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SONG NEO-CONFUCIAN CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY AND MORAL SOURCES (ZHU XI): CONNECTIONS WITH CHAN BUDDHISM

ABSTRACT

In this study of ancient Confucian, Neo-Confucian (School of Principle) and Chan Buddhist ways of thinking about morality and the moral agent, my main objective is to trace changes relating to the nature and foundation of Confucian moral thought that occurred during the Song dynasty, through a parallel reading of Neo-Confucian writings and the *Platform Sutra*. By using the hermeneutical method and comparative textual analysis, the essay provides evidence that these changes reflect the Chan influence on Neo-Confucianism and embody a specific Neo-Confucian spirituality. The following concepts and themes articulate the theoretical framework of the research: the moral agent and moral agency; the heart-mind, authentic nature, and the principle of coherence; types of morality (substantive and procedural); and interrelatedness, oneness and purity.

I. OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

As reflected in their historical writings, the Song Neo-Confucians considered the calamities they witnessed as clear evidence that ancient Confucianism was not particularly effective as a moral practice¹ and needed regeneration. In examining their texts, my goal is first to compare the nature of their renewed creative approach with the early Confucian perspective; and second, to demonstrate that, in developing this moral viewpoint, they drew inspiration from Chan ideas. The essay is innovative in two areas: its methodology (hermeneutical analysis) and its outward-looking perspective (spirituality expressed as societal moral practice). Through comparatively interpreting textual evidence this essay argues that Chan Buddhist notions and practice clearly inspired Neo-Confucianism and provided it with the following new dimensions that were incorporated

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in hopes of improving its effectiveness as a practice of morality: a spiritual foundation, an understanding of the nature of the human being, and an elaborated method of self-development.

This argument is built on two types of textual sources: first, the Neo-Confucian corpus of Zhu Xi's 朱熹 commentaries to the *Si Shu* 《四書》 (*Four Books*) and the anthology *Jinsilu* 《近思錄》 (*Reflections on Things at Hand*)² compiled by Zhu Xi and Lü Zuqian 呂祖謙, which both make extensive reference to the Song masters;³ and second, the mature version of the formative Chan scripture, the *Liuzu Dashi Fabao Tan Jing* 《六祖大師法寶壇經》 (*Platform Sutra*),⁴ presumably established by the monk-literati Qisong (契嵩, 1007–1072),⁵ who, like Zhu Xi, lived in Song dynasty, and later edited by Zongbao 宗寶 in 1291. The comparison is relevant because Zhu Xi's commentaries and the *Jinsilu* constitute the core of Neo-Confucian thought, just as the *Platform Sutra* is at the heart of Chan thought.

This research studies some philosophical confluences between Confucianism and Buddhism. It contributes to the development of comparative philosophy in the area of mutual interactions between the two teachings. It is connected with Wing-tsit Chan's and James T. C. Liu's studies on the Neo-Confucian thought and examines a major dimension of this philosophy: a spirituality embodied in social interrelatedness. The methodology employed draws inspiration from Charles Taylor's theory. The study contributes to the further development of the area of Song-dynasty philosophical studies and relates, inter alia, to Makeham's recent collection of works on the Buddhist roots of Zhu Xi's philosophical thought.

II. CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY: SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL

Wing-tsit Chan has stressed that the Five Masters, who all greatly influenced Zhu Xi, “met the challenge of Buddhism and formulated a new Confucian metaphysics [...] revitalized the teachings of Confucius and Mencius [...] and developed new methods of moral cultivation and study.”⁶ James T.C. Liu also sees their major contribution as a metaphysical one, and considers them to be transcendental moralists⁷ “who tended to emphasize the inward-looking side of Confucian ethical thought [...] and internalized moral values within the individual person rather than in the patterns and structures of society and the political order.”⁸

Unlike Chan and Liu, I give their innovations a new interpretation as (1) being ultimately outward oriented (see also Yü Ying-shih)⁹—not only metaphysical or transcendental—and (2) reflecting

a spirituality that could be translated as awareness of an all-embracing interrelatedness. I argue that this awareness is a principle of motion and action, and of meaningful interaction, which has its source in Chan spirituality. The term “spiritual” not only emphasizes one’s connectedness with the rest of the universe, but also embodies the idea of practice and transformative process within community and society. This practice does indeed arise from introspection and personal morality; however, according to the *Great Learning*, its commentary by Zhu Xi,¹⁰ and the mature version of the *Platform Sutra*, it always extends beyond the individual by aiming to put order into social reality as a whole. As further described below, while metaphysics has a major speculative quality, Neo-Confucian spirituality is entirely practical, and simultaneously internal and external. This essay points out how, despite the explicit critical rhetoric of Song Neo-Confucians addressed against Chinese Chan Buddhism in general,¹¹ Chan, after all, enriched Confucianism and stimulated the Neo-Confucians’ creativity in their development of an effective, socially oriented, moral practice.

This theoretical framework draws inspiration from two facets of Charles Taylor’s moral philosophy. First, it draws on his examination of the changes in Western notions of what it is to be a moral agent endowed with moral agency over time, from Plato to the Enlightenment; and second, this theoretical framework draws on his investigation of the particular places where the Western “moral sources” are to be found over time. Broadly defined, a moral source can be described as “something the love of which empowers us to do and be good.”¹²

My analysis adapts this theoretical tool to the Confucian context. First, it identifies significant changes in Confucian moral thought through comparatively examining the ancient understanding of moral practice and its Song-dynasty meaning. More precisely, it takes a close look at the innovations that have occurred in the area of three dimensions of (Neo-)Confucian moral thought: conceptions of the moral agent and moral agency, types of conceptions of morality, and localization of the moral sources. Second, in order to identify the source of these changes—Chan Buddhist thought, the article brings to light the high proximity existing between the meanings of these dimensions in Song Neo-Confucianism and Song Chan Buddhism. The adaptation of Taylor’s theoretical framework to this development in Chinese moral philosophy is detailed below.

