

# **Plants in Early Buddhism and the Far Eastern Idea of the Buddha-Nature of Grasses and Trees**

**Lambert Schmithausen**



**Lumbini International Research Institute**  
Lumbini 2009

# **Plants in Early Buddhism and the Far Eastern Idea of the Buddha-Nature of Grasses and Trees**

**Lambert Schmithausen**

**Lumbini International Research Institute**

Lumbini 2009



Lumbini International Research Institute  
P.O. Box 39  
Bhairahawa, Dist. Rupandehi  
NEPAL  
e-mail: liri@mos.com.np

© Lumbini International Research Institute

Cover: Oil painting by Felicitas Schmithausen

All rights reserved.

Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, no part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photocopy, microfilm, scanner or any other means without prior written permission. Enquiries should be made to the publisher.

ISBN 978-9937-2-1716-3

First published 2009

Printed in Nepal by Dongol Printers, Kathmandu

## Contents

Preface .....	9
Technical Remarks .....	17
<b>Pt. I: Reconsidering the Status of Plants in Early Buddhism .....</b>	<b>19</b>
1. Plants as a Borderline Case between Sentient and Insentient .....	19
2. Alternative Proposals .....	30
3. Plants as Living Beings with One Sense-Faculty in the <i>Vinaya</i> ....	36
Philological Excursus on the phrase ‘ <i>jīvasaññino manussā     rukkhasmim</i> ’ (§ 16) .....	42
4. Plants as Insentient Living Beings (FUJIMOTO) .....	48
5. Additional Arguments for the Sentience of Plants Revisited .....	58
5.1. FINDLY’s Arguments .....	58
5.1.1. Additional Passages Referring to Plants as Sentient Beings	59
5.1.2. Additional Arguments for Plants Possessing the Sense of Touch .....	65
5.1.3. Arguments for Plants as Complex Sentient Beings .....	69
5.2. OKADA’s Arguments for Plants as Sentient Beings .....	76
5.2.1 Tree Deities and Numinous Trees .....	77
5.2.2. Plants Reacting to Extraordinary Events .....	84
5.3 Résumé .....	89
6. Plants as Saintly Beings? .....	89
6.1 Discussion of FINDLY’s Arguments .....	90
6.2. Systematic difficulties .....	94
7. Résumé .....	98

<b>Pt. II: The Problem of the Relationship between the Idea of the Buddha-Nature of Grasses and Trees and Early Buddhism.....</b>	<b>101</b>
<b>Pt. II.A: The Question of Textual Continuity .....</b>	<b>103</b>
Excursus: Remarks on 'Buddha-nature' (§ 53) .....	106
1. General Passages .....	122
1.1 <i>Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra</i> : Maitreya's Palace .....	123
1.2. <i>Sāgaramatipariṣcchā</i> .....	124
1.3. <i>Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra</i> (1): * <i>Āyusparivarta</i> .....	129
1.4. <i>Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi</i> .....	136
1.5. <i>Buddhāvataṃsaka</i> (1): <i>Cittamātra</i> Passages.....	140
1.5.1. <i>Daśabhūmika-sūtra</i> VI.....	141
1.5.2. 'Verses Recited in the Palace of Suyāma' .....	148
1.5.3. The 'Chapter on Religious Practice' .....	160
1.6. <i>Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa</i> .....	161
1.7. <i>Buddhāvataṃsaka</i> (2): 'Eulogies on Mount Sumeru' .....	163
1.8. <i>Saddharmapuṇḍarīka: Oṣadhiparivarta</i> .....	167
1.9. Résumé.....	168
2. Specific passages.....	169
2.1. <i>Dharmadhātu-prakṛty-asambheda-nirdeśa</i> .....	170
2.2. <i>Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra</i> (2): 'Chapter on Religious Practice' .....	176
2.3. 'Amitābha-sūtra' .....	185
2.4. <i>Buddhāvataṃsaka</i> (3): <i>Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa</i> .....	189
2.4.1. First Explanation.....	197
2.4.2. Second Explanation .....	201
2.4.3. Third Explanation .....	224
2.4.4. Conclusions Regarding the <i>Buddhāvataṃsaka</i> .....	226
2.5. Résumé.....	238

<b>Pt. II.B: An Attempt at a Structural Comparison .....</b>	<b>241</b>
1. Facets of the Far Eastern Idea of the 'Buddha-Nature of Grasses and Trees' and their Indian Background.....	247
1.1. Buddha-Nature as the Essential Nature of Plants .....	249
1.2. The Buddha-Nature of Plants as Experienced by Awakened Beings.....	275
1.3. The Omnipresence of Vairocana.....	280
1.4. Plants Miraculously Transformed into Buddhas .....	290
1.5. Plants Becoming Buddhas.....	292
2. New Aspects of the Buddha-Nature and Sentience of Plants in Japanese Buddhism.....	294
3. The Question of Practical Consequences .....	308
4. Résumé.....	322
Conclusion .....	327
Abbreviations:.....	329
References.....	341
Index .....	367



## Preface

The present study has grown out of a lecture held in the winter term 2003–04, in which my aim was to present my view on the problem of the sentience of plants in early Buddhism to the participants of a series of lectures on various aspects of Buddhism, past and present, which were arranged by the Department of Indian and Tibetan studies of the University of Hamburg over about a decade.\* In the materials distributed beforehand to the participants, I had included Ellison Banks FINDLY's paper on plants as borderline beings (FINDLY 2002), in which she suggests, taking my monograph on the problem (SCHMITHAUSEN 1991a) as a kind of stepping stone, that in early Buddhism plants may have been borderline beings not, as I had proposed, on the lower margin, but rather on the upper one: She advances the idea that they are saintly beings close to nirvāṇa. Naturally, I had to tell my audience why I found this suggestion fascinating but, alas, not really convincing from a historical and philological point of view. In the autumn of 2005, as a guest professor at Kyoto University, I had a chance to present revised versions of my lecture, now in English, before audiences at my host university as well as at Komazawa University in Tokyo, and a year later, when I was a guest professor at the International College for Buddhist Studies in Tokyo, at Taishō University. In all these places, I benefited greatly from the comments and suggestions of the audience, and I seize the opportunity to express my heartfelt thanks to the discussants as well as to the colleagues who organized the lectures.

On the above-mentioned occasions, the focus of my lecture was on the status of plants in earliest Buddhism, and especially on defending

---

\* "Zur Stellung der Pflanzen im Buddhismus", in: *Buddhismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, vol. X (winter term 2003/4). The lecture is accessible on the homepage of the Center for Buddhist Studies of the University of Hamburg (<http://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de>).

my position that in the earliest Buddhist sources there are, to be sure, no statements of an express dogmatic rejection of plants as sentient beings (as in later Buddhist works), but no statements of dogmatic affirmation either, and that the early textual material points to practical flexibility and theoretical non-commitment, treating plants as a kind of borderline case on the lower margin. The first part of the present study is a revised and enlarged version of this main part of my lecture.

The lecture also contained, however, a kind of supplement. Already Ellison Banks FINDLY had suggested that her idea of plants as saintly beings in early Buddhism may be supported by the fact that eminent representatives of Far Eastern Buddhism “describe plants as beings who have already reached enlightenment” (FINDLY 2002: 261). Mamiko OKADA (1999) had argued in a similar vein for the continuity of an early Buddhist belief in the sentience of plants and had even adduced two passages from Mahāyāna sūtras as evidence. For this reason, I found it appropriate to conclude my lecture with some critical remarks on the alleged continuity between the early Buddhist view on plants and the Far Eastern idea of their Buddha-nature. These remarks comprised, on the one hand, a brief examination of the passages adduced as evidence for the alleged continuity. On the other hand, it included a preliminary attempt to take a closer look at the structure of the Far Eastern idea, the direction of its historical development and its connection with practical concerns, in order to compare it with the (alleged) early Buddhist view and to find out whether from this perspective continuity seems likely or not. Unfortunately, I am anything but a specialist of Far Eastern Buddhism. Thus, I could not but realize that this attempt was somewhat rash. When starting the revision of my draft, I almost decided to omit this part, but at the same time I felt that a glance at the Far Eastern developments from the point of view of Indian Buddhism might not be superfluous. Therefore, I took some pains to improve upon my former attempt. This time, I decided to start from an ‘emic’ analysis, by the Japanese Tendai monk Shōshin (證眞, active 1153–1207), of the idea of the

Buddha-nature, or Buddhahood, of plants (or rather all so-called insentients), and to check the facets distinguished by him against the Indian background. The result is contained in Pt. II.B of the present study. At the same time, in Pt. II.A the discussion of scriptural passages used as evidence for a continuity of an early Buddhist view of plants as sentient beings has been supplemented by an investigation, from the Indologist's point of view, into the original purport of a number of passages from authoritative texts hailing from India (or at least from an Indianized milieu in Central Asia) that were adduced by Chinese and Japanese masters in support of the thesis of the Buddha-nature of plants or of the so-called insentient. I must apologize for the fact that in some cases, this investigation has become somewhat disproportionate, to the effect that Pt. II.A has grown into the largest section of the present study.

As for Pt. II.B, I would like to emphasize that my intention was merely to put into relief, for the sake of contrast, what I understand to be the main facets involved in the idea of the Buddha-nature or Buddhahood of the insentient, and to discuss the question of an Indian background of each of these facets. An exhaustive reconstruction of the various strands and stages of the development of this complex idea as well as an elaboration of its points of contact with indigenous Chinese and Japanese thought or of the question to what extent it may have been influenced or motivated by indigenous cultural patterns or social concerns is entirely beyond the scope of this study and outside my competence.

Likewise, at least some of the interpretations of single passages from Mahāyāna sūtras in Pt. II.A are admittedly provisional. A definitive judgement, if possible at all, would presuppose an in-depth study of each work from which the passages are taken — a task that in some cases (like the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*) would require years. An investigation concerned with a particular subject diachronically is always confronted with the difficulty that one has to make use of passages from a large number of texts without being in a position to enter upon an exhaustive study of each text as a whole in a synchronical

perspective. On the other hand, in a synchronical study of a single text one normally has to deal with such a variety of subjects that one will hardly be able to clarify the specific contribution of this text to all these issues in a diachronic perspective. Unless one is working in a large and well-coordinated team, we must normally be content with working in just one of these ways and leave it to others to supplement or correct our results from the complementary perspective. The same is true with regard to, e.g., the study of the history of ideas and their social background, motives or consequences. For a full picture, it would surely be indispensable to study the problem at all these levels, but I had to confine myself mainly to aspects of the history of ideas, leaving an approach from other angles to scholars familiar with the respective source material.

It was only when the present study had almost been completed that I obtained, thanks to the kind help of Dr. Felix Erb and Dr. Ram Prasad Bhatt, a copy of FINDLY's recently published monograph on *Plant Lives* (2008). In this book she has enlarged her earlier article (2002) on the status of plants in early Buddhism into a comprehensive treatment of the issue in a pan-Indian perspective, including not only the Vedic, Jaina and later Hindu traditions but also areas like medicine and horticulture or 'tree-medicine' (*vrkṣāyurveda*). Though acknowledging the existence of differences between the various traditions, she seems more interested in elaborating, as much as possible, a "trans-traditional" Indian consensus, in the hope that it might serve as a basis for an appropriate nature ethics with special reference to plants, so urgently needed in our age of global destruction of nature. In this connection, the book also includes detailed information on views on plants among contemporary Hindu, Jain and Buddhist environmentalists, the latter pertaining to the Thai Saṅgha. The subject of part I of the present study is, however, only the *early Buddhist* view on plants, with regard to which FINDLY's opinion does not seem to have significantly changed. I have therefore decided to retain, more or less, my summary of her position which I had outlined on the basis of her earlier paper, but references to the respective pages of her re-



cent book have been added. In my discussion of her views, however, some issues have been added and some points have been reconsidered.

Let me emphasize once more that in this study I am concerned with the status of plants in early Buddhism only from a *doctrinal* perspective and as a *historian* of ideas working on a *philological* basis, which means that one tries one's best to come as close as possible to the original meaning of the available sources (in this case: texts). My conviction is that in an age of historical awareness such an approach is indispensable even in the context of an attempt to delineate an adequate ethics of nature, if such an attempt includes resorting to the resources of old traditions. In this case, neglecting historical and philological accuracy is bound to detract from the persuasiveness of the attempt, at any rate in the eyes of critical readers. I am fully aware of the fact that many readers will have the impression that this study is too destructive, and I myself regret that this impression is not unjustified. But my conviction is that in a historical perspective we have to refrain from wishful, arbitrary assumptions and rash conclusions and keep to what, to the best of our ability, can be established as being supported by the sources; and since nobody is perfect, clarification is, in many cases, only reached through a process of critical discussion, to which the present study is intended to contribute. After all, the Indian traditions themselves were, on the whole, not so much committed to a concept of trans-traditional harmony as to a culture of dispute and debate among each other and even internally.

In view of the wide range of primary sources and secondary literature relevant for the present investigation it may be next to impossible to discover and read everything that is, in some way or other, pertinent. I therefore had to be content with being selective, and it is certain that I have overlooked quite a few important passages and contributions, a fact for which I can only apologize. But for several reasons I have to conclude this study in its present form. I can only hope that in spite of its imperfections it has some merits and that it will encourage further research.

From a formal point of view, some readers may be annoyed with the large number and the size of the footnotes. Yet, since readers who are not specializing in the subject may prefer to concentrate on the main thread, I have tightened up the presentation by normally relegating textual material, supplementary evidence, discussions of accidental problems or details, digressions, etc., to the footnotes.

The present study would not have been completed without the help of so many *kalyāṇamitras* to whom I should like to express my heartfelt thanks. Important information I owe to Professors Noritoshi Aramaki, Fumio Enomoto, Shūdō Ishii, Shiro Matsumoto and Kōdō Yotsuya. Special thanks are due to Prof. Takashi Ogawa for pointing out to me pertinent passages in the *Tsu-t'ang-chi* on the occasion of a meeting where Mr. Mikiyasu Yanagi read a paper on insentient beings preaching the Dharma in the early Ch'an tradition (of which he kindly let me have a copy), and to Prof. John McRae for acting as an interpreter on this occasion, to Dr. Siglinde Dietz for her comments on the Uigur fragment on the Buddha Vairocana dealt with in §§ 139 and 157.2–3 of the present study, to Prof. Florin Deleanu for precious hints concerning the chapter on the '*Suyāma gāthās*' (Pt. II.A, ch. 1.5.2) and some other sections, and to Profs. Michael Friedrich and Tilmann Vetter for having read through a previous version of the present study and for their invaluable suggestions and their help and encouragement. Needless to say, the responsibility for all mistakes that have remained is solely mine.

I am also deeply obliged to Profs. Margarita I. Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya and Tatyana Oranskaya for kindly making the manuscript of the final portion of the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa* accessible to me, to Prof. Jonathan Silk for kindly sending me an important publication in the very last minute, once more to Prof. Florin Deleanu for untiringly making a number of Japanese publications accessible to me, and to Dr. Ram Prasad Bhatt, Dr. Felix Erb, Dr. M. Maithrimurthi, Mrs. Ayako Nakamura, MA, and Dr. Barbara Schuler for constant support in procuring materials and in solving other problems of organization, and to Dr. Christoph Anderl for kindly providing me with a copy of

his article on the semantics of *qíng* (情). Most heartily I should like to thank Dr. Anne MacDonald for most carefully correcting my English. If any blunders should have remained or crept in afterwards, it is my mistake.

Finally, I should like to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Christoph Cüppers for his generous offer to include the present study in the series of publications of the Lumbini International Research Institute, for helping me with the index (responsibility for any errors is, of course, entirely mine) and for his patience, to my daughter, Felicitas, for the cover design, and last but not least to my wife, Helga, for her patience with a terrible husband who even after his retirement cannot stop spending a lot of time researching abstruse things.

## Technical Remarks

1. When quoting texts according to page and line, I use the pattern x,y (page x, line y; “f” = only one more page or line, “ff” = more than one), without normally prefixing “p.”. When quoting text according to chapter and paragraph or chapter and verse-number, I use the pattern x.y (chapter x. paragraph or verse y).

2. The abbreviation “fn.” (pl. “fns.”) is used only in references to footnotes of the present studies; in the case of other works, I simply use “n.” (pl. “ns.”).

3. I use “§” only when referring to paragraphs of the present study; “#” refers to paragraphs in other works.

4. Cross-references to chapters (ch.) refer to chapters of the same part (I, II.A, II.B) of the present study unless marked otherwise.

5. Chinese texts are mostly quoted from the *Taishō Tripitaka* (大正新脩大藏經, abbrev. T) and the *Hsü-tsang ching* or *Zokuzōkyō* (卍新纂續藏經) (CBETA version, abbrev. X). As for Tibetan texts (in the present study mostly from the *Kanjur*), I ought to have used Peking and sTog throughout, but until recently the only version continuously available to me in full was Derge. I therefore apologize for being inconsistent in my references.

6. Especially in the Tibetan version of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, the Peking and the Derge block prints sometimes preserve traces of old orthography like *myin* or *myed* (for *min* and *med*), or 4 (< *sprind kyī*) for *sprin gyi*. I have retained them when my quote is from the respective block print. On the other hand, technical obstacles prevented me from faithfully reproducing the variant writings of Chinese characters in the original of the *Tsu-t’ang-chi*, so I had to replace them with the standard characters available in my font. For a list of variant graphs, see ANDERL 2004a: 83 ff.



7. My references to primary sources are normally to the original texts. References to translations into modern languages have been added only exceptionally.

8. When capitalized, *Sūtra* (no italics) is part of a translated title or refers to the literary genre, while the non-capitalized term (*sūtra*) is used with reference to single sermons. Likewise, *Vinaya* (capitalized but not in italics) refers to the genre or to the area of monastic discipline, whereas *Vinaya* (italics) is used when emphasis is on the text as such or on specific passages or when a specific *Vinaya* collection (e.g. that of the Sarvāstivādins, or that of the Theravādins) is meant. Similarly, *Dharma* is capitalized when referring to the Buddhist Doctrine (or to Hindu law), but dharmas in the sense of properties or elements of existence are not capitalized or italicized. In order to reduce the use of italics, I have also desisted from employing them in the case of grammatical or metrical Indian terms like 'bahuvrīhi', 'śloka', 'pāda', etc., as well as in the case of the terms *nirvāṇa*, *saṃsāra*, *arhat*, *śrāvaka*, *pratyekabuddha*, and *bodhisattva*. The latter word is capitalized only when referring to the historical Buddha before Awakening or in his former lives, but not when used as a generic term. An analogous distinction in the case of the term 'Buddha', however, turns out to be impracticable. Therefore, in this case capitalization is kept throughout.

9. Small caps are used only for the *family* names of *modern* authors (and monks' names in an analogous function).

10. The index refers to the *paragraphs* and (after the sign "fn.") to *footnotes*. Footnotes belonging to a *listed* paragraph are *not* normally listed separately. Occasionally, reference is to whole sections or chapters (bold italics). Sets of references preceded by an asterisk are deliberately selective. References to modern authors are only listed if their opinion is criticized or made use of, though the selection is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. This holds good also for references to primary sources (including abbreviations), which have been included only selectively. For more complex issues, the reader is referred to the table of contents and to the *résumés*.

# Pt. I: Reconsidering the Status of Plants in Early Buddhism

## 1. Plants as a Borderline Case between Sentient and Insentient

1. As is well known, in the course of doctrinal consolidation, Indian Buddhist thinkers, or at any rate non-Tantric Indian Buddhist thinkers, in contrast to the Jains and a strong current of Hindu thought,<sup>1</sup> came to regard plants (and seeds) as insentient beings, not participating in the process of reiterated individual rebirth (*saṃsāra*).<sup>2</sup> This does not necessarily exclude that plants are somehow recognized as living

---

<sup>1</sup> For exceptions, see, e.g., HALBFASS 1980: 291 f = 1991: 317 f; 2000: 201 f; WEZLER 1987b: 126–130.

<sup>2</sup> *Plants* pp. 82–94. Cf. also AKBh 221,1: sentient beings (*sattva*) have previous lives and afterlives, plants (*ṭṭṇādī*) do not; AKVy 381,27 f and 30 f: “[An action that is] blameable by nature referring to a sentient being is, e.g., the killing of an animate being (like a man or an animal). ... [An action that is] blameable by declaration (i.e., because the Buddha has declared it to be so) referring to something insentient is [e.g.] when a monk cuts off the leaves, etc., of a tree” (*prakṛtisāvadyaṃ sattvādhiṣṭhānaṃ prāṇivadhādi. ... prajñaptisāvadyaṃ asattvādhiṣṭhānaṃ vṛkṣa-patrādicchedo bhikṣoḥ*). — According to ŚrBh Sh 212,10–11 (Tai II 72,18–20) and 482,13 + 483,2–3, plants form part of the external element earth (*bāhyaḥ pṛthivī-dhātuḥ*) or of external things (*bāhyaṃ vastu*), contrasted by Sthiramati (SAVBh P mi 133a1–3) with sentient beings (*sems can*) as internal (*nang gi dngos po*). — In his *Fo-hsing lun* (佛性論: T 31.1610: 788a11–12), Paramārtha (†569) bases a *reductio ad absurdum* on the undisputed presupposition that plants are, like stones, insentient: “If [the alleged beings] lack the six sense-faculties and were nonetheless sentient beings, then insentient [things] like grasses, trees and stones, too, would all be sentient beings, because [both groups] are equal in lacking the six sense-faculties” (若無六根 而是眾生者, 則一切無情草木石等 皆是眾生, 同無根故). — Cf. also fn. 291, and the Buddhist position as against that of the Jains in SRINIVASAN 2007: 1–26.

things in the context of everyday conceptions.<sup>3</sup> But on the doctrinal level they came to be strictly distinguished from living beings proper, i.e., from *sentient* beings, beings “capable of sensation and of at least rudimentary consciousness”,<sup>4</sup> especially in the form of experiencing, somehow, pleasure and/or pain. And it is, as far as I can see, sentience, or *sentient* life, that is ethically relevant in the early Indian context.<sup>5</sup> It is *sentient* living beings that are, in Buddhism as well as in

---

<sup>3</sup> Cf., e.g., Sp 898, explaining, in the *sekhiya* rule (no. 74) that a monk should not defecate or urinate on green plants (*harita*), the expression ‘*harita*’ as referring to parts of *living* trees (*jīvarukkha*), more precisely: to roots that visibly spread on the [surface of the] soil (*yaṃ ... mūlaṃ pathaviyaṃ dissamānaṃ gacchati*) and to branches that grow close to the ground (*bhūmilagga*). The *Vinayavinicchaya-ṭīkā* (CSCD: # 1950) adds that corresponding parts of *living* herbs, creepers, etc., should be included. Similarly, Sp 1037 states that a tree as a mark (*nimitta*: Vin I 106) of the boundary of a monastic community (*sīmā*) must be alive (*jīvamānaka*). Jāgara’s *Pācīyādiyojanā* (a traditional commentary written in Burma in 1869: VON HINÜBER 1996: 194, n. 694) makes clear that “alive” means alive according to the everyday way of speaking, i.e., in the sense of its roots, sprouts, etc., [being] green/fresh (CSCD: *Mahāvaggayojanā* # 138: *jīvamānako ti lokavohāravasena mūlaṅkurādi-haritasāṅkhātajīvamānako*).

<sup>4</sup> WEBSTER 2069a, s.v. ‘sentient (1).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. SRINIVASAN 2007: vii (“... the view implicit in traditional Indian thought that ethics regards but the sentient”); 113 (“... violence and nonviolence regard the sentient, and the implication, one pan-Indian, is that morality concerns only the sentient”); 126 (“... in Indian thought morality concerns only the sentient, with no reflection as to whether insentience means moral irrelevance ...”). Cf. also FINDLY 2008: 370. — The importance of the distinction between living and non-living entities is emphasized in BUTZENBERGER 1999 (esp. 18 ff). According to BUTZENBERGER’s stimulating article, the basic characteristic of life is spontaneous, unpredictable *motion* (ibid. 19; 22; 18). This criterion works well in the case not only of animals but also of wind, fire and water, but creates problems in the case of the earth (ibid. 50) — unless we take earthquakes into consideration — as well as in the case of plants, traditionally labelled “stationary” (*sthāvara*). As for plants and seeds, one may take phototropism (ibid. 25 n. 78), hydrotropism or just their sprouting and growing as an (albeit imperceptible) form of spontaneous motion (cf. FINDLY 2008: 227; 365), but it is most probably growth as such (cf. Āyār 4,29 [JĀG #45]: *vuddhi-dhammayāṃ*; Sv I 161,21-22: *tesu ... virūhanabhāvena jīvasaññī*), intake of food/nutrients (Āyār 4,30: *āhāragāṃ*), withering (especially when cut: cf. Āyār 4,31: *chinnam milāi*) and reproduction that qualify them to be viewed as alive. In the case

Jainism, the object of the basic commitment not to kill or injure animate beings (*pāṇa, prāṇin*)<sup>6</sup>.<sup>7</sup> This is evident from the Indian formulations of the Golden Rule according to which one should not kill or hurt other beings because they are *afraid* of death and *dislike* pain just as oneself.<sup>8</sup> It even seems to me that in early Indian thought life and sentience almost<sup>9</sup> coincide. In early canonical Buddhism, the presence

---

of the earth, the main point for its being considered alive may have been its fertility (cf. § 17 with fn. 100). In the practical context of *ahimsā*, however, the decisive criterion is *sentience*, as is obvious from the fact that for the Jains all living beings, regardless of their capacity to move or grow, possess at least one sense-faculty, viz., the sense of touch.

<sup>6</sup> My rendering of *pāṇa/prāṇin* as “animate being” is deliberate, with the primary aim of leaving open the possibility of understanding it either [1.] in the sense of “breathing being” — which in most pre-modern systems (but not in doctrinally consolidated Jainism: see VON GLASENAPP 1925: 172; FINDLY 2008: 82) would exclude plants (cf. THIEME 1971: 377 n. 5) —, or [2.] in the wider sense of “living being”, as in the present paragraph. At the same time, this rendering allows me to reserve “living being” for *jīva* and “sentient being” for *sattva*.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Sv III 986,9-12, stating that — in contrast to thoughts of desire or aversion — thoughts of injuring (*vihiṃsā-vitakka*) arise only with reference to sentient beings (*satta*) but do not arise with reference to ‘things’ (*saṅkhāra*), because ‘things’ cannot be caused to suffer (*saṅkhāro hi dukkhāpetabbo nāma n’atthi*).

<sup>8</sup> See, e.g., Sn 368 and 705 (≈ MVu III 387,12-13); Ud 5.1 (p. 47); Dhṃ vs. 129–130 (cf. Uv V.18); SN V 353,29–354,5; cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 2007b: 796. The opposite, i.e., that insentient things (in this period definitely including plants) are not the object of the commitment not to kill animate beings, is evident from passages like MPSDh 460b17-19: “Just as by digging in the earth, mowing grass, cutting trees or dissecting a corpse, or insulting or whipping it, one does not commit the misdeed [of killing, etc.,] or earn its karmic result, ...” (譬如掘地 刈草斫樹 斬截死屍 罵詈鞭撻 無有罪報.).

<sup>9</sup> In doctrinally consolidated Buddhist thought, two exceptions come to mind. One is living plants, nonetheless regarded as insentient; in this case, the attribution of life could be relegated to the everyday world-view or way of speech (cf. fn. 3). The other exception is the ‘unconscious heavenly beings’ in Theravāda Abhidhamma, for which see § 21. In the Sarvāstivāda system, however, these heavenly beings do possess consciousness at the moment of birth and death, and are entirely unconscious only in between, becoming immersed, so to speak, in a life-long swoon or deep sleep (AKBh 68,10-15 and 19-22, ad II.41b-d). In the Yogācāra system (cf., e.g., MSg I.7.5 and I.50), even during this time they are, unlike plants, endowed



of sensitivity (*viññāṇa*)<sup>10</sup> in the body guarantees both life and sentience. In doctrinally consolidated Buddhism, there is even a tendency to disregard the peculiar features of vegetal life and put plants on a par with the mineral world. At any rate, when arguments against the sentience or in favour of the insentience of plants are produced, Buddhist philosophers, like Bhavya (Bhāviveka), tend to play down the features plants have in common with man and animals and to emphasize the distinguishing features, which bring them closer to the inanimate world.<sup>11</sup>

2. In a small monograph, published nearly 20 years ago (SCHMITHAUSEN 1991a), I tried to find out whether this denial of the sentience of plants in the consolidated doctrinal position of later Buddhist authors could be traced back to the early period. In other words, did Buddhism from the outset discard the view, apparently quite common at that time,<sup>12</sup> that plants, too, are sentient beings, or did this happen only later, in the course of time? As far as I know, the canonical texts of early Buddhism do not contain any specific discussion of the mat-

---

with subliminal individual forms of 'consciousness': a subtle ego-feeling (*manas*) and the 'store-consciousness' (*ālayavijñāna*) as a kind of subliminal sentience which keeps life going and enables the re-emergence of full consciousness.

<sup>10</sup> On the various facets of meaning of this term see VETTER 2000: 63–73.

<sup>11</sup> *Plants* # 30–34. I take the opportunity to make clear that in *Plants* n. 494 it was not my intention (as Chr. LINDTNER, *Madhyamakahrdayam of Bhavya*, Adyar 1997: 169 seems to assume) to propose an emendation of the Sanskrit text of MHrd IX.146d; my aim was merely to point out the variants which the Tibetan translation seems to presuppose, with no intention to give preference to one reading or the other.

<sup>12</sup> Indisputable examples are the position of the Jainas (*Plants* # 2.2 with n. 18) and, for Vedic religion, the story of 'Bṛgu in the yonder world' (*Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* XI.6.1; *Jaiminiyabrāhmaṇa* I.42–44; cf. SCHMIDT 1968: 644 f; further evidence *ibid.* 646–649). The Vedic material is, however, not uniform; cf., e.g., *Āitareyāranyaka* (Ānandāśrama series, 1959) II.3.2, where plants, animals (*prāṇa-bhṛt* "supporting [human] life" = *paśu*; see WEZLER 1992b, esp. 401 f) and man are (hierarchically) distinguished: in plants only sap (*rasa*) is observed, animals have also consciousness (*citta*), but only man is, additionally, endowed with understanding or intelligence (*prajñāna*).

ter or any *explicit* doctrinal statement in either direction: there is neither any express assertion in the form “plants are sentient beings” nor a straightforward denial stating that they are not. The latter fact is, by the way, also expressly recognized by the Sarvāstivāda master Saṅghabhadra when he asks the rhetorical question: “Where in the Scriptures is it clearly and unambiguously taught that trees, etc., do not have [sentient] life?”<sup>13</sup>

3. Still, a few passages, mainly in comparatively old verse texts, *de facto* include plants among animate beings (*pāṇa*), thus almost certainly presupposing their sentience. The most indubitable one is found in the *Vāseṭṭha-sutta* of the *Suttanipāta*,<sup>14</sup> which in the context of classifying the species of animate beings starts with “grasses and trees” (*tiṇarukkha*). To be sure, the main purport of this text is not to offer a classification of animate beings but to demonstrate the unnaturalness of caste distinction by contrasting it with the verifiable distinctiveness of biological species or classes.<sup>15</sup> But even so it includes plants, as a matter of course, among animate beings. Other passages speak of mobile (*tasa*) and stationary (*sthāvara*) beings, occasionally expressly *animate* beings, which one should not kill or injure but rather include in one’s cultivation of benevolence.<sup>16</sup> The “mobile and stationary

<sup>13</sup> T 29.1562: 489a27-28: 聖教中 何處顯了定說樹等皆無有命。This shows that leaving the matter undecided is not a peculiarity of the Theravāda scriptures but appears to hold good for the Sarvāstivāda canon as well.

<sup>14</sup> Sn pp. 112–121, esp. verses 600–606; cf. *Plants* # 21.1, and # 21.2 for commentarial exegesis.

<sup>15</sup> It is in this context that the phraseology of verse 601 (... *na cāpi paṭijānare | liṅgaṃ jātimayaṃ tesaṃ* ...) reveals its full purport: Although they do not, as the brahmins do, vociferously pretend to be something special by birth, they are, unlike the brahmins, endowed with distinctive features accruing to them by birth, naturally.

<sup>16</sup> *Plants* ## 20.2–20.3. The pair *trasa*–*sthāvara* is also attested to in the existing remains (or translations) of the canons of other schools (see *Plants* ns. 347 and 357). For the Pāli verse texts that expressly use the pair to qualify animate beings (*prāṇa*) no parallels are known to me, but in the Sanskrit *Upasena-sūtra* (see fn. 134) the expressions *trasa* and *sthāvara* refer to *sattva*, i.e., sentient beings (*Plants* n. 364). Here, the Tibetan translation of the Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinaya* (Kj P che: 113a2)

animate beings” (Skt. *trasa* and *sthāvara*) are well known from early Jaina and also Hindu sources,<sup>17</sup> and there the stationary animate beings are, in the first place, the plants, or plants and seeds. It is hard to believe that in the early times the authors or reciters of the verses, simply using this expression without any indication of a departure from the current meaning, understood it in a different sense.<sup>18</sup>

4. Whereas the passages adduced thus far obviously presuppose, or take for granted, that plants, too, are living and hence, in the context of the ascetic movement and its preoccupations, somehow sentient beings, there are other materials that require a more careful assessment. One of these is the *Kūṭadanta-sutta* of the *Dīghanikāya*,<sup>19</sup> where a kind of ideal sacrifice, arranged by a king of the past, is described. In this sacrifice the only offerings were things like butter, curds and molasses; no cattle were killed (*haññiṃsu*), no animals (*pāṇa*) slain (*āghātaṃ āpajjiṃsu*), no trees felled (*chijjiṃsu*) for the sake of using them as sacrificial posts, and no *darbha* grass was cut (*lūyiṃsu*) to strew over the sacrificial ground. According to a couple of other sermons,<sup>20</sup> sacrifices performed by kings or brahmins were, normally, characterized by exactly these actions of slaughtering animals, felling trees and cutting grasses. It is clear from the differentiating terminology that the texts somehow distinguish between killing animals and destroying plants. But even so they seem to regard destroying plants

---

renders the terms with *mgul* (for *'gul*) and *gnas*, the Chinese translation by I-ching (635–713) with 行 and 住 (T 23.1442: 657a28), i.e., both have preserved the original meanings “mobile” and “stationary”. Cf. also the rendering of the two kinds of sentient beings (有情, *sattva*) as “sentient” (情, for *trasa*) and “container” (器, i.e., environment, for *sthāvara*!) in T 14.505: 773b29, a separate Chinese translation of the *Upasena-sūtra* produced by Dānapāla, active between 982 and 1017.

<sup>17</sup> See *Plants* ns. 368 and 375. Cf. also INOUE 1998: 55–56; MORI 2005:181 (Mhbh VI.5.10–17); PREISENDANZ 1994: 429 (*Nyāyabhāṣya* ad *Nyāyasūtra* III.2.36: *trasaṣthāvaraśarīreṣu*).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. NORMAN 1992: 68; 1997: 163 f.

<sup>19</sup> DN I 141; cf. *Plants* # 19.

<sup>20</sup> MN no. 50 (I 344; cf. also no. 60: I 412,13–20 [text abbreviated]); AN no. 4.198 (II 207).

— at any rate in the context of a religious ceremony — as unwholesome karma, a judgement that from an early Indian viewpoint hardly makes sense unless plants were presupposed to be, somehow, sentient beings. It cannot, perhaps, be excluded that the text merely argues from the point of view of the Vedic ritualists for whom plants, too, were indeed living, sentient beings.<sup>21</sup> But there is no proof for such a kind of argumentation either. Significantly, the reference to trees and grasses is missing in the extant versions of other schools.<sup>22</sup> It is hard to imagine a reason why the Theravāda redactors should have inserted the reference to trees and grasses. It would seem to make more sense to assume that the reference was cancelled in the other versions because its implication, the sentience of plants, was felt incompatible with the consolidated Buddhist doctrinal position.

5. Another important issue concerns the rules of behaviour for monks (and nuns, by way of implication). In a number of sermons, the basic principles of correct behaviour start with “abstention from

---

<sup>21</sup> As is most obvious in the “story of Bhṛgu in the yonder world” (see fn. 12), since plants’ taking revenge, in the yonder world, on the people who injured them in this world hardly makes sense unless they were considered to *suffer* when being cut, etc., and as bearing a grudge against the injurer(s).

