman doctrines, but not with self-praise. Therefore, only this item and the two preceding it are characterizable as the self-praise set.

11.4 Motivation. Under the sway of attachment to gain and respect, he envies someone else his enjoyment of them. The scripture names four things that occasion his speaking under the influence of envy.<sup>293</sup>

Master Śāntideva, in citing the defeats taught in the *Bbh* [*SS* v. 10b-11d], does not cite the first. This indicates, I submit, that it [*Bbh* no. 1] is identical in sense to the defeat taught here. My thinking is that it seems necessary to take the explanation here in accordance with the (52a) *Bḥ* version. But if we take things according to the interpretation of terms in the *Bbh*, must we also cite from the *Bbh* those not included here?

In any case, it is sufficient to have praise and deprecation separately, plus attachment to either gain or respect, as explained above.<sup>294</sup>

What truth is there in the praise and deprecation? The scripture puts it succinctly as, "to speak with forked tongue."<sup>295</sup> And in the summary, we read,<sup>296</sup> "by reason of the falsity a very great fall occurs." This point is not addressed in the [commentary] attributed to Samudra, which reads, "describing good qualities and flaws." In the new commentary, we read,<sup>297</sup> "'Praising': he praises and wrongly praises his own genuine good qualities." The latter set of terms would appear to address the question of how much truth there is [to his praise]. According to the former set, however, it seems we must take the sense of the latter to be "superior and inferior" good qualities, and the sense of the former to be "speaking falsely."<sup>298</sup>

12. The defeat of false claim to superhuman doctrines. Two points.

12.1 The object of the speech is a person who understands the meaning.

12.2 How it is spoken. Having taught the doctrine of emptiness, he adds, "This I have made evident to myself. I teach it to you out of mercy, but you must cultivate it in the same way until it becomes evident and you become like myself." While having made no such personal discovery, he makes the false claim--the sense of which must be understood by the other person--with an attitude conjoined with defilement (but not including envy).

Incidentally, the basis for this is a possessor of the bodhisattva vow. If he is also a monk, there is a chance for both defeats to occur.<sup>299</sup>

The great commentary to the *BCA* suggests that this seminal transgression comes from teaching that one has discovered the profound doctrine merely by reading, and instigating others to do the same. This seems inconsistent with the scripture.<sup>300</sup>

(52b) The defeat of taking sacred property. Here advisers, ministers, etc., depending upon the rulers [for their authority], levy fines upon the religious. In doing so they cause the theft of requisites belonging to individuals, the local community, the broader community, or a shrine, which are then presented to them as bribes. And they present them to the rulers. Both king and ministers, etc. incur a seminal transgression.

As a seminal transgression of punishing the religious, this would be included with seminal transgression number three. As a seminal transgression of taking the wealth of the Precious Three, it would be included in seminal transgression number one. Therefore, this is a seminal transgression of taking what is given. Seminal transgression number one involves theft by oneself or instigating someone else [to steal]. In this case, the transgression is [for a minister] to levy a fine upon someone else, thereby stealing, or [in the case of a ruler] to accept property that someone was made to steal.<sup>301</sup>

As to the property of "individuals": This refers, in particular, to that of one, two, or three persons such as monks. More than that, as has been explained above, [constitutes the "community"].

14. The defeat of legislating bad laws and so forth. Two points.

14.1 The object of the bad legislation: monks who practice the doctrine.

14.2 What sort of laws are legislated. Laws are legislated for them which result in their neglect of calming meditation with sympathetic attitude and of insight meditation with corresponding attentiveness.

They steal the goods of those in retreat. Four points to this. (1) The owners of the objects: monks who are diligent in renunciation. Were the owner a noble and the objects community property, this defeat would become seminal transgression number one. So they are not nobles, nor is it a matter of goods that belong to those four.<sup>302</sup> (2) Attitude: an attitude of hatred towards them. (3) Application: taking their things, one gives them to reciters.

According to the scriptures, both parties incur a seminal transgression. The two parties are the rulers and the monks who utter insults that alienate them. To call this a seminal transgression for the reciters contradicts the scripture.<sup>303</sup>

"These are" is added to the end of the latter set of eight transgressions [SS v. 9a], as though to say, "These are the eight beginners' transgressions formulated in the scripture." "For sentient beings" shows their disadvantage. "In a dream" indicates the means to rise from downfall, according to the SS.

Objection: "If a seminal transgression has developed, 'the vow should be taken again' [TV 8a]. Is this unnecessary? Can one arise [from a downfall] by confession [as the *AG* implies?]" Response: By confession as presented in the scripture<sup>304</sup> one can avoid going to a lower state of rebirth. But for its restoration, the vow must be [re-] taken. This is not mentioned in the present context, where the *SS* cites the *Skill in Means* scripture [on transgression], because it will be made known in another context [*SS* ch. 8], when it is explained that when a seminal transgression has occurred, it can be corrected.

In the other system [that of the *SS*], it is taught that one can arise by confession when the downfall is "confessable." A confessable transgression is one in which the factors shared by all these transgressions, the "factors of greater involvement," are incomplete. These are transgressions of lesser and medium involvement belonging to the defeat category, as will be explained below [sec. 223211.3, 54af].

"Relinquishing the thought of awakening" [*SS* v. 10a] means giving up the aspiration [to reach buddhahood]. This is the seminal transgression promulgated by the *Skill in Means* scripture.<sup>305</sup> As precondition for this seminal transgression, one must possess the bodhisattva vow. In the initial moment of giving up the thought one still has the vow; from the second moment onward the vow has been relinquished. But once having relinquished [the thought of awakening], one is a non-bodhisattva.<sup>306</sup> The production of wrong view [*SS* no. 5] should be understood in the same way. In both these cases the very occurrence results in a seminal transgression, so we need not address the question of whether they have the shared factors of greater involvement, as we must and shall for the others.

"Attachment and stinginess" [*SS* v. 10c] are two factors;<sup>307</sup> they show (1) the failure to give doctrine and (2) the failure to give wealth to a mendicant. "Conscientiously" [11a] makes a third factor, but with the peculiarity that has already been discussed.<sup>308</sup>

"Out of defilement" [11c], which is the first factor [of no. 18], appears as "with defilement, following someone else" in a translation cited by the *MMA* [88b.6]. This is correct, for in the *Bbh* this appears as "on

his own or echoing someone else, to devote himself to counterfeits of the good doctrine." <sup>309</sup> To put it as "He speaks a counterfeit of the good doctrine out of defilement" indicates that it is done out of his own unskilful attention, whereas to put it as "He speaks a counterfeit of the doctrine following someone else" indicates that he is straying after someone else's lead.

223211.2 The functioning or disadvantage of defeat. Should he commit<sup>310</sup> any or one of these events that are grounds for "defeat"--not to mention committing them all--his opportunity to gather and grasp the vast resources that he needs for awakening will disappear for the present. In this life<sup>311</sup> there is no opportunity for a purified intention. He is a counterfeit, not a genuine bodhisattva.

In the explanation of Guṇaprabha, "gather" means "to increase," and "grasp" means "to produce." The other commentaries interpret them as being powerless to gather the resources that are proximate to achievement of the [ten bodhisattva] stages. <sup>312</sup> "Purified intention" is explained by all the commentaries as referring to attainment of the stages--that is to say, the first stage. <sup>313</sup>

Briefly, if even a single defeat has occurred it is impossible to attain the first stage in the same lifetime, and you lose the opportunity to increase the vast resources which you previously possessed that are the (54a) proximate cause of it, and to produce those you have not previously possessed. What need to mention the repeated occurrence of defeat? So do not think, "Even if a defeat should occur, I can still retake the bodhisattva vow." Dedicate your life to never being infected by a seminal transgression. The *BCA* says [4:11]:

So between the power of the transgression,  
And the power of the awakening thought,  
He oscillates in samsara, long delayed  
From attainment of the [first bodhisattva] stage.

Only the four defeats appear in this text, so the functioning of those, formulated in the *SS* must be extrapolated from it. But the *AG* scripture also promulgates a disadvantage, <sup>314</sup> saying, "Misguided beginners participating in the Greater Vehicle have their previously produced good roots

pulverized by these seminal transgressions; they are defeated and, falling from divine, human, and greater-vehicle well-being, they go to a lower state of rebirth. They revolve for a long time in samsara, deprived of a spiritual adviser."

223211.3 The divisions of involvement: How involvement results in relinquishment or not. The vow-of-ethics undertaking will not be relinquished with medium or lesser involvement in these four events that are "grounds for defeat." Relinquishment is the result of a greater degree of involvement.<sup>315</sup>

"Grounds for defeat" refers to the set of four (in terms of attitude) and the set of eight (in terms of application), beginning with "attachment to gain and respect," that were explained above. These that we characterize as eight, as well as those formulated in the *SS*, will not function as defeats when greater involvement is incomplete. [Two of (54b) the transgressions] that are also formulated there [in the *SS*]-rejecting the Greater Vehicle, and praising oneself and deprecating another from attachment to gain and respect--which are even more reprehensible than the immediates, are here said not to result in defeat unless greater involvement is complete. Therefore it clearly must apply to the others as well.

Objection: "You have just explained that complete greater involvement is not necessary in cases of generating wrong view and giving up the thought of awakening, that to create them is sufficient." Response: By the same token, we can know when those of the *AG* scripture will lack the complete [set of factors of] greater involvement, being of lesser or medium outflow as the case may be, by means of the explanation in this text of [events] that belong to the defeat category but do not result in defeat because they are of lesser or medium outflow.

To identify greater involvement: making a regular practice of these four events that are "grounds for defeat," generating not the slightest sense of shame and embarrassment, being pleased with and glad of it, and having a view for its good qualities. This should be understood as greater involvement.

There are four factors here.<sup>316</sup> (1) "Making a regular practice of these

four events that are 'grounds for defeat.'" To the phrase "these four events," some commentators<sup>317</sup> would prefix "any or all of," indicating that all four are not necessary. "Regular" is defined by some Tibetans as doing it more than twice, and by others as meaning the complete perpetration [lit. "preparation, principal, and ending] of the deed. But nothing of this sort is mentioned in any commentary; it misses the point and should be rejected. One commits any one of these causes for going down to defeat and retains the desire to do it, either repeatedly or once again. The former phrase gives the sense of "regular." As the new commentary puts it, "'Severe defilement' is repeated and regular practice of deeds with outflow, combined with the failure to generate even a little sense of shame and embarrassment." And the commentary of Samudra reads, "the desire to commit these four, or any one of them, repeatedly."

(55a) Samudramegha and Jinaputra show "regular practice" to be cause for the degeneration of shame and embarrassment, the sense of the latter pair being tied to that of the former. They say, "By the regular practice of events that are 'grounds for defeat,' one's sense of shame and embarrassment are made to completely degenerate. That is why it reads, 'not the slightest.'" <sup>318</sup> Some commentaries define it as [behavior that is not interrupted before] the lapse of a watch. This will be discussed further on.

(2) "Generating not the slightest sense of shame and embarrassment." On shame and embarrassment, the *Bbh* has this to say: "When the bodhisattva behaves reprehensibly, the constraint of knowing, 'This is not the thing for me to do' is his sense of shame. The constraint of fear and respect for others is his embarrassment."<sup>319</sup> Their common mental object is his misbehavior. Their common mode is the generation of constraint. Their particulars are this: Constraint generated as self-motivation from thinking, "This is not the thing for me to do" is his sense of shame; constraint generated as external motivation--"This is wrong if someone disapproves"--is his embarrassment.

We may ignore "greater" and "medium" in regard to these two. Not the slightest bit is generated, and this absence is the basis for engaging

in the misbehavior that is cause for going down to defeat. Since it is stated that neither is generated in going down to defeat, I conclude that defeat will not result if the slightest bit of either shame or embarrassment has been produced.

Objection: "At what point in time are these two created or not?" Response: Immediately after engaging in the misbehavior that is cause for going down to defeat. However, to define it as "within the period of a watch" is untenable, as I will explain further on.

"Being pleased with and glad of it." Samudramegha and Jinaputra ex-(55b) pound it thus: "He is pleased with that shamelessness." I take this to indicate either (1) that he is pleased with the misbehavior for whatever reason shame is not generated, or (2) that the lack of conscience causes him to be pleased at the deed. Samudra interprets "being glad" as gratification by his very lack of conscience.

What [the *Bbh*] is saying is that failure to produce constraint at engaging in this misbehavior does not suffice: a positive sense of self-satisfaction with the activity is required.

He is "glad" not to eliminate that misbehavior, according to both Samudramegha and Jinaputra.

Objection: "You establish these [elements of the third factor] on the basis of those that precede, and then assert that if the later ones are not present in full, the factors of greater involvement are incomplete. So [the later ones] are an addition. There is no reason they should not be eliminated [separately]. What if they should be eliminated? In that case their elimination is, for all practical purposes, a constrained mind, which implies that the second factor is also incomplete."

Response: Failure to eliminate [the third factor] is not a matter of failing to see the disadvantages [of the action] and to eliminate it on that basis [i.e., it is not a matter of constraint].

Objection: "What is it then?"

Response: Master Guṇaprabha interprets "being pleased" as "being glad from the bottom of one's heart," and "being glad" as "remaining so--the gladness in terms of application." His thinking is that "being pleased" is to be glad of the misbehavior, while "being glad" refers only to being glad of the way it works out in practice. Don't you agree?

Objection: "This duplicates 'the desire to commit [the deed] in future,' as [part of the definition of the first factor], regular practice."

Response: There is no duplication. Desire for it and enjoyment of it are distinct mental events.

(4) The fourth factor: "having a view for its good qualities." The sense of this, as Samudramegha and Jinaputra explain, is "not looking at the disadvantages in it."

Objection: "If someone did look at the disadvantages, how could he be unconstrained? There would be no enjoyment, etc. of it in the first place."

Response: There is no inconsistency. To look at the disadvantages may be a cause for the existence of conscience, but it is not the same thing. One may see its disadvantages, yet engage in it out of enjoyment, just as a law-abiding person will engage in adultery.

(56a) Excepting his alteration in explaining the "pleased-glad" pair, Samudra agrees with his predecessors.

Master Guṇaprabha says, "To have a view for its good qualities is to be disposed to think, 'These events that are "grounds for defeat" have such-and-such good qualities.'" What he means to say--and other commentators have the same idea--is that one need not hold the event that is grounds for defeat to be flawless. Rather, one looks at the side of it that one wishes to see, at what might be termed "the desired good qualities," and not at the side one does not wish to see.

In the *Sūtra-samuccaya* commentary [117a.6-b.5], "regular" is interpreted as "not interrupted before the period of a watch has elapsed." By much [discussion] that precedes, [Ratnākaraśānti] has defined this to mean, "Being absent during this period, shame and embarrassment do not intervene." He thinks one would be seriously overdoing it to require literal continuity of processes such as praising oneself.

"The period of a watch" he defines from this passage of the *Questioning of Upāli* scripture:<sup>320</sup> "If a seminal transgression has developed for the bodhīśattva in the morning, and at midday he remains not parted from the thought of awakening, his ethics undergoes no limitation. Likewise, if it has developed at midday and from midday to late afternoon,

late afternoon to evening, evening to midnight, midnight to predawn, or predawn to morning he remains not parted from the thought of awakening, his ethics undergoes no limitation." Upon reaching the conclusion, "If it develops in the predawn, and at morning..." the definition reaches "the sixth part of a full day"--there being three parts to the day and three parts to the night.

The preceding definition is not tenable. It combines the senses of "regular" and "nongeneration of shame and embarrassment" into one, thus contradicting their enumeration as distinct factors in the text. To adduce "the period of a watch" is to imply that the *Bbh* explanation of the factors of greater involvement is incomplete, and the factors taught in it do not illustrate the matter and need a supplement. Once you begin to add teachings from other sources, many sorts of factor without restriction can be introduced with no theoretical limit.

Although it does subsequently adduce "the period of a watch," this is not the point of that scripture. Prior to that it says: "Upāli, how is it that bodhisattvas participating in the Greater Vehicle have a way to mend their training, whereas persons of the auditors' vehicle have not? For the bodhisattva, Upāli, who is participating in the Greater Vehicle, should a transgression have developed in the morning-time, and he at the time of midday remain not parted from the thought of omniscience [i.e., awakening], then for him the aggregate of ethics of a bodhisattva participating in the Greater Vehicle is entirely unaffected." This is applied in the same way to midday and late afternoon, late afternoon and the first watch of the night, the first watch of the night and the middle of the night, midnight and the last watch. Then it goes on to say: "In that way, Upāli, the training of bodhisattvas participating in the Greater Vehicle does have a mending, and for that reason the bodhisattva does not grow obsessed with excessive regret,<sup>321</sup> nor does he become overly nostalgic. When a transgression has repeatedly developed for someone of the auditors' vehicle, Upāli, the aggregate of auditors' vehicle ethics should be understood to be entirely effected, to be failed and lost. Why so? Someone of the auditors' vehicle must eliminate all defilements as though his head and clothes were set on fire. So the training of those

of the auditors' vehicle, who resolutely seek to enter complete nirvana, has no mending."

The transgression referred to in the clause, "Should a transgression (57a) have developed in the morning," is already a seminal transgression.<sup>322</sup>

Objection: "How do you know that it is a seminal transgression?" Response: This passage addresses the question of whether or no the greater-vehicle training, as opposed to auditor training, has a mending. In summarizing, it states, "In that way, the training of bodhisattvas does have a mending" and, "When a transgression has developed for someone of the auditors' vehicle, there is no rectification." We know it by these statements, for if the remedy were appropriate to anything other than a seminal transgression, it would apply to the auditor as well and not be a feature of the bodhisattva.<sup>323</sup>

Objection: "That is incorrect. To call it a seminal transgression contradicts the statement that 'the aggregate of ethics is entirely unaffected,' for the sense of 'entirely effected' would be 'failed.'" <sup>324</sup>

Response: There is no problem. The translation that appears cited by the *SS* is preferable. It reads, "the aggregate of ethics undergoes no limitation."<sup>325</sup> The sense is that the only limit to the continuation of a bodhisattva's ethics is to fail to retake [the vow] when a seminal transgression has developed. Retaking it, there is no limit.

Even if we were compelled by that scripture to introduce "the period of a watch" [into the *Bbh* system], your definition of that period would be unacceptable. For one thing, you are defining the period of a watch so as to indicate the period *within which* the process must be terminated by means of an antidote [to the transgression], whereas the scripture says, "Should a transgression have developed in the morning, and he *at* midday," defining the two as distinct periods of time. For another thing the text [i.e., the *Bbh*] explains that [the development of defeat depends upon] whether or no conscience and a view for the disadvantages are present, whereas the scripture declares that [mending depends upon] not being parted from the aspiration thought.

Objection: "Why then does the *Lamp of the Path* declare, <sup>326</sup>

The six watches have eighteen periods; <sup>327</sup>

An offense occurring in the first of the middle period  
 Of the three periods of the morning watch,  
 If the thought of awakening is forgotten in the last period,  
 Results in a bodhisattva's failure.

The last five may be disclosed in the same way."

(57b) Response: The line just above this in the transmission says, "Eliminating sinful companions, and possessing 'means within watches...',"<sup>1</sup> referring to the characteristics of a disciple who has entered the path after taking the bodhisattva vow. "The possession of 'means within watches'" shows that for offenses committed within the first two periods of each of the six watches he needs to recollect the thought of awakening and to possess a means of correction. If he does not, the bodhisattva will fail even in his last method of reparation. And so the balance of that transmission says,

The superior personality makes correction  
 In the first period, the medium in the second;  
 To correct in the last is inferior.

Besides that, we have the superior among superior personalities who corrects himself in the first moment [of the first period], the medium-superior who corrects himself in the second, and the inferior-superior who corrects himself in the third. So there are nine types of personality which, multiplied by six periods, gives fifty-four possibilities for reparation. But a "watch" is not the criterion for defeat.

Objection: "The statement, 'Even should a seminal transgression have developed, his ethics can be repaired': does it refer to the bodhisattva vow or to the *prātimokṣa* of a bodhisattva's mental continuum? In the first case, since repair is possible, the specification 'If he has not been parted from the aspiration thought' is irrelevant, because a relinquished aspiration is automatically re-created when you generate the thought and retake the bodhisattva vow. In the second case, the distinction between being parted or not parted from the aspiration thought is untenable because, as we know from many texts of the greater and lesser vehicles both, should a holder of the *prātimokṣa* vow develop a defeat,

then even though he may take the vow again, there is no retaking of it that will make it as it had been before."

Response: This scripture is cited by master Śāntideva to make known how a transgressional sin may be purified by the might of the thought of awakening. The aim of the scripture is to show that even when a seminal transgression has developed, if one is not parted from the (58a) thought that aspires [to buddhahood], the vow can be corrected. It must be glossed in this way: The hindrance created by a seminal transgression that obstructs one's re-creation of the vow is itself blocked by the power of one's not being parted from the thought of awakening.

Therefore it is obviously one's prātimokṣa vow [to which the passage refers], because [as you say] the bodhisattva vow can be re-created even when one has relinquished the aspiration thought. Also, the *BCA* [4: 11] was cited above, in context of the disadvantages of relinquishing the aspiration thought [Ts. 54a], as stating that if one's practice is a mixture of efficacious transgression with efficacious bodhicitta, then obtainment of the stages will be long delayed. This "efficacious transgression" is relinquishment of the aspiration thought, of which that canonical text has already said [*BCA* 4:8]: "This is, for the bodhisattva,/ The gravest of transgressions." To oscillate between it and an efficacious aspiration thought is to be continually regenerating an efficacious aspiration thought after the development of transgression. [Based on these verses] therefore, the generated thought being thus restored, there is no question of the vow not being re-created.

Furthermore, the *Questioning of Upāli* says [par. 34]: "How does [the Lord] describe the prātimokṣa vow of those of the auditors' vehicle? How does he describe the prātimokṣa vow of those of the independent buddhas' vehicle? How does he describe the prātimokṣa vow of bodhisattvas participating in the Greater Vehicle?" Although [Upāli] has asked about the prātimokṣa of the bodhisattva, he has not asked about the bodhisattva vow. So in response to the question he formulates about the prātimokṣa of greater versus lesser-vehicle personalities, the [Buddha] must, in the passage cited above, be saying that the bodhisattva training may be corrected, but the auditors' training may not.

Objection: "If he has not been parted from the aspiration thought there is a remedy, and if he has been parted, there is not. So where does the distinction [between vehicles] come in?" Response: It is not the case that the distinction is rendered meaningless if any holder of prātimokṣa vow can retake the vow after a seminal transgression has (58b) occurred. The situation is as follows. A bodhisattva who holds the prātimokṣa vow can retake the prātimokṣa vow after a seminal transgression has occurred to it if he has not been parted from the previously generated thought [of awakening] during the period immediately after the occurrence of the seminal transgression. Even for a bodhisattva, on the other hand, re-creation is impossible if he has relinquished and become dissociated from the generated thought during the period immediately following the complete perpetuation of a seminal transgression. Were it possible, [the prātimokṣa vow of a bodhisattva] would be too far removed from its lesser-vehicle basis.

Hence "morning" refers to [any point during] the general period from the break of dawn up to but not including midday, and "midday" is used to characterize the time immediately following the development of a transgression.

Briefly, if one is not parted from the aspiration thought immediately after the occurrence of a seminal transgression, then the might of the thought is such that the seminal transgression is incapable of creating an obstruction to re-creation of the vow. If one has been parted from it, on the other hand, the capability of that [seminal transgression] is itself unobstructed and repair [of the vow] is said to be impossible. Therefore, if one has relinquished and been parted from the thought before the occurrence of a seminal transgression, [the vow] cannot be mended. There must be an unpartedness from that thought at the end of the occurrence of the transgression. Considering this, [the scripture] says, "If one has not been parted from..." It says, "not been parted from--has not relinquished--the previously generated [thought]"; it does not say, "the thought that has not yet been generated at that time."

The *Skill in Means* scripture says,<sup>329</sup> "Kulaputra, even should a transgression occur, under the influence of some sinful companion, the

bodhisattva who is skilled in means will train himself to think thus: 'In any case, if I were to enter nirvana with these aggregates, my mind would be full of anxiety.<sup>330</sup> Instead, let me put on the armor thus: I shall remain in samsara until its future end, in order to bring sentient beings to maturity. Let my mind not be anxious: As long as I revolve (59a) in samsara, I shall bring sentient beings to maturity. Furthermore, I will treat this transgression according to the doctrine. Nor will I commit the offense in future.' Supposing, *kulaputra*, that a monastic bodhisattva falls into all four [monastic] seminal transgressions. If he removes them with this skill in means, then he is a bodhisattva without transgression, according to me."

The transgression must occur to someone based as a bodhisattva. Should the transgression initially occur upon some other basis, that basis cannot subsequently reproduce the *prātimokṣa* by becoming a bodhisattva. For both scriptures promulgate [a reproduction] only in regard to the *prātimokṣa* of a bodhisattva's mental continuum.

To err in this regard and say that in the greater-vehicle system, to reproduce [the vow] after a *prātimokṣa* defeat has occurred enables one to obtain the vow as it was before, is the horrendous mistake of identifying the greater-vehicle personality with the greater-vehicle philosophic system.

In order to distinguish greater from lesser-vehicle *prātimokṣa*, the *Questioning of Upāli* formulates three criteria for distinguishing them [par. 37]: whether or not it comes together with guarding, or compliance with the thoughts of others, whether or not it has a way of being mended, and whether it is a long-term process or is attached to the goal. Nevertheless, his final aim should not be defined as a long-term process during which the bodhisattva does not relinquish the *prātimokṣa* from his mental continuum even when changing lives. The scripture says [par. 40]: "The bodhisattva does not bring his good roots to maturity so as to exhaust all defilements in a single lifetime; he exhausts them gradually. The auditor, on the other hand, brings his good roots to maturity as though his head were set on fire, so that he not create rebirth in existence for so much as a single instant. These two [approaches illustrate]

long-term process versus attachment to the goal." So the scripture is referring to holding on to existence or not for the sake of samsara.<sup>331</sup>

This much amplification should suffice.

\* \* \*

(59b) Now we proceed to the rundown. Question: "Two complete sets of two factors each are needed for 'greater involvement': (1) nonproduction of conscience and lack of concern for the disadvantages, which would prevent it, and (2) desire to do it in future and being pleased with and glad of it, which carry it out. At what point do the two absences begin and up to what point do they continue, and at what point do the two presences begin and up to what point need they continue?"

Answer: The two absences commence with the development of motivation. They must continue to be absent to the point immediately after completion of the principal part of the action. Should either a sense of shame or embarrassment, or a concern for the disadvantages develop during that period, the factors of greater involvement would be incomplete. The two presences as well should develop at some point during that time, and one must not be diverted from those thoughts until immediately after completion of the principal part of the action. But to require literal continuity as though it were a family line [of which members are always present] is indeed to seriously overdo it.

Question: "How can medium and lesser involvement be expected to differ?" Answer: This is not explained in *Samudramegha*, *Guṇaprabha*, *Jinaputra*, or the old commentary to the *TV*.<sup>332</sup> *Samudra* teaches (1) his own system, presenting lesser, medium, and greater involvement as "inclining towards, alighting upon, and falling into" defilement. At first, the defilement is only generated; afterwards the mind alights upon it, finally coming under its influence.<sup>333</sup> He also presents (2) someone else's system, applying [the three degrees] to the *Ratnamegha* promulgation of lesser, medium, and greater [grades] to [each of] the three poisons.<sup>334</sup> But it is not at all clear that the former [theory] is to be found in the text [the *Bbh*], and the latter would appear to disagree with it.

The new commentary to the *TV* deposits a factor on top of the pre-

vious four: not reversing [the activity] at someone's request. When the five are complete, it explains, there is greater involvement. To reverse it upon request is medium, while reversing it promptly on one's own, regardless of the request, is lesser.<sup>335</sup> However, this is apparently not to (60a) be considered tenable. Were each commentator to add one factor, the bounds of the factors would be undemarcated.

"What is it then?" The master must, at this point, make some distinction among the three degrees of involvement, and he must also identify the transgressions represented by the three. Should he fail to do so [the disciple] will not know which must be confessed to three persons, and which may be confessed to one.<sup>336</sup> Since [medium or lesser] are not adequately explained in any other context, they will be clarified here in a way that will enable [the disciple] to understand them in terms of greater involvement, which has already been identified.

Between the factors of (1) being pleased with and glad of it, and having a desire to do it in future, and (2) not considering its disadvantages--the latter clearly represents the greater defilement. You may possess the former set and still see the disadvantages, in which case constraint may be produced, but not to see the disadvantages at all leaves no room for the production of constraint. The fact that you see the disadvantages does not necessarily mean that you have shame and embarrassment, but without seeing the disadvantages their production is impossible. Therefore, when the factors of greater involvement are incomplete, the presence of a concern for the disadvantages, even in the presence of all the rest, should be taken to indicate a lesser degree of involvement, and its absence to indicate a medium.

When there is no concern for the disadvantages, there may or may not be shame and embarrassment, whereas if shame and embarrassment have developed it is certain that a concern for the disadvantages will have developed as well. So that pair is set aside and not counted.

223211.4 Correction proper to each. The bodhisattva vow is not relinquished by only once committing an act of bodhisattva defeat.<sup>337</sup> The point of the passage is stated just above it:<sup>338</sup> As the monk, by committing a defeat, relinquishes his prātimokṣa vow. The sense is that

it is not relinquished as the *prātimokṣa* is. That is to say, "It is not like the relinquishment of *prātimokṣa* which when a defeat has occurred is relinquished in such a way that even if it is retaken, it will not be (60b) produced as it had been before." This is not to be construed as "once not sufficing for defeat, it is relinquished by committing the deed a matching time." That is why the text states, immediately after: Even if he has relinquished the undertaking, the bodhisattva still has the opportunity to receive it again in the same lifetime. The monk for whom defeat has developed has no such opportunity at all.

Objection: Is it not the case that for the *prātimokṣa* vow as well, if defeat has occurred without dissembling and the vow is then formally returned, that it may be retaken and considered a valid higher ordination?<sup>339</sup> Why then is it stated that there is no retaking of it?"

Response: In certain classes [of *prātimokṣa* infraction], if there is no dissembling, defeat will not ensue. So all defeats are defined to include dissembling. It is sufficient [for the purposes of our discussion] to ascertain the phrase "has no such opportunity" according to that definition. Furthermore, [the phrase] is used considering a lesser-vehicle basis, as has already been explained. Even if we were to define it [the hypothetical *prātimokṣa* defeat] to be a defeat without dissembling, it would still differ from the retaking that is possible for the bodhisattva vow. For the bodhisattva, retaking the vow re-creates it in a pure form, whereas for the lesser-vehicle basis, retaking the monk's vow will not do so. As we know, a higher ordination may be effective or not, depending upon the source [of ordination] and the basis [or person taking it].

Question: "For what reason does *prātimokṣa* have no mending when mending is possible for defeat of the bodhisattva vow?"

Response: Samudramegha says, "The auditor's *prātimokṣa* is called the seminal vow, because it functions as the ground for all wholesome factors. Its being cut implies an extreme lack of conscience, by which conscience is made to fail and one is made to lose the opportunity to receive the vow [again] in the same lifetime. The bodhisattva's is not like this. Even if the bodhisattva vow has been completely relinquished (61a) in this life, the opportunity remains to receive it again within

the same lifetime, because it implies no failure of conscience." The reason being adduced is that when *prātimokṣa* defeat occurs, conscience is caused to fail, while defeat of the bodhisattva vow does not cause its failure. The reason is restatable as, "because the *prātimokṣa* functions as the ground for all wholesome factors." Jinaputra and Samudra explain it in the same way.

Reasoning along these lines, it is difficult to see an answer as to whether or not the bodhisattva vow can be created by someone for whom a *prātimokṣa* defeat has occurred.

Our own system deems it necessary to explain this according to the previously cited passage from the *Questioning of Upāli*, namely, "A defeat for someone of the auditors' vehicle completely effects his ethics, for which reason he must act to eliminate all defilement as though his head and robes were set on fire," and according to its subsequent declaration, "So the auditors' training has no remedy," as well as the previously cited *Skill in Means* scripture: "In any case, if I were to enter nirvana with these aggregates my mind would be full of anxiety."

Generally speaking, *prātimokṣa* is dual; it is greater and lesser-vehicle, because it is a basis for the greater as well as for the lesser vehicle. Nevertheless, chief among those to be disciplined by the various *prātimokṣa* precepts that have been legislated, is the lesser-vehicle personality. Whether or not he is actually capable of attaining arhatship in his present lifetime by means of the lesser vehicle, he must put on the great armor of the intention to exhaust the outflows in that life, and then undertake initiatives for eliminating the defilements as vigorously as though he were trying to extinguish a fire on his head and robes. Hence the vow is taken in order to attain the exhaustion of outflows in (61b) that life, and defeat with dissembling renders it impossible to do so, thus undermining what was the chief purpose for having undertaken the vow. For the bodhisattva, a seminal transgression that effects the bodhisattva vow may not undermine the chief purpose for his reception of it. Such is the reason for the possibility and impossibility of rectification, and the two scriptures, as cited above, attest it.

The comment by the extended commentary to the *Vinaya-sūtra* [of

Dharmamitra, O 5622] should also be mentioned: "If a vow has been taken for the sake of deliverance, then defeat delays deliverance for a long time; it still exists, but it is virtually nonexistent."

223211.5 Causes for relinquishment. To summarize, relinquishment of the bodhisattva vow-undertaking comes from only two causes: relinquishment of the aspiration for full awakening, and action with greater involvement in an event that is "grounds for defeat." <sup>340</sup>

Objection: "Why then are four causes for relinquishment formulated in the *Summary*? It says, 'One may speak of four relinquishments of the bodhisattva vow. They are, in brief, (1) to generate a thought that is certain in its dissimilarity to the thought with which one undertook it, (2) to enunciate the formula of return before an individual who cognizes it, (3) to commit the offense of each or all of the four events that are "grounds for defeat," and (4) to cause the commission of the offense of greater involvement in each or all of the four events that are "grounds for defeat."' Then again, why are the latter two listed separately.?" <sup>341</sup>

Response: Two are taught in the *Bbh*, and more than two in the listing by the *Ascertainment-Summary*. The two accounts are not contradictory, because they are like source-work and commentary.

The first cause for relinquishment, "to generate a thought," is to generate a lesser-vehicle intention. Moreover, it is to generate a thought (62a) that is certain in its dissimilarity to--that is to say, incongruent with--the thought of desire with which, at the time you received the vow, you undertook to attain buddhahood for the sake of sentient beings. It is a matter of relinquishing the aspiration thought.

The second cause for relinquishment is to enunciate the formula of returning it before someone who undertands the meaning, and for the other to understand. This is not like the formal return in the *prātimokṣa* system. In that case, when you cannot keep [the vow], the merit [being accumulated by] following the vow is cut off by its return, but the return is not by its very nature the generation of a great evil. But here, for returning the bodhisattva vow--for ceasing to hold the vow after having promised to accomplish the benefit and pleasure of infinite

sentient beings--you must fall into a state of woe and wander there in circles for a very long time. For undermining the happiness of a single sentient being you must go to a lower state of rebirth; if you undermine the happiness of the universe of sentient beings, [the consequence] is unspeakable! Much more evidence might be cited to support this.

So the *BCA* says [4:4-6]:

If I have committed myself to it,  
 And I fail to do the work,  
 I have deceived [all] those sentient beings: <sup>342</sup>  
 What will my destiny be?

I produce a generous attitude,  
 And will not give to anyone;  
 For just a few ordinary things,  
 "He will become a hungry ghost."

Having invited them sincerely  
 To transcendent happiness,  
 And then deceived the whole world,  
 To what happy rebirth could I go?

And [4:9-10]:

For impeding someone else's merit,  
 For even a single moment,  
 One's woeful destinies will be endless,  
 Because a being's welfare is harmed.

If undermining one person's well-being  
 Is cause for one's own decay,  
 What is the consequence of doing so  
 To all the embodied of space?

(62b) These are evidence that to return [the vow] in any way is wrong. The first [cause for relinquishment of the vow] is to relinquish the aspiration thought. The second is not to relinquish the aspiration thought, but to relinquish the obligation to take up the burden of bodhisattva practice. They amount to the same thing. You should take the vow only

after this has been well examined. Apart from this, the three scriptures cited in the *SS* prove the disadvantages to be very great. This has already been discussed.<sup>343</sup>

The third cause for relinquishment is explained to be all four offenses together or each offense individually, and the fourth is stated to be both of these with greater involvement. If greater involvement is not present, however, these are offenses of the defeat class but not actual defeats. So unless [number three] is not a transgression that relinquishes the vow after all, it appears to amount to the same thing as number four.<sup>344</sup> I conclude that both these causes for relinquishment are a matter of each offense and of two or more, with greater involvement, and that the two causes for relinquishment that are formulated in the text [the *Bbh*] are divided [by the *Summary*] into two.