The first change that occurs in Confucian thought during the Song dynasty concerns the conception of morality. Taylor distinguishes two types of morality, namely procedural and substantive. In his work *Sources of the Self*, he argues that the ancient Western

conception of the good and of ethics is a substantive one: “either in the Platonic mode, as the key to cosmic order, or in the form of the good life à la Aristotle, [this] sets a standard for us in nature, independent of our will.”¹³ He also notes: “I call a notion of reason substantive where we judge the rationality of agents or their thoughts and feelings in substantive terms. This means that the criterion for rationality is that one get it right. Plato has a conception of this kind.”¹⁴ Taylor further explains that “to make practical reason substantive implies that practical wisdom is a matter of seeing an order which in some sense is in nature. This order determines what ought to be done.”¹⁵ By contrast, the procedural view, on which the West focused starting from the Enlightenment, after abandoning the initial substantive one, revolves around method and action.¹⁶

In what follows, I will argue that, unlike Western ancient morality, the early Confucian view is procedural, and that, through the introduction of the principle of coherence (*li*理) (lat. *coherentia*, organic order, structure)¹⁷ or authentic nature (*xing*性), attuned to the Chan notion of original nature (Buddha-nature), Neo-Confucianism transformed the ancient procedural perspective of morality and the moral agent, or heart-mind (*xin*心), into a simultaneously procedural and substantive conception. Thus, in Taylor’s theory, the terms procedural and substantive indicate two separate conceptions of morality, operating individually at distinct times in the Western history of moral thought, whereas in Song Neo-Confucian and Chan thinking, I argue that they are complementary and inseparable.

The early Confucian conception of morality differs from that of the Greeks. One could say that it presupposes that the activity carried out by a moral agent is a non-individualized process. It does not take what Charles Taylor describes in the ancient Western context as “a stance of radical reflexivity or adopting the first-person standpoint,”¹⁸ an introspection or self-examination as exploration. Consequently, it generates no “substantive” discourse on inwardness, no “substantive” configuration of that inner zone where I examine myself and am present to myself. A substantive perspective implies that I have to preliminarily look inwardly and gain an understanding of myself before being able to function as a moral agent. As will be shown below, early Confucianism focuses on activity fueled by perseverance and determination, by a power of choice, and not by the use of knowledge of oneself as a pre-condition of one’s action. It is grounded in a procedural vision of morality, which focuses on working on one’s desires and tendencies until one meets the standard parameters of an external model, namely Zhou ritual, and clearly, as reflected in this passage from the *Lunyu*,¹⁹ neither

investigates nor develops a substantive vision centered on the nature of morality and on the self-knowledge of the moral agent or his knowledge of a higher order outside himself: “One has no access to Confucius’ vision of human nature and of the way of heaven (夫子之言性與天道, 不可得而聞也).”²⁰

Therefore, the beginnings and development of the Confucian conception of morality do not resemble those of Western morality. The ancient Confucian perspective on morality commences with an exclusively procedural perspective. In what follows, I provide evidence that its interaction with Chan enriches Confucianism with a second, substantive dimension of morality grafted onto the first, which appears in Song Neo-Confucianism and provides it with a spiritual feature. To that end, Part III introduces a theoretical framework based on the notions of moral agent and moral agency. This is used to examine the conceptions of heart-mind, authentic nature and principle of coherence.

III. TRANSFORMATION OF THE ANCIENT CONCEPTIONS OF HEART-MIND AND AUTHENTIC NATURE

The starting point of this section is moral agency, as defined in Susan Harter’s developmental theory: self-agency as moral agency is a sense of authorship over one’s acts, thoughts and emotions.²¹ In the *Lunyu*, it takes the concrete form of self-mastery (*ke* 克), self-control (*yue* 約) and self-examination (*sheng* 省). Consequently, a good life is conceived mainly in terms of the moral agent’s efficacy. In this context, one’s capacity to analyze oneself in order to determine the future course of one’s actions is not called into question, but rather presupposed as an ability already existing within oneself. This assumption suggests the implicit presence in ancient Confucianism of a strong sense of self-confidence in the moral agent, who perceives himself in terms of self-government, and on the continuity of a process of cultivation through training and education, whose content—focusing on self-mastery, self-control and self-examination—is presumed as being already known: “I daily examine myself on three points (*wu ri sansheng wushen* 吾日三省吾身);”²² “control yourself, and you will seldom experience failure (*yi yue shizhizhe xianyi* 以約失之者鮮矣).”²³ Starting from this presupposition, the next sub-section presents the early Confucian vision of morality as procedural and embodied within the ancient notions of heart-mind/will and authentic nature. The second sub-section examines comparatively its Neo-Confucian counterpart, while at the same time highlighting its substantive dimension and connections with Chan

thought. The last sub-section identifies this substantive facet as Neo-Confucian spirituality and provides an explanation of its content. Within this framework, all sub-sections illustrate that while the ancient morality is procedural, the pre-modern, Song-dynasty morality is both procedural and substantive.

3.1 *Early Confucian Understandings of the Heart-Mind and Authentic Nature: A Procedural Vision of Morality*

The Confucian moral agent, I, myself (*wu* 吾, *wo* 我, *wushen* 吾身) is not embodied as in Western thought in “reason” and its corollary, the intellect, which are clearly separated from emotions and feelings, and mainly based on logical understanding, but in the “inside (*nei* 內)” or the “heart-mind,” in which what the West distinguishes as separate practical, theoretical and emotional aspects are bound up together into a holistic unity.

The classic *Great Learning* and its commentary by Zhu Xi (*Daxue Zhangju*, Zhang 7)²⁴ present the heart-mind as an inner master and judge that can be either present or absent. Its presence ensures that all sensations and judgments made by an individual are correct. When absent, sense knowledge and judgments about things perceived are erroneous. In other words, one perceives first of all with the heart-mind, by which the eye, ear and mouth themselves are enabled to perceive correctly: “When the heart-mind is absent (*xin bu zai* 心不在), one is looking but does not see, is listening but does not hear, is eating and does not know the flavor of the food.”²⁵ The ancient Confucian heart-mind is not only the active cause of perception, but is also a perfectly unitary and transrational entity—i.e., the place within which reason, thoughts, feelings and sensations coexist inseparably; external sense, internal sense and reason are equal; and understanding is manifold: rational, emotional, sensory-based, relational, empathic and moral. If one can say that Western moral philosophy is a moral philosophy of reason, then Confucianism is a moral philosophy of the heart-mind.