<sup>22</sup> *Dīrghāgama* of the Dharmaguptakas (T 1.1) 100b5-6: “On the occasion of the great sacrifice of that king, one did not slaughter cattle or sheep or any other sentient being; one only used butter (\**sarpis*), milk, sesame oil, honey, ‘black honey’ and ‘stone honey’ (crystallized cane sugar: *Hōb* 252a) as sacrificial offerings” 彼王大祭祀時，不殺牛羊 及諸眾生。唯用酥·乳·麻油·蜜·黑蜜·石蜜，以為祭祀。 No corresponding passage is found in the fragments of the Sanskrit *Kūṭatāṇḍya-sūtra* in *SHT* V no. 1290 b and c (pp. 207–210), but in the manuscript of the *Dīrghāgama* of the Sarvāstivādins (fol. 406V), where the text is complete, there is no reference to trees and grasses either (this information courtesy of Prof. Jens-Uwe HARTMANN). As for the *Majjhima* and *Anguttara* passages indicated in fn. 20, neither AKANUMA 1958 (166 and 302) nor ANĀLAYO & BUCKNELL 2006 (224–225) indicate any Chinese *sūtra* parallels, and the fragments in *SHT* listed in the latter work do not cover the passage under discussion. Even so, there is reason to assume that the reference to trees and grasses was missing in the (Mūla-?)Sarvāstivāda version not only of the *Kūṭatāṇḍya-sūtra* but also of this text since it is lacking in the corresponding paragraph of the *Saṅgūtiparyāya* (T 26.1536: 406b27-28; STACHE-ROSEN 1968: 123 (IV.44)).

killing any animate being (*p(r)āṇātipāta*)<sup>23</sup>. The basic rules are often followed by a succinct set of mainly ascetic observances, the first of which is, in the Theravāda tradition, “abstention from violent treatment (*samārambha*) of seeds and plants (*bījagāma-bhūtagāma*)”,<sup>24</sup> a formulation that is also found at the beginning of another, much more elaborate set of guidelines for the proper behaviour of Buddhist ascetics.<sup>25</sup> As in the *Kūṭadanta-sutta*, in these passages, too, the separate registering of “killing animate beings” and “violent treatment of seeds and plants” seems to indicate awareness of a certain difference between humans and animals on the one hand and seeds and plants on the other. But the verbal noun used in connection with seeds and plants, viz., *samārambha* (“violent treatment”), though certainly less specific than *atipāta* (“killing”), is occasionally also used for slaughtering cattle (Sn 311), and in early Jaina sources (*sam*)*ā-rab-* is closely associated with committing acts of violence<sup>26</sup> against any kind of living, sentient beings, including plants and seeds. Hence, though registered separately and thus clearly distinguished from humans and

<sup>23</sup> On this term cf. CAILLAT 1993: 213–216.

<sup>24</sup> DN I 5,4-5; 64,16; 100,6-7, etc. (abbreviated); MN I 180; 268; III 34; AN II 209; V 205; cp. SN V 470; *Plants* # 4.3. This commitment is, as far as I can see, missing in the parallel versions of this set (see *Plants* n. 42), except perhaps T 1.21: 264c6-7 不絕生穀 (“he does not cut/break off living/raw cereals/grain”), which looks like a blend of the abstention from injuring plants and seeds and the abstention from accepting raw grain. — For the use of ‘*bhūta*’ in the sense of “plants”, see *Plants* # 4.2.1. Cf. also the explicit reference to the meaning *rukkhādi* for ‘*bhūta*’ at Ps I 32,1.

<sup>25</sup> DN I 5,28-34; 64,34–65,2; cf. 100,6-7, etc. (abbreviated); parallel text at Saṅghabh II: 234,3-7 and T 1.1: 84a9-11 ≈ 89a17-19 (cf. MEISIG 1987: 212; RAIMERS 1996: 126–133). In the case of the latter passage, the decisive part (種殖[植]樹木 鬼神所依) is translated by MEISIG as “säen und pflanzen Bäume, verkehren mit Dämonen und Geistern”, but surely WELLER’s rendering (MEISIG 212 n. 1: “... Bäume ..., in denen dämonische Geister ihre Bleibe nehmen”) is preferable (鬼神 [“spirits”] = *bhūta*, 所依 [“where they settle”, “inhabited by”] = *grāma*; for similar reinterpretations of the expression ‘*bhūtagrāma*’ see *Plants* #5.2–5.3). Anyway, the Chinese translation is a far cry from the original meaning of the rule.

<sup>26</sup> *Plants* n. 51; CAILLAT 1993: 212–213.

animals, plants and seeds may not yet have been regarded as being entirely excluded from the realm of sentient beings. Actually, in Jaina sources, too, the term “animate beings” (*pāṇa*) is not infrequently reserved for humans and animals (i.e., used in the narrower sense of “breathing beings”), in spite of the fact that seeds and plants are asserted to be living and even sentient as well.<sup>27</sup>

6. In connection with killing or injuring, a similar distinction between humans and animals on the one hand and plants (and seeds) on the other is also found in the code of monastic discipline, the *Pātimokkhasutta*, which seems to be a more developed collection of rules than the succinct set of ascetic observances in the sermons discussed in the preceding paragraph.<sup>28</sup> In the *Pātimokkhasutta* of the Theravāda school as well as in the preserved *Prātimokṣasūtras* of other schools, monks (and nuns) are prohibited from killing animals as well as from destroying plants (and seeds)<sup>29</sup>, but only animals are termed “animate beings” (*pāṇa*: *Pācittiya* 61) — humans are treated separately because killing a human being is a more serious offence according to the criteria of the Vinaya (*Pārājika* 3). Moreover, in contradistinction to the killing of an animal which is called “depriving it of its life” (*jīvītā voropeti*) — which is the same term the text had also used for killing a human —, in the case of plants the Theravāda version (*Pācittiya* 11) uses the archaic term *pātavyatā*, probably meaning something like “uncontrolled, ruthless behaviour”.<sup>30</sup> Other versions show the same

---

<sup>27</sup> *Plants* # 6.2.2.

<sup>28</sup> VON HINÜBER 1999: 22–31, esp. 30 (“Dieser Abschnitt enthält also gleichsam die Rohmaterialien, aus denen Regeln für das *Pātimokkhasutta* gewonnen werden konnten.”).

<sup>29</sup> Seeds are not mentioned in some *Prātimokṣasūtra* versions, including that of the Theravādins (Vin IV 34 [*Pācittiya* 11]: *bhūtagāmapātavyatāya pācittiyam*), but are present in others (see *Plants* n. 21 and # 4.4).

<sup>30</sup> The obscure term *pātavyatā* is not only used with reference to plants but also with reference to animate beings (*pāṇesu*) and sensual pleasures (*kāmesu*) (see *Plants* # 4.2.2). In view of the fact that in a parallel situation we find *asaññata* (“un-

contrast but have replaced the obscure term *pātavyatā* by *pātana* “felling”, “destroying”.<sup>31</sup> One may be tempted to deduce from this terminological difference that in this text plants are no longer considered to have life (*jīvita*), or are at any rate regarded to be a doubtful case. One might argue that from a moral point of view the rule that at least monks (and nuns) should not behave ruthlessly towards plants just as they should not behave ruthlessly towards animate beings (i.e., animals)<sup>32</sup> would make much better sense if plants, too, were somehow living, sentient beings. However, the Vinaya is not so much concerned with morality (much less than the rules for monks referred to in the preceding paragraph) as with preserving harmony within the Order and, above all, its reputation in society.<sup>33</sup> Hence, the

---

restrained”) for *pātavya* (Sn 243a and 247a: *kāmesu/pāṇesu asaṇṇatā janā*), I tentatively understand *pātavya* to have a meaning coming close to that of *asaṇṇata*.

<sup>31</sup> For Chinese equivalents, see *Plants* n. 40: most of them mean “felling”, “destroying”, etc., but some versions have “killing” (殺), viz., T 23.1436: 474b7 (*Bhikṣu-Prātimokṣasūtra* of the Sarvāstivādins, translated by Kumārajīva), a Tun-huang fragment of the *Bhikṣuṇī-Prātimokṣa* of the same school, probably also by Kumārajīva (see YUYAMA 1979: 4 # 1.12.C.2; cf. *Plants* p. 5 n. 21), and, partly, the *Vinaya* of the Mahīśāsakas (VinMī 41c17 and 23 f; cf. also T 22.1422: 203a10), transl. by Buddhajīva, Hui-yen and Chu Tao-shēng between 422 and 423 (YUYAMA 1979: 37 f).

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Vin III 42: *mā ... janatā pāṇesu pātavyataṃ āpajji*. The context here is that a monk fired a large amount of clay in order to build a hut. The Buddha reproaches him for lacking in mercy toward the animate beings that are injured by the act of firing (cf. VinMā 238c7: ... 焚燒傷殺眾生; VinMī 5b11-12: 爲此惡業 殘害物命 而無哀愍; VinDh 572b24-25) and orders the hut to be destroyed. According to Sp II 288, the animate beings injured are tiny (*khuddānukhuddaka*) creatures (*pāṇa*), probably insects, worms, etc. According to the Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinayas* (VinSa 3b27-28: 莫使外道譏嫌呵責; T 23.1442: 636a25-27), however, the Buddha gives the order to destroy the hut because he wants to prevent criticism from non-Buddhists (外道). If this is taken into consideration, the animate beings injured by the process may also be the earth beings constituting the fresh clay that is regarded as sentient by some non-Buddhists (Jains). Even so, my argument would not be invalidated.

<sup>33</sup> See *Plants* p. 16 with n. 94. Cf. SCHOPEN 1997: 218. Cf. also MPPU 648b1-9, emphasizing the difference of perspective in evaluating an action from a Vinaya point of view or under the aspect of karmic consequences, and pointing out that the

rule may as well merely take into account views or expectations prevalent among the people of the time or possible criticism from rival groups.

7. Since so far no consensus has been reached with regard to a detailed stratification of the (earlier) canonical texts, the evidence presented above may admit of different hypothetical explanations. If one is of the opinion that the verse texts referred to in § 3 represent the oldest stratum of the Buddhist textual heritage, one might conclude that in earliest Buddhism acceptance of the sentience of plants was still a matter of course. If these texts are instead regarded as a more popular, doctrinally less rigid strand, one might interpret them as borrowings from pre- or non-Buddhist ascetic poetry, borrowings which need not exactly represent the Buddhist view on plants, which might, in this case, have been more reserved from the outset. In any case, the above-mentioned evidence, together with the lack of fully explicit doctrinal statements in either direction, seems to exclude the existence of a clear-cut, binding dogmatic position with regard to the sentience of plants in earliest Buddhism. My own suggestion<sup>34</sup> was that plants (and seeds) were probably regarded as a kind of borderline case, on the boundary between sentient and insentient beings, and that a theoretical, doctrinal decision with regard to their status was not found necessary, or was even deliberately avoided. As a borderline case, plants (and seeds) could be dealt with pragmatically. In the context of developing a mental attitude of all-encompassing peacefulness or benevolence towards all animate beings, e.g., it made good sense to include even borderline beings, or at least no need was felt to cancel a reference to them if it was part of an inherited formulation. In connection with rules or guidelines for physical behaviour, however, it was useful to make distinctions in order to underline the difference. Thus, the separate mention of refraining from injuring plants (or

---

criterion of the Vinaya is the protection of the Buddhist Dharma [as an institution embodied in the Buddhist Order] (爲護佛法故) and the avoidance of criticism or irritation an action may arouse in society (制戒意 爲眾人譏嫌故爲重).

<sup>34</sup> *Plants* # 24.



seeds and plants) in the case of a monk's correct behaviour is intended to make clear that *monks* (and nuns) are expected to avoid violence even against borderline beings, whereas in the case of *lay followers* the lack of such an additional rule<sup>35</sup> makes tacit allowance for the fact that such a requirement would render their life impracticable.<sup>36</sup>

## 2. Alternative Proposals

8. Since the publication of my study, several scholars have taken up the issue of the sentience of plants in earliest Buddhism, pointing out further pertinent source material but partly also proposing diverging interpretations of the evidence. Of particular interest I find, apart from most valuable supplements contributed by Nalini BALBIR (2000),

---

<sup>35</sup> That the precept not to injure plants is not expected to be observed by lay followers is, later on, clearly implied in the fact that even in the case of monks breaking it is classified merely as "blameable because [the Buddha] has declared it [to be so] or has interdicted it [specifically for monks and nuns]" (*paññatti-vajja*, *prajñāpti-* or *pratikṣepaṇa-sāvadya*, see fn. 2 and *Plants* # 5.5 with n. 93). A Chinese text (*Ch'ing kuan-yin ching shu* 請觀音經疏, ascribed to Chih-i but spurious according to NG 1993: 9) explicitly states that since lay persons have not committed themselves to this precept, acting against it does not result in an offence for them (T 39.1800: 974b18f: ... 遮制等戒 如比丘草木戒, 受者 犯得罪, 不受 犯不得罪; cf. also 39.1801: 994c25-29: ... 俗眾不受 犯之無性罪). According to another Chinese source (Chih-yüan's [智圓, †1022] subcommentary on Chan-jan's *VkN* commentary), acting against the precept not to cut plants (斬草) does not involve an "offence by nature" (*prakṛti-sāvadya*, i.e., a blameable action entailing undesirable karmic retribution by its immoral character as such), since plants are not sentient beings (T 38.1779: 793b15: 既非有情, 犯無性罪).

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *Plants* # 26.1. Cf. also DHARMASIRI 1986: 174 f, stating, with reference to the *Pātimokkha* rules prohibiting monks from injuring plants and digging the ground: "He [sc. the Buddha] did not enjoin these rules for laymen because of the practical difficulties. ... [T]he Buddha did not preach an extreme form of non-violence or *Ahimsā* as the Jains did, because of its impracticability."

two articles by Mamiko OKADA (1998 and 1999),<sup>37</sup> a paper by Ellison Banks FINDLY (2002) as well as her recently published book on *Plant Lives* (FINDLY 2008), in which the ideas of her paper have been fully developed and integrated into a broader perspective, and, finally, an article by Akira FUJIMOTO (2003).<sup>38</sup>

9. OKADA admits that in the Northern tradition and in Mahāyāna sources plants are on the whole not regarded as living, sentient beings,<sup>39</sup> but she thinks that in earlier and Theravāda Buddhism they were considered to be living beings with at least one sense-faculty (*ekindriya*), viz., the sense of touch.<sup>40</sup> She substantiates her view by means of an exhaustive and most valuable examination of the *Jātaka* literature. As she points out, she could not find any *Jātakas* where the Bodhisatta is reborn as a plant,<sup>41</sup> but in the Pāli *Jātaka* collection there are quite a few stories describing him as having assumed rebirth as a plant deity (mostly, but not exclusively, as a tree deity).<sup>42</sup> Although the relationship of the deity to the tree is usually that of an inhabitant to his abode, so that the deity is able to move to another tree in case

---

<sup>37</sup> Cf. also OKADA 2002, briefly repeating the main points of the preceding papers but on the whole dedicated to other aspects which, though very interesting, do not concern the present paper.

<sup>38</sup> An (obviously approving) report in Japanese of the main points of my essay is found in HORIBATA 2006: 48–61, though my name has been changed to “Lambert Stein”. TATSUGUCHI 2009 is rather brief and mainly descriptive.

<sup>39</sup> OKADA 1998: 285, # 2.2.

<sup>40</sup> OKADA 1999: 105, English summary; 106, # 1.10.

<sup>41</sup> OKADA 1998: 284 # 3.2; 1999: 106 # 1.7. Cf. also SHIRATO 1998: 15b4. According to the *\*Upāsakaśīla-sūtra* (T 24.1488: 1042a13-15; SHIH 1994: 45), at the time of epidemics, the *bodhisattva* makes a resolve (*praṇidhāna*) through which his body becomes a medicinal tree, so that when sick people see, smell or touch him or consume his skin, blood, flesh, bones and marrow, their diseases are cured (疾疫世時 復立大願。以願力故 身爲藥樹。諸有病者 見聞觸我 及食皮膚血肉骨髓 病悉除愈。). It is, however, obvious from the phraseology that this is not rebirth as a tree but rather deliberate metamorphosis. Cf. also § 107.1 with fn. 592.

<sup>42</sup> OKADA 1998: 284 # 3.3 and 281 ns. 9 and 10. Cf. also the list in ZIN 2003: 219 n. 26.

of emergency, OKADA presents three cases where the cutting of the tree is regarded as entailing the death of the deity.<sup>43</sup> In these cases, the relationship between the deity and the tree is obviously much closer, looking more like that between a tree-spirit or tree-soul and its body.<sup>44</sup> It seems that OKADA considers this relationship to be the genuine one and that she takes it as additional support for her assumption that in earlier and Theravāda Buddhism plants were considered sentient.<sup>45</sup> In this way, the potential for becoming a Buddha attributed to tree or plant deities by virtue of their identification with the Bodhisatta<sup>46</sup> would, practically, accrue to the trees or plants themselves. It is all the more remarkable in this connection that OKADA herself observes that in the narrative literature of the *Northern* tradition stories in which a tree deity, not to consider a tree, is equated with the Bodhisattva seem to be entirely missing.<sup>47</sup>

10.1. FINDLY, too, though accepting my suggestion that in earliest Buddhism plants were treated as a kind of borderline beings, assumes a standpoint different from that presented in my analysis in taking, like OKADA, early Buddhists to have shared the view that plants are living beings with one sense-faculty (*ekindriya jīva*), viz., the sense of touch (252a; 254a/124; 165; 253; 369),<sup>48</sup> and that they are thus sentient (252b/370). She tries to support this idea by adducing further

---

<sup>43</sup> OKADA 1999: 106 ## 1.8 and 1.9.

<sup>44</sup> OKADA 1998: 283 # 3.7; 1999: 105, English summary.

<sup>45</sup> OKADA 1998: 283 # 3.7: このように草木神を立てることによって、パーリジャータカは草木を、生命体のパラダイムに包含していたと考えられる。("It seems that in this way, by establishing plant deities, the Pāli *Jātakas* have included plants in the paradigm of living organisms.")

<sup>46</sup> Cf. also SHIRATO 1998: 15a21–b2.

<sup>47</sup> OKADA 1998: 285 # 2.2 and 284 # 3.4. Cf. also SHIRATO 1998: 15b5–6. Worth mentioning in this connection is a passage in the autobiography of the Sōtō Zen patriarch Keizan Jōkin, according to which he attained arhatship in a previous existence as a tree deity (FAURE 1996: 30; RAMBELLI 2001: 81).

<sup>48</sup> The references in §§ 10.1–3 refer first to the pages (a = left column, b = right column) of FINDLY 2002, and then (after the slash) to the pages of FINDLY 2008.

evidence from the canonical texts for the assumption that plants were indeed regarded, by the early Buddhists, to be sentient beings (*satta*) endowed with the sense of touch (256a–257a / 127 f; 130–133; 136–142; 183).

10.2. However, FINDLY does not stop here. She rather suggests that the sense of touch somehow implies or includes the other sense faculties. Touch is “the one sense faculty that pervades all the others” and underlies them as the “base sense serving as the foundation of the other four” (2008: 144) or as the “foundation of all reception of sense data” (2008: 147), to the extent that “at base there is only one sense organ, that of the skin” (257b / 142–165). By these assumptions, she tries to make sure that the sense of touch in plants is sufficient to establish contact (*phassa*) between sense organ(s) and objects, involving consciousness (*viññāṇa*: 260a / 147; 151; 153 f; 227 f) and entailing feeling (*vedanā*) or experience of pleasure and/or pain (260a / 155–160) in the sense of the twelve-linked formula of origination in dependence (*paṭicca-samuppāda*) (258a / 161). Consequently, plants should, in spite of what textual evidence suggests (2008: 209), by implication (2008: 227) also be considered as subject to ignorance, desire, and attachment (258a / 161), and hence to participate in the process of kamma-directed rebirth in the saṃsāric cycle (258a / 207 ff, esp. 223 f and 227–229), including having the capacity to develop (2008: 161), even spiritually (2008: 162; 165). In this connection, FINDLY suggests that since ‘*kāya*’ is used for both the faculty of touch and the body as one of “the three channels by which kamma is made” and since “such dual usages are not ordinarily coincidental”, it would seem that plants being endowed with *kāya* would also be kamma-producing (258a-b / 223). Though FINDLY herself seems to have some doubt about this conclusion, conceding that “early Buddhists do not admit to kammic endowment in plants” (259a), she nonetheless suggests that they could not but recognize some kamma-like features in plants, viz., “that they grow luxuriantly with constant change and variety, and that they have ongoing lineages like human families” in the form of the seed–plant–seed–plant sequence (259b / 230 f).

10.3. As an alternative, FINDLY then proposes to integrate plants into the saṃsāric scheme as a form of rebirth where karma is only consumed but not accumulated (259b /231; 233 f; 252).<sup>49</sup> This, she continues, need not mean that they are lowly beings reborn in a state of “darkness” (*tamas*) — inertia, stagnation, helpless suffering — due to previous bad karma, as in Jainism and some Hindu sources (261a /158 f; 195–198; 230; 234 f). She rather suggests placing them at the top: “The critical location in early Buddhism where a sentient being does not accumulate kamma ..., but does consume it, is the post-*nibbāna* and pre-*parinibbāna* stage, when the adept is unable to beget new kamma, but is still living out the residue of old” (259b–260a /234 f; 254). What she thus describes is, in other words, the state of an arhat. FINDLY thus proposes to understand plants in early Buddhism as liberated, Awakened beings, spontaneously bountiful and compassionate (2008: 253 f; 360 f). In order to render her hypothesis plausible, she refers to “some East Asian Buddhists who not only believe plants to be sentient beings, but who ... describe plants as of a *sattvic* nature, and as beings who have already reached enlightenment” (261b /248; 253; 262–264 n. 202). In support of her suggestion that a similar view “may be present already for early forms of Buddhism” (263a /248 f), she points to three aspects of the treatment of plants in early Buddhist texts. First, “the centrality of renunciants dwelling at the root of trees” (262a /237; 242–244), second “the use of trees in metaphors for spiritual growth” or models of ascetic behaviour (262a-b /237; 245–247; 250), and third the fact that plants are referred to as *thāvāra*, which means “stationary” in the first place but

---

<sup>49</sup> For this possibility, FINDLY (2002: 259b n. 59; 2008: 230 f) refers to *Plants* p. 101. In order to avoid misunderstandings, I should like to point out that I neither suggested nor excluded that this possibility was actually adopted by Buddhists but merely wanted to show that the reason (*hetu*) adduced by later Buddhist sources to prove that plants are not sentient beings, viz., that they do not engage in wholesome and unwholesome actions, is not conclusive from a historical perspective (even if we accept the presupposition that all sentient beings are *eo ipso* participants in karma-directed saṃsāra) because there is a tradition according to which in non-human destinies karma is only consumed but not accumulated (cf. fn. 180).

is interpreted in the sense of spiritual and emotional stability in the commentaries (262b/248 f). In this connection, FINDLY also points to the analogy between plants as stationary beings and the immobility and inactivity of the advanced Jain ascetic (263a/249). Thus, for FINDLY, plants may, to be sure, be called a “borderline case”, but not necessarily in the sense of rudimentary beings of doubtful sentience; rather, they are at the upper end of the scale, “so advanced that they no longer move about and need only dissipate a few kammic remains before final enlightenment<sup>50</sup>” (263b/254).

11. FUJIMOTO, in an interesting attempt to clarify the position of plants in early and Theravāda Buddhism, seems to take for granted that already in early canonical Buddhism plants are *de facto* regarded as *insentient* and not participating in karma-conditioned saṃsāra (87,12-16).<sup>51</sup> At the same time, he stresses the fact that monks are prohibited from injuring them just as they are from injuring animals, both being *pācittiya* offences (93,4-5; 102,4-6). He admits<sup>52</sup> that there is no explicit statement in the *Sutta-* and *Vinayapīṭaka* according to which this is based on the fact that seeds and growing plants, too, are regarded as *living* beings (90,3-4; 93,9-14). But he tries to prove that, according to the Theravāda Abhidhamma, plants, although insentient, i.e., lacking sense-faculties and mind, are nevertheless living beings because of being endowed with *material* life-faculty (*rūpa-jīvitindriya*: 96,16 ff; 101,14-16), just like the so-called unconscious heavenly beings (*asañña-satta*: 96,22 ff, esp. 97,3-5). It is, according to FUJIMOTO, on this view (which he thus takes to have been a tacit assumption in the earlier period as well) that the prohibition to injure seeds and plants (102,4-8) as well as their inclusion into the cultivation of benevolence towards all living beings in the *Mettā-sutta* of the *Sutta-*

---

<sup>50</sup> I am not sure what “final enlightenment” is intended to mean, but since plants are assumed to have already attained a state in which karma is no longer accumulated, i.e., the state of an arhat, “final enlightenment” should probably be final Nirvana (at death).

<sup>51</sup> Unspecified references in § 11 are to FUJIMOTO 2003.

<sup>52</sup> Suggesting only one possible exception, for which, however, see fn. 105.

*nipāta* (102,11 ff) is based. According to him, what is ethically relevant is thus not sentience but *life*, and life is *not* more or less coincident with sentience, not even in earliest Buddhism. And instead of having a precarious borderline status between sentient and insentient, plants have an unambiguous nature: they are insentient but living organisms (101,10-17).

12. Though very much appreciative of the above-mentioned publications as stimulating and sympathetic contributions, I still cannot help having some doubts with regard to the conclusions and to the arguments adduced in support. Since progress and clarification in research takes place through critical discussion, allow me to reconsider the matter.

### 3. Plants as Living Beings with One Sense-Faculty in the *Vinaya*

13. My first problem concerns the designation of plants as “living beings with one sense-faculty” (*ekindriya jīva*), which both OKADA and FINDLY treat as an early Buddhist or Theravāda view on plants. But in all passages in the canon where the expression occurs in connection with plants<sup>53</sup> it is only “people” (*manussā*) — ordinary people

---

<sup>53</sup> Vin I 137,16, 138,5 and 293,20 (on which VON HINÜBER in *StII* 2/1976: 34); 189,14 f; III 156,1 f; IV 34,22 f; (cf. *Plants* ## 5.4–5 and 8–10.1; other versions: *ibid.* ns. 77, 78, 122, 130 and 146). The only parallel to these passages in a non-Theravāda *Vinaya* which contains an exact equivalent to the expression *ekindriya jīva* I have noted is in the *Vinaya* of the Sarvāstivādins (see fn. 87). — In Vin I 137 and 138, the phrase *ekindriyaṃ jīvaṃ viheṭhentā* follows after the accusation that by wandering around in the rainy season the monks crush green herbs (*haritāni tināni*) and precedes the accusation that they cause the death of many tiny (*khuddaka*) animals (*pāṇa*). FINDLY (2008: xxxi n. 12) remarks that in this case “the one-facultied beings may not be the plants themselves at all, but instead the beings who reside in the plants”. These beings would, however, be somewhat enigmatic (cf. BRUHN 2007: 24 f), for they could hardly be tiny animals since these are mentioned separately and since animals proper, even the tiniest, are regarded as having at least two sense-faculties (Utt 36.126 ff; *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* II.23–24; thus also FINDLY 2008: 117 and 120). What is more, such an assumption would not solve the main problem

or householders,<sup>54</sup> who are not necessarily affiliated with Buddhism, and surely not doctrinally trained Buddhists<sup>55</sup> — or even representatives of other religious groups<sup>56</sup> who think that trees and other plants

---

of the passage, viz., the somewhat surprising use of the singular *ekindriyaṃ jīvaṃ*. ‘(Plant)-life’ in a collective sense? Or could the phrase *ekindriyaṃ jīvaṃ viheṭhantā*, which in this passage has no correspondence in any of the other *Vinayas* (see *Plants* n. 130), perhaps be a redactional addition, added in order to explain why the crushing of green herbs upsets the householders, and borrowed from the commentary on *Pācittiya* 11 without fully adapting it to the context by replacing the singular with a plural?

<sup>54</sup> See *Plants* n. 90. Cf. also VinDh 586b9-10; 830b10-14 and 24-25; 847b13-14 (居士 “householders”); VinMī 41c14-15 (人 “people”); T 24.1463 (\**Vinayamātrkā*): 823b25-26 (國中諸人 “all the people in the country”).

<sup>55</sup> As FINDLY puts it in the case of Vin I 189, where monks are reproached by people because they had young palmyra palms (*tāla-taruṇa*) cut (probably: stripped of leaves)<sup>a</sup> in order to use the leaves (*tāla-patta*) as sandals, with the effect that the palmyra palms withered up (cf. also SYED 1990: 315 n. 7: “... durch das Abreißen der Blätter wurden die Bäume zerstört.”). FINDLY remarks (2008: 159 f; cf. 2002: 256b): “We see the early *Buddhist* attribution of this capacity to experience pain in the important *Vinaya* passage 1.189 ... The specifically horrific evidence for this prohibition is that when cut ... the young palmyra palms wither up — suggesting that they are feeling pain ...”. Similarly 2008: 364: “... the canonical Buddhist injunction against wearing palmyra leaf sandals due to the withering and bleeding of the leaves after being cut, which suggests to *Buddhist* observers that the plant feels pain.” [Emphasis mine.] There is, however, definitely no reason to assume that the “people” (*manussā*) or “householders” (居士: VinDh 847b13) who blame the monks are specifically affiliated with Buddhism. They are most probably lay persons who would support all ascetics with proper behaviour. In any case, their belief in the sentience of plants does not prove anything for Buddhism on a doctrinal level. Nor does the passage actually say that when the palmyra leaves were cut off these leaves (or rather the young palms) *bled*. It merely says that the young palmyra palms withered up. This may indeed have been associated with dying and pain by the householders, but not necessarily by the Buddhist monks.

<sup>a</sup> I take *tālataṭaruṇa* to mean young palmyra trees (like *bodhitaruṇa* “young bodhi trees” in *Mahāvamsa* [ed. W. GEIGER, PTS 1958] 19.58). Cf. VinDh 847b12-13, where it is stated that certain monks “tore off the leaves (v. l.: bark) of a *tāla* (= palmyra) tree in order to make sandals, with the result that the tree withered up” (剝多羅樹葉 [v.l.皮] 作屐。樹便枯乾。).

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *Plants* # 5.5 with n. 91.



are living beings (*jīvasaññino rukkhasmim*),<sup>57</sup> and who therefore reproach Buddhist monks who had cut down a tree or damaged some other plant (or had ordered others to do so) for having injured a living being with one sense-faculty (*ekindriyaṃ ... jīvaṃ viheṭhenti*). The *Samantapāsādikā* expressly specifies this sense-faculty as the sense of touch,<sup>58</sup> which means that plants are seen as endowed with rudimentary sentience.<sup>59</sup> Later commentaries expressly ascribe this view to the Jains or Ājīvikas.<sup>60</sup> Hence, the references to plants as living beings

<sup>57</sup> For further discussion of this phrase, see § 16.

<sup>58</sup> Sp 575: *ekindriyaṃ ti kāyindriyaṃ sandhāya vadanti*. Cf. HARVEY 2000: 175. Cf. also BALBIR 2000: 23 (*Vajirabuddhi-ṭīkā*).

<sup>59</sup> Implying sensations of pleasure (SRINIVASAN 2007: 3 and 10: contentment; 4 and 17: happiness) and pain (11: pains from some diseases; 17: suffering in winter) as well as some form of desire (ibid. 9–11). For all the six kinds of living beings (*jīva*) being subject to pain cf. also Sūy II.1.48 (*JĀG* 2.2 # 679; cf. CAILLAT 2007: 91) and *Viyāhapanaṇatti* XIX.3 (*JĀG* 4.2: 840 ## 33–37; DELEU 1970: 250; 2007: 104).

<sup>60</sup> Cf. BALBIR 2000: 23, quoting the *Vajirabuddhi-ṭīkā* (6<sup>th</sup>–7<sup>th</sup> cent.) and a commentary on the *Abhidhānappadīpikā* ascribing the view to the Nigaṇṭhas and Khapaṇakas, respectively, i.e., to the Jains (cf., e.g., SCHUBRING 1935: 133; JAINI 1980: 223 f; DELEU 2007: 104; METTE 2007: 115; SRINIVASAN 2007: 12 f; 22; 90; cf. also 24 and 36). On the other hand, Sv I 161,18–22 refers to the idea of animate beings with one sense-faculty and to an interpretation of *sabbe jīvā* as plants (cf. also Ps III 120,7–12 and 11–12; Spk II 341,4–8) in connection with the views of Makkhali Gosāla (DN I 53, 24 and 31 f). — The view that plants (and other external things) are living beings endowed with one sense-faculty is ascribed to the Nirgranthas (= Jains) also in the Sarvāstivāda-affiliated *Mahāvibhāṣā* (T 28.1547: 439b27–c2; T 28.1546: 270c26–271a2; Vi 729a13–18). Here, however, this sense-faculty is, somewhat surprisingly, defined not as the sense of touch but as the life-faculty (命根 = *jīvitendriya*, → life) or as the *mana-indriya* (意根, → sentience), or both (!). This looks like a (somewhat unfortunate) attempt to describe the Jain view that they are living beings (*jīva*) with a rudimentary sentience in terms of *Buddhist* abhidharmic concepts. From a Buddhist point of view, every living being (in the sense of beings participating in karma-directed saṃsāra), even the unconscious heavenly beings (*asañña-deva*: cf. § 21), must have a life-faculty. If consciousness is involved (cf. fn. 9) and/or if the issue of faculties is narrowed down to sense-faculties, the most basic and indispensable one is the *mana-indriya* (cf. Vi 793a7 f; AK[Bh] 50,9 f), i.e., consciousness as a faculty. In Jainism, on the other hand, con-

with one sense-faculty, interpreted in their context,<sup>61</sup> rather suggest that the authors of these *Vinaya* passages did *not* share this view.<sup>62</sup> This is explicitly stated in the Mahāsāṅghika version: “Although [in reality] they (i.e., trees) have no life, one should not cause people to become upset.”<sup>63</sup> These passages cannot therefore be used for ascertaining the position of the Buddhists (or at least doctrinally trained Buddhists) themselves.<sup>64</sup>

14. That the concept of living beings with one sense-faculty (*ekindriya jīva*) refers to a non-Buddhist view is also corroborated by the fact that throughout the earlier texts of the Pāli canon, ‘*jīva*’ as a

---

sciousness is an inborn property of the soul (FRAUWALLNER 1956: 271 f), and life-span (*āyus*) is not reckoned among the faculties (*indriya*) but among the life-functions (*prāṇa*) (ibid. 270). Therefore, the characterization of sentient beings as *ekindriya* must refer to yet another property (i.e., the sense of touch).

<sup>61</sup> I.e., in connection with the statement that *people* regard trees, or plants, as living beings (*jīvasaññino ... manussā rukkhasmim*), for which see § 16. The mere statement that it is “people”, or “householders” who charge the monks who had cut (or had ordered others to cut) a tree with injuring a living being would not necessarily imply that the monks themselves did not regard trees, or plants, as living beings, for in other *Vinayas* people make similar accusations also in situations where the monks had injured *animals*.<sup>a</sup> In the case of plants, however, the express ascription of the belief that plants are living beings to “people” and the use of the term ‘*ekindriya jīva*’ (which occurs only in the speech of “people”, and never in expositions of a specifically Buddhist point of view) suggest that the monks did not really share this belief.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. § 28.2; VinMī 44c24–45a3; 58a20–25; VinMā 344c27–29. In the Pāli *Vinaya*, however, and partly also in other *Vinayas* (e.g., VinSa 79c3–7; 97b6–10), in cases of injury to animals the monks are reproached by *other monks*: see Vin IV 48, 124 and 125 (introductory stories ad Pācittiya 20, 61 and 62, respectively).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *Plants* # 5.5; BALBIR 2000: 23; HARVEY 2000: 175; HARA 2003: 472; OBEYESEKERE 2006: 96. Another explanation also points in the same direction: monks should not cut down trees because the trees are inhabited by deities or by animals who may be hurt or even killed or would at any rate lose their abode (*Plants* ## 5.2 and 5.3).

<sup>63</sup> VinMā 339a13: 是中雖無命 不應使人生惡心.