The phrase "all four" designates the set of two through four.

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If the aspiration thought of a bodhisattva vow-holder has not been relinquished, and his training has not been returned, and if he has not acted with greater involvement in what is grounds for defeat, then even when he has changed lives and been reborn up, down, or on a level, the bodhisattva vow is not relinquished. Even should he forget upon changing lives, when he comes into contact with a spiritual adviser and takes [the vow], it is done to rouse his memory; it is not a fresh undertaking.

The commentaries explain that he is reborn "up" as a god, "on the same level" as a human being, or "down" into a state of woe. He is reborn in those places under the influences, respectively, of the aspiration thought, the welfare of sentient beings, or karma. Jinaputra and Samudramegha would have it that even in the next life "he undertakes no action inappropriate for a bodhisattva"--which is the virtue of being established in the vow.<sup>345</sup>

(63a) 22321.2 The set of misdeeds. Two parts: the general teaching, and the explanation of individual misdeeds.

22321.1 General teaching. One should distinguish and know what has not been legislated to be faulty for someone established in the bodhisattva vow and what is faulty, what is defiled and not, and the minor, the

medium, and the major among faults. What results in transgression and not, and what is defiled and not among transgressions, will be taught in context of individual misdeeds. Minor, medium, and major will be explained below them. <sup>346</sup>

223212.2 Explanation of individual misdeeds. Two parts: the set of faults that are incompatible with collecting wholesome factors, and the set of faults incompatible with accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings.

223212.1 Faults incompatible with the six perfections. Six parts: giving, morality, patience, vigor, meditation, and wisdom.

223212.1 Five incompatible with giving.

223212.1.1 Failure in the chief thing, giving material goods.

(9a) Not offering three to the Precious Three. <sup>347</sup>

Since you have taken refuge, and especially since you have generated the thought of awakening, it is wrong not to do daily worship and service to the Precious Three. Not to do so is a misdeed. <sup>348</sup>

Three points to this. 1.1 Objects of worship. To the Buddha: the Tathāgata or his shrine. The Doctrine: the Doctrine, or the bodhisattva collection or its code in book form. The Community: or to the community, the community of high-stage bodhisattvas of the ten directions.

The Tathāgata is the actual presence; a shrine is a representation of his physical form. <sup>349</sup> The Doctrine is the doctrine as personal discovery, the path to cessation and, in the form of books, doctrine as canonical (63b) texts, both the word of the Buddha and systematic commentary. "The bodhisattva collection" has to refer to doctrine of the Greater Vehicle. "Community" is qualified by "community of high-stage bodhisattvas," or bodhisattva nobles (*ārya*). <sup>350</sup>

"To the Tathāgata of..." shows that either he or a shrine will suffice. "To the Doctrine or..." shows that either discovered or canonical will suffice. "Collection or..." shows that either buddha-word or systematic commentary will be sufficient.

"A shrine that represents him... its code or the Community" shows that worship may be done to any of the three objects of worship, and that making a minimal offering will prevent the misdeed.

1.2 Act of worship. To perform no act of worship to those objects, be it great or small—not even so much as a single prostration with one's body, not even so much as the recitation of a single four-line verse composed on the qualities of those three objects with one's speech, not even so much as a single act of faith, guided by recollection of the qualities of those three objects, with one's mind.

That there is no term indicating an option among these last three, as there is among the three objects, implies that one should do all three for any one of the Precious Three.<sup>351</sup> [On the other hand], the new commentary glosses it, "Make offerings with flowers and the like, whatever you own; even as much as a single prostration with your body." And Samudra declares, "Practice virtue by day or by night; if you can do nothing else in the way of making offerings and so forth, prostrate with your body a little bit." So one can stop the misdeed by offering something such as flowers.

1.3 Time. Should a full day pass without the performance of such (64a) worship, then because it is reprehensible, one is said to be "possessed of fault"; and because it contradicts what is natural to a bodhi-sattva, one is "possessed of contradiction."<sup>352</sup>

In this case there is no fault for someone who has reached the stage of purified intention. By analogy, the monk who has attained "faith through understanding" is always serving the Teacher, the Doctrine, and the Community by the nature of things, and doing worship with the highest offerings. This statement is not meant to show that there is no fault is not doing worship when one has attained the stage of purified intention (the Stage of Delight). Rather, it shows that this misdeed does not occur to someone who has attained that stage, because he is never parted from the act of worshipping the Precious Three.<sup>353</sup>

This transgression is still defiled if done out of disrespect for the training, faithless laziness, or indolence which is energetic but in regard to offenses.<sup>354</sup> If done forgetfully, on the other hand, it is not defiled.

In the new commentary, this verse is found:<sup>355</sup>

Attachment, resentment, pride, and the like  
Make these downfalls defiled;

With indolence, forgetfulness, and the like  
They are undefiled, except for "[Not] offering."

Aversion and the like are accordingly "defiled," because of their gravity; indolence etc., because of their relative triviality, are designated--by the negative particle in the word "undefiled"--as being minor. This much is promulgated in context of misdeeds [generally]. In this [particular] instance, however, laziness and indolence are also said to be defiled--for, as Drolungpa<sup>356</sup> puts it, this supersedes the rule for the broader basis.

The new commentary interprets this misdeed as failure in the "extensive offerings" mentioned above as part of collecting wholesome factors.<sup>357</sup>

223212211.2 Failure in [giving as] the antidote to stinginess.

(9b) Following thoughts of desire.

To follow--to allow, to fail to put a stop to--the occurrence of insatiability, discontent, attachment to gain and respect, to any among these three or four things, is defiled. This offense has no occurrence that is undefiled. <sup>358</sup>

There is no fault contradictory to the precept if you generate a will to stop those thoughts, try hard to do so, and continue to oppose them by keeping hold of their antidote, but are prevented, committing [the misdeed] over and over because you are by nature overwhelmed with a great share of defilement. But this is not to say that there is no problem at all.

The new commentary explains that this fails, in context of the ethics of the vow, to disallow attachment to gain and respect, and to be easily satisfied and easily contented.

223212211.3 Two incompatible with giving confidence. Two points.

3.1 In connection with a specific object.

(9c) Not paying respect to elders.

For a bodhisattva to see someone with the same religion as his<sup>359</sup> deserving deference, deserving to be addressed first and so forth, on account of his age, more advanced than his own in terms of [the length of time that he has held] the vow, and on account of the qualities with which

he should believe him to be endowed, and to fail to rise and provide a seat, is a misdeed.

3.2 In connection with a general object.

(9d) Giving no answer to questions.

Should someone else accost him first to be pleasant, address words to enquire after his health and so forth, greeting him and asking after the particulars of some matter from the past, and he give no reply in a suitable manner, it is a misdeed.

"In a suitable manner" is interpreted by some commentators<sup>360</sup> as having, for example, no desire to gain something from answering. The new commentary, however, correctly glosses it as a congenial response.

To fail to act so is without fault in the following cases. First, on account of the basis [i.e., the bodhisattva]: There is no fault in not (65a) answering when (1) you are critically ill, and (2) you cannot answer someone who has greeted you with the notion that you are awake, when in fact you are asleep. There is no transgression, on account of circumstances, in the following instances: (1) You are teaching doctrine to someone else or conducting a discussion of doctrine with someone else. (2) At the time, you are engaged in being pleasant by greeting, etc. a person other than both those objects. (3) You are, at the time, listening to someone who is teaching doctrine to yourself, or you are overhearing others conduct a discussion. There is no fault, on account of necessity, in the following cases. (1) You are guarding against inconvenience to someone else when getting up, etc. and would interfere with his listening to doctrine.<sup>361</sup> (2) You are guarding the mind of the person speaking doctrine when you suspect a potential inconvenience to him. (3) You are raising them from an unwholesome, to place them in a wholesome situation by means of not rising etc. (4) You are keeping to what is done by your community, an integral rule such as not prostrating or not speaking. (5) You are guarding against enmity that might arise for showing respect, or talking or whatever, in many people toward you.

Outside of these circumstances, it will result in transgression. Not

doing so is defiled when the motivation is pride, enmity desiring to do harm, hatred with the mind upset by resentment, and so forth. Not doing so is undefiled in cases motivated by laziness, indolence, a [karmically] indeterminate [thought], and forgetfulness.

The new commentary explains that these two misdeeds fail in the "guarding others' minds" aspect of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings.<sup>362</sup>

223212211.4 Failure to create conditions for others' giving. Two points.

4.1 Not consenting to an invitation.

(10a) Not accepting an invitation.

(65b) Upon being invited to the house of others who are monastics, to a monastery of the community, or to the house of a layperson<sup>363</sup> for requisites such as food, drink, and clothing, should one not accept the call and fail to go out of pride-enmity-resentment, there is a misdeed with defilement. To stay away under the influence of laziness and indolence is a fault that is not defiled.

To stay away is without fault in the following cases. On account of the basis: (1) You are sick and incapacitated. (2) You have already promised someone else. On account of the road: (1) The road is long and the place so remote that you could not travel to it easily. (2) The road holds sundry dangers of enemies, violence, and harm. On account of the donor: a call with malicious intent.<sup>364</sup> On account of necessity: (1) You desire to exert discipline, as indicated above, by means of staying away. (2) You are guarding against interference with a wholesome practice in which you have been continuously diligent. (3) You suspect that you will miss hearing a useful topic of doctrine you have not heard before, and (4) likewise for a discussion you have not heard before. (5) You are guarding against thoughts of enmity on the part of the majority. (6) You are keeping an internal rule of the community, such as turning the almsbowl down [in disapproval of the donor].

4.2 Not taking requisites provided.

(10b) Not taking such things as gold.

Being about to obtain--that is to say, having the opportunity to be

provided with, as an urgent donation--various manner of wealth such as gold, silver, pearl, and lapis lazuli, from anyone else who is a donor, and not taking, but refusing it out of enmity and resentment, is a defiled fault, because it shows disdain for a sentient beings. Not taking it out of laziness and indolence, there is fault that is not defiled.

No reservations are expressed for the following, but the two thoughts [enmity and resentment] should be understood to be the major consideration. Not taking it is without fault, firstly, in view of oneself, when (66a) you see that by taking the thing, your own mind will grow enamored of it.<sup>365</sup> In view of the donor: (1) You suspect that he will subsequently regret the gift. (2) You suspect that he has mistaken you for someone else. (3) You suspect that the donor, by renouncing all the requisites he owns, will be impoverished. On account of the object: (1) You suspect that it is something dedicated to the community or a shrine. (2) You suspect that it has been improperly carried off from a third party, and that some penalty may come of it. The penalties are some harm such as execution, bondage, fine, or the gouging of eyes, or condemnation to exile.<sup>366</sup> Jinaputra explains these as penalties for accepting them. Samudra suggests that the penalties will occur to the robber--seeing this, he says, one should not accept [the gift].

The new commentary explains that these two misdeeds fail in accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings, from not assisting their meritorious activity.<sup>367</sup>

223212211.5 A contradiction to giving doctrine.

(10c) Not giving to those who seek doctrine.

Should the bodhisattva fail to give doctrine to those who seek doctrine, under the influence of the two thoughts or being envious by nature, it is defiled. With the other thoughts, it is undefiled.

Not giving is without transgression, firstly, on account of the basis, when: (1) You are critically ill. (2) You do not know doctrine. On account of necessity when you desire, by means of not giving doctrine, to exert discipline, as taught above. On account of the disciple, if you do not have a fit vessel, if he is (1) a tīrthika seeking an opening, (2) someone who would receive it with disrespectful thoughts, without a

word of courtesy and with bad physical deportment, (3) suspecting that when someone of weak, immature faculties hears<sup>368</sup> teaching of awesome doctrine, he will tremble at its difficulty to grasp, have wrong views out of disbelief, wrong adherence out of not heeding although it be communicated correctly and, on that basis, impairment by the creation of much demerit and the decay of going to a lower state of rebirth that comes of that [demerit], or (4) suspecting that if it comes into the hands of that person it will be diffused to others who are not fit vessels

In this last set, the first indicates someone seeking controversy as well.<sup>369</sup> In the second case, "disrespectful" etc. will each suffice. In the third it is not necessary that all the elements be complete.

In this group [of seven], the second misdeed [9b] is a fault of commission, and the other six [9a, 9c-10c] are faults of omission. As with the second, any that may occur under the influence of time and place or associates are set aside; the necessity of sufficiently relinquishing the vow-thought should always be understood [to be necessary for a misdeed to have occurred].

This last misdeed, the new commentary points out, fails in giving as part of collecting virtue and accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings.<sup>370</sup>

22321221.2 Factors incompatible with morality. Three parts: contradictions with others as the chief concern, contradictions with oneself as the chief concern, and contradictions with equal concern for both.

22321221.1 Contradictions with others as the chief concern. Two parts: actual contradictions with others as the chief concern, and a particular point of training oneself in prātimokṣa precepts dealing with natural [morality].

22321221.1 Actual contradictions to morality with others as the chief concern. Three points.

1.1 Abandoning the object of extra sympathy.

(10d) Neglecting the immoral.

(67a) To neglect or discount sentient beings for the two reasons that they are violent and they are immoral, with the two thoughts is defiled. To neglect them with the other two thoughts [laziness and indolence]

and to discount them absentmindedly, is undefiled. The reason for this is that a bodhisattva lives with a thought of mercy and a desire-to-do for those who are violent and immoral and dwell in the cause of suffering such as he does not have for someone who is righteous and at peace in his activities of body, speech, and mind.

"Violent" refers to committing the [five] immediates and so forth. "Immoral" refers to the occurrence of a seminal transgression. Samudra interprets them as being possessed of aversion and passive toward the training.<sup>371</sup>

Neglect is without transgression when, on account of necessity, (1) you are exerting discipline by that means. (2) You are guarding the minds of many others. (3) You are keeping an internal rule of the community.

#### 1.2 Not training in the shared precepts.

(1a) Not training for the sake of others' faith.<sup>372</sup>

The bodhisattva trains himself as do the auditors--not refusing to conform by distinguishing himself from them--according to what has been legislated by the Lord as trainings in the *Prātimokṣa*, the source work, and in other vinaya texts such as the *Vibhaṅga* that are commentaries to it,<sup>373</sup> to be reprehensible by precept (which means, those [rules] not reprehensible by nature), in order to guard the thought of others. He renounces whatever the auditors renounce.

In order that those previously without faith may have faith, and those previously faithful may develop it further, there are precepts for not drinking alcohol, abstinence from eating at the wrong time and so forth, as well as [not] digging the soil, making a fire, etc.<sup>374</sup> You must train yourself in these as do the auditors, for if you fail to do so, not only does a fault develop contradicting the *prātimokṣa*--a misdeed also develops contradicting the bodhisattva vow.

(67b) The reason for this is that the auditors, intent as they are upon their own welfare, train themselves in trainings that guard the minds of others. How much more so must the bodhisattvas, intent as they are upon the welfare of others!<sup>375</sup> The new commentary adds, 'Not to train yourself in those [bases of training] out of lack of faith and disre-

spect for them, is defiled; not to train yourself out of indolence and so forth is undefiled.<sup>376</sup>

Is this a possible misdeed for all bodhisattvas, lay and monastic? According to the explanation of the new commentary, it applies to the monastic bodhisattva.<sup>377</sup> Nevertheless, many individual enactments for the lay bodhisattva appear to be shared with the prātimokṣa.<sup>378</sup>

1.3 [Not] training in the unshared.

(11b) Doing little for the welfare of sentient beings.

He must not train himself as do the auditors in what the Teacher has prescribed for auditors with respect to dwelling in meager aims, few deeds, and little concern--that is to say, in individual enactments such as the ten dealing with robes and [in general] the thirty beginning with "owning an extra [robe]."<sup>379</sup> To train himself as they do is a misdeed. To have meager aims and so forth with the two thoughts is defiled, and with the other two thoughts is undefiled.<sup>380</sup> The reason for this is that the auditor excels in being intent upon his own welfare--that is to say, he advances in self-discipline<sup>381</sup> and disregards the welfare of others. In undertaking the welfare of others, he dwells in meager aims and so forth. The bodhisattva, for whom the welfare of others is paramount in that he advances for the sake of the benefit and pleasure of all sentient beings, does not excel in undertaking others' welfare with meager aims and the like.

"Meager aims" means small desires. "Few deeds" means not owning many requisites. "Little concern" means dwelling in the family of nobles<sup>382</sup>--that is to say, the family of nobles who are four things: content (68a) with their (1) robes, (2) alms, and (3) an inferior dwelling place, and (4) enraptured by renunciation and meditative development.<sup>383</sup>

The bodhisattva, for the sake of others, should seek<sup>384</sup> as many as a hundred, a thousand robes from unrelated brahmins and householders. If an occasion presents itself in the form of a patron, he should examine whether or not these sentient beings have enough, and if not, accept what they require. Samudra would interpolate the clause "examine whether or not they can bear it," explaining it to mean "examine whether or not, if I accept, the donor will be impoverished, and whether or not

he will be ridiculed by others." This is untenable. The passage is meant to show that there is no fault in accepting more than the proper measure while begging.

As with robes, so also with begging bowls.<sup>385</sup> And just as with accepting robes, there is no transgression in having them woven, by unrelated weavers, out of yarn he has accepted. According to this text, to give it to unrelated weavers to be woven is clearly a [prātimokṣa] transgression, even if you pay the fee for weaving. In the monastic discipline the transgression is declared to be a fault without a fee being given.<sup>386</sup>

He should also furnish a hundred beds of silk for the sake of others, and a hundred rugs for sitting. He should accept more than a million-million in gold and silver.<sup>387</sup> Jinaputra interprets these as beds of raw silk, rugs, and cushions. Permission for beds of silk for the sake of others implies permission for raw silk, black wool, and a blending of two parts. "Rugs for sitting" gives permission for the "six year" forfeiture.<sup>388</sup>

He does not train himself, as do the auditors, in these and other precepts that begin with meager aims, few deeds, and dwelling in little concern.<sup>389</sup>

These two guidelines [11a,b], plus the one that follows [11c], constitute the great counsel, showing just how prātimokṣa (monk, etc.) holders of the bodhisattva vow should train themselves in prātimokṣa precepts. There are two topics here: precepts that are natural and precepts that are individual enactments. Just how to train in the first will be taught [at 11c] below. Individual enactments have two parts in their turn. First come those legislated in order to guard the thought of others [11a]. The new commentary says of these,<sup>390</sup> "The bodhisattva is someone who should train himself even more than others do, and when he has become a monastic, he must certainly keep his training." According to this, he must keep his thought even more tightly guarded than does the auditor. Second comes the guideline as to meager aims and so forth. When the welfare of others is at stake, this must supersede the first. So in this respect he does not keep [the prātimokṣa vow] as the auditors do. These three classes of guideline comprise all prātimokṣa precepts.

Being aware of this sort of classification,<sup>391</sup> one might say of these prātimokṣa precepts, which are shared: "We are bodhisattvas. We are tantrics. Even should we 'supersede' them, the latter status will purify us." They say this and proceed to grow lax. This laxity is an even larger offense that contradicts bodhisattva precepts in context of this [bodhisattva] teaching, and in a tantric context it creates a "gross breach" contradicting that vow. So it is said,<sup>392</sup>

The "superseders" who say there is no need  
To keep the precepts of both vow,  
Encur a "gross breach" improbity.

In light of this formulation, how can those who claim to be greater vehicle, but fail to keep either of the two vows, have any basis whatsoever for speaking in this way? They pollute the Teacher's dispensation with the sewage of their sordid preoccupations. We who desire something better should avoid them as we would poison.

The old commentary states, "[An example of the auditor's] bases of (69a) training [is as follows]: 'If any monk approaches an unrelated householder or householder's wife and begs for a robe, that is a "fofeiture" transgression.' Maintaining both vows, one should be understood to have relinquished the welfare of others, and to be intent on one's own." The matters permitted by this, if not done for the welfare of others but under the influence of being intent on one's own, are exactly the same offenses that are presented in the *Vinaya-vastu*.<sup>393</sup>

The new commentary explains that these last three misdeeds fail, respectively, in ethics-of-the-vow restrictions, collecting wholesomeness, and accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings.<sup>394</sup>

2232122121.2 A particular point of training oneself in prātimokṣa precepts dealing with natural [morality].<sup>395</sup>

(11c) With mercy there is no [deed] without virtue.

On this point the text, the old commentary to the *TV* and the two commentaries to the Chapter on Ethics teach that there are occasions when the seven of body and speech--murder and the rest--are permitted. Aside from this, they do not state that not to engage in them for the sake

of others is a fault. The new commentary, in noting that there are forty-six misdeeds, implicitly numbers this as one misdeed.<sup>396</sup> Furthermore, that commentary would appear to interpret this line as an exception to "Not training for the sake of others' faith" [11a]. Jinaputra and Samudramegha likewise interpret it as teaching that there is a distinction to be made between what is naturally reprehensible for the bodhisattva and for the auditor.<sup>397</sup> Why then are these taught in context of prātimokṣa guidelines as to what is naturally reprehensible? Repeatedly it is stated, in relation to each of the seven of body and speech beginning with murder, that when done by a bodhisattva with skill in means there is no fault, but a spread of much merit. On this basis the text presents sexual misconduct as prohibited for the monastic and a support (69b) for [the training of] the lay bodhisattva. (To quote: "For the monastic bodhisattva, who guards against breaking the auditors' training, to resort to uncelibacy is entirely out of the question.") The other six--stealing and the rest--are general bodhisattva supports.

Objection: "That bodhisattva who is engaged in murder and the rest, in some basis for possible defeat, is he monastic or lay? If he is monastic, there is no such distinction between sexual misconduct being wrong and murder, etc., being all right: both would be equal in resulting in defeat or not. If he is lay, it would contradict the text when it makes a qualification for sexual misconduct, but not for the others."<sup>398</sup>

"Furthermore, the SS says:<sup>399</sup> 'Indeed, if he sees a larger benefit for sentient beings, he may put aside his training. <sup>400</sup> By fostering them for many aeons, they have come to possess good roots that are fulfilled in the great compassion, skill in means, and so forth, which function as their very nature. How can desire-attachment create an impediment for such bodhisattvas?'<sup>400</sup> The *Skill in Means* scripture reads: "The brahman youth Jyotis lived under the rule of celibacy for forty-two thousand years. As he stood on the seventh step, compassion was born in him, upon which he thought, 'Breaking my vow of austerity, I may go to hell. However, I can bear to experience the pain of hell that this woman, who was about to die, may be pleased.' Kulaputra, the brahman Jyotis turned back and took the woman by her right hand and said,

'Arise, dear sister, and do what you desire.'"<sup>400</sup> This contradicts the explanation [of the text that a monk may not break celibacy.]"

Response: There is no problem. For taking what has not been freely given to create a defeat, it is necessary to have taken it for one's own sake. When it is permissible for a bodhisattva, it is not the case that he is being permitted the defeat of stealing, because he is only taking it for someone else's sake. Therefore, to engage in something that will (70a) result in the defeats of [theft,] murder, and lying is wrong for the monastic, just as uncelibacy is wrong.

Objection: "What then is the distinction between lay and monastic that belongs uniquely to uncelibacy?" Response: There is no problem here either. The distinction has been made from this consideration: To take a course of action of killing, stealing, or lying does not necessarily result in defeat, while for someone to take the course of uncelibacy when it has been prescribed for him as a basis [of his training] will necessarily become a seminal transgression. There is no contradiction with the *SS* either. Celibacy is in general the best way to accomplish someone else's welfare, and its relinquishment is no larger benefit to the other person. In particular circumstances, however, it is permissible for the layperson, though not for the monastic, to put aside his training and engage in something that is a basis for the *prātimokṣa* seminal transgression when he sees in it a larger benefit for a sentient being. Conversely, if it were permissible for the monastic as well, there would be no point in calling it a "laying aside of training."

As to the person who implements others' welfare by murder etc.: In the *SS*, we read, "This is intended for someone who has not attained the stages, who courses in the six perfections, not for anyone else." Such is the reading of the old translation.<sup>401</sup> The new translation reads, "who has attained the stages."<sup>402</sup> Some [scholars] prefer the reading of the old translation, on the grounds that the teacher's words [in the new translation] are pointless: Someone who has attained the stages would have to be coursing in the six perfections. I wonder if this opinion is tenable. According to the passage of the *SS* cited above, it does not suffice to course in the six perfections without having attained the sta-

ges; one must be a bodhisattva endowed with skill in means and with a great compassion developed on the path for many aeons. Furthermore, it is permissible for a bodhisattva who has taken the bodhisattva vow and come into possession of skilful training in the trainings, who is (70b) therefore endowed with the thought of awakening that cherishes others, and then only if he finds no other means than taking life etc. It is not permissible for just anyone of the Greater Vehicle. If it is not permissible for someone who only trains skilfully in the bodhisattva vow, it is never suitable for those who claim to be greater vehicle without keeping the vow at all, who possess only a semblance of compassion and a semblance of having generated the thought. By analogy, in the prātimokṣa if a monk who is ill does not eat a late afternoon meal it will worsen his illness, and if he eats it will help, so it is permissible for him, while all other monks must keep [the rule].

Uncelibacy has been explained in that canonical text which the SS cites, and the seminal transgressions of murder and the rest are basically similar. These others, including the four [of speech]--lying and so forth--and stealing, will be explained below. For now, let us establish that one must investigate with a precise intellect whether or not the deed is faultless--whether it is endowed with a great purpose that will effect the welfare of the sentient being in question, whether it involves skilfully keeping the bodhisattva vow when no other means is available, and whether one's thinking is motivated by the circumstances. For this situation is an exclusive province of the capable, and fraught with very imminent peril. Samudramegha, Jinaputra, and Samudra explain, in context of murder, that this is the course of bodhisattvas who have gained control--who have an undefiled intention--and whose attitude has been purified; it is not the province of those whose good roots are small, whose understanding is dull, who are partisan in the views, and who take the scriptures literally. Only to the buddhas is [the procedure] obvious in that case; no one else should attempt it at all, lest he come to acquire the opposite of merit.

[The seven unvirtuous courses of action.] (1) Permission to murder. The object is a robber, thief, etc. who is embarking upon a deed of

(71a) immediate [retribution], being about to murder many hundreds of auditors, independent buddhas, and bodhisattvas for the sake of a few material goods. The attitude: Seeing someone like that, he thinks, "If I slay him, I myself may be reborn in hell. Nevertheless, that would be far better than for this sentient being to commit an 'immediate' and go straight to hell." Adopting only a thought of mercy for the consequence, he presumes to change places with the other.

At the time of killing he must ascertain the state of his own thought to be either virtuous or [karmically] indeterminate, and entirely unmixed with defilement and the like. The interpretation of some, that this applies to the thought of the victim, makes no sense. <sup>403</sup>

Constrained: There is a paucity of alternatives, since he can find no other means.

Should he take life in this way there is no fault, but a spread of much merit. <sup>404</sup>

(2) Permission to steal. There are three objects.

2.1 Kings and high officials who are generally savage, without compassion <sup>405</sup> for sentient beings and engaged entirely in oppression who, if they remain in their position, will spread great demerit. The attitude: With a thought of mercy or the intention of doing benefit, he overthrows them from that dominion; he steals it from them. <sup>406</sup>

2.2 Robbers and thieves who take wealth from community and shrine by theft, desiring to enjoy it. The attitude: Thinking only, "Let not extended harm <sup>407</sup> and misfortune come to them on that basis," he steals it back and restores whatever belongs to them, to the community and the shrine.

2.3 Storekeepers or park custodians who clumsily waste the wealth of community or shrine and use it for themselves. <sup>408</sup> The attitude: As explained just above, he removes them from that [position].

(71b) In this way he takes what has not been freely given yet incurs no fault; but there is a spread of much merit.

(3) Permission for sexual misconduct. The object: A single woman who is <sup>409</sup> attached to that bodhisattva, in agony to end her celibacy <sup>409</sup> because she holds the spiteful attitude that if he does not satisfy her desire, she will die. <sup>410</sup>

The term "single," according to some commentaries, excludes sexual misconduct.<sup>411</sup> But this is not tenable. The situation is precisely one in which sexual misconduct is permitted. The *SS* states that the fault of sexual misconduct does not occur [for the bodhisattva acting with skill in means, etc.] whether or not she has a husband: "There is no sexual misconduct even if it is done covertly, with someone who has a husband or is single, or with someone guarded by family, religion, or flag."<sup>412</sup> In this context the *SS* also declares, "As to those who are proper celibates: worship them from afar, as though they were your mother or your sister, for they are already pursuing the goal." This implies (1) that monastics are generally dissimilar to those who dwell as laypersons, and (2) that the training should be put aside if one sees a higher goal. So the sense is the same as that of the *Bbh*.

The new commentary says,<sup>413</sup> "To practice sexual intercourse may result in transgression, in going to uninterrupted hell, and in loss of faith by many who are worthy of being disciples. The magnificent ones never allow themselves to resort to sexual intercourse when they see that these situations will follow it for worldly persons. Neither will they commit the others, beginning with taking human life."<sup>414</sup>

The attitude: He thinks, "Let not much evil spread, based on this thought of enmity." And he thinks, "If I resort to sexual desire, I will (72a) bring her to wholesomeness according to my desire, and bring her under my influence for abandonment of the unwholesome."<sup>415</sup> If he resorts to sexual intercourse with a thought that is nothing but merciful there is no fault, but a spread of much merit.<sup>416</sup>

(4) Permission to tell lies. The object: many sentient beings who can be shielded from loss of life, from mutilation of hand, foot, nose, and ear, and from the gouging of eyes. The attitude: He undertakes it to protect them from those penalties. He duly considers that a bodhisattva will not knowingly tell a lie if it is a matter of his own welfare, even for the sake of his life. Then he tells a lie for the sake of the sentient beings. In short, he sees only the welfare of sentient beings and what [will accomplish it], not the reverse. Having no thought of self-interest, only a desire for benefit, he changes his opinion to tell a lie. In such a case there is no fault, but a spread of much merit.<sup>417</sup>

(5) Permission to slander. The object: sentient beings who have been captured by an unwholesome adviser. The attitude: thinking, "Let not extensive harm and misfortune come to them through contact with a sinful companion," he speaks words that will part them from the unwholesome adviser. Although he creates discord in that way, there is no fault, but a spread of much merit.<sup>418</sup>

(6) Permission for harsh words. The object: sentient beings who are taking the wrong path and doing wrong. The attitude: by means of speaking harshly, to move them from unwholesomeness to the wholesome. Although this is harsh speech there is no fault, but a spread of much merit.

Samudra interprets "taking the wrong path" as engaging in the ten unwholesome [paths of action], of knowing the path of the Greater Vehicle (72b) but taking the limited vehicle, and knowing the lesser vehicle but taking a heterodox path. "Doing wrong" he interprets as knowing what is right, but being passive and without respect for the lessons.

(7) Permission for idle chatter. The object: sentient beings inclined to dance, song, and instrumental music, and those inclined to tales of kings and robbers, food and drink, prostitutes and street scenes.<sup>419</sup> Precondition and attitude: He is learned in dance and the rest. With merciful intention he pleases them with varieties of dance, etc., bending them to submission to his will and influence. Having drawn them in to listen to his words, he moves them from unwholesomeness to the wholesome. Although this is idle chatter there is no fault, but a spread of much merit.

Neither this text nor the *Vairocana-bhisambodhi* give any situation in which the three of mind, aside from the seven of body and speech, are permissible.<sup>420</sup> Apparently, Dhārmika Subhūti would have it that "those who do them without the slightest regard for their own welfare, but desiring only the other's welfare and being entirely endowed with compassion, are permitted [all] excepting the three misbehaviors of mind-- or, excepting [the one of] false view. This may be seen in the textbooks on bodhisattva vow."<sup>421</sup> This statement would appear to require some primary source [as corroboration].

Bodhibhadra suggests that even in superseding prātimokṣa precepts-by-nature, "there is no fault, and a spread of much merit. What need to mention what is only reprehensible by precept?"<sup>422</sup> One can judge from [explanations] given above the lack of fault in superseding individual enactments when a greater need connected with the welfare of others is discerned.

223212212.2 Contradictions to ethics with oneself as the chief concern. Three points.

### 2.1 Failure in livelihood.

(11d) Ready acceptance of wrong livelihood.

The five wrong means of livelihood, beginning with hypocrisy. To allow (73a) any to occur, feeling no shame or constraint at them nor attempting to remove them with the antidote, is a defiled fault. There is no case that is undefiled. If you have generated a will to remove them but have a great share of defilement, there is no fault, as was explained in context of "Following thoughts of desire" [9b].

The definitions of wrong livelihood, according to the *Precious Garland*, are:

Hypocrisy is restraint of the senses  
 For the sake of gain and respect;  
 Sweet talk is speaking first and gently  
 For the sake of gain and respect;  
 Hinting to obtain something  
 Is praising someone else's things;  
 Extortion for the sake of gain  
 Is outright reproach of the other;  
 Seeking to profit from possessions  
 Is praising what has already been obtained.<sup>423</sup>

The commentaries suggest that there is a misdeed if one fails to be aware of the thought of wrong livelihood as soon as it has arisen.<sup>424</sup> This does not appear to correspond to the text.

### 2.2 Failure in deportment.

(12a) Laughing aloud, and so forth, from levity.

To be excited--the mind restless, a subdivision of desire-attachment-- and, because one is caught up by it, to be restless, to enjoy that [restlessness], showing one's excitement with a horse laugh, distractedly sporting and clamoring and wishing others to share in one's merriment, is a defiled fault.<sup>425</sup> Doing these absentmindedly is undefiled.

To do these, down through "showing one's excitement with a horse laugh," is no fault, on account of the basis, when you have generated the will to remove it, as above. On account of necessity, (1) if you desire by that means to remove enmity that has been created in others. (2) You desire to remove someone's sorrow. (3) You are attracting and establishing [in the doctrine] others who enjoy games. (4) You are keeping (73b) ing with you old friends who have taken the lead.<sup>426</sup> (5) You are showing your pure intention with a cheerful countenance towards others whom you suspect might otherwise take a dislike, enmity, and aversion to you.

Greed for the taste of existence.

(12b) Thinking to travel only in samsara.

Many scriptures say such things as, "The esteem which a bodhisattva has for nirvana does not compare with his esteem for samsara."<sup>427</sup> To mistake these, and to hold and espouse<sup>428</sup> the view that "The bodhisattva should not look forward to nirvana, but should avert his face from it. Nor should he fear the defilements and the subsidiary defilements. He should not set his mind too far apart from them, for the bodhisattva must accomplish bodhi in this way, revolving through samsara for three incalculable aeons"--is a defiled fault.

What fault is there in such a view? The auditor must anticipate nirvana, his thinking alarmed at the defilements, and the bodhisattva must do so a million-millionfold more. The auditor must do so even though he acts to liberate himself along from renewed existence; since the bodhisattva acts to liberate all sentient beings from existence, what need to mention his striving? The bodhisattva must carry out the exercises described above that will free his mind of being defiled. For he cannot release others from defilements without have first released himself from them. The MSA says: <sup>429</sup>

Having taken a great burden upon his head,  
 A fine creature does not shine at a leisurely pace;  
 Bound all the more by the harness of self and others,  
 (74a) He should be making efforts by the hundred.

The bodhisattva is no arhat, but he is distinguished from them in that he may course in things that are bound up with outflow without being defiled--in other words, he is skilled in means.

Samudra suggests that "The auditors, although their faculties are dull, recognize the inadequacy of samsara with alarm. How much more so must the bodhisattva, with keen faculties and intellect immeasurable?"<sup>430</sup> If this were so, the declaration made by scriptures that one should not esteem nirvana and that one should esteem samsara, would (1) exclude nirvana as being fundamentally irreconcilable with taking rebirth in existence, and (2) acclaim samsara as being existence unsoiled by the bonds of karma and defilement. However, not be alarmed at samsara because of its karma-defilement, and esteeming nirvana as the interruption [of that process], are not mutually exclusive.

These three misdeeds, according to Bodhibhadra, fail respectively in pure livelihood, non-frivolity, and detachment, all within the ethics of the vow. To the first he adds the wrong means of livelihood [for a layperson] of selling alcohol, weapons, poison, living beings, drugs and the like, and food adulteration.<sup>431</sup> And he says, "What need to mention such [occupations] as farming?"<sup>432</sup>

223212212.3 Contradictions to ethics with equal concern for oneself and others. Two points.

### 3.1 Not guarding one's own reputation.

(12c) Failing to ward off defamation.