In the context of the heart-mind, Confucius specifically focuses on the will or determination (*zhi* 志)²⁶ as the instrument of realizing moral life through which one is able to make the decision to return to ritual and follow it, namely to not listen to, look at, or talk about what is contrary to ritual.²⁷ However, the nature of this notion of will is not elaborated. As with the early notion of heart-mind, the concept of will also depends on the capacity of perception and sense knowledge, which are seen as the foundation of moral agency. Confucius conveys his confidence in the power of the will, seen as the master and principle of order of the heart-mind, through the

following analogy: “A great army can be deprived of its commander, but no one may be deprived of one’s willpower (三軍可奪帥匹夫不可奪志也).”²⁸ This image of willpower or determination as an indubitable presence in everyone reflects ancient Confucianism’s adherence to a procedural rather than a substantive vision of the capacity for moral agency, i.e., a moral agency understood in processual terms of instrumental efficacy, which serves as a guide to moral action, specifically a return to ritual and an adherence to it as the proper standard of behavior for all individuals. Moreover, the main function of one’s willpower is to decide upon and initiate undertakings, to judge and “inwardly reprimand oneself (*nei zisong* 內自訟)”²⁹ and to supply persistence. This inner strength is the major dimension of the heart-mind and it provides the endurance necessary to remain on the middle path (*zhongyong* 中庸) of impartial morality, which involves striking a balance between “doing too much and too little (*wu guo buji* 無過不及)”³⁰ to triumph over failures or deficiencies (*shi* 矢), excesses or transgressions (*guo* 過),³¹ and doubts or misconceptions (*huo* 惑).³² Moral order is thus seen in terms of harmony and equilibrium. However, there is no indication in early Confucianism about how to persevere longer than “a single day, or a single month (*ri yue zhi* 日月至)”³³ in such moral practice.

The *Zhongyong*³⁴ introduces another central moral notion, that of authentic nature, described as the allotment conferred on an individual by heaven (*tianming* 天命).³⁵ In ancient Confucianism, this notion is celebrated in Mencius’ famous formula: “Original nature is good (*xingbenshan* 性本善).” However, in Mencius, it appears more like a moral intuition and is not further clarified. Neo-Confucian commentaries further develop this concept.

3.2 *Song Neo-Confucian and Chan Understandings of the Heart-Mind, Authentic Nature, and Principle of Coherence: A Substantive and Procedural Vision of Morality*

This sub-section opens by outlining the major changes to Confucian thought that the Song Neo-Confucians introduced. Zhu Xi and his earlier teachers transformed the perception of the moral agent from this processually oriented articulation of heart-mind/will to a simultaneously substantive and procedural conception. Its substantive dimension includes the heart-mind and authentic nature (coherence principle), thus introducing a higher “transmoral” order (Paul Tillich’s term), i.e., one “participating in a reality that transcends the sphere of moral commands.”³⁶ This sub-section examines this new Neo-Confucian conception, comparing its elements with similar ones

in Chan. The subsequent subsection defines the Neo-Confucian moral agent as an expression of Neo-Confucian spirituality.

According to the Neo-Confucian anthology, the heart-mind is recognized as “the master of the body (*zhu yu shen* 主於身),”³⁷ which “must be kept within the body (*xin yao zai qiangzi li* 心要在腔子裏)” and prevented from leaving through “cracks that open to the outside (*waimian youxie xixia* 外面有些隙罅).”³⁸ This resonates with the Chan perspective in the *Platform Sutra*:

The material body of the person is a walled town (*cheng* 城): eyes, ears, nose, tongue and body are the town gates (*men* 門). These five doors open outward and there is another one opening inward, namely, intentionality (*yi men* 意門). The heart-mind is a land, and authentic nature its king (*xin shi di, xing shi wang* 心是地, 性是王). The king dwells in the land of the heart-mind; if authentic nature is present, then the king is present. If authentic nature has gone, the king is no longer there. When authentic nature is present, the body and the heart-mind remain alive (*cun* 存). When authentic nature has gone, the body and the heart-mind perish (*huai* 壞).³⁹

From this comparative reading, one perceives the influence of Chan images on Neo-Confucianism, and also the changes in the conceptualization of moral agent that occurred from ancient Confucianism to Neo-Confucianism. The Neo-Confucian/Chan perspective of the heart-mind and authentic nature is not merely procedural in its effort to keep them inside, explained elsewhere by Zhu Xi as an endeavor to purify the heart-mind (*xizhuo qixin yi que* 洗濯其心以去惡).⁴⁰ It is substantive too, because the image of the heart-mind with its master, authentic nature, depicts a vision of order. Here the apprehension of the master shifts; it is no more only functional, but also substantive, in the sense that it is able when purified, namely kept inside, to embody the order or goodness that vivifies the individual.

A specific Neo-Confucian articulation, namely, that of essence-function (*ti-yong* 體-用), provides an illustration of this simultaneously substantive and procedural notion of the heart-mind. Being a single entity, therefore indivisible, the heart-mind can be perceived in two ways, as heart-mind-essence (*ti* 體) or heart-mind-function (*yong* 用), depending on the moral agent’s perspective (*qi suo jian* 其所見)⁴¹ and, therefore, on his capacity to access different levels of perception and awareness. For Zhu Xi, the heart-mind-essence is the state of impartiality (*zhong* 中). In *Jinsilu* and in his *Zhongyong Zhangju*, this state embodies authentic nature and the coherence principle.⁴² The substantive heart-mind-essence is a balanced state, or a state of equanimity, equilibrium or neutrality; this is not indifference, but a condition in which nothing moves the individual

(*budong* 不動).⁴³ This means that his feelings are impersonal or neutral, devoid of idiosyncratic subjectivity. In other words, the heart-mind is free from attraction (i.e., joy and enjoyment) or aversion (i.e., anger and sadness): “specific feelings of joy, anger, sadness and enjoyment are not set in motion (*xi nu ai le zhi weifa* 喜怒哀樂之未發).”⁴⁴ Consequently, equanimity (*zhong* 中) involves only neutral feelings, neither painful nor pleasant, which the heart-mind neither entertains nor rejects, and this, in Zhu Xi’s view, equates with authentic nature, a state within which the moral agent “neither inclines to, nor takes a side (*wu suo pian yi* 無所偏倚).”⁴⁵