<sup>64</sup> For Pācittiya 88 see § 28.2.

general term for “living beings” seems to be largely avoided, except when a non-Buddhist view or popular belief is characterized.<sup>65</sup> In this connection, the occurrences of the pattern “all sentient beings (*satta*), all animate beings (*pāṇa*), all creatures (*bhūta*), all living beings (*jīva*)” — originally surely a list of quasi-synonymous, i.e., more or less overlapping expressions<sup>66</sup> — are revealing: In its complete form, which corresponds (apart from the position of the element ‘*satta*’) to

---

<sup>65</sup> ‘*Jīva*’ in the sense of “soul” (e.g., DN I 56,26; II 333 ff) is non-Buddhist terminology. The same holds good for the alternative question *taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ udāhu aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ* (e.g., DN I 157–160, with unusual neuter *jīvaṃ*, < Eastern \**se jīve se sarīre*?; cf. DhSk 56,5–6 or AKBh 469,14: *sa jīvas tac charīram*), which the Buddha refuses to answer. In the first alternative, ‘*jīva*’ would seem to denote the living being (mistakenly) reduced to the body, in the second alternative ‘*jīva*’ points to a hypostatized life-principle or soul distinct, and separable, from the body. I am not concerned here with ‘*jīva*’ in everyday usage: in the sense of “alive” (as an antonym to *mata* “dead”,<sup>a</sup> or as in *jīvagāhaṃ gahetvāna* “having captured alive”: OBERLIES 2001: 268), “the living” (as in *jīvaloke* “in the world of the living”)<sup>b</sup> or even “life”.<sup>c</sup> At Jā V 239,18 (no. 528, vs. 26) ‘*jīva*’ does mean “living being” (de facto: “man”), but the speaker is a non-Buddhist. — In later texts, the reticence to use ‘*jīva*’ as a quasi-synonym of ‘*satt(v)a*’ or ‘*pāṇa*’/‘*prāṇin*’ seems to diminish; cf., e.g., DhSk 81,1–2 (19v10: *prāṇinī prāṇisaṃjñī jīve jīvasaṃjñī sattve sattvasaṃjñī*), or *Mahāniddeśa* I 3 (*macco ti satto naro mānava poso puggalo jīvo ...*). In the latter passage, the focus seems to be on human beings, as is still more obviously the case in I 12, where the explanandum is actually “man” (*naro ti*).

<sup>a</sup> Jā III 263,2.

<sup>b</sup> = *manussaloke* Jā II 318,1–2; = *imasmimṃ sattaloke* Ud-a 294,5.

<sup>c</sup> E.g., Sn 432; Jā VI 304,27 [no. 545, vs. 207].

<sup>66</sup> Thus explicitly even the Jaina commentator Śīlāṅka, who states, in connection with a differentiating explanation, according to which ‘*pāṇa*’ refers to lower animals (with two to four senses), ‘*bhūta*’ to plants, ‘*jīva*’ to beings with five senses, and ‘*satta*’ to element-beings (ĀyārViv 47,33–36; cf. also the quotation *ibid.* 47,36–37), that he proposes this explanation “although in reality there is, in this passage, no difference between the terms ‘*prāṇa*’, etc., [as regards the range of entities they denote]” (ĀyārViv 47,36: *iha ca prāṇādiśabdānāṃ yady api paramārtha-to ’bhedah ...*).

that of the early Jaina texts,<sup>67</sup> this pattern occurs in the Buddhist Sermons<sup>68</sup> only in connection with non-Buddhist views. When the pattern is, exceptionally, used in a Buddhist context,<sup>69</sup> the item “living beings” (*jīva*) is significantly missing. The reason may well have been that the term ‘*jīva*’ was felt to be typical of traditions in which forms of life (like plants) which the Buddhists found problematic were considered to be sentient. This seems to be confirmed by Buddhaghosa, who in fact, when commenting upon the aforementioned four-membered pattern, explains ‘*jīva*’ as referring to plants.<sup>70</sup> By contrast, in the case of ‘*pāṇa*’ and ‘*bhūta*’ no such inherent tinge seems to have been felt, in spite of the sporadic use of ‘*pāṇa*’ as including plants in early Buddhist verse texts (see § 3), and of the particular use of ‘*bhūta*’ for plants in the compound ‘*bhūtagāma*’ (see §§ 5–6).

15. If the passages referring to plants as living beings with one sense-faculty (*ekindriya jīva*) are nonetheless used as evidence for the Buddhists’ own opinion, one would likewise have to accept that, in contrast to FINDLY’s preference for a biocentric approach including plants but not the elements,<sup>71</sup> the Buddhists themselves also shared the view that the *earth* is a living being with one sense-faculty, since this idea is, in connection with the prohibition to dig the ground, referred to in precisely the same pattern as the belief in trees as living

---

<sup>67</sup> Āyār 17,18-19 (JĀG # 132): *savve pāṇā savve bhūyā savve jīvā savve sattā*; cf. also 5,6-7 (# 49); 18,18-19 (# 136), etc.; Sūy II.7.13 and 15 (JĀG ## 852 and 854 = pp. 241,15 and 243,11–244,10).

<sup>68</sup> DN I 53,31; MN I 407,34; SN III 210,8: *sabbe sattā sabbe pāṇā sabbe bhūtā sabbe jīvā*.

<sup>69</sup> AN II 73,4.

<sup>70</sup> Sv 161,20-22 (cf. Ps III 120,11-12; Spk II 341,6-8): “With ‘all living beings’ he (i.e., Makkhali Gosāla) refers to rice, barley, wheat, etc., for he thinks that these are living beings because they grow” (*sabbe jīvā ti sāliyavagodhūmādayo sandhāya vadati | tesu hi so virūhanabhāvena jīvasaññī*). Cf., however, the completely different distribution of the four terms as proposed by Śīlāṅka (see fn. 66).

<sup>71</sup> Cf. FINDLY 2008: 372; cf. also 253 (terming the inclusion of inanimate things like stones and rocks in the Far Eastern idea of universal Buddhahood “bad news”) and 376 f.

beings with one sense-faculty is in the introduction to the prohibition to injure plants.<sup>72</sup> However, since both passages occur only in the commentarial stratum of the *Vinaya*, which, though canonical, is definitely not from the earliest period,<sup>73</sup> it cannot be taken for granted that the view they presuppose for the Buddhist monks of their time is identical with the way plants, or even the earth, were viewed in the earliest period or by the Buddha himself.<sup>74</sup>

### Philological Excursus on the phrase ‘*jīvasaññino manussā rukkhasmiṃ*’ (§ 16)

16.1. The expression *jīvasaññino manussā rukkhasmiṃ* (/paṭhaviyaṃ) cannot mean that people think<sup>75</sup> that there are living things in a tree (or in the soil),<sup>76</sup> for such an idea would not have had to have been ascribed to *people* since the Buddhist monks, too, would, of

---

<sup>72</sup> *Vin* IV 32–33 (Pācittiya 10). Cf. *Plants* pp. 46 ff. In this case, the expression *ekindriya jīva* has an equivalent in the Chinese version of two other *Vinayas* (see fn. 87). Cf. also the use of the same phrase at *Mil* 259,7–8 with reference to *water*; here, the position of its being a living being with one sense-faculty is expressly ascribed to “certain non-Buddhists” (*ekacce tiṭṭhiyā*). Similar to the case of plants (cf. § 13), in the case of the earth the *Vinaya* of the Mahāsāṅghikas expressly states that from the Buddhist point of view the earth is not a living being but that ascetics should nevertheless not dig the ground (*VinMā* 384c16–17; cf. FUJIMOTO 2003: 105 n. 14).

<sup>73</sup> SCHLINGLOFF 1963; VON HINÜBER 1996: 13. Likewise, the other references to people regarding plants as living beings with one sense-faculty occur either in the canonical commentary to the *Pātimokkhasutta* or in analogous portions of the *Khandhakas*.

<sup>74</sup> For this reason, I should be less assertive than GOMBRICH (2005), who states (733): “That monks and nuns should avoid destroying plants has no rationale in Buddhist doctrine.” He is right as regards doctrinally consolidated Buddhism, and probably also for the authors of the *Suttavibhaṅga*. But in the absence of express and unambiguous doctrinal statements in the early canonical texts we can hardly be sure that the issue was settled from the outset.

<sup>75</sup> For the semantic sphere of *sañjñā*/*saññā* see VETTER 2000: 24–27.

<sup>76</sup> And it definitely cannot imply that people, or even Buddhists, see “trees as living beings who have perception, discernment or cognition ... (*sañjñā*)” (FINDLY 2008: 153).

course, have agreed that in a tree as well in the soil there are living things, viz., animals or spirits. There can thus be no doubt that we must understand the phrase in the sense of people thinking that the tree or the soil itself *is* a living being (*jīva*).

16.2. Actually, the syntactical pattern “noun<sup>loc</sup> noun-*saññin*” is rather common, especially in the *Vinaya*. In most occurrences, the noun in the locative and the noun compounded with °*saññin* are identical (in the form ‘A<sup>loc</sup> A-*saññin*’, or ‘non-A<sup>loc</sup> non-A-*saññin*’), or one is the negated form of the other (‘A<sup>loc</sup> non-A-*saññin*’, or ‘non-A<sup>loc</sup> A-*saññin*’).<sup>77</sup> In these cases, the meaning of the phrase is regularly that someone has, with regard to A, the notion that it is A, etc., i.e., the locative is to be understood as a *viśayasaptamī* and the complement of °*saññin* as indicating the *content* of the notion or idea.<sup>78</sup> The same holds good if the noun compounded with °*saññin* is different from the noun in the locative (‘A<sup>loc</sup> B-*saññin*’), provided that B is an adjective<sup>79</sup> or, if it is a substantive, something that can, rightly, deliberately or (more often than not) by mistake, be equated with A in a statement “A is B”.<sup>80</sup> For the sentence under discussion, this requirement would

<sup>77</sup> E.g., Vin IV 33,22-28 (ad Pācittiya 10): *pathaviyā pathavī-saññī*, etc.; 35,14-19 (ad Pācittiya 11): *bīje bīja-saññī*, etc.; AN I 84,19 *akappiye kappiya-saññī* and *kappiye akappiya-saññī*.

<sup>78</sup> Cf., e.g., Mp II 155,20-21 (ad AN I 84,19, see fn. 77): “Having, with regard to something unsuitable [for renunciants], like lion’s meat, the notion ‘this is suitable’” (*akappiye sīhamasādimhi “kappiyaṃ idan” ti evaṃ-saññī*), or Mp V 2,7-9 (ad AN V 7: *na pathaviyaṃ pathavī-saññī assa*): “He may not have a notion in terms of a notion that has arisen in the form ‘earth’ after having made earth its object” (*pathaviṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā pathavī ti evaṃ uppannāya saññāya saññī na bhaveyya*).

<sup>79</sup> E.g., Vin IV 40,25: *saṅghike puggalika-saññī* (“having the [wrong] notion ‘personal [property]’ with regard to what is [in reality the property] of the community”); AN V 109,3: *sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccasaññā* (“the [correct] notion ‘impermanent’ with regard to all conditioned things”); MN I 336,23: *āhāre paṭikūla-saññīno* (“having the [deliberate] notion ‘disgusting’ with regard to [esp. delicious] food”).

<sup>80</sup> E.g., Sp III 536: *itthiyā paṇḍaka-purisa-...-saññissa* (“of [a person] who mistakes a woman for a eunuch or a man”); or Ps I 70,3-4: *manussā pi ca rājāno*

be met as long as '*jīva*' is understood in the sense of "living being". We could then translate the passage as:

[1] "People have, with regard to a tree (/the soil), the idea [that it is] a living being."

There are, however, also instances of the pattern '*A*<sup>loc</sup> *B-saññin*' where *B* denotes a concept that cannot, rightly or wrongly, be equated with *A* but can, e.g., only be attributed to *A* or located in *A*. Such cases amount to statements like "A has B" or "there is B in A".<sup>81</sup> Such an interpretation would be required if '*jīva*' is, in the passage under discussion, taken to mean "life-force", "soul". A translation would then run as follows:

[2] "People have the idea that *in* a tree (/in the soil) [there is] a life-force (or soul)."<sup>82</sup>

**16.3.** Can we decide which of the two interpretations deserves preference? Let us consider the problem from three angles: a) context, b) explanatory materials in the Buddhist tradition, and c) linguistic usage in early Jaina texts.

**16.3.1.** As for the context, we could ask which of the two interpretations would better fit in with the preceding accusation that the Buddhist monks, by felling the tree, injure a *jīva* with one sense-faculty. Doubtless, it would seem more natural to speak of injuring a living being than of injuring a soul, because the soul is, strictly speaking, invulnerable. But since in Jainism consciousness is a property of the soul,<sup>83</sup> it must be the soul that experiences the pain of its body being

---

*viya attani deva-saññino honti* ("[certain] humans, like kings, consider themselves as heavenly beings"); VisM XVII.62: *anirōdhabhūte pi gattiviseṣe dukkhanirōdha-saññī* ("thinking a certain destiny to be the end of suffering although in reality it is not").

<sup>81</sup> Cf., e.g., DN I 22,20-21 *anta-saññī lokasmim*, which clearly means "having the notion that the world *has* an end (i.e., is spatially limited)", or VisM III.111, where a *kalaviṅka* bird (cuckoo) in a room with mirrors on all sides is described as thinking that there are *kalaviṅka* birds in all directions (*sabbadisāsu karaviṅka-saññī*).

<sup>82</sup> Or: "... that a tree (/the soil) *has* a life-force (or soul)." Cf. HARVEY 2000: 175.

<sup>83</sup> See fn. 60.

cut, and therefore it may not be inappropriate to say that by cutting down the tree the monks hurt the soul<sup>84</sup> whose body it is.

16.3.2. As regards Buddhist explanatory materials, the *Samantapāsādikā* explains ‘*jīva*’ as ‘*satta*’<sup>85</sup> and thus seems to support its interpretation as “living being”, provided that ‘*satta*’ is used in the ordinary sense of “sentient being” and not in the sense of a metaphysical principle of sentience, as is the case in a similar discussion of the sentience of water in the *Milindapañha*. In this text (259,1-5), the king Milinda argues that certain non-Buddhists (*ekacce titthiyā*: no doubt the Jains) believe that “water is alive” (*udakaṃ jīvati*), a formulation that suggests taking water itself as a living being (*jīva*), but in his reply the monk Nāgasena actually uses the term ‘*jīva*’ in the sense of “life-principle” or “soul”: “Water is not, of course, alive: there is no life-principle or principle-of-sentience in water” (*na hi ... udakaṃ jīvati, n’atthi udake jīvo satto vā*). In other words, he uses ‘*jīva*’ not in the sense of a living organism as a whole but in the sense of the life-force or soul that is embodied in this organism and constitutes it as a living being, as in interpretation [2]. The phrase under discussion is, in connection with the rule not to dig in the soil, understood in a similar way in the *Vinaya* of the Sarvāstivādins: “There were householders who, being pupils of the non-Buddhists, said that in earth there is a life-faculty.”<sup>86</sup> But the phrase accusing the Buddhist monks of injuring a *jīva* with one sense-faculty is translated in the

<sup>84</sup> Cf. HENRICHS 1979: 92 and FINDLY 2008: 158 for a similar idea in Manichaeism and in the *Purāṇas*, respectively.

<sup>85</sup> Sp 575 *jīvasaññino ti sattasaññino*.

<sup>86</sup> VinSa 117b17 f (on Pācittiya 10): 有居士 是外道弟子 說地中有命根. In the case of plants (Pācittiya 11), the text is ambiguous: “At that time, there were householders who with regard to plants had (生, lit. produced, formed) the notion of their being endowed with life” (VinSa 74c24: 是時有居士 於草木中 生有命想). Still less unambiguous is VinMi 41c14 f: “With regard to plants, people had the notion of life” (草木之中 人生命想). Similarly T 24.1463 (\**Vinayamātrkā*) 823b25 f: “Throughout the country, people all had, with regard(?)<sup>a</sup> to this tree, the notion of life” (國中諸人 皆以此樹有命之想).

<sup>a</sup> 以 is puzzling here; one expects 於.



same *Vinaya* as: “They take the life of a *living being* [possessing only] one sense-faculty”,<sup>87</sup> which means that in this case ‘*jīva*’ is understood in the sense of interpretation [1]. Similarly, in the discussion of the monastic rule not to injure plants the *Ṭīkā*s have somebody raise the objection that this rule does not make sense in the Buddhist context because trees, etc., are not living beings (*jīva*) since they lack consciousness, and that even growth is not a sufficient reason for assuming that they are living beings (*tesaṃ jīvabhāve*) since growth is observed also in coral, crystals or salt.<sup>88</sup> Here, ‘*jīva*’ is clearly used in the sense of “living being”, applied to the plant as a whole, as in interpretation [1]. And in a passage of the *Papañcasūdanī*, we hear of non-Buddhists (probably the Jains) who insist on the view that iron is a living being (*jīva*).<sup>89</sup> The explanatory material is thus not unanimous.

**16.3.3.** It is well-known that in doctrinally developed Jaina texts ‘*jīva*’ is used in the technical meaning of “soul”, but to what extent can this usage be taken for granted in the case of the earliest Jaina

<sup>87</sup> VinSa 117b19-20: 奪一根眾生命。Similarly, with reference to cutting grass and picking flowers, VinSa 74c25: “The Buddhist monks are takers of life: they kill a *living being* [possessing only] one sense-faculty” (沙門釋子是奪命人，殺一根眾生)<sup>a</sup>. Ambiguous is the *Vinaya* of the Mahāsāṅghikas: “But now, digging the ground with their own hands ..., they deliberately injure *life* [possessing only] one sense-faculty” (VinMā 384c12-13: 而今自手掘地 ... 故傷一根命)<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> In both passages, — (“one”) is given as a v.l. in T, whereas in the text itself we have 切 (“to cut”) and 破 (“to break”), forming binominal expressions with 殺 (“to kill”) and 傷 (“to injure”), respectively. But these are clearly secondary alterations by Chinese transmitters who, being unfamiliar with the Indian background of the concept *ekendriya*, tried to make sense of the passages.

<sup>88</sup> Sv-pt I 157: *nanu ca rukkhādayo cittarahitatāya na jīvā; ... vuddhi pana pavāḷa-silā-lavaṇānam pi vijjati ti na tesaṃ jīvabhāve kāraṇaṃ*.

<sup>89</sup> Ps I 27,18-19: *aye jīvasaññī hutvā pana ayaṃ jīvo ti abhinivisati*. Though one could understand *aye jīvasaññī* as “having the idea of a soul (life-principle) in iron”, ‘*jīva*’ cannot be rendered as “soul” in the second part of the passage, which can only mean “he tenaciously declares iron to be a living being (*jīvo ti*)”. It would thus seem preferable to keep to this meaning of ‘*jīva*’ for the whole passage and to understand it as describing two steps of misconception (viz., *saññā*- and *ditṭhi-vipallāsa*): “Having formed the idea that iron is a living being, he then insists on [this status of] iron [by expressly asserting:] ‘[It is] a living being’ (*jīvo ti*).”

sources? Translations present a sometimes confusing oscillation between “soul” and “living/animate being”, and the issue would seem to be in need of critical revision, which, however, would exceed the limits of this study. Even so, I have the impression, provisional as it might be (I am anyway not a specialist of Jain studies), that in the first part of the *Āyāraṅga* and the *Sūyagada* as well as in the *Dasaveyāliya* there are few if any occurrences of ‘*jīva*’ where the meaning “soul” is necessary, but many where “living/animate being” fits best. As already mentioned (§ 14), ‘*jīva*’ occurs, along with ‘*pāṇa*’, ‘*bhūya*’ and ‘*satta*’, in a series of (originally quasi-synonymous) expressions for living, animate, sentient beings. In other passages, it alternates with such expressions,<sup>90</sup> and like them it may denote living or animate beings in the perspective of their present existence<sup>91</sup> as well as in the perspective of subjects of reiterated rebirth and, possibly, liberation.<sup>92</sup> What is, however, most important in the present context is that as in Buddhism and in the Aśoka inscriptions<sup>93</sup>, in the early Jaina sources the object of the verb “to injure” ((*vi-*)√*hims*) is

---

<sup>90</sup> E.g., Utt 3.1–7: *jantu*, *payā* (= *prajā*), *pāṇino* (pl.) and *jīvā* (pl.), all rightly rendered as “living being(s)” by JACOBI (1995/1968: 15 f). Sometimes (e.g., Dasav 8.2 or Sūy 11.7–8), ‘*jīva*’ is used as a comprehensive category including the elements, the plants and the mobile animate beings (*tasā pāṇā*), like animals and man. With “animate beings” (*pāṇa*) as a sub-category, ‘*jīva*’ can hardly mean “soul” but only “living being” (i.e., in the perspective of the developed Jaina system: bodies animated by an enduring soul that constitutes life and sentence: cf. METTE 1991: 186 f (s.v. *jīva*)).

<sup>91</sup> Thus especially in connection with injuring, or not injuring, them (see fns. 94 and 95).

<sup>92</sup> E.g., Utt 3.7 (see fn. 90). Cf. the analogous use of *satta* (etc.) in Buddhist texts (e.g., DN I 82 f). It is, of course, especially in the context of accumulating karma and undergoing reiterated rebirth that in the mature Jaina system the understanding of ‘*jīva*’ as “soul” (as the transmigrating entity in a doctrinal perspective) is of central importance, but in the beginning of *Āyār* (1,7–13) the transmigrating entity is (still?) called *āyā* (*ātman*).

<sup>93</sup> Major Rock Edict IV.A (Kālsī: E. HULTZSCH: *Inscriptions of Asoka*, Oxford 1925: 30 f): *pāṇālambe vihiśa ca bhūtānaṃ*; cf. also IV.C (ibid.) and Pillar Edict 7.NN (ibid. 133 and 137).

normally living, animate beings (*pāṇa*, *pāṇin*, *bhūya*, *pāṇabhūya*).<sup>94</sup> Therefore, when ‘*jīva*’ occurs as the object of a verb denoting injury,<sup>95</sup> we can be fairly sure that it has the meaning “living, animate being”, and not “soul”.

#### 4. Plants as Insentient Living Beings (FUJIMOTO)

17. FUJIMOTO (see § 11) is well aware of the parallelism of phraseology in connection with plants and the earth (see § 15), and also of the fact that in both cases it is probably the Jaina point of view that is alluded to (90,24–91,6).<sup>96</sup> At the same time, he insists on a Buddhist

---

<sup>94</sup> Āyār 2,10-11 and 21-22 (*pāṇe*); Sūy I.5.1.4 (*tase pāṇino thāvare ya*); 5.2.24 (*kaṃcana*, explained by Śīlāṅka as *kaṃ api prāṇinam*: SūyViv 94,28); 7.5 (*bhūtāim*); Dasav vs. 4.1, etc. (*pāṇabhūyāi*); 5.1.5 (*pāṇabhūyāim tase aduva thāvare*); 6.28 (*puḍhavi-kāyaṃ ... tase ya ... pāṇe*); 6.42 (*vaṇassāim ... tase ya ... pāṇe*); 8.12 (*tase pāṇe*); Utt 5.8 (*bhūtagāmaṃ*, here including the mobile and the stationary [living] beings); 12.39 (*pāṇāi bhūyāi*); 25.23 (*tasapāṇe ... ya thāvare*).

<sup>95</sup> E.g., Utt 32.27: *jīve carācare hiṃsai* (JACOBI 1895/1968: 188: “will kill many movable and immovable beings”). In Utt 35.11 we read that through cooking, *jīvas* that live in the water, in the grain, in/on the ground and in/on the fuel are killed (*hammanti*), which clearly does not make sense in connection with souls but does with respect to living beings (small animals?). In Sūy I.7.5–7 it is stated that by using fire one kills or injures creatures (*bhūta*) or animate beings (*pāṇa*), including flying insects and vermin living in the fuel as well as earth and water, which also consist of living beings (*puḍhavi vi jīvā āu vi jīvā*). Similarly, in Sūy I.11.7–9 the beings not to be injured comprise mobile animate beings (*tasā pāṇā*, i.e. animals), plants and seeds and the living beings (*jīva*) [the bodies of] which consist of earth, water, wind and fire (*puḍhavi jīvā, āujīvā, agaṇi, vāujīvā*). In both passages, the parallelism of *jīva* and *pāṇa* is obvious, as is the parallelism of *jīva* and *jaga(t)* at Dasav 5.1.68: *puḍhavi-jīve vi hiṃsejjā je ya tam-nissiyā jagā* (SCHUBRING: “souls in the earth or upon it”, but improbable in view of passages already adduced and the material assembled in fn. 94). Likewise, in Dasav 4 (p. 6,20 f) where it is asserted that a monk should not perform acts of violence towards the six *jīva-nikāyas*, ‘*jīva*’ hardly means “souls” (SCHUBRING) but rather “living beings” (i.e. animate *bodies* or *embodied* souls), the six groups being indeed specified as the elements (as long as not made lifeless), the plants, and the mobile animate beings (*tasā pāṇā*), viz., insects and other animals, men and heavenly beings.

<sup>96</sup> Unspecified references in ch. 4 are to FUJIMOTO 2003.

background for the prohibitions.<sup>97</sup> In the case of plants he suggests that the prohibition is based on the nature of plants *themselves*, on their being, to be sure, insentient but nonetheless endowed with life (102,4-8). In the case of the earth or soil, on the other hand, he sees the reason for the prohibition not in the idea of its being alive but in the fact that by digging the ground small living things *in* the soil would be injured (91,7-11). As proof, he refers to the fact that the canonical commentary confines the prohibition to 'living' (*jāta*) soil, which he interprets as "soil in which many small living things and worms/insects are likely to live".<sup>98</sup> The situation would thus be the same as in the case of water, the drinking or pouring out of which is prohibited only if it contains tiny animals (91,12-16). But this assumption seems rather arbitrary. In contrast to the prohibitions concerning water, the rule prohibiting digging the ground does not mention animals,<sup>99</sup> nor does the canonical commentary refer to them when defining the expression 'living (*jāta*) soil'. The expression *jātā paṭhavī* seems to mean something like fertile, undamaged, 'living' soil, capable of producing plants,<sup>100</sup> contrasted with *ajātā paṭhavī*, which is explained as comprising both stony or sandy (i.e., barren, 'dead') soil and soil that has been burnt (i.e., 'killed') or disturbed and not yet recovered.<sup>101</sup> The distinction between these two kinds of soil is thus

<sup>97</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 93,11-12, where FUJIMOTO states that the Vinaya aims at keeping monks from committing bad actions (比丘たちに悪業を犯させないことを目的とする律蔵).

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.* 91,8: ... 微生物や虫たちが多く棲んでいそうな生地.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. *Plants* # 15.1-2. Reference to the danger that one may injure animals inhabiting the ground when one tills it comes in only in later sources (cf., e.g., I-ching's *Record of the Buddhist Religion*: T 54.2125: 213b9 and b14-15, transl. TAKAKUSU 1966: 61-62; Śrīghṛ 16,16: *kṛmi*-...-*ādīnāṃ vihiṃsanāṃ* ... *karṣaṇe sati*; KLIMKEIT 1977: 206), just as the prohibition to injure plants is justified only in later sources by referring to the animals inhabiting them (cf. *Plants* # 5.2).

<sup>100</sup> Cf. T 23.1440: 559b20: 能生草木故 義名生地.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. *Plants* # 15.4 (with ns. 289-291). The terms may be taken from everyday language and seem to be used by the authors of the *Suttavibhaṅga* without any doctrinal implications on their part.

comparable to that between ‘living’ and ‘dead’, i.e., green and withered, plants,<sup>102</sup> and between germinable and non-germinable seeds. Thus, there is, at the level of the canonical *Vinaya* commentary, no reason to interpret the implications of the prohibition to dig the ground in a way different from those of the precept not to damage plants. In both cases, it is only *people* who have the idea of a living being with one sense-faculty. If this does not imply that the monks themselves (or rather the authors of the canonical *Vinaya*-commentary) held a similar view in the case of the soil (i.e., did not regard the soil as a living being of ethical relevance), there is no reason why it should imply such a view in the case of plants. Nor is there any need for either rule to be based on ethically relevant presuppositions shared by the Buddhist monks themselves. As stated above (§ 6), the *Vinaya* is not so much concerned with ethical or spiritual issues as with safeguarding the reputation of the Buddhist Order in society.<sup>103</sup> Hence the fact that if monks fell a tree or dig the soil (or have others do so) *people* would be scandalized because *they* think that plants or the earth are living, sentient beings and that at least ascetics should refrain from injuring them constitutes a sufficient reason for prohibiting the monks from damaging plants or digging the ground.

18. There is thus no need to postulate, in order to explain the prohibition of damaging plants and seeds, that they were from the outset considered, in a doctrinal sense, to be endowed with a material life-faculty (*rūpa-jīvitindriya*), and hence might be designated as *ekindriya jīva*, “living beings with one faculty”, even from a Buddhist

---

<sup>102</sup> Cf., e.g., VinMī 42a7 f (knowingly cutting a living plant is a *pācittiya* offence; cutting a dried up or withered plant when one knows that it is dried up is no offence); VinMā 340a12-14; VinDh 641c22–642a1; 642a12 f (cutting a dried up plant is no offence); VinSa 75c7-11. Cf. also Sp 761, defining the plants not to be damaged as “green grass, trees, etc., [as long as they are] rooted (i.e., not cut off or uprooted?)” (*paṭiṭṭhita-harita-tiṇa-rukkhādi*).

<sup>103</sup> In this regard, I fully agree with GOMBRICH (2005: 733) when he states that “one of the reasons for formulating rules for the Saṅgha is to avoid public criticism.”

point of view.<sup>104</sup> In view of the total lack of textual evidence in the earlier sources,<sup>105</sup> such an assumption appears unwarranted. It would even seem to be at variance with the fact that the terminology used with regard to humans and animals, i.e., “to deprive of life” (*jīvita voropeti*), is not used in the case of plants (see § 6).

19.1. What is more, even the foundation of FUJIMOTO’s thesis, namely, the ascription of a material life-faculty to plants in systematized Theravāda Abhidharma, appears doubtful. In fact, FUJIMOTO’s assertion rests on one single passage from the *Kathāvatthu* commentary.<sup>106</sup> Actually, however, the passage merely says that the opponent, who had first refused to accept the existence of a material life-faculty (*rūpa-jīvitindriya*), assents to a life-span (*āyu*),<sup>107</sup> duration (*thiti*), continuation (*yapanā*), etc., of material factors in the sense of the serial continuity of both ‘acquired’ matter (*upādinna-rūpa*)<sup>108</sup> on

---

<sup>104</sup> As far as I can see, FUJIMOTO does not expressly draw this latter conclusion, but it strongly suggests itself in view of his remark that the common feature due to which both the killing of animals and the destroying of plants are declared to be a *pācittiya* offence is their being endowed with a material life-faculty (FUJIMOTO 2003: 102,6-7), as well as in view of his putting plants on a par with the unconscious heavenly beings (ib. 97,3-5; 99,20-22), who are indeed expressly stated to have only one sense-faculty in the *Vibhaṅga* (see fn. 119).

<sup>105</sup> FUJIMOTO’s (104 n. 9) suggestion that in the Chinese rendering of the words of the indignant people in the *Vinaya* of the Mahāsāṅghikas (VinMā 339a9-10: ... 斫樹採華 傷殺物命), the characters 物命 may perhaps correspond to the *rūpa-jīvitindriya* of the Theravādins, is not convincing. The expression 物命 is not of rare occurrence and rather means “life of creatures”, i.e., of sentient beings. Cf., e.g., T 23.1442: 735c6-20, where monks who have manufactured mats from fresh silk are reproached for having killed many sentient beings (viz., the silk-worms) and are therefore called “destroyers of the life of creatures” (735c13: 斷物命者).

<sup>106</sup> Kv-a 112,14-18 (see fn. 109), quoted on p. 96,3-8 of FUJIMOTO’s article.

<sup>107</sup> The opponent seems to have taken *āyu* metaphorically in the sense of “span of duration”.

<sup>108</sup> “Action-generated” (*CPD* s.v.) or “produced (as a result of previous kamma)” (*CONE* s.v.) fits the Theravāda Abhidhammic definition (see below) but hardly the literal meaning; neither does the rendering “animate” (*CPD*, *CONE*). For the literal meaning, *CPD* proposes “grasped at, clung to”, which seems adequate for the early

the one hand and grass, wood, etc. (*tiṇakatṭhādī*) on the other.<sup>109</sup> FUJIMOTO (96,11-15) is right to take ‘acquired’ matter as confined to the bodies of sentient beings, but it seems impossible to refer “grass, wood, etc.” to living plants as such because *kaṭṭha* (Skt. *kāṣṭha*) only

canonical use of the expression (MN I 185,21 and 32 f: *imassa ... kāyassa taṇhupādinṇassa*, etc.; cf. KARUNADASA 1989: 105 f). In the Vaibhāsika system, ‘*upātta*’ means appropriated by mind and mental factors as their [physical] basis, i.e., it characterizes the material components of sentient beings as far and as long as they are qualified by sentience (AKBh 23,16 f). In Theravāda Abhidhamma, however, the use of ‘*upādinṇa*’ is not restricted to material factors, but as far as the latter are concerned, in a strictly technical sense (*nippariyāyato*) only those material components of sentient beings that are the result of one’s former karma are *upādinṇa* (see fn. 114) and not, e.g., those produced by food. In this sense, ‘*upādinṇa*’ could be rendered as “(karmically) earned”. However, even in Abhidhammic texts ‘*upādinṇa*’ is sometimes also used in a wider, less technical sense comprising all factors located in or belonging to the body (*sarīratṭhaka*) of a sentient being, because they are appropriated, grasped at, clung to (*ādinna-gahita-parāmatṭha*): e.g., Vibh-a 55 f; Asl 338 (# 673) and 361 (# 735); Ps II 222 (# 18; cf. KARUNADASA 1989: 106; for the adjective *sarīratṭhaka* cf. also Spk III 9,9-10 *catūsu āsīvisesu sarīratṭhakesu* [text corrected in acc. with CSCD] and Jā VI 58,2 f *sarīra-tṭhā ti ... sarīra-tṭhakā*). In this sense, *upādinna* includes even insensitive parts of the body like hair and nails. Yet another definition of *upādinṇa* is “bound up with sense-faculties” (*indriyabaddha*: e.g., Ps-pt [Mūlapaṇṇāsa] # 388; cf. CPD II: 305a), in its turn defined as “sentient” (*saviññānaka*: Ps IV 151,2; V 36,20 f) and as “belonging to the personal continuum of a sentient being” (*satta-santāna-pariyāpanna*: Ps-pt ad Ps I 26 *ajjhatikā*; cf. Sv-pt I 511). My rendering “acquired” is an attempt to find a common denominator for these different applications.

<sup>109</sup> Kv-a 112,14-18 (ad Kv VIII.10): “As for the question ‘Is there no life-span of material entities?’, the opponent takes, [in the case] of ‘acquired’ matter as well as of grass, wood, etc., [their] mere continuity in terms of a series [of moments] to be [their] ‘life-span’, duration, ...; therefore, he rejects [the negation of life-span in material entities]” (*‘natthi rūpīnaṃ dhammānaṃ āyū’ ti pañhe upādinna-rūpānaṃ pi tiṇakatṭhādīnaṃ pi santānavasena pavattañ c’eva* [B<sup>c</sup>: *pavattim eva*] *āyū tṭhiti yapaṇā yāpanā iriyānā vattanā pālanā ti icchati, tasmā paṭikkhipati*). I read the B<sup>c</sup> variant as *pavattim eva* (acc.) and take it as the object of *icchati*. Another possibility is to read *pavatti-m-eva* (nom.) and take *ti icchati* to govern a nominal sentence with *āyū*, etc., as the theme and *santānavasena pavatti-m-eva* as the comment (“... is of the opinion that life-span ... is nothing but continuity in terms of ...”). The E<sup>c</sup> reading, too, can be understood in both ways, if *pavatta* is taken as an action noun (= *pavatti*), and *c’eva* as practically equivalent to *eva*.

means “piece of wood” or just “wood, timber” or “wooden things” like sticks, poles or rafters, at best “branch, twig”,<sup>110</sup> and hardly a living tree as such, as FUJIMOTO contends (106 n. 26), while even *tiṇa* (Skt. *trṇa*) can mean not only grass as it grows but is frequently used for dry grass or straw as well.<sup>111</sup> The passage thus merely states that the *opponent* accepts *continuity* for both animate and inanimate material things. As a statement concerning the opponent’s view, it has no bearing on the Theravādin’s own position, let alone on whether he assumes a material life-faculty in (living) plants or not.

19.2. But let us take FUJIMOTO’s interpretation of “grass, wood, etc.” (*tiṇakaṭṭhādi*) as living plants for granted. Even so, the statement that the opponent, though admitting, in the case of ‘acquired’ matter (*upādīṇṇa-rūpa*) as well as in the case of grass, wood, etc., a ‘life-span’ in the metaphorical sense of serial continuity, rejects the existence of a material life-faculty does not imply that the Theravādin accepts the latter in *both* cases. This is indeed impossible because by being contrasted with ‘acquired’ matter (*upādīṇṇa-rūpa*), grass, wood, etc., regardless of whether they are dead stuff or living plants, are anyway by implication characterized as ‘unacquired’ (*anupādīṇṇa*) matter. That this is what even living plants are held to be in doctrinally developed Theravāda is clear from other passages, where “grasses and trees” (*tiṇarukkha*) — not “wood” (*kaṭṭha*), hence clearly *living* plants — are explicitly qualified as ‘unacquired’ (*anupādīṇṇaka*) [matter].<sup>112</sup> Yet, *all* material faculties (*indriya*), including

<sup>110</sup> CPD III: 45, s.v. *kaṭṭha*. Even in the case of the meaning “branch, twig” (*kaṭṭha* 2.a), some examples, especially those with *tiṇaṇ ca kaṭṭhaṇ ca*, clearly do not refer to living branches, the context (demolished huts, fuel) rather suggesting dry brushwood; explicitly so in the example from SN II 85,5: *sukkhāni ... kaṭṭhāni*.