Not to guard against, to fail to dispel the stench of an unflattering or ignominious<sup>433</sup> report of oneself, when it is based upon something that (74b) is true, is a defiled fault. To fail to guard against and dispel it when it is based upon something that is not a matter of fact, is undefiled.<sup>434</sup>

Drolungpa [sp. Gro-lung-pa] states that the threesome "stench, insult,

and bad report" represent greater, medium, and lesser degrees of fault-finding.

"Not to guard against" indicates the failure to stop it from occurring in the first place. "Fail to dispel" indicates the failure to stop its spread once it has occurred.

To take no measure to dispel an insulting remark is without transgression, on account of the speaker, when (1) the individual is a tīrthika or (2) someone prejudiced, who would not believe even if he were told, or (3) he is speaking overcome with anger. <sup>435</sup>

The wording of the new commentary, "others who are prejudiced tīrthikas," collapsing the first two into one, does not accord with the text.<sup>436</sup>

[There is no transgression] on account of what is said, when the insult is uttered on the basis of you (1) being ordained, (2) living on alms, or (3) [more generally] living a virtuous life. <sup>437</sup>

3.2 Failure to frighten with harsh measures applied to the welfare of others.

(12d) Not to give treatment even comprising affliction.

Seeing that some caustic means, unenjoyable to the other party, some severity of discipline involving unpleasant physical or verbal action, would be of benefit to a sentient beings, to fail to employ it only to guard against displeasing the other person, is defiled. <sup>438</sup> Not doing so is without fail when to do so would result in little benefit for the other person in this life, and great unhappiness for him upon that basis. But commentaries contain the gloss that this would result in little benefit for the other and great trouble for oneself. <sup>439</sup>

The new commentary says, "'Comprising affliction' indicates severe measure. 'Even' shows that not only does he fail to [give treatment] with them: [Neither does he give treatment] with measures that are gentle." It almost appears that he is placing the opposite construction on it, declaring that "Not only does he not treat them with severity; He does not even treat them with gentleness." So it seems that we must (75a) explain it in this way: "Not to give treatment to others when the treatment of which you are capable is afflictive or very hazardous..."<sup>440</sup>

These two misdeeds, according to the new commentary, fail respectively (1) in collecting wholesome factors, for failure to course in mindfulness and awareness, and for failure to eliminate one's own errors even when they are common knowledge, and (2) in accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings, as accomplished by rebuking them.

22321221.3 Contradictions to patience. Three parts.

(13a) Abuse in return for abuse, and so forth.

The fault of being without the four qualities of a religious person;<sup>441</sup> it is defiled.

"Abuse" is angry scolding. Included in the "and so forth" are returning anger for anger--unpleasant speech with the intention of implementing the anger; returning blow for blow--to strike out with the intention of causing pain; and returning cavil for cavil--carping back and forth.<sup>442</sup>

223212213.2 Not stopping the flow of anger. Two points.

2.1 Not stopping the anger of others. <sup>443</sup>

(13b) Neglecting those who are angry.

Whether you have given offense to someone else or whether you have not, but the other person suspects you of having done so, if you fail to apologise in a suitable manner, with a thought of enmity that is predominantly envy, or out of pride that is shame to humble yourself, then it is defiled.<sup>444</sup> To fail to do so with the other two thoughts, and out of carelessness, is a fault that is not defiled.

Not to do so is without transgression, on account of necessity, when desiring to exert discipline by that means. On account of the object of the apology, when (1) he is a tīrthika. (2) He is someone improper, who desires to induce an apology by acting reprehensibly. (3) He is someone (3) He is someone contentious and given to dispute, whom the apology (75b) would further agitate. (4) He is someone of a patient disposition whose thinking will not change whether or not an apology is made. (5) He is someone who wants no apology or someone whom, it would embarrass.

The last two, as presented in the text, appear to be one. The commentaries, however, make them appear to be separate.<sup>445</sup>

## 2.2 Not stopping one's own.

## (13c) Rejecting someone's excuses.

When someone who has offended in the course of some dispute apologises for it in the right way if, with a thought of enmity or an attitude of malice towards the other person you do not heed, you fail to accept the apology, it is defiled. Being without hatred but of an impatient disposition and not accepting it only because you do not want to accept it, the fault is not defiled. <sup>446</sup>

Not accepting it is without fault, on account of necessity, when desiring to exert discipline by that means. On account of the object, when he makes an apology in what is not the right way, and it is incompatible. The former term means "incorrectly," and the latter means "only verbally." In place of the latter, both the old and new commentaries to the *TV* have "not at the right time," <sup>447</sup> which I take to mean "not apologising immediately afterward."

The new commentary would have it that cases involving *tīrthikas* and contentious persons are also without fault.

## 223212213.3 Not maintaining [patience] as an antidote.

## (13d) Following thoughts of anger.

To develop in the first place, and to harbor, never relinquishing, <sup>448</sup> an attitude of anger toward someone else, not seeing it to be a fault nor having recourse to the antidote--thus readily allowing it to occur--is a defiled fault. Trying to remove it but not reversing it there is no fault, as explained above.

Master Bodhibhadra proposes this to be "the fault of harboring the development of anger." <sup>449</sup>

Among these four faults, the first two are explained by the new commentary to fail, respectively, (1) in eagerness to benefit others by means of the vow and the collection of virtue both, and (2) in disallowing the (76a) defilements and their subsidiaries--which acts as the basis for violating the ethics of collecting virtue. No information appears on the latter two.

## 22321221.4 Contradictions to vigor. Three points.

4.1 Inferior application. <sup>450</sup>

(14a) Attracting followers out of desire for honor.

To yearn for service, such as being bathed, and for honor, such as a rug for one's seat and not being assigned to work, attracting followers with a thought of self-interest, as for example with the expectation of material offerings, is defiled. There is no fault in accepting service etc. with no thought for one's own interests. <sup>451</sup>

## 4.2 No application at all.

(14b) Not dispelling laziness and the like.

Laziness and indolence arise for him. "And the like" includes the pleasure of sleep, the pleasure of staying in bed and of lying on one's side. His pleasure in this repose is "unseasonable"--by day and by night--and intemperate. <sup>452</sup> To succumb to and fail to dispel it is a defiled fault in the earlier and later parts of the night, though not in the middle watch. To succumb is without fault, on account of the basis, when (1) sick and incapacitated, (2) fatigued from travelling, and (3) having generated the will to dispel it, as before.

## 4.3 Demeaning activity.

(14c) Giving way with a passion to gossip.

To pass the time with one's mind enamored of social intercourse, of [gossip about] such things as kings and ministers, robbers and thieves, women and love, is a defiled misdeed. <sup>453</sup> If done absentmindedly, the fault is not defiled.

(76b) This is accomplished, Samudra suggests, by only passing the time listening to someone else, and by passing a period of time that extends beyond the morning into afternoon, thence into evening and so forth. <sup>454</sup>

Listening and talking is no fault, on account of the listener, when someone is continuing to speak and you listen but a moment to comply with his expectations, while stationed in mindfulness. On account of the discussion, when you are only asking someone else, or only answering a question asked of yourself, in a discussion of something curious or wondrous. <sup>455</sup>

Jinaputra and [Samudramegha] contend that this is also a fault when trying to study. <sup>456</sup>

These three misdeeds, as explained by the new commentary, fail in (1) gathering a following in accord with the doctrine as part of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings, (2) the perfection of vigor as part of collecting wholesomeness, and (3) disallowing any sojourn in society ["and"--Bodhibhadra] demeaning conversations, as part of the ethics of the vow.

22321221.5 Contradictions to meditation. Three points.

5.1 A fault of preparation.

(14d) Failure to seek the goal of concentration.

Whereas it is desirable to settle one's mind in equilibrium, not to go, with a thought of enmity and out of pride, to someone else to receive instruction on undertaking mental stability,<sup>457</sup> is defiled. With the other two thoughts the fault is not defiled. Not to receive [instruction] is without fault, on account of the basis, when (1) you are sick and incapacitated. (2) You suspect the instruction will be distorted. (3) You yourself are erudite and capable of settling your mind in equilibrium, or you have already carried out the instruction that is to be given.

5.2 A fault of the principal.

(15a) Not to eliminate hindrances in meditation.

To allow any of the hindrances that obstruct meditation to occur, to fail to dispel them, is defiled. In generating the will to remove them, and so forth, there is no fault, as above.

(77a) The five hindrances, according to the *Letter to a Friend*,<sup>458</sup> are:

Excitedness, regret, ill will and langour,  
Drowsiness, sense-desire and doubt;  
Recognize these five hindrances as thieves  
Who will steal your wealth of virtue.

Excitedness-regret is a single hindrance, and drowsiness-langour is also.

There are two parts to this discussion: (1) identification of the hindrances to be purged and the phenomena that induce them, and (2) how to purge them.

1. Sense-desire: With craving and desire for the five sensory objects--form, sound, and the rest--thought pursues<sup>459</sup> the five objects. Its inducement is unskillful attention that imputes pleasing and agreeable characteristics to the object. Ill will: the intention of injuring and doing harm to someone else. Its inducement is the imputation of unpleasant and disagreeable characteristics as grounds for annoyance. Langour: a part of bewilderment representing mind stunned and unfit for action. Drowsiness: in this context, a part of bewilderment that abstracts mind from its object. The inducement of both these is turbidity on account of attention to the darker characteristics of mind. Excitedness: the restless part of attachment. Regret: nostalgia. The inducements of these two are preoccupation with neighborhood, district, country, and deities, and memories of former activities involving laughter, affection, joy, and satisfaction. Doubt as to whether or not you<sup>460</sup> exist in the past, present, or future. "Profound doubt" [has as its object] the Precious [Three], activity-result, and the four truths. Their inducements are past etc. phenomena and unskillful attention in visualizing them.

(77b) 2. How to purge them: (2.1) with what attitude and (2.2) with what sort of deportment.

2.1 Three parts. 21.1 How to purge them with respect to doctrine. As antidote to sense-desire, there is meditative cultivation of the repulsive--a discolored corpse, a worm-eaten corpse, and so forth. The antidote to ill will is to cultivate love. Antidotes to drowsiness-langour are perceiving the characteristics of light in the sun, moon, and so forth and then forming thoughts with the aspect of clarity; recollection of the qualities of Buddha, Doctrine, and Community, morality and renunciation; and recollection of deities. In addition, there are focusing upon an image that clears it away, followed by mental jubilation; gazing at the directions, the moon, and the stars; and bathing one's countenance with water. The antidote to excitement-regret is introversion and doing unification concentration. As antidote to doubt, there is seeing that the "self" of the past, the future, and so forth is a matter of the causal interaction of mere phenomena that do not exist, and subsequent skillful attention free from imputation and negation of existence qua existence or nonexistence quas nonexistence.

In addition, for all of them you should intone passages from the exalted word of the Buddha that condemn the five hindrances and the phenomena that induce them, in terms of the disadvantages, and that praise being free from them in terms of the advantages. If you contemplate etc. the meaning [of such passages], then [hindrances] that have not arisen will not arise, and those that have arisen will be stopped.

21.2 Purging them with respect to yourself. As soon as any of the five hindrances has arisen, that hindrance is a subsidiary defilement of your thinking, a diminution of your understanding, and an injury to your virtue; so, recognizing that it is incompatible with your way [of practicing the doctrine], be ashamed and, refusing to allow it, get rid of it.

21.3 Purging them with respect to the world. When any of the five hindrances have arisen or come close to arising, then think, "If I create these, then my teachers, the deities that I know in meditation,<sup>461</sup> and my learned friends will all condemn me." Then do not create those not arisen, and eliminate those that have already arisen. (78a)

2.2 With what sort of deportment to purge them. Standing, in the case of drowsiness-langour, purge this one by walking to and fro. The other four are purged by directing your mindfulness to correcting the sitting position.

To refuse to allow these, and to get rid of them, holds not only for periods of meditative concentration: it is to be done at all times.

5.3 A fault of the conclusion.

(15b) Seeking good qualities in the taste of meditation.

When meditative trance arises in his [mental] continuum, to experience its taste and to thirst for joy and ease and the like, looking for good qualities in its taste, is defiled. There is no fault when he has generated the will to eliminate it, and so forth as above.<sup>462</sup>

The two [Bbh] commentaries interpret this as the fault of being content with concentration.<sup>463</sup> This does not seem acceptable. Even when concentration has arisen, it has four possible defilements to interrupt it before it becomes distinguished: having a taste [for it], too much pride, too much ignorance, and too many views.

These three faults, the new commentary explains, fail respectively in (1) achieving concentration as part of the ethics of the vow, (2) not dispelling sordid preoccupation as part of the ethics of the vow, plus not allowing defilements of the equalization process as part of collecting wholesomeness, and (3) not allowing the tasting of that equalization process, as part of collecting wholesomeness.

22321221.6 Contradictions to wisdom. Two parts: in connection with an inferior object, and in connection with the superior.

223212216.1 In connection with an inferior object. Four points.

1.1 Rejecting the lesser vehicle.

(15c) Rejecting the auditors' vehicle.

(78b) To hold oneself, and espouse to others the view that "A bodhisattva does not listen to doctrine that is associated with the vehicle of the auditors; he should not guard the words and the sense of it, nor should he train himself sustainedly in it. There is no need to do these things"--is a defiled fault.

To hold the opinion that it is necessary for someone of the lesser vehicle to listen etc. to the auditors' vehicle, but it is not necessary for the bodhisattva, does not constitute a fundamental rejection of the vehicle of the auditors. It looms especially large, however, as the seminal transgression of causing others to reject the prātimokṣa.<sup>464</sup>

The reason that this results in transgression is that if the bodhisattva need apply himself even to tīrthika treatises, what need to mention the exalted word of the Buddha?

To maintain that those of little familiarity with doctrine, so long as they belong to the Greater Vehicle, need not train themselves in prātimokṣa, is a great pitfall that accumulates obstacles whose karmic maturation is a paucity of doctrine. This precept [TV 15a] is the best guideline for avoiding it.

If it is done to deter someone of the Greater Vehicle from one-sided devotion to the vehicle of the auditors, and to make him devoted to the Greater Vehicle, there is no transgression, on account of the basis.

1.2 The fault of a one-sided application to it.

(15d) Application to it while having one's own method.

While one has the bodhisattva collection to which to apply oneself, to entirely neglect it and apply oneself to the auditors' collection, is defiled.

One must therefore study the lesser-vehicle collection in a way that does not constitute relinquishment of the Greater Vehicle.<sup>465</sup>

1.3 One-sided application to tīrthika texts.

(16a) Application only to outside treatises.

If you possess the exalted word of the Buddha to which to apply yourself and have not done so, and you have tīrthika treatises, heterodox [or (79a) "outside"] treatises to which application should not be made, to have failed to apply yourself to your own texts while making application to those, is a defiled fault.

Samudra interprets "heterodox treatises" as treatises of logic and grammar.<sup>466</sup>

As basis for application in the previous case [15d], the bodhisattva collection was necessary; here the word of the Buddha is sufficient.

On account of the basis, there is no fault in application to heterodox texts when you are very judicious, quick of apprehension, capable of not forgetting over a long period, able to contemplate and to penetrate the meaning, and endowed with an intellectual understanding that is unalterable because it is accompanied by investigation through reasoning, and so long as you make twice the daily application to the exalted word of the Buddha that you make to heterodox treatises.<sup>467</sup>

Jinaputra glosses "judicious" by "able to remember over the short term," "contemplate the meaning" by "sharpness of intellect," "penetrate the meaning" by "clear of understanding" and "investigate through reasoning" by "great accompanying wisdom."<sup>468</sup>

1.4 The fault of enoying one's application to tīrthika texts.

(16b) Taking pleasure in that application.

While not infringing the guideline explained above, to become proficient in tīrthika, heterodox treatises and to act accordingly (whereas one should act as though resorting to strong medicine, here one does not

do so), to do it in a manner anticipating the beginning, taking pleasure in the middle, and gratified by it at the end, is a defiled fault.

One must therefore study them by force of circumstance, without wanting to. <sup>469</sup>

In this set of four misdeeds, according to the new commentary, the (79b) first [15c] fails in eliminating wrong view, in context of collecting wholesomeness, and the second and third fail in application to hearing and consideration as part of collecting wholesomeness. No information appears on the fourth.

223212216.2 In connection with the superior object. Three parts.

2.1 Rejecting the source of wisdom.

(16c) Rejecting the Greater Vehicle.

Repudiating the bodhisattva collection is a defiled misdeed. "Why should one repudiate what one has heard?" one might ask. Having heard, from that collection, teachings that are profound (in that they go beyond the cognitive range of ordinary persons), most profound (in that they go beyond the cognitive range of auditors and independent buddhas), <sup>470</sup> dealing with profound principles of reality or the vast, astonishing might of the buddhas and bodhisattvas, he has no inclination for them--that is to say, he does not believe in them--and so repudiates [the bodhisattva collection].

The statement "dealing with profound principles of reality or with the might..." shows that the misdeed is to repudiate either one: the profound side, or the vast. <sup>471</sup>

It is repudiated in four ways, by saying any or all of these things: "These are not meaningful, in that they are inferior in what is said-- in other words, they are not a source of gnosis; they are not the doctrine, in that the act of speaking is inferior--in other words, they are not a source of merit; they are not the declaration of the Tathāgata, in that the speaker is inferior;<sup>472</sup> and in consequence they will not bring benefit and pleasure to sentient beings." The cause for repudiation is his own unskilful attention or following someone else's lead. <sup>473</sup>

How to guard one's thoughts from rejecting the doctrine: If he has heard the profound topics and the most profound topics and his thinking

is disinclined, the bodhisattva should, with faith and free of pretense, train himself to think thus: "It is not fitting for me, who am blind and (80a) lacking the eye of wisdom free from outflows, who can only function in accordance with the eye of the Tathāgata,<sup>474</sup> to reject what the Tathāgata has declared intending another meaning.<sup>475</sup> The bodhisattva counts himself ignorant and rightly regards the Tathāgata himself as being visible in those doctrines. In that way he will make progress.

If he has no inclination but does not repudiate it either, there is no fault.<sup>476</sup>

The *MSA* declares [1:21]:

The nature of mental fault is to be poisonous,  
 Even physical impropriety is improper;  
 What then must one say of doctrine eaten by doubt?  
 Therefore evenmindedness is preferable, being without fault.

And the *Precious Garland* says: <sup>477</sup>

The intentional declarations of the Tathāgata  
 Are not easy to understand; for which reason  
 He promulgated one and three vehicles.  
 Guard yourself with evenmindedness;  
 No misdeed will come from evenmindedness,  
 From aversion comes sin and not virtue.

Since it is difficult for the beginner to attain devotion that is in intellectual harmony with all [buddhist schools], if he cannot be devoted he should adopt evenmindedness and there will be no fault. <sup>478</sup>

## 2.2 Misuse of the results.

(16d) Praising oneself and deprecating another.

With a thought of self-interest and a thought of resentment, to publicly praise oneself and deprecate others is a defiled fault.

"A thought of self-interest" refers to pride; as the new commentary and Samudra put it, this is "a conceited thought" [Bodhibhadra], or "a haughty thought" [Samudra?]. Jinaputra glosses it as "a thought that holds to cherishing oneself," which is virtually the same. Therefore, the context is quite different from that of the defeat. <sup>479</sup>

To praise oneself and deprecate someone else is without fault, on account of necessity, (1) when you wish to overcome tīrthikas in order to maintain the teaching, (2) You desire to discipline someone else by that means. (3) You do it so that others without faith may have faith, and those with faith may develop it further.<sup>480</sup>

2.3 Failure in the causes of wisdom. Two points.

23.1 Not to participate in hearing.

(17a) Not to go for the sake of doctrine.

Not to go, possessed of pride and the other two thoughts, when doctrine will be discoursed upon and explained to others, and discussion of the good doctrine will be held,<sup>481</sup> is a defiled fault. To stay away with the other two thoughts is a misdeed that is not defiled. To stay away is without fault, on account of the basis, when (1) you are unaware of the doctrinal discourse etc. (2) You are sick and incapacitated. (3) You suspect that the teaching will be distorted. (4) You know that you already know the doctrinal discourse, having heard it over and over and learned it by heart. (5) You are erudite, and have learned and assimilated what you have heard. (6) You are continuing a meditative visualization, consummating a concentration. (7) Your understanding is very dull; you are weak in grasping doctrine, weak in retaining it, and weak in settling the mind upon the visualization.

The threesome "erudite..." [no. 5] refers to the arrangement of hearing, knowing, and fulfilling.<sup>482</sup> "Grasping..." refers to hearing, contemplation, and meditative cultivation.

[There is] one [case without fault] on account of necessity: when guarding from unpleasantness the thought of a lama who is already speaking doctrine to you.

(17b) Deprecating him and referring to the letter.<sup>483</sup>

To deliberately discount the person speaking doctrine--not sincerely conceiving of him as a spiritual adviser and a teacher--and to fail to pay respect to him with one's body, while ridiculing him with humiliating [questions] and making sarcastic remarks with harsh words,<sup>484</sup> and referring to the literary expression in the sense of making much of it, is a defiled fault.

(81a) Briefly, if the words are not good but the meaning is good he fails to rely upon the meaning, whereas if the words are good but the meaning is not he does rely upon it.<sup>485</sup> Some would have it that the deprecation amounts to saying to the preacher that his teaching is only literary expression, without meaning, or that the meaning is incomprehensible--in other words, failing to enter into the spirit of the letter.<sup>486</sup> This should be taken as explained earlier in the *Bbh*, in context of the four points of reference.<sup>487</sup> Jinaputra and Samudra further gloss this as a misdeed of "disrespect for the doctrine."

These three misdeeds are explained by the new commentary as failing, respectively, in eliminating bad view,<sup>488</sup> in application to study, and in service to the lama, [all] as part of collecting wholesomeness. "Makes his reference the letter" is explained as relying upon the literary expression in the sense of discounting the person who is speaking doctrine.

2232122.2 Faults incompatible with accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings. Two parts: in connection with general objects whose welfare is to be accomplished, and in connection with particular objects.

2232122.1 In connection with general objects. Two parts: not accomplishing welfare, and not dispelling harm.

2232122.1.1

(17c) Not being a friend in need.

Not to render assistance, because of the two thoughts, in the eight ways from "deciding what is to be done" through "meritorious deeds,"<sup>489</sup> is defiled; with the other two thoughts it is undefiled. The others are as explained above, [except for] "business" [or, "conventionality"], which Drolungpa explains as "teaching the linguistic conventions of other lands to someone who does not know them."<sup>490</sup>

Not to do so is without fault, on account of the basis, when (1) you are sick and incapacitated. (2) You are already promised to someone else. (3) You have entrusted it to someone else who is capable. (4) You are continuing in some even more virtuous direction. (5) You are dull-witted by nature and not qualified to impart the tradition. On account of what is to be done, when it is improper, being connected with some (81b) harm and unconnected with doctrine.<sup>491</sup> On account of the

object, when the seeker of assistance is capable of doing it himself, or if he already has some protector and recourse. On account of necessity, when (1) you desire to exert discipline by that means. (2) You are guarding against thoughts of enmity on the part of others who are more numerous. (3) You are keeping an internal rule of the community.

223212221.2 Not dispelling harm. Two parts: not dispelling suffering, and not dispelling its cause.

2.1 Not dispelling suffering. Two points.

21.1 Not to dispel particular suffering.

(17d) Refusing to serve the sick.

When someone stricken with illness is encountered, with the two thoughts to fail to render him attendance and service such as nursing his illness, is defiled; with the other two thoughts it is undefiled. Not to do so is without fault, on account of the basis, when (1) you are sick and incapacitated. (2) You have appointed someone who is capable, and congenial to the mind of the patient. (3) Your understanding is too dull, you cannot properly expound the doctrine nor properly bear it in mind, nor settle your mind upon an image.<sup>492</sup> (4) You are already promised to someone else. On account of the object, when (1) the patient already has a protector and recourse. (2) He is capable of taking care of himself. (3) He has been stricken with a long-standing illness and is about to be healed. On account of necessity, one point: guarding against interference in some sublime, wholesome direction in which you are engaged<sup>493</sup>

21.2 Not to dispel suffering in general. <sup>494</sup>

(18a) Not acting to remove suffering.

The arrangement of transgression with and without defilement, and of being without transgression, is the same as in the case of the patient. The sufferings to be removed and the ways to remove them are as explained above [18b4-19a2].

2.2 Not to dispel the cause of suffering.

(18b) Not teaching what is relevant to the careless.

(82a) If one sees sentient beings proceeding in a manner not conducive

to present and future welfare, and with the two thoughts does not point out what is relevant, or without problems, and how it is conducive, or appropriate, it is defiled; with the other two thoughts it is not. Not to teach them is without fault, on account of the basis, when (1) you are incapable, not knowing how to teach. (2) You have entrusted it to someone else who is capable of teaching. On account of the object, when (1) he is capable of correcting himself. (2) He is already associated with a spiritual adviser. (3) He has a thought of enmity toward you and would misconstrue [what you say] out of obduracy. (4) He is wild, with no respect or affection for the relevant instruction. On account of necessity, one point: you desire to exert discipline by that means. The rest can be known in detail from the explanations above.

22321222.2 In connection with particular objects whose welfare is to be accomplished. Two parts: not giving assistance, and not suppressing.

22321222.1 Not giving assistance. Six points.

1.1 Abuse of helpers.

(18c) Not to repay a good turn.

To be ungrateful to sentient beings who have helped you because you do not want to return the favor, to have no feeling for the deed in that you do not remember nor think about the assistance, and to fail, with a thought of enmity, to return the favor with assistance that is proportionate in that it is greater or, if you are incapable of that, is equal or even less, is defiled.<sup>495</sup> With the other two thoughts, the fault is undefiled. Not to do so is without fault, on account of the basis, in one case: while conscientious about returning the favor, you are unable, incapable. On account of necessity, in one case: exerting discipline by (82b) means of not returning the favor. On account of the object, in one case: he himself does not want the favor in return.

1.2 Abuse of the unhappy.

(18d) Not to assuage the sorrow of others.

Not to relieve the sorrow of others that has developed from parting with relatives and property, with a thought of enmity is defiled; with the other two thoughts the fault is not defiled. The cases without trans-

gression are the same as in "Not being a friend in need" [17c]. The classification of sorrows and how to relieve them have been explained in detail above.<sup>496</sup>

### 1.3 Abuse of the indigent.

(19a) Not giving to those who seek wealth.

Not to give requisites when begged, correctly and properly, by mendicants who desire food, drink and the like, with the two thoughts is defiled; not to give with the other two thoughts, and out of carelessness, is a fault that is undefiled. Not to give is without fault, on account of the basis, in one case: when you yourself do not have those goods. On account of the thing begged, when (1) it is improper in that it will create a problem in the present or the future. (2) It is something unsuitable for the particular beggar.<sup>497</sup> On account of necessity, when (1) you desire to exert discipline by means of not giving. (2) You are guarding against an offense to the king to which giving to this person will give rise. (3) You are keeping an internal rule of the community.

### 1.4 Abuse of one's followers.

(19b) Not working the welfare of followers.

Not to advise and instruct the following you have drawn, nor search out, in the right way, from faithful brahmins and householders, robes, food, bed and bedding, medicinal drugs and other requisites,<sup>498</sup> for those of them who are destitute, with a thought of enmity is defiled; with the other two thoughts and out of carelessness, not to advise and instruct, (83a) nor search out [requisites] is a fault that is undefiled. Not to do these things is without fault, on account of the basis, when (1) you are sick and it would be unbearable in practice. (2) You have entrusted it to someone else who is capable. On account of necessity, when (1) you desire to exert discipline by means of not instructing and searching out. (2) You are keeping an internal rule of the community. On account of the object, when (1) your following possesses great merit, or you know it is capable of searching out its own robes and the like. (2) You have already done what is to be done for them in the way of advising and instruction. (3) [The follower] is someone who was previously a tīr-

tika and has come as a Dharma thief, and there is no opportunity to tame him.<sup>499</sup>

How to attract followers with doctrine and material goods has already been explained in detail [sec. 22133.7, 21a-b above].

#### 1.5 Abuse of compliance.<sup>500</sup>

(19c) Not to conform to the expectations of others.

Not to comply with the expectations of others results in [misdeeds], both defiled and not, as in the case explained just above. Not to comply is without fault, on account of the basis, in one circumstance: when one is sick and it would be unbearable in practice. On account of necessity, when (1) the other's wish is unsuitable and would result in harm to him--or in harm to yourself.<sup>501</sup> (2) The desire is suitable but does not suit others who are more numerous, and you are guarding their thought from something unwished-for and displeasing. (3) You are keeping an internal rule of the community. (4) You are suppressing a tīrthika. (5) You desire to exert discipline by that means.<sup>502</sup> This also has been explained in detail [sec. 22133.8, 21b-22b above].

#### 1.6 Abuse of good qualities.

(19d) Not speaking in praise of good qualities.

Not to speak in praise of the genuine good qualities of others (faith and the rest, as explained [at sec. 22133, 22b] above), nor give a "Well (83b) done!" to what has been well spoken, with the one thought and the three is defiled and not, as above. Not to speak is without fault, on account of the basis, when (1) you are sick and unable to speak. (2) You are awaiting the final outcome of the other person's narration.<sup>503</sup> On account of the object, one case: you know that to mention his good qualities would displease him, because he is by nature unprepossessing. On account of what is to be said, one case: the good qualities and correct speech are only apparent. On account of necessity, when (1) you desire to exert discipline by means of not speaking. (2) You are keeping an internal rule of the community. (3) You suspect that should you speak, defilement in general, self-conceit, arrogance, and harm would result, and you are avoiding that. (4) You are suppressing tīrthikas.

223212222.2 Not suppressing. Two points.

2.1 Not to influence conduct that is wrong.

(20a) Not to suppress in accord with conditions.

In regard to sentient beings who deserve to be rebuked, to be punished, and to be banished, on account of defilement to fail to rebuke them or, having rebuked them to fail to punish them or, having punished them to fail to banish them, is defiled; with the other two thoughts, and out of carelessness, the fault is undefiled. Not to do so is without fault, on account of the basis, in one case: when awaiting the proper time. On account of the object, when (1) he is obdurately closed to discussion and possessed of a great share of enmity--in a word, incorrigible. (2) Being endowed with an intense sense of shame as well as embarrassment, he will comply as soon as possible.<sup>504</sup> On account of necessity, when (1) you foresee that to rebuke him etc. would result in conflict, caviling, fighting, and disputation, in order to prevent that. (2) You foresee strife and dissension in the community, to stop that.

(84a) The foursome "conflict, etc." are explained by Drolungpa thus: The first is general; the remaining three refer to petty squabbling, physical fighting, and fighting in academia.

2.2 Not to influence those who are hostile to the teaching.

(20b) Not using psychic powers to threaten and so forth.

If endowed with wonder-working power and various sorts of might, not to frighten those who deserve to be frightened and to bend to your will those who deserve to be bent to your will, nor to employ your wonder-working power to frighten and to bend to your will those who already dwell in the teaching, in order to make them relinquish gifts of faith, because they should not lay hold of gifts of faith when not in possession of vow, is a fault that is not defiled.<sup>505</sup>

Both commentaries to the *TV* rule this last misdeed "defiled"--seemingly, a textual corruption.<sup>506</sup>

There is no fault in not showing it to someone who is a strongly prejudiced tīrthika, who will deny the wonder-working power, saying, "This is [the effect of] a mantra, or of chemistry."<sup>507</sup>

These twelve misdeeds [17c-20b], the new commentary tells us, each fails in its own context of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings.

(20cd) There is no fault in a wholesome thought either,  
Compassionate and [acting] out of love.

There is no fault to be found among the precepts taught above as injunctions and prohibitions when one is endowed with a thought of mercy for sentient beings and when there is love for sentient beings. That is to say, there is no fault in anything done with a desire to help and a desire to exert discipline.<sup>508</sup>

"Either" includes the following, in the explanation of master master Bodhibhadra:

When thought is highly afflicted,  
And hardpressed by suffering,  
And for those asleep and drunk,  
No transgression can develop.<sup>509</sup>

The text itself, in this context, declares that there is no fault when (84b) your mind is distraught or you are hardpressed by your feelings.<sup>510</sup> This, he proposes, is implicit in these two lines.

The great master Śāntarakṣita correctly proposes that the fault of attachment appearing further on, although placed in context of lesser misdeeds, is [another circumstance in which] there is no fault.<sup>511</sup>

2232.2 How to guard the mind from these [transgressions]. The bases of training of the bodhisattvas that have been presented above appear separately in the scriptures. That is to say, they have been promulgated by the Teacher in scattered passages of this and that scripture dealing with the three sorts of ethics. The scattered passages are presented here, in the code to the bodhisattva collection by noble Asanga, comprehensively--in a unified format with a single line of development.

When setting about to train himself in the authentic grounds of training, the bodhisattva should generate respect for them; he should take the vow, from someone else, with the three blessed attitudes and then sincerely make his training the most important thing. Then he will train himself in a way that does not infringe the guidelines.

The three attitudes are a quite purified intention of training himself in them, an attitude desirous of awakening, and the intention of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings. These three are interpreted by the commentators as training oneself in the three sorts of ethics [respectively].<sup>512</sup> But they can be put in better perspective by explaining them as (1) desiring to train in the three sorts of ethics--the essential nature of the training--and (2-3) training for the specific purposes of (2) awakening and (3) the welfare of others.

At the start, from the very outset of the vow-undertaking, he should generate great respect so that offenses will not occur.

Chapter Eighteen of the *Bbh* declares [Skt 203.14-17]: "Bodhisattvas (85a) who stake the claim, 'I am a bodhisattva,' not correctly performing the trainings of a bodhisattva, should be known as counterfeit bodhisattvas; they are not genuine bodhisattvas. Bodhisattvas who stake the claim, 'I am a bodhisattva' and train themselves correctly in the bodhisattva training should be known as genuine bodhisattvas." These [real bodhisattvas] do not think, "Now let us see whether it has been performed, or whether it has been incorrectly performed." They look at the crucial guidelines. Having taken the vow, to practice the six perfections and the four means of attraction is the bare minimum. You should know the profound and extensive dispensation of the Jina to be a set of universal guidelines and, with a high enthusiasm, follow in the tracks of those holy ones who have journeyed on the path of the great chariot, paying no regard to certain renegades who do not know universality to be the keynote of the teaching.

2232.3 Means to remedy failure. And if you try not to be infected but an offense does occur, out of the four causes of transgression--ignorance, carelessness, an excess of defilement and disrespect<sup>513</sup> --you may be healed of the fault by treating it according to the doctrine.

Apart from defeat, every fault that contradicts a bodhisattva's training is included in the set of misdeeds. There are not many classes of fault, as in *prātimokṣa*. Those that occur may be confessed to anyone of the auditors' vehicle or the bodhisattva vehicle who is capable of cognizing and comprehending the topic of confession that is being verbally communicated.

[A confessor] need not possess the bodhisattva vow, although he must possess the *prātimokṣa*. Nor need he be a fully ordained monk, even (85b) though novices and the like are not appropriate confessors of *prātimokṣa* transgression. In my opinion, if the person confessing is a monastic, he should have a monastic confessor; even a bodhisattva layperson would be inappropriate.<sup>514</sup>

Now the text says, If an event that is "grounds for defeat" has occurred with greater involvement, the vow is relinquished by this and should be received a second time. And the *Summary* reads [O 5539, 42a.5]: "So long as one has arrived at a thought for retaking it that is perfectly pure, it may be retaken."

Some Tibetans propose that it is impossible to discard [the vow] more than twice.<sup>515</sup> Others think that it may be taken the first time, and twice thereafter--in other words, one may discard it three times--but more than that is not permitted, because it would result in a very bad conscience. This thinking is untenable: The text means "a second time." It means "a second time" in relation to the first or previous reception; there is no hint that [taking the vow] is impossible thereafter. Nor can I find such a standard to be held by any Indian text that is a primary source. The commentary of Samudra explains, "Even should the occasional major offense occur, under the influence of defilement, one may confess it before the community and generate the thought of awakening with the intention of benefiting all the world--that is to say, retake [the vow] with a purified intention. The phrase 'a second time' does not limit it to two. In relation to the initial undertaking, one takes it again later on; 'second' refers to the subsequent undertaking."

If an offense has occurred with medium outflow, it should be confessed as a misdeed to three or more persons. Seated before them, first describe the matter--the transgression that has occurred. Then say, (86a) "Please take notice, Long-lived Ones. I, named so-and-so, have developed, from the matter that has been described, a 'misdeed' type of offense that constitutes an infraction of the bodhisattva disciplinary code. The remainder should be spoken just as in the monk's confession of misdeeds. Below the phrase "a misdeed type of offense" name the

transgression that has occurred--for example, "praising myself" or "deprecating someone else."