Thus, Zhu Xi’s heart-mind-essence is the master of the body,⁴⁶ and authentic nature is the embodiment in humans of the coherence principle bestowed (*fu* 賦) by heaven to all beings,⁴⁷ i.e., the fundamental ordering principle present in everything. This is, Zhu Xi explains in his *Daxue Zhangju, Jing*, the wellspring of the complete good, i.e., the moral source: “the highest perfection, inherent in the coherence principles of all things (*shili dangran zhi ji* 事理當然之極).”⁴⁸

The procedural heart-mind-function is, according to Zhu Xi, the movement of the feelings (*qing* 情) that set off and take shape from the original immobile heart-mind essence. These feelings can be good or not good, and take the form of thoughts and concerns (*sili* 思慮).⁴⁹ The highest level of heart-mind-function, termed harmony *he* 和, is attained when its movements follow authentic nature and feelings manifest their presence within the boundaries of the right balance (*fa jie zhong jie* 發皆中節); that is, when one’s feelings are rectified (*zheng* 正).⁵⁰ This state is the inner moral source, the complete good, in which the heart-mind should settle permanently (*zhi yu zhishan* 止於至善).⁵¹

The coherence principle is part of the substantive facet of the Neo-Confucian vision of morality. As mentioned above, Zhu Xi equates authentic nature with the coherence principle. According to his school, all beings have their specific principles of coherence that share at a profound level a common dimension, as they all originate from the same unique coherence principle of heaven (*tianli* 天理). This idea of *li* clearly acknowledges the existence of a standard of order in nature and within us. Becoming aware of it results in following it, which is to settle within the complete good. Neo-Confucian training aims to ascend from cognitively knowing things to becoming aware of their principles of coherence, spiritually knowing them, and ultimately “getting to the bottom of those principles of coherence (*qiong qi li* 窮其理)”⁵² as a way of understanding what constitutes the good and of practicing it.

As already mentioned, the coherence principle introduces in Neo-Confucianism a spiritual or transmoral level. In his introductory note to the *Zhongyong Zhangju*, Zhu Xi states this when quoting Master Cheng:

This writing begins by evoking a unique natural principle of coherence, which dissipates itself into ten thousand things and events that finally return to it. This principle dissipates itself and fills the world, wraps itself and pulls itself back so as to set itself aside in a remote place.⁵³

Therefore, the world is an ordered realm of existence and the moral source is localized both inwardly and outwardly. Through this *li* of heaven, a structural relationship of moral order is established between beings.

Another major development introduced by Zhu Xi is his substantive concept of authentic nature: “authentic nature is the same as the coherence principle (*xing ji li ye* 性即理也)”⁵⁴ and is “conferred by heaven (*xing chu yu tian* 性出於天).”⁵⁵ As with the coherence principle, which is one but develops itself into a multitude of specific coherence principles, authentic nature is also one while being present in the particular authentic nature of each individual thing. This description suggests that the coherence principle and authentic nature constitute a higher order of reality present in nature. This idea is clearly articulated in the *Jinsilu*⁵⁶ which depicts one’s authentic nature as the single source of all things (*wanwu zhi yiyuan* 萬物之一源), and something that one cannot personally own (*fei you wo zhi desi* 非有我之得私).

In what follows, I suggest that this vision of a substantive, transmoral/spiritual order of one’s authentic nature in Neo-Confucian and Chan contexts is to be understood as interrelatedness—expressed as oneness and purity, and then examine the connections between the two traditions.

IV. SUBSTANTIVE ORDER AS NEO-CONFUCIAN SPIRITUALITY: INTERRELATEDNESS, ONENESS AND PURITY IN SONG NEO- CONFUCIANISM AND CHAN

One major argument for and the clearest evidence in support of the transmoral/spiritual character of this substantive order is the oneness motif. In both traditions, its common metaphor is the heart-mind as wide (*da* 大), as one common body (*yiti* 一體), and its common significance is to become fully aware of the unity and sameness between inside and outside (*nei/wai* 內/外), namely between the moral agent

and his external reality. The Neo-Confucian oneness is embodied in the unique coherence principle of heaven, present in all heart-minds and connecting them. The *Platform Sutra* expresses this same idea of oneness: “one’s heart-mind is originally the Buddha (*ji xin ji fo* 即心即佛);”⁵⁷ “original nature is the Buddha (*benxin shi fo* 本性是佛);”⁵⁸ “the Buddha acts within one’s own authentic nature (*fo xiang xingzhong zuo* 佛向性中作).”⁵⁹ Also: “all phenomena dwell in one’s own authentic nature (*fa zai zixing zhong* 法在自性中).”⁶⁰ The next paragraph illustrates oneness as interrelatedness as well:

The capacity of one’s own authentic nature to contain all phenomena is wide (*da* 大), and the totality of all phenomena lies within one’s authentic nature. When seeing in it all human beings, the good and the evil ones, without choosing or rejecting anything, without being stained or attached (*ranzhao* 染著), the heart-mind is void (*xukong* 虛空); this is what has been called wide.⁶¹

The metaphor of the void heart-mind refers to a heart-mind that is not self-sufficient, to a new sense of the self, with no boundaries, one engaged and interconnected with the realities of all others.

Neo-Confucian anthology shares this Chan view but expresses it in moral terms. The narrow heart-mind is considered partial (*sixin* 私心),⁶² and the wide heart-mind, impartial (*gong* 公)⁶³ or empty—that is, free of self (*xu zhong wu wo* 虛中無我).⁶⁴ The first is physically and psychologically limited to an individual’s closed self while the latter is all-inclusive. Consequently, the effort to open the heart-mind is a significant dimension of Neo-Confucian education. “One must render one’s heart-mind wide to ensure that it is open and large, exactly as one builds a nine-storey tower [a pagoda!].”⁶⁵ The *Jinsilu* also advises to unify the inside and the outside (*he nei wai* 合內外), and consider things equal to oneself (*ping wu wo* 平物我).⁶⁶ This equality refers to the same coherence principle present in all things as opposed to perceptible qualitative differences.