<sup>111</sup> Cf., e.g., SN II 85,1-7: dry grass (*sukkhāni tiṇāni*) as fuel, along with dry wood (*kaṭṭha*), or MN III 129,22: “These [animals] feed on both fresh and dry grass” (*te allāni pi tiṇāni sukk(h)āni (pi) ... khādanti*).

<sup>112</sup> Sn-a 464,8-9 (ad Sn 601: see § 3): “Although what should be set forth is the distinction of species of animate beings, [the Buddha], with the words ‘consider grass and trees’, starts with setting forth [the distinction of species] of ‘unacquired’ (i.e., inanimate) [material things]” (... *pāṇānaṃ jātivibhaṅge kathetabbe “tiṇarukkhe*



the material life-faculty, are, in the Theravāda doctrine, 'acquired' (*upādiṇṇa*),<sup>113</sup> more precisely: 'acquired' in the strict sense of the term, viz., in the sense of "originating from karma" (*kammaja*, *kammasamuṭṭhāna*).<sup>114</sup> In other words: they are invariably an effect of one's own previous wholesome or unwholesome actions. This would seem to imply that this kind of matter, and hence also a material life-faculty, is found only in the body of beings participating in karma-directed *saṁsāra*, i.e., in the body of *sentient* beings. Since, as FUJIMOTO, too, admits (87,12-16), plants are, in Theravāda Abhidharma, not regarded as stages of karma-directed rebirth, it is hard to see how they can have a karma-conditioned material life-faculty. FUJIMOTO, who is indeed aware of this difficulty (100,7-10), suggests that plants and their material life-faculty may be conditioned by the common (*sādhāraṇa*) karma of sentient beings as a kind of by-product (*adhipati-phala*), just as in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma the external world as a whole is (100,11-15). But this suggestion is hardly convincing because, as far as I can see, it is only in post-Buddhaghosa commentaries that a view comparable to the position of the Sarvāstivādins

---

*pi jānāthā*" ti *anupādiṇṇakānaṃ tāva kathetuṃ āradhho*). Similarly Ps III 433,10. There are more passages connecting *anupādiṇṇaka* with plants, e.g., Ps II 293,9-12 (see § 31); Mp I 353,15-19; Asl 343,4-6; 378,29-379,1; Vibh-a 356-357. For plants being comprised in what is not bound up with sense-faculties (*anindriyabaddha*, cf. fn. 108), see fn. 160 and § 31 (VisM XX.73).

<sup>113</sup> Dhs 146,4-6: *katamaṃ taṃ rūpaṃ upādinnaṃ? cakkhāyatanam ... jīvitindriyaṃ*.

<sup>114</sup> Dhs 211,33-36: *katame dhammā upādinna? ... yaṃ ca rūpaṃ kammaṣa katattā*. Cf. also VisM XIV.79: *indriyarūpaṃ kammajam eva*; VisM-mhṭ # 448: *kammato jātan'ti ettha yaṃ ekantakammasamuṭṭhānaṃ aṭṭh' indriyāni hadayaṃ cā ti navavidham rūpaṃ ...*; KARUNADASA 1989: 59 (+ n. 6); 107; 109; 161. All matter that does not form part of the body of a living, sentient being originates, in Theravāda Abhidhamma, from season/temperature (*utu-samuṭṭhāna*) (ibid. 161), and this includes also plants (cf. Asl 343,5-8: *utusaluṭṭhāno nāma valāhako, utupaccayā nāma vuṭṭhidhārā, deve pana vuṭṭhe* [CSCD] *bījāni virūhanti, ... evaṃ utupaccaya-utusaluṭṭhānaṃ nāma*).

is occasionally found.<sup>115</sup> Moreover, in view of the fact that according to this view the whole external world is a kind of side-effect of the karma of sentient beings, it is difficult to see why this should result in a karma-conditioned life-faculty for plants but not for other parts of the environment.<sup>116</sup> Actually, to my knowledge, the idea that plants possess a material life-faculty is nowhere attested in traditional Theravāda literature, at any rate not on a doctrinal level.

20. NĀRADA's view that plants are endowed with a material life-faculty that differs from that of sentient beings by not being karma-conditioned<sup>117</sup> would rather seem to be an innovation, perhaps inspired by a passage like *Milindapañha* 151,18-21. Here, a person whose life-span is exhausted (*khīṇāyuka*) is compared with a tree which is dead, dried up and sapless, the life of which has been destroyed (*uparuddhajīvita*), the life-span impulses of which are gone (*gatāyusankhāra*); just as it is impossible that such a tree will again be fresh, sprouting and green, so is there no hope that this person can be kept alive. One might indeed be tempted to deduce from this passage that plants have a kind of material life-faculty (*rūpa-jīvitindriya*), but I suspect that this would amount to over-interpreting the text and that

---

<sup>115</sup> The most interesting passage I have come across is Paṭis-a (by Mahānāma in AD 559: VON HINÜBER 1996: 149) I 290,16-19: "Even the material things (visible, etc.) not bound up with sense-faculties ... have arisen from temperature conditioned by the common karma of all sentient beings" (*anindriyabaddha-rūpādayo 'pi ... sabbasatta-sādhāraṇa-kamma-paccaya-utu-samuṭṭhānā*). In the *Kathāvatthu* (VII.7), however, the view that the earth is the result of the maturation (*vipāka*) of karma is rejected, but a decisive reason for this rejection is probably the fact that for the Theravādin the meaning of '*vipāka*' is restricted to the primary result of a karmic action, which is exclusively connected with the individual agent.

<sup>116</sup> This argument would also hold good if FUJIMOTO's (100,15–101,6) reference to the *Aggañña-sutta* (DN III 80 ff, esp. 84–88) as *virtually* presupposing a causal function of the common karma of sentient beings on the external world were accepted.

<sup>117</sup> *A Manual of Abhidhamma (Abhidhammattha Sangaha)*, Colombo <sup>3</sup>1975, 88. Cf. *Plants* p. 82.

the terminology of the comparison is merely conditioned by the matter to be explained.<sup>118</sup>

21. Being devoid of even a material life-faculty, plants are also different from the so-called unconscious heavenly beings (*asañña-sattā nāma devā*). As FUJIMOTO (98,11-14) rightly points out, the latter are, in the Theravāda doctrinal texts, explicitly defined as living bodies endowed with a material life-faculty conditioned by their previous karma. This being the case, they are, albeit entirely lacking mental factors as well as sense-faculties including even the sense of touch throughout their existence in that state, even in Buddhist terms nonetheless living beings with one sense-faculty (*ekindriya*), namely, the material life-faculty.<sup>119</sup> Although they are indeed, from the very first moment, insentient during their existence as unconscious heavenly beings, this existence was preceded by an existence in which they were sentient, and when their existence as unconscious heavenly beings comes to an end they will return to sentient existence (cf. also FUJIMOTO p. 99,14-19). They are thus, in contrast to plants, *virtually* sentient beings, their insentient existence being, in spite of its long duration, merely an episode in their odyssey in karma-driven *samsāra*.

---

<sup>118</sup> This is also true of the verse SN I 154 (no. 6.2.2; SOM. 332 f, vs. 597) comparing the fact that being honoured 'kills' a bad person just as the fruit kills the plantain tree, the bamboo and the reed, or as the embryo kills the mule. Comparison does not presuppose equality in every regard. The use of the word "to kill" with regard to plants, animals and men need not imply that all three are alive and sentient in the same way, and in the case of the bad person the expression that he is 'killed' by being honoured would anyway seem to have a metaphorical meaning. At Jā III 493,14 (no. 429, *gāthā*!) the wish of the parrot that the withered tree might be revived (*āyaṃ rukkhō punar āyūṃ labheta*) just mirrors the perspective of daily life; the text is a eulogy on loyalty to friends, not a doctrinal disquisition.

<sup>119</sup> Vibh 419,21-28: *asaññasattānaṃ devānaṃ upapattikkhaṇe ... ekindriyaṃ pātubhavati: rūpajīvitindriyaṃ*. It should, however, be noted that *ekindriyaṃ* is not a *bahuvrīhi* here, and in view of parallel phrases (esp. 417,12-18: ... *upapattikkhaṇe ... cattār' indriyāṇi pātubhavanti*) probably not a compound at all but rather a sandhi-form for *ekaṃ indriyaṃ* (cf. OBERLIES 2001: 117: *kath' ajja* for *katham ajja*), so that we ought to write *ek' indriyaṃ*.

22. Even if the hypothesis of a material life-faculty in plants were established as a doctrine of systematized later Theravāda, its tacit assumption, without conclusive evidence, for early canonical Buddhism or even for the earliest period is surely unwarranted from a historical perspective.<sup>120</sup>

23. Finally, I am not at all sure whether establishing plants as being endowed with mere vegetative, insentient life would actually have sufficed, from an early Buddhist or early Indian point of view, to include them, for their *own* sake, in the range of beings that should not be killed or injured, since, lacking emotions, they would neither be afraid of death or fond of life nor feel pain or pleasure. Nor would it make sense to include them into the cultivation of benevolence unless for the sake of purifying one's own mind; for what kind of happiness could one wish for organisms that do not have any feelings or emotions at all? And even if we disregard these problems, we must still be aware that if in early Buddhism plants were, as living beings, definitely included in the range of creatures the killing or injuring of which is an evil (*pāpa*) or unwholesome (*akuśala*) action (cf. FUJI-

---

<sup>120</sup> This holds good *a fortiori* for an interesting comment on the prohibition regarding the cutting of plants ("grasses and trees") by an important Chinese monk of the Ming dynasty, viz., Chu-hung (株宏, 1535–1615: *HôbRép* 280b), who promoted a synthesis of Ch'an and Pure Land doctrines. According to him (T 40.1820: 847a11-13), the non-Buddhist thesis that plants possess life (命) means that they possess consciousness (知, i.e., sentience). As against this, the Buddha would attribute to them life (命) only in the sense of vegetal life or growth (生). They have vegetal life but lack consciousness. Since they have vegetal life, they should not be killed. To this extent the Buddha agrees with people (i.e., the non-Buddhists). But he does not agree with them as regards the view that plants possess consciousness. Obviously, this view comes very close to FUJIMOTO's. But its terminology is, as Prof. Michael FRIEDRICH convincingly pointed out to me, strongly reminiscent of the *Hsün-tzŭ*, book 9: Wang chih (王制): "Water and fire have energy, but no life (生); grasses/herbs and trees have life but no consciousness (知); birds and quadrupeds have consciousness but no sense of right and wrong" (水火有氣而無生, 草木有生而無知, 禽獸有知而無義; cf. UNGER 2000: 65–66). Perhaps this is also the background for Kumārajīva's and Buddhajīva's (Tao-sheng's) occasional rendering of Pācittiya 11 in terms of a prohibition of "killing of living plants" (殺生草木, see fn. 31).

MOTO 2003: 88,8), it would, in the early Indian context, have been very difficult for ordinary lay persons to survive without amassing a huge amount of bad karma. From a Jōdoshinshū point of view, this may be just the true state of affairs from which only Amida's grace can save us, but as far as I can see the tendency in early Buddhism was to keep the life of both monks and lay people practicable, enabling monks to concentrate their efforts on meditative practices and giving lay people a chance to meet moral standards without neglecting their everyday duties. To my mind, this is the main reason why early Buddhism, even in the early period, tended to disregard the question of the animateness and sentience of plants, or to leave it undecided.

## 5. Additional Arguments for the Sentience of Plants Revisited

24. Let me now turn to the evidence adduced by OKADA and FINDLY, in addition to the *Vinaya* phrase discussed in ch. 3, in support of their thesis that in early (and Theravāda) Buddhism plants were regarded as sentient, endowed with, at least, the sense of touch, or even with a more complex set of faculties. I shall first discuss FINDLY's arguments (ch. 5.1) and then OKADA's (ch. 5.2).

### 5.1. FINDLY's Arguments

25. Among the arguments adduced by FINDLY in order to prove her view that in early Buddhism (and not merely in the very beginning but, it seems, more or less throughout the canonical period) plants were still regarded as sentient beings, I shall first (ch. 5.1.1) examine two passages adduced by her as referring to plants in terms of sentient beings, and three more where she thinks the belief in plants as sentient beings is presupposed. Thereafter (ch. 5.1.2), some remarks will be made with respect to the evidence on which FINDLY bases her view that in early Buddhism plants were considered to possess the sense of touch. Finally (ch. 5.1.3), I shall discuss her thesis that there

is, in view of their being endowed with the sense of touch, good reason to assume that plants were considered to be even more complex beings and to participate in karma-directed *saṃsāra*. Her suggestion that they may even have been regarded as saintly beings will be dealt with later (ch. 6).

### 5.1.1. Additional Passages Referring to Plants as Sentient Beings

26. As far as I can see, the expression “sentient being” (*satt(v)a*) is not normally used in the Pāli canon in a way that explicitly includes plants from a Buddhist point of view. A phrase adduced by FINDLY (2008: 43) from the *Dīghanikāya* as evidence for ‘*satta*’ denoting plants is surely inconclusive. In this phrase, an area donated by the king to a brahmin is characterised as “abounding in *sattas*, [well] equipped with grass (i.e., fodder), wood and water, and having [plenty of] cereals”.<sup>121</sup> There is no reason to understand “abounding in *sattas*” as being specified by the subsequent qualifications, but even if we do so, the *sattas* would have to comprise not only living plants but also [dry] wood (*kaṭṭha*)<sup>122</sup> and water (*udaka*). Buddhaghosa is no doubt right in understanding *satta* as referring to *human* population and useful *animals* (cattle and game).<sup>123</sup> It is true that from a historical point of view we cannot take for granted that later commentarial explanations always correspond to the original meaning of earlier texts,

<sup>121</sup> E.g., DN I 87,8-9; 111,7-8; 127,8-9: *sattussadam satīṇakaṭṭhodakam sa-dhañṇam*. The Sarvāstivāda version reads *sotsadām* instead (*Dīrghāgama* ms. fol. 395V, 397R, 401R and 410R), which according to Gudrun MELZER’s still unpublished dissertation on the *Ambāṣṭha-sūtra* the Tibetan translators have understood as “along with the tax yield” (this information courtesy of Prof. Jens-Uwe HARTMANN). The parallel in the *Divyāvadāna* (Divy 319,11 and 21) has (*sa*)*saptotsadam*, on which see BHSD s.v. *utsada*(3).

<sup>122</sup> See § 19.1 with fn. 110.

<sup>123</sup> Sv I 245,20-22: *satt-ussadam ti ... bahujanam ākiṇṇa-manussam posāvaniya-hatthi-assa-mora-migādi-aneka-satta-samākiṇṇam cā ti attho*. Buddhaghosa draws on the ideal, frequently met with in the canonical texts (e.g., DN III 75,7-18), of a densely populated, largely urbanized world (cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 1991b: 15; 1997: 24; HARVEY 2000: 183).

but we should not lightly discard them unless we have strong arguments. In any case, it is not advisable to base innovative doctrinal or semantic assumptions on ambiguous passages or arbitrary interpretations. When looking for an occurrence of ‘*satta*’ that may include plants, the most promising candidate would seem to be the old verses mentioning mobile and stationary animate beings, the latter being, most probably, the plants (see § 3). What comes to mind is the *Metta-sutta*.<sup>124</sup> Here, too, it is, to be sure, *animate* beings (*pāṇabhū(ta) < prāṇabhṛt*) that are divided into mobile and stationary, but the passage is framed by the wish that all *sentient* beings (*satta*) may be happy, suggesting the inclusion of the stationary beings, and thus of plants, into this category as well. This supposition is confirmed by the *Upasena-sūtra* of the Northern tradition, where we find indeed the mobile and stationary, as the object of benevolence (*maitrī*), subsumed under the “sentient beings” (*sattva*).<sup>125</sup>

27. Another problematic reference to plants is adduced by FINDLY from the verses of the so-called *Khandha-paritta*.<sup>126</sup> In this text, the

<sup>124</sup> Sn 145c–147d. The early date of the text is confirmed by its metre (old *āryā*).

<sup>125</sup> See fn. 134.

<sup>126</sup> AN 4.67 (II 72–73), discussed in FINDLY 2008: 392–394. FINDLY criticizes the remarks I made on this text in SCHMITHAUSEN 1997a: 18 f, but I am afraid she has missed my point. I did not say that “historically *maitrī* or *mettā* was ‘an alliance or ... contract with’ ... wild animals” but “did not ... entail an appreciation ... of a species, tribe, or group of individuals who were ‘deserving to be valued’” (FINDLY 2008: 392). What I actually said is that even in the Vedic antecedent of the Buddhist *maitrī*, viz., “alliance” or “friendship contract” (*mitra*, *mitradheya*, n.), animal species are *not* envisaged in their aspect of *species* that have an inherent value *as such*, as a constitutive part of natural diversity or of an eco-system, *but*, in the first place, like other tribes, as *groups* of potentially dangerous (or at least, e.g., in the case of domestic animals or plants, potentially uncooperative) *individuals*, and that it seems doubtful to me that this attitude was, in the course of its transformation into the Buddhist attitude of benevolence, developed in such a way as to take species of animals as deserving to be valued as species, the Buddhist attitude of *maitrī* being directed towards *individual* sentient beings, not species *as such*. — For a detailed discussion of the *Khandhaparitta* and related materials, the reader is referred to

speaker (any monk — the text is addressed to *bhikkhus* — who wants to protect himself from poisonous snakes or other dangerous creatures), after [1] declaring his friendship (FINDLY: kindness) with the Virūpakkhas, etc. (i.e., the four families or tribes of snakes), [2a] declares his friendship with the footless, the two-footed, the four-footed and the many-footed, and [2b] subsequently expresses his hope or wish that none of them might injure him. FINDLY (2008: 393) suggests that in this text the “preemptive diplomacy” of the first declaration (viz., [1], referring to the snakes) is, in [2a–b], “in the process of reinvention into a ‘self-other’ process in which both parties are transformed”. Although such an understanding is by no means a matter of course — [2b] merely expresses a hope or wish or invocation —, it is not excluded either.<sup>127</sup> But FINDLY’s main reason, viz., that in [2a] and [2b] the “footless” are the *plants* and that the inclusion of plants makes little sense in the context of protection from danger (2008: 394: “for how hostile can a plant be anyway?”) is hardly conclusive. For the presupposition of this argument, viz., that the “footless” are the plants, is at best a mere possibility, and it is only based on the somewhat remote lexical evidence that a certain parasitical (or rather epiphytic) plant<sup>128</sup> is called *apadaruhā* or *apadarohiṇī* (2008: 97), which FINDLY apparently takes to mean “growing on what is footless”, i.e.,

---

SCHMITHAUSEN 1997b (not used by FINDLY), MAITHRIMURTHI 1999: 55–63, and HARA 2000:15–18.

<sup>127</sup> The introductory prose merely shows that the practice is considered to be effective. It does not tell us *how* it works. In the case of animals, there is good reason to assume that it is normally considered to work by way of influencing and changing their attitude, as in the case of the Buddha taming the furious elephant Nālāgiri (Vin II 194 f), or in the case of hermits whose irradiation of benevolence is believed to transform all animals in the vicinity into peaceful creatures (e.g., Jā VI 73,11–13; 520,27–28). But *mettā/maitrī* is also thought to protect automatically against forces of nature or weapons (AN IV 150,15–16; V 342,8–9). Cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 1997b: 39–42.

<sup>128</sup> *Epidendron tesseloides* (MW 49b) or *Vanda roxburghii* (pw I: 70b).



on a tree. Be that as it may,<sup>129</sup> there is by far more textual support for understanding the “footless” not as trees (which are after all, in epic and later texts, even called *pādapa*, “drinking with the foot”) but as footless animals like fish and, especially, *snakes*. Since this evidence is found in Vedic<sup>130</sup> and Buddhist<sup>131</sup> sources, including the explanation of the verses under discussion in the *Jātaka* commentary,<sup>132</sup> it is, in addition, much closer to the *Khandha-paritta*. Also from the point of view of the context, viz., preventive protection against snake-bite, it is much more natural to assume that the “footless” are, in the first place, the snakes of the preceding verse, now viewed as one category among dangerous creatures as a whole. There is, of course, no reason why plants should not be included in the cultivation of benevolence (cf. § 7), as they indeed seem to have been in the early period,<sup>133</sup> but in the context of the *Khandha-paritta* this is made explicit only in the

---

<sup>129</sup> One could, in this connection, also refer to *PāiaSM* 54c, according to which *apaya* (*apada*) may refer to any footless thing like a tree, an object (*dravya*) or the earth (*bhūmi*). Actually, the passage indicated, viz., *Nāyādhammakahāo* 1.8 [80] (Suttāg I 1024,27; ROTH 1983: 106 and 107, # 115), is unspecific (a painter is able to paint the complete picture of any two-footed, four-footed and footless being even when he has seen only a small part of it), and a reference to footless animals can hardly be excluded.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. *Ṛgveda* 1.32.7 (see WITZEL and GOTÖ 2007: 61 and 535), 3.30.8 and *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* 1.6.3.9 (referring to the mythical snake *Vṛtra*).

<sup>131</sup> Vin III 52,18: *apada* = snakes (*ahi*) and fish (*maccha*), as a category of things not to be appropriated unless given. Snakes are not, perhaps, the first thing that comes to mind in connection with stealing, but the Vinaya is notorious for its casuistry: a monk must not set free a snake owned by a snake-charmer (Sp 362 f). Yet precisely the fact that such a case may sound somewhat far-fetched shows that the category of the “footless” was firmly associated with snakes. On the other hand, one would surely expect *plants* to be mentioned in connection with stealing, had their designation as “footless” beings been customary. Actually, however, they are only mentioned under other categories like *vanappati*. For “footless” sentient beings defined as snakes and fish, see also Mp III 74,5 (*apadā ti ... ahimacchādayo*) on AN II 34,13-14 (*sattā apadā vā dipadā vā catuppadā vā bahupadā vā*).

<sup>132</sup> Jā II 146,3-4: *apādakesu dīghajātikesu c'eva macchesu ca* (snakes and fish).

<sup>133</sup> Sn 967 and 145c–147d (see § 26); cf. also SN IV 351 (see *Plants* n. 347).

*Upasena-sūtra*,<sup>134</sup> provided that at the time of its compilation the association of the “stationary beings” with the plants was still alive.

**28.0.** FINDLY also tries to corroborate her view with some other passages where according to her interpretation the recognition of the sentience of plants in early Buddhism results from the fact that the injuring of them is reproached.

**28.1.** One of these passages is MN III 157 (FINDLY 2008: 83), where monks are described who correctly dispose of their meal scraps by throwing them out in a place where there are few or no green plants (*appaharite*; FINDLY: no crops) or by dropping them into water that is free from (small) animals (*appāṇake udake*). FINDLY thinks that the parallelism between green plants and animals proves that “plants must be among the living”. This is obvious, but we cannot be sure to what extent, or how long, this idea was fully alive among the Buddhist monks,<sup>135</sup> and not rather a rule of ascetic decorum, the more so if the “green plants” are restricted to “crops”.<sup>136</sup>

**28.2.** The same holds good for the Vinaya rule that a monk should not upholster a couch or seat with cotton [wool] (*tūla*; FINDLY, following HIRAKAWA: “some kinds of grass”).<sup>137</sup> FINDLY (2008: 46) takes such an action to have been interdicted “presumably because ... it involves the killing of plants.” *Tūla* no doubt means cotton and similar fluffy seeds. In the introductory story of the Pāli *Vinaya*, there is no trace of cotton fibres being considered as sentient. Rather, people are upset because by upholstering their couches with cotton, the monks enjoy a life of luxury like householders or, according to other *Vinayas*,<sup>138</sup> like a king or minister, i.e., deviate from the standards of

<sup>134</sup> WALDSCHMIDT 1967: 342, vs. 26: *sarvvanāgeṣu me maitrī ... | sarvasatveṣu me maitrī ye ttrasāḥ sthāvarāś ca ye ||*.

<sup>135</sup> Cf. the discussion in *Plants* # 11.1–2.

<sup>136</sup> As is indeed the case, in a similar context, at Vin IV 264,1-2 (see *Plants* # 11.3 with n. 198).

<sup>137</sup> Vin IV 169,29-30 (Pācittiya 88). Parallels: HIRAKAWA 1982: 264 n. 66.

<sup>138</sup> VinSa 127c18-20; similarly VinMā 392a15-16.

ascetic life.<sup>139</sup> To be sure, in the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*, householders reproach the monks for killing living beings for want of compassion,<sup>140</sup> but we cannot be sure that it is the cotton itself that the householders have in mind when they refer to living beings, for the same phrase occurs also in connection with householders reproaching monks for using water containing tiny animals<sup>141</sup> and for killing animals.<sup>142</sup> Actually, in the *Vinaya* of the Mahīśāsakas, what the monks would injure is tiny animals: “This stuff is filthy and tends to produce insects/worms.”<sup>143</sup> Even if we assume that in the *Vinaya* of the Dharmaguptakas the householders reproach the monks because they, i.e., the householders, believed the cottonseeds to be living, sentient beings, this would not necessarily imply that the monks themselves shared such a view (see §§ 13 and 15).

**28.3.** Inapposite is, in my opinion, FINDLY’s (2008: 44) reference to the *Māgandhiya-sutta* (MN I 501 f). According to this text, the Buddha was staying with a brahmin, spending the night on a spread or mat of grass (*tīna-santharaka*). In his absence during the daytime, a wandering mendicant, Māgandhiya, visits the brahmin and, seeing the spread of grass, asks the brahmin for whom it has been prepared. When he hears that it has been prepared for the Buddha, this, so FINDLY, “elicits charges from Māgandhiya that the Buddha is a killer of plants”, a *bhūnahu*, translated by I.B. HORNER, following Buddhaghosa,<sup>144</sup> as “destroyer of growth”. Even if this interpretation were accepted, it would only prove that the *non*-Buddhist ascetic regarded the cutting of grass as an act of killing sentient plant beings. It would not prove that the Buddha, or Buddhist monks, shared this view. But

<sup>139</sup> A couch or seat stuffed with cotton-wool (*tūlapicu-pūrita*) as an example of a comfortable seat: Sp 424 (= Paṭi-a II 497).

<sup>140</sup> VinDh 693b10-12: 無有慈心 斷眾生命.

<sup>141</sup> VinDh 954c10-12; cf. 646b28–c1 (with 害 for 斷); cf. also 677b16-17.

<sup>142</sup> VinDh 677a2-5, with 殺 for 斷.

<sup>143</sup> VinMī 70a28-29: 此物臭穢 好生諸虫.

<sup>144</sup> Ps III 211,4: *bhūnahuno ti hatavaḍḍhino*.

FINDLY's interpretation rests on faulty assumptions. First, *bhūnahu* has convincingly been demonstrated to represent Skt. *bhrūṇahan*, which literally means "killer of embryos",<sup>145</sup> and has thus nothing to do with destroying plants. Second, there is no reason to derive Māgandhiya's irritation from the use of a "spread or mat of grass". The "grass" (*tiṇa*) is, in this case as in many others, surely not fresh grass but *dry* grass or straw, and using a spread or mat of dry grass or straw for sleeping was allowed even to the rigid Jain monks.<sup>146</sup> After all, Māgandhiya himself states that the *tiṇa-santharaka* looks like an ascetic's sleeping place (*samaṇaseyyārūpa*), implying that it conforms to ascetic decorum.<sup>147</sup> Magandhiya's irritation rather has to do with the Buddha's spirituality of controlling the senses (cf. MN I 503,14 ff) and discarding sensual pleasure, and calling him an "embryo killer" may just be an insult<sup>148</sup>.

### 5.1.2. Additional Arguments for Plants Possessing the Sense of Touch

29. The cornerstone in FINDLY's argumentation in favour of a full recognition of the sentience of plants in early (i.e., canonical) Buddhism is the assertion that they were regarded as being endowed with the sense of *touch*. In ch. 3, I tried to show that the *Vinaya* references to plants as living beings with one sense-faculty, viz., the sense of

<sup>145</sup> WEZLER 1994: 643 f, n. 120; VETTER 2000: 132 (with n. 45); OBERLIES 2001: 82 (with n. 4). Further references *ibid*.

<sup>146</sup> SCHUBRING 1935: 167.

<sup>147</sup> Thus explicitly Ps III 210,22-23: *imaṃ tiṇasantharakam samaṇassa anu-cchavikā seyyā ti maññāmi*. Cf. AN IV 251,21-23.

<sup>148</sup> In the context of the *Māgandhiya-sutta*, VETTER (2000: 132 with n. 45) takes "embryo-killer" to refer to the fact that the Buddha's insistence on control of the senses involves abstention from sexual intercourse and thus prevents children from being conceived (cf. WEZLER 1994: 640, referring to a strand in brahminical law in which even the failure to attempt procreation during the time of a woman's cycle favourable for conception (*rtu*) is regarded as 'embryo-killing' (*bhrūṇahatyā*)). The problem is that this interpretation is hardly possible for Sn 664 (cf. ANĀLAYO 2006: 285, n. 96).

touch, cannot be taken as evidence for a *Buddhist* position. However, as already indicated (§ 10.1), FINDLY adduces further evidence from the canonical texts for her assertion. The problem with this additional evidence is that it is, as FINDLY herself is well aware (2002: 256a; 2008: 124),<sup>149</sup> mainly taken from *descriptive* canonical passages, i.e., from passages describing *observable* properties of plants which, according to FINDLY, show that they possess the sense of touch. Such properties she finds expressed, e.g., when plants are described as growing, withering and dying (256a / 130 f), for they prosper in response to the warmth of the sun and wither in response to the cold of the winter (256a–b / 133), and they react positively to contact with water and negatively to drought (256b / 136)<sup>150</sup> or to the different qualities of the soil (2008: 139–140; cf. 2002: 257a). In a sense, they even move towards light or towards the sun (heliotropism) and, with their roots, towards water (hydrotropism) (2008: 227; 365). Therefore they must be endowed with the sense of touch and, argues FINDLY, presumably even experience pleasure and pain (256b / 159 f). Yet, these conclusions result, inasmuch as they are based on passages that merely *describe* observable phenomena, only by way of *implication*, and this is the problem. From a methodological point of view I find it highly questionable to argue that because *we*, or common people, or non-Buddhist authors for that matter, think that *X implies Y*, Buddhist masters, too, must have thought so.<sup>151</sup> It is true that in Jaina texts and in some Hindu sources we can indeed find passages where the above-mentioned phenomena are adduced in a *doctrinal* setting in order to prove that plants are sentient beings endowed with the sense of touch or even other sense-faculties and hence prone to experience pleasure

---

<sup>149</sup> For unspecified references in ch. 5.1.2 and ch. 5.1.3 see the remark in fn. 48.

<sup>150</sup> FINDLY (256b / 137 f) even tries to derive the presence of a sense of touch in plants from the fact that they respond to variations in weight, for a heavy fruit lowers a tree branch, and when the fruit is dropped the branch rises up again. But if this is accepted even an elastic would have the sense of touch.

<sup>151</sup> This was, many years ago, emphasized by Claus OETKE, but I cannot remember where.

and pain.<sup>152</sup> But FINDLY does not point out any such passage in a Buddhist source that expresses the *Buddhist* point of view.<sup>153</sup> Rather, the evidence she offers<sup>154</sup> is confined to passages which merely *mention* or *describe* empirical properties of plants like growing and withering, or flourishing and becoming stunted under certain conditions — facts which no Buddhist can, of course, deny —, but as far as I can see none of the passages contains a *doctrinal* statement *interpreting* these properties as somehow indicating that plants possess a sense of touch or sentience.

30. Moreover, much of her evidence is gathered from *comparisons*. But comparisons merely make use of empirical facts or common ideas in order to *illustrate* doctrinal or spiritual issues. Taken on their own they simply mirror the way things were looked at, or expressed, in daily life by unsophisticated people. They are not normally intended to make doctrinal statements on the very matter that is used as the basis for the comparison or simile, and it would thus seem methodically inadmissible to interpret them in such a way. To give just two examples:<sup>155</sup> When in SN V 46 (no. 45.150) we read that a monk who cultivates the eightfold Path on the basis of virtuous conduct (*sīla*) attains growth with regard to the [wholesome] factors or states (*dhamma*) just as seeds and plants attain growth with the earth as their

---

<sup>152</sup> Thus, e.g., in Āyār 4,28-32 (I.1.5.6-7; JĀG ## 45-47; cf. FINDLY 2008: 130) with ĀyārViv 43,32-44,29, or in the famous passage Mhbh XII.177.10-18, which tries to prove that trees possess all the five senses: cf. HARA 2003: 472-474 (further references: ib. 473 n. 4); id. 2007: 55-56; FINDLY 2002: 260b; 2008: 121-122.

<sup>153</sup> For Vin I 189 (FINDLY 2002: 256b), see fn. 55. At DN III 44,6-12 (FINDLY 2002: 256a n. 35) the five kinds of reproductive parts of plants (*bīja*) may indeed be presupposed to be living beings (cf. T 1.1: 48a16: 更生[之]物 = “things that may grow again”, i.e., are capable of reproduction), but the person who is speaking is a misguided (non-Buddhist, cf. DN III 40,27-42,8) ascetic (*tapassin*).

<sup>154</sup> Most of the material is indicated in FINDLY 2002: 256a-257a, ns. 35, 36, 38 and 39, corresponding to FINDLY 2008: 174-176, ns. 124, 142, 167 and 195, with some *Jātaka* material added.

<sup>155</sup> Both examples are taken from passages listed in FINDLY (256a n. 35 / 174 n. 124).

basis, the *tertium comparationis* is clearly only the fact that just as in nature, so in spirituality growth requires a solid and suitable basis, but I do not see how we can, from this reference to the everyday phenomenon of the growth of seeds and plants, derive anything with regard to the doctrinal status of plants, such as, e.g., that they are sentient beings endowed with the sense of touch. And when in SN III 137 f (no. 22.93; cf. VETTER 2000: 239 f) the unreliability of the *khandhas* is compared to grasses, reeds and trees *growing* along a rapid mountain-river and hanging down onto it but breaking off when a drowning person grabs them, the common point is just unreliability, and surely no doctrinal statement on the issue of the sentience of plants is intended.

31. I do not at all deny that descriptive passages as well as comparisons may point to an *emotional* bond with plant life, but such a perspective should be clearly distinguished from a *doctrinal* assessment of the status of plants. This becomes especially clear in one of the passages listed by FINDLY,<sup>156</sup> viz., *Visuddhimagga* XX.74 f. Even though in this passage the process of sprouting, growth, withering and dropping leaves is not described in the context of a comparison but is set forth as a possible objective support for meditating on impermanence, it has no doctrinal implication concerning the sentience of plants. On the contrary, the preceding paragraph (*VisM* XX.73) expressly enumerates grasses, trees and creepers along with minerals, jewels, soil and stones as instances of external (*bahiddhā*) matter “not bound up with sense-faculties” (*anindriyabaddha*), i.e., inanimate. Another instructive case, not mentioned by FINDLY, is *Ps* II 293 (# 34). In connection with the remark of the Buddha that he remembers once having fallen asleep after the daily meal in the hot season (*MN* I 249,33-36), the commentary points out that it is only mental torpor and sloth (*thīnamiddha*)<sup>157</sup> that is eliminated by attaining

---

<sup>156</sup> Ibid. (“*Vism* 625”, referring to the PTS-ed.).

<sup>157</sup> On this term and its history, see SAKAMOTO-GOTŌ 2005.

arhatship, but not fatigue of the body (*kāyadaratha*)<sup>158</sup>. This kind of fatigue, states the text, can be observed even in plants: lotuses open their blossoms at one time (e.g., at daytime) but close them at another (e.g., during the night), and some trees contract their leaves in the evening and unroll them in the morning. But far from concluding that plants must therefore be endowed with the sense of touch and with sentience, the text expressly classifies them as ‘unacquired’ (*anupādinṇaka*), i.e., not bound up with sense-faculties (*anindriyabaddha*)<sup>159</sup> and hence insentient.<sup>160</sup> These examples show that even later authors, for whom plants are definitely not sentient beings, have no problems using the everyday perspective on a descriptive level. Descriptive passages as such, and still more so comparisons, are doctrinally neutral.