"The remainder" is completed in the old commentary: "I confess them to the Long-lived Ones, candidly and free of dissembling. Confessing and candid, I am at ease; not candid nor confessing,<sup>516</sup> I would not be at ease. If they ask, 'Do you see these as offenses?' he should answer, 'I do see.' And if they ask, 'Will you keep the vow hereafter?' he should answer, 'I do assent to it in all humility, according to the doctrine and the disciplinary code.' And thus a second and a third time." The new commentary has, "'Aware, observant, and mindful, I do assent to it in all humility, according to the doctrine and the disciplinary code.'" And how should you comport yourself at the time? The same work says, "Join palms and bow. Sit squatting in an inferior position, join palms, and [first describe the matter].." The other commentaries, in response to the question, "Will you [keep the] vow [hereafter]?" have, as response, only "I will be bound."

Should an event that is "grounds for defeat" have occurred with lesser involvement, it, and the other faults as well, should be confessed before (86b) one person, as in the ceremony above. There being no person who is congenial, or worthy of confession, he should generate the thought that he will not commit it again, and bind himself for the future. Having done so, he may be said to have disposed of that offense.

Jinaputra and company say of this, "This shows that there is no fault because of the sustaining power," which makes no sense.<sup>517</sup>

These are summarized by the *TV*:

- (8) The vow should be taken again;  
 Confess those of medium outflow to three,  
 The rest before one person;  
 The defiled and not, in one's own mind thus.

The last line bears on misdeeds both defiled and undefiled. Master Śāntaraṅgita glosses it thus: "There being no congenial person, confess it making your very own mind act as witness to you possession of embarrassment, sense of shame, discipline, calm, and the intention of not doing it in future. The implication of 'thus' (*bzhin*, \**tathā*) is, 'You may con-

fess before one person in the same way.<sup>1</sup> The line 'In one's own mind thus' gives an example, and at the same time shows that there are alternate means for healing fault." In his exposition, the method cited under "There being no congenial person" should be considered to apply to [offenses of] lesser and medium outflow as well.

Bodhibhadra appears to criticize the system of the old commentary in this regard when he says: "The way to mend transgression of lesser and medium outflow is fundamentally different from the way to mend other misdeeds. In situations of lesser and medium, when you cannot find three and one persons you must seek further, whereas in a situation of misdeed, if you cannot find one person you need not seek further. In the latter case you are not restricted from rising [from downfall] by (87a) making a vow in your own mind, whereas in the case of the former pair you are so restricted. If such were not the case, it would be incorrect to write 'to three' and 'before one' in a way that restricts them to different objects; the former will not be purified by confession to fewer than three, so what chance is there that they will be purified [by confession in one's own mind]? The *Bbh* does not say 'In one's own mind thus.' To introduce it is misguided. [Candragomin] should rather say, 'The defiled and not, in one's own mind' period. The *Bbh* formulates 'to three' and 'before one' for medium and lesser transgressions, and 'If there is no congenial person, vow mentally' for other transgressions."

I fail to see this to be tenable. The *Bbh* says, "Should an event that is 'grounds for defeat' have occurred with lesser involvement then it, and the other faults as well, are understood to be confessable before one person. There being no congenial person before whom to confess, the bodhisattva should generate the thought, from the bottom of his heart, that he will not commit it again, and restrain himself for the future. Having done so, he may be said to have disposed of that offense." Thus it is quite clearly stated that rectification for [defeats of] lesser outflow is like that for other misdeeds. If that is right, its relevance to downfalls of middling outflow is quite the same. This is a general text after all, teaching rectification of transgression by means of a proper attitude; its concerns are not limited to the legalities of rising from

downfall. And besides, the phrase "in one's own mind thus," although not found as such in the *Bbh*, does make sense, because it [the *Bbh*] promulgates the possibility of correction by making a vow in one's own mind in cases where there is no one person before whom to correct it by confession.

Some say<sup>518</sup> that defiled misdeeds must be confessed before one person when a confessor is available, whereas the undefiled are to be corrected by making a vow in your own mind even when a confessor is available. This is untenable, because they have been taught without distinction in the *Bbh*.

So let us stick to what is said in the text. [Defeats of] lesser and medium outflow, and the forty-five misdeeds as well, are not to be corrected, when a confessor is available, merely by making a vow. Aside from these, faults, may be confessed to a single person. This is the easy way to the creation of shame and embarrassment, and so the better way. If this is impossible, confess with the buddhas and their disciples in mind. The Chapter on Ethics<sup>519</sup> says: "My mistakes are recognized and regarded as faults. Being recognized and seen as faults, they are abandoned. My mistakes are confessed as faults before the buddhas, the bodhisattvas, and my co-religionists." And the seventeenth chapter of the *Bbh* says [Skt 179.18-21]: "Furthermore, all past and present mistakes and all past and present faults are individually confessed, with a thought virtuously endowed with desire for the trainings, before the lord buddhas in all of space; and others as well are caused to undertake the same. Making regular confession of mistakes in this way one will, with little difficulty, be freed from all obstacles caused by past deeds."

The *SS* promulgates a method of confessing before Ākāśagarbha in dream, and it also says, "In particular, the confession to be done for offenses of relative gravity and triviality is promulgated in the noble *Questioning of Upāli*." Later on, it gives the rectification to be done according to this scripture.<sup>520</sup> So the *SS* says, in the new translation:

(88a) "This has been spoken in the *Questioning of Upāli*: 'There are two transgressions, Śāriputra, that are greatly reprehensible for bodhisattvas. What are the two? Association with aversion, and association with

bewilderment. Their application is as follows. The former transgression, Śāriputra, the bodhisattva should confess straightforwardly as being grave among a quorum of ten. The possession of transgression he should confess as being grave among a quorum of five.<sup>521</sup> Śāriputra, the transgressions of taking hold of a woman by hand, looking [at her] with one's eyes, and ill will he should confess to one person or to two. The bodhisattva should confess, as being grave,<sup>522</sup> transgressions associated with the five immediates, transgression developed from women, from hand, from boys,<sup>523</sup> from shrine, and from community, as well as transgressions other than these, to the thirty-five lord buddhas, [making confession] day and night by himself."<sup>524</sup>

The translation of the scripture itself reads,<sup>525</sup> "The gravity of the first fault he should confess straightforwardly among a group of ten." This much is correct; among the two faults that have been mentioned, the first is association with aversion. This is confessed to ten objects. The sentence, "The possession of transgression he should confess as being grave among a quorum of five" is correct [although not found in the scripture itself]: it must refer to the second gravity, association with bewilderment. Here the scripture has "The grave fault of taking hold of a woman by hand<sup>526</sup> he should confess to a group of five." This reading does not conform to the statement in the *SS* that this same fault is confessed to one or two persons, nor to the summary instruction of the (88b) scripture itself or its statement that motivations by attachment are of lesser reprehensibility.<sup>527</sup> The translation [of the scripture] is therefore corrupt.

The threesome "taking hold of a woman by hand, etc." he should confess to one or to two. The old translation explains this to be grave. The new translation has "[relatively] trivial." Is this any better? I believe so. "Ill will" does not appear in the present-day scripture at all, but clearly, since it is mentioned in the *SS*, it has been deleted from the scripture.<sup>528</sup> Faults associated with aversion are said to be grave, yet ill will is said to be trivial. To avoid discrepancy [with other statements], one would have to say that "ill will" is here intended to represent only the intention of doing injury, without one's mental continuum being upset.

The statement that he should practice the confession of offenses day and night is intended to apply, we would have to say, to grave transgressions, such as the five immediates, whose karmic maturation cannot be remedied by means such as the rectification ceremony done three times before a [single] person.

The *BCA* says:

Three times day and night recite the three aggregates;  
Rely on the Jina and the thought to calm other faults. <sup>529</sup>

This manner of rectification is explained by Prajñākaramati to be relevant for faults other than seminal transgressions, or for transgressions committed absentmindedly and lacking full awareness--those not committed deliberately. For these, one recites the three aggregates [three times by day and three times by night] and mentally relies upon the jinas and the thought of awakening. The three aggregates he glosses as confession of misdeeds, appreciation [of merit], and dedication [of the merit to awakening].<sup>530</sup> This is rectification accomplished by the confession of offenses. The other two [aggregates] are glossed by \*Ksemadeva [O 5275] as the power of the reliances--hence, taking refuge and generating the thought.

Bodhisattva trainings being infinite, this rectification is a pressing need for the correction of offenses other than those done deliberately. (89a) Furthermore, you must intend to restrain yourself from doing it in future; without this, what you have done previously may be purged, but its correction is problematic. The *Lion's Roar of Maitreya* scripture <sup>531</sup> says: "Furthermore, Maitreya, in future, at the close of the period, five hundred years in the future at the time of the setting of the holy doctrine, at the time of its fall, certain individuals will appear, claiming to be bodhisattvas. They will transgress excessively; being unrestrained in body, unrestrained in speech, and unrestrained in mind, they will commit sinful deeds to excess. Yet they will correct these faults only by confession, without mentally making vows for the future. They will not make vows to restrain themselves in future. These foolish people, having manufactured the karmic formations of excessive transgression, will think that it will be corrected merely by confessional purging of the fault; just

because I have taught the doctrinal system of the three aggregates to consume the sinful karma of what has already been done, they will fail to make a vow for the future." So the means for rectification evidently has extreme importance as an appendage to pure ethics, and is taught as a detailed system to those of the great chariot.<sup>532</sup>

2232.4 The intention behind declaring attachment to be a minor fault. The Teacher has declared, "Know that the faults of a bodhisattva develop, for the most part, from aversion, rather than from desire-attachment." The intent of this is as follows. When ruled by affection for sentient beings and by love for them, whatever he may do is part of a bodhisattva's duty, and to do what he should do will not result in a fault. To bear hatred towards sentient beings does no good for himself (89b) or others, which is unworthy of a bodhisattva and the fault of doing what he should not do.<sup>533</sup>

The MSA says [13:21]:

In doing good for sentient beings,  
 There's no offense in attachment to them;  
 But one's aversion is always in contradiction  
 To [the interests of] all living creatures.

And the *Questioning of Upāli* explains, "If a bodhisattva participating in the Greater Vehicle has developed transgressions associated with desire-attachment many as the sands along the river Ganges, and a single transgression associated with aversion, then by the authority of the bodhisattva vehicle the transgression of aversion is much more grave. For by it he relinquishes sentient beings, whereas by the former he attracts them. The bodhisattva has no constraint or fear in regard to any defilement by which he attracts sentient beings... So I explain to you that no transgression associated with desire-attachment is a transgression."<sup>534</sup>

Because such statements are a major source of error, the jina's son Śāntideva goes on to elucidate its intention. The SS says, "What is the intention behind this? It has already been specified [by the scripture] as the attraction of sentient beings." This means that the statement "Those associated with desire-attachment are not transgressions"<sup>535</sup> applies to desire-attachment that is permissible when it will result in the welfare

of a sentient being--as in the case of the brahman youth Jyotis--<sup>536</sup> but that it is not appropriate for just any desire-attachment that the bodhisattva may have. For the above scripture has promulgated it specifically for desire-attachment that converts sentient beings.

Desire-attachment is recommended with what sort of person in mind as its basis, that it will not result in transgression? The *SS* says,<sup>537</sup> "This (90a) teaching is for those endowed with resolution and with sympathy, wherefore the same scripture declares, immediately after [*Upāli* par. 43]: 'In this regard, *Upāli*, bodhisattvas who are not skilled in means fear association with desire-attachment rather than association with aversion. Bodhisattvas who are skilled in means, *Upāli*, fear transgressions associated with aversion rather than those associated with desire-attachment.' And who are those who are 'skilled in means'? They are those who avoid relinquishing sentient beings because of both wisdom and compassion." This has been formulated as "those whose thought of awakening, containing the root of great compassion, is stable, and who are impregnated by the power of wisdom that comprehends the lack of essential nature in all phenomena."

Therefore, regarding the distinction marked [by the scripture] as to whether or not there is transgression in attachment and in aversion: In a hypothetical act of love entirely unmixed with desire-attachment, no doubt will occur to a sage as to whether or not there is fault equal to that of aversion and the other two [i.e., enmity and resentment], so there is no need to resolve it. To maintain that there is no fault in any attachment whatsoever on the part of the bodhisattva is to go too far. Therefore, according to the formulation of the *SS*, when you have it in connection with the grand welfare of sentient beings, attachment to sentient beings on account of love for them is without fault on many occasions. <sup>538</sup>

Objection: "In the case of aversion, what fault is there in being angry in order to avert harm?" Response: In that case the fault of failure in compassion will result when the habit of anger is later activated. "To cut that, will cut the root," as will be explained later on.<sup>539</sup> There is no occasion upon which [anger] is permissible because, according to the

cited passage, even if it is of benefit to a particular sentient being, (90b) the bodhisattva who fails in compassion will fail to continue to the greater benefit of sentient beings.

The same is true when the bodhisattva himself is the object. The girl Śrī Dakṣiṇottarā changes lives and is reborn a god by virtue of falling in love with the bodhisattva Priyaṅkara. But as to hatred for the bodhisattva, it is said [elsewhere] that:

Three incalculable ages in hell

The sage has prophesied for a mean thought. <sup>540</sup>

The intention of the *Bbh* corresponds to this; it should be taken according to our treatment of the *SS* statement that attachment is not a transgression.

2232.5 The distinction between major and minor offenses. Bodhisattva offenses should be known as minor, medium, and major. For this, refer to the *Topical Summary*.

The *Disciplinary Code Summary* says: <sup>541</sup> "Minor, medium, and major degrees of transgression are taught in five modes. (1) The first presents minor etc. in terms of essential nature. Defeat is major, suspension is medium, and the rest are minor.<sup>542</sup> In an alternative arrangement, defeat and suspension are grave, transgression and confessable are medium, and misdeed is trivial.<sup>543</sup> (2) In terms of the agent, what is done out of unawareness and carelessness is minor, what is done out of much defilement is medium, and what is done out of disrespect is major.<sup>544</sup> (3) In terms of intention, those done out of minor, medium, and major [degrees of] the three poisons are minor, medium, and major.<sup>545</sup> (4) In terms of the matter: By analogy with intention, doing something that has but a single nature gives rise nonetheless to minor, medium, and major results. In the case of aversion, for example, the slaying of animals, of human beings or persons aside from parents, and of one's parents as human beings are, respectively, transgression, defeat (but not an immediate), and (91a) defeat that is an immediate. (5) The sum total also results in minor etc. To fail to rectify, in accord with doctrine, from one to five offenses, is minor. To fail to rectify, in accord with doctrine, from six to as many as one can know the number of, is medium.<sup>546</sup> Measure-

less offense, of which one cannot know the number, viz., 'There are this many,' is major."

Just as essential nature and matter [no. 1 & 3] are not combined, the other three [are applied] as called for by the situation.

An offense occurring out of unawareness [no. 2] is an offense that occurs with the notion that the deed is not an offense, because one's intellect is unprepared--that is to say, one has not heard of and comprehended the offense. An offense that occurs although one is thus aware is an offense that occurs with mindfulness not established, because of forgetfulness and a lack of full awareness. "Occurring out of much defilement" refers to an offense that occurs uncontrollably, because one has a great share of the three poisons, although one is aware of it, thinking, "This is not what I should do." "Occurring out of defilement" refers to an offense that occurs according to one's wishes, although one's intellect has been prepared, because of an inclination for something inferior, a disregard for the religious way of life because of a failure to cultivate past causes [of it], a disrespect for nirvana, doctrine, and community, forgetfulness, shamelessness, and a lack of desire and disrespect for the training. The first two of these are undefiled offenses; the latter two are defiled. Such is the formulation of the *Disciplinary Code Summary*.

Antidotes to these four causes for transgression are knowing the transgressions, reliance upon mindfulness and awareness, application to the particular antidote to whichever defilement is greatest, shame and embarrassment, and respect for the teacher and the trainings.

(91b) 2232.6 Causes for continued well-being. The bodhisattva who applies himself to training in his own disciplinary code maintains contact with well-being because he is blessed with a threefold good fortune. <sup>547</sup>

(1) The blessing of practice. At the outset, he does not violate ethics; his behavior with the three gateways is pure. In the middle, he never commits an offense, because he maintains a great share of respect and care for the training. At the end, he confesses the rare sin he has committed. With this he maintains contact with well-being: Seeing himself to be clear of offenses, he is generally joyful day and night.

(2) The blessing of attitude. He is ordained thinking of practicing the doctrine as it is presented, not thinking of livelihood. He is eager for the great awakening, not uneager. He is eager for the religious life and for nirvana, not uneager. With such eagerness he cannot remain indolent, because he has taken an initiative towards the wholesome. His vigor is not feeble and he is not contaminated by evil, unwholesome deeds.

What sort of unwholesomeness? According to Jinaputra [and Guṇaprabhā], it is what is defiled in this life and will develop into renewed existence in future. The disadvantage of the first is to have a psychophysical organism that is compounded of scorching fever. The disadvantage of the second is a suffering fruition because you are reborn in a state of woe. Consequently, birth plus old age and death drag one a long way.

The religious life, [according to Jinaputra,] refers to the path of application to the three trainings in ten stages, and nirvana refers to non-stationary nirvana--so we have the results of application to accomplishing those two.

(92a) (3) The blessing of previous causes. The bodhisattva, because he has in past lives performed acts of giving as well as acts of virtue that have eliminated the impediments to great possessions,<sup>548</sup> never lacks clothing, food, bed and bedding, cures for illness and other requisites for himself. In addition, he is able to share them with others. With this he makes contact with well-being by the elimination of poverty.

Cursed with three misfortunes that are the reverse of these three blessing, one maintains contact with suffering.

\* \* \*

So here we have the brief teaching of the complete (lay and monastic) bodhisattva, the essential nature; as well as the detailed explanation, the completion. The remaining seven, difficulty and the rest, are sections of this "complete ethics."

\* \* \*

2.3 The sections of that explanation. Seven parts, from "difficulty" to "purified."

## 23.1 Difficulty. Three points.

23.1.1 From having great possessions and holding sovereignty as the Ruler, he renounces both to take on the vow. The great possessions are four:<sup>549</sup> (1) those physically owned by the person who enjoys them, (2) those which make him more greatly beloved and agreeable to friends and relations together with whom they are enjoyed, (3) those which result in a greater number of servants and the like, and (4) those which result in greater possessions such as food. Hence there are actually five, with the addition of great livelihood [i.e., sovereignty] to the list of possessions. The great Ruler is someone who exercises sovereignty over others at will by means of commands for whatever he desires. Some commentators like to analyze "sovereignty" and "wealth" separately.<sup>550</sup>

23.1.2 The second difficulty is being troubled. He would not allow the vow-of-ethics obligation to weaken in the slightest even at the cost of his life. How much less would he let it disappear?

(92b) 23.1.3 Having undertaken the vow, no error that is the subtlest fault may arise in regard to ethics so long as his life may last, because he possesses the five aspects of vigilance<sup>551</sup> and highly aware mindfulness of all his movements and stations and attentions. How much less so the grave?

The other commentaries suggest that the first refers to [the vow] as difficult to take, the middle as difficult to keep, and the last as difficult to fulfill. But the interpretation of Guṇaprabha is that [the vow] is both hard to take and hard to keep, and the latter two refer to its difficulty to keep.<sup>552</sup> This interpretation is preferable, because to keep it from weakening even at the cost of losing one's life is a difficulty of keeping it in the face of adverse conditions, whereas to keep it from being soiled by the subtlest fault so long as one is alive is a difficulty of keeping it in view of the bases of training themselves plus ordinary temporal factors.

If you really cannot train yourself in these three ways at present, make them an object of resolve and prepare your intellect to do so, and it will come about in another life.

## 23.2 Universal gateway ethics. Four points.

232.1 Adopted ethics is what has been achieved by present application--that is to say, by having taken on the three sorts of ethics.

232.2 Natural morality is undertaking physical and verbal activity that is perfectly pure because of the natural goodness of a mental continuum that is established in the family insasmuch as its aptitude has been stimulated and contains signs of the perfections, irrespective of any thought, karma formation, or aspiration.<sup>553</sup>

232.3 Habituated ethics represents continued progress from long past. Based upon impregnated power instilled by having grown accustomed to (93a) three sorts of ethics in past lives, he does not like offensive behavior in any way whatsoever--his mind recoils from it--whereas he like virtuous behavior and welcomes it.

232.4 Ethics conjoined with means refers to reliance upon the four attractions as the means to convert others, thereby introducing sentient beings to wholesome physical and verbal activity. The four means of attraction are<sup>554</sup> (1) generosity that attracts with material goods, (2) kind words of advice to one's converts on what to accept and reject, (3) deeds meant to induce them to put into practice the meaning of the words, and (4) consistency with the meaning, so that you yourself hold to what has been presented to others for practice.

Functioning thus as the gateway to entering all of ethics, it is the universal gateway.

23.3 Ethics of a holy person. Five points. (1) He himself is endowed with ethics. (2) Others who remain profane he induces to undertake ethics. (3) He placates the enmity of those who are averse to ethics, by singing its praises. (4) He is glad to see fellows in the doctrine who are participating, and he has no envy of them.<sup>555</sup> (5) He treats any fault that arises according to doctrine.

These five are holy ethics because they prevent harm to others and are associated as well with holy deeds that achieve all welfare.<sup>556</sup> The first and last achieve one's own welfare, the remaining three the welfare of others.

23.4 Ethics as all modes. Thirteen points: six modes plus seven modes.

234.1 The six modes. (1) Extensive, because it fulfills the ground by

acquiring extensive bases of training, and because it fulfills the fruition with dedication to the great awakening. (2) Unreprehensible: free from defiled well-being by avoiding the extreme of indulgence in sense-desire. (93b) (3) A basis for delight: free from pointless suffering.<sup>557</sup> (4) Permanent, to avoid interference with the training by not abjuring the training that has been undertaken and practicing it so long as one lives. (5) Steadfast, never to be overcome and robbed by the three negative directions: by gain and respect, because you disregard them; by disputants, because of your steadfast conviction in your own path; and by defilement and its subsidiaries, because of your endurance in stopping what needs to be rejected. The commentaries interpret this as not being overcome by disputants because you have abjured your own training in order to live as a tīrthika and no longer hold the vow. This is senseless; it has already been covered by "not abjuring the vow."<sup>558</sup> (6) Adorned with ethics: the seventeen adornments of a religious person that appear in the *Sbh*.

The *Sbh* provides this summary contraction: <sup>559</sup>

Faithful, unpretentious, seldom ill,  
 Vigorous, wise, unprepossessing,  
 Contented, easily fed and satiated,  
 Austere, attractive, temperate,  
 Having the character of a holy man  
 And the signs of learnedness,  
 Forbearing, tender, and open. <sup>560</sup>

234.2 The seven modes. Ethics as disengagement: to undertake the avoidance of misbehavior such as murder, because it is absolutely not to be done. (2) Ethics as engagement: to train yourself in the collection of wholesomeness and in accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings, because these are absolutely to be done. (3) Guardian ethics, to protect both engagement and disengagement with eternal vigilance. These three are sections of the essential nature of ethics.<sup>561</sup> (4) Ethics that matures in the characteristics of a great personage: to proceed towards the (94a) achievement of characteristics to be achieved at the appropriate stages. (5) [Ethics] that matures in higher thought: achieving many bodhi-

sattva concentrations. (6) [Ethics] that matures in pleasant destinies: achieving divine and human bodies. (7) [Ethics] that matures in the welfare of sentient beings: achieving a fruition that is beneficial to sentient beings.

These last four are sections of the fruition of ethics. Master Gunaprabha explains that the first of these four constitutes the ethics of collecting wholesomeness, the middle two constitute that of the vow, and the last constitutes that of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings. He also proposes that the set of six modes represents the possession of any and all good qualities, whereas the seven modes represent sections of the essential nature and the fruition [of ethics].

23.5 Distressed and wishing ethics. Eight points. He wishes this in his own mind: "I myself do not wish for murder and so forth, those eight things; I wish for the eight that are their opposites. Should someone else perform the unwished-for [upon me], I would be distressed by that act of murder and so forth; it would be disagreeable to me. Other sentient beings are just like myself in this respect." Having investigated the matter thus, he will not commit those eight unwished-for to someone else even for the sake of his life.

The eight unwished-for are murder, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, slander, harsh speech, idle chatter, and a set of three disagreeable contacts--the contacts of being beaten and hurt by hand, clump of earth, and whip.<sup>562</sup> The eight wished-for things<sup>563</sup> are their reverse: long life, great possessions, a faithful wife, honesty, unalienated followers, sweet sounds,<sup>564</sup> meaningful conversation, and agreeable contacts.

(94b) So the ethics that rids one of the eight unwished-for distresses and brings about their eight wished-for alternatives is called "distressed and wishing ethics."

23.6 Ethics as well-being here and there. There are nine points, divided into four plus five.

236.1 Ethics as four points. (1) Sentient beings who are preparing grounds for future suffering he forbids from situations that should be forbidden. (2) Those who are preparing grounds for well-being, he permits situations that should be permitted, and he will bring those grounds

into being. (3) He attracts sentient beings worthy of being attracted in that they are making progress in regard to the situations permitted and forbidden. (4) He stops sentient beings who should be stopped in that they are proceeding wrongly in regard to the permitted and forbidden situations. His own physical and verbal deeds in regard to these four are perfectly pure.

236.2 As five points: five sorts of ethics endowed with the five perfections besides the perfection of morality.

Inasmuch as these result in well-being for the bodhisattva himself and for other sentient beings now and in the future, they are called "well-being here and there."

The following represents the interpretation of Jinaputra and company. Giving results in great possessions in the future. Patience will function as grounds for well-being now and in the future for oneself and others, and result in future endowment with a retinue. Vigor brings about non-contamination by unwholesomeness in the present and great energy in the future. Meditation results in present contact with well-being and future rebirth as a purified god.<sup>565</sup> Wisdom constitutes learnedness in the present, and becomes distinguished wisdom in the future.

(95a) 23.7 Purified ethics. Ten points. (1) Correctly undertaken in the first place: Ethics is undertaken out of a desire for the religious way of life as the path, and out of a desire for full awakening as its destination; it is not undertaken in order to be exempt from conscription by the government<sup>566</sup> and so forth, nor out of a desire for livelihood. (2) There is no excessive discouragement: Upon transgressing a precept of the grounds of training, [one is free from] little regret--or, from lesser regret.<sup>567</sup>

In the case of excessive discouragement, there is lesser regret; he is free from that and possessed "greater regret." So the *Sbh* [in a parallel passage] reads: "What is excessive discouragement? It is someone being unashamed, having lesser regret, being slack and passive in regard to the grounds of training." Therefore, "being "free of lesser regret" [in the *Bbh*] should be taken as having greater regret. If it meant that one is free from even so much as a little regret, the statement "no excessive

discouragement" would be distorted, because one would be entirely free of regret.<sup>568</sup>

(3) There is no overdoing it. To exceed the bounds, doing more than the Teacher has prescribed, might cause regret; he is free from it. (4) Free of indolence: not making a practice of sleeping, lying on one's side and staying in bed, but persevering in wholesome directions day and night. (5) Sustained by carefulness: reliance upon five-limbed vigilance as described above.<sup>569</sup> (6) Correctly aspiring: free of yearnings for gain and respect, and not consenting to live celibate out of aspirations to divinity [in a future life]. (7) Sustained by a blessed lifestyle: conduct that is blessed and exemplary, because it is consistent with the world and with the disciplinary code in regard to deportment, as while walking (95b) and standing, in regard to incidental duties such as wearing robes, and in regard to wholesome practices such as recitation. (8) Sustained by blessed livelihood: avoiding all the faults of the five wrong means of livelihood beginning with hypocrisy. (9) Avoiding the two extremes: (9.1) avoiding the extreme of indulgence in sense-desires, the disadvantages of which one fails to see, longing for robes, alms, bedding and the like to be sought from others by fair means or foul, and (9.2) afflicting oneself with living among thorns, in the dust and so forth, plunging three times into fire and water, and other exhausting practices of severe asceticism.<sup>570</sup> (10) Conducive to deliverance: avoiding the views of all tīrthikas.<sup>571</sup> Unfailing in the obligation of bodhisattva ethics: not allowing it to weaken in any way whatsoever by exceeding the prescribed bounds out of disregard for the guidelines of training, nor allowing it to disappear by committing a seminal transgression.<sup>572</sup>

So we see that the summary teaching mentions ten, but eleven appear in the discussion. Jinaputra says, "The antidote to both these faults is to correct them by becoming well aware of just what has been prescribed," thus combining in one the antidotes to both faults: the fault of excessive discouragement that fails to make application to the training [no.2], and the fault of overdoing it that follows trainings not prescribed [no.3]. Clearly, he makes these two points--no excessive discouragement and no overdoing it--into one. Guṇaprabha also combines these two in one, say-

ing, "There are two faults of attitude. When it comes to taking [the vow], there is a fault of the undertaking [no. 1]. When it comes to keeping it, there are excessive discouragement and overdoing it [no. 2, 3]." <sup>573</sup> Samudra appears to make number eleven a summary conclusion (96a) to the ten taught above it. <sup>574</sup> None of these is tenable. The master teacher [Asanga] himself, in the *Sbh* [Skt p. 45, 46] in context of the ten faults that are the reverse of these ten purifications, says, "Caught up with carelessness and indolence," thus combining these two into one. Hence in this text [the *Bbh*] "carefulness" and "free of indolence" [no. 4,5] are meant to be combined in one. So we have [at *Sbh* 45] this list of ten causes for failure: incorrectly taking it in the first place, excessive discouragement, overdoing it, being caught up with carelessness and indolence, wrong resolve, being cursed with unfortunate lifestyle, being cursed with unfortunate livelihood, falling into the two extremes, what is uncondusive to deliverance, and failing in the obligation. Without these, there is what is called "blessedness," or purified ethics.

2.4 The advantages of ethics. Two points.

2.4.1 Advantages of its destination. This great aggregate of bodhisattva ethics bears the fruition of great awakening. Based upon it, one fulfills the perfection of morality and awakens to supreme awakening. The phrase "great aggregate" refers to it as a great resource of merit, broad and vast. <sup>575</sup> In other words, it refers to ethics as full-blown, measureless, and complete.

2.4.2 And up until buddhahood you will obtain five occasional benefits. Namely, (1) you will come to the notice of the buddhas, as explained above. <sup>576</sup> (2) You will die in a state of great elation. (3) After your (96b) physical dissolution, wherever you are reborn, <sup>577</sup> those with the same ethics as yours are found--in other words, higher bodhisattva colleagues<sup>577</sup> with the same doctrine who function as spritual advisers. (4) You are endowed with a measureless aggregate of merit that fulfills the perfection of morality in this life, (5) and there is a natural morality of which, in future lives, you inherit the very essence.

The sense of the second of these, as Jinaputra and company interpret it, is that you turn your attention to meeting the buddhas and bodhisatt-

tvās afterward, thus transcending the fear of death. By this you obtain "great elation." Samudra gives two reasons: the above, plus the fact that you have no fear for a lower state of rebirth, because you possess measureless good roots.

The commentary of Guṇaprabha explains that these five represent, in order, the decisive result, the dissociation result, the maturation result, the man-made result, and the natural outcome result.<sup>578</sup> Upon mentioning the dissociation result, he proposes that it consists of the elimination of unhappiness<sup>579</sup> through the blunting of misbehavior and through correct resolve.

Advantage number one brings about the two that follow it: So long as you maintain the vow, the jinas and their disciples consider you as a son and a brother, and so your wholesome factors will grow, and not decrease.<sup>580</sup> Numbers two and four are benefits in this life: At the point of death you are free of the fear for a lower rebirth and pleased to see that you will go to an especially happy destination. Even beyond that, as the *BCA* says [1:18-19]:

Wherever you begin, take on the thought  
Irrevocably, to liberate  
Infinite realms of sentient beings;

(97a) And' from that beginning the forces of merit,  
Not interrupted even asleep or unvigilant,  
Will become the equal of space.

And measureless resource will grow in every moment as well.

Numbers three and four are benefits for future lives: You are not parted from the vow in your various rebirths. Other causes of the latter are found in the *Questioning of Kāśyapa*, where it formulates eliminating four dark factors and so forth as causes for not forgetting the thought of awakening.<sup>581</sup> There is also a verse of the *King of Concentrations* which master Śāntideva proposes to apply to this topic:<sup>582</sup>

Whatever a man's chief preoccupation,  
On which his thought is based,  
That is what his thought will 'light upon.

In other words, one's thought process will tend to alight upon that to which one's attention has been frequently and continuously given.

Wise men, seeing these supreme advantages, labor with the most severe exertion at keeping the vow of the jinas' sons.<sup>583</sup>

2.5 The summary of ethics. All these nine modes, beginning with the essence of ethics, should be understood to be included by the threesome beginning with "ethics of the vow." Each of the nine, moreover, is included by the three, as Jinaputra and Samudra put it.

2.6 The functions of ethics. Objection: "Why restrict bodhisattva ethics to three?"<sup>584</sup> Response: Because the work of a bodhisattva, to put it briefly, is comprised by the following three things: (1) to stabilize the mind in undefiled well-being, (2) based upon that, to bring one's own (97b) elements to maturity, and (3) to bring to maturity the mental continuums of sentient beings. And these are achieved by three sorts of ethics: the vow, the collection of wholesomeness, and accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings.

Accordingly, mind should be assigned to a wholesome visualization in terms of laboring in the ethics of the vow to reverse misbehavior. For without being established in a wholesome visualization, the basis for the other two is lost. That is why the canonical text cited above states that one should first make ethics the most cherished thing.<sup>585</sup> Furthermore, since seven prātimokṣa classes have been formulated, the bodhisattva should persevere in whatever prātimokṣa vow to which he has assented, as being the root of the dispensation. Nāgārjuna the protector states this emphatically in the *Precious Garland*:<sup>586</sup>

Then the ordained one should first  
 Create deep respect for the training,  
 And strive to study and ascertain the sense  
 Of the prātimokṣa with the vinaya.

So both the great chariots appear to have an identical understanding of this matter.<sup>587</sup>

Among the other two modes of ethics, one must first strive to bring oneself to maturity, making the collection of virtue the chief thing. For

it has been taught that there is no basis or opportunity for bringing others to maturity when you yourself are immature.<sup>588</sup>

These nine or these three are bodhisattva ethics. These are the six advantages of ethics.<sup>589</sup> And the work of ethics is (1) to remain at peace to establish well-being in the present, (2) to ripen the factors of buddhahood without physical or mental fatigue, and (3) to bring sentient beings to full maturity. These are all. There is nothing beyond this three-some of essence, benefit, and work. There is nothing more than this (98a) threesome, nothing not included in it. Past bodhisattvas have trained in it... and so forth, as cited from above [sec. 22221.2, 34b], which shows that all bodhisattvas of eternity train themselves according to this alone. It is not the case that some train in this while others train in that. There is but one path travelled by all who train themselves astutely on the bodhisattva's path to buddhahood. So relieve yourself of any sense of ambiguity you may have about the path.

This is how one should train in ethics: Know the other perfections, the four means of attraction and the rest, and practice them sincerely. Then if you are not capable of training yourself in the other practices, there is stated to be no fault. Nevertheless, you may never in any way give up the responsibility to train yourself in the remaining practices.

This Chapter on Ethics is initially the most important [of the *Bbh*] for the beginning bodhisattva. Were I to have cited the whole text in commenting upon it, I fear the words would have grown too numerous. So I have relied upon a number of creditable treatises on the topic--the two *Bbh* commentaries in their treatment of this subject, the two Chapter on Ethics commentaries,<sup>590</sup> as well as the *SS*, the *BCA* source commentary and so forth, as well as the scriptures, in order to settle the details of the problems in taking, in keeping, and in rectification. As to the commentary attributed to Samudramegha: Although his name appears to correspond to that of Gyatso-trin [Rgya-mtsho-sprin, \*Samudramegha], author of the *Extensive Commentary to the Bbh* [O 5548], it is not that master.

[Concluding Verses]

To achieve buddhahood one enters the Greater Vehicle:

This must be a set rule for all efforts.

The basics of this path are resolve and implementation:

Take them on and affirm them accordingly.

To say, as some do,<sup>591</sup> though not training as bodhisattvas,

That they yet have a path to the omniscient state,

(98b) Though not proposed by the buddhas, their sons, or the learned,

That the vajra vehicle and that of the perfections

Differ in prohibitions and in their injunctions

Is the height of folly, merely a flight of fancy:

The basics of the general Greater Vehicle,

The good and stainless path, for these unlucky ones disappears.