The Neo-Confucian goal of widening the heart-mind is similar to the Chan viewpoint. The latter also aims to acquire the capacity to perceive the wideness of one’s real nature, expressed in the *Platform Sutra* as being able “to see one’s nature (*jian xing* 見性)” or “opening one’s heart-mind through enlightened understanding (*xinkai wujie* 心開悟解).”⁶⁷ This means becoming aware that one’s nature is all encompassing, reality in its entirety lies inside the moral agent, there is no frontier between inward and outward, self and reality form one body, exactly as “all the water courses flow towards the great ocean, all streams come together in one body (*hewei yiti* 合為一體).”⁶⁸

The Neo-Confucians also took up this idea of one common body as representing interrelatedness, “Through widening one’s heart-mind, one is able to become one body with all the things of reality (大其心則能體天下之物).”⁶⁹ This interrelatedness holds two major connotations; namely, the impossibility of living free from the influence of others and of other things, and one’s deep engagement with fellow human beings and the world. Zhang Zai expresses this belonging to the same body using the metaphor of family, which reveals—one could say—a combination of Chan inspiration and that of the ancestor cult: “what fills the world is my body, what commends the world is my authentic nature. I and all people descend from the same parents (*min wu tongbao* 民吾同胞), all things are like me (*wu wu yu ye* 物吾與也).”⁷⁰ His emphasis on sameness (i.e., solidarity within the larger, meaningful order of one body) born from the awareness of the presence of authentic nature suggests that when one has reached a profound level of self-development, one becomes able to perceive one’s interconnectedness with all things.

The first result of cultivating this all-encompassing awareness is an enlargement of one’s own boundaries of acquired knowledge, experience and insight about oneself—about one’s particular authentic nature or the coherence principle of human beings. This amounts to gaining experience and insight about the specific coherence principles of realities around us, and thus about the unique Neo-Confucian coherence principle of heaven: “As long as all things and oneself do not form one body, there are things left outside one’s heart-mind.”⁷¹

Second, acquiring knowledge in the ancient Confucian context involves a moral imperative to return to and follow ritual. As described below, during the Song dynasty, the Neo-Confucian notion of ritual acquires a new meaning which also joins the Chan perspective. The aim of Neo-Confucian education—the following of ritual—is that everything outside oneself becomes as important as oneself, a perception that engenders a palpable sense of becoming one with everything, which translates into a genuine abovementioned impartiality, an equal sense of responsibility and concern felt by the moral agent for everything in the world as for himself:

The sage extends his authentic nature to the widest possible limit and does not allow that which is seen or heard to chain his heart-mind. He regards every single thing in the world as undistinguishable from himself (*wu yiwu fei wo* 無一物非我). [...] Heaven is wide and has no outside; therefore, if one’s heart-mind has still left something outside, it cannot come together with heaven’s heart-mind.⁷²

Moreover, the anthology emphasizes that “the heart-mind must be wide-open and all-embracing (*hong fang* 洪放)”⁷³ because “the wide heart-mind is connected (*tong* 通) to all things.”⁷⁴

The Chan school, like Neo-Confucianism, perceives this training as a practice starting from the inside and taking concrete form outside. Achieving awareness that all beings form one body with one-self equates to cultivating wisdom and compassion, that is, effective interrelatedness. The *PS*, 0351b05 highlights that seeing original nature is “being in the world (*zaishijian* 在世間)” or “awareness of the world (*shijianjue* 世間覺),” because “looking for the original nature outside of the world is like looking for the horn of a hare.” The wisdom developed through Chan practice, the *Platform Sutra* stresses, is compassion or commiseration, which results from cultivating “a heart-mind exempt of contempt, and respectful behavior towards all (*xin ji bu qing chang xing pu jing* 心即不輕, 常行普敬),”⁷⁵ being “respectful of superiors and mindful of inferiors, having compassion (*jinxu* 矜恤) for those poor and alone and helping them”⁷⁶ cultivating rectitude of behavior (*yi* 義), which is defined as “having compassion/commiseration (*lian* 憐) for superiors and inferiors.”⁷⁷ Thus, in terms similar to Confucian language (i.e., respect, moral quality, modesty, ritual, rectitude of behavior), which again reflects the mutual influence between Chan and Confucianism prior to the Song times, the *Platform Sutra* describes Chan practice in terms of cultivating respect and rectitude of behavior, and the effect of practice in terms of merit and moral quality: “modest within the heart-mind, this is merit; following ritual outside, this is moral quality (內心謙下是功, 外行於禮是德).”⁷⁸

This Chan viewpoint directly resonates with the attributes of the Neo-Confucian sage depicted by Zhu Xi⁷⁹ in terms of the moral quality of modesty (*shengren zhi qiande* 聖人之謙德) and of cultivating respect (*jing* 敬) as the major dimension of inner self-cultivation, and the inner precondition to its external correlative, that is, rectitude of behavior. Like the *Platform Sutra*, the Neo-Confucian anthology also embraces the notion of compassion when defining the “heart-mind of commiseration (*ceyinzixin* 惻隱之心)” as “the life guide of the human being (*ren zhi shengdao* 人之生道).”⁸⁰ In Zhu Xi’s words, “everyone has a coherence principle, and therefore is naturally endowed with compassion, loyalty and affection.”⁸¹ Note that the Neo-Confucian source of compassion is the principle of coherence. In the same paragraph, he adds: “Benevolence is the heart-mind through which Nature (heaven-earth) brings things to life; that by which humans are brought to life, what is called the origin of humans, is the highest good (*shanzhizhang* 善之長).” It might be said that the traditional Confucian notion that best equates with

Chan compassion is benevolence (*ren* 仁). Through benevolence, Zhu Xi glosses, “one experiences the coherence principle within oneself.”⁸² In conclusion, this theme of oneness is a clear illustration of the interaction between Confucianism and Chan Buddhism, of a mutual enrichment that gave Confucianism a new, transmoral orientation.