### 5.1.3. Arguments for Plants as Complex Sentient Beings

32. If in this way the evidence adduced for proving that in early Buddhism plants are understood to have the sense of touch is unconvincing, FINDLY’s conclusion that on account of being endowed with the sense of touch they must also have been regarded as endowed

<sup>158</sup> Cf. Ps-pt (Mūlapaṇṇāsa) # 388: *kāyadaratho ti paccayavisesavasena rūpa-kāyassa parissamākāro*.

<sup>159</sup> Thus Ps-pt (Mūlapaṇṇāsa) # 388.

<sup>160</sup> Cf. also Sv III 976,26-30, where it is stated that plants (*tiṇḍāṇi*, *tiṇarukkha-latāḍḍhi*) wither when it does not rain and become green when it rains, but where they are at the same time expressly subsumed under what is not bound up with sense-faculties (*anindriyabaddha*), hence insentient. An unambiguous doctrinal interpretation of the everyday view that plants die is Vibh-a 101: “What we [normally] call (*nāma*) ‘dying’ holds good only for what is bound up with sense-faculties; in the case of what is not bound up with sense-faculties, there is no[thing] to be called] ‘dying’ [in the ordinary sense of the word]. To say ‘the crops have died, the tree has died’ is merely common usage. In reality such expressions indicate only that crops, etc., are subject to decay and annihilation” (*indriyabaddhassa’ eva maraṇaṃ nāma hoti, anindriyabaddhassa maraṇaṃ nāma natthi ....*; “*sassaṃ mataṃ, rukkho mato*” *ti idaṃ pana vohāramattam eva; atthato pana evarūpāni vacanāni sassāḍḍhiṇaṃ khayavayabhāvam eva dīpenti.*). Cf. also VisM VIII.1: *rukkho mato lohaṃ mataṃ ti-āḍḍisu saṃmutimaraṇaṃ*.



with more complex faculties and as participating in the process of karma-directed *saṃsāra* (see § 10.2) turns out to be baseless. But even if her presupposition, viz., that plants possess the sense of touch, were accepted, at least some aspects of her conclusion would remain problematic. I shall first (§ 33) discuss her assumption that the sense of touch somehow involves the other sense-faculties, and then (§ 34) her thesis that plants, being endowed with at least the sense of touch and hence sentient, must have been regarded as participating in the karma-directed *saṃsāra*.

**33.0.** After having admitted that the “five sense faculties are ordinarily thought to be mutually exclusive” and that this is the usual way they are portrayed in the *Nikāyas* (257b / 144), FINDLY goes on to contrast this with the “more pronounced Buddhist belief ... that touch is the one sense faculty that pervades all the others, that touch underlies all the other senses, and that at base there is only one sense organ, that of the skin ...” (2002: 257b).<sup>161</sup> Yet this sentence juxtaposes, or even tacitly equates, quite different views. Regarding the sense of touch as *pervading* the other senses is hardly the same as taking it to *underlie* the others in the sense of being *presupposed* by them, and to consider it as being in reality the *only* sense organ, fulfilling the functions of all senses, is yet another thing.

**33.1.** In post-canonical Theravāda Abhidharma the sense of touch is indeed stated to pervade the whole body or at any rate all ‘acquired’ matter (*upādīṇṇa-rūpa*)<sup>162</sup> in the body,<sup>163</sup> comprising the other mate-

---

<sup>161</sup> Cf. FINDLY 2008: 145: “... touch is said to be the one sense faculty that pervades all the others. As the sense that underlies all others, the only sense organ at base, then, is that of the skin.” Or 147: “... touch ... is the foundation of all reception of sense data ...”.

<sup>162</sup> See §§ 19.1–2 with fns. 108 and 114.

<sup>163</sup> VisM XIV.52 (≈ Asl 311,7–11; cf. FINDLY 2008: 128; 146): *yāvatā pana ima-smim kāye upādīṇṇarūpaṃ nāma atthi, sabbattha kāyo* [Asl: *kāyāyatanam*, i.e., *kāyendriyaṃ*] *kappāsapaṭale sineho viya ... tiṭṭhati*; XIV.58: “[The faculties of male and female sex] both pervade the whole body, just as the sense of touch does” (*tadubhayaṃ pi kāyappasādo [= kāyendriyaṃ] viya sakalasārīrabhayaṃ*). For a simi-

rial sense faculties,<sup>164</sup> but it does *not* underlie the other senses as a *conditio sine qua non* for their presence, for in the Theravāda system the heavenly beings of the *rūpadhātu* are endowed with the senses of sight and hearing but not with the sense of touch.<sup>165</sup>

33.2. In the Vaibhāṣika system, on the other hand, the sense of touch not only pervades the other senses<sup>166</sup> but also underlies them in the sense of being presupposed by them<sup>167</sup> and never being absent where they are present.<sup>168</sup> But this is *not* meant to imply that a sentient being possessing the sense of touch must also be endowed with the

---

lar definition in the Yogācāra tradition, see the *Pañcaskandhaka-bhāṣya* by Sa'i rtsa lag (\*Prthivībandhu, or rather \*Vasubandhu?): "The atoms of the [sense of touch] constantly envelop the whole body like a skin or hide" (*de'i* [= *kāyendriyasya*] *rdul phran ni pags pa'am ko ba bzhin du lus thog thag khyab par gnas so*: Tj P hi: 108b1-2).

<sup>164</sup> The pervasion is to be understood only as an intermingling of the respective 'molecules' (*kalāpa*), not in the sense that a sense-of-touch-'atom' is integrated into each 'molecule' of the other senses, as in the Vaibhāṣika theory (see fn. 166): cf. KARUNADASA 1989: 157.

<sup>165</sup> KARUNADASA 1989: 162. Cf. Kv VIII.7.

<sup>166</sup> According to AKBh 53,1-7, the "molecules" of all the other bodily sense-faculties include a sense-of-touch-atom. Cf. KARUNADASA 1989: 157.

<sup>167</sup> AKVy 123,25-26: *yatra hi cakṣuḥ śrotrādi vā, tatra kāyendriyeṇa bhavitavyaṁ, tatpratibaddhavr̥ttitvāc cakṣurādīnām*.

<sup>168</sup> Vi 792c9-10 and 25: "Who is endowed with the faculty of sight (*cakṣur-indriya*), is necessarily endowed with five faculties (*indriya*); with the remaining [faculties], not necessarily. 'Endowed with five', viz., the faculties of sight, touch, life, mind (*manas*) and neutral feeling (*upekṣā*). ... As [one who is endowed with] the faculty of sight, so also [one who is endowed with the faculty of] hearing, smelling or tasting [is necessarily endowed with five faculties, viz., this faculty plus the faculties of touch, life, mind and neutral feeling]" (若成就眼根, 彼定成就五。餘不定。成就五者, 謂眼身命意捨根。... 如眼根, 耳鼻舌根亦爾。; see also AKBh 51,2-3); Vi 793a7-12, esp. 9-12: "As for the faculties of sight, hearing, smelling and tasting, ... when one is born in the *kāmadhātu*, one is either endowed or not endowed [with them]. ... As for the faculty of touch, when one is born in the *kāma-* or *rūpadhātu* ..., one is [necessarily] endowed [with it]" (眼耳鼻舌根, ... 生欲界 或成就 或不成就 ...。身根, 生欲色界 則成就。.)

other sense faculties.<sup>169</sup> Anyway, if this were implied in the case of plants, their characterization as *ekindriya* would be misleading, for this expression would not convey any *specific* information about them unless understood, as in Jainism,<sup>170</sup> in the sense of “having *only* one sense faculty”, in contrast to other sentient beings who have more than one.<sup>171</sup>

33.3. This argument (viz., that no specific information on plants would be conveyed) would also work under the presupposition of a general *ekendriya-vāda*, i.e., the theory that there is basically only one sense organ, viz., the skin (or the sense faculty residing in it), different parts of which perform different functions like seeing, etc.<sup>172</sup> I.e., it would not make sense to characterize plants specifically as *ekindriya* unless what is meant is that in their case only one function of the multifunctional skin, viz., receiving impressions of touch, is working. Moreover, no such theory is, to my knowledge, attested to

---

<sup>169</sup> Vi 792c26–293a1: “Who is endowed with the faculty of touch (*kāyendriya*), is necessarily endowed with four faculties (*indriya*); with the remaining [faculties], not necessarily. ‘Endowed with four’, viz., the faculties of touch, life, mind and neutral feeling (*upekṣā*). ‘With the remaining [faculties], not necessarily’: with the remaining 18 faculties, one is either endowed or not endowed. As for the faculty of sight (*cakṣurindriya*), if one has the faculty of sight, one is endowed with it; if one lacks it (i.e., is blind), one is not endowed with it. ...” (若成就身根 彼定成就四。餘不定。成就四者，謂 身命意捨根。餘不定者，餘十八根 或成就 或不成就。眼根，眼根具者 則成就。不具者 不成就。; see also AKBh 50,22). Cf. also the fact that at the moment of rebirth (/conception) the only material sense-faculty is the sense of touch, with the others arising later (Kv-a 148,1-3; AKBh 47,18-19; AKVy 285,2-4; cf. also YBh 24,10-13). Even so, FINDLY’s (2002: 257a; cf. 2008: 144) statement that the sense of touch “survives the scattering of faculties at death” sounds problematic, suggesting as it does that the sense of touch is a kind of transmigrating entity.

<sup>170</sup> BALBIR 2000: 22–23.

<sup>171</sup> The *Mahābhārata* passage (crit. ed. 12.177.10–18) proving that trees have all the five senses (see fn. 152) significantly does not label them *ekendriya*.

<sup>172</sup> For this theory and its presumable advocates, see the exhaustive discussion in PREISENDANZ 1994, pt. 2: 609–622 (n. 206).

in Buddhist sources.<sup>173</sup> Still less is there any clue for assuming an *ekendriya-vāda* of this kind specially for plants, according to which, in contrast to humans and animals endowed with five different material sense-faculties, plants would have only one multifunctional sense organ like the skin in the aforementioned theory. The main reason for FINDLY's speculation in this direction seems to be that she deliberately conflates the sense of touch, i.e. the specifically tactile 'body-sense' (*kāyindriya*), with the unspecified contact of *any* sense-faculty (including even the faculty of thought, *manas*) with its respective objects, because the term denoting this kind of contact, viz. '*phassa*', is derived from the same verbal root (Skt.  $\sqrt{\text{sprś}}$ ) as the terms for the function of the tactile sense, viz., to touch (*phusati*), and its objects, viz., tangibles (*phoṭṭhabba*).<sup>174</sup> But such a conflation seems quite arbitrary and is, as far as I can see, not supported by the Buddhist tradition.

34. Let me now turn to FINDLY's thesis that plants, having at least the sense of touch, must also have sentience or consciousness, contact (*phassa*) with objects and hence feelings (*vedanā*) of pleasure or pain, desire, etc., in the sense of the (ten- or twelve-linked) chain of origination in dependence (*paṭicca-samuppāda*), and should therefore be regarded as participating in the karma-directed *samsāra*. As in the case of the sense of touch, FINDLY tries to support her conclusion mainly<sup>175</sup> by adducing observable facts and casual textual references,

---

<sup>173</sup> Cf. also PREISENDANZ 1994: 612–615.

<sup>174</sup> Cf., e.g., FINDLY 2008: 147 (emphasis mine): "One conclusion from this, then, is that if plants are in fact endowed with touch ..., and if *touch or contact* is the foundation of all reception of sense data, then plant experience must be seen as belonging to the Buddhist scheme of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* ...".

<sup>175</sup> For an infelicitous attempt to derive consciousness or cognition (*saṃjñā*) in plants from textual evidence see fn. 76. Likewise, FINDLY's (2008: 154; 226) reference to the Abhidhammic distinction of *ajjhata* and *bahiddhā* (Dhs 187 f: ## 1044–1045) in order to characterize plant consciousness as "inward" or "interior" (in the sense of the brahminical concept of *antaḥsaṃjñā*, for which see WEZLER 1987b) is misleading. Both corporeal and mental factors are *ajjhata* in so far as they are personally (*ajjhataṃ*) and individually (*paccattaṃ*, not "self-referable" in an epistemic

mostly in similes, to phenomena which she takes to imply the presence of consciousness, feelings or needs and desires<sup>176</sup> in plants, or by taking passages mentioning the growth and variety of plants or their reproductive continuity to suggest their participation, somehow or other, in karma-directed *saṃsāra* (259a / 230 f),<sup>177</sup> as in Jainism and

---

sense!) owned (*niyaka* etc.) by the respective sentient being itself (or, in the context of the practice of mindfulness: by the respective person himself or herself), and “external” (*bahiddhā*) are the same corporeal and mental factors in so far as they are personally and individually owned by another sentient being (or person). In this passage, only ‘acquired’ (*upādiṇṇa*: see fn. 108) factors, i.e., factors forming part of sentient beings, are taken into consideration, hence no constituents of plants, which are reckoned among the ‘unacquired’ (see § 19.2 with fn. 112). When they are included, they fall exclusively under the category “external”, as is made explicit in Dhs 241,33-34 (# 1418): “matter not bound up with sense-faculties (i.e., ‘unacquired’ matter, including plants: see fn. 112) is [exclusively] ‘external’” (*anindriya-baddha-rūpaṃ ... bahiddhā*, corr. with Asl 423,6).

<sup>176</sup> E.g., according to FINDLY, the *empirical fact* (“we can observe”) that plants respond to sun and water in that “leaves turn toward sun and roots turn toward water” suggests the presence of consciousness (*viññāṇa*) in plants (2002: 260a-b), with the tacit implication that even the Buddhists could not but realize this. And canonical passages according to which seeds, in order to grow, must be planted in a fertile field and receive a continuous water supply imply that plants were taken to have needs or even desires (257a with n. 40 / 161 with n. 301), while the fact that they adapt to the soil and to weather conditions indicates “intention” (*cetanā*) and “cultivation” (*bhāvanā*) (257a / 164).

<sup>177</sup> It is, I might note, not quite correct to say that Thī vs. 499 “compares the succession of leaves, twigs, and grasses to that of fathers”. Rather, the verse has to be interpreted in line with SN II 178 (no. 15.1; cf. NORMAN, 1971: 173). In this sermon, the unfathomableness of a beginning of *saṃsāra* is illustrated by pointing out that the series of one’s mother, mother’s mother, etc. (the Sanskrit version at YBh 197,6–198,1 adds: father, father’s father, etc.), could not be measured even by the number resulting from all grasses, pieces of wood, branches and leaves growing in our continent *Jambudvīpa* when they are cut into bits of four inches. There is no mention of a *series* of plants. And at Mīl 269 it is the king, not the Buddhist master, who illustrates his thesis that *nibbāna* must have a cause by pointing to various chains of cause and effect from everyday experience: son – father – grandfather, pupil – teacher – teacher’s teacher, or sprout – seed – seed of the seed. In none of the illustrations is karmic causality involved; the sequence of generations is, of course, something quite different from the karma-directed sequence of rebirths of one individual. I do not see how any clue for a doctrinal position of plants being

most strands of Hinduism.<sup>178</sup> I have already (§ 29) stated my objections to deriving doctrinal positions from descriptive passages and similes referring to empirical facts as expressed in everyday language unless this is explicitly done in the Buddhist texts themselves. But even if we accept the presupposition that in earliest Buddhism plants were somehow still tacitly believed to have rudimentary experiences<sup>179</sup> and perhaps even appetitions, this need not necessarily mean that they were regarded as capable of free decisions and morally qualified actions;<sup>180</sup> FINDLY herself admits that her conclusion for

---

involved in karma-directed *saṃsāra* could be gathered from these passages, even if the *caveat* against using similes for this purpose were ignored. By way of contrast, at VisM XXII.87 (PTS-ed. p. 688; transl. NĀNAMOLI p. 715) the tree propagating over generations is indeed paralleled with the *khandhas* of a certain individual which reproduce themselves in the process of rebirth, but what the simile wants to demonstrate is that just as the sap pervades the whole tree so the defilements (*kilesa*) cling to all the five *khandhas*. We are not entitled to stretch the simile beyond this and derive from it that plants are bodies of ‘transmigrating’ sentient beings.

<sup>178</sup> Cf. FINDLY 2008: 209–219. Cf. also, e.g., HALBFASS 2000: 25; 60; 71 f; 139; 171 f; 201 f. On the early Upaniṣads: SCHMITHAUSEN 1995a and 1995b.

<sup>179</sup> The ascription of the sense of touch to plants would indeed not make sense unless it leads to some kind of experience of tangibles and of pain or pleasure, i.e., in Buddhist terms, some kind of sensation (*viññāna*) and feeling (*vedanā*). This is made explicit (in Buddhist terminology, cf. fn. 60!) in *Vimativinodanī* (CSCD) I # 365 (Saṅghādisesa-kaṇḍo 7), where it is stated that “[in Sp 575] the expression ‘having [only] one sense faculty’ is referred to the sense of touch because when it is stated [in the *Suttavibhaṅga*] that [people consider a tree] to have only one sense-faculty this is meant to [point out] which among the *material* sense faculties is [regarded by people to be] present [in a tree],” and that those who regard plants as living beings of course assume that they have also *manindriya*, i.e., some form of mind, probably tactile perception (*rūpindriyesu vijjāmānaṃ sandhāya ekindriyatā vuccatīti āha “kāyindriyaṃ sandhāyā”ti. te hi manindriyaṃ pi bhūtagāmānaṃ icchanti*).

<sup>180</sup> FINDLY’s argument that because plants have the sense of touch (*kāyindriya*) they should also be capable of bodily action (*kāyakamma*) because the use of the same word (i.e., *kāya*) in both cases is hardly coincidental (258a–b / 223) is not convincing. The idea that in some (non-human) existences karma can only be consumed but not accumulated is not rare in Indian thought (cf., e.g., HALBFASS 2000: 168; P.V. KANE: *History of Dharmaśāstra*, vol. IV, Poona <sup>2</sup>1972: 176 f with n. 419; cf. also *Plants* # 36.5.5 with n. 568, actually referred to by FINDLY [259b / 231], but

consciousness in plants (and *a fortiori* for their participation in karma-directed *saṃsāra*) rests on implication (260a/227; cf. 230). It would rather appear that this issue was simply not considered or even deliberately left undecided.<sup>181</sup> Logically, it is true, the mere possibility of sentient beings helplessly suffering without being karmically responsible for their status appears incompatible with the fundamental assumption that one's present predicament is not a matter of mere chance or divine arbitrariness but due to one's own former wholesome or unwholesome actions. But, to say it again, we must be careful to distinguish between what logically follows (or what we think or realize to follow) from a position and what people at a certain period thought or realized to follow from it. To be sure, in doctrinally consolidated Buddhism (at least Indian Buddhism) the problem was realized and solved by rejecting the existence of primitive sentient beings not (or not yet) participating in karma-directed *saṃsāra*. In Jainism, on the other hand, such beings were expressly admitted in the form of the micro-vegetal *nigodas*.<sup>182</sup> In earliest Buddhism, however, a systematic alignment of borderline areas may have been felt unnecessary or even inexpedient.

## 5.2. OKADA's Arguments for Plants as Sentient Beings

35. OKADA, too, incidentally adduces similes in order to show that there are exceptions to the usual treatment of plants as insentient even in Mahāyāna narrative literature; she refers, e.g., to a passage from the *Śrīmālāsūtra* of the *Mahāratnakūṭa* collection, which states that

---

see fn. 49). This view would seem to be characteristic of karma theories with a strong ritual component, but it is not entirely incompatible with ethicized theories either.

<sup>181</sup> As FINDLY herself states (260b/229): "It makes most sense, then, to argue for an agnostic position."

<sup>182</sup> More precisely: the *nitya-nigodas*. Cf., e.g., SCHUBRING 1935: 131; 133 f; JAINI 1980: 224–228; BUTZENBERGER 1998: 43–45 (with further references in n. 164); HALBFASS 2000: 71 f; BRUHN 2007: 25 (with further references); FINDLY 2008: 118. No Pkt. equivalent of the term '*nigoda*' seems to occur in the earliest Jaina scriptures.

all wholesome dharmas of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are based on the *mahāyāna* just as all seeds and plants sprout and thrive with the earth, or soil, as their basis.<sup>183</sup> But on the whole she is concerned with evidence that deserves to be assessed more carefully. We may divide this evidence into two categories: 1. The cases where the relation of a tree deity to the tree is so close that it suggests a soul-body relation<sup>184</sup> (ch. 5.2.1), and 2. cases where plants react to extraordinary spiritual achievements (ch. 5.2.2).

### 5.2.1 Tree Deities and Numinous Trees

36. OKADA is perfectly right in highlighting the close connection of the tree deity or tree spirit with the tree in the *Bhaddasāla-jātaka* (no. 465). In this text, as I had also pointed out in *Plants* # 5.4, the tree spirit has to die when his tree is felled, and he even calls the tree his body (*sarīra*). But although a similar close connection is expressed or presupposed in a couple of other *Jātakas* as well,<sup>185</sup> it is, contrary to what OKADA seems to suggest,<sup>186</sup> surely not typical of the Theravāda *Jātaka* literature as a whole. Above all, it is indispensable to distinguish the various textual layers, especially the *gāthās* and the various prose sections.<sup>187</sup> As far as I can see from an admittedly very cursory inspection of the material, the general idea expressed in the

<sup>183</sup> T 11.310: 675a9-11, quoted in OKADA 1998: 282 n. 2 (1). For another example, see § 88.

<sup>184</sup> See § 9 with fns. 43-44.

<sup>185</sup> OKADA 1999: 108 n. 10 mentions the *Koṭisimbālī-jātaka* (no. 412) and the *Phandana-jātaka* (no. 475). Perhaps one could add the *Haṭṭhipāla-jātaka* (no. 509) where the tree deity is threatened with destruction (*niṭṭhāna*) through the cutting of the tree (IV 474,16-21 and 475,16-19).

<sup>186</sup> OKADA 1998: 283 # 3.7: パーリジャータカの草木神はこの様に草木を身体として有し、海神など他の天部の神々とは全く異なっている。("The plant deities of the Pāli *Jātaka*, in this way, have the plant as their body and are thus completely different from the ocean deity and similar divine spirits.").

<sup>187</sup> For detailed information on the structure and literary history of the Pāli *Jātaka* collection see VON HINÜBER 1998, and, briefly, id. 1996, pp. 54-58.



*prose* is that tree deities  *dwell in trees*<sup>188</sup> — occasionally also minor plant spirits dwelling in bunches of grass, etc., are mentioned<sup>189</sup> — or in palaces (*vimāna*) located in trees or in one of their parts.<sup>190</sup> The tree

<sup>188</sup> Cf., e.g., Jā III 397,16: *Bodhisatto koṭisimbaliyaṃ rukkhadevatā hutvā nibbatti*; III 34,2 f; I 223,23 f: *varaṇarukkhe adhivatthā devatā*; II 385,27 f: *tasmim rukkhe adhivatthā devatā*. Cf. MN I 306,4 f (*sāle adhivatthā devatā*) and AN III 370,11 (*nigrodharāje adhivatthā devatā*). Also Mil 173,14 and 27 f.

<sup>189</sup> *Kusanāli-jātaka* (no. 121; cf. OKADA 1998: 283 #3.6, last item; FINDLY 2008: 275): *kusanāligacche devatā* (Jā I 441,19). Cf. also MN I 306,7-8 and SN IV 302,22-23, mentioning, besides the deities of parks, groves and [special] trees, deities /spirits inhabiting herbs, grasses and forest trees (*osadhi-tiṇa-vanappaṭṭisu adhivatthā devatā*).

<sup>190</sup> E.g., Jā I 328,16-25 (tree deities exhorted not to move into *vimānas* in [solitary] courtyard trees but nonetheless doing so). Cf. also Ps II 373,3-6 and SāraSg 237,5-19: tree deities live in *vimānas* that are invisible to human eyes; if the *vimāna* is located in the branches, it is destroyed to the extent the branches are broken or cut; if it is located in the tree as a whole, it persists as long as at least the root is intact. The Mahāyānist *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* (MPST S 209b4-5; Dh 415a12-13; Fa 889b23-24) states that tree deities dwell in trees but that one does not know in which part. OKADA (1998: 283; see fn. 186) stresses that the conception of other nature deities/spirits is entirely different from that of plant deities. As evidence she points out (281 n. 13) that ocean and river deities do not dwell in the ocean or river but are only guardians of these spheres, not in the sense of protecting the ocean or river itself but rather in the sense of protecting sentient beings from harm. However, this matter seems to require further study. At any rate, at Jā VI 555,22 deities dwelling in the river (*nadiyā adhivatthā devatā*) are mentioned (same terminology as in the case of tree deities, cf. fn. 188!), and in the *Kimchanda-jātaka* (no. 511) at least the commentary (Jā V 6,15-16) takes the river deity (*nadī-devatā*) to live in a palace situated in the Ganges, and her (fem., cf. V 4,16-22) appearance in the air above the river (V 3,22) is entirely in agreement with how tree deities may manifest themselves (see fn. 193). Cf. perhaps also SāraSg 246,25-27 (≈ Sv-pt II 202), explaining the compound *paṭhavi-devatā*: “They say that there is a deity dwelling in (but v. l.: [presiding] over) the Great Earth similar to the ocean deity [dwelling in the ocean]” (*ettha samuddadevatā viya mahāpaṭhaviyā adhivatthā* [v. l. and Sv-pt only: *adhi-devatā nāma kira atthi*]). The same notions obtain even in the case of deities residing in artefacts like a ‘gate-room’ (*dvārakoṭṭhaka*: Jā I 228,25-29) or a parasol (*chatta*: Jā VI 4,13). And in the *Samudda-jātaka* (Jā II 441 f = no. 296) the ocean deity does not protect people but, if anything, the ocean itself (by chasing away the crow which wants to empty it, though this is of course impossible), whereas at Jā II 308,8-13 the *tree* deity is summoned to resume her function of protecting *human*

deities are not locked up in their trees. They may appear to humans in heavenly splendour or otherwise,<sup>191</sup> either in some part of the tree<sup>192</sup> or in the air,<sup>193</sup> or may even visit humans at home (as the tree deity in the *Bhaddasāla-jātaka* does)<sup>194</sup>. Tree and plant deities may also assemble or visit each other.<sup>195</sup> Tree deities dislike the destruction of their trees because it involves the destruction of their palaces<sup>196</sup> (though not necessarily the destruction of their lives)<sup>197</sup>. Sometimes they are described as searching for another abode.<sup>198</sup> In other cases, as in the *Bhaddasāla-jātaka*, the life of the tree deity is, to be sure, closely connected with the tree and the palace the tree constitutes or contains, but even in this case the prose text merely states that the life

---

beings who have entered the forest. Cf. also the story in the Chinese *Dharmapada* commentary (T 4.211:591c17 ff, esp. c23-27; SHIRATO 1998: 15a) of a tree deity feeding travellers.

<sup>191</sup> Jā IV 475,20-21 (*rukkhadevatā mahantenānubhāvena khandhavivarato nik-khamitvā* ...); Dh-p-a II 16,3-4 and 13 (tree deity is advised to step out of the tree in a red garment and actually does so); Jā I 442,20-25 (grass-bunch deity appears in the form of a chameleon); Sv III 941,14-16 ≈ Sn-a II 419,21-22 ≈ Ps II 135,5-6 (tree deity approaches a king in the appearance of a squirrel). Cf. also Jā I 69,4-15 (with Sv II 572,7-9), suggesting that a tree spirit may illuminate the tree with the splendour of his body, although in the given case it is the Bodhisatta shortly before his Awakening who does so.

<sup>192</sup> E.g., Jā I 169,14: *khandhaviṭape thatvā*; IV 475,20-21 (*khandhavivarato nik-khamitvā*: see fn. 191).

<sup>193</sup> E.g., Jā I 168,2-3: *ākāse pallamkena nisīditvā*.

<sup>194</sup> Jā IV 154,10-13.

<sup>195</sup> Jā II 357,27–358,5: One tree deity approaches another (cf. 356,17) and then goes to a different forest; cf. Jā I 442,14-18: Forest deities and a grass-bunch deity (cf. 441,19) visit a tree deity; cf. also 442,29–443,1. Every fortnight tree deities assemble in the Himalayas and are asked whether they have kept to the “*dhamma* of trees” (Sp 759; cf. *Plants* p. 74 with n. 418).

<sup>196</sup> E.g., Jā III 209,25-26 and 210,10-11; Ps II 373,3-9.

<sup>197</sup> Thus clearly Jā I 328,25–329,1. Cf. also AN III 370,4-9 (tree deity stands weeping (*rudamānā*, fem.) beside her tree, which had been overthrown by a thunderstorm).

<sup>198</sup> Jā I 328,30-31. Cf. also fn. 205.

of the deity lasts only as long as the palace does,<sup>199</sup> and does not call the tree the body of the tree deity.<sup>200</sup> It is only in the *gāthās* that the tree deity states that by the cutting of the tree he will be separated from his body, and asks to be cut piece by piece in order to avoid crushing his offspring growing around him.<sup>201</sup> OKADA is right in assuming that the speaker of these verses is obviously a numinous sentient being *embodied* in a tree, or the tree *itself* as a numinous sentient being.<sup>202</sup> Yet it is surely not a rudimentary sentient being possessing

<sup>199</sup> Jā IV 154,5-6: *vimānapariyantikam eva kho pana mayham jīvitaṃ*.

<sup>200</sup> Similarly in the *Phandana-jātaka* (no. 475: IV 209,26-28): "... he destroys my palace, and I myself shall perish" (... *mama vimānaṃ nāseti, ahaṃ ca nassissāmi*). In this *Jātaka*, the tree deity, retaliating enmity, is *not* identified with the Bodhisatta; the deity living in that forest who witnessed the event and who is identified with the Bodhisatta in the *samodhāna* must be another deity. On the other hand, in the *Palāsa-jātaka* (no. 307) even in the *gāthās* (Jā III 24,1 and 9) the tree is said to be *acetana* (not necessarily insentient but in any event lacking cognitive faculties like understanding speech: *Plants* n. 459) and characterized as an *abode* of a spirit or of spirits (*bhūta-nivāsa*).

<sup>201</sup> Jā 465 vs. 6-7 and vs. 10-11 = IV 155,26-156,2 and 156,23-26.

<sup>202</sup> In the *gāthās* of the *Phandana-jātaka* (no. 475), too, it is the tree itself that speaks to the woodcutter and is stated to have retaliated enmity (Jā IV 210,19 [vs. 20] and 23 [vs. 22]). In the *Koṭisimbali-jātaka* (no. 412: III 397-400), the *tree itself* is addressed (vs. 122; comm. 398,20 explains: the *deity* is addressed by the name of the tree!), trembles (vs. 121; comm. 398,7-8: the *deity* trembles with fear and thereby the tree, too, trembles!)<sup>a</sup> and realizes (vs. 124) that the parasitic trees "will strangle me and will make me a non-tree (*arukkha*)". As the commentary (399,9-10: *maṃ arukkham eva karissanti sabbaso bhañjissanti*) suggests, the latter expression would seem to mean: will completely destroy me. Even if we take *arukkha* as a *bahuvrīhi*, it may be understood in the sense of: will make me treeless = bodiless, i.e., will kill me (cf. *rukkhāse ... hatā* in vs. 125). Cf. also the *gāthās* of Jā no. 370 (*Palāsa-jātaka*). — Also in Tamilnadu (SCHULER 2009: 227-229 with ns. 37-39 and 50; cf. *ibid.* 258), certain trees are regarded as the abode of female or male spirits (*devatā* or *pey*, i.e., *preta*: cf. § 38 with fn. 208), and when the tree is felled the spirit loses his or her home or is even bodily injured. The latter notion suggests that the tree is sometimes almost viewed as the *pey*'s body. And like the tree spirits in the *Jātakas*, the *pey* whose tree has been felled becomes angry and aggressive.

only one sense-faculty, viz., the sense of touch, as in Jainism, but rather a complex, rational being, able to understand and use speech, and capable of compassion and self-sacrifice but also, as other stories suggest,<sup>203</sup> of fear and enmity.

37. However, many *Jātaka-gāthās* are not specifically Buddhist creations but rather gathered from a stock of old Indian narrative and gnomic literature<sup>204</sup>. It is not always easy to decide whether ideas expressed in them were *shared* by the learned members of the early Buddhist community or just *tolerated* by them in a popular genre like the *Jātakas*. If my interpretation of the evidence of the early Sūtra and Vinaya materials is correct, it is conceivable that, in view of the undecided status of plants in earliest Buddhism, stories in which trees or other plants played a part were not, as a matter of principle, precluded from being incorporated in the *Jātaka* genre. In the course of doctrinal consolidation, however, the situation changed. When viewed as rudimentary borderline beings, plants could easily be excluded from the range of animate, sentient creatures. But when emphasis was on their numinous, more anthropomorphic aspect, the matter was not that easy. In this case, the Buddhist solution was to clearly detach the numinous aspect of trees and plants from their natural aspect and to conceive it as a deity or spirit *inhabiting* the tree or the plant.<sup>205</sup> Con-

---

<sup>a</sup> For a similar interpretation with regard to earthquake, cf. SāraSg (see fn. 190) 246,25-29 (≈ Sv-pt II 202).

<sup>203</sup> See fns. 200 and 202. Similarly the tree-inhabiting *peys* in Tamilnadu (see fn. 202).

<sup>204</sup> Cf. VON HINÜBER 1998: 190–191.

<sup>205</sup> In this perspective, WODILLA (1928: 4–21) is doubtless right in taking the idea of the tree as the abode of a deity to be a more developed stage than the belief in the tree or plant itself as a numinous being. But it may well be that on a popular level the belief had been less clear-cut, oscillating between both concepts as two facets of a more dynamic belief in the numinous nature of plants, especially old and large trees (cf. also NUGTEREN 2005: 170). The Buddhists would then merely have eliminated the ambiguity by unequivocally distinguishing the numinous being from the tree or plant. From a practical point of view, this clear-cut distinction between the tree or plant and the numinous being made it possible to conceive of the latter as,

sequently, the stories in which a tree or plant played a part had either to be omitted or had to be explicitly interpreted in terms of the tree deity concept, reducing the tree or plant itself to a mere abode of the deity or spirit. Exceptions as in the *Bhaddasāla-jātaka* would seem to have survived due to the constraints of the narrative in which they were embedded.

38. Whether the fact that in the Northern tradition(s) there are, according to OKADA's important observation (see § 9), no *Jātakas* in which the Bodhisattva is identified with a tree deity has something to do with this shift, requires further investigation. There may have been other reasons as well. For example, in the Northern tradition(s) tree deities may not have been considered a suitable type of being for the Buddha's former existences because, being related to the ambivalent *gandharvas*<sup>206</sup> and, above all, to the *yakṣas* or *yakṣiṇīs*,<sup>207</sup> who in the *Peta-* and *Vimāna-vatthu* are exceptionally fortunate and powerful

---

principally, independent of a given tree or plant, so that in felling the tree or cutting the plant one does not necessarily kill the spirit. Actually, at least in the case of larger trees, the spirit is usually asked to move to another tree: cf. BECHERT 1984: 563; TOKIYA 1985: 169; *Plants* # 39.1.2 with n. 584; SCHOPEN 1997: 233; SOBISCH 2005: 112 and 131 n. 53. Cf. also the passage from the *Bṛhatsamhitā* cited in FINDLY 2008: 272. Since according to SCHOPEN (1997: 232) the *Tridaṇḍaka* is a kind of formulary adaptable to different occasions, its employment in the context of the ritual of felling a tree on the one hand and in funeral rites on the other can hardly be used as evidence for trees being regarded as sentient beings.

<sup>206</sup> Cf. OBERLIES 2005: 102 n. 22 (*gandharvas* believed to live in trees). As for the ambivalence of the *gandharvas*, see *ibid.* 106–107 (# 8): on the one hand helpful, on the other greedy for women and a cause of possession and madness. For the connection of *gandharvas* with trees, see also SN III 250.