If you set about to enter the vajra vehicle,

First create the thought of awakening and take the vow,

Which are the topics of the immaculate scriptures

As explained by Maitreya, Nāgārjuna, and Asanga;

Take on the practice of six perfections as the basis,

And then the path of Vajrayāna in addition.

That is the best-vehicle path that is not deficient;

Others only delight those who are foolish.

So I comment here in terms easy to understand,

In line with the Jina's intentions, unpolluted

By any stain of fabricated disputation,

From texts in which I believe plus stainless reasoning,

Upon the system of a purified bodhisattva vow,

The only path travelled by the jinas and their sons.

With it I do ongoing salutation of Mañjuśrī,

By virtue of my continued reverence for whom

I confess any foolish lapses in style or meaning

That appear in regard to the path of the best vehicle,

And entreat the merciful ones to deflect those infractions.

By whatever merit I have acquired from the endeavor  
 To show the way and establish them in the teaching,  
 Now mostly gone, the very life of the path  
 Of the sage's dispensation, the special best vehicle,  
 May everyone see fully that a counterfeit path,  
 Is without satisfaction, and strive to achieve  
 The essence of the correct and genuine path.

May I also, sustained by Mañjuśrī in all lives,  
 By the holy protector, rightly recognize the best vehicle,  
 Bear the burden of liberation of the whole world,  
 And spread the dispensation of the Jina.

[Colophon]

The *Basic Path to Awakening*, an explanation of how to take the bodhisattva vow and purify the aggregate of ethics, was composed by the buddhist monk Losang Dragpa Pā (Shākya'i dge slong Blo bzang grags pa'i dpal), who has generated a bit of devotion to the bodhisattava career, for the sake of those who wish to take the vow of the jinas' sons and train themselves in the training, at the buddhist retreat site called Reting, in the north.<sup>592</sup>

#### NOTES

1. The buddha is the preacher of doctrine; Maitreya transmits the Yogācāra treatises through Asanga.

2. Jina: the Buddha. Disciples: the bodhisattvas.

3. The argument: cp. concluding verses.

4. *MMT* O 162; cp. Skt ed. Gaṇapati 1925:617:5-13; also cited by Atiśa, see Sherburne 1983:70.

5. Correct *de ni* to *de nyid* after Skt (*tattvārtha*); cp. also second verse following. The term may allude to the *Tattvārtha* chapter of the *Bbh* (ch. tr. Willis 1979), or to a lost work entitled \**Tattva-viniścaya* (see Ruegg. 1969:44).

6. The verse attributes to Asanga the classification of scripture as *nītārtha* versus *neyārtha*. See for ex. *Bbh* Skt 175; Takasaki 1966 v. 13, p. 387 & 285 n. 137.

7. The list of envoys given earlier in *MMT* is noted by Edgerton 1953 s.v. *mahādūti*.

8. The resources (*saṃbhāra*) of merit and gnosis.

9. *Dharma-śrota(-anugata)-samadhi*: a "concentration" enabling one to travel wherever doctrine is being taught--in the case of Asanga, to Tu-shita Heaven to hear Maitreya. See Tatz 1977 no. 54.

10. Attributed to Samudramegha.

11. *Trisaṃvaranirdeśa* from the Ratnakūṭa collection, O 760:1.

12. "Tantra": lit. mantra (*gsang sngags*). On terms for the tantras see Tsong-kha-pa tr. Hopkins 1977:105-10.

13. Corrected from *Saṃbhūti*. These three are O 2327, 18, & 113.

14. On the vajrayāna vow, five buddha families, see Mkhas-grub-rje 100f, Beyer 1973:403-7.

15. "Shared": possessed by both possessed; see Mkhas-grub-rje 144f, Hopkins 1977:166-69.

16. O 11, P Rgyud Ka 288b.4-5. The canonical translation differs; it is followed by Mkhas-grub-rje (150).

17. Underlining for passages cited from the Chapter on Ethics, but note that Tsong-kha-pa often paraphrases. This passage *Bbh* Skt [ed. Dutt] 95.1-8, W 137.1-13, Tib 84b.6-85a.2. See also Jinaputra 240a.7-b.1=Samudramegha 183b.6-8, Bodhibhadra 214a.8-b.2. No commentator but Ts. explicates the contraction.

18. The "basis" for ethics is the person who engages in it.

19. The "great" (*chen*) or "extensive" commentary by Jinaputra. See sec. 23.5, 94a-b infra.

20. "Certain commentaries": Jinaputra, Samudramegha, Refs, this section, *Bbh* Skt 95.8-22, W 137.14-138.9; Tib 85a.2-b.2. See also Jinaputra 240b.1-241b.4=Samudramegha 183b.8-185a.3, Bodhibhadra 214b.2-215a.1.

21. Śāntideva O 5336; Skt 10.12-15, Eng 12-13.

22. "Inducement" (*āvāhaka*): an elements of causality in the system of the *Bbh*. For example, the seed induces the fruit (W 97.26-98.2).

23. So Samudramegha; but Jinaputra refers to no. 1 as giving the vow, 2-4 as taking it.

24. To paraphrase: "When in the course of rebirth you become by

merit Lord God of the universe, you will not use the position to tyrannize sentient beings." According to Jinaputra, these three items are aspects of the essence of ethics: "In terms of a purified attitude, because he has undertaken ethics, when the bodhisattva is teaching doctrine his words will be made acceptable. Because he has undertaken ethics, the monastic bodhisattva will constitute a field of merit [for others who make offerings to him]. And because he has undertaken ethics, when he obtains the sovereignty of the Ruler (*īśvara*) he will do no injury to sentient beings. So it is praised in these terms:

His words are acceptable as spoken,  
 He is merit for the embodied,  
 He does no injury to others,  
 He relies on a merciful nature."

25. Jinaputra: "They are also determined [to be four] in terms of the cause and effect of the purification of ethics. The cause for purification is twofold. (1) Embarrassment: 'Because he has correctly received it from someone else' it will be guarded with reference to oneself. The effect of the purification of ethics is to be free from regret, as indicated by the latter two qualities." Others of his comments are used by Ts. above.

26. Jinaputra: "The self-benefit of auditors and others is to eliminate and permanently avoid all defilement. Among the four truths that induce this, they know that of the path. So they proceed to obtain nirvana, the situation of permanent freedom from suffering. In context of that vehicle and the entry into it, they progress to self-discipline, to self-pacification, and to self-nirvana for the sake of meager deeds, for the sake of meager aims, and for the sake of self-healing. The self-benefit of bodhisattvas is the two modes of elimination [of obscurations caused by defilement and by the cognizable], and the two sorts of gnosis [the exact and the full], because these are the results to be found within their mental continuum." Refs *Bbh* Skt 95.22-96.5, W 138.9-17; Tib 85b.2-6. See also *Guṇaprabha* 229a.7-b.5, *Jinaputra* 241b.4-243b.5=Samudramegha 185a.3-186b.7, *Bodhibhadra* 215a.1-4.

27. "Spiritual class": *gotra*. See *Bbh* ch. 1; Ruegg 1969, pt. 1, esp. 75f ont he classless--those without a path.

28. Jinaputra: these last two items recapitulate the "four right efforts" (*samyak-prahāṇa*), the production of wholesomeness.

29. So Samudramegha, but Jinaputra has "being unworthy vessels." "Hostile, etc.": to the doctrine.

30. There is one other gloss of "wholesome" in Jinaputra, copied from *Guṇaprabha*'s 'introduction to the Chapter on Ethics, but it contains nothing noteworthy.

31. Jinaputra: "'Immeasurable' because they cannot be measured in terms of basis, or foundation of training."

32. This phrase is cited by Jinaputra from the \**Kāśyapa-varga* scripture ('*Od srung ba'i sde'i mdo*): "Monks, I will teach you doctrine," as appears in detail."

33. Only human beings are capable of taking vows, so monks etc. are found only among humanity. Hell-dwellers and gods can only be "natural laypersons." Refs *Bbh Skt* 96.6-12, W 138.18-27; Tib 85b.6-86a.2. See also *Guṇaprabha* 229b.5-7, *Jinaputra* 243b.5-244a.8=Samudramegha 186b.7-187b.2, *Bodhibhadra* 215a.4-b.4.

34. On the cosmology see Tatz 1977:33f.

35. For this last, *Bbh Skt* has the more usual "accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings."

36. *Jinaputra*: "The auditors have three sorts of vow--of *prātimokṣa*, of meditation, and of being free from outflows--in order to effect the elimination of the three sorts of defilement that motivate misbehavior: coursing in sense-desire, coursing in forms, and coursing in outflows. The vow against coursing in sense-desire eliminates [misbehavior] by blunting it. That against coursing in forms eliminates [misbehavior] by overcoming it, because the behavior ceases even when conditions for it are present. That against outflows eliminates [misbehavior] by interruption, because it ceases for good. So by correspondence the vow of the *bodhisattvas* is also of three sorts."

37. "Classes," Tib *ris*; but *Bbh Skt* reads *naikāyika*, glossed by *Jinaputra* as "those who follow the teachings."

38. *Upavāsa*: the vow of what Robinson calls the "asceticizing layperson" (1965-66:26): adhering, for one day (at new and full moons, first and last lunar quarters) to the eight precepts (excepting non-handling of money) of a novice monk (*MHV* 8693-8700): not killing, not stealing, no uncelibacy, no lying, no taking liquor, no wearing perfume, bright colors, unguents, or garlands, not using a high or large bed, and not eating after noon. For details see *Ñyanatiloka* 1980 s.v. *sikkhapada*. The *AK* counts *upavāsa* an eighth class (4:43f), *Atiśa* does not (Sherburne 70).

39. *Bodhibhadra*, ref. n.33 above. *Atiśa* also cites this passage, with slight alteration (Sherburne 1983:70).

40. The phrase also appears at *MHV* 1629: *upavāsam upavasanti*.

41. *Bbh Tib* omits nun-probationer, thus listing only six classes. "Samudramegha" is providing two possible explanations for the missing seventh, an indication of Tibetan provenance. "Nun-probationer" appears in *Bbh Skt* and in *Bodhibhadra*.

42. Sherburne 1983:96.

43. That is to say, the seven unvirtuous deeds of body and speech

are motivated by the three of mind--covetousness, ill will, and false view.

44. Bodhibhadra, ref. n. 33 above; also cited by Atiśa (Sherburne 1983:66-67).

45. Sec. 2232122121.2, 70b below.

46. Eating in the postmeridien is forbidden unless one is ill, but there is no exception to the prohibition to taking liquor.

47. Sherburne 1983:66.

48. The interlinear notes to the *MMA* specify Bodhibhadra.

49. "Associated texts": the treatises (*śāstra*) that comment on the *sūtras*.

50. So Śāntarakṣita, as cited 68b-69a infra; he may be inferred to believe that the *prātimokṣa* is a basis for creations of the bodhisattva vow (one must be a member of the seven *prātimokṣa* classes to undertake it) but an obstruction to its maintenance. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan takes the position that it is neither a basis for the creation, nor for the maintenance (Tatz 1982a:22-23).

51. The ten powers (*bala*) beginning with knowing right from wrong and the results of actions, and the four confidences (*vaiśaradya*) beginning with the realization of all things and knowledge of the exhaustion of all outflows.

52. O 4546:251a2-3, 252a4, 253a7-8.

53. See *Bbh* cited at sec. 2213.1, 14b infra on renouncing even universal sovereignty to take on ethics of the vow.

54. For example, in *A Lamp for the Path* (Sherburne 1983:97).

55. Cited not from scripture but from Jinaputra. Refs. *Bbh* Skt 96.13-97.8, W 139.1-140.3; Tib 86a2-b5. See also Gunaprabha 229b7-8, Jinaputra 244a8-246a2=Samudramegha 187b2-189a3, Bodhibhadra 217a3-b3.

56. Again from Jinaputra.

57. Jinaputra; he continues: "Furthermore, one should know the synthesis and analysis. Among wholesome factors, some are gathered physically some verbally, and some in both ways."

58. Bodhibhadra, followed by Atiśa (Sherburne 1983:97) paraphrases the *Bbh* definition of "collecting wholesome factors" by saying, "subsequent to having undertaken the vow one accumulates, for the sake of awakening, every possible bit of virtue with body, speech, and mind." The phrase

"body, speech, and mind" also appears in the *Bbh*, detailed explanation infra.

59. Bodhibhadra: "He applies himself with delight in solitude to hearing, contemplation, and the cultivation of calm and insight." The phrase also appears in Jinaputra: "He takes 'delight in solitude' because physical and mental seclusion are preliminary to that meditative cultivation. He 'applies himself' to contemplating and realizing the doctrines he has heard. The implication is that he applies himself with diligence."

60. So Jinaputra.

61. Not found in *Bbh* Skt or indicated by any commentary.

62. Both works are part of the Avataṃsaka collection: (1) *Daśabhūmi-kasūtra*, O 761:31; see Skt 10, introd. 3, and Eng ch. 1; and (2) *Bhadracari-praṇidhāna*, Eng tr. Tatz 1977a.

63. Jinaputra: "'Bases of training' indicates wholesome abiding upon the path of resources. He guards himself by mindfully not [mis-] behaving, and by correcting himself with awareness when he does. These two [mindfulness and awareness] are antidotes to defilement not yet arisen and defilement already arisen."

64. Numbering is overlooked at this item and the following.

65. Ts. omits the explanation of the *Bbh* here in light of the expansion that follows. Guṇaprabha and Jinaputra likewise provide the details here that are noted at n. 84 below.

Refs *Bbh* Skt 97.9-24, W 140.4-27; Tib 86b.5-87a.6. See also Guṇaprabha 229b8-230a4, Jinaputra 246a2-b8=Samudramegha 189a3-190a2.

66. "Success": *phun sum tshogs pa*, \**saṃpad*; in context of *Bbh*, *saṃpad* is translated as "good fortune" or "blessing." Jinaputra, Bodhibhadra gloss it "fulfillment" (*yöngs su rdzogs pa*, \**paripūrṇa*).

67. So Guṇaprabha: "There are two sorts of desire: sensory desires that are things, and desires that are defiled. So there are sensory desires that are things, inasmuch as they are desirable, and desires that are defiled, inasmuch as they are the desire itself. Here we refer to desires that are things. These are of two sorts: desires for things having to do with sexual intercourse, and desire for other things (*maithuna-bhāva-rāga*, *anya-bhāva-rāga*). Desire for other things is likened to desire for grass; desire for things [having to do with sexual intercourse] is likened to desire for impurity. Therefore, what are called [in the *Bbh*] 'the baser [desires]' are of two sorts, according to the thing in question. He disregards all the highest human desires, up to those of a universal monarch--referring to this life--and he has no anticipating--referring to the future. 'For the future' means 'consequently': such desires include [rebirth in] the realm of Māra. He does not sow aspirations and keep celibacy for the sake of such desires. He views them wisely as being

like eating vomit, and eliminates both sorts of desire." Refs *Bbh* Skt 97.25-99.24; W 141.1-144.1; Tib 87a6-88b8. See also *Guṇaprabha* 230a4-231a7, *Jinaputra* 246b8-248b1=Samudramegha 190a2-191b3, *Bodhibhadra* 215b4-217a3.

68. These glosses from *Jinaputra*, who goes on to explicate a passage disregarded by Ts., thus: "The monastic will disregard anything he might desire, putting it aside with a thought for the livelihood [to be had as a monk, etc.] Therefore the bodhisattva, influenced by a special disregard for the very highest human desires, disregards the desires of a universal monarch." *Bodhibhadra* puts it more simply: "Inferior persons go forth to the monastic life for the sake of desire and livelihood."

69. One should not keep celibacy--live the monastic life--out of an aspiration for rebirth even in the highest heaven of the realm of sense-desire, the *Paranirmitavaśavartin* ruled by *Māra* in which gods wish for an object and it is created by their servants. See Tatz 1977, no. 32.

70. "Sovereignities" (*vaśitā*) over length of life, karma, rebirth etc. Although this is not mentioned in the *Bbh* listing at the end of this section, it is also treated with item no. 4 by *Bodhibhadra*. Physical isolation (item no. 4) implies meditation.

71. "Subject to" (*chos can*, \**dharmin*) in place of *Bbh* "according to the doctrine" (*chos can gyi*, *dharma*<sup>o</sup>). This reading by Ts. is not based upon any commentary; *Guṇaprabha* repeats *chos bzhin*.

73. *Bbh* Skt bears out the reading of Ts.

74. The four qualities of a religious person are defined at 75a infra.

75. These glosses from *Jinaputra*, who says: "that the fault no occur in future."

76. *Jinaputra*: "The prior duty [no. 4] is to investigate the matter so as to undertake physical and verbal activities that are not reprehensible. Subsequent combined practice is to implement behavior exactly in accord with such investigation." But cp. *Bodhibhadra*: "The temporally prior duty is to be most emphatic that offense will never occur. According to some, this implies that offense will never occur. [But] subsequent combined practice is what ensures that the offense will not occur, come what may, because you maintain 'vigilance as a prior duty.'"

77. Cp. for example Chapter Two of the *Dhammapada*.

78. *Jinaputra* omits the item "calm deportment" that follows, perhaps considering it to be combined with this one.

79. See 72b-73a foll.

80. "Forbearance" or patience follows ethics in the list of six perfec-

tions. One could also interpret "failure to hold one's follower(s)," i.e. disciples, as the outcome of lack of tenderness and forbearance as described above.

81. Anger typifies the defilements; rancor, their subsidiaries; for the distinction see *AK* 5:88f. Bodhibhadra: "...defilements such as desire-attachment and aversion, as well as subsidiary defilements such as stinginess, envy, resentment, and rancor." The first five perfections are giving, morality, patience, vigor, and meditation. Refs *Bbh* Skt 99.25-100.12, W 144.2-23; Tib 88b8-89a8. See also Guṇaprabha 231a7-12, Jinaputra 248b1-249a2=Samudramegha 191b4-192a4, Bodhibhadra 217b3-218a3.

82. *Bbh* (followed by Bodhibhadra) uses the term for the higher stages of meditative achievement: "equalizations" (*samāpatti*: not "attainment" [Conze 1967 & others] as though derived from  $\sqrt{\text{āp}}$ , but "equalization" from  $\bar{\text{ā}} - \sqrt{\text{pad}}$ ). Jinaputra (followed by Ts.) uses the term for the lower stages: trances (*dhyāna*).

83. "Common ground": (*nyer gnas, upaniṣad*). In the *Bbh* (e.g. W 2. 26) this is a term of causality. But Jinaputra glosses it "achievement," and Bodhibhadra "carry out." See the discussion of this passage at Edgerton 1953:138b. (Edgerton is mistaken in insisting that the second set of five aspects of collecting wholesome factors corresponds to perfections five through ten.)

84. Guṇaprabha gives another explanation (ref. n. 65 above): "The ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings has eleven modes. Briefly, there are three sorts of sentient being: the common [Jinaputra: "the destitute"], the participating, and the hostile. Beginning with the common: there are seven modes of accomplishing their welfare... Those who are participating consist of those who are participating correctly and those who are participating wrongly, both co-religionists. Those who are hostile come last." Jinaputra expands this, relating them to the eleven items (ref. *ibid.*), and then gives the "alternative" explanation that is followed here by Ts. Refs *Bbh* Skt 100.13-101.2, W 144.24-145.19; Tib 89a8-b7. See also Guṇaprabha 231b2-232a2, Jinaputra 249a2-250a3=Samudramegha 192a4-193a6, Bodhibhadra 218a3-b2.

Jinaputra's breakdown of the eleven aspects differs slightly from that of Ts., who follows Bodhibhadra while using Jinaputra's subtitles.

85. This and other references follow Jinaputra.

86. Guṇaprabha: "seamanship and farming." Cp. Bodhibhadra cited 74a foll.: farming as an instance of wrong livelihood.

87. Jinaputra: "escorts them or shows them the road."

88. Ts. would evidently prefer to avoid the sense of "massage" by taking the term as something like "comforts their bodies," but the sense is unmistakable in *Bbh* and Bodhibhadra.

89. On how to dispel the hindrances to meditation, see 77a-78a foll. These glosses from Jinaputra.

90. This last gloss from Jinaputra. All other commentators include "humiliation and defeat by others" (foll.) together with "repudiation by someone else" (above)--thus dividing mental suffering into two parts rather than three. (Gunaṅgābha says: "There are two sorts of mental suffering: the suffering of the hindrances and the suffering of preoccupation.") The distinction, according to Jinaputra, is that "repudiation" comes from within one's own family.

91. "Literary expression" (*pada-vyañjana*) as opposed to content. Cp 80b foll.: the fault of relying on the letter rather than the meaning. This passage reorganizes material from the "teaching doctrine" section of the *Balagotra* chapter (*Bbh* ch. 8, Skt 74.23-75.26, W 106.5-107.20). See also Gunaṅgābha 232a2-b7, Jinaputra 250a4-251a1=Samudramegha 193a6-194a3, Bodhibhadra 218b2-6.

92. From this phrase correct Edgerton 1953 s.v.

93. Both sets found within longer listings *MHV* 350f, 444f.

94. Gunaṅgābha also reports this interpretation: "There are answers endowed with eight qualities by which, according to scriptural tradition, he spreads enlightenment. The eight qualities are that his teaching (1) occurs fitted to the meaning, (2) is connected with literary expressions well known to the world, (3) harmonizes disputes and inconsistencies, (4) is a profound expression and the definitive meaning, (5) for the hearer is a beneficial expression, an unshakeable foundation, (6) is classified according to the predispositions and inclinations of the disciples, (7) does not supplant the reception, recitation, memorization, consideration, and meditative cultivation of scriptural tradition, and (8) induces no attachment to the sound."

95. Jinaputra: "He teaches various crafts and work that are bases for acquiring goods."

96. Glosses and phrasing follow Jinaputra. The phrase "to obtain vision" is lost in *Bbh* Tib, but attested from Jinaputra and Bodhibhadra. Defilements keep one from attaining the path of vision, and the fetters of impure philosophic view keep one from advancing beyond it.

97. Refs. *Bbh* Skt 101.9-16, W 146.4-13; Tib 90a4-7. See also Gunaṅgābha 232b7, Jinaputra 251a1-6=Samudramegha 1943-8, Bodhibhadra 218b6-219a1.

98. But Jinaputra may have in mind legal powers and spies (*\*pranidhi*) to enforce them. Glosses and divisions follow Jinaputra, who follows Gunaṅgābha. Refs. *Bbh* Skt 101.17-20, W 146.14-19; Tib 90a7-b1. See also Gunaṅgābha 232b7-233a4, Jinaputra 251a6-b3=Samudramegha 194a8-b5, Bodhibhadra 219a1-4.

99. "Inhuman being" (*mi ma yin, amanuṣya*): as used here (according to Guṇaprabha and Jinaputra) it is a general term for supernatural beings such as ghosts and spirits. At his last phrase Ts. shows that he has paid insufficient attention to the commentaries: Samudramegha reads *rīgs sngags*, a corruption of *rig sngags*, \**vidyā*, hence "[who have become so by means of a] spell," as found in Guṇaprabha and Jinaputra. Reading *rīgs* forces Ts. into a clumsy interpretation "properly" (*rīgs pas*).

*Bbh* "zombies" (*ro lang, vetāḍa*): corpses raised from the dead by a spell.

Ts. has followed the classification made by Jinaputra: There are ten [sic] fears: two of animals, four of human beings, three of deprivation of something dear, and two of inhuman beings. According to Guṇaprabha, there are six fears: land-based animals, water, water-based animals, human beings, experiences of the three stations [body, speech, and mind], and two sorts having to do with inhuman beings; fear of human beings is divided into four sorts: those shared by all sentient beings (of kings and robbers) and those specific to some (adversaries and lords).

100. Jinaputra: "The poor and the sorrowful"; Bodhibhadra: "Relieving the sorrow of those impoverished of relatives and friends and of property." Classification and glosses primarily from Guṇaprabha. Refs (this sec. & two foll.) *Bbh* Skt 101.20-102.14, W 146.19-147.25; Tib 90b1-91a4. See also Guṇaprabha 233a4-b5, Jinaputra 251b3-252a5=Samudramegha 194b5-195a6, Bodhibhadra 219a4-220b1.

101. "Older generation": *rgan rabs*. Only Bodhibhadra, C ed., preserves a translation of *Bbh* Skt: "maternal relations" (*sālohita, snag gi gnyen*).

102. But Jinaputra: "teacher, preceptor, and celibates," substituting the last for "guru."

103. *Kuladūṣaka*: the monk corrupts a family with petty gifts (*saṃghavaśesa* no. 12).

104. "Sorrows created by death he relieves by showing impermanence to be part of the condition of sentient beings... The suffering of those [who are parted from their property] he relieves by showing conditioned things to be impermanent" (Jinaputra).

105. "Setting himself up as a resource or preceptor, teacher, and guru" (Jinaputra).

106. This summarizes a section of the *Balagotra* chapter (no. 8) of the *Bbh* (Skt 78.1-79.7, W 110.14-112.9). However, this account follows Bodhibhadra.

107. Ts. implies that these three terms refer to the three sorts of advice that immediately precede them. According to *Bbh* and Bodhibhadra, however, they summarize all eight preceding.

108. *Bbh*, Bodhibhadra: "in the case of confusion as to what is permitted and prohibited."

109. *Bbh* Tib: "He knows the dispositions, the nature, and the elements of sentient beings." *Bbh* Skt, Bodhibhadra: "essence [or "disposition"] and nature" (*bhāva*, *ngo bo*; *prakṛti*, *rang bzhin*). Guṇaprabha: "disposition (*bsam pa*, \**bhāva*) and nature." Samudramegha: "According to the text, he acts as one should in terms of the inclinations (*mos pa*, \**adhimukti*) and elements (*kham*s, \**dhātu*) of sentient beings. 'Disposition' means thinking (*sems pa*, \**cintā*). 'Nature' means instinct (*bag la nya*l, *vāsanā*) or element." (The text of Jinaputra glosses "nature" with inclination and "element" with instinct.) The best gloss is that of Guṇaprabha: "'Disposition' is one's thinking as created by present conditions. 'Nature' is one's nature (*ngo bo nyid*, \**svabhāva*) as caused by past lives. Alternatively, 'disposition' may be interpreted as the various sorts of nature possessed by individual sentient beings, and 'nature' as the thought process they all share."

Refs, this sec. & three foll., *Bbh* Skt 102.15-105.3, W 147.25-152.17; Tib 91a4-93a6. See also Guṇaprabha 233b6-234b4, Jinaputra 252a5-253b6=Samudramegha 195a6-196b6, Bodhibhadra 220b1-222a8.

110. The bodhisattva gives in moderation "lest it be repudiated" (Jinaputra). Knowing the proper measure to take would come under "ethics of the vow."

111. Jinaputra: He may excuse himself to prevent the other becoming impoverished.

112. Guṇaprabha classifies the above items into acts of body, speech, and mind. "Mind" includes those from "involvement in anger" through "shows himself to be grand." (Guṇaprabha seems to lack accosting and greeting.) "Body" includes the set of guidelines for cultivating others. "Speech" comprises the remainder.

113. This last phrase from Bodhibhadra, who also comments, "He applauds them by showing them [the good qualities] clearly to others."

114. Jinaputra: "...being the causes for the body and possessions of a higher rebirth."

115. "Free from bad feeling": *sdang ba med pa*<sup>2</sup>=*avipanna*. Bodhibhadra seems to read the phrase as in a previous passage (Skt 97.20-21, W 140.22) not cited by Ts.: "inner attitude gentle and endowed with beneficial intention."

116. For the offender to accept donations and honor under the pretense that he is more holy than is the case would result in demerit in place of the usual merit of giving. This comment from Jinaputra, see also 83b foll.

117. Jinaputra, subtitle: "Those who are hostile to the teaching of the Tathāgata." This item deals with anti-buddhists, the previous with buddhist who have gone wrong.

118. On the behavior leading to each of the hells see Tatz 1977, no. 1-8.

119. For an image identified as *Vajrapāṇi-yakṣa* see Coomaraswamy 1928, p. 15, fig. 2.

120. "Not speak": *mi smra ba la* in the two commentaries. But this would appear to be no more than a corruption of *sma dbab* "humiliating [questions]" as found in the text.

121. Jinaputra: He "frightens them by showing himself as a terrifying creation-body (*nirmāṇa-kāya*) with his power of working wonders."

122. "Wall" and "enclosure" (*kuḍya, prākāra*) are listed as the same item at *MHV* 219, but attested as separate in other sources, e.g. *Bbh Skt* 42:15=W 61:2-3, *VM* ch. 12.

123. All the powers listed in this paragraph he shares with the auditors, according to the *Bbh*. Jinaputra mentions the distinction between shared and unshared powers; on it see *Bbh Skt* 54:5-18=W 76:26-77:18, grading the powers of auditor, independent buddha, and bodhisattva. The miracle of fire and water was performed by the Buddha at Srāvastī and elsewhere (*PTSD* s.v. *yamaka*).

124. But Jinaputra includes the latter two with item no. 2, "those who are deluded."

125. Jetāri O 5363, 282a4-6=O 5406, 62a3-4. For the final phrase (Ts. "course of pleasing" *mgu ba'i spyod pa*). Jetāri reads "[take the] course of teaching [sentient beings]" *ston pa'i spyod pa*.

126. "This 'aggregate of ethics' is comprised of the infinite mass of the matters to be trained in. The 'aggregate of merit' is comprised of the measureless mass of merit." Refs *Bbh Skt* 105.4-6, W 152.18-21; Tib 93a6-8. See also Guṇaprabha 234b4, Jinaputra 253b6-7=Samudramegha 196b6-7.

127. Ts. reads '*thob* "that will be obtained"; here we follow O 5539: *thob*.

128. *SS* cp. *Skt* 11:3-8, Eng 14.

129. Continuing *Bhaiṣajyaguru* as cited in *SS* (but *Skt* differs).

130. The *Bhaiṣajyaguru* deals with twelve great aspiration made for-ferly by the buddha of that name. See *Skt* 3-7, Eng 238.

131. Nāgārjuna O 5361, 276a2-3, 276a7-b2.

132. *SS* ch. 1, *BCA* ch. 3.

133. Sec. 22221.2, 34b foll.

134. Bodhibhadra O 5362, Abhayākara O 5365. The two great chariots are Mādhyamika (Nāgārjuna and Śāntideva) and Yogācāra (Asanga).

135. Atiśa makes this statement in context of generating the thought (Sherburne 1983:45-46) but later, in context of taking the vow, he says that in composing his ceremony (O 5403) he followed Asanga. He then refers to Śāntideva (SS, the ceremony of Ambarāja from the *Mañjuśrī-buddhakṣetra-alaṅkāra*, O 760:15) for the ceremony "without a guru" (91).

136. The "misconstrual" of Sakya Pandita, *Sdom gsum* 15a.

137. In the chapter of the *Bbh* called Generating the Thought (ch. 2), no ceremony is found.

138. Together in O 5403, separate at Sherburne 1983:43-44.

139. O 5331, 5276 (see P Sha 109b5f). Authorship of the former is ascribed in the colophon to Ratnākaraśānti, the translation only to Kṛṣṇapāda.

140. So Atiśa in O 5403, Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan at Tatz 1982a. For an aspiration (without ceremony) composed by Ts. see Thurman 1982:90-95.

141. In such early texts the vow ceremony is often referred to as *cittotpāda*. See for example Jinaputra cited n. 144 below. This, along with the absence of a separate ceremony for *cittotpāda* in the *Bbh*, is evidence that separate ceremonies are a late development: perhaps, as Ts. implies, stemming from the time of Jetāri (ninth century).

142. Singular here and in Indian sources, plural in *Bbh* Tib. Refs, this sec. & foll., *Bbh* Skt 105.7-13, W 152.22-153.5; Tib 93a8-b3. See also Gunaprabha 234b5-6; Jinaputra 253b7-254a6=Samudramegha 196b7-197a5; Śāntarakṣita 269 (Eng), 550-51 (Tib); Bodhibhadra 227a4-6; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 9a5-6 (Tib), 24-25 (Eng); *Bodhisattvaprātimokṣa-sūtra* (abbrev. *BPS*) 1b1-4.

143. "According to instructions": the candidate has undergone a ceremonial meditation for generating the resolve; see for ex. Tatz 1982a: 27-31.

144. Jinaputra: "The *prātimokṣa* vow is limited to those who have taken refuge. In the same way, the aspiration must have been sown in order to undertake the *cittotpāda*.

That the resolve is precondition for taking the vow is indicated by Candragomin at *TV* 2b: "With it as your lofty intention." Bodhibhadra explains the line (226a5-6): "A 'lofty intention' is the intention of protecting the whole world, an attitude endowed with the great serenity that has but the single taste of compassion and wishes to come into contact with buddha and bodhisattva qualities." See also Tatz 1982a:24-25 for the discussion by Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan.

145. Asanga makes clear in the closing statement of this passage that the obligations entailed by the vow are explained to the candidate before he undertakes it--unlike monastic ordination--as Ts. contends. Atiśa assumes that they are explained afterward (O 5403, 54a2-3; see also Sherburne 1976:288). Ts. takes "before" (*puratas*) to mean "before the ceremony"; Jinaputra takes it to refer to the bases of training taught previously in the Chapter; more obvious would be the sense "before the candidate." Refs *Bbh* Skt 108.5-10, W 157.14-158.1; Tib 96a3-6. See also Jinaputra 256b5-8=Samudramegha 199b1-5; Śāntarakṣita 273, 555; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 12b2.

146. The earlier Indian commentaries point out with frequency that the bodhisattva's vow-ceremony is in essence different from, although formally patterned upon) vinaya ceremonies for monastic ordination. For the structure of vinaya ceremonies see Sherburne 1976:236-40 & refs, Banerjee 1949:19-30. For the substance see Jinananda 1961.

147. He is a co-religionist. (lit. "fellow in the Dharma") by analogy with auditor ethics: One cannot take monastic ordination from someone "beneath oneself in rank" (Jinaputra)--for example, become a full monk at the hands of a novice. In this case, the officiant must be Mahayanist.

148. Correct *Bbh* Skt to \**saṃvara-samādatta-vijñasya* after *Bbh* Tib *sdom pa blangs pa mkhas pa*, borne out of Śāntarakṣita, Atiśa (O 5403, 51b5), Bodhibhadra (O 5362, 277a1-2), and *TV* 2c ("From a guru maintaining and learned in the vow"). *BPS* is broken in this place.

Bodhibhadra says of this line of the *TV* (O 5584, 226a6-b2): "Established in the vow": receive it from a co-religionist, someone in possession of the bodhisattva vow of ethics, not from someone who is not a co-religionist in that he has relinquished the vow or broken the moral code. 'Learned': do not receive it from just anyone established in the vow, but from someone learned in the ceremony for undertaking the bodhisattva vow of ethics. The vow should not be obtained from someone who is not learned, lest the ceremony fail. Likewise, do not take it from just anyone who is learned and a co-religionist, but from someone who is 'capable,' or powerful--who is suitable and appropriate to impart it."

Ts.'s "learned in the Greater Vehicle" follows Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan.

149. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan: "You should take it from a lay or monastic bodhisattva who is capable of understanding and communicating the meaning."

150. In *Bbh*, this passage follows the ceremony; Ts. follows Bodhibhadra and Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan in moving it forward. Atiśa (*Lamp* ch. 4) omits. Refs *Bbh* Skt 107.14-23, W 156.9-157.4; Tib 95b3-8. See also Jinaputra 255b6-256b3=Samudramegha 198b3-199a7; Śāntarakṣita 272-73, 554; Bodhibhadra 226a6-227a5; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 4b5-5a6.

151. "Preparedness" (*rtog pa, avakalpayet*): to give it a thought.

152. So Jinaputra. Cp. Bodhibhadra: "The blessing of attitude [that qualifies one to impart this vow] is to have faith, sincerity, detachment, and compassion, by which he is greatly devoted to the bodhisattva vow-of-ethics undertaking. He has faith, not repudiating the code of the bodhisattva collection and so forth; respecting the trainings, he participates in and believes in them; he is by nature easily satisfied, content, not intent upon his own interests, endowed with compassion, not melancholic, tolerant of others' faults, not angry or rancorous. The blessing of application is to augment this into wholesome factors, to participate out of respect, by all means to believe in some of the bases of training in this regard without being stupid, to be energetic and not lazy, not to anticipate sense-pleasures or socializing, and to be free of mental wandering."

153. This definition of "attachment" (*lobha*) from Jinaputra accords with that of the *Trimsāka* of Vasubandhu (ed. Lèvi, index s.v. *lobha*).