Apart from the oneness motif, another connection between the two traditions is the motif of the initial purity of human nature. In the Chan vision, the moral agent becomes estranged from this pure state because of feelings, thoughts, perceptions and intentions, which generate confusion and damage his interdependence with others. Training thus means to purify one’s state of consciousness, to empty it out, and open it up. The *Platform Sutra*⁸³ compares the purity of human nature with a clear sky (*qing tian* 青天) obscured by clouds of erroneous thoughts: “the external realities of the manifest objects (*wai zhao jing* 外著境)” trigger these clouds, which obscure one’s own nature, thus preventing one from seeing it. And its purity is explained in terms of being “free from erroneous thoughts (*wu wangxiang* 無妄想),” “motionless (*budong* 不動),” “still (*ding* 定),” and as synonymous with being “internally free of confusion (*nei bu luan* 內不亂)” and “externally [i.e., within the realm of forms] detached from forms (*wai li xiang* 外離相).”⁸⁴

A condition of being confused occurs under the sway of erroneous thoughts that constantly follow phenomena or forms (*xiang* 相), to which the individual’s thoughts become attached. In the *Platform Sutra*, one’s attachment to phenomena has a double effect of tarnishing. It not only engenders mistaken views within one’s heart-mind, therefore clouding it (*ran* 染),⁸⁵ but also “stains the manifest things (*ran wanjing* 染萬境).”⁸⁶ Accordingly, the Chan practice aims to restore the initial pure condition through detaching one’s thoughts from objects, thus simultaneously clearing the heart-mind and avoiding the staining of reality. This double tarnishing and double purification is also a strong argument in support of the oneness/interrelatedness motif discussed above.

Zhu Xi and the Song Neo-Confucians examine these same relationships—human authentic nature/feelings and feelings/external things—in terms of the coherence principle and vital breath (*qi* 氣). In explaining them holistically, Zhu Xi likens the coherence principle to “a world of purity (*jing* 淨), wide, void, with no perceptible trace, which takes no form”⁸⁷ and describes vital breath as that “which can be gradually refined, solidified, and concentrated, in order to give birth to all the things,”⁸⁸ including feelings. In the anthology, Cheng Yi stresses that original nature is authentic and still (*zhen er jing* 真而靜), and not set in motion (*weifa* 未發): “When

it takes form (*xing* 形), its manifestation comes into contact with external things; this contact starts moving its neutral state *zhong*, and the seven feelings set out. The feelings emerging from this contact become stronger and distort authentic nature.”⁸⁹ Of note is that this Neo-Confucian image is akin to the Chan vision of the attachment of thoughts to appearances.

Zhu Xi also developed a substantive framework to explain the essence of feelings/personal desires (*siyu* 私欲),⁹⁰ their functioning, and their adverse effect on the original purity of the heart-mind and authentic nature. His conceptualization presents similarities with the Chan description of how original nature is affected by erroneous thoughts. To this end, he uses two connected pairs of correlatives: partial (private, personal)/impartial (common, impersonal) (*si* 私/*gong* 公); and erroneous (wrong, biased)/righteous (correct, neutral) (*wang* 妄/*cheng* 誠). The first element of these articulations refers to the non-cultivated condition, as an expression of the focus on individuality and separateness from other beings. It is also an indication that the original purity of the heart-mind is lost. The second, points to the state of the sage, a condition marked by belongingness to the world, purity, engagement and interrelatedness, in which “one’s feelings follow events and things and one has no personal feelings (*qiqing shun wanshi er wuqing* 其情順萬事而無情)”⁹¹—a description of the neutral state *zhong* discussed earlier, which is neither lack of interest nor intervention, because both are subordinated to the biased subjectivity of the agent, but a deep, equanimous and objective attention to each thing, not clouded by any personal interest. This state is the condition of great impartiality (*dagong* 大公), i.e., a state of impersonality in the sense of objectivity and interrelatedness, in which the moral agent is able to follow (*shun* 順) or respond (*ying* 應)⁹² to things and events as they are, without personal interest distorting them.

The first correlation embodies the idea that, when partial and personal (*zisi* 自私) feelings take hold of an individual, he is “unable to act in order to respond to and follow things (*buneng yi youwei wei yingji* 不能以有為為應跡),”⁹³ because his heart-mind is impure, and his authentic nature inactive. As a result, the Neo-Confucian also acknowledges that being self-centered (*wo* 我) means being limited (*youfang* 有方), isolated and not interconnected, therefore unable to grasp things as they really are.

Obviously, the two recurring topics of oneness and purity are deeply interdependent. Consequently, in the views of both the Neo-Confucian anthology and the *Platform Sutra*, the actual self is the pure original self (common authentic nature or Buddha-nature) contaminated by vital breath, which takes the form of feelings and thoughts. The Neo-Confucian state of purity and great impartiality

is equated by Cheng Yi with the image of the “heart-mind which is originally void, following and responding to things without leaving a trace (*xin xi benxu ying wu wuji* 心兮本虛，應物無跡),”⁹⁴ with no personal feelings interfering with the individual’s capacity to see and react to things as these really are. Consequently, in the Neo-Confucian perspective as in Chan, “responding to things” describes the formation of sensations not as a passive reaction “undergone” by the heart-mind, but as an active double process of incitement and response between the interrelated self and things, under the guidance of the heart-mind, which leaves no trace, neither in things, nor in the heart-mind. The narrow complex made of the individual physical body and idiosyncratic personality traits no longer exists. Therefore, in the Neo-Confucian perspective, a void heart-mind (*xuzhong* 虛中) is an impartial one, “without subjectivity (*wuwo* 無我),” which “doesn’t have its personal interests as its master (*zhong wu si zhu* 中無私主).”⁹⁵ Thus, “only impartiality enables the mutual mirroring of the self and things (*zhi you gong ze wu wo jian zhao* 只為公則物我兼照).”⁹⁶ This is reminiscent of the well-known *Platform Sutra* image of the mirror without dust.

The second pair of correlatives is a different illustration of the same relationship in terms of authentic nature (the coherence principle), which is governed by righteousness and feelings (desires), which are dominated by erroneousness. According to the Song Confucians, “when one is motivated by heaven [the coherence principle of heaven], he will act without error (*wuwang* 無妄) [i.e., righteously, authentically (*cheng* 誠)]; when one is motivated by human desires, he will act erroneously (*wang* 妄).”⁹⁷ The Neo-Confucian cultivation of righteousness involves getting rid of desires and developing one’s concentration,⁹⁸ and getting rid of desires equates with detaching oneself from things (as in the Chan practice): “When things and events happen, one’s heart-mind sets in motion in relation to the things and events one considers as important. When one sees the thing one considers as important, one’s heart-mind sets in motion because of that thing. If one is able to leave each thing as it is, without moving it, one’s heart-mind will not set in motion (若能物各付物，便自不出來也).”⁹⁹ In a sense, the Neo-Confucian idea of leaving things in their original place as a way to act righteously, amounts to the Chan training that one should not be attached to things and not stain them.