<sup>207</sup> For malevolent tree spirits regarded as *yakṣas*, cf. Jā no. 398: III 325,19–21 (prose) and 328,14 (vs.). In Jā no. 402, the tree spirit (III 343,16 f) addressed as *yakkha* in the *gāthās* (III 345,4) merely announces mortal danger. In the *Bhaddasāla-jātaka*, even the benign tree deity identical with the Bodhisatta is called a *yakkha* in one of the *gāthās*. Similarly Jā IV 4,3 (v.l. B<sup>d</sup>: *rukkhadevatā*) with 4,11 and 6,7. Cf. also HARA 2007: 54 and 59; ZIN 2003: 219 (concluding that '*devatā*' and '*yakṣiṇī*' were exchangeable terms in the Bharhut period).

spirits of the dead (*mahiddhika peta*)<sup>208</sup> but in the course of time came to be regarded more and more as evil demons,<sup>209</sup> they often appear as fierce and dangerous beings, who devour men or must be propitiated with bloody animal and even human sacrifices.<sup>210</sup> Besides, in the majority of the *Jātakas* in which the Bodhisatta is a tree deity<sup>211</sup> he is, significantly, not an actor in the plot. He rather appears to have been introduced merely as an eyewitness to the events,<sup>212</sup> especially in stories which take place in the wilderness and in which none of the actors seems to be suitable for being identified with the Bodhisatta. It may well be that introducing the Bodhisatta as a tree deity was a device, of only one part of the tradition, to integrate such stories into the genre.<sup>213</sup>

<sup>208</sup> STEDE 1914: 41–43. Cf. also SCHULER 2009 (see fn. 202) and FINDLY 2008: 276–278.

<sup>209</sup> ZIN 2003: 219–220 and 256. Cf. also SCHULER 2009, ch. 7.3.1: *yakṣīs*, who may also be tree spirits, devour babies.

<sup>210</sup> Cf., e.g., the *Dummedha-jātaka* (no. 50: I 260,8 ff), the *Sutano-jātaka* (no. 398: III 325,20 ff) and the *Dhonasāka-jātaka* (no. 353 : III 159,25–160,8). Buddhist commentarial literature presupposes this custom but in several places has tree deities (in conformity with Buddhist ethics) dissuade people from such bloody offerings: e.g., Jā no. 19 (I 169); no. 113 (I 425,11–13); Dh-p-a II 14–19; cf. also Jā no. 537 (V 472,20–23 and 473,25 ff). See VIENNOT 1954: 114–117; NUGTEREN 2005: 173.

<sup>211</sup> See fn. 42.

<sup>212</sup> OKADA 1998: 282 # 3.3.

<sup>213</sup> If it is true that tree deities were (in contrast to the Bodhisatta tree deities in the Theravāda *Jātakas*; cf. OKADA 1998: 230 n. 11) more often than not conceived of, and artistically represented, as females (cf. ZIN 2003: 219; FINDLY 2008: 304; but *ibid.* 273: of both genders), this may furnish yet another explanation for the reticence of the Northern tradition to have the Bodhisattva reborn as a tree deity. In this connection, it is interesting that in the *Bhaddasāla-jātaka* the tree deity appearing to the king is first addressed as a female (Jā IV 154,15 = vs. 1: *kā tvaṃ ... thitā*), and that it is only after the tree deity has introduced himself that the king uses masculine forms (e.g., 155,13 = vs. 4: *abhirūpo si*).

## 5.2.2. Plants Reacting to Extraordinary Events

39. In connection with exceptions to the standard view on plants as insentient, OKADA (1998: 282 n. 2(2)) also refers to a number of passages in which plants are described as reacting to extraordinary spiritual achievements or to events of extraordinary significance. According to a first set of passages,<sup>214</sup> plants and trees bow their heads in reverence before the Bodhisattva on the occasion of (or after) his Awakening or on some similar occasion. In a further passage (from a Chinese version of the *Śyāma-jātaka*),<sup>215</sup> plants are, according to OKADA, stated to have raised their voices and wept (草木が声を上げて泣いた) when Śyāma, the Bodhisattva in a former life, had been killed by a hunting king, although the text merely says that when the king and his entourage approached the hermitage of Śyāma's blind parents there was a rustling noise in the trees, unusual and thus announcing the arrival of strangers.<sup>216</sup> To these passages, one might add

<sup>214</sup> T 11.310: 103b18-20; 3.187: 596c20-22; 3.160: 343b6-7. The pertinent material could easily be increased; cf., e.g., Aṣṭ 255,10-12: grasses, shrubs, herbs and trees bow before Dharmodgata and shower him with flowers produced out of season; similarly *Druma-kinnara-rāja-paripṛcchā-sūtra* (ed. Paul HARRISON, Tokyo 1992) 45,7 ff.

<sup>215</sup> T 3.152: 24c12-13: 王從眾多 草木肅肅有聲。二親聞之 疑其異人, 曰 ...。 Cf. the French translation in CHAVANNES 1962: 158: "... le cortège du roi était nombreux et les herbes et les arbres faisaient un bruit de froissement; les deux parents perçurent (ce bruit) et, supposant qu'il y avait là quelque étranger, ils dirent: ...".

<sup>216</sup> Cf. the parallel at T 3.174: 437b19-21 (王行馳駛 觸動草木 肅肅(v. l. 肅肅)有人聲。父母驚言。此是何人。非我子行。) ≈ T 3.175: 441a25-27 (王行使疾 觸動草木 肅肅有聲。...) ≈ 443a14-15 (駛 for 使, with v. l. 使, but 駛 "to hasten" makes better sense). I understand this to mean: "The king's going being rapid, he stirred the grasses and trees [along the path, so that] there was a rustling sound" (T 174: "... [producing] a rustling sound [indicating that] there was a man [coming]"). I take 肅肅 as an onomatopoeic, equivalent to 蕭蕭 (cf. *HDC* 9: 257a, s. v. 肅肅⑦; cf. also CHAVANNES's rendering [see fn. 215]). Cf. T 3.174: 437c13-14 = T 3.175: 441b18 = 443b6-7: "The spirits (including tree spirits, cf. 437a28) all became afraid and moved [producing] a rustling [sound]" (諸神皆驚 肅肅而動). Cf. also T 4.203: 448b25-26: "Then [Śyāma's] blind parents heard the sound [produced by] the king's walking [in the form of] a rustling. In their hearts, anxiety arose: '[This] is not [the way] our son walks!'" (時盲父母 聞王行聲索索。心生恐怖。非我子行。). For 索索

the episode of the twin *sāla* trees blossoming out of season on the occasion of the *parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha and strewing flowers on his body (DN II 137,20-22). But it should be clear that the aim of these passages is not to make a *doctrinal* statement on the sentience of plants or trees, but rather to *extol* the spiritual supremacy of the Buddha or the Bodhisattva<sup>217</sup> or the extraordinary nature of his achievements: not only sentient beings, but, as one of the passages adduced by OKADA<sup>218</sup> explicitly remarks, even the insentient cannot but miraculously show their reverence.<sup>219</sup> In a slightly more extended

---

see HDC 9: 748b s. v. 索④: like 瑟瑟 “rustle”; DKWJ 8: 989(9125)c: description of a sound, exemplified by the rustling of branches, of the wind and of the wings of birds. —The *Śyāma-jātaka* in the *Haribhaṭṭa-jātakamālā*, too, merely mentions the noise of the dry leaves crushed by the feet of the king (HAHN 1976: 46 and 59 [vs. 42]).

<sup>217</sup> In this sense we must surely also understand vs. 223 of the *Vessantara-jātaka* (Jā VI 513, = *Cariyāpiṭaka* 1.9.35), which states that the high (*ubbiddha*) and broad fruit-trees in the forest, seeing Vessantara’s (= the Bodhisatta’s) children weeping with hunger, spontaneously bend down towards them so that the children might pick their fill. According to one reading (accepted by FINDLY [2008:138] following COWELL and ROUSE but rejected by CPD II 531a and CONE 500b), the trees are even characterized as sorrowful or agitated (*ubbigga* instead of *ubbiddha*). In any case, the presentation of the trees acting like humans is poetic license, with no doctrinal purport. And the real force at work is, as both verses (vs. 225c) and prose (VI 513,18) explicitly state, the Bodhisatta’s miraculous power or charisma (*teja, ānubhāva*).

<sup>218</sup> Viz., T 3.160: 343b6-7: “When [the Bodhisattva] has succeeded in becoming a Buddha, sentient and insentient beings all incline when the Buddha passes by, bow their heads and show respect” (得成佛已 情非情等 於佛行時 皆悉傾側 低頭禮敬); cf. also b3-4: “(When the Buddha is walking,) even insentient things [like] the ground and the trees all bow [to him]; how could sentient beings ever fail to show their respect?” (無情土木 尚皆傾奉。何況有情 而常不敬。). It must, however, be added that T 3.160 is a 12<sup>th</sup> century pseudo-translation of the *Jātakamālā* (BROUGH 1964).

<sup>219</sup> Even so, it is natural that such passages were taken as support for the sentience of the so-called insentient by Far Eastern authors; cf., e.g., GRONER 2000: 489 = (30). Cf. also Li t’ung-hsüan’s (李通玄, see § 116.1c) remark (T 36.1739: 973b27-29), in connection with Gv 128,17-26 (BAvŚ 357b22-28), that sentient and insentient beings all have a common essence (有情無情 皆悉同體). In the Gv passage we read that when the king Mahāprabha (one of Sudhana’s *kalyāṇamitras*) had



Chinese version of the *Śyāma-jātaka*, not only birds and quadrupeds cry and flowers wither when Śyāma is hit by the arrow of the king but a storm also comes up, breaking even trees, the sun eclipses, and fountains dry up.<sup>220</sup> There is surely no reason to deduce sentience from these miraculous reactions, either for the elements or for plants. If any passage in these *Śyāma-jātaka* versions could be taken to imply the sentience of what is normally considered insentient, it would be the statement that Śyāma's behaviour was so compassionate and benevolent that even when treading upon the earth he was afraid she might feel pain.<sup>221</sup> But even this passage should surely not be taken as

---

entered a special *samādhi* characterized by Great Benevolence (*mahāmaitrī*), not only people and animals bowed their heads in his direction, but also the summits of the mountains as well as trees and herbs did so, and even fountains, ponds and rivers directed their current towards him. In the Indian context, these effects are merely intended to underscore the miraculous power of the cultivation of benevolence, and nothing would justify us deriving from them that plants or even mountains and rivers were still regarded as sentient — still less so since a few lines earlier the text points out that the king's *samādhi* even made the whole city and the surrounding area quake and caused all kinds of artefacts to move or resound (Gv 128,10-16).

<sup>220</sup> T 3.174: 437a11-14; 3.175: 440c17-21; 442c5-9. Cf. also the *Śyāma-jātaka* of the *Haribhaṭṭa-jātakamālā*: The sounds produced by the water rushing down from the rocks gives the impression that even the river was grieving (HAHN 1976: 48 and 62 [vs. 52]).

<sup>221</sup> T 3.174: 436c22 (睽至孝慈心 履地常恐地痛), ≈ 3.175: 440c3 f = 442b20 f: “Śyāma was a person of utmost filial piety and humanity (Confucian concepts!), his benevolence (*maitrī*, Buddhist concept!) was unsurpassed. [Even] when treading upon the earth, he was always afraid that the earth might feel pain” (睽至孝仁 慈無有過。蹈地常恐地痛). As is typical of high-standard hermits, Śyāma's overwhelming *maitrī* spreads to his natural environment and creates an atmosphere of friendship and harmony, to the effect that not only deer and birds flock around him, but even predators like lions, tigers, etc., are affected: far from attacking the young ascetic (cf. T 3.174: 437a10 f; 3.175: 442c4 f), they even develop benevolence towards one another (T 3.174: 436c19 f; 3.175: 442b17 f), to the extent that they become vegetarians: “They all drank [only] water and ate [only] fruits”, i.e., did not even injure the plants themselves, like the ascetic (T 3.175: 440c1 = 442b18 f; not in T 3.174). Even the vegetation, springs and ponds, wind and rain become bounteous and delightful (T 3.174: 436c14-17; 3.175: 442b12-16), but this hardly implies that they are regarded as sentient on a doctrinal level.

having a doctrinal import but ought rather be seen as a literary device to highlight Śyāma's all-embracing sympathy.<sup>222</sup> At best, it may be taken to mirror the way in which ideal pre-Buddhist ascetics were considered to have thought and behaved.

40. Although not made use of by FINDLY and OKADA, another couple of canonical passages deserve to be discussed in connection with the problem of the sentience of plants in early Buddhism.<sup>223</sup> At AN II 194,22-25, the Buddha underlines the efficacy of his teaching with the concluding remark that even these big *sāla* trees (standing around him) would attain welfare and happiness for a long time if they were stimulated by his teaching to abandon the unwholesome mental factors and modes of acting and to turn to the wholesome ones — supposing they could think or were endowed with intelligence or rationality (*sace ceteyyūṃ*) —; how much more so will this hold good for human beings (who *are* endowed with rationality). At AN IV 259,19-23, the same phrase is used to underscore the efficacy of the eightfold *uposatha* observance. Similarly, at SN V 377,25-27 the Buddha states that he would even declare that these big *sāla* trees would become 'stream-enterers' (*sotāpanna*) if they were able to understand [the distinction between] good (i.e., salvific) and bad (i.e., misleading) speech (i.e., if they were able to understand his preach-

---

<sup>222</sup> The same holds good for the Bodhisattva's mourning at the sight of ploughing, by which not only worms and insects are killed but also the soil and the young grass are torn up, as described in BCar V.4-5, cited in FINDLY 2008: 49.

<sup>223</sup> My attention was drawn to these passages, years ago, through the kindness of Dr. Mudagamuwe MAITHRIMURTHI. He also mentioned the related idea expressed in *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 5.2.3, where we read: "Even if one were to impart this [doctrine] to a withered stump, it would certainly sprout new branches and grow new leaves" (*yady apy enac chuṣkāya sthānave brūyāj jāyerann evāsmiñ chākhāḥ praroheyuḥ palāśāni*; transl. OLIVELLE 1996: 139, slightly modified). The purport of this passage is obviously to extol the extraordinary power of Truth or its formulation. Its effectivity is clearly automatic, 'magical', not presupposing understanding, for the object affected is a *withered* stump, hence a lifeless, *insentient* thing; the effect occurs regardless of whether *living* plants were considered sentient or not.

ing). It does not, however, appear justified to deduce from these passages a doctrinal judgement on the sentience or insentience of trees (let alone plants in general). The purport of the passages is rather to stress that by correctly understanding and practising the teaching of the Buddha everybody without exception will attain welfare or salvation,<sup>224</sup> and this would even hold good for trees and plants if they were intelligent, rational beings. The addition of this condition<sup>225</sup> would not make sense if the rationality of trees had been taken for granted. It makes sense only if rationality in trees was a matter of doubt, or was believed to be absent, as is made explicit by the commentary on AN IV 259<sup>226</sup> as well as by the Chinese version of SN V 377.<sup>227</sup> In either case, the question of a lower, sub-rational or border-

<sup>224</sup> Cf. Spk-pt (CSCD) Mahāvagga # 1020: “[The Buddha] said [this] while pointing out to [four] very strong trees’ (*sāra*- looks like a hyper-Pālicism for *sāla*-, cf. also T 2.99: 240b6 堅固樹 and Spk III 288,13, reading *mahāsāle sāra-rukkhe*): [i.e.] in order to show that whosoever is of intelligent nature — when he approaches (or: associates with) the Buddha (*mama*), no one’s coming is futile [or] in vain” (*mahāsārarukkhe dassento āha — “yo koci viññujātiko mama ce gocaraṃ gacchati, ekassa āgamanam avañjham amoghaṃ”ti dassetuṃ*).

<sup>225</sup> In AN II 194, the parenthetic addition is missing in the Burmese edition (CSCD), and it is commented upon by the Mp (IV 129) only in AN IV 259. In any case, the condition expressed by the main protasis (which anyway presupposes rationality) — viz., that trees are stimulated to spiritual practice by the teaching of the Buddha — may well have been regarded as unreal, or at best as doubtful. There is no clue for assuming that it was considered to be as a real possibility.

<sup>226</sup> Mp IV 129,20: *ime tāva mahāsālā acetanā*. The reference to the *sāla* trees is called a “simile based on a hypothetical assumption” (*parikappopamā*: ibid. 129,19).

<sup>227</sup> T 2.99: 240b5-7: “It is not possible that these strong (\**sāra*, cf. fn. 224) trees are able to understand the meaning of my teaching; but if they were able to understand [it], then I would predict [those spiritual attainments for them as well]” (此堅固樹 於我所說 能知義者, 無有是處。若能知者, 我則記說。). Cf. also T 46.1937 (by Tsung-hsiao 宗曉, 1151–1214): 890b8-10 (≈ T 38.1778: 639a26-28): “The *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* (passage not located) says: If a *nyagrodha* tree were endowed with mind (and hence capable of practising morality, meditative concentration and insight), I should bestow [on it] the prediction of Supreme Awakening. But since it is not endowed with mind, I do not bestow [such a] prediction [on it]” (涅槃經云: 若拘陀樹有心, 我當授與阿耨菩提記。以其無心故 不與授記。).

line form of sentence is not necessarily concerned, unless we take *ceteyyum* in a broader meaning comprising both rationality and mere sentience. But this is not necessarily required by the present context.

### 5.3 Résumé

41. The evidence offered by OKADA and FINDLY is thus hardly sufficient to prove that in earliest Buddhism, not to mention doctrinally consolidated Theravāda Buddhism, plants were unambiguously and on a doctrinal level classified as sentient beings with one sense-faculty, viz., the sense of touch, as in Jainism, let alone as more complex sentient beings (see ch. 5.1.3). Some of the passages adduced are expressly marked as the view of “people” or non-Buddhists (§ 13), while others make use of everyday notions concerning plants in contexts like comparisons, which must not be interpreted as doctrinal statements (ch. 5.1.2), or are inconclusive for other reasons (ch. 5.1.1). Others, again, have to be taken as a literary device intending to extol the charisma of holy persons or the extraordinary significance of an achievement or event (ch. 5.2.2). As for the couple of *Jātaka gāthās* that seem to treat trees themselves as numinous beings, their reception into the collection is hardly more than an additional indication that in the early period the question of the sentience of plants had not yet been definitely settled at a doctrinal level (ch. 5.2.1).

## 6. Plants as Sainly Beings?

42. Let us now turn to FINDLY’s idea that in early Buddhism plants might have been regarded as borderline beings in the sense of sentient beings at the top or upper end of *samsāra*, viz., as saintly beings, or arhats, consuming their last karmic residues (§ 10.3).<sup>228</sup> It is by no means my intention to deny that in the context of contemplative practice intended to generate a respectful attitude towards plant life this is

---

<sup>228</sup> One might ask whether such a status is claimed for all plants or only for some, e.g., trees or certain majestic trees. FINDLY, though sometimes focussing on trees, on the whole seems to think of plants in general.

surely an attractive suggestion. But in a historical perspective and on a doctrinal level, I have considerable difficulties with FINDLY's proposal. First, I do not think that her arguments (see § 10.3) are conclusive (ch. 6.1). Second, her suggestion would seem to entail serious systematic problems (ch. 6.2).

## 6.1 Discussion of FINDLY's Arguments

43. To begin with the argument of the "centrality of renunciants dwelling at the root of trees": The fact that large trees or forests are, in a tropical country, the ideal place for meditation since they offer both shade and solitude is hardly a sufficient reason for regarding trees as spiritually accomplished sentient beings.<sup>229</sup> Nor do I understand how any doctrinal position regarding the sentience or spiritual status of trees could be derived from symbolism, e.g., that of the tree as "a vertical axis connecting the ordinary to the transcendent" (262a / 243 f)<sup>230</sup>, provided this idea is indeed attested to in early Buddhism. Moreover, this kind of argument would only concern the status of trees, and not that of plants in general. And when the bodhi tree is ritually venerated (2008: 389), it is venerated not so much as a sentient being of its own as because of its association with, or as a symbol of, the Buddha's Awakening.<sup>231</sup>

44.1. As for the argument of the "use of trees in metaphors for spiritual growth", or as a model of spiritual practice, there can be no doubt that such metaphors have considerable poetical quality, emotional impact and didactic significance, but it is surely methodically inadequate to interpret similes or metaphors in terms of a wholesale

---

<sup>229</sup> Could one not, with similar right, argue for the sentience of empty houses, mountain caves, or charnel grounds, since they too offer shade and solitude and actually figure among the ideal places for meditation (see, e.g., MN I 56,12-13: *araññagato vā rukkhamūlagato vā suññāgāragato vā*; DN I 71,16-17: *araññaṃ rukkhamūlaṃ ... giriguhaṃ susānaṃ ...*)?

<sup>230</sup> For unspecified references in ch. 5.1.2 and ch. 5.1.3 see the remark in fn. 48.

<sup>231</sup> For a circumspect discussion of the various facets associated with the bodhi tree, see NUGTEREN 2005: 166 ff.

equation. One has to confine oneself to the common feature actually aimed at in the text, and even this feature may have to be taken *cum grano salis*. The comparison, e.g., of a perfected saint living alone in the wilderness and patiently enduring gnats and mosquitoes with a tree cast away in the woods does not in any way imply that the tree, too, is a sentient or even saintly being — still less so if the “tree” is, as in the verse (Th 62) adduced by FINDLY (262a / 245 with n. 192), obviously an abandoned *dead* (hence anyway *insentient*) trunk or piece of wood (*apaviddham ... dārukam*).<sup>232</sup> Or, if one insists in deducing, from plants being endowed with an exemplary property which the ascetic shares or should share, that they are saintly beings, why should one not draw the same conclusion also with regard to *animals* like a lion or an elephant bull? Why should one not, from the fact that these animals, too, are described as possessing exemplary

---

<sup>232</sup> Cf. Th-a I 153,12-13: *vane chaḍḍita-dāru-khaṇḍam viya*. — At Th 1137 (262b n. 82 / 245 with n. 193), too, the combination of the tree with the verb  $\sqrt{\text{śi}}$  “to lie” suggests a fallen, dead trunk. At Th 110 (ibid.) no comparison is expressed, but according to the commentary (Th-a I 232,3-5) the growing vegetation stimulates the Thera to strive for spiritual growth. That this does not of course imply that the vegetation is sentient is made explicit by the commentary where the trees growing in season are expressly called “insentient” or, at any rate, “lacking cognitive faculties” (*acetana*). Among the other verses adduced by FINDLY in the same footnote (262a n. 81 / 262 n. 192), Th 2 does not compare a saintly person or ascetic with a tree but with the wind, Th 244 does so with an elephant in battle, and FINDLY herself adds that “there are many other objects used as metaphors for renunciant life”, like fire, cotton, a rock, or a sharp sword, to which she would certainly not be willing to ascribe sentience or saintliness. — Likewise, the passage adduced by FINDLY (2008: 246 f) from the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* (Vkn VII vs. 5) as indicating “spiritual maturity in trees” is only a *simile*, comparing the bodhisattvas’ ability to memorize innumerable teachings and their meaning (*dhāraṇī*, cf. BoBh 185,7-13) with a garden, where the riches of the Doctrine (*dharmadhana*) are the trees and the factors of Awakening (*bodhyaṅga*) are the flowers. And when Śāntideva (BCA VIII.26) praises living with trees because they are not indignant and no effort is required to propitiate them, what may appear to point “to an ethical or behavioral quality of trees” (2008: 250) is of course not intended to ascribe sentience to trees on a doctrinal level (note also the negative formulation: “trees ... are *not* indignant ...”), for Śāntideva merely wants to contrast the worrisome life in the forest with the constant social stress one is exposed to in human communities.

virtues to be imitated by the renunciant, like fearlessness or living in solitude (e.g., Sn 53 or 71–72), deduce that they are also saintly beings? This is, of course, hardly acceptable, since these animals also have less commendable properties, and since at least from a traditional Buddhist point of view animal existence is an evil destiny (*duggatī*).<sup>233</sup> Apart from this, plant behaviour is sometimes also used to illustrate spiritually detrimental attitudes. Thus, in the *Samyutta-nikāya*<sup>234</sup> the way certain giant trees like *Ficus indica* (*nigrodha*) or *Ficus infectoria* (*pilakkha*), though growing from minute seeds, finally overgrow and destroy other trees, is used to illustrate the tendency of spiritual obstacles (*nīvaraṇa*) to overgrow and suppress insight. Or in the *Buddhacarita*<sup>235</sup> we read that only a thoughtless person can remain unmoved at the sight of another person's falling prey to old age, disease and death in the way a tree remains unmoved when another tree is shorn of its flowers or fruit or is cut down. Therefore, comparisons and similes alone are not sufficient for proving plants to be arhat-like saintly beings.

44.2. A somewhat different case is the function of plants as disclosing, in the course of contemplation or all of a sudden, the true nature of things. According to the *Visuddhimagga* (II.58–59), e.g., one of the advantages of meditating under a tree is that the frequent observation of the gradual change of its leaves gives rise to the understanding of impermanence. Or in the *Manorathapūraṇī*<sup>236</sup> we read that

---

<sup>233</sup> Even exceptional animals as portrayed in the *Jātakas* are only identified with the Bodhisattva, i.e., the Buddha-to-be, who is still on his way to Awakening and Liberation and not yet an arhat.

<sup>234</sup> SN V 96 f (no. 46.39; cf. HARA 2007: 52), cited FINDLY 2008: 296 but misunderstood as expressing the idea that “just as the great tree grows up, grows old, and dies, so the Buddhist practitioner does as well, regardless of whatever achievements he's made in his own cultivation.”

<sup>235</sup> BCar IV.60–61. FINDLY's (2008: 246) remark that in this passage “the contemplative renunciant is urged to be unattached to the loss of pleasurable things around him like a tree who loses its flowers, fruits, and companions” is misleading.

<sup>236</sup> Mp I 353. For similar stories, see SCHMITHAUSEN 1999: 249–251. See also § 109.

a group of princes, seeing new lotus flowers opening while the old ones fall off, realize that the same thing will happen to their own bodies and thus attain Awakening as *pratyekabuddhas*<sup>237</sup>. Such an intuition does not, of course, require any activity or intelligent participation, let alone a state of being Awakened, on the part of the plants, still less so since it may happen as well through the observation of similar phenomena in animals, e.g., upon seeing a bull that was previously bursting with energy but is now old and decrepit.<sup>238</sup>

44.3. In both this function and in that of being a model for renunciant behaviour trees or other plants might even be called to ‘teach’ the Dharma. This idea has been developed in different ways in Indian Mahāyāna and in Far Eastern Buddhism,<sup>239</sup> but it is also popular with some contemporary Thai monks like Ajahn Chah.<sup>240</sup> I am not, however, aware of an occurrence of this metaphor — and a metaphor it surely would be — in the Pāli canon.

45. FINDLY’s third argument (262b–263a / 248 f) is based on the designation of plants as stationary (*thāvara*) living beings. Starting from the old meaning “stationary” in a physical sense, she suggests that in early Buddhism this may not have been understood as a low-level state of helpless suffering but as a state comparable to that of the advanced Jain ascetic who (deliberately) sits motionless, not stirring from his place and patiently suffering hardship in order to annihilate old karma without accumulating any new. But the Jains themselves do not understand plants in this way, and in early Buddhism such an ascetic practice of complete immobility is not appreciated but would rather fall under the heading of unnecessary, exaggerated austerity.<sup>241</sup>

---

<sup>237</sup> On the original meaning of this term (“Awakened through a fortunate coincidence”) see VON HINÜBER 2001: 193; OBERLIES 2001: 96 n. 5.

<sup>238</sup> Cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 1999: 250.

<sup>239</sup> See Pt. II.A, ch. 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4; Pt. II.B: §§ 129.3.3; 140–141; 145.

<sup>240</sup> See FINDLY 2008: 539–548.

<sup>241</sup> Cf. BRONKHORST 2005: 73. — There is, to be sure, a highly valued state of immobility, viz., the “attainment of the cessation of conscious ideas and feeling”



For want of textual support, FINDLY's suggestion is mere speculation, interesting but hardly persuasive.

## 6.2. Systematic difficulties

46. It is, however, not only the lack of compelling or at least persuasive evidence that makes me disinclined to accept, for early Buddhism, FINDLY's suggestion that plants are liberated, enlightened beings consuming the remaining karmic residues, but also the serious systematic and practical difficulties this idea entails if viewed in the framework of early Buddhism.

47. a) As far as I can see, the canonical texts are unanimous in declaring that a person who has attained arhatship is not reborn anywhere anymore. Thus such a person cannot become a plant by way of rebirth. Nor is there any mention in the texts of arhats metamorphosing into plants before dying. Even if we admit this possibility, the enormous number of plants (and even trees), as compared with the rarity of arhats, would require explanation, especially in times when a Buddha has not yet appeared in the world.

b) If plants were not considered to have attained arhatship or Awakening in a previous, human existence but were thought to attain it only *after* having been reborn as plants, those plants which have not yet attained Awakening would not yet be arhats, and for these plants FINDLY's assumption that plants are sentient beings that merely consume the residues of previous karma would not work. Besides, attaining Awakening in a non-human existence is not normally admitted in Indian Buddhism (or in Jainism)<sup>242</sup>.

c) Theoretically, a third possibility (cf. Kv IV.2) would be that plants attain arhatship just at the moment of being reborn as plants. In

---

(*saññā-vedayita-nirodha-samāpatti*). But in this state plants would by definition be devoid of feeling and hence incapable of experiencing the results of their remaining karmic residues, which is, however, precisely what FINDLY suggests to be the purpose of their existence as plants (see § 10.3).

<sup>242</sup> JAINI 1979: 29.

view of the great number of plants and even of trees, this would suggest rebirth as a plant to be a short-cut or easy way to arhatship, obviously much easier than the traditional eightfold Path, but unfortunately not testified to by any textual evidence.

d) In any case, attaining Awakening or possessing “full wisdom” (2008: 253)<sup>243</sup> would presuppose, in early Buddhism, not just sentience but higher cognitive faculties. But as far as early Buddhism is concerned, neither textual evidence nor conclusive arguments are available for the presence of such faculties in plants (ch. 5.1.3). The comparatively few passages, mainly in old verse texts dealing with the spirituality and behaviour of renunciants, where plants are, expressly or implicitly, included among animate beings (*pāṇa*) (§ 3), hardly serve the purpose. For the phraseology of these passages shows their close connection with the ascetic strand, i.e., the ambience to which also early Jainism belongs, and this suggests that they rather presuppose a view on plants as animate beings towards the lower end of the scale, with only rudimentary sentience. On the other hand, the idea of numinous trees, met with in a couple of *Jātaka* verses of probably pre- or at least non-Buddhist provenience,<sup>244</sup> may, to be sure, point to plants, or at least trees, as beings with higher faculties, but to judge from the nature of the closely related<sup>245</sup> tree spirits, trees as numinous beings were not normally regarded as saintly beings. Rather, though sometimes benign, they can also be malevolent and vengeful<sup>246</sup> or, unlike arhats, afraid of death.<sup>247</sup>

---

<sup>243</sup> Cf. fn. 250.

<sup>244</sup> Cf. § 36 with fn. 185 and § 37.

<sup>245</sup> Cf. fn. 205.

<sup>246</sup> Cf. the *Phandana-jātaka* (no. 475): *rukkhadevatā* (Jā IV 209,26) ... *veraṃ appesi* (210,17); verse: *phandanarukkho ... veraṃ appesi* (210,23), or Vin IV 34 where the tree spirit desists only on second thought from killing the monk who had felled the tree. On a tree about to be pruned threatening revenge in a Manichaean text, cf. HENRICHS 1979: 92.

<sup>247</sup> Cf., e.g., the *Koṭisimbali-jātaka* (see fn. 202), or MN I 306,1 ff, esp. 4-5 (cf. FINDLY 2008: 273).

48. Another difficulty resulting from regarding plants as arhat-like saintly sentient beings are the practical consequences this view would seem to entail for everyday life. In view of the commitment not to kill any animate beings, even the mere sentience of plants, if taken seriously (as in Jainism), is bound to create considerable complications for the life of lay followers (cf. § 7), and indirectly also for monks and nuns. If plants were not just simple sentient beings but arhats, wouldn't this aggravate the situation even further, since in this case the cutting of plants for food, fuel or timber, inevitable for most lay people of the time, would involve the murder of innumerable arhats — one of the gravest evil deeds according to the Buddhist tradition? But FINDLY's conception of plants as spiritually perfected beings implies that they are benign and compassionate, giving "*themselves up to use* by other sentient beings" (2008: 252 f; cf. 360), somehow comparable to a bodhisattva in Mahāyāna, who assumes the body of a medicinal tree<sup>248</sup> or takes rebirth as a fish<sup>249</sup> in order to satisfy the needs of people, willingly consenting to being cut up and eaten by them.<sup>250</sup> But as far as I can see there is no textual evidence for such an idea in early Buddhism. In the much-quoted verse<sup>251</sup> where a person breaking the branch of a tree in whose shade he has rested is charged with be-

---

<sup>248</sup> See fn. 41. Cf. also § 107.1 with fn. 592.

<sup>249</sup> Cf. LAMOTTE 1980: 2298–2300; BoBh 247,6-9.

<sup>250</sup> According to FINDLY (2008: 252 f), the compassionate activity of plants does not mean that they "consciously perform actions that are non-violent and compassionate" in order to acquire 'merit' but rather act "spontaneously and naturally in a manner seen by others to be good — given the general cultural assumption that having full wisdom naturally gives rise to what is seen as good behavior". The problem is the ascription of full wisdom to plants as an element of the early Buddhist doctrine, where such wisdom could only be understood as a cognitive state (see § 47d), and hardly in terms of the Far Eastern idea of 'original Awakening' undisturbed by deluded thoughts and emotions (cf. § 129.1).

<sup>251</sup> Jā IV 352,24-25 (no. 493, vs. 18); *Petavatthu* II.9.3 (cf. also vs. 5). Cf. *Plants* 74 n. 414. The verse is also alluded to by FINDLY (2008: 361).

ing a “friend-deceiver/harmer” (*mittadūbha*)<sup>252</sup>, the tree is, to be sure, styled a friend and, implicitly, a benefactor. But the main purport of the verse is surely to condemn ingratitude, and not to posit the sentience or even saintliness of the tree on a doctrinal level. And even if we take the idea of the tree as a bountiful sentient being for granted in this case, it does not easily lend itself to generalization; for not all plants submit to being eaten without offering resistance: some have thorns, others are poisonous. And even in the case of a fruit-tree, the prototype of a bountiful plant, feeding others is only one aspect of the matter; the other, probably the primary one, is its own propagation.

49. Personally, I appreciate FINDLY’s suggestion of plants as saintly beings as a sympathetic view on plants, one that is much more appealing than the sombre picture of plants as helplessly suffering lowly creatures; and as already indicated (§§ 31 and 44.1), I do not at all deny that descriptive passages and comparisons may point to an *emotional* bond with plant life, not only on the part of ordinary people but also on the part of doctrinally educated monks and nuns, and that such a bond can be fruitfully cultivated in connection with a conscious ethics of nature. But I do not find it easy to reconcile such a view with the undeniable fact that even in the vegetable kingdom there is a great deal of competition and struggle for survival. The decisive point from the perspective of this study is, however, that I am definitely unable to follow FINDLY from a historico-philological perspective. Her thesis is, as far as I can see, neither corroborated by the evidence available in canonical texts of early Buddhism nor in tune with the basic structure of their soteriology, and to postulate such an idea for an initial, pre-canonical period would seem to me entirely speculative.

---

<sup>252</sup> Cf. SCHMIDT 1978: 358. Cf. also OBERLIES 2001: 12 and 56 (3d).

## 7. Résumé

50. To sum up the results of the preceding investigation: There is no conclusive evidence showing that in early Buddhism plants were regarded as animate, sentient beings on a doctrinal level. In the early period, the issue appears to have remained unsettled. Probably a decision was deliberately avoided. In a few passages, most of which make use of pre-Buddhist notions or phrases, plants are *de facto* included among animate beings, expressly or implicitly (§ 3). Other passages, however, clearly distinguish plants from animate beings proper (§§ 4-6), suggesting that they were considered to have a kind of borderline status between the animate and the inanimate, i.e., were situated at the lower end of the range of sentient beings (§ 7), and that there was a growing tendency toward an attitude of strong reserve against any explicit classification of plants as sentient beings in a doctrinal sense (cf. § 13).<sup>253</sup> Though green living plants are distinguished from dried up or withered ones in an everyday sense,<sup>254</sup> there is no conclusive evidence proving that they were — not only by the Jains but also by early Buddhists — definitely regarded as living, sentient beings with one sense-faculty, viz., the sense of touch (OKADA, FINDLY: ch. 3 and ch. 5.1.2), or that the borderline status of plants was defined, in the Abhidhammic period or even earlier, as their being insentient but in possession of a material life-faculty and that this was the reason why monks and nuns were prohibited from injuring them (FUJIMOTO: ch. 4). Still less successful appears the attempt (FINDLY) to conclude, from the alleged fact of their being endowed with the sense of touch, that in early Buddhism plants were, in a doctrinal sense, regarded as fully conscious, complex sentient beings participating in karma-directed saṃsāra (ch. 5.1.3); the additional arguments adduced in fa-

---

<sup>253</sup> In this connection, it may be of interest to refer to FINDLY's (2008: 562 f) report on the views on plants of some present-day Thai Buddhist monks, the scope of which ranges from tending to deny their sentience to ascribing them "some level of primitive form of awareness and sensitivity" including some experience of pleasure and pain but no conception of an ego.