154. This definition by Ts. accords with AK 6:6bcd.

155. "Categorically a fault" (after Jinaputra): a fault that cannot be rectified by confession etc.; see n. 533 below. "Respect": see *MSA* 4:5 (Tib 213b6): "With ethics being undertaken, there is strong respect (*gurutā*) for the bodhisattva training"; and *ibid.* 11:4, on vinaya, where disrespect (*anādara*) is identified, with defilement, as a source of transgression. At AK 4:37d respect (*ādara*, glossed by Yaśomitra as "strong faith," *tīvra-prasāda*) is said to produce the vow. See also n. 179 below.

156. On the four dharmas of a shramana see 75a foll. These represent faults of attitude as well as application.

157. His liking for negative directions is shown, according to Jinaputra, by the examples, But one might prefer to take the set of three as laziness, and socializing as indolence.

158. The adjuvant cause (*\*parigraha-hetu*) is not the seed but the field, the water, or the fertilizer that contributes to the growth of grain (*Bbh Skt* 71:24-25, W 101.21-23; *AS* 46; *Siddhi* 457; cp. *MSA* 14:22v, 20-21:31 [*saṃparigraha*]). "Because," Jinaputra explains, "by repudiating the good doctrine, one ensures defective understanding in future lives as well."

159. The *TV* (2c) uses the term "guru [maintaining and learned in the vow]"; Bodhibhadra takes this as a further qualification: "It is not to be taken from just anyone, although he may be capable. So we read, 'a guru.' It should be taken from someone who functions as a guru for you, and not from anyone else. If you do not hold the guru to be your equal, you will, not have the good form to imitate him, because you will have not respect for those who do." Cp. Ts. foll. on whether to take the vow in a ceremony with lama or without (36b).

"Some commentaries" refers to the opinions of Tibetan scholars not endorsed by Ts.

160. This reason from Jinaputra, who adds, "The vow will only be created in someone who wants it." Refs. n. 142 above.

161. Jetāri O 5363, 280a6-7; Abhayākara O 5365, 289b8. Offerings detailed by Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan at Tatz 1982a:27-28. Mandala-offering ceremony at Hanson 1977:92-117. Abhayākara mentions other preliminaries--taking refuge and lay precepts--in line with the *Bbh* precondition that the candidate be a member of one of the seven *prātimokṣa* classes. Atiśa includes the seven offices of worship--confession and the rest--from the *Bhadracari*, plus taking refuge (O 5403).

162. Refs n. 142 above. This entreaty is, strictly speaking, what the guru is able "to grasp and understand" (Guṇaprabha). Kulaputra: lit. "child of the family"; a member of the Greater Vehicle (see Ruegg 1969: 86, 144 n. 3). Bodhibhadra (O 5362) gives *āyusman* and *bhadanta* as alternatives; for their range of usage see 34a foll. Atiśa addresses him as *ācārya*, "master." "If it be no importunity" corresponds to the precondition that monastic ordination (*upasampada*) cause no inconvenience to the community (Banerjee 1957:123-24, *ibid.* for the phrase "out of pity"). Bodhibhadra reads, "If the entreaty is proper and causes no difficulty."

163. *BPS* also mentions this (1b4). See Jētari 60a5-6; Bodhibhadra O 5362, 277a3; Atiśa O 5403, 51b7; Abhayākara O 5365, 289b1-3.

164. Abhayākara: "seated before him with palms joined, either kneeling on both knees or squatting." Jetāri: "kneeling, palms joined, on his right knee."

165. This passage absent from *Bbh* Skt, *BPS*; nor is it referred to by Guṇaprabha or Jinaputra; it does appear in *Bbh* Tib (93b3-6) and Śāntarākṣita (269-70, 551). Jetāri has the guru answer "Yes" (60a6). Abhayākara (289b3-4) supplies an "inquiry," as in *Bbh*'s Announcement to the Candidate (Ts. 29b). Atiśa combines that inquiry with this one (O 5403, 51b7-52a2). Bodhibhadra omits this passage in O 5362 but his commentary (following Śāntarākṣita?) makes this speech a test (227a6-b1):

"After that entreaty, in order to examine whether he is a suitable repository [for the vow], he should make him listen to the bases of *bodhisattva* training, and say, 'Have you the fortitude to train in this?' This having been said, if [the candidate] verbally indicates that he is highly enthusiastic, and passes some days with transformed countenance and gaze, by which it is known that he is eager, and that he has not been instigated by someone else, and that he is not in competition with someone else, then he will stand by it."

Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan cites the *Ākāśagarbha* and other scriptures on the disadvantages of failure, as does Ts. at 54a foll.

166. *SS*, Skt 12:29-13:21, Eng 17-19. See also Ts. 96a-97a foll.

167. Plural in Skt.

168. Skt adds: "and propagates."

169. In *SS*, *kārikā* 3a (Skt), correct *mahāyāna* to *mahāphala*.
170. *Samādhirāja-sūtra* O 5511; Skt 35:3-4.
171. *SS* Skt 10:17-30, Eng 13.
172. Correct 'dod to 'ong after Skt.
173. Correct *dge ba* to *dge ba's rtsa ba* after Skt; learning is not one of the thirty-seven wings of awakening, but a "root" or source of their development. On the thirty-seven wings see Dayal 1932, ch. 4.
174. *Atiśa* O 5403, 51b7-52a2. This arrangement comes from Bodhibhadra; see n. 165 above.
175. The Kadampa geshes (*bka' gdams pa'i dge ba'i bshes gnyen*).
176. The customary response is "Yes" as with Jetāri; see n. 165 above.
177. Bhavabhadrā (ninth century?): a tantric master of Vikramāśīla (Tāranātha, Eng 326).
178. "Not yet in unstationary nirvana" would include auditors and independent buddhas, whose attainment is "stationary": lacking further rebirth.
179. Prātimoksa ordination results from respect for the preceptor; see Banerjee 1957: 108, 110, 114-15. Refs, this sec. & 3 foll., *Bbh* Skt 105. 13-25, W 153.5-24; *BPS* 1b4-2a4; Tib 93b6-94a4. See also Guṇaprabha 234b6-235a2; Jinaputra 254a6-b6=Samudramegha 197a4-b5; Śāntarakṣita 270, 551-52; Bodhibhadra 227b1-7; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 10a5-b.2.
180. "Profound...and extensive" from Guṇaprabha. See gloss at Ts.49a foll.
181. "Effort" *rtsol*, but this may be a misreading. Guṇaprabha has "whatever human skill *rtśal* he may presently possess in generating a serene thought." (Ts. uses "human skill" at 37b foll.)
182. The "power of causes" (*hetu-bala*) is one of a set of powers necessary to create conventional (*sāṃketika*) bodhicitta, as the vow is sometimes called (MSA 4:7 & comm., Tib 148a6; cp. Ruegg 1969:84-85). *Hetu-bala* is a hereditary aptitude, a predisposition for the vow. Other forces that help to create the vow are the spiritual adviser (*mitra-bala*), good roots (*mūla-bala*, defined as augmentation of that *gotra*), as well as hearing of it (*śruta-bala*). In a parallel abhidharma usage, instinct (*anuśaya*) is the causal force in the development of defilement, phenomena the objective force, and so forth (AK 5:34, AD 295-96).
183. Skt read *saṃpūjya puraskṛtya* after *BPS* & Tib sources.

184. A customary recitation that precedes formal instruction during which the teacher is conceived to be the Buddha in person.

185. Atiśa (O 5403, 52a2-6): "Thereupon, seated before a statue or a painting of the Tathāgata Śākyamuni and thinking himself to be seated before all the buddhas and bodhisattvas, beginning with Śākyamuni, who dwell in all the realms of the universe in the ten directions, he does worship with the five outer offerings [of sense-objects] as well as he is able, and makes prostration. Immediately thereafter he falls at the feet of the spiritual adviser, who is seated on a high seat, with the notion of him as the Teacher..."

186. "Squatting" with both heels on the ground *PTSD s.v.ukkuṭika*).

187. Atiśa (O 5403) 52a4-6. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan also specifies three recitals of the entreaty.

188. In vinaya acts, preference is given to the seniority of a monk, not to age.

189. O 4546, 252a7-8. Ts. corrected on the basis of O 4546.

190. Atiśa, in the famous verse 21 of *A Lamp for the Path*, declares the full monk (*bhikṣu*) to be the highest of prātimokṣa ranks; but he never says that one must be a monk to undertake a greater-vehicle path.

191. *TV* 2a, "That treasury of all merit," indicates the purpose (Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 4a5-6), or the distinction (Bodhibhadra 225b5-226a5). The sense (as they agree) is that taking the vow is the source of short and long-term benefit for self and others.

This section implies, according to Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan, a "recollection of the Buddha" meditation that recapitulates the ceremony for generating the aspiration thought. See Tatz 1982a:34.

192. "Hereditary aptitude": see n. 182 above. Jinaputra: "Taking refuge is preliminary to [taking] the vow of the auditor. In the same way, the resolve is preliminary for the bodhisattva. To show this, an inquiry is made as to his resolve, with the aim of making it firm." However, this section would seem to correspond to the inquiry, during bhikṣu ordination, "Are you a man? Have you the male organ?" (Banerjee 1957:119, 124). Bodhibhadra omits this in O 5362.

193. Atiśa O 5403, 52b1. The question comes from Bodhibhadra, who also adds, as preliminaries, confession of sin, taking refuge, etc.

194. Bodhibhadra (O 5362) has a more extensive affirmation which does not seem to have influenced later ceremonies. In monastic ordination the pattern of question and answer is similar; see Banerjee 1957: 128-40. Refs *Bbh Skt* 105.25-106.9, W 153.24-154.13, *BPS* 2a4-b3; Tib 94a4-b1. See also Guṇaprabha 235a2-3; Jinaputra 254b6-8=Samudramegha 197b5-6, Śāntaraṣṭita 271, 552-53; Bodhibhadra 227b3-7; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 10b5-11a5.

195. These definitions follow Jinaputra; cp. Guṇaprabha: "'Bases of training' are the foundations for training in each of the three sorts of ethics as they are found individually. 'Ethics' refers to tripartite ethics." Bases of training are taught as a system, but also considered to be infinite (MS 70, 217; Abhayākara O 5299, 93a1f; Atiśa, *Lamp* 92).

196. This procedure follows Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan. A bodhisattva name is bestowed upon the candidate at this point, or at least he receives the title "bodhisattva." Although the buddhas etc. are present in all directions, the Kagyu lama Kalu Rinpoche (Karma Rang-byung-kun-kyab-phrin-las-dpal-bzang-po), when performing this "Yogācāra" version of the ceremony (Vancouver, B.C., 1974), addressed the announcement upwards. Refs, this sec. & the foll., *Bbh Skt* 106.14-107.2, W 154.9-155.17, *BPS* 2b3, 4b1-3; Tib 94ab3-95a4. See also Guṇaprabha 235a3-4; Jinaputra 254b8-255a6=Samudramegha 197b6-198a4; Śāntaraṣita 271-72, 553, 556-57; Bodhibhadra 228a7-b5; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 11a5-12a4.

197. Bodhibhadra (O 5362:279a6-b1): "I, the bodhisattva so-and-so, fully aware (*\*saṃprajānant*) that I am witness, announce that the bodhisattva so-and-so has undertaken the bodhisattva vow of ethics to the highest of nobles, invisible in the infinite realms of the universe of the ten directions, who are nonetheless no invisible when it comes to the welfare of sentient beings."

This announcement corresponds to vinaya notification to the community that an ordination has been performed (Banerjee 1957:120f; *MSA* 11: 4, ed. 55:8 with the correction by Nagao, p. xiv). Atiśa describes the announcement with the vinaya term "declaration of act" (*karma-vācanā*, O 5403).

198. Guṇaprabha: "'Intuition': they perceive the invisible; 'vision': they perceive it directly [read *mngon sum*]." Jinaputra: "Vision (*darśana*) that is identical to mystic intuition (*jñāna*); because it is directly present [to the mind]." Cp. *MHV* 151-53: the cognition of a buddha that "proceeds unattached and unobstructed through he past, the future, and the present." See also *VM* 20:2, 22:119; *AK* 7:27c-28; *PTSD* s.v. *nāṇa-dassana*; Jayatillike 1963, par. 718f.

199. "Without any hindrance" follows Jinaputra. Bodhibhadra: The phrase "forever" at *TV* 3c has the sense "[they consider him as a son] uninterruptedly, until the point [at which he reaches] awakening."

200. This analysis follows Jinaputra, who introduces it by saying, "Because it is higher than any other vow undertaking, and because it is more open, it is 'most distinguished.'" *MS* presents a set of four superiorities whose subdivisions include these (68-70, 212-17). Refs *Bbh Skt* 107.5-10, W 155.21-156.3; Tib 95a5-8. See also Jinaputra 255a6-b3=Samudramegha 198a4-8; Śāntaraṣita 274, 555-56.

201. The *prātimokṣa* vow stops misbehavior only on the part of the person who takes the vow.

202. So Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan. Refs *Bbh Skt* 107.2-5, *W* 155.17-21; *Tib* 95a4-5.

203. Atiśa is even more explicit: "The bodhisattva who is highly virtuous will keep it secret" (O 5403:53b6-54a2). Refs *Bbh Skt* 107.24-108.4, *W* 157.4-13; *Tib* 95b8-96a3. See also Jinaputra 256b3-5=Samudramegha 199a7-b1; Śāntarakṣita 273, 554-55; Bodhibhadra 227b8-228a2; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 12a4-b1.

204. In Atiśa (O 5403:53a8), the thanks offering consists only of prostrations by teacher and disciple. Ts. is mistaken when he says that in the *Bbh* the announcement follows the thanks offering; he must be looking at Śāntarakṣita. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan ends by dedicating the merit gain from taking the vow to the attainment of awakening.

205. Verse 1 & 2 of the *TV* are explicated prior to description of the ceremony by Bodhibhadra (213b3-227a4, including an account of prefatory sections of the Chapter on Ethics), and by Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan (4a1-5a6).

206. Bodhibhadra: "because in such cases they are not fit vessels." Cp. his comment at n. 159 above. Bodhibhadra notes that this is the only vow that you can take by yourself. He adds a summary verse:

In order to have this moral code,  
In a pure but secluded place  
Where no guru is available,  
You may be the guru yourself.

Refs *Bbh Skt* 124.24-125.7, *W* 181.16-182.4, *BPS* 4b4-5a2; *Tib* 108b7-109a4. See also Jinaputra 272b8-273a1=Samudramegha 214b1-2; Śāntarakṣita 280-81, 561-62; Bodhibhadra 228a1-7; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 12b6-13a4. See also Bodhibhadra O 5362:279b5-280a2; Atiśa *Lamp* v. 24; *MMA* 75b1f.

207. See also the discussion at 97b foll.

208. "Perform and guard" follows *Bbh Tib*, the *Skt* original may have read *rakṣitavyañca* in place of *Bbh Skt śikṣā karaṇīyā* "perform the trainings." But the latter is attested by Jinaputra. The corruption of *Bbh Tib* may also come from reading Jinaputra during translation work, for he subtitles this section "guarding [the vow]" \**anurakṣa*. Refs *Bbh Skt* 107.10-14, *W* 156.3-9; *Tib* 95a8-b3. See also Jinaputra 255b3-6=Samudramegha 198a8-b3; Śāntarakṣita 275, 557.

209. This last clause absent from *Bbh Skt* and all commentaries except Śāntarakṣita. But cp. the passage at *Bbh Skt* 124.5-6 (*W* 180.13-14) at 84b foll.

210. The first half-verse also cited *BCA* comm., *Skt* 48.

211. See Shukla 1979, v. 290-91; Willemsen 1978, v. 21-22; Pali *Dhammapada* vs. 19-20. Other refs Shukla 1979:59.

212. Skt "recite" *pathisyāmi*.

213. SS Skt 10:3-4, Eng 12. Skt read *sāmanyena*.

214. SS 10:5-8, Eng 12.

215. *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* O 761: 31.

216. The fault of not trying is worse than neglect of the training; it is positively wicked by nature, not only by the Buddha's prescription (MSA 1:21).

217. The verse may be taken as a summary of *Bbh* ch. 3; it is a starting point for the SS, the first *pada* of which is apparently the same; cp. also *BCA* 8:95-96. The comment by Ts. follows Śāntarakṣita 275-77, 557-58; Bodhibhadra 228b5-229a6; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 13b1-5.

218. "Ultimately" *dam pas* is inspired by Bodhibhadra: "Someone does something of benefit to someone. What he does is pleasantness in the ultimate sense (*\*paramārthikena*), because the benefit is a cause for [future] well-being."

219. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan: "to let someone ill with fever forego sleep and take liquor." The example of adultery is original to Ts. Bodhibhadra gives a more detailed account of the permutations based on *Bbh* ch. 3.

220. *Bbh* ch. 3 *svaparārthā-pāṭala*.

221. For additional exculpatory circumstances proposed by Bodhibhadra, and a discussion of the placement of this passage in the text, see 84a-b foll. Refs *Bbh* Skt 124.3-4, W 180.10-12; Tib 108.5. See also Jinaputra 272a6-7=Samudramegha 213b7-8; Śāntarakṣita 312, 594; Bodhibhadra 250a2-7; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 28a5-6.

222. "Factions" *ris*; but Śāntarakṣita reads "classes" *rigs*, (284, 565). In this context, the comment is evidently an afterthought by Śāntarakṣita.

223. "Corpus" *lus*, *\*kāya* (Bodhibhadra 229a6); "quorum" *sde*, *\*varga* (MMA 87b3). Bodhibhadra introduces this section thus (229a6-b1): "What are its transgressions and failures? The corpus of transgression is twofold: (1) events that are 'grounds for defeat,' from the habitual practice of which the vow will be relinquished (TV 5-8a), and (2) misbehavior-transgressions, by which one becomes possessed of transgression (TV 8d-20b). One might add in this connection that some downfalls are confessable to another, as will be explained at 8bc, while some can be curbed alone, as will be explained at 8d. These transgressions--how they result in failure, along with their causes--have been legislated in the codes of the bodhisattva collection."

224. *Kṛṣṇapāda*, O 527? "Gross breach" (*sthūlātyaya*): defeat-type

offenses that do not meet all requirements necessary to result in defeat. Cp. its usage at Ts. 49a, 68b & n. 282 foll.

225. These are called "defeats" only by analogy with *prātimokṣa* defeat; they differ significantly in their functioning. See the analysis of the term at 42b foll. On the defeats see *Bbh* Skt 108.11-14, W 158.2-159.2; Tib 96a6-b4. See also *Guṇaprabha* 235a4-236a6; *Jinaputra* 256b8-257b3 = *Samudramegha* 199b5-200a7; *Śāntarakṣita* 277, 279, 558, 560-61; *Bodhibhadra* 231a2-235a6; *Graṅs-pa-rgyal-mtshan* 14b5-15a2.

226. Analysis of the defeats follows *Graṅs-pa-rgyal-mtshan*.

227. This interpretation is original, as is the following.

228. An imprecise report. According to *Bodhibhadra*, the bodhisattva praises his own real or imagined good qualities and denigrates the good qualities possessed or reported to be possessed by someone else, and describes the other person's defects.

229. *Bodhibhadra* reads simply "attachment." *Bodhibhadra* provides a reason to consider this a defeat: "The function of a bodhisattva is to give the profit he obtains to others, and to teach them secret doctrines. How can he be attached to them, not to mention praising himself and deprecating others for their sake?"

230. *Bodhibhadra*: "indigency" refers to hunger.

231. Cp. *Guṇaprabha*: the beggar must have approached, and must have approached properly.

232. When not to give: see the Chapter on Giving, Skt 81.7-96.9, W 115.17-123.17; Tib 72a6-77a4. Cp *SS* Eng 248 on when to give liquor.

233. *Bodhibhadra*: "The function of a bodhisattva is to know intimately those who are poor and those endowed with higher aspiration and then, even without their having to beg, of his own accord to cause them to acquire wealth and encourage them to listen to doctrine."

234. "Appears": because some Tib variants indicate that the bodhisattva has been the object of harsh speech.

236. Ts. understands the *SS* "seminal transgressions" to be equivalent to the *Bbh* "defeats." See sem. tr. no. 3 at 49b foll.

237. This is being treated as a separate defeat; see discussion at 43a-44b foll. *Bodhibhadra* also treats the two lines separately, pointing out that beating should logically follow failure to heed the apology, as is the order in *TV*.

238. *Bodhibhadra*: "Your function as a bodhisattva is to be forbearant no matter how excessive and widespread the other's offenses and to

be delighted, with an appreciative state of mind, even without grounds [var. "as though there were grounds"]."

239. Bodhibhadra glosses this "the code for the bodhisattva collection, and so forth."

240. "Limited scope" alludes to the lesser vehicle, "heterodox" to non-buddhists. The *MMA* makes the same identification; its interlinear commentary reasons that teaching an inferior view of emptiness cuts the chances for full buddhahood. (89b6-7).

241. "The function of a bodhisattva is to rely upon and illumine this very Greater Vehicle as well as he is able, for it is the means to benefit and pleasure for the broad masses of sentient beings" (Bodhibhadra).

242. "Defeat" is derived from *parā-√ji*, "like a defeat" by *vṛddhi* from this. Cp. Lévi in *JA* 1912:505-6; Pali refs Edgerton 1953 s.v.

243. "For with the occurrence of a 'defeat' type of transgression the monk is no longer a monk, nor a religious person (shramana) of any sort, and in this life he will not regain the opportunity to become a real monk. The bodhisattva is not like that. He does no more than relinquish the vow--he has the opportunity to take it again in the same life, as will be shown at line 8a." All Indian commentators make this point.

244. And they (Jinaputra and Samudramegha) point out that this demonstrates the relative profundity and comprehensiveness of this particular moral code. Gunaprabha gives a similar account of the correspondences. On the four bhikṣu defeats see Prebish 1975:51, 53; the order is changed in this account.

245. Their motivations are the three defilements. In the case of bhikṣu defeats, desire-attachment gives rise to sexual intercourse and to theft, aversion gives rise to murder, and ignorance gives rise to the false claim of superhuman *dharma*s. Motivations for bodhisattva "defeats" are the same (all three Indian commentators). Gunaprabha notes that the three defilements are grounds upon which the defeat occurs--hence the term "grounds for defeat."

246. This approach follows Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan.

247. Adding the four bhikṣu to eight bodhisattva defeats to make twelve may in fact reflect an Indian tradition; it is found in the Sung Dynasty translation of the Chapter on Ethics (*EB* 3:243b). Other items of *prātimokṣa* also infiltrate, *ibid.* 244a.

248. *MMA* 88b7. "Code to the bodhisattva collection" is its term of reference to the *Bbh*.

249. *MMA* 90a5-6; interlinear comm. gives the other three pairs.

250. Ratnākaraśānti O 5331:320a4.

251. But Śāntarakṣita cites all verbatim from the *Bbh*!

252. Cited also sec. foll., 48a. The order of the lines here differs from that of the Tib translation of the *SS* (and does in fact accord with *Skt*). In *SS* Tib it is more difficult to discern two independent transgressions: "While conscientiously enjoying it,/ To be intolerant of sentient beings/ And strike sentient beings out of anger."

"Seminal" refers to the verse portion of the text.

253. Actually, Bodhibhadra says, "by dissimilarity of [motivating] deilement" (238a2-3).

254. Samudramegha 200a6-8=Jinaputra 257b2-4. Portions in parentheses are found in the text but omitted by Ts.

255. The *SS* system of seminal transgression is based upon that of the *AG* scripture, which enumerates five for a ruler, etc. The passage is translated as Appendix B below. The eighteen of the *SS* are given by Ts. foll. Bodhibhadra does not of course make the statement that seminal transgressions are not seminal transgressions (cp. 230b2-231a2).

256. But Bodhibhadra does not refer to the *Bbh*; he refers to the bodhisattva collection itself, implying that the *AG* would state that they cause one to lose the vow.

257. The Sakya view; ref n. 136 above.

258. As above: that the "seminal transgressions" of the *AG* are not meant to be regarded as defeats of the vow.

259. This discussion appears at Ratnākaraśānti O 5331:320a5f in more detail, and at *MMA* 89a4f.

260. Abhayākara is being accused of circularity: the *Bbh* four include the *SS* eighteen, but the *SS* eighteen are adduced to describe the characteristics of the *Bbh* four. Therefore, Ts. observes, not all the eighteen can be included in the four. Cp. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan at Tatz 1982a:42: "They represent a different scriptural system."

261. Ratnākaraśānti O 5331:320a1f.

262. The old translation of the *SS* by Jinamitra and Dānaśīla (ninth century) is no longer available; we have in the Tangyur its revision (referred to by Ts. as "the new translation") by Tilakakalaśa of Kashmir and Blo-ldan-shes-rab (A.D. 1059-1109).

263. "Summary verses" *saṃgraha-kārikā* (*SS* *Skt* 41:1); correct Tib from *tshig le'ur byas pa dag* to *tshigs su bcad pa dag*. "unified theory": *ekīyagatanām*, *gcig gi 'dod pa ltar*.

264. *SS* Tib P 52b3, N Ki 47a.

265. "Summary verses": n. 263 above. "To establish a certain system": 'ga' zhiḡ gi lugs gnas par bya ba'i phyir, \*kasminścit kayagatanārtham.

266. *BCA* Skt 78-79.

267. Dge-ba-lha O 5275. This is not clearly verse in its citation by Ts., the second *shad* having become *ste*.

268. *SS* Skt 41; Tib O 5336:52b3-53a4, N Ki 47a5-b5; cp. Eng 70-71. See also *BCA* Skt 78-79.

269. The order of these last three lines follows *SS* Skt and *BCA* Skt; see n. 252 above. (Lines abc here are cab in *SS* Tib.) The last three defeats of this listing are taken from the *Bbh* set of four (*Bbh* no. 1 being equivalent to *SS* no. 11 above.)

270. See Appendix B below for this section.

271. Canonical texts, personal discovery, and ultimate reality (\*āgama, *adhigama*, *paramārtha*) are the three aspects of doctrine; they correspond to foundation, path, and goal. See Buddhābhadrā cited Tatz 1985: 66 & 104, n. 50.

272. "Noble one" ārya: someone who has attained awakening, an *arhat*.

273. In other words, not only the ultimate level of the Precious Three is in question.

274. *AG* reads "or"; Ts. is working from the *SS* version. (*SS* Skt also reads "or.")

275. As a ruler's transgression in the *AG*, this may be understood as confiscation or taxation of church property.

276. A monastic who steals is defeated and disobeyed.

277. Read *nor* for *dor*.

278. This may allude to the interpretation of Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan, see Tatz 1982a:37-39.

279. Tib 'phrog rku ba. But there is no basis in the existing Skt text to assume that two terms are used, as in the *Bbh* (Skt 113.19, W 166 2) foll.

280. No. 1, 13, & 14.

281. These glosses follow Ratnākaraśānti O 5331:321b4-5. The *Bbh* discussion of the corresponding misdeed will be found at Ts. 79b foll.

282. But see the suggestion by Rhys Davids & Oldenberg(1882:xxv) that the category of "gross breach" (*thullaccaya*) is a late addition to vinaya comprising offenses that the redactors added to a list of defeats. This item--shedding the blood of a Tathāgata--appears in the *AG* as a fifth defeat (App. B, Auditors' Transgressions, below); Ts. misses it because he is reading the *SS* instead of the original *AG*.

283. But even *SS* Tib could well be causative: the ruler causes others to reject and deny (*spong bar byed 'gog par byed*); *AG* Tib adds "and conceal."

284. But cp. 78a-b (*TV* 15c) foll.

285. No. 2, 8, 15.

286. No. 1, 3.

287. *TV* 7b, "Striking him out of anger."

288. No. 1, 3, 6, 13.

289. *BCA* Skt 78:20-21.

290. "Training" *slob* a wrong reading by Ts. for "guard" *srung*?

291. *Idem.* n. 289 above.

292. See sec. 2232122161.1, 78b foll.

293. Gain, respect, fame, and reputation.

294. Sec. 2232111121.1, 40b.

295. Lit. "two tongues" *dvijihvika*.

296. *AG* 291a5, *SS* 38:20.

297. Bodhibhadra 231a4, paraphrased no. 228 above.

298. The simpler interpretation would be that genuine good qualities are praised, whereas ungenue are wrongly praised.

299. This bodhisattva defeat, and monastic defeat no. 4: false claim to superhuman *dharmas*. (*Dharmas*: originally "qualities" in this context, but in the *AG* etc. taken to mean "doctrines.")

300. Prajñākaramati (*BCA* 78:28) and Ts., eight centuries apart, stand on opposite sides of the perennial buddhist controversy of study versus meditation. See also n. 303 below.

301. Prajñākaramati (*BCA* 78:28) identifies the rulers as the second par-

ty at fault. Defeats for rulers and ministers, however, are listed separately in the *AG*. This being a beginner's transgression, the second party at fault should be the monks who are caused to steal to pay their taxes. See also the first sentence of the following defeat in the *AG*, App. B.

302. Again, a simpler interpretation would be that this differs from ruler's no. 1 in that a second party is also at fault.

303. But in transgression no. 13 above, the rulers are pronounced guilty for accepting goods that have been misappropriated. Why not consider the reciters--those who study texts but do not meditate--guilty here?

304. This confessional ceremony from the *AG* is cited by the *SS* just above the verses on seminal transgression. See Ts. 87b foll.

305. *Upāyakaūśālya-sūtra* (O 760:38, 927; summary Tatz 1981, tr. forthcoming). This passage sec. 22; O 927:301:1-4; cited *SS* Skt 40:25-30, Tib N Ki 47a2-5, Eng 70.

306. So P; T & C insert *mi* "one is not."

307. This discussion continues to deal with particular factors, not those shared by all defeats.

308. Ts. 44a; see also n. 252, 259 above.

309. Ts. 42a above.

310. "Commit" is the vinaya term for performance of any act of transgression; see *CPD* s.v. *ajjhāpajjati*. This introduction follows Śāntarakṣita; *Bbh* is continuous from sec. 2232111.1 (40a) above. Śāntarakṣita inserts "even once [commit]"; this is probably an intrusion from its occurrence further on (Ts. 60a). Refs, this sec. & the foll., *Bbh* Skt 108. 24-109.8, W 159.3-16; Tib 96b4-8. See also Guṇaprabhā 236a6-8; Jinaputra 257b5-258a8=Samudramegha 200a7-201a3; Śāntarakṣita 277, 558-59; Bodhibhadra 229b7-230a6; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 14b5-15b2.

311. "In this life" should be understood--despite the arguments of Ts. foll.--as "for the present, until he may retake the vow." No Indian commentator, unfortunately, glosses *dr̥ṣṭa-dharma*.

312. Jinaputra: "The monk for whom a defeat has occurred loses the opportunity, for the present (*dr̥ṣṭe dharmā*), to take the noble path and obtain the wholesome factors that develop from application to it. The bodhisattva loses his opportunity..."

313. But "stages" is missing in Samudramegha, which gives a better reading: "...loses his opportunity for discovery and for accumulating the resources proximate to discovery."

314. Ts. may be copying the passage from Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan,

who cites it as part of the lama's speech (Ts. 32a-33a above) describing the disadvantages of failure in the vow; the passage appears at *AG* somewhat different in form (*AG* 287a,b foll); cp. *SS* Skt 37:26-28, Eng 63).

315. "Involvement" *pariyavasthāna* is a term for defilement made manifest, as opposed to latent or instinctual defilement *anuśaya*; it is synonymous with "outflow." See *Sgra* s.v. *kun nas lang pa*; *AK* 5:5, p. 3-4n.

316. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan makes them three, taking 3 & 4 together.

317. Bodhibhadra, Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan.

318. This gloss follows Skt more accurately than does *Bbh* Tib.

319. These two form "conscience" in this system of ethics. This citation *Bbh* Skt 171.9-10; see also *Bbh* (this ch.) cited sec. 211.2, 6a above.

320. *Upāli* par. 39; see also *SS* Skt 99:7-13, Eng 173-74. Ts. condenses the passage in citation. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan also cites it, subscribing to the hypothesis of Ratnākaraśānti.

321. Following Skt on this last clause.

322. That is to say, the scripture is speaking of mending, not of how long it takes for a deed to become a transgression in the first place.

323. The monk can remedy all transgressions except defeat; only the bodhisattva can remedy defeat.

324. A seminal transgression must have some effect upon the totality of one's ethics even if it is subsequently rectified.

325. Both versions (*aparyanta*, *aparyāta*) are attested in Skt; see *Upāli* 45, bottom n. 1.

326. Sherburne 1983:106; cp. Tib at Sherburne 1976:591. Tib wording differs in citation by Atiśa.

327. The length of a period is therefore one hour, twenty minutes.

328. So a moment is about twenty-five minutes. This concludes the analysis by Atiśa, *ibid*.

329. *Upāyakaśālya*, O 927:301b4-8; foll. passage cited n. 305 above; also cited *SS* Tib 110a4-8, Skt 93:23-29, Eng 164. Ts. adapts the sutra version.

330. *SS* simply, "Let me not enter nirvana with these aggregates [i.e., in this lifetime] in any case."

331. The *prātimokṣa* vow lasts only for one lifetime; the bodhisattva plans to remain in *samsāra*. See Ts. 10b above.

332. Jinaputra does point out that "grounds for defeat" may contradict the vow without defeating it, and that the auditors' vow lacks any such distinction.

333. These two theories are also reported by Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan, but without attribution. For the first, his cover terms are "generated, inclining towards, and falling into," but his gloss is almost identical.

334.O 897:15a-17a. The sense lent by bracketed portions is clear in the scripture.

335. This explanation is endorsed by interlinear notes to the *MMA* (92a3-7). Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan alludes to it.

336. On confession see sec. 2232.3, 85a foll.

337. Śāntarakṣita rewrites this passage to make it an introduction (as in Ts.) to rectification of defeat. *Bbh* Tib should read *dpas* for *dpa'i*. Refs *Bbh* Skt 109.8-12, W 159.16-23; Tib 96b8-97a3. See also Jinaputra 258a5-8=Samudramegha 200b8-201a3; Śāntarakṣita 279-80, 561; Bodhibhadra 233a2-6; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 17a4-5.

338. Above it in *Bbh* Tib, below it in Skt.

339. See for example Dharmamitra O 5622:349b1, 363a7; Banerjee 1957:228, 230.

340. The former cause for relinquishment is not mentioned in the *TV*, as Śāntarakṣita explains, "because it is so obvious." By analogy, he argues, relinquishing Buddhism is not mentioned as cause for monk's defeat. So also Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan. Refs *Bbh* Skt 109.13-20, W 159.23-160.9; Tib 93a3-7. See also Guṇaprabha 236b4; Jinaputra 258a8-259a2=Samudramegha 201a3-b4; Santaraksita 277-78, 559-60; Bodhibhadra 230a6-b2; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 15b2-16b1.

341. Asanga O 5339:42a3-5 (P ed. omits no. 3; see C Zi 39a3-5). Jinaputra compares the five causes for relinquishment of monastic vows: formal return of the training (to the preceptor who had bestowed the vow), death, sex change, defeat, and elapse of the appointed time (for which the vow may have been taken). Cp. *AK* 4:38, Atiśa at Sherburne 1983:76-77. Bodhibhadra and Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan affirm the possibility of formally returning the bodhisattva vow.

342. Skt *sarvān*, Tib \**sattvān*.

343. Ts. 31a-32b above.

344. Again, Ts. misses a causal construction. To cause someone to commit a defeat--infraction no. 4 of this list--is not attested by the *Bbh* or commentaries as a defeat, but appears in several items of the *AG* list.

345. For a more accurate representation of the last comment, see the italicized line near the end of the following. Jinaputra: "The auditors' vow lasts only to the end of their lifetime or even [in the case of *upavāsa*] to the end of the day. Because they have no memory of it after death, and because they may obtain a body incompatible with [being a monk or the like], they do not continue to follow it in their next life. So it is only prescribed for this life. Bodhisattvas are vowed until they reach the site of awakening, in order to obtain a special basis [the body of a buddha], and to obtain powers with memory, intellect, and particular qualities..."

"Down" refers to the states of woe. Applying the power of his aspiration, he is reborn in a lower realm in order to bring sentient beings to maturity. But his vow is not relinquished, save when there is cause for relinquishment... [here material cited n. 341 above]

"Therefore the bodhisattva [vow] has no temporal limitation. With no cause for relinquishment, the vow will not be relinquished even upon changing lives."

"Up means among the gods; 'straight' means among human beings."

"That there is no cause for relinquishment in this instance is shown by the passage beginning 'If the bodhisattva has neither relinquished...' Even if he should fail to remember [the vow] he remains, by the nature of things, a natural bodhisattva, and he will continue to be so by doing nothing inappropriate to bodhisattvas. That he receives it again does not indicate any infraction, as is shown by the statement 'coming into contact with a spiritual adviser.'"