V. CONCLUSION

In the context of the political and social challenges faced during the Song dynasty, the Neo-Confucians revitalized their tradition,

drawing inspiration from Chan ideas. This study provides an in-depth textual examination of this process. Concretely, it puts forward the idea that, under Chan influence, the Confucian moral practice changes from a procedural perspective (pre-Song Confucianism) to a simultaneously procedural and substantive perspective (Song Neo-Confucianism). It also demonstrates that its substantive dimension emerges as Neo-Confucian spirituality/transmorality.

The study is part of the recent philosophical research in the sphere of the confluences between Confucianism and Buddhism. It is complementary, *inter alia*, to Makeham's recent collection of work on the Buddhist roots of Zhu Xi's philosophical thought.¹⁰⁰ In this book, the authors examine certain concepts of Zhu's work and their connection with Buddhism: radiant mind (Jorgensen), selfishness, salvation and self-cultivation (Tiwald), ignorance and badness (Makeham). The contribution of this essay to the development of this area of Song-dynasty comparative scholarship consists of the following: an investigation of a distinct issue—Neo-Confucian morality and spirituality in the course of daily life and interactions; a specific philosophical approach—comparative hermeneutics; and the strategic application of a transcultural theoretical perspective on moral agency and moral sources.

Another outcome of this research is its methodology and transcultural viewpoint: its theoretical framework is an adaptation of Charles Taylor's theory to Chinese thought. Taylor demonstrated that the ancient Western conception of morality is a substantive one, which, beginning with the Enlightenment, becomes a procedural morality. The present study identifies the Song dynasty as the pivotal moment for Confucian moral thought. First, it provides evidence that the ancient Confucian conception of morality is a procedural one. Second, that during the Song period, following its interaction with Chan, although this conception does not change as radically as Western moral thought did with the Enlightenment and remains focused on procedure (practice), it does enrich itself through incorporating a new, substantive dimension.

In order to illustrate the specific characteristics of this substantive feature which emerged within Confucian conception of morality as a consequence of the Chan influence, the analysis proceeds from the notions of heart-mind, authentic nature and principle of coherence. Moreover, the essay establishes that this substantive dimension is embodied in the notions of interrelatedness, oneness and purity, which are common to both Neo-Confucianism and Chan. It thus provides a contribution to the philosophical study of the connections and mutual exchanges between Confucianism and Buddhism.

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ENDNOTES

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¹James T.C. Liu examined the feelings of Song literati expressed in the historical work *Jianyan Yilai Xinian Yaolu* 《建炎以來繫年要錄》 of Li Xinchuan 李心傳 (1167–1244). See James T.C. Liu, *China Turning Inward: Intellectual-Political Changes in the Early Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 18–20.

²Hereafter abbreviated as *JSL*. Located in vol. 13, Zhu Xi 朱熹, *Zhuzi Quan Shu* 《朱子全書》 (*The Collected Works of Master Zhu*) (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2002) and (Hefei: Anhui Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2002), 151–302. Cited as *ZZQS*. See also Zhang Jinghua 張京華, *Xinyi Jinsilu* 《新譯近思錄》 (*Reflections on Things at Hand: New Translation*) (Taipei: Sanmin Shuju, 2005).

An English version is available and I also consulted it: Wing-tsit Chan, trans., *Reflections on Things at Hand* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

³Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–73), Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–85), Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107), Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–77), Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011–77).

⁴T48n2008-1 (www.cbeta.org). Hereafter abbreviated as *PS*. An English version is available and I also consulted it: John R. McRae, trans., *The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch* (Berkeley: Numata Center, 2000). On the importance of this foundational text, see Morten Schlütter, “Introduction: The Platform Sutra, Buddhism and Chinese religion,” in *Readings of the Platform Sutra*, ed. M. Schlütter and S.F. Teiser (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 1–24.

⁵See Li Zhonghua 李中華 and Ding Min 丁敏, *Xinyi Liuzu Tanjing* 《新譯六祖壇經》 (*Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch: New Translation*), 3rd ed. (Taipei: Sanmin Shuju, 2010), 7–8.

⁶See Wing-tsit Chan, “Introduction,” in Wing-tsit Chan, *Reflections on Things at Hand*, xvii.

⁷See Liu, *China Turning Inward: Intellectual-Political Changes in the Early Twelfth Century*, 43.

⁸*Ibid.*, 152.

⁹See also Yü Ying-shih 余英時, chapter *Nei sheng yu Wai wang zhi jian de Jnzhang* 《「內聖」與「外王」之間的緊張》 (*The Tension between Being a Sage Inwardly and a King Outwardly*) in *Zhu Xi de Lishi Shijie: Songdai shidaifu zhengzhiwenhua de yanjiu*, Xia 《朱熹的歷史世界宋代士大夫政治文化的研究下》 (*The Historical World of Zhu Xi: A Study of the Political Culture of Song Intellectuals*, vol. 2) (Taipei: Yunchen Wenhua, 2003), 26–54.

¹⁰For an interpretation of the inner and outer steps of the *Great Learning*, see Diana Arghirescu, “Zhu Xi’s Spirituality: A New Interpretation of The *Great Learning*,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 39, no. 2 (2012): 272–89.

¹¹See, for example, the paragraphs explicitly against the Chinese Chan Buddhist methods in the chapters 4 and 13 of the *Jinsilu*: 4: 48, 4: 53, 13: 3, 13: 4, 13: 6.

¹²See Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 92.

¹³*Ibid.*, 82.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 85.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 86.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 143–56.

¹⁷Coherence, i.e., exactly in the sense of an organic order and structure, existing already in the nature: lat. *cohaerentia*.

¹⁸Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 130.

¹⁹*Lunyu* 《論語》, 5: 12 in *The Collected Works of Master Zhu*, (*ZZQS*, vol. 6, 103).