<sup>254</sup> See § 1 with fn. 3; § 17 with fn. 102.

vous of this thesis are likewise hardly convincing (§ 34). Nor is there, to the best of my knowledge, evidence which might justify the deduction of a doctrinal acceptance of the sentience of trees (or plants in general) from the belief in their seemingly sentient reaction to extraordinary events or in their numinous character (OKADA); for the former belongs to the realm of miracles and poetic license (ch. 5.2.2), and the latter is confined to a couple of *Jātaka* verses of presumably pre- or non-Buddhist origin, whereas in texts of genuinely Buddhist origin the numinous aspect of a tree or plant is consistently conceived of as a spirit or deity essentially distinct from the tree or plant itself (§§ 36–37). Finally, the suggestion that plants may have been regarded in early Buddhism as borderline beings not on the lower but on the upper end of the scale, i.e., as Awakened, saintly beings who have reached the other shore and are merely consuming the remnants of their previous karma (FINDLY), is neither corroborated by the evidence available in the canonical texts of early Buddhism nor in harmony with the basic structure of their soteriology (ch. 6).

## Pt. II: The Problem of the Relationship between the Idea of the Buddha-Nature of Grasses and Trees and Early Buddhism

51. Both OKADA<sup>255</sup> and FINDLY<sup>256</sup> consider their understanding of the early Buddhist view on plants — as sentient or even saintly beings — to be confirmed by the emergence of a comparable idea in Far Eastern Buddhism, viz., that plants, too, possess Buddha-nature (佛性) and may become, or turn out to be, Buddha (成佛),<sup>257</sup> i.e., may attain Awakening or already be in the state of Awakening, an idea which, at least at first glance, would seem to imply their sentience. The problem is, of course, that the emergence of this idea in the Far East (probably in the sixth century A.D.)<sup>258</sup> is separated by many centuries

---

<sup>255</sup> OKADA 1998: 282 # 4.2; 1999: 107–108 # 4.

<sup>256</sup> FINDLY 2002: 261b; 2008: 248 with n. 202. A few pages later (2008: 253) she suggests, cautiously, that “the attribution of a Buddha-nature, and even final Buddhahood, to grasses, plants, and trees ... might seem a positive development of the Buddhism originating in Indian-influenced cultures.” But then she goes on to connect this idea even with the Vedic period: “But, in the end, it functions as a recapitulation of an idea present already in Vedic times, that of *ṛta*”, admitting herself, however, that with this conclusion she moves “in the land of inconclusiveness”.

<sup>257</sup> For the ambiguity of the expression *ch'eng fo* 成佛 see § 143 with fn. 898.

<sup>258</sup> That is, if we take its ‘weak’ formulation by Hui-yüan (523–592: see § 127.2) as the starting point. As far as I can see, it is only after Chi-tsang (549–623: see § 127.3) that the idea of the Buddha-nature of plants or the insentient — whatever facets (see Pt. II.B, ch. 1) this label may involve in a given case — becomes, in a sufficiently explicit form, a kind of high-level doctrinal issue, especially in T'ien-t'ai (cf., e.g., KAMATA 1965: 442 f) and (though less conspicuously) Hua-yen (see § 116) as well as in part of the Ch'an traditions (see § 129.1 with fn. 788). For analogous conceptions in Taoist sources, see KAMATA 1965: 459 and 1968: 86 f; NAKAJIMA 1983: 398–400; SHARF 2002: 249. — In Ch'an sources, the idea of the Buddha-nature of plants or the insentient is often (cf. MATSUMOTO 1994: 100) as-

from the early (perhaps pre-Aśokan) period of Indian Buddhism in which it was not yet felt problematic, in certain contexts, to reckon plants among the animate beings, or in which at least the tendency to ignore their sentience had not yet solidified into a doctrinal denial. It is thus hard to maintain any continuity between the early Buddhist treatment of plants and those Far Eastern developments after such a long period of tacit or explicit doctrinal rejection of their sentience, not to mention their alleged status of perfected saints. To bridge the gap, one would have to assume that the Far Eastern masters had textual materials at their disposal that gave them direct or at least indirect access to the postulated early Buddhist view on plants. In the absence of such material, we would at least expect a structural similarity, a persuasive coincidence of characteristics, between the Far Eastern idea of the Buddha-nature of plants, especially its earliest formulations, on the one hand and, on the other, the early Buddhist view on plants, either as proposed by myself or as posited by OKADA and FINDLY. In the following two sub-sections, I shall first discuss the question of textual continuity (Pt. II.A), and then the problem of structural similarity (Pt. II.B).

---

sociated and equated with an earlier statement (referred to in § 54), ascribed, in one source, to Tao-sheng (道生, †434), though the ascription is not beyond doubt (see fn. 303). If this ascription were to prove correct, we would have to assign a considerably earlier date to the origination of the idea of the Buddha-nature of plants. But even in this case we would still have to try to find out which facets of the complex idea of Buddha-nature of the insentient the statement anticipates, and to what extent these facets are inherited from Indian Buddhism or rather innovations due, perhaps, to the influence of indigenous Chinese (e.g., Taoist) thought.



## Pt. II.A: The Question of Textual Continuity

52.0. As for textual continuity, there are two possibilities: either the Far Eastern masters deliberately picked up scraps of the early view according to which plants were still tacitly accepted, somehow, as animate (though hardly saintly) beings, or they had access to later Indian sources that had preserved or re-vitalized the early view in spite of its rejection by the mainstream.

52.1. The first alternative seems to be excluded by the fact that the only text in the Theravāda canon that *expressly* takes plants to be animate beings (though not focussing on the question of their sentience as a doctrinal issue), viz., the *Vāseṭṭha-sutta* of the *Suttanipāta* (see § 3), does not seem to exist in Chinese translation,<sup>259</sup> and by the fact that most of the passages in other works which speak of stationary animate beings or suggest a borderline status of plants in the earliest period have no counterpart in their Chinese versions.<sup>260</sup> The Bud-

---

<sup>259</sup> An argument similar to that of the *Vāseṭṭha-sutta* is found in the *Śārdūla-karṇāvadāna* (Divy 325,6–326,7). However, this text merely adduces animals as well as various groups of trees, shrubs and flowers in order to illustrate the criteria for distinguishing between various species, but does not subsume them under the heading “animate beings”. This holds equally good for the Chinese versions (T 21.1300: 402c10-14, which mention only various species of lotuses, and T 21.1301: 413b13–c4).

<sup>260</sup> Most Chinese parallels either disregard (T 4.210: 572c25 ≈ Dhṛp 405) or seriously misunderstand (T 4.212: 772a27 ≈ Uv 33.36) *trasa* and *sthāvara*, or render *trasa* as “afraid” and *sthāvara* as “at ease” (see *Plants* ns. 347 and 364), thus presupposing a commentarial reinterpretation of the two terms in the sense of spiritual immaturity and maturity, respectively (cf. *Plants* # 20.4.1). An exception is the translation of the *Upasena-sūtra* in the Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinaya* (see § 3, fn. 16), made by I-ching in the beginning of the 8<sup>th</sup> century and therefore too late for a seminal function. The same holds good for Dānapāla’s still later translation (see *ibid.*), which would seem to have in its turn been influenced by the Far Eastern idea of the Buddha-nature of the insentient. The *Prātimokṣa-sūtra* is too ambiguous with regard to the status of plants (see § 6), especially in view of its being embedded in

dhist narrative literature transmitted to China does not seem to include *Jātakas* in which the Bodhisattva figures, the way he does in the Theravāda *Jātaka* collection, as a tree deity (cf. §§ 9 and 38), let alone a tree-soul-like numinous being. Thus, it is difficult to see how such stories could have contributed to the formation of the Far Eastern idea of the Buddha-nature of plants. What may have had some impact are passages describing plants as reacting to extraordinary events or paying reverence to the Bodhisattva or to the Buddha, but as has been pointed out, the function of this *topos* in the Indian context is rather to highlight the outstanding significance of the event or person (cf. § 39), and it is hard to say whether such passages contributed in some way to the formation of the idea of the Buddha-nature of plants or rather came to be re-interpreted in its light and to be used as a confirmation only afterwards.<sup>261</sup>

52.2. The second alternative would be arbitrary unless substantiated by some evidence.<sup>262</sup> Actually, OKADA tries to offer such evi-

---

the canonical commentary, which mentions the sentience of plants merely as something people or non-Buddhists believe in (see § 13; cf. also *Plants* # 5.5 with ns. 90 and 91).

<sup>261</sup> Cf. fn. 219.

<sup>262</sup> Upon coming across a passage of the Chinese version of the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra*, I first thought it might offer such evidence. The passage (T 17.721: 162c12-14) deals with the conditions for rebirth in the realm of the thirty-three gods (三十三天), and one condition is avoidance of killing living, sentient beings. The question how this condition is to be understood in this connection (云何不殺) is answered as follows: 乃至菜 (v.l. 草) 葉 若於水中 見微細蟲, 護之 不食; 若不灑水 終不故飲. At first glance, one may be tempted to follow the analogy of the definition of not stealing (*adattādāna*) given a few lines later (162c20-21: 云何不盜. 乃至草葉 亦不故盜., i.e.: “What is meant by ‘not stealing’? That one does not intentionally take away even as much as a blade of grass.”) and to take 乃至菜葉 as referring to vegetables as an *object* of consumption (i.e., of killing): “Even as much as a leaf of a vegetable, [or] if one perceives tiny animals in the [drinking-] water: one spares them and does not consume [the vegetable or the water]. One never intentionally drinks water without having strained it.” In view of the context (viz., the precept not to kill any living, sentient being), this interpretation would imply that like the animalcules so also vegetables are regarded as (border-line) sentient beings. But it is more likely that 菜葉 is to be understood as an unmarked

dence for the aspect of the sentience of plants by adducing two passages from Mahāyāna sūtras (see §§ 55 and 88) which she seems to regard as representing a kind of undercurrent that continues an early Buddhist view according to which plants were still regarded as sentient. But already many of the medieval Chinese and Japanese masters who discuss the question of the Buddha-nature of plants (or any insentient things, for that matter) refer to passages from Mahāyāna sūtras that were considered to support such an assumption. In the present part of this study, I shall critically examine a number of these passages and try to clarify their original purport in the context of the source from which they are taken (if available: the Indic original), with a view to determining their conclusiveness as evidence for a recognition of plants as sentient or Buddha-natured beings in Indian

---

locative, parallel to the following 於水中: “Even if one perceives tiny animals on a leaf of a vegetable or in the [drinking-]water, one spares them and does not consume [either].” This understanding of the passage seems to be supported by the Tibetan version (Kj P yu 182b2; S khi 179b6-7: ‘*di la lo ma sngon po’am chu dag gi nang na srin bu shin tu phra mo yang mthong nas za bar mi byed la | chu la yang ’thung bar mi byed do|| yongs su ’tshag par byed de|* ...), which, in view of the plural-marker *dag*, is best translated as “In this [connection, one has to commit oneself to abstention from killing to the extent that], having perceived, on green leaves or in water, animalcules, however tiny they may be, one does not eat [them] and does not drink the water. [Rather,] one strains it, ...” Fortunately, this interpretation is unambiguously confirmed by the Sanskrit manuscript of the text, the transcription of which I owe to the kindness of Prof. Michael HAHN and his wife, Dr. Mitsuyo DEMOTO-HAHN: *iha śākaharītodakānām susūkṣmāṇy api kṛmīni dṛṣṭvā na bhakṣayate, salilam api na pibate nāpi parisrāvayate*, i.e.: “In this [connection ...], when one sees that vegetables and greens or water have (i.e., contain, are full of) animalcules, however tiny they may be, one does not consume [these vegetables]; nor does one drink the water without straining it.”<sup>a</sup> This is in fact what is expected of a pious lay person also according to the *Yu-p’o-sē wu-chie-hsiang ching* 優婆塞五戒相經 (*Sūtra on the characteristics of the five precepts of an Upāsaka*: T 24.1476) 941b23-24: “If a lay follower uses water containing animalcules or kills insects in/on herbs and trees, in all such cases he commits an offence” (若優婆塞用有蟲水及草木中殺蟲, 皆犯罪。).

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Chin. (see above); Skt. *nāpi parisrāvayate* appears, in this sense, syntactically unusual, but the finite verb is confirmed by Tib. *yongs su ’tshag par byed de*, whereas *nāpi* is not represented.

Mahāyāna sources. In case the examination shows that a passage is indeed conclusive evidence or that at least the possibility of its being such evidence cannot be ruled out, I shall try to assess the probability of its representing a survival or re-vitalization of the early Buddhist view.

### Excursus: Remarks on 'Buddha-nature' (§ 53)

**53.0.** Before entering into the discussion of those passages, a clarifying remark on the term 'Buddha-nature' (*fo-hsing* 佛性) may be required. The use of the word *hsing* (性) seems to take up the thread of an earlier Chinese (especially Confucian) discussion on human nature.<sup>263</sup> A concise analysis of the facets conveyed by the term 'Buddha-nature' in its Buddhist context from the 'emic' point of view of a Far Eastern Buddhist master will be introduced in Pt. II.B, ch. 1. I therefore can limit myself here to very briefly summarizing some aspects of its Indian background that are relevant to my investigation. The Chinese expression 佛性 may translate several Sanskrit terms.<sup>264</sup> It does indeed occasionally render the abstract *buddhatva* (in the sense of [accomplished] Buddhahood),<sup>265</sup> but more important for the present context is that in the overwhelming majority of occurrences of 佛性 the character 性 renders Skt. °*gotra* or °*dhātu*, sometimes even °*garbha*.<sup>266</sup> In these meanings, which overlap, the expression

---

<sup>263</sup> KING 1991: 5. On 性 in early Chinese philosophy, see UNGER 2000: 95–98. For a Chinese Buddhist analysis of the meanings of 性 in 佛性, see Hui-yüan's *Ta-sheng i chang* 大乘義章 (T 44.1851: 472a–b; cf. LIU 1985a: 188 n. 26): 1. seed, cause, or root (a9: 種子因本); 2. essence (a15: 體); 3. immutability (a23–24: 不改), and distinction (b9: 性別).

<sup>264</sup> In BAvB, e.g., 佛性 usually seems to render *buddhavaṃśa* (cf. 676c17 = Gv 4,2; 693a13 = Gv 59,26; 717c6 = Gv 157,11).

<sup>265</sup> My evidence for this use is from Hsüan-tsang's translations: cf. T 7.220: 895b27, etc., in a series corresponding to Aṣṭ 138,7–8, or T 31.1606: 748a21 = ASBh 105,10.

<sup>266</sup> Cf. MIZUTANI 156; SHINODA 1963; OGAWA 1963. In the Chinese versions of the MPS, 佛性 mostly corresponds to Tib. *sangs rgyas kyi kham*s, confirming 性 = *dhātu*.

‘Buddha-nature’ is thus closely related to the concept of *tathāgata-garbha* (Ch. 如來藏).<sup>267</sup>

**53.1.1.** The common meaning of *gotra*<sup>268</sup> is (apart from “cattle-stall”) “family”, “lineage”, or simply “kind”, “class”, but it is also used in the sense of “mine” or “matrix” (of gems or metals). In Buddhist texts, *gotra* is often employed to denote, metaphorically, a ‘family’ or ‘lineage’ in a spiritual or soteriological sense (the disciples or bodhisattvas as spiritual children of the Buddha, heading for liberation) as well as the property or disposition due to which one belongs to such a spiritual ‘family’. In a more abstract sense, *gotra* acquires the general meaning of “source” or “cause” and is stated to be quasi-synonymous with *bīja* (“seed”, in a metaphorical sense) and *dhātu* (see § 53.2) as well as with *prakṛti*,<sup>269</sup> which combines the aspects of “source” and “[original] nature”. Thus, *buddhagotra* (or *tathāgatagotra*) could mean either “[spiritual] family or lineage of the Buddhas” or “source /cause of the Buddhas (or of Buddha[hood])”, the latter even in the sense of an original nature inherent in individuals. If it is used as an adjective,<sup>270</sup> it can denote someone who belongs to that lineage (albeit, perhaps, not yet mature) or possesses that source or cause. As for the

<sup>267</sup> Cf. §§ 53.2.2 and 53.3. For detailed information on the history of *tathāgata-garbha* thought in India cf., above all, SEYFORTH RUEGG 1969 and TAKASAKI 1974. For the connotation of family affiliation, see HARA 1994. As for Tibetan developments, it may suffice here to refer, apart from SEYFORTH RUEGG 1969 and 1973, to MATHES 2008. Regarding the hermeneutical problems involved in the interpretation of the *tathāgatagarbha* complex, see SEYFORTH RUEGG 1989: 17–55. For the purpose of the present study, however, it will suffice to simply follow, by and large, the phraseology of the sources, without getting involved with the problem of how to interpret this phraseology and its purport in the broader context of Buddhist thought, or with the question of its relationship to brahminical thought.

<sup>268</sup> Cf. BHSD 216; SCHMITHAUSEN 1969: 114; TAKASAKI 1974: 751–754; SEYFORTH RUEGG 1976, esp. 341–344 and 354–356.

<sup>269</sup> Cf. BoBh 2,7-8: *tat punar gotraṃ bījaṃ ity apy ucyate, dhātuḥ prakṛtiḥ ity api*; similarly ŚrBh Tai 2,21-22.

<sup>270</sup> E.g., BoBh 55,17: *buddhagotraḥ* (sc. *pudgalaḥ*); MSABh 48,5-6: *buddha-gotrāḥ sattvāḥ*.

*gotra* as the source of Buddhahood, some texts distinguish between a naturally inherent or undeveloped (*prakṛtistha*) one and an acquired or developed (*samudānīta*, *paripuṣṭa*) one,<sup>271</sup> the latter being connected with the actual practice of the Path (cf. also § 53.4).

53.1.2. As for the precise nature of the naturally inherent *gotra*, there are, very roughly speaking, two basic patterns (not always clearly distinguished, esp. in Sūtra texts):<sup>272</sup> either it is understood as a specific feature or potential of an individual or of this individual's mind, to be realized through being developed or actualized, or it is conceived of as the hidden presence of some timeless reality that merely has to be realized in the sense of revealing or unveiling it, to the effect that one becomes aware of it so that it can unfold its salvific efficacy. In the first case, the *gotra* as the cause of Buddhahood may, but need not, be present in every sentient being (some may have a *gotra* corresponding to the lesser 'vehicles' or even none at all), and its presence in plants is hard to conceive unless these are regarded as somehow sentient, and not as part of the insentient world. In the second case, there is a tendency to equate the *gotra* with omnipresent True Reality or Suchness (*tathatā*, *dharmadhātu*), which in its turn is, in texts like the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, equated with Buddhahood. In this case, a sentient being can be excluded from actually becoming a Buddha only if it lacks the capacity to become fully aware of its own Buddhahood, which has always been present within, absolutely perfect but veiled by extrinsic defilements. Theoretically, the same would hold good for insentient beings like plants (unless they are re-

---

<sup>271</sup> E.g., BoBh 2,4-7; MSABh 11,12 (ad III.4a). Similarly the distinction, in the later part of the MPS found only in Dharmakṣema (530c15-17; LIU 1982: 74), of the Buddha-nature (佛性, here for *\*buddhagotra*?) of sentient beings as the direct cause (正因), here consisting in the sentient being as such, and as the auxiliary cause (緣因), viz., the six *pāramitās*. Cf. also the discussion in Chi-tsang's *Ta-sheng hsüan lun* 大乘玄論 (T 45.1853: 38b8-23, 39a28-b3 and b15-17; cf. KOSEKI 1980: 20-21).

<sup>272</sup> For details cf. SEYFORTH RUEGG 1969, esp. 71 ff and 277 ff. Similar divergencies of opinion are reflected in the various interpretations of Buddha-nature reported by Chi-tsang in *Ta-sheng hsüan lun* (T 45.1853) 35b20-c19 (cf. KOSEKI 1980: 18-19).

duced to mere epiphenomena of sentient beings): omnipresent True Reality must be present in them as well, but in order to realize this they would have to be, or become, sentient. To my knowledge, however, the issue is not discussed in Indian sources.

**53.2.1.** The meaning of *dhātu* is still more complex.<sup>273</sup> It may, among other things, denote a layer, a sphere (e.g., of the world), a spiritual level or realm (e.g., of *nirvāṇa*, or the *amalo dhātuḥ*<sup>274</sup> as the level of accomplished Buddhahood), a mass or totality (e.g., of water, or of sentient beings), an element or constituent, or a natural disposition or inclination, but also an invariable rule or principle (like origination in dependence), or ore or a mine, and hence a source or cause, like *gotra*, and like the latter it is also equated with “[original] nature” (*prakṛti*).<sup>275</sup> In addition, *dhātu* was also used in the sense of “relic”, not exclusively but, of course, especially of the Buddha.

**53.2.2.** The latter meaning is, according to SHIMODA’s thorough investigation,<sup>276</sup> of crucial importance also for the formation of the term *buddhadhātu*, which seems to have been coined by the (Mahāyānist) *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*<sup>277</sup> in what SHIMODA<sup>278</sup> has called “Group 2”, i.e., layer or strand 2 (more particularly: 2-2), of the ‘common part’ of this text, i.e., of that part which is represented in all the three translations,<sup>279</sup> in contrast to the voluminous second part contained only in Dharmakṣema’s version. In this common part of the

<sup>273</sup> Cf., e.g., *BHSD* 282–284; *EncB* IV.4 (1989): 566–574; SCHMITHAUSEN 1969: 82 f (n. 7B); 114 (footnote c); 117 f (n. 58); 134 f (n. 97b); 146 f; TAKASAKI 1974: 758–763. Cf. also SEYFORTH RUEGG 1989: 19, where it is stressed that in contrast to *tathāgatagarbha* confined to the level of ordinary sentient beings, *tathāgata dhātu* may also refer to the level of Buddhahood itself.

<sup>274</sup> MSA IX.26 and 36; RGV II.39.

<sup>275</sup> See fn. 269.

<sup>276</sup> SHIMODA 1997, esp. 278–298; English summary 22–24.

<sup>277</sup> TAKASAKI 1974: 133; 177–181; English summary p. 10.

<sup>278</sup> SHIMODA 1997, esp. 163 ff and 256 ff; English summary 13 ff.

<sup>279</sup> Viz., MPST, MPSFa and MPSDh.

text, the message of the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* that all sentient beings have a Tathāgata within themselves (*sarvasattvās tathāgātagarbhāḥ* (bahuvrīhi))<sup>280</sup> has been re-formulated into the thesis that in all sentient beings, or in their bodies, there exists a ‘Tathāgata embryo’ (*tathāgatagarbha*, now *tatpuruṣa*), or ‘Buddha-element’ (*buddhadhātu*).<sup>281</sup> Basically following SHIMODA, we may attribute this re-formulation to two main motives:

a) *First*, by stating that in all sentient beings there exists not a Tathāgata but merely the ‘embryo’ of a Tathāgata, the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* would seem to emphasize the fact that the Buddha-nature inherent in sentient beings is not yet fully developed but requires some kind of growth or actualisation, to be achieved, as the text variously indicates,<sup>282</sup> by means of spiritual and ascetic practices.<sup>283</sup> The

---

<sup>280</sup> Cf. TGS # 0M (end) (ZIMMERMANN 2002: 252–253; transl.: 105) and RGVV 26,7: *sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhā ity uktam Bhagavatā*; similarly 68,13. Cf. also TGS # 1B (beginning), quoted RGVV 73,11–12. For a discussion of the term *tathāgatagarbha* with special reference to the TGS, see ZIMMERMANN 2002: 39–46.

<sup>281</sup> Cf., e.g., MPST S 156b6 (*sems can thams cad la de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po yod do = tathāgatagarbhāḥ sarvasattvānām*: HABATA 2007: 87), 175a5 (*sems can thams cad la ni sangs rgyas kyi kham yod la kham de rang rang gi lus la tshang* [P: ‘chang S] *ste*), 175b1 (*bdag gi lus la sangs rgyas kyi kham ni yod do*), and 199b7–200a1 (*rang gi lus la de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po yod*), corresponding, respectively, to P tu 86b2, 99a6, 99a8–b1, and 117a1, to MPSFa 877c6–7 (眾生 各各自分 有如來性), 881b24–25 (一切眾生 皆有佛性 在於身中), 881b28 (我身中 實有佛性), and 887b8–9 (於自身中 [v.l.上] 觀如來性), and to MPSDh 399a6–7 (眾生 悉有佛性), 404c4–5 (一切眾生 皆有佛性), 404c8 (我今身中 定有佛性), and 412a24–25 (於己身中 見如來性). The terms *tathāgatagarbha* and *buddhadhātu* are unambiguously equated in passages like MPST S 193b1 or 194b4–5 (P 112a7 and 113a6).—For a more exhaustive conspectus of pertinent passages, see TAKASAKI 1974: 137 ff, and SHIMODA 1997: 267 ff.

<sup>282</sup> Cf., e.g., MPST S 175b3–4 and 6–7 (P 99b2–3 and 4–6): “Even though the [Buddha]-element is present [in sentient beings], it is [effectively] present only in those endowed with liberality, impeccable behaviour, wisdom, and [salvific] teaching (? *dharma*). ... Only after having abandoned the appropriation of improper things and having continuously practised being content with little and perfect austerity for eighty *koṭis* of eons, and after having meditated on the presence of the *tathāgatagarbha*, I have attained full Awakening ...” (*kham yod du zin kyang sbyin*



term *buddhadhātu*, too, would seem to indicate this aspect if the meaning “ore” or “mine”, i.e., “source”, for *dhātu* is taken into account, and according to another passage the ‘Tathāgata embryo’ or ‘Buddha element’ is but the ‘seed’ (*bīja*) for actually becoming a Buddha.<sup>284</sup> Still, these biological metaphors may not be intended to establish a process of real growth in deliberate contrast to a pattern of setting free what has already fully been there from the beginning in a hidden, latent form.<sup>285</sup> Actually, practice is occasionally stated to be

---

*pa dang | tshul khirms dang | shes pa dang | chos dang ldan pa rnam la yod par zad do ... || ... ngas bskal pa bye ba phrag brgyad cu'i bar du rung ba ma yin pa'i dngos po yongs su 'dzin pa spangs te [P: spong ste S] | chog shes pa dang | yo byad bsnnyungs pa'i mchog la gnas nas de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po yod par bsgoms te | mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas ...). Cf. SHIMODA 1997: 267–269 and 594–596 (ns. 59 and 62); LIU 1982: 71–72.*

<sup>283</sup> SHIMODA 1997: 289. I do not, however, think that spiritual practice was deemed superfluous by the authors of the TGS. Actually, there are a few passages that indicate that sentient beings are expected to actively participate in the process of purification (ZIMMERMANN 2002: 66–67). It is merely that the focus of the text is on other issues: on the idea of the presence of Buddha-nature within all sentient beings (described as a hidden presence to be set free or ‘revealed’, not so much as a potential to be developed, though there is some oscillation of the phraseology, cf. *ibid.*: 50 ff) and on the salvific rôle of the (accomplished) Buddha in this connection. But I think that SHIMODA is right in pointing out that the MPS lays more stress on the fact that the Buddha-nature of sentient beings is not yet actual Buddhahood and requires diligent practice on their part, and it may well be that this shift of emphasis was due to some concern about a possible misunderstanding of the message of the TGS.

<sup>284</sup> MPST S 179a1-2 (P 101b8; MPSFa 882a25-26; MPSDh 405c12-13 is somewhat different): *bdag la sangs rgyas su 'gyur ba'i sa bon de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po zhes bya ba yod do*. Cf. also fn. 359 and fn. 360.

<sup>285</sup> The pattern of latency and manifestation (elaborated, as is well known, in a philosophically reflected form in the Sāṅkhya system) may perhaps even be understood as being, originally, just an archaic way of expressing the more abstract concepts of potentiality and actualization. On the other hand, it may have suggested itself in connection with Buddhahood being regarded as permanent (*nitya*; the eternalness of the Buddha is a central issue of layer 1 of the MPS: see § 65.1 with fn. 355), for traditionally what originates (i.e., is caused, conditioned) is bound to cease. — LIU (1982: 82; 88), although admitting the existence of passages in the MPS that suggest the idea of Buddha-nature as a hidden presence or potency, gives

required merely in order to remove the extrinsic defilements (*kleśa*).<sup>286</sup>

b) *Second*, a decisive motive for coining the term *buddhadhātu* was obviously the intention to internalize the veneration of the Buddha's relics and the cult of the *stūpa* containing them. For the group that created layer 2(-2) of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, the salvific presence of the Buddha in the world was secured not so much by the fact that he left the relics (*dhātu*) of his material body as a kind of more stable, surviving bodily element, but rather by the presence, in the body of every sentient being, of an uncreated,<sup>287</sup> indestructible<sup>288</sup>

---

preference to an interpretation of Buddha-nature as a mere perspective in the future, open to sentient beings on the condition that they practise the path of Awakening. It is, however, worth noting that (in contrast to most of the material that suggests a hidden presence or potential: ib. 77–80) all the passages LIU adduces in favour of his view (ib. 83–86; cf. also 70–71[above] and 81) stem from the part of the text that is only found in Dharmakṣema, and from the latter half of this part at that. As LIU himself points out and exemplifies convincingly in his discussion of the *icchantikas* in the MPS (LIU 1984), the doctrinal positions and patterns of thought in these different parts do not necessarily agree. The statements in the later parts (i.e., those found only in Dharmakṣema) may therefore be meant as an adjustment of a pattern of thought or phraseology that was found problematic from a more decidedly anti-substantialist point of view. But I agree with LIU (1982: 87–88) in that also in the 'common part' the main concern is with soteriology and that its phraseology is hardly aimed at establishing a particular ontology in a *theoretical* perspective.

<sup>286</sup> MPST S 177b4-5 (P 101a2; MPSDh 405b8-11; MPSFa 882a11-13): "Those who speak thus: 'In my body, there is the Buddha-nature; [therefore,] I shall attain Buddhahood. But [for this purpose] I must eliminate the defilements (*kleśa*),' they are my [true] disciples" (*gang dag bdag gi lus la sangs rgyas kyi khams yod de | bdag gis sangs rgyas thob par 'gyur mod kyi | nyong mongs pa zad par bya dgos so zhes de skad zer ba de dag ni nga'i nyan thos yin no ||*). — MPST S 175a5-6 (P 99a6-7): "This '[Buddha]-element' is completely present in the body of each individual, but [only] when sentient beings have eliminated the various [adventitious] defilements (*\*kleśagata?*) [by which it is covered] do they become [actual] Buddhas" (*khams de rang rang gi lus la tshang [P: 'chang S] ste| sems can rnam kyis [P: kyi S] nyon mongs pa'i rnam pa zad par byas nas sangs rgyas su 'gyur te*). — Similarly S 197a7–b1 (P 115a4-5).

<sup>287</sup> MPST S 197a7 = P 115a4 (*bcos ma ma yin pa = \*akṛtrima*; cf. MPSDh 411b28; MPSFa 886c14-15); S 199a1 = P 116a6 (*ma byas pa = \*akṛta*).

‘element’ (*dhātu*) essentially identical with, and thus in a sense anticipating, their own future actual Buddhahood, due to which they are like living *stūpas*, containing an ‘element’ (*dhātu*) comparable and even superior to a relic (*dhātu*).<sup>289</sup>

53.2.3. It is obvious that the treatment of the ‘Buddha element’ in the ‘common part’ of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* is only concerned with its presence in *sentient* beings,<sup>290</sup> hence not in plants, for their sentience is expressly rejected in this text:

“[If there are texts] stating [things like] ‘Having seen that all trees (here surely *pars pro toto* for plants) have life and consciousness (\**saṃjñā*), [the Buddha] entered into *parinirvāṇa*’, then such kind [of texts] must be recognized as Sūtra and Vinaya [texts] promulgated by Māra. Texts making statements like ... ‘I prescribe (\**anujānāmi*) to have, with regard to trees, the notion (\**saṃjñā*) that they are devoid of

<sup>288</sup> MPST S 189a3-4 (P 109a3-4; MPSDh 408b28-c1; MPSFa 884a17-18; cf. SHIMODA 1997: 276–277): the *jīva* = *tathāgatagarbha* = (*buddha*-)*dhātu* cannot be destroyed, killed, or annihilated.

<sup>289</sup> SHIMODA 1997, esp. 278–298 and 301–303, and English summary 22–24. SHIMODA takes the *buddhadhātu* in the MPS as an internalization not only of the Buddha relic but also of the *stūpa* (i.e., the building containing the relic), but I must admit that I have problems with the latter correspondence because *dhātu* does not seem to be used as a designation of the *stūpa* (the equation of *dharmadhātu* and *stūpa* adduced by SHIMODA on p. 610–611 can, not least in view of the late date of the source, viz., the *Kriyāsamgraha* [12<sup>th</sup> / 13<sup>th</sup> century], hardly be regarded as pertinent evidence). When the MPS has the bodhisattva declare that he wants to venerate the Buddha’s relic (*dhātu*) and the *stūpa* without abandoning the *dharmakāya*, or that he wants to become himself like a *stūpa* (or both the true *stūpa* and the true ‘relic’: Fa) for all sentient beings (MPST S 192a1-2 = P 111a5-6; MPSFa 885a6-7; cf. SHIMODA 1997: 279 and 605 n. 84), this may well mean that his *body* (cf. S 192a2 *bdag gi lus* and MPSDh 410a8 令眾生於我身中起塔廟想) is, or will be, like a *stūpa* because it enshrines the relic-like Buddha-element (*buddhadhātu*), the latter being, in essence or in the future, identical with the *dharmakāya*. But perhaps my problems are merely due to my insufficient familiarity with the subject.

<sup>290</sup> Cf. MPSDh 524c8-9 (only Dh): “All those endowed with mind will attain the *anuttarā samyak sambodhi*” (凡有心者 定當得成阿耨多羅三藐三菩提).

life (or: a life-principle, soul: *\*nirjīva?*), and not to have the notion that they are sentient' ... [or:] 'I do not teach that the four elements have life and consciousness (*\*saṃjñā*)': such kind of Sūtra and Vinaya [texts] must be recognized as spoken by the Buddha."<sup>291</sup>

<sup>291</sup> MPST P 103a3-4 and 6-8 (S 180b5-6 and 181a1-4; D 100b1-2 and 4-6; cf. SHIMODA 1990: 105b and 109 n. 20; no Skt. acc. to HABATA 2007: xxxviii f): ... *shing ngo cog la srog dang 'du shes yod par gzigs nas* [PD : *na S*] *yongs su mya ngan las 'das so zhes zer ba de lta bu ni | bdud kyis smras pa'i mdo sde dang 'dul ba yin par rig par bya ste | ... shing thams cad la srog med pa'i 'du shes dang | sems pa'i* [DS : *sems pa med pa'i P*] *'du shes med par ngas gnang ngo || ... khams bzhi la ni srog dang 'du shes yod ces nga mi zer ro zhes zer ba de lta bu'i mdo sde dang 'dul ba ni sangs rgyas kyis gsungs pa* [S : *pa'i mdo sde DP*] *yin par rig par bya'o ||*. The expression '*srog med pa'i 'du shes dang | sems pa'i 'du shes med par*' is somewhat strange. The reading of P would yield the opposite sense, which would render the teaching of the Buddha equivalent to that of Māra, unless we substitute *yod par* for *med par* at the end. I would expect an original like *\*nirjīva-saṃjñām acetana-saṃjñām ca anujānāmi*, i.e., "I prescribe [to have], with regard to trees, the notion that they are devoid of [a] life[-principle] and the notion that they are insentient". This would, in content, be the expected opposite of what is taught with regard to trees in the pseudo-scriptures promulgated by Māra. Cf. also the Buddha's teaching regarding the four elements, which from a formal point of view is precisely parallel to the negation of the statement on trees ascribed to Māra. However, in view of the equivocal use of *'du shes* (*\*saṃjñā*) in the Tibetan translation as it stands, I am not sure about the correctness of the formulation *srog dang 'du shes yod* either (might it perhaps go back to *\*sajīvasaṃjñā*, i.e., "the notion of their possessing [a] life[-principle]"?). — In the Chinese versions, the opposition between the statements of the pseudo-scriptures and the genuine scriptures with regard to plants ("grasses and trees") is unambiguous, but they mention only life, not sentience. Cf. MPSFa 882b19-29: "If [someone] says: The Tathāgata has allowed ... to form the notion of life with regard to grasses and trees ..., then you must know that this is [from] a sūtra or a Vinaya promulgated by Māra. If [somebody] declares me to have allowed ... to form the notion of life with regard to grasses and trees: such a statement has not been allowed by me. Whoever makes such a statement, such people should be known to be disciples of [misguided] non-Buddhist [teachers]" (... 言如來聽 ... 於諸草木作壽命想 ... 當知是為魔說經律。若言我聽 ... 一切草木作壽命想: 如是說者我所不聽。作是說者 當知是輩外道弟子). Similarly MPSDh 406a23-b1: 若有說言 ... 草木之屬皆有壽命 ... 若有經律作是說者, 當知即是魔之所說。又亦不聽 ... 草木有命。... 若言世尊作如是說, 當知是為外道眷屬, 非我弟子. Cf. also the parallel in 408c29 f and 409a8-9 (not in MPST, MPSFa and not even in

From this perspective, it is not very surprising that in a famous passage, which, however, belongs to that part of the text that is found only in Dharmakṣema, indisputably insentient things like walls and rubble are expressly excluded from Buddha-nature.<sup>292</sup>

**53.3.** This limiting, as a matter of course, of the naturally inherent Buddha-nature to sentient beings<sup>293</sup> continues into more systematic Indian texts. In this connection, the analysis of the term *tathāgata-garbha* in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* is quite helpful because it clearly distinguishes different aspects of the relation between individual beings and the Buddha (or Buddhahood).<sup>294</sup> Starting from the famous statement of the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* that all sentient beings are *tathāgatagarbha*, it proposes a threefold interpretation. The first interpretation takes the compound as a tatpuruṣa, the second and the third are based on an analysis of it as a bahuvrīhi:

1. All sentient beings are inside the Tathāgata (like an embryo (*garbha*) in the womb) because they are all enveloped and pervaded by the 'meta-physical', true 'body' (*dharmakāya*) of the Tathāgata,<sup>295</sup>

---

T 12.375), where the correct position is formulated as "grain and rice, grasses and trees have no life, have no self (\*ātman); they are not reckoned among sentient beings" (穀米草木無命無我，非眾生數). Cf. also MPDh 460b17-19 (in the part found only in Dharmakṣema), referring to mowing grass and cutting trees on a par with digging in the earth and dissecting a corpse.