Bodhibhadra says of the passage: "Though his memory be lost, his inclination will be completely re-created through the influence of previous cultivation plus meeting a spiritual adviser, or by hearing of the qualities of a bodhisattva. Nevertheless, it is not the case that he blithely forbears from retaking the vow. Apart from all that, whether or not he belongs to a higher set in a formal undertaking, he is someone who undertakes it by attempting to purify his ethics because he is bound to do so by the natural continuation of the vow."

346. Sec. 2232.5, 90b-91a foll. Refs here *Bbh Skt* 109.21-22, W 160.10-13; Tib 97a7-8.

347. *TV* 9a. Subheadings generally follow Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan. Refs, all items on giving, *Bbh Skt* 109.22-112.10, W 160.10-164.5; Tib 97a8-99a7. See also Jinaputra 259b8-261b8=Samudramegha 202b1-204a7; Śāntaraṣita 283-88, 564-70; Bodhibhadra 235b6-238a4; Grags-pa 18a5-19b6.

348. This comment follows Jinaputra.

349. A shrine *caitya* such as a reliquary *stūpa*. See Lamotte 1958: 342, 556-70.

350. Jinaputra: "whose progress is irreversible."

351. This interpretation by Ts. is problematic. "Great or small" represents an option; the actions named could be examples of the small.

352. These glosses follow Jinaputra.

353. "Purified intention": *śuddhāśaya(-bhūmi)*. The auditors reach "faith through understanding" *avetya-prasāda* associated with "vision of the four noble truths"; this is their "path of vision" (Jinaputra; see also *Siddhi* 603; *AK* 6:292-95; *CPD* s.v. *aveti*). Equivalent in the bodhisattva system is the first stage, that of Delight *pramuditā-bhūmi*; see *Siddhi* 729.

354. In all other misdeeds, laziness and indolence as motivation function as mitigating factors that make the transgression undefiled; here they make the deed a defiled transgression. "Because they show disrespect for the Precious Three" is probably what Asanga had in mind by adding to them "lack of respect." "Indolence" *kausīdya* is not precisely inactivity; it may represent energy in a wrong direction. "Laziness" *alasya* stands for physical and mental weariness on the grounds that one does not want to do it (Bodhibhadra).

355. The verses summarizes a discussion that introduces the misdeeds "What then are the transgressions termed 'defiled and not' [TV 8d]? The defiled are transgressions motivated by defiled thinking such as attachment, enmity, resentment, envy, conceit, lack of faith, and disrespect. The undefiled develop from laziness, indolence, carelessness, failure of memory and so forth; apart from "[Not] offering three to the Precious Three," none of these is defiled. But in this case [9a], [not] doing it out of indolence and laziness is considered to be defiled. *MMA* repeats this discussion (92b1-5).

These represent mitigating or extenuating circumstances; for exculpatory circumstances see Ts. 39b above and 84a-b foll.

356. Gro-lung-pa a.k.a. Blo-gros-'byung-gnas of Gro-lung, a Kadampa geshe whose *Graded Teachings (bstan rim)* were a model for the *Great Gradual Path (lam rim chen mo)* of Ts. See Chattopadhyaya 1967:393-95, Khetsum Sangpo 1973:5:1:14-16.

357. See p. 114 above.

358. In this case, desire-attachment is no excuse because it is the misdeed itself. "Three things" as Jinaputra counts them; "four" by counting gain and respect separately, as in the case of defeat no. 1.

359. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan: "of the same [greater-vehicle] *gotra*!"

360. Jinaputra, Samudramegha.

361. "Guarding against inconvenience": *virasa*. But *visara* is also attested, and Jinaputra seem to read it: "[If you fail to do it] with the thought that it might interfere with listening to doctrine," and "to guard against mental wandering in others listening to doctrine."

"Discussion" could include ordinary conversation; but cp. the later specification (*TV* 17a) "discussion of doctrine." Here Jinaputra takes it to refer to *abhidharma* and *abhivṛṇaya*. For "conduct [a discussion]" he says "reach a mutual understanding."

362. Chinese tradition counts these two a single item (*EB* 242b).

363. Bodhibhadra: "another's home or monastery or a home or monastery elsewhere."

364. But Graggs-pa-rgyal-mtshan: "suspecting that the patron will come to regret it."

365. "Enamored of it": "seeing that once it has been acquired, you will keep it for yourself" (*Jinaputra*).

366. Although "gouging of eyes" is added by Ts., it is not taken from Tibetan experience but from *Bbh* (cited 72a) foll. Skt: read *vyābādho nirgarhaṇa va* for *jyanir...*

367. See sec. 221331.1, item no. 7, at 18a above. Note that accepting money is prohibited by vinaya as forfeiture transgression no. 18 (*Prebish* 1975:70).

368 "Hears" *thos* is a wrong reading from *Bbh* (some eds.) for "obtains" *thob* (Skt *pariyāpta*). Śāntarakṣita reads *ston*: "if he teaches and shows."

369. "Tīrthikas [non-buddhists] are mentioned because of their hostile thoughts" *Jinaputra*).

370. On the difference of this misdeed from defeat no. 2 see 44a above.

371. The five deeds of "immediate retribution!" are listed at Appendix B, ruler's no. 5 below. This definition of "immoral" is found in *AK* (4:95 n. 5) referring to the monk. The subtitle given by Graggs-pa-rgyal-mtshan reads, "To abandon those who fail in their vows." *Jinaputra*: "Considering only morality, he neglects the immoral with an irritated mind and discounts them with a thought of contempt." *Jinaputra* and Bodhibhadra point out that this implies a refusal to help. Refs *Bbh* Skt 112.11-19, W 164.6-18; Tib 99a8-b4. See also *Jinaputra* 261b8-262a4=Samudramegha 204a8-b4; Śāntarakṣita 288-89, 570-71; Bodhibhadra 238a4-8, Graggs-pa-rgyal-mtshan 19b6-a3.

372 Śāntarakṣita treats this line together with the following. In *Bbh* they constitute, with *TV* 11c, an integral discussion of bodhisattva versus prātimokṣa vow. *Jinaputra* introduces them: "This section, beginning with the prātimokṣa, determines which trainings are shared with the auditors in the prātimokṣa vow, and which are not shared." Refs *TV* 11abc, *Bbh* Skt 112.20-115.21, W 164.19-168.20; Tib 99b4-101b7. See also *Jinaputra* 262a4-268a4=Samudramegha 204b3-210a2; Śāntarakṣita 289-94, 571-76; Bodhibhadra 238a8-241a4; Graggs-pa-rgyal-mtshan 20a3-b2, 13b4-14b4. Skt also publ. LVP 1929:210-17; see also *Siddhi* 631 & refs n.

373. *Prātimokṣa-sūtra* and *Vinaya-vibhaṅga*, O 1031-32. For the former see *Prebish* 1975, *Thakur* 1975.

374. These are transgressions (*pātayantika*) of the monk no. 79, 37, 73, & 52. The first two are also mentioned by Jinaputra, who says: "Reprehensible by precept' is something one does not do not because it is unvirtuous by nature, but because the Lord has legislated it to be reprehensible, inasmuch as doing it fosters what is [naturally] reprehensible. Drinking alcohol is an example." The digression on alcohol that follows is given as Appendix C below.

375. *Bbh* Tib shows a cumbersome double negative: "that do not fail to guard the minds of others" (*na paraniranurakṣā*). The account of Jinaputra suggests the reading "disregarding the welfare of others" \**parārthanirapekṣā*--as appears in the sec. foll.

376. "This results, with distinction of motivation, in offenses with and without defilement. There is no fault when he is ill and so forth, as above (Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan).

377. Bodhibhadra's reason for this guideline is cited by Ts. at 68b foll.

378. For example, the lay precepts of *upavāsa* are shared with the novice monk; see n. 38 above.

379. For the thirty forfeiture offenses see *MHV* 8383-8416, Prebish 1975:65-75.

380. "For those who are ill and not normal, there is no fault. The other circumstances without fault are like those in the case of 'Not taking such things as gold'" (Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan). See also the comment by Śāntarakṣita cited at 68b-69a foll.

381. "Self-discipline": \**ātma-vinaya*; gloss from Jinaputra.

382. These glosses from Jinaputra, who adds: "With more requisites being owned, more activity will result, so [the auditor] renounces them."

383. List follows *AK* 6:146-47. "Family of nobles" *ārya-vaṃśa* comes from the name of the scripture in which the four items were formulated; see *CPD* 1:428b.

384. "Seek" as in *Bbh* accords with the relevant *prātimokṣa* interdiction, forbidding the monk to approach an unrelated household or his wife for robes when not in need (Prebish 1975:65 n. 6). Śāntarakṣita reads "accept." Jinaputra: "He should not fail to beg..." In general, the monk may own no more than three sets of robes (Prebish 1975:65, no. 2). On the rules governing robes see also Chang 1957.

\*385. A monk may own no more than one bowl in serviceable condition (forfeiture no. 22).

386. Apparently, Ts. takes the causative construction to imply payment of a fee. In the *vinaya* formulation it would be assumed that no fee

could be paid, however, for that would incur the forfeiture (no. 18) of handling money.

387. The monk may not have a bed made of silk (forfeiture no. 11).

388. No. 11-14.

389. This way of putting it comes from Śāntarakṣita, who makes the interpolation discussed foll.

390. See n. 377 above.

391. "Classification" comes from Jñānaśrīmitra, upon whose work this discussion is based (O 4546, e.g. 251b3). The following discussion points up the major issue upon which Ts. founded the Gelugpa sect.

392. Source unidentified--presumably, it is Kadampa tradition on tantric vows. On bodhisattva versus tantric vows see also Ts. O 6188.

393. Corrected from the text of Bodhibhadra. From this discussion we see that these distinctions are not, as has been thought, a matter of keeping certain (unspecified) rules of prātimokṣa, but not others (*Siddhi* 631, LVP 1929).

395. This subtitle from Jinaputra; for his introduction to this section see Appendix D below. The *MS*, in a corresponding passage on "profound ethics," notes that these seven deeds of body and speech (which break the lay precepts) are an exercise of the sovereignty of the bodhisattva: with variations on a theme of mercy, he places sentient beings under discipline of doctrine. This is a fictional (*nirmaṇa*) act--as, for example, King Viśvāntara in the jātaka tale gives away his wife and children, appearing to harm one set of persons for the benefit of another, but all is put right in the end. See also Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan (Tatz 1982a: 37-39, Tib ref n. 217 above): the bodhisattva must be without fault but have the appearance of fault, etc.

396. So also Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan and most Tibetan tradition since him. In Chinese tradition, three translations of the *Bbh* omit this passage entirely, while that of Hsüan Tsang also presents it as a misdeed (*EB* 3: 242b). Even so K'uei Chi seems to believe that a bodhisattva is not permitted what is reprehensible by nature (*Siddhi* 931 n.)

397. According to Bodhibhadra, lines b & c represent exceptions to a general injunction (11a) to keep the prātimokṣa. According to Jinaputra, the category "reprehensible by nature" does not include the deeds of a bodhisattva anyway, when his motives are undefiled.

398. That is to say, when the text states that sexual misconduct is out of bounds for a monastic bodhisattva under any circumstances, it

implies that the other six misdeeds are permissible for either lay or monastic. Surprisingly, it is Jinaputra who has asserted the contrary; see end of Appendix D below.

399. *SS Skt* 93:12-17, *Tib* 109b4-8, *Eng* 163-64.

400. Not found in *SS Skt*; it corresponds to the introduction to the following passage, provided by the *Upāyakaśālya* itself (O 927:303a, sec. 31).

401. So also *SS Skt* 94:11, *Eng* 165.

402. *SS Tib* 110b7.

403. Nevertheless, this interpretation is apparently supported by one *Skt ms.* cited LVP 1929:216; see also *MS* 216n.; W 166 n. 1. LVP comments: "Hamlet bouddhique, le Futur Bouddha attend donc le moment où le bandit a, par hasard, une bonne pensée ou, du moins, un pensée indifférente au point de vue moral..." That his own attitude is in question still leaves him a buddhist Hamlet. Demiéville follows LVP; see 1973:293.

404. Some early Tibetan monks took this teaching to heart. In the year 842 the iconoclastic king Glang-dar-ma was assassinated with bow and arrow by the monk Dpal-gyi-rdo-rje. The monk is said by the lama historians to have acted out of a special compassion (Bsod-nams-grags-pa 32a1, *Eng* 161; Bu-ston 893.1, *Eng* 2:198); in some traditions he is considered to be a creation of the bodhisattva Vajrapāṇi (Bsod-nams-grags-pa 33a4-5). He is defeated in his monastic vow, however, and cannot subsequently participate in a ceremony of ordination (Bu-ston 2: 202; on disqualification see Banerjee 1957:151 no. I:1).

The *Bbh* account of murder may come from the story of the bodhisattva ship's captain of the *Upāya*, O 927:319b2-320b1 (sec. 133-38).

Chinese tradition permits suicide for the benefit of others; see I Tsing tr. Takakusu 1896:187; Demiéville 1973:263; Lamotte 1949:740 n. 1, 741.

405. "Compassion" follows Śāntarakṣita; *Bbh* uses the synonym "mercy."

406. Jinaputra: "He steals the dominion with the aim of redistributing its wealth."

407. "Harm" *gnod pa* is supported by *Bbh Tib*, Śāntarakṣita, Jinaputra; "pointless" *anārthais* supported by *Bbh Skt*, Bodhibhadra.

408. On these classes of monastery worker see Prebish 1975, *naiḥsar-gika* no. 10, in which they act as agents of the monk for receiving robes illegally.

409. So Śāntarakṣita; cp. *Bbh Tib*, supported by Bodhibhadra: "bound by a thought agonizing to end her celibacy, desiring intercourse."

410. "Spiteful" is a judgement rendered by Ts., otherwise this follows

Jinaputra, Bodhibhadra, and the story of Jyotis from the *Upāya-kauśalya*. Cp. the story of the novice at Frye 1981, ch. 17, who kills himself rather than give in to the girl.

411. If she is single, it is not adultery. Skt reads lit. "not taken by another," rendered by Śāntarakṣita "without husband." Bodhibhadra, however, specifies that she is indeed "someone else's woman."

412. *SS* Skt 93:9, Tib 109b1, Eng 163.

413. Preceded by these reflections (Bodhibhadra): "Bodhisattvas who are skilled in means will practice such deeds as are reprehensible by nature, and no misdeed results; there is no fault and a spread of much merit. What need to mention what is only reprehensible by precept? Accordingly, if a great bodhisattva endowed with great wonder-working power will resort to the *dharma* of copulation in order to guard the foolish, what need to mention the others? Based on which [doctrine], fools who doubtless have yet to eliminate their defiled instincts and who are endowed with continuing clumsy attention [to sense data] take hold of whatever object they desire and cling tightly to something inferior.

"He ponders the deed for a very long time, raising these issues: whether it is in his character, whether he really wants to, and the immediate conditions. Doing it out of mercy for someone else after adopting such thoughts, there is said to be 'no fault.'

"In regard to sexual intercourse in particular, he considers these issues..."

414. "...without having first engaged in such a thought process" (Bodhibhadra).

415. In other words, the *Bbh* phrase "whatever is desired" has two senses: his desire, and hers. This follows Bodhibhadra, who says in full: "She says to him, 'Do to me whatever you desire, and I will come under your influence. Otherwise, I will surely abandon my life.' In response to this, he thinks, 'Let not enmity be created toward me, and much demerit spread. Let her instead--by attaining her desire--come under my influence just as I desire for abandonment of the unwholesome and application to the wholesome.' Considering just this sort of thing the Lord has declared, in many ways, that the bodhisattva should avoid transgressions motivated by aversion, but that such is not the case for those motivated by attachment... Here 'attachment' has the sense of love. And love, inasmuch as it acts solely for the benefit of whoever is its object, should be pursued. No one who has love conjoined with sympathy can be hateful."

[Bodhibhadra then cites *MSA* 13:20-22; 20 & 22 are quoted also by Atiśa, *Lamp* 19.]

416. The qualification "virtually [no fault]" is made by Śāntarakṣita and Bodhibhadra. The latter explains, "There is not the least bit [of fault] for the bodhisattva who murders and so forth with the [right] conception. There may be however, in the case of sexual intercourse, be-

cause one may think about it correctly and still see it in proximity to other condition."

Cp. the discussion of bodhisattva and tantric parallels by LVP at 1931:411-13.

417. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan notes the implication that he may commit the fourth monastic defeat, false claim to spiritual accomplishments.

418. The *Bbh* statement that he enjoys doing this comes from the vinaya formulation of the suspension offense (no. 10) of sectarianism. "He is somewhat fond of that division" in Śāntaraksita is a textual corruption.

419. "Street scenes" *vīthī* may refer to the comic one-act play of that genre (see Warder 1972, par. 322). LVP comments that the sin of idle chatter has never, to his knowledge, frightened even lesser-vehicle monks (1929:213).

420. The three of mind are covetousness, ill will, and false view. The tantric authority referred to is O 126; see ch. 20 on bodhisattva precepts. The point is that mental infractions are not condoned even in tantric context.

421. Dhārmika Subhūti O 5417:109a8-b2. "Apparently," because this is not found in the other translation, O 5679. On the text and author see Mus 1939.

422. Passage cited in full n. 413 above.

423. Nāgārjuna O 5659, Eng v. 413a-415b. Cp. the definitions given by Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan at Tatz 1982a:49; mendicant's list of avoidances at *VM* ch. 1. Refs, remaining items of morality, *Bbh* Skt 115.21-117.2, W 168.21-170.18; Tib 101b7-102b8. See also Jinaputra 268a4-b7=Samudramegha 210a2-b5; Śāntaraksita 294-97, 576-79; Bodhibhadra 241a4-242b7; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 20b4-22a2.

424. "Auditors are possessed of transgression by the actual practice of wrong livelihood, whereas bodhisattvas are faulted, it is taught, if they fail to recognize it to be a transgression as soon as the thought has arisen" (Jinaputra). Bodhibhadra is cited foll. *TV* 12b.

425. This gloss of "excited" comes from Jinaputra, who adds: "A 'horse laugh' is a very noisy laugh. 'Sporting' applies to the body, 'clamoring' to body and speech."

426. Śāntaraksita: "putting them at ease." Bodhibhadra: "to guard the mind of those with a will for it."

427. See for example *Prajñāpāramitā*, Conze 1975:650-51; *Vimalakīrti* French tr. 8:29 & refs. For the point made here by the *Bbh*, on the other hand, see Conze 1975:406. Beware the use of this passage at Dayal 1932:3-4: he gets the message backwards.

428. But Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan: "he teaches to others and himself practices."

429. MSA 4:28; this verse cited by Bodhibhadra.

430. This follows Jinaputra, who says: "I have discovered the sense of what the Lord has taught. He says in the scriptures that the bodhisattva is someone who remains in samsara." Bodhisattvas who delight in samsara on this basis are taught to be at fault. The auditors, although their wisdom is dull, recognize that defilement is the disadvantage of samsara; they anticipate nirvana and are alarmed at samsara. The teaching is: How much more so must the bodhisattva! The bodhisattva is distinguished from them in that he has no defilement, and because he has great gnosis and great might. This is not so of the arhat monk."

431. "Drugs" lit. lac *lāksā* O 5584 var. "oil of lac" *lāksā-taila*, pressing insects for lac? "Food adulteration" lit. "pressing [oil from] sesame and white [i.e., inedible] mustard seeds that have not been examined [var. "that have not been (properly) ground up]."

432. In farming the soil, one kills insects.

433. "Unflattering": *mi btsan pa*; "ignominious": *mi btsun pa*. The former is a wrong reading found in *Bbh* Tib for the latter, which is attested by Śāntarakṣita and Bodhibhadra; Skt *anādeya*.

434. Cp. explanation by Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan at Tatz 1982a:50.

435. Cp. additional exculpatory circumstances *ibid*.

436. Bodhibhadra and Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan seem to follow Jinaputra in this; the latter comments, "tīrthikas are exceedingly prejudiced inasmuch as they are incapable of appreciation."

437. Jinaputra: "There is no fault if he cannot avoid [disrepute] because of some opinion, not constituting a stench, that the foolish raise on account of something that is not reprehensible."

438. *Bbh* all eds. labels this "undefiled." All *TV* comms. label it "defiled," probably an oversight that began with Śāntarakṣita. *Bbh* comms. do not touch on this point.

439. Jinaputra, Samudramegha; so also Bodhibhadra and Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan.

440. Read "hazardous" *nyen pa* for "blameworthy" *nyes pa*.

441. The four *dharma*s of a *śramana*; see Banerjee 1957:139, Sherburne 1976:127 n. 2. Refs, items on patience, *Bbh* Skt 117.3-25, W 170.19-171.22; Tib 102b8-103b2. See also Jinaputra 268b7-269a8=Samudramegha 210b5-211a5; Śāntarakṣita 297-99, 579-81; Bodhibhadra 242b7-243b6; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 22a4-b5.

442. These glosses from Jinaputra. See mitigating and exculpatory circumstances supplied by Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan at Tatz 1982a:51. On the difference between this misdeed and defeat no. 3 see 44a above; in the case of defeat the blow etc. is unprovoked.

443. Ts. has mistakenly reversed this subtitle with the following (by reading along with Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan), and reads here "Not stopping one's own."

444. These glosses follow Jinaputra, who adds, "The 'failure to apologize' applies to a transgression one has committed; 'neglecting them' [Bbh] to the suspicion."

445. Jinaputra might be read in that way, and Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan divides them. Jinaputra adds, "He would get the wrong idea." The Chinese, Sung tr., combines this misdeed with the following (EB 3:232).

446. But cp. Bbh: "There is [Tib "the same"] defiled fault." Bodhibhadra and Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan call it undefiled. Jinaputra does not specify, saying only, "'will not heed' because he is unhappy, or because he has an impatient disposition." The Bbh reading--defiled--is preferable; an impatient disposition is no excuse for lacking patience; it is a form of anger.

447. They read *asamayena* for [Bbh] *asamena*; so also Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan. Jinaputra glosses the first term as "incorrectly" but does not mention the second. Again, this differs from the corresponding defeat (TV 7a) in that here one is provoked (44a above).

448. Jinaputra: "It develops uninterruptedly; 'harbors' is the way [in which that occurs]."

449. "For the bodhisattva to accept, to harbor, and to follow the development of an attitude of anger towards others, becomes a defiled fault" (Bodhibhadra).

450. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan subtitles these three: inferior physical, mental, and verbal activity. Refs for vigor Bbh Skt 118.1-12, W 171.23-172.13; Tib 103b2-8. See also Jinaputra 269a8-b4=Samudramegha 211a5-8; Śantaraksita 299-300, 581-82; Bodhibhadra 243b6-244a7; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 22b5-23a6.

451. "Because the actual practice is present, but his intention is pure" (Jinaputra).

452 Reading *zin* for [Bbh] *yin* after Śantaraksita. This comment follows Bodhibhadra and Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan.

453. "Gossip" is specified by Jinaputra and Bodhibhadra. This list of topics is expanded by Ts. from Jinaputra's "kings and robbers."

454. From the wording, it would appear that Samudra is discussing the exculpatory circumstance that follows. Nevertheless, Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan also stipulates that the period of a watch must pass for this to become a transgression.

455. "Or wondrous" comes from Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan.

456. "This is also an issue in trying to study and other [situations] that will appear below" (Jinaputra).

457. "Settle the mind" and "mental stability" are synonymous (Jinaputra); see the Chapter on Meditation of the *Bbh* tr. Demiéville 1957. Refs on meditation *Bbh* Skt 118.13-24, W 172.14-173.4; Tib 103b8-104a6. See also Jinaputra 269b4-5=Samudramegha 211a8-b1; Śāntarakṣita 300-1, 582-83; Bodhibhadra 244a7-245a1; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 23a6-b6.

458. Nāgārjuna O 5409, v. 44; tr. Kawamura 40, Beyer 1974:14. On the five hindrances to meditation see also Lamotte 1949:1013-22, Nyana-tiloka 1980 s.v. *nīvaraṇa*, AK5:99-101.

459. T, C "pursues"; P "adheres to."

460. P "something."

461. "Deities..." *bsam pa shes pa'i lha=yi dam gyi lha*.

462. Joy *prīti* comes with attainment of the first (of four) levels of *dhyāna*.

463. Jinaputra: "Even when concentration (*samādhi*) has been attained, there is the fault of taking satisfaction in mere meditation (*dhyāna*)."

464. Beginner's transgression no. 3, App. B below, SS no. 9 (50b-51a) above. Refs on wisdom *Bbh* Skt 119.1-120.19, W 173.5-175.18; Tib 104a6-105b4. See also Jinaputra 269b5-271a5=Samudramegha 211b1-212b7; Śāntarakṣita 301-5, 583-87; Bodhibhadra 245a1-246b8; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 23b6-25b2.

465. "The bodhisattva collection shows the path of abundant merit and gnosis; therefore he must study it in particular" (Jinaputra). Exculpatory circumstances; If you do not have the bodhisattva collection, have already done the exercises in it, or have learned it for good (Bodhibhadra); if you are neglecting it in order to be a guide for the auditors (Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan).

466. So also the *Bbh*: logic, grammar, and medicine are non-buddhist subjects to be studied (Skt +68.4-5, W 96.8-9). Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan: "heterodox vedic treatises."

467. No more than one-third of each day may be spent on the heterodox (Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan).

468. "Accompanying wisdom" (\**sahaja-prajñā*) glosses "accompanied by (*sahagata*) investigation through reasoning"; this is not evident from *Bbh* Tib. Jinaputra adds: "and there has been a great deal of investigation." On the difference of this misdeed, and the following, from the defeat of rejecting the Greater Vehicle, see 44a above.

469. Jinaputra: "'Twice as much' means that if you are always prompt about it, applying yourself to them [tīrthika treatises] with reverence and growing accustomed to them, then even if you have applied yourself to your own texts, there is fault. 'While not infringing that guideline': That you have applied yourself to the exalted word of the Buddha does not mean that you are permitted to apply yourself to tīrthika treatises with the view that they are the basis for it. Tīrthika treatises are like strong medicine to which one resorts by force of circumstance." See also the comments of Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan at Tatz 1982a:55.

470. These identifications from Jinaputra.

471. Profound philosophy and vast powers are taught, for example, in the *Perfection of Wisdom* and *Avataṃsaka* scriptures respectively.

472. The glosses follow Jinaputra, but for this third item he says, "neither the literary expression nor the sense of this is good."

473. Bodhibhadra and Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan specify rather that he repudiates it in the presence of someone else.

474. Jinaputra: "in accordance with the authority (*pramāṇa*) of canonical texts in which I believe."

475. Jinaputra: "because his words are intended enigmatically (*abhi-saṃdhi*)"; on this concept see Hürvitz 1976:350, Ruegg 1969:165-66.

476. Jinaputra: "Some commentators add to this, 'There is no fault even if he is positively disinclined, so long as he does not reject it.'"

477. Nāgārjuna O 5659, Skt v. 88a-89b, Eng v. 388a-389b.

478. This conclusion is inspired by Bodhibhadra.

479. The defeat is *TV* 6ab; at 44a above Ts. states that it differs in motivation; cp. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan at Tatz 1982a:56. This misdeed is found in the wisdom section because it is a case of boasting of what one knows.

480. Jinaputra: "To deprecate tīrthikas in order to show them to be enemies of the teaching is no fault... To praise oneself in order to create faith in someone else by making him fond of you is no fault."

481. *Bbh* Tib indicates the reading *dharma-śravaṇa-saddharma-sāṃkathya*.

482. Jinaputra: "hearing and fulfilling."

483. Correct *mi dge* to *yi ge* after *TV* etac.

484. The glosses thus far follow Jinaputra.

485. Bodhibhadra and Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan assume that the teacher is speaking correctly, but the offending listener refuses to accept it, referring to the style of expression.

486. These two interpretations are also reported by Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan.

487. The four *pratisarana* have been discussed earlier in the *Bbh* (Skt 74-74, W 106-7), but the account further on is more detailed (Skt 175-76, W 256-57). See also *AK* 9:246-48 & refs, Edgerton 1953 s.v.

488. But Bodhibhadra says of 16d, "This fails in disallowing defilement and the subsidiary defilements--the causes for immorality--as part of collecting wholesome factors." Ts. is taking "defilement" etc. as false view in particular.

489. For the list of eight see 18a-b above. Refs, these 12 misdeeds, *Bbh* Skt 120.20-124.3, W 175.19-180.10; Tib 105b4-108a5. See also Jinaputra 271a5-272a6=Samudramegha 212b7-213b6; Śāntaraksita 305-12, 587-94; Bodhibhadra 246b8-249b6; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 25b2-28a5.

490. Gro-lung-pa is stabbing in the dark; *vyavahāra* may refer to occupation as well as to language (Monier-Williams 1899 & Edgerton 1953 s.v. *vyavahārika*).

491. *Bbh* Skt *adharmā-upasāṃhita* would be better taken as "connected with some impropriety" than as "unconnected with doctrine."

492. "Upon a meditative visualization"; this clause absent from other commentaries.

493. Jinaputra specifies meditation and recitation.

494. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan also makes this a generalization, following Candragomin; the *Bbh* is referring to the remainder of this list of which "nursing the ill" is the first item.

495. Bodhibhadra reads "it must be greater or equal," which accords better with the earlier statement of the *Bbh* (19b above). He also says, "If the bodhisattva, whether or not he has the capability, with a thought of enmity and a lack of what this text terms 'mercy' does not return the favor, and has a wild nature, and associates with some other spiritual adviser--in fact, if he sees any sentient being who has done him any favor and ungratefully, out of pride and anger, fails to return the favor with assistance that is equal or greater in proportion, there is defiled fault." Presumably, resentment is not mentioned as a possible motivation because resentment of a good turn is inconceivable.

496. Sec. 22133.5, 20a-b above. The duty mentioned above (sec. 22133.

4) to protect sentient beings from fear is not covered in this list of derelictions.

497. Description of the last two items follows Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan; he cites a monk begging liquor. Jinaputra: "begging with an improper attitude, and begging something insuitable." On the distinction from the similar defeat see 44a above.

498. "And other requisites": Actually, these four are a complete list of requisites in itself, but *Bbh* Tib implies that phrasing. See Edgerton 1953 s.v. *pariṣkāra*.

499. "Dharma thief": someone requesting doctrine with an ulterior motive. Śāntarakṣita, however, shows the variant *skur* for *rkur*, followed by Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan: "someone who has come to repudiate the doctrine."

500. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan: "Assistance with partiality."

501. Probably looking at Bodhibhadra, who says, "the deed is harmful."

502. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan adds, "If you suspect that compliance would result in some other disharmony."

503. "...and the occasion has not yet arisen" (Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan).

504. "Comply" as in [*Bbh*] *mtshun par byed, pratyāpadyeran*; tr. in Bodhibhadra as "make amends" *phyir 'chos*. Jinaputra has "confesses the fault"; does he read *āpattim deśayeran*?

505. This follows Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan. The former object stands for "tīrthikas of a class who might generate a longing for the teaching," the latter for buddhists "whose morality has failed," to whom the gifts of faith "bring no benefit." But according to Mkhan-po A-pad, the gifts bring no merit to the donor.

506. So also Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan. Since enmity etc. are not specified, the misdeed must be undefiled.

507. Jinaputra: "This is made by a mantra, a drug, or a miracle." Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan: "a mantra, a visual error, or an illusion."

508. Bodhibhadra: "Nothing that has been taught herein, whether in terms of injunction or of prohibition, can possibly supersede this. 'There is no fault' shows clearly that no transgression will ensue. They are naturally superseded, and you are without fault, in this way: 'with a wholesome thought.' A wholesome attitude is an attitude that does not fail. It is to be endowed with compassion and with love for sentient beings in a way that does not fail--in terms of the instruction given here and in terms of a fruition [of your actions] that is congruent with the single over-riding fruition [of awakening]. Faults are superseded by

the presence of a desire to help, to discipline, and to convert." See also Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan at Tatz 1982a:62. Other refs n. 221 above.

509. The verse summarizes this explanation by Bodhibhadra: "Either' (TV 20c) summarizes cases in which there is no fault because of a highly distraught mind, being overcome by severe feelings, being asleep, being abnormal, when you wish to eliminate [the fault] but further endeavor is superseded by involvement in severe defilement, and so forth." Following the verse cited also by Ts., he says, "The sense is to be indicated thus: Supersedence by attachment, resentment, envy, anger, rancor, pride, conceit and so forth result in transgression. Therefore the bases of training of a bodhisattva are for all practical purposes summarized by these. Since the other bodhisattva practices are measureless and endless, one should understand what results in fault and what does not by following the above indications."

510. Cited in full sec. 2232.1, 39b above.

511. TV 20d, which in Tib is 20c, follows directly upon the listing of misdeeds. Śāntarakṣita in his commentary sets it off clearly from that listing. That is not to say, however, that any commentator has mistaken "Compassionate and acting out of love" (TV 20d) for the description of a misdeed. But note that Ts. himself suggests it by the subtitle to sec. 2232.4, 89a foll.

512. Jinaputra, Samudramegha. Refs, this sec. & the foll., *Bbh* Skt 124.5-125.8, W 180.13-182.4; Tib 108a5-109a4. See also Jinaputra 272a7-273a1=Samudramegha 213b8-214b2.

513. Bodhibhadra: "lack of mindfulness, error, or disrespect." Refs n 512 above. Also *BPS* 4b4-5a2; Guṇaprabha 236b5-237a1; Śāntarakṣita 280-83, 561-64; Bodhibhadra 233a6-235b6; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 13a4-17a6.

514. Śāntarakṣita, Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan: "There being no such congenial person, such as a monk, before whom to confess," the bodhisattva may make confession by himself.

515. This is to read the *Bbh* phrase as "may be received twice" (*Ian gnyis su slar yang nod par bya, dvir api punar ādatavya*)—that is to say, discarding the vow a second time leaves no third opportunity to take it.

516. Actually, Śāntarakṣita is the reverse here. Cp. monastic confession: "Having revealed it, there will be comfort for him; whereas by not revealing it, there is none" (Prebish 1975:50; Thakur 1975:6:13-14). Guṇaprabha, Jinaputra, and Bodhibhadra also furnish the remainder of the ceremony, with variants in terminology.

517. The full thought does seem to make sense: "This shows that when there is no one to receive it, confession of offenses is made by

means of the sustaining power (*\*adhiṣṭhāna*) [of the Buddha, as represented by his image, before whom one makes confession]."

518. Gags-pa-rgyal-mtshan says this.

519. Samudra, commentary to...?

520. The *AG* ceremony has been alluded to above, Ts. 48 at *SS* v. 9cd; Ts. 53a & n. 304. For the sentence cited see *SS* O 5336:107b8-108a1, *Skt* 92:3, Eng 161. For the passage of the *Upāli* see *SS* *Skt* 94:12-18, *Tib* 110b8f (N Ki 104a5f), Eng 165.

521. Quorums of ten and five are required for monastic ordination in the buddhist heartland and the borderlands respectively. The *Skt* text upon which this *Tib* translation of the *SS* is based is certainly defective at this point: for "the possession of transgression" (*\*sāpattika*), *SS* *Skt* reads "the transgression of hand" (*hastāpatti*, w.r. for *\*hastyadyapatti?*); this item should probably form part of the following set, confessable to five persons--a possibility not inferred by Ts. See n. 528 below.

522. But this last clause not found in *SS* *Tib*.

523. Or, "children." *Skt* has "girls," but *Tib* is probably correct; see *MHV* 6865 and *SS* *Skt* 45:24-25, Eng 80 on punishment in hell for homosexuality.

524. The thirty-five buddhas of confession are named by *SS* and scripture in a ceremony that follows.

525. *Upāli* par. 22; see discussion of these points by Python in the notes s.v. his translation.

526. Actually, "the grave fault of hand--taking hold of a woman by the hand..." See n. 528 below.

527. The "summary instruction" comes in verse at the end of the *Upāli*. See v. 78: "Knowing phenomena to be free of essential nature,/ These heroes whose ordinary living is nirvana,/ Course in the taste of desire without any attachment;/ And free of attachment they discipline sentient beings." The relative triviality of desire-attachment as an offense is discussed at *Upāli* par. 21 and at par. 42-43 cited Ts. foll.

528. This is incorrect. "Ill will" has not been deleted; rather, the *Skt* *duṣṭa-citta* has been translated in *Upāli* *Tib* as "defiled thought." Ts. overlooks the phrase entirely. So *Upāli* *Tib* should read: "The grave fault of the hand--taking hold of a woman by the hand--he confesses to a group of five. The fault of looking at her with one's eyes with a defiled thought he confesses before one or two."

529. *BCA* 5:98. The "three aggregates" may refer to O 950, tr. LTWA 1980 (*Triskandhaka-sūtra*).