- ²⁰Except where the translator is indicated, all translations from classical Chinese are the author's.
- ²¹See Susan Harter, *The Construction of the Self: A Developmental Perspective* (New York: Guilford, 1999).
- ²²See *Lunyu*, 1: 4 (ZZQS, vol. 6, 69).
- ²³See *Lunyu*, 4: 23 (ZZQS, vol. 6, 98).
- ²⁴See Zhu Xi, *Daxue Zhangju* 《大學章句》 (ZZQS, vol. 6, 22).
- ²⁵Ibid.
- ²⁶*Lunyu*, 9: 25 (ZZQS, vol. 6, 146).
- ²⁷*Lunyu*, 12: 1 (ZZQS, vol. 6, 167).
- ²⁸*Lunyu*, 9: 25 (ZZQS, vol. 6, 146).
- ²⁹*Lunyu*, 5: 26 (ZZQS, vol. 6, 108).
- ³⁰*Zhongyong, Zhang 4* (ZZQS, vol. 6, 35). This difference between doing too much and too little is explored by Zhu Xi in his commentaries, *Zhongyong Zhangju, Zhang 1,2,4,6,8, and 27*. For an extensive discussion on Zhu Xi's *Zhongyong Zhangju*, see Diana Arghiresco, *De la continuité dynamique dans l'univers confucéen, Lecture néoconfucéenne du Zhongyong 中庸* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2013).
- ³¹See *Lunyu*, 5: 26, 9: 24.
- ³²*Lunyu*, 12: 10 (ZZQS, vol. 6, 172).
- ³³*Lunyu*, 6: 5 (ZZQS, vol. 6, 21).
- ³⁴About the interest in the *Zhongyong* during the Northern Song, see Chi-chiang Huang, "Chung-yung in Northern Sung Intellectual Discourse: The Buddhist Components," in *Classics and Interpretations, The Hermeneutic Traditions in Chinese Culture*, ed. Ching-I Tu (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 315–40.
- ³⁵*Zhongyong Zhangju, Zhang 1* (ZZQS, vol. 6, 32).
- ³⁶See Paul Tillich, *Morality and Beyond* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 77.
- ³⁷See *Jinsilu, JSL*, 1: 39.
- ³⁸*JSL*, 4: 34.
- ³⁹See *Platform Sutra*, T48n2008-1, PS, 0352b06.
- ⁴⁰*Daxue Zhangju, Zhang 2* (ZZQS, vol. 6, 18).
- ⁴¹*JSL*, 1: 4.
- ⁴²See *JSL*, 1: 38; *Zhongyong Zhangju, Zhang 1*.
- ⁴³*JSL*, 1: 3.
- ⁴⁴*Zhongyong Zhangju, Zhang 1* (ZZQS, vol. 6, 32).
- ⁴⁵Ibid.
- ⁴⁶See *JSL*, 1: 39.
- ⁴⁷*Zhongyong Zhangju, Zhang 1*. About the idea of *li* as principle, see Wing-tsit Chan, "The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept *LI* 理 as Principle," *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, no. 2 (1964): 123–49.
- ⁴⁸ZZQS, vol. 6, 16.
- ⁴⁹*JSL*, 1: 39.
- ⁵⁰Ibid., and also *JSL*, 1: 4.
- ⁵¹*Daxue Zhangju, Jing* (ZZQS, vol. 6, 16) and *JSL*, 1: 39.
- ⁵²See *Daxue Zhangju, Zhang 5*, (ZZQS, vol. 6, 20).
- ⁵³ZZQS, vol. 6, 32. For an analysis of this note, see Arghiresco, *De la continuité dynamique*, 39–97.
- ⁵⁴*JSL*, 1: 38.
- ⁵⁵*JSL*, 1: 40.
- ⁵⁶*JSL*, 1: 48 and 1: 51.
- ⁵⁷PS, 0355a27.
- ⁵⁸PS, 0350a10.
- ⁵⁹PS, 0352b06.
- ⁶⁰PS, 0354b12.
- ⁶¹PS, 0350a10.
- ⁶²*JSL*, 2: 76, 2: 63.
- ⁶³*JSL*, 2: 52.
- ⁶⁴*JSL*, 2: 10.

- ⁶⁵*JSL*, 2: 24. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers who pointed out that Daoism was also present in the Neo-Confucian developments: for example, the image of the nine-storey tower appears in *Laozi* 64. The discussion of this topic is certainly beyond the scope of this article which focuses on the correlations between Neo-Confucianism and Chan Buddhism. However, it is important to emphasize that the Daoist influence is another essential issue related to the evolution of Neo-Confucian thought.
- ⁶⁶*JSL*, 2: 105.
- ⁶⁷*PS*, 0350b29.
- ⁶⁸*PS*, 0350b29.
- ⁶⁹*JSL*, 2: 83.
- ⁷⁰*JSL*, 2: 89.
- ⁷¹*JSL*, 2: 83.
- ⁷²*Ibid.*
- ⁷³*JSL*, 2: 101.
- ⁷⁴*JSL*, 2: 103.
- ⁷⁵*PS*, 0351c27.
- ⁷⁶*PS*, 0353b29.
- ⁷⁷*PS*, 0352b25.
- ⁷⁸*PS*, 0351c27.
- ⁷⁹Zhu Xi, *Lunyu Jizhu*, 11: 3 (*ZZQS*, vol. 6: 158). See also *JSL*, 2: 7, 4: 44.
- ⁸⁰*JSL*, 1: 42.
- ⁸¹Zhu Xi, *Zhongyong Zhangju*, Zhang 20.
- ⁸²*Ibid.*
- ⁸³*PS*, 0354b12.
- ⁸⁴*PS*, 0353b18.
- ⁸⁵*PS*, 0351a03.
- ⁸⁶*PS*, 0353a07.
- ⁸⁷Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi Yulei*, Juan 4 (*ZZQS*, vol. 14, 185).
- ⁸⁸*Ibid.*
- ⁸⁹*JSL*, 2: 3.
- ⁹⁰See Zhu Xi, *Lunyu Jizhu*, 12: 1 (*ZZQS*, vol. 6: 167).
- ⁹¹*JSL*, 2: 4.
- ⁹²See *JSL*, 2: 4.
- ⁹³*Ibid.*
- ⁹⁴*JSL*, 5: 3.
- ⁹⁵*JSL*, 2: 10.
- ⁹⁶*JSL*, 2: 52.
- ⁹⁷*JSL*, 2: 8.
- ⁹⁸See *JSL*, 5: 2.
- ⁹⁹*JSL*, 4: 53.
- ¹⁰⁰John Makeham, ed., *The Buddhist Roots of Zhu Xi's Philosophical Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).