530. Bracketed portions from Prajñākaramati, *BCA* comm. 75:13-17.

531. O 760, no. 23 of the Ratnakūṭa collection.

532. Vinaya also distinguishes between confessable and vowable transgression; see Atiṣa, *Lamp* 71.

533. *Bbh*: "On the bodhisattva's path of fault there is nothing that is categorically (*niravaśeṣa*) a fault." The term "categorically" is a vinaya distinction; see Edgerton 1953, *CPD* s.v. For Bodhibhadra's comment to this passage see n. 415 above. Refs *Bbh* Skt 125.8-14, W 182.5-13; Tib 109a4-7. See also Jinaputra 273a1-6=Samudramegha 214b2-6; Śāntarakṣita 312, 584-85; Bodhibhadra 249b6-250a7; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 28a6-b4. Bodhibhadra 249b6-250a7; Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan 28a6-b4. On the bodhisattva and sexual love see LVP 1918:750n., and such scriptures as the *Mañjusri-vikrīḍita* (O 764).

534. *Upāli* par. 42; but cited here from *SS*, Tib 108a; see also Skt 92.3-9, Eng 161. The last sentence is from par. 43.

535. But this already reinterprets the scripture, which says, "No transgression associated with desire-attachment is a transgression"--to which it is difficult to attach the qualification Ts. desires. The Buddha's point seems to be that desire-attachment by its nature attracts sentient beings.

536. The story of Jyotis follows in the *SS*. See Ts. 69b; n. 399, 400 above.

537. *SS* Tib 108a5-8, Skt 92:10-13, Eng 161.

538. "Grand welfare" refers to spiritual awakening. But Ts. is carrying his qualification too far. The *Bbh* comms. specify only that "others' welfare" is at stake. Jinaputra: "Desire-attachment, in this context, constitutes affection for sentient beings. Whatever the bodhisattva may do on account of love for a sentient being is the very duty of a bodhisattva. If it is done with the welfare of a sentient being in mind, no fault will result. In what will it result? It will result precisely in what is well done. Therefore, what develops from desire-attachment is no fault."

539. A few lines further in the *SS*.

540. The love affair comes from the *Skill in Means* scripture (O 927:305a5-308b5, par. 48-58); but this reference comes from the *SS* (Skt 94:1-2, Eng 164-65). On hatred cp. the citation from the *Gaṇḍavyūha* in Ratnakaraśānti O 5331:292b3-4 in discussing this point. The story of Priyaṅkara, however, is a poor choice for corroboration. The moral drawn from it is that however one approaches a bodhisattva--whether with faith, passion, hatred, etc.--one's attitude is changed into bodhicitta, just as any object standing before the golden side of Mount Sumeru is tinged by a gold reflection.

541. Asanga O. 5540, 5541. The latter work is listed separately in the indices, but it is part of the *Topical Summary*. This citation O 5541:9b6-10b2 (N Yi 9b5-10b1). Gunaprabha and Jinaputra also provide this information. Refs *Bbh Skt* 125.15-16, W 182.14-15; Tib 109a7-8. See also Gunaprabha 237a1-7; Jinaputra 259a2-b8, 237a6=Samudramegha 201b4-202 b1, 214b6-7. See also *EB* 3:243a-b.

542. These terms also summarize types of vinaya infraction: expulsion from the order, suspension, and minor offenses.

543. Again from monastic discipline. Gunaprabha and Jinaputra omit "transgression," showing "confessable" as medium and "misdeed" as trivial.

544. Gunaprabha shows the reverse for the latter two.

545. Gunaprabha specifies the three poisons: desire-attachment, aversion, and bewilderment.

546. Jinaputra: from six to one-hundred.

547. The following glosses from Jinaputra, who introduces the section thus: "With respect to their ethics, the auditors have four blessings and four misfortunes. The blessings are [the continuation of] ethics, view, lifestyle, and livelihood. The ethics of the bodhisattvas, being a continual vow, already has no loss [upon death and rebirth], so there are only the latter three blessings." Various listings of blessings (*sampad*) are found in scripture, but this one is otherwise unknown; see *PTSD* 690b, Dayal 1932:145. Refs *Bbh Skt* 126.16-19, W 182.16-184.5; Tib 109a8-110 a6. See also Gunaprabha 237b7-238a4, Jinaputra 273a6-274b8=Samudramegha 214b7-217a7, Bodhibhadra 250a7-b6.

548. Glosses from Jinaputra, who adds that merit is active and virtue is passive ("being unrepensible"). The sense seems to be that acts of merit, such as giving, result in the qualities of a buddha that help others, and acts of virtue result in the bliss of a "great enjoyment" body.

549. This explanation from Jinaputra. Not all bodhisattvas have renounced being God (*iśvara*) to undertake the religious life; that is the extreme instance of renunciation.

550. Not as done above by Jinaputra, but by analyzing the Tib term "ruler" (*dbang-phyug*) into its components: sovereignty (*dbang*) and wealth (*phyug*). *Skt iśvara*?

551. Jinaputra adduces the five aspects of vigilance. See sec. 2213.1 (9), 17a above.

552. The last is difficulty "to constantly keep" (Gunaprabha).

553. Glosses follow Jinaputra. This passage cited Ruegg 1969:90. Refs, this sec & two foll., *Bbh Skt* 126.20-127.19, W 184.23-185.15; Tib 110a6-

111a3. See also Guṇaprabha 238a4-239a3, Jinaputra 275b6-277b2=Samudramegha 217a7-219a2.

554. This follows their presentation in *Bbh* ch. 15.

555. Jinaputra differs: "he does not compete with them."

556. "The holy person is one who achieves non-injury of self and others and, beyond that, practices deeds of body, speech, and mind that benefit self and others" (Jinaputra).

557. On numbers 2 & 3 see sec. 23.7 (9), 95b below. The division of these thirteen modes follows Guṇaprabha.

558. Certainly, it makes no sense when read in this way. What Jinaputra says, however, is this: "overcome by persons who--having abjured ethics prescribed by the Tathāgata to live as tīrthikas--dispute, etc., your undertaking the vow."

559. *Sbh* Skt 155-66, verse summary 166. Verses provided by Guṇaprabha with a differing Tib tr.; prose listing in Jinaputra. Wogihara notes Chinese ref. as *Ybh* fasc. 22.

560. On this last *Sbh* says (Skt 164): "without a frown, of open countenance, smiling."

561. This comment by Guṇaprabha.

562. Guṇaprabha shows a variant that corresponds to *Bbh* Skt ed.Dutt: "contacts including disagreeable hurt, being beaten by hand and clump of earth, which are part of the physically unvirtuous path." Refs, this sec & two foll., *Bbh* Skt 127.20-128.25, W 185.16-187.15; Tib 111a3-112a5. See also Guṇaprabha 239a3-b6, Jinaputra 277b2-279a1=Samudramegha 219a3-220b1.

563. A concept introduced by Jinaputra.

564. So Jinaputra; Ts. follows a textual corruption in Samudramegha: "sweet hearing."

565. Rebirth on the level of *brahmakāyikā* gods, associated with the first trance state; see Tatz 1977, no. 35f.

566. This gloss original by Ts.

567. *Bbh* Tib *chung ngu 'gyod pa*, for which Ts. suggests *'gyod pa chung ngu*, as in *Sbh* Tib. Skt for both is *manda-kaukrtya*, which I translate in *Bbh* Eng as "sluggish regret." See *Sbh* Skt 46. See note foll.

568. The problem faced by Ts. is created by differing Tib translations of the same term in the two texts, and the use of the word "little." This tempts him to postulate a "greater regret"--a concept not warranted by either text. As in the next item, "groundless regret," this regret

is a debilitating emotion that prevents one from continuing to practice. Cp. the statement of the *Upāli* (par. 39, cited 56b above) that "the bodhisattva does not grow obsessed with excessive regret."

569. Sec. 2213.1 (9), 17a above.

570. Glosses on item no. 9 taken from *Sbh*; see Skt 49-50. *Sbh* mentions some ascetic practices still in use: standing on one foot, for example, and sun-gazing.

571. *Sbh* stipulates this false view (and Jinaputra alludes to it): "Some might adhere to rules or to rites as a false view, viz., 'One may be purified by this rule or that rite; one may be lead to deliverance; all rules, even the heterodox, are to be kept, to be cultivated.' These are examples of what are uncondusive to deliverance."

572. *Sbh* stipulates (Skt 51) the chief transgression (for an auditor): uncelibacy. Guṇaprabha may have a different reading of *Bbh* here: "not being steadfast (*\*dhīra*), and allowing it to disappear."

573. Guṇaprabha divided the eleven points (by our numbering) into six categories: of attitude (no. 1 & 2-3), of application (4, 5) of resolve (6), of others' loss of faith (7, 8), of helping oneself (9), and of attaining the desired goal (10, 11).

574. He may be following Jinaputra in this, for Jinaputra does not label no. 11 as the antidote to a fault, as he does the others.

575. This gloss from Jinaputra. Refs, this sec. to end, *Bbh* Skt 128.26-129.19, W 187.16-188.18; Tib 112a5-b8. See also Guṇaprabha 239b6-240a6, Jinaputra 279a1-b5=Samudramegha 220b1-221a3. Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan cites the advantages "from oral tradition" during the vow-ceremony; see Tatz 1982a:33.

576. Sec. 222213.2, 35b above.

577. According to *Bbh* Tib, which reads *\*samāna-sīlāḥ vā-adhika-bodhisattvāḥ sabhagāḥ*. But *Bbh* Skt is preferable; see *Bbh* Eng above.

578. These five "results" are no. 5, 3, 1, 4, & 2 respectively of an earlier *Bbh* discussion of causality (Skt 72:12f, W 102:16f), and no. 2, 5, 4, 3, & 1 of the *MHV* listing (2271-77); see also *AK* 2:287f, 2:185.

579. "...at the time of death" (Guṇaprabha).

580. Cp. sec. 222213.2, 35b above.

581. *Kāśyapa-parivarta*, ed. 8-11. See also Sherburne 1983:58; *SS* Skt 33:13-22, Eng 53; Tatz 1982a:31; introd. n. 20 above.

582. "Proposes to apply" because in the scripture the verse arises in

context of meditative visualization. As Rockwell remarks (1980:110 n.14), it is cited by the *SS* "somewhat out of context." See *SS* Skt 34:6-10, Eng 54; *Samādhirāja* Skt 4:16bcd; *Bhāvanā-krama* at Tucci 1958:164 (Eng), 204 (Skt). See also n. 585 below.

583. "Supreme" because these benefits are not shared with the auditors (Jinaputra).

584. Rhetorical question from Jinaputra.

585. That is to say, the *Samādhirāja* statement (n. 582 above) is not misplaced in the *SS* context after all: morality is the basis for effective meditation, or "mental stability"; wholesomeness is visualized first in action, then in meditation.

586. Nāgārjuna O 5659, Eng v. 401.

587. The two chariots are Asanga and Nāgārjuna; this comment answers those who maintain that in the Mādhyamika system, prātimokṣa is not prerequisite for taking the bodhisattva vow (see n. 136 above).

588. So commentators; see 8b09a above.

589. Gunaprabha reads "these five"--not counting the great awakening.

590. Samudramegha and Gunaprabha, Jinaputra and "Samudra."

591. Having come this far the reader is presumed to be prepared for a real slammer to rival Tibetan schools.

592. On his stay at Reting (rwa sgreng), a monastery north of Lhasa, see Thurman 1983:22f. P ed. provides publisher's verses and colophon.

## Appendices

### APPENDIX A

#### FRAGMENT OF A COMMENTARY

to the

*TWENTY VERSES*

FROM TUN HUANG, AUTHOR UNKNOWN

Reference: Introduction, page 34

The twenty [verses] on the bodhisattva vow have been taught by the master Candragomin as an easy introduction for other sentient beings to come. However, it is not original. Candragomin has composed it condensing the three trainings as found on the bodhisattva stage, a part of the *Yogācārabhūmi* of noble Asanga, which themselves condense the boundless scriptures and vinaya of the Greater Vehicle.

The division of this [work] are as follows: (1) the means by which to undertake ethics, (2) the good qualities [*yon tan*, for "advantages" *phan yon*] of having undertaken it, (3) a summary of the trainings, (4) matters of transgression, and (5) means to arise from transgression. The sense and usage of the terms will be explained below.

In general, the training of the bodhisattva has three modes: the ethics of the vow, the ethics of collecting virtue, and the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings. The sense and usage of these also will be made known as they occur below.

Finally, he teaches how to keep [the vow]--that is to say, the matters

[*dn̄gos po*, for "bases" *gzhi*] of training, wholesome factors, that which constitutes the welfare of sentient beings, and that which governs their greater welfare.

In Tibetan [this is entitled] *Twenty [Verses] on the Bodhisattva Vow*.

He says "bodhisattva" in order to set them apart from the auditors. Among them there are, moreover, two [sorts of] bodhisattva: those with purified intention abiding above the first stage, and those of unpurified intention abiding below, on the stage of "coursing in devotion." Until either of these two has been made to see the matters of training, he has not made, nor is he bound to the vow.

Twenty: "I write twenty verses."

Make prostration reverently and offer what you can to the buddhas and their disciples (*TV 1ab*) illustrates, among the five-fold division of parts, the first: the means by which to undertake ethics. That is to say, one makes prostration to the buddhas and their retinue of bodhisattvas of the first stage [on up, and then entertains the master] to receive the moral code of the bodhisattva... [end fragment one]

They are said to be "born from the heart" because the Tathāgata, having discovered the non-dual meaning, attains the Dharma-body, and the bodhisattva who has [gone] to the limit [of the bodhisattva path] also comprehends the non-dual meaning and achieves the Dharma-body. The auditor is "born from the speech" because he relies upon explanation of the doctrine to attain the [same] result. That is to say, one does not refuse to welcome the auditor, for his Dharma is no different.

Regarding them reverently, generate faith and then make [offering] with whatever cause and mental power that one has, as much as one is able, and with whatever wealth one may possess.

They exist in all time and space (*1c*). Having thus made prostration and offering, one should receive whatever the moral code of the bodhi-[sattva may be]. By analogy, it is unlike the code of the auditor which, even if it has been kept inviolate, is temporary in that it lasts for only one lifetime.

The cause for destruction of bodhisattva ethics is severe defilement; by it [the vow] is destroyed. Beyond that, when one has made the re-

solve for supreme awakening one may lose one's life and change bodies, but wherever and whenever you are reborn, ethics is not lost.

The bodhi[sattva] is defined as householder bodhi[sattva] and monastic bodhi[sattva]: the vow is essentially for both. Therefore, that moral code has been and will be kept by all bodhisattvas of all the ten directions and all the three times.

That refers to complete ethics: the ethics of the vow, the ethics of collecting wholesomeness, and the ethics of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings.

Treasury of all merit (2a). That bodhisattva code is discovered to be a reservoir, a treasury, a great store of all the highest merit, worldly and world-transcending. As an illustration, it is like a mine of jewels.

He does not refer to it in this context as a great treasury of the resource of gnosis, because ethics is understood to be the essential nature of merit. Nevertheless, that ethics is the cause for the production of higher contemplation and higher wisdom--so, although he does not say so, it can also be conceived as a treasury of those two [merit and gnosis].

[With it] as your lofty intention (2b). That [bodhi]sattva ethics should be received by the candidate with a pure intention, an intention that is lofty--free from dishonesty--and desirous of awakening.

[From] a reverend, learned and capable (2cd) [*btsun pa* for *bla ma*; differing sentence construction]. The master moreover, from whom it is to be received, is in possession of the three trainings. [The vow] should be taken from someone with discretion [*the tshom*, for "sense of shame" *ngo tsha*] and embarrassment [*khrel pa* for *khrel yod*]. A "reverend" is someone in possession of higher morality. "Learned" indicates his possession of higher wisdom, "capable" his possession of higher contemplation. However, "capable" [also] indicates his possession of higher vigor.

Who maintains the vow (2c) indicates that he progresses by means of all three higher [trainings]. If he lacks qualities such as these, he has [at least] ethics, plus discretion and embarrassment.

From [a reverend] maintaining the vow, it should be taken (2cd). "Take it from him." However, if such a one is not available, then before

any image, shrine and/or Dharma [*dar ma* for *chos*] scripture, visualize all [the Precious Three?] as actually present together with the Buddha. Make prostration and offerings; generate faith, and take it from them.

At which time, because of the virtue in that,/ The buddhas and their disciples/ With their virtuous hearts, forever/ Consider you their beloved son (3). Among the division of parts, this is the second: the good qualities of having undertaken ethics. When one has thus obtained bodhisattva ethics, one comes into possession of good roots that are measureless. Therupon, the might of all buddhas and bodhisattvas of the ten directions sees (*mthong?*) and blesses you, and the buddhas [know that] "In a certain realm, the bodhisattva..."

[Interlinear note to the last citation: "a sign, such as an earthquake."]

## APPENDIX B

### SEMINAL TRANSGRESSION FROM THE

#### *ĀKĀŚAGARBHA-SŪTRA*

Reference: Basic Path, note 255

Ruler's transgressions. [O 926:287a4-b6; cp. Skt in *SS* Skt 37:1-16, *SS* Tib N Ki 42a4f, summary in *BCA* Skt 78:3-10. Translation here follows *AG* unless otherwise indicated.] There are five seminal transgressions of an anointed ruler (*kṣatriya*), in possession of which anointed ruler shakes all his previously produced good roots and is defeated, falling from divine and human well-being into a lower state of rebirth.

What are the five? (1) The first seminal transgression, kulaputra, is for the anointed ruler to steal objects from a shrine, or to steal or cause someone to steal offerings belonging to the local community or to the broader community [of all buddhists]. (2) The second seminal transgression is to reject the doctrine--to reject, to cause someone to deny, and to conceal teachings for the deliverance of the auditor, teachings for the deliverance of the independent buddha, or teachings for the deliverance of the Greater Vehicle. (3) The third seminal transgression is to disrobe someone who for my sake has shaved his head and facial hair to wear the saffron robe, to make him a householder,

to inflict corporal punishment, to cast him into prison, or to deprive him of life, whether he be someone who keeps the training or not, whether he be moral or immoral. (4) The fourth seminal transgression of an anointed ruler is to purposefully take the life of his mother, his father, or an arhat auditor of the Lord, to sow dissension in a united monastic community or to purposefully with an evil mind shed the blood of a tathāgata, arhat, fully perfected buddha--to commit any one of these five deeds of immediate karmic retribution. (5) The fifth seminal transgression of the ruler is to deny causality, to disregard other worlds, to continually pursue the ten unwholesome courses of action and to cause many sentient beings as well to undertake the ten unwholesome courses of action, to convert them to it, to engage and establish them in it.

Minister's transgressions. [AG 288a3-8; summarized by SS Skt 37:16-17, summarized by BCA Skt 78:11.] Maitreya, the seminal transgressions of an office-holder are also five. The five are for an office-holder (1) to steal objects belonging to a shrine, or to steal objects belonging to the broader community; (2) to sack a village, raze a district, or conquer a city [SS "or a country"]; (3) to reject the doctrine, rejecting teachings for the deliverance of the auditor, the independent buddha, or the all-knowing [buddha]--to cause someone to deny and to conceal them; (4) to disrobe someone who loves the monastic life, to make him a householder, to inflict corporal punishment, to cast him into prison, or to deprive him of life, whether he be someone who keeps the training or not, whether he be moral or immoral; and (5) to commit and accumulate [the karmic results of] any one of the five deeds of immediate retribution.

Auditor's transgressions. [AG 288b6-7; not cited SS or BCA.] Kulaputra, there are five seminal transgression of an auditor. They are: taking life, taking what is not freely given, uncelibacy, telling a lie, and attacking the person of a tathāgata, shedding his blood.

Beginner's transgressions. [AG 289a1-292b8; cp. SS Skt 37:17-19:21; summarized BCA.] There are eight seminal transgressions for a beginning kulaputra participating in the Greater Vehicle, by which misguided beginners participating in the Greater Vehicle have all their previously

produced good roots shaken [SS "by which they are tripped up and their ...destroyed"]: They are defeated and fall from divine and human well-being into a lower state of rebirth; they remain in samsara, deprived of a spiritual adviser, for a long time.

What are the eight? (1) There are sentient beings born into this defiled realm of the universe of the five sorts of degeneration by reason of their previous bad conduct who, although their good roots are small, rely upon a spiritual adviser. They listen to this very profound Greater Vehicle. These kulaputras may be small of intellect, but they generate the thought of supreme, right and full awakening. [Other] beginning bodhisattvas listen to this scripture with its very profound doctrine of emptiness, transmit it, and read it aloud among them. They remember and teach it in detail, both the letter and the meaning, just as they have heard and mastered it, before other sentient beings with intellects like theirs were before. These foolish ordinary persons, unprepared for difficulties, become frightened at hearing them; they are terrified; they tremble. Trembling diverts them from supreme, right and full awakening, and they aspire to the vehicle of the auditors. This is the first seminal transgression of the beginning bodhisattva. With it, the kulaputra shakes all his previously produced good roots. He is defeated and falls from heavenly and liberated well-being, [AG 289b:] his thought of awakening broken, into a lower state of rebirth.

Therefore the bodhisattva, the great hero, should first ascertain the dispositions and the instincts of other persons, and teach doctrine to them gradually, in accordance with their dispositions as bodhisattvas, as though crossing a great ocean by stages... [AG 290a6:]

(2) The second seminal transgression for the beginning bodhisattva is to say to certain persons, speaking as has been explained above, "You are incapable of coursing in the six perfections. You cannot fully awaken to supreme, right and full awakening. So quickly generate the thought of the auditors' vehicle or that of the vehicle of the independent bud-dhas. With it you will quickly be delivered from samsara."

(3) The third seminal transgression for beginning bodhisattvas is to say to someone, [AG 290b] as has been explained above, "Why should

you keep the prātimokṣa disciplinary code, or ethics [in general], or [even more generally] be well-guarded [in one's senses]? Quickly generate the thought of supreme, right and full awakening, and read the Greater Vehicle. With that, every bit of unwholesome activity performed out of defilement by body, speech, and mind will be purified without ripening [into an undesired karmic result]."

(4) The fourth seminal transgression, kulaputra, for beginning bodhisattvas is to speak thus to certain persons: "Kulaputra, avoid discussions of the auditors' vehicle. Do not listen to it. Do not read it. Do not teach it to others. Kulaputra, cause discussions of the auditors' vehicle to be avoided. You will not gain a great result from it. You cannot put an end to defilement with it. Have faith in discussions of the Greater Vehicle. Listen to the Greater Vehicle. Read the Greater Vehicle. Teach it to others. With it you will not go to any lower rebirth or enter any path to a state of woe; you will quickly awaken to supreme, right and full awakening." Should they be won over to such false view and act in accord with this speech, a seminal transgression ensues for both parties.

(5) The fifth seminal transgression for beginning bodhisattvas is to speak with "forked tongue" (*dvijihvika*) and teach something other than what they think. They will read this Greater Vehicle, repeat it, learn it by heart, recite and teach it, recommending it so that others may hear, only for the sake of fame and reputation, for the sake of gain and respect, saying, "We belong to the Greater Vehicle, and the others do not." They envy others their gain and respect, and anything that others may obtain to use and enjoy becomes for them a ground for irritation. They name-call, deprecate, contemn, and speak ill of them; they praise themselves and, by reason of envy of them, claim to possess superhuman doctrines. [SS Tib: "And, by reason of envy of the prostrations done them, they praise themselves and report that they themselves possess superhuman doctrines." [SS Skt 38:19-20 differs.] By that matter they are defeated; they fall from greater-vehicle well-being, and because of it there develops a very grave fall from the Greater Vehicle, because of which they go to a lower state of rebirth...

[AG 291a6] (6) This, kulaputra, is the sixth seminal transgression for

beginning bodhisattvas. In future times, there will be beginning bodhisattvas, householders or monastics, who read, repeat, recite, and explain in detail to others greater-vehicle scriptures that are the range of bodhisattvas who have little difficulty, personages endowed with great intellects and adorned with the scriptural incantations (*dhāraṇī*) of the profound doctrine of emptiness, with the acceptances, the concentrations, and the [bodhisattva] stages (*kṣānti-samādhi-bhūmi*). They will say, "I have discovered these doctrines with my own intellect, and I teach them to you out of compassion. [291b] You simply must, on your part, cultivate them until these [AG Tib: "this"] profound doctrines become evident, so that you too will come to have intuitive vision. They will sell [Tib 'tshong, Skt *vikrīṇāti*, early wrong reading for *utkarṣaṇā*, the *Bbh* term for "praise"?] themselves for the sake of gain and respect, neglecting to mention that they have not actualized very deep doctrines of this sort, but teach them only from readings...

[AG 292a1, SS 39:10] (7) This, kulaputra, is the seventh seminal transgression. In future times rulers will have sweepers [*caṇḍāla*, *phyag dar ba*; (SS) Tib *gdol pa*, "outcastes"] for advisers, sweepers for ministers, sweepers for warriors, and [AG "or"] sweepers for physicians who are foolish, haughty in their learnedness, possessing great wealth and property. Carried away by conceit for their renunciation, out of pride and conceit they will alienate the rulers ["from the religious," SS Tib], and the religious from the rulers. Depending upon the rulers [for their authority], they will levy fines upon the religious, confiscating their wealth. That oppression will cause monks to take [property] from individuals, from the local community or the broader community, or from a shrine, and then present it to them [SS "as bribes"]. And those sweepers will present it to the rulers. Both parties incur a seminal transgression.

(8) Then again the rulers, together with the religious, will be at fault [SS "will be at odds"], and accordingly misconstrue the doctrine wrongly. [The rulers] will construe [SS "legislate"] the doctrine in an undoctinal manner, thus abandoning the doctrine. They will abandon the practices of love and compassion, of the perfections of wisdom and skill in means, and the practices taught in other scriptures as well. In order to

injure the monks, [the rulers] will legislate undoctinal actions in accord with this, by which actions the monks will be injured. [292b] Their attention to calm and insight will quit. While meditating, the monks will experience an abundance of ill will, because of which their unpacified defilements will not be pacified or attenuated. Then those monks' intentions will be lost; their ethics, their conduct, and their views will miscarry and they will grow slack; they will grow mostly slack and their morality will fail. Not religious although claiming to be religious, uncelibate although claiming to be celibate, they will proclaim the doctrine quite clearly just like donkeys. The ruler and his retinue will pay them all the more respect, service, and worship. Among householders they will utter disparaging remarks about monks who are diligent in renunciation. The ruler and his retinue will grow ill-disposed and scornful towards monks who are diligent in renunciation. All the benefits and enjoyments belonging to monks who are diligent in renunciation, they will present to monks who are diligent only in recitation. A seminal transgression will ensue for both parties...

## APPENDIX C

### ALCOHOL: HOW IS IT REPREHENSIBLE?

Reference: Basic Path, note 374

[Jinaputra 262a7-263a2=Samudramegha 204b6-205b2.] "How is it that alcohol is expressly stated to be reprehensible by precept, and other times said to be not?" Because it is stated to be misconduct just like murder, because it is taught to be the very cause for a lower state of rebirth, because it is stated to be the foundation for a state of carelessness, and because it is absolutely forbidden. To investigate to what extent it is reprehensible by nature as opposed to being reprehensible by precept: It is naturally reprehensible when done with a defiled thought; but when it can be done with an undefiled thought it is what the Lord has prescribed in order to guard against other offenses--that is to say, it is reprehensible by precept.

Furthermore, this argument should be investigated: "Is it or is it not

[reprehensible] to drink alcohol upon due consideration, upon the advice of a physician and with an undefiled thought--that is to say, without desiring it at all? If you maintain that it is, how can one be misbehaving with a thought not possessed of defilement? If you maintain that it is not, you admit my argument. Therefore, alcohol is reprehensible only when drunk in full awareness without a sense of shame."

You hold that reprehensible alcohol is not reprehensible! How can it not be reprehensible?

"Drinking in moderation, you cannot become drunk. So why should it be reprehensible when drunk thus in full awareness? By analogy, if you prepare and eat poison after measuring [out a non-lethal amount], it has not the power to effect the offense of poisoning, and no transgression will ensue. Therefore, not all drinking of alcohol constitutes misbehavior."

This is the way to think of it. People who drink alcohol mostly drink to get drunk. They think, "Why not enjoy it?" and nonetheless proceed to get drunk. Drinking in full awareness of themselves, their thought is therefore defiled and, based upon it, physical misbehavior will occur. [Cp. *Nandika-sūtra*, cited AK 4:84.] It causes them to go to a lower state of rebirth. Its many dangers are a basis for further carelessness. Inasmuch as one cannot know the proper measure to drink, it is absolutely forbidden. On the other hand, it is done by those, among others, who lack desire-attachment, so it is not unvirtuous for them; drinking alcohol without desire-attachment is not reprehensible by nature.

#### APPENDIX D

##### PERMISSION TO MURDER ETC.

Reference: Basic Path, note 395

[Jinaputra 264a4-267b3=Samudramegha 206a8-209b3.] Even in the case of what is reprehensible by nature is said in order to demonstrate a particular point of training--namely, that the bodhisattva does what is reprehensible by nature. Although known as "reprehensible by nature" from the auditors' point of view, they are not reprehensible by nature for

the bodhisattva when done with a thought that is undefiled. [How are they done? With] skill in means. If he beholds someone obviously going to commit one of the deeds of immediate [retribution] etc., compassion is generated in him, for he has ascertained that the karmic maturation of the deed will be unbearable for a long period of time. He affirms that "by killing him, I myself may be reborn as one of the creatures of hell." To avoid that, he positions himself in a thought that is virtuous or indeterminate, thinking, "Better that I be reborn a creature of hell than that he encounter a tremendous aggregate of suffering." Then he deprives him of life.

Were it not this way, [one might raise the following objection]. "Why are these also not reprehensible: vedic sacrificers, and those who seek liberation from samsara as well, slaughter cattle and other animals in seeking some benefit, and in order to obtain heaven?"

Do those amount to the same thing? Their taking of life is based upon bewilderment and attachment. To slaughter cattle or other living creatures in the suffering of a sacrifice, thinking that it will result in the obtainment of heaven or liberation, is bewilderment, because it constitutes adherence to a distorted view of the results of deeds. To hold the view that "By this deed I will go to heaven" constitutes bewilderment plus attachment.

Let us turn now to the general definitions of the unvirtuous courses of action, as they have been presented by the Lord. Three sorts of murder have been formulated in connection with monks' [defeat]: those which develop from attachment, from bewilderment, and from aversion. Up to "wrong view" [the motivations] are the same. [Cp. AK 4:144] How then to prove these to be unrepensible? In the same way that the *Skill in Means* scripture shows taking life to be unrepensible when done with detachment and so forth. When it develops from a virtuous thought (because the thought is conjoined with detachment and so forth), it is virtuous.

All those done by body [murder, theft, and sexual intercourse] are presented in relationship to thought. The Lord has declared:

Mind precedes events, chief is mind; born from mind  
 There is a positive thought, and speech or action follow;  
 There is a negative thought, and speech or action follow.

And,

All the world is guided by thought, completely led by thought;  
 Every event follows after thought alone.

So application follows intention, and killing with a pure intention is unrepensible.

If killing with detachment and so forth is not a fault, how can the Tathāgata be faulted for speaking harsh words, telling a lie, and estranging friends for the benefit of sentient beings?

"Stay-in-bed, you are the son of a servant girl," he said, speaking harshly, and in the *Scripture of \*Udayin* he says, "You are like a blind fool. Do you think to read [my] thoughts on abhidharma and abhivinaya as Śāriputra does, a monk with eyes?" And the *Thus Spoken (ji gsung, \*yathāvāda)* scripture speaks mostly in words estranging friends. For example, the local policeman, formerly a Nirgrantha [Jain] teacher, says, "Reverend, it is like mounting a wild horse to search up and down for wealth. One might not only fail to obtain wealth, but come to great harm besides. Reverend, I myself was a Nirgrantha searching up and down for wealth like a fool--confused, turbid, ignorantly adhering to what is useless, circumnambulating what is useless, honoring what is useless. I not only failed to obtain wealth from them, but came to great harm besides." Other scriptures do it as well. After making the point *in extenso*, he declares, "I will not give the community of monks over to a pair of worthies such as Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana. What need to mention a corpse-like snot-eater such as yourself?"

This shows slander and harsh words. He also tells lies, not teaching what is literally true. He said, for example, "Monks, come here! Should you see a young mother, conceive of her as your sister. Should you see a young sister..." and applied [to each type of woman] in detail. But he also said, "Does the thought of renunciation not constitute aversion? I want to protect you from this flood of suffering. This is what

those endowed with compassion do. When you see someone with a true and beautiful [physical] support that is an obvious basis for performing deeds which you will experience as love and more love, how can you renounce it? To do so would be like looking for benefit in someone else's death because he is wealthy." Sixty monks died of [hearing] this.

Were both scriptures really spoken by the Tathāgata? The "*Woodpile*" (*shing gi phung po lta bu*) scripture says of these two teachings, "When he had delivered this manner of doctrine, sixty monks had their minds delivered from outflow without further grasping. Sixty monks vomited warm blood. Sixty monks put aside their training and failed. Thus the Lord affirmed that one should be diligent in the Teacher's dispensation. The Sugata affirmed it in a difficult way." The scripture shows that by cause of this teaching, there were three sorts of result. Different sorts of sentient being did, immediately after, (1) attain arhatship as the result, (2) attain elevation [of rebirth], and (3) lose their many factors of wholesomeness and relinquish the [monastic] basis [of their practice].

In the *Putting a Stick to Wild Animals* (*dbyug pas ri dags 'tshor*) scripture, the Lord teaches and praises meditative cultivation of the repulsive, saying, "Monks cultivating the repulsive...[will gain] great advantages." And we read, "Then those monks cultivated the repulsive. And having cultivated the repulsive, they were ashamed of this rotten body. They scorned and deprecated it. They went so far in that deprecation as to cut out their tongues with weapons, eat poison, leap off cliffs, and die hanging by ropes."

So much for taking life, harsh words, and the rest. Just as the Tathāgatas, whose intentions are completely purified, engage in them, so do the bodhisattvas, in exactly the same way.

Moreover, the lord buddhas have not only done what is to be done [in the way of spiritual training]. They also implement the welfare, the benefit, and the pleasure of sentient beings, taking their very breath with skill in means to discipline all sentient beings in all modes--for, as we read in scripture, "The foolish make much of this life; the wise make much of the next." And the farsighted, because they make much

of the next life, care not for the minor, petty, reprehensible pleasures of sentient beings in this life. They care only for the great benefit and pleasure that is unrepensible in the long run [Samudramegha: "although it involves pain"]. So doctrine is taught to some to destroy their vice, to some to destroy their pleasure, and to some to destroy retinue. For some it applies to their pleasure and happiness, for some it applies to their pain and unhappiness. Some it disciplines, provoking a fear of death by revealing fierce yakshas such as Vajrapāṇi. There is no carelessness on the part of the lord buddhas, who have purified their intention, when it comes to the benefit and pleasure of sentient beings, and the bodhisattvas resemble them.

The unvirtuous course of action never presents itself when thought is undefiled. So we read in vinaya, "Objects carried off by robbers and thieves are recaptured by the arhat," yet theirs is not the offense of stealing because his intention is undefiled. The arhat may penetrate even a sesame seed, yet he has no defiled intention and no experience; inasmuch as he has no feeling, he has no act of sexual intercourse. [Cp. AK 2:115, 4:121-23]. Bodhisattvas who have gained the control of having an undefiled intention and who are purified in attitude should be viewed in the same way. Inasmuch as they are engaged in the means for bringing sentient beings to maturity, their verbal conduct can have no connection at all with the unvirtuous courses of action.

[On the terms of the text] The course of bodhisattvas who have attained the perfection of highest skill in means is inconceivable; it is not to be attempted by those whose [good] roots are small, whose understanding is dull, who are partisan in their views, and whose intellects interpret the terms literally. In that case, only to the buddhas themselves is it obvious. Their reprehensible conduct is nothing more than their wisdom, and others should utterly avoid it as a means to the acquisition of much demerit.

Ascertain that the thought is virtuous or indeterminate: He does it upon discovering that his own intention is pure. Feeling constrained: Because of a paucity of alternatives, there is no other means. With only a thought of mercy for the consequence shows that if the only

intention generated is that they be benefited in future, such a deed may be done without fault, for the true bodhisattva is one who follows through in his duty.

It should be understood that only lay bodhisattvas may engage in what is reprehensible by nature, for in the scriptures it is seen only in regard to them.

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AG=Ākāśagarbha-sūtra.

AK=Abhidharmakośa. See Vasubandhu.

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