<sup>292</sup> MPDh 581a22-23: "Not Buddha-natured are all insentient things [like] walls and rubble" (非佛性者，所謂一切牆壁瓦石無情之物.).

<sup>293</sup> Cf., e.g., also RGV I.52 or 156.

<sup>294</sup> RGV I.27 and 28; RGVV 26,7-9 and, most explicitly, 70,16-18, etc. (see fns. 295-297). Cf. TAKASAKI 1966: 197 f; 284-290; SEYFORTH RUEGG 1969: 272-278; 1976: 345.

<sup>295</sup> Most clearly RGVV 70,16-17 (ad I.146 f): *tathāgatadharmakāyena niravāśeṣa-sattvadhātu-parispharaṇārtham adhikṛtya "tathāgatasyēme garbhāḥ sarvasattvā" iti*. If *parispharaṇa* is understood as merely expressing the aspect of pervasion, *garbha* could, in this case, also be taken to mean "womb". But the next sentence of the passage makes clear that the purport is rather that all sentient beings are inside, i.e. encompassed by, the *dharmakāya* (RGVV 70,18 f: *na hi sa kaścit sattvaḥ sattvadhātau saṁvidyate yas tathāgatadharmakāyād bahiḥ*). Likewise, in RGV I.27 the corresponding phrase *buddhajñānāntargamāt sattvarāśeḥ* is more likely to be

2. all sentient beings contain the Tathāgata in the sense that his true nature or Suchness (*tathatā*) is also their true nature, Suchness admitting of no division (*avyatibheda*);<sup>296</sup>
3. all sentient beings contain a Tathāgata in the sense that they contain the *tathāgatagotra*, i.e., their own Buddhahood as a potential or in a hidden form.<sup>297</sup>

The alternative (viz., “as a potential or in a hidden form”) in my explanation of the third interpretation is deliberate, being aimed at indicating the two different ways of conceiving the realization of Awakening, viz., as a *development* of a potential on the one hand and as an unwrapping or a *manifestation* of something already fully present<sup>298</sup> on the other (cf. § 53.1.2). Both require spiritual practice, if only in order to remove misconceptions.

**53.4.** As for the process of unfolding the inherent Buddha-nature, Paramārtha’s (active in China between 546 and 569) “Treatise on

---

understood as “because the crowd[s] of sentient beings are [all] inside the Buddha’s wisdom” (cf. TAKASAKI 1966: 197; SEYFORTH RUEGG 1969: 273); cf. also the Chinese version, which in its rendering of the commentary on RGV I.146 f adds the remark that there is not a single living, sentient being that is separated from or outside the Tathāgata’s wisdom (T 31.1611: 838c4-6: 於眾生界中 無有一眾生 離如來法身 在於法身外, 離於如來智 在如來智外.).

<sup>296</sup> RGVV 71,11: *tathatāvyatibhedārtham adhiḥkṛtya* “*tathāgatatathataiśām garbhaḥ sarvasattvānām*” iti ... (ed. °*gatas tatha*°, but see SCHMITHAUSEN 1971: 157).

<sup>297</sup> RGVV 72,8-9: *trividhabuddhakāyotpattigotrasadbhāvārtham adhiḥkṛtya* “*tathāgatadhātur esām garbhaḥ sarvasattvānām*” iti ... (ed. °*svabhāvā*°, but see SCHMITHAUSEN 1971: 157). In this case, the designation of the result (*phala*, i.e. ‘*tathāgata*’) is ‘metaphorically’ applied (*upacāra*) to the cause (*gotra* = *hetu*) (RGV I.27c; cf. SEYFORTH RUEGG 1969: 273). For the common phrase *hetau phalopacārah* and vice versa cf., e.g., AKBh 260,14 and 25,13.

<sup>298</sup> Cf. the TGS (see fn. 283). A nice example from an early Chinese Ch’an text is the alleged quotation from the *Treatise on the [Sūtra of the] Ten Stages* (i.e., T 26.1522, i.e., DBhVyC) in the *Hsiu-hsin yao lun* 修心要論 ascribed to Hung-jen 弘忍 (MCRAE 1986: 121–122): “Like the sun, it (i.e., the Buddha Nature within the bodies of sentient beings) is essentially bright, perfect, and complete ... merely covered by the layered clouds of the five *skandhas*. Like a lamp inside a jar, its light cannot shine.” Similarly the fourth illustration in the *Mahābherī-sūtra* passage quoted in SEYFORTH RUEGG 1973: 78 f.

Buddha-nature” (*Fo-hsing lun* 佛性論) is instructive. According to this text,<sup>299</sup> the basic presupposition is the unconditioned (*\*asaṃskṛta*) “cause to be attained” (應得因), i.e., inherent Buddha-nature consisting in Suchness (*tathatā*) to be revealed by [comprehending] the two-fold emptiness [of person and dharmas] (二空所現真如).<sup>300</sup> It has always been present in its original state (*\*prakṛtistha*). Due to the “cause for practising (*\*prayoga*) [the Path]” (加行因), i.e., the resolve for Awakening (*bodhicitta*)<sup>301</sup>, and the “cause for perfection” (圓滿因), i.e., the actual practice, the inherent Buddha-nature gradually unfolds on the bodhisattva path until it manifests itself as the *dharmakāya*.

54. Among the passages adduced or discussed by medieval Chinese and Japanese masters in connection with the Buddha-nature, or Awakening, of *plants* (or insentient things: see § 119), I disregard those which can be safely regarded as being of Chinese origin, since I am, in this chapter, only concerned with the question of possible Indian antecedents of the Far Eastern idea of plants possessing Buddha-nature. Thus there is no need, in this context, to discuss the meaning or implications of dicta of earlier Chinese masters like Seng-chao (僧肇, †414)<sup>302</sup> or the statement, ascribed, in one source, to Tao-sheng (道生, †434),<sup>303</sup> that the vividly emerald green bamboos are, all of

<sup>299</sup> T 31.1610: 794a10-24. Cf. KING 1991: 40–41; TAKASAKI & KASHIWAGI 2005: 119–120.

<sup>300</sup> Cf. also T 31.1610: 787b4-5: 佛性者, 即是人法二空所顯真如.

<sup>301</sup> On the history of this term in Indian and Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, see WANG-CHUK 2007.

<sup>302</sup> Cf. the reference to *Chao-lun* 肇論 (T 45.1858) 153a4-5 in the *Ta-sheng hsüan lun* 大乘玄論 (T 45.1853: 40c7-9).

<sup>303</sup> Viz., in the *Tsu-t'ing shih-yüan* 祖庭事苑 (X 64.1261: 387b13), compiled by Mu-an shan-ch'ing 睦庵善卿 in 1108 (*FK* 4241a; *SBDJ* 907b). But OKUNO (2002: 372) points out that in the *Tsu-t'ang-chi* (ch. 15, fol. 12, 21-22; Taiw. 291b7-8), which was compiled in 952, it is ascribed to Seng-chao (僧肇, †414), and that in a passage of the much earlier *Chüron shoki* (中論疏記) of the Sanron scholar Anchō (安澄, 763–814) — based on a lost commentary by the Sanron master Chikō (智光, middle of the 8<sup>th</sup> century) — that is missing in T 65.2255 but found in an old ms.

them, *dharmakāya*, and the densely growing chrysanthemums [the Buddha's] gnosis (*prajñā*).<sup>304</sup> Likewise, I need not discuss the *Yüan-chüeh ching* 圓覺經 (T 17.842), a passage from which is sometimes interpreted to express the view that insentient things, too, attain Buddhahood,<sup>305</sup> because this text is nowadays regarded as having been compiled in China in the last decade of the seventh century or around the beginning of the eighth.<sup>306</sup> Nor am I going to deal, in this

---

from the Tōdaiji library (OKUNO 2002: 377 n. 38), a slight variant of the statement is connected with a quotation from “[the one living] in the mountains” (山中), i.e., according to OKUNO, Seng-ch’üan (僧詮, 6<sup>th</sup> century acc. to KRAUSE 2003: 403), the teacher of Chi-tsang’s teacher Fa-lang (法朗, 507–581 acc. to KRAUSE 2003: 407; cf. also MAGNIN 1979: 143). None of these attributions or connections can be verified, because the statement cannot be traced in the extant works of Tao-sheng and Seng-chao and because no work of Seng-ch’üan has been preserved, but the ascription to Seng-ch’üan appears most likely.

<sup>304</sup> Cf., e.g., *Tsu-t’ang-chi* ch. 3 fol. 13,13-14 (Taiw. 63a13-14; cf. YANAGIDA 1990: 168 # 259 and 393 f; ANDERL 2004a: 626, quoting an occurrence in the *Shen-hui yü-lu* 神會語錄) and ch. 15, fol. 12, 21-22 (see fn. 303); *Ch’uan-teng lu* 247c15-16 and 441b21; T 47.1998A: 875a3-4 and 13-14: “The vividly emerald green bamboos: all of them are the *dharmakāya* (v.l.: *tathatā*); the densely growing ‘yellow-flowers’ (i.e., chrysanthemums): there is none that is not *prajñā*” (青青翠竹 盡是法身(v.l. 真如), 鬱鬱黃華 無非般若). For further information, cf. also SUEKI 1993a: 709,14-15 and 740–741, n. 8; GRONER 2000: 481–480 rl, n. 22.

<sup>305</sup> T 17.842: 917b6-7: 地獄天堂 皆爲淨土。有性無性 齊成佛道., transl. in MULLER 1999: 162: “Hell and heaven are both the Pure Land; those having Buddha-nature and those not having it equally accomplish the Buddha’s enlightenment.” Cf. SHIRATO 1998: 18. The natural interpretation of this passage would rather be that even those sentient beings that are regarded as being devoid of Buddha-nature, i.e., the *icchantikas*, are, after all, not definitively excluded from attaining Buddhahood. This is in fact how the passage is explained by Tsung-mi 宗密 (T 39.1795: 556a29–b1: 有性者, 三乘性也。無性者, 闡提性也.). But there are also commentators who explain the terms “having nature” (有性) and “devoid of nature” (無性) in the sense of having sentience (有情), i.e., sentient beings capable of spontaneous movement (“wriggling beings”: 蠢動之物), and “lacking sentience” (無情), i.e., insentient beings like grasses and trees, tiles and pebbles (cf. X 10.254: 407c11-13 [Chih-ts’ung 智聰]; X 10.253: 312b17-19 [Chou-ch’i 周琪]; see MULLER 1999: 311).

<sup>306</sup> Cf., e.g., BUSWELL 1989: 115 with n. 126, referring to MOCHIZUKI 1946: 509–519; MULLER 1999: 3 and 12 + 289 n. 14. See also SHIRATO 1998: 18b3-8.



connection, with the *Chung-yin ching* 中陰經 — another text the Indian origin of which is doubtful<sup>307</sup> — because the passage referred to by Japanese Tendai masters like Annen (安然, 841? to ca. 890)<sup>308</sup> and Shōshin (證眞, active 1153–1207)<sup>309</sup> as evidence, or alleged evidence, for plants becoming Buddhas is not found in the extant Chinese text.<sup>310</sup>

55. From the aforementioned point of view, I could also disregard a passage OKADA<sup>311</sup> adduces from the so-called *Śūramgama-sūtra* (T 19.945) as evidence for the continuity of the idea of the sentience of plants in Indian Mahāyāna. According to this passage, “the plants (‘grasses and trees’) in the ten directions all [deserve to be] called sentient [beings]; [essentially,] they are not different from humans. Plants become humans, and humans after their death again become the plants of the ten directions.”<sup>312</sup> Actually, this *Śūramgama-sūtra*, a Tantric text allegedly translated into Chinese in 705, is of doubtful authenticity and now generally considered to have been composed in

<sup>307</sup> SUEKI 1991: 167 n. 25: “Although it is said to be a translation by Chu Fo-nien, there are doubts” (竺仏念訳とされるも、疑問あり).

<sup>308</sup> *Bodaishin* 484c7-9: “When Śākyamuni attained Awakening, all grasses and trees [likewise] attained Buddha-bodies. The bodies’ height was a *ch’ih* (= 10 feet) and six [feet], and they all expounded the Dharma” (釋迦成道之時 一切草木 皆成佛身。身長丈六，悉皆說法。); similarly *Shinjō shiki* 713,16, with “grasses and trees and the land” (草木國土) instead of “all grasses and trees”. Cf. SUEKI 1991: 45,2-3 and 1995a: 749,7-9; SHIRATO 1998: 16b.

<sup>309</sup> *Shikan shiki* 249a14-16 (quotation) and 249a16–b8 (discussion). Cf. SHIRATO 1998: 16b.

<sup>310</sup> Cf., e.g., MIYAMOTO 1961: 674–678; HANANO 1976b: 156; SUEKI 1991: 167 n. 25; 1995a: 751 n. 13; SHIRATO 1998: 16b; MATSUMOTO 2000: 56–58. On the problem of invented texts or passages, see the well-considered remarks in STONE 1999: 158–159.

<sup>311</sup> OKADA 1999: 107a # 3.5.

<sup>312</sup> *Śūr* 153c10-12: 十方草木 皆稱有情 與人無異。草木爲人 人死還成十方草樹。 The last sentence is reminiscent of *Āyār* 41,7 (*JĀG* #267): “The stationary [turn] into mobile, and the mobile living beings [turn] into stationary ones” (... *thāvarā ya tasattāe tasajīvā ya thāvarattāe*).

China at the beginning of the 8<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>313</sup> Post-dating the emergence of the discussion about Buddha-nature in the insentient, it cannot be adduced as evidence for an undercurrent that would bridge the gap between these developments and the earliest period of Buddhism. But even if we disregard this basic difficulty, the passage adduced by OKADA will not serve the purpose. It occurs in a paragraph describing, like the surrounding paragraphs, a yogi who has thoroughly investigated (窮) the voidness of the *saṃskāras* (i.e., the fourth *skandha*, including wholesome and unwholesome drives and karmic forces) and has thus removed [future] arising and vanishing (已滅生滅)<sup>314</sup> but — not yet having transcended the realm of the fifth *skandha*, viz., consciousness or sentience (*vijñāna*) — has still not completely realized the subtle, marvellous nature of quietude (寂滅, i.e., true *nirvāṇa*). All the paragraphs then continue with a conditional clause (若 ... 者) describing some misconception of the yogi that makes him fall into a wrong belief equal to that of certain misguided non-Buddhists, so that he misses true Awakening and forfeits true insight.

---

<sup>313</sup> Detailed discussion in DEMIÉVILLE 1952: 43–52. Cf. also BUSWELL 1990: 8–9 and 1989: 115 (in n. 125, BUSWELL refers to the dissertation of Ronald EPSTEIN as an attempt to prove the Indian provenance of the text, but states that he finds EPSTEIN's argument unconvincing); SUEKI 1991: 187 n. 147; MATSUMOTO 2000: 433 ff; BENN 2008. As DEMIÉVILLE (1952: 45) points out, the authenticity of the text was controversial in Japan already in the Nara period, immediately after the introduction of the text from China.

<sup>314</sup> The precise meaning of the expression requires further investigation (for which an earlier passage of the *Śūraṅgama-sūtra*, viz., Śūr 128b19–21, may be important). To judge from the present context according to which “the *saṃskāra-skandha* has come to an end” (153b4: 行陰盡), the “removal of arising and vanishing” would seem to refer to a state in which the [future] cessation of *saṃsāric* existence is secured due to the extinction of its cause, i.e., the *saṃskāras*. This is confirmed by the commentator Tzū-hsüan (T 39.1799: 956c4), who explicitly states that the *saṃskāra-skandha* is the source of arising and vanishing (行陰是生滅元) and that if one is able to eliminate the cause of *saṃsāra* one ‘removes arising and vanishing’ (856c5: 輪迴之因 若能遠離 即滅生滅). In this connection, it may be worth mentioning that early translators like An Shih-kao even use the expression 生死 to render Skt. *saṃskāra*, probably in a causative sense (“that which causes one to be [re]born and die [again]”: T. VETTER, oral communication).

Now, it is precisely in this conditional clause formulating the misconception of the yogi that the sentence quoted by OKADA is embedded, and it is by adhering to the idea that plants are sentient, etc., that the yogi is stated to fall into the “wrong belief of ascribing awareness to what has no awareness” (知無知執), so that Va(sis)ṭha (婆吒) and Śreṇi(ka) (霰尼),<sup>315</sup> who believe that everything is sentient (覺, i.e., *cetana*),<sup>316</sup> become his companions.<sup>317</sup> Tzū-hsüan’s (子璿, 965?–1038?, Hua-yen) commentary on the passage is quite explicit: “Plants lack awareness; yet he takes them to have awareness.”<sup>318</sup> At another place, the *Śūramgama-sūtra* itself regards plants as lacking feeling (受 = *vedanā*) and conscious experience (想 = *saṃjñā*).<sup>319</sup>

56. The passage just discussed aside, I shall, however, confine myself, though without claiming exhaustiveness, to passages adduced from texts whose Indic<sup>320</sup> origin is certain or at least arguable. Among them, two groups may be distinguished. The first group are passages of a more general type, i.e., such as make general statements about

<sup>315</sup> Thus according to Tzū-hsüan (T 39.1799: 962c1), who equates the names with 波私吒 and 先尼 occurring at MPSDh 593b13 ff and 594a14 ff, respectively, but neither of them propounds the view ascribed to the two teachers in the *Śūramgama-sūtra*. In the MPS, Śreṇika advocates the position of an all-pervading and eternal yet individual Self (我, *ātman*); cf. also STONE 1999: 77–78.

<sup>316</sup> Tzū-hsüan explains this to mean that plants are endowed with life (T 39.1799: 962c2: 草木有命).

<sup>317</sup> This interpretation of the passage is also confirmed by the English translation of the text in HSUAN HUA 2003: 281.

<sup>318</sup> T 39.1799: 962b29: 草木無知 而執有知. The error seems to consist in taking both humans and plants as real and as being *individually* sentient, for a few lines later (T 39.1799: 962c3-5) the commentary remarks that these persons do not understand that all phenomena are merely transformations (所變, i.e., manifestations) of *erroneous* consciousness (妄識, 妄想). When erroneous consciousness ‘coagulates’ (凝結), one calls it insentient, when it is ‘fluid/mobile’ (流動), it is called sentient.

<sup>319</sup> Śūr 152c21: ... 無受想 與草木同。

<sup>320</sup> In the wider sense, including the developments of Indian Buddhism in Central Asia.

“all dharmas” and not specifically about plants or insentients, and at that statements whose connection with the issue of Buddha-nature is in most cases not explicit but merely assumed to be implied (ch. 1). The second group, to be discussed in greater detail (ch. 2), consists of four more specific passages, i.e., passages which clearly state that plants or any insentient things are, or may become, sentient, or turn into Buddhas or perform characteristic functions of a Buddha, especially that of preaching the Dharma.

## 1. General Passages

57. Most of the general, inexplicit passages I am going to discuss are taken from the *Ta-sheng hsüan lun* (大乘玄論: T 45.1853) ascribed<sup>321</sup> to the San-lun (三論, i.e., Madhyamaka) master Chi-tsang (吉藏, 549–623). In order to corroborate his argument that, from the perspective of the ‘principle’ (理) understood as pervasive (通門), Buddha-nature cannot be confined to sentient beings but must be accepted in the insentient as well, Chi-tsang<sup>322</sup> first refers to three Sūtra passages: to the vision of Maitreya’s palace in the *Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra* (ch. 1.1), to a passage from the *Mahāsaṃnipāta* (ch. 1.2), and to one from the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* (ch. 1.3). There follows a reference to Vasubandhu’s *Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* (ch. 1.4), and, in connection with the latter, a reference to a passage from the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* (ch. 1.6). Along with the passage from the *Viṃśatikā*, I shall also (ch. 1.5) deal with an equally inexplicit passage from the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* adduced, according to his record as transmitted in the *Tsu-t’ang-chi* (祖堂集), by the Ch’an master Nan-yang Hui-chung (南陽慧忠, ?-775) in order to prove that insentient things, too, have (or rather *are*) mind (心), i.e., Buddha-Mind (佛心), and hence

<sup>321</sup> For problems concerning the unity and authorship of the *Ta-sheng hsüan lun*, see PLASSEN 2002: 14–20.

<sup>322</sup> T 45.1853: 40c3-23.

Buddha-nature (性, 佛性).<sup>323</sup> Another set of unspecific passages, all from the chapter 'Eulogies on Mount Sumeru' (須彌頂上偈讚品) of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, are adduced by the T'ien-t'ai master Chan-jan (湛然, 711–782) in his *Diamond Scalpel* (金剛鐮論)<sup>324</sup> in order to prove that Suchness cannot be split up into Buddha-nature, restricted to sentient beings, and mere Nature-of-dharmas (*dharmatā*) in insentient things (ch. 1.7). Finally (ch. 1.8), I shall briefly comment on the Chapter on Herbs (*Oṣadhiparivarta*) of the *Lotus Sūtra*, which is adduced not only by OKADA and FINDLY in support of their position but is also interpreted by medieval Far Eastern authors in terms of the idea that plants attain Buddhahood.

### 1.1 *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*: Maitreya's Palace

58. In his reference to the vision of Maitreya's palace or mansion (*kūṭāgāra*)<sup>325</sup> in the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, Chi-tsang does not quote the full wording of a specific passage. He merely states that the spiritual wayfarer Sudhana, when seeing Maitreya's palace, obtains countless introductions to religious practice (*dharmamukha*),<sup>326</sup> and adds the rhetorical question:

“Doesn't this mean that just by contemplating things and perceiving their [Buddha-?]nature one obtains countless [modes of experience taking place in] deep concentration (三昧, *samādhi*)?”<sup>327</sup>

This almost certainly refers to Gv 410,31–411,29, where Sudhana is described as hearing various instructions issuing from all kinds of *objects* in the various palaces within Maitreya's palace, like bells and musical instruments. Towards the end of the passage, these instruc-

<sup>323</sup> See § 129.3.1-2.

<sup>324</sup> *Chin-kang-pei* 783a21-29; cf. PENKOWER 1993: 484–486.

<sup>325</sup> On the meaning of *kūṭāgāra* (Ch. 樓觀, cf. HIR. 669b), see SWTF s.v.

<sup>326</sup> T 45.1853: 40c4-5: 善財童子 見彌勒樓觀 即得無量法門。

<sup>327</sup> T 45.1853: 40c5: 豈非是觀物見性即得無量三昧。

tions are termed *dharmamukhas*, and by way of conclusion the text states that Sudhana receives [in this way?] introductions to various aspects of religious practice, culminating in introductions to *samādhi*. It would thus seem that this passage is an instance of insentient things preaching the Dharma, interpreted by Chi-tsang as a manifestation of their Buddha-nature. Since this complex will be dealt with extensively in connection with the second group of passages, and especially, as far as the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* is concerned, in ch. 2.4, I will leave the matter at that for the time being.

## 1.2. *Sāgaramatipariṣcchā*

59. Chi-tsang's second scriptural proof is from the *Mahāsaṃnipāta*, more precisely from the *Sāgaramati-pariṣcchā*. According to this passage, the bodhisattvas (Chi-tsang: Buddhas and bodhisattvas) explain (Chi-tsang: perceive) that among all the dharmas there is none that is not Awakening (*bodhi*).<sup>328</sup> In Chi-tsang's understanding, being *bodhi* implies being (in essence) Buddha-nature.<sup>329</sup> It is only due to delusion with regard to the Buddha-nature that they appear as the mundane, saṃsāric multitude of things. When one awakens, they are just Awakening (*bodhi*).<sup>330</sup> The implication seems to be that insentient things somehow participate in Awakening, or disclose themselves as being, in their essence, part of it. Still, it is hardly Chi-tsang's intention to establish any definitive doctrinal *position* concerning insentient things and their Awakening (see § 127.3). Rather, his aim is merely to show that from the perspective of the 'principle' (理) understood as all-pervasive — i.e., as the Suchness of everything (*tathatā*) —, an apodictic doctrinal restriction of Buddha-nature to

<sup>328</sup> T 45.1853: 40c5-6: 又大集經云: 諸佛菩薩 觀一切諸法 無非是菩提。For the *Sāg* passage, see fn. 331.

<sup>329</sup> T 45.1853: 40c9-10: "If among all dharmas there is none that is not *bodhi*, what would allow one to get around (lit.: not to reach) [the conclusion] that there is nothing that is not Buddha-nature?" (若一切諸法 無非是菩提, 何容不得無非是佛性。).

<sup>330</sup> T 45.1853: 40c6-7: 此明: 迷佛性故 爲生死萬法。悟 即是菩提。

sentient beings is untenable. If Buddha-nature is equated with the all-pervasive ‘principle’, then Buddha-nature, too, must be all-pervasive, not admitting of any limitations.

60. The question is, however, to what extent this interpretation of the passage coincides with its purport in the context of the Indian source. There, the sentence occurs in a series of comparisons illustrating various aspects connected with the bodhisattva, especially the bodhisattva who has just made the resolve to become a Buddha. In this connection, the text has the Buddha say:

“Just as Jivaka, the king of physicians, always says that there is nothing in the world that is not a medicine, so the bodhisattva explains that among all the dharmas there is none that is not Awakening (*bodhi*).”<sup>331</sup>

Judging from the comparison, we might consider the possibility that the passage is concerned with the bodhisattva’s skill in pedagogic strategies (*upāyakauśalya*), i.e., with his being aware of the fact that just as there is nothing in the world that, suitably applied, does not help to cure one or the other disease, there is no *dharma* (phenomenon, practice, or teaching?) that does not, brought into play in the right situation, lead one or the other person to Awakening.

61. The Tibetan version, however, may suggest a slightly different interpretation. It runs thus:

“Just as there is nothing — [even though it] appears as [just an ordinary] material thing (*rūpa*) — that Jivaka, the king of physicians, does not perceive as a medicine, so there is no *appearance* of (lit.: as) phenomena (*\*dharmābhāsa*?) which the bodhisattva who practises the *prajñāpāramitā* does not per-

---

<sup>331</sup> SāgDh: 54c28–55a1: 如耆婆醫王 常作是言: 天下所有 無非是藥。菩薩亦爾 說一切法 無非菩提。 Similarly SāgW: 489b21–23, reading, like Chi-tsang (see fn. 326), 觀 (“perceives”) instead of 說 (“explains”) and specifying, in the comparison, the things Jivaka perceives to be medicine as “all plants on earth” (大地一切草木). For Tibetan, see fn. 332.

ceive as Awakening (*bodhi*).<sup>332</sup>

Here, what seems to be envisaged is rather the bodhisattva's faculty, based on his practising the *prajñāpāramitā*, to see through the superficial appearance of phenomena and perceive their real, ultimate nature, which is conducive to Awakening, just as Jivaka penetrates through the superficial appearance of material things and perceives their healing powers.

62. Or, if we take the comparison to envisage merely the aspect of equality, we may interpret the passage as pointing to the ultimate equality of all dharmas, including *bodhi*. As is stated elsewhere in the *Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā*, Awakening consists precisely in the insight that Awakening (*bodhi*), sentient beings and all dharmas are essentially equal and without distinction, of one taste and one nature,<sup>333</sup> which means that they are all originally pure,<sup>334</sup> like space,<sup>335</sup> without arising and cessation.<sup>336</sup> From the Buddha's (and analogously the bodhisattva's) point of view, there is thus not a single dharma apart

<sup>332</sup> SāgT 37b5-6: 'di lta ste dper na | sman gyi rgyal po 'Tsho byed kyis gang sman du mi mthong ba'i gzugs su snang ba de gang yang med do || Sha ra dva ti'i bu de bzhin du shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa'i byang chub sems dpas kyang gang byang chub tu mi mthong ba'i chos su snang ba de gang yang med do ||

<sup>333</sup> SāgDh: 60a19-23 (菩提眾生一切法性 等無差別 一味一性。如來 坐於菩提樹下 見如是法。是故名爲逮得菩提。我 ... 見一切法 皆悉平等。). Cf. SāgW 498a27-b2; SāgT 57b3-5: "Awakening (*bodhi*), too, is of the same nature ... as I (= the Buddha) myself, all sentient beings are of the same nature, all dharmas are of the same nature. O Mañjuśrī, what I have been Awakened to at the seat (/as the essence) of Awakening (*\*bodhimanda*) is [this fact that these are all] of one and the same nature, of one single taste. ... I have been Awakened to the equality of all dharmas (/I have comprehended all dharmas as equal)" (*nga'i ngo bo nyid gang yin pa ... byang chub kyang de'i ngo bo nyid* || *sems can thams cad kyang de'i ngo bo nyid* | *chos thams cad kyang de'i ngo bo nyid do* || 'Jam dpal byang chub kyi snying por gang ngas mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas pa de ni ngo bo nyid gcig pa'o || ro gcig pa'o || ... chos thams cad mnyam pa nyid du mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas so ||).

<sup>334</sup> SāgDh: 51a18: 一切諸法本性淨; 51c13; 53a4.

<sup>335</sup> SāgDh: 47b9: 一切法如虛空; 65c14: 一切諸法猶如虛空.

<sup>336</sup> SāgDh: 51a21: 若觀諸法無生滅 是人即得真實知; 62a24: 知一切法不生不滅.



from *bodhi*,<sup>337</sup> i.e., as I understand it, apart from Awakening viewed in the perspective of its true ‘nature’ or ‘essence’.<sup>338</sup> When Awakening takes place, everything, including Awakening itself as a psychic state, somehow dissolves into this true nature, into the ‘silent desert’ (if I may use the phrase). This does not, however, mean that the author(s) of the *Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā* was (/were) in any way aware of, let alone interested in, the question of a soteriological perspective of (insentient) dharmas in their own right. It rather appears that as a matter of course soteriology remained focused on sentient beings. According to a passage from this sūtra quoted in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, the soteric activity of the bodhisattva is stated to be promising due to the original purity of the mind and the adventitiousness of the defilements, but this original purity of the mind is taken for granted to be a

---

<sup>337</sup> SāgDh: 60a22: 我都不見 離菩提外 別有一法. SāgT 57b5 has *byang chub kyi snying po* (*bodhimanda*) instead of *bodhi*. Thus also SāgW 498b29–c1, where, however, the meaning of the whole sentence is different.

<sup>338</sup> The idea that all dharmas are [essentially] Awakening is also implied in a verse of the Questions of the god Brahman Viśeṣacintin (*Brahma-Viśeṣacintī-paripṛcchā*, cf. MVy no. 1367; for the form °*cintin*, see also MVy no. 1099 and PTSD 268b). According to this verse, Awakening is the essence of the *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas* (which means: all dharmas), or these are precisely Awakening, and there is no Awakening apart from them (Kj D ba 78a8; S tsha 235a4-5: *byang chub de yi rang bzhin tel|| de las gud na byang chub med||*; T 15.586: 52b29: 陰界入即是離是無菩提; 585: 22a20; 587: 85c10). To judge from the context, the purport of the passage is to stress that in their Suchness (*tathatā*) all dharmas and Awakening are alike (Kj D ba 78a6: *de bzhin nyid kyis phye bas na|| gzugs ltar byang chub de bzhin tel||*). They are dependent on conditions and lack substantial reality (Kj S tsha 238b3: *rkyen la rag las ngos po med*). Being without specific characteristics (*mīṣhan nyid*, \**lakṣaṇa*) constituting them as entities in their own right, they are comparable to empty space (Kj D ba 78b4-5). Correctly perceiving them as all alike means *not* to perceive them (*mi mthong ba*: Kj D ba 77a4-5; S tsha 233a6-7), and in reality even Awakening (understood as a separate entity) cannot be found (Kj D ba 78a6: *don la byang chub mi dmigs so*). Consequently, the bodhisattva does not set out for Awakening in order to eliminate corporeal or visible matter (*rūpa*) (*gzugs gzhiḡ phyir*: Kj D ba 78a5; cf. T 15.586: 52b21: 壞色). He neither clings to any dharmas nor discards any (Kj D ba 78a7; cf. 78b7). He remains in the world without being polluted, afraid or dejected (Kj D ba 78b2-3).

property of sentient beings only.<sup>339</sup> Likewise, in Dharmakṣema's Chinese translation a certain bodhisattva states that the correct attitude of a bodhisattva consists in his perceiving [all] dharmas as cessation and as being devoid of arising and perishing, and all sentient beings as possessing Buddha-nature.<sup>340</sup> Here, too, the soteriological perspective proper (i.e., Buddha-nature, here obviously envisaged as a potential for becoming a Buddha) seems to be, as a matter of course, restricted to sentient beings. This corresponds to Chi-tsang's 'perspective of distinction' (別門). According to this perspective, Buddha-nature is understood as Awakening (or comprehending the Truth) in a psychological sense, which is only possible for sentient beings because it presupposes a prior state of error, just as in an everyday context awaking presupposes sleep. Error, however, can only occur in beings possessed of mind. Thus, insentients, devoid of mind and thus being incapable of error, are neither capable of nor in need of Awakening.<sup>341</sup> For Chi-tsang, this is only a preliminary perspective, of merely pedagogical value, to be transcended by the 'perspective of pervasiveness' (通門), which is not meant as a dogmatic position either but has to be transcended as well (see § 127.3). In this regard, his position may not be incompatible with that of the sūtra, but in the sūtra the term 'Buddha-nature' is not used with reference to what Chi-tsang calls the 'perspective of pervasiveness', and in the above-quoted passage corresponding to Chi-tsang's 'perspective of distinction' the

---

<sup>339</sup> RGVV 49,9-10: *bodhisattvaḥ sattvānām cittaprakṛtiprabhāsvaratām prajānāti*. In contrast to SāgT 85a6-7 and SāgW: 511a15 and 17, SāgDh (68a19) lacks an equivalent for *sattvānām* here, but has it in the parallel expression at 71a20: 若見眾生心性本淨 名如法住.

<sup>340</sup> SāgDh: 71a11-12: 見法是滅 及無生滅, 一切眾生 悉有佛性. SāgT 98a4 differs considerably, the only part corresponding, somehow, to SāgDh being the statement that a bodhisattva should perceive all *sentient beings* as completely extinguished by nature (*\*prakṛtiparinirvṛta*). SāgW: 516b10-11 is similar to SāgT but here all *dharmas* are extinguished by nature.

<sup>341</sup> T 45.1853: 40c24-27: 明眾生有心迷故得有覺悟之理. 草木無心故不迷, 寧得有覺悟之義. 喻如夢覺. 不夢 則不覺. 以是義故 云眾生有佛性故成佛, 草木無佛性故不成佛也.

term may have been introduced by the translator Dharmakṣema since it is lacking in the other versions.<sup>342</sup>

### 1.3. *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (1): \**Āyusparivarta*

63. The third passage adduced by Chi-tsang is the most problematic one. It is from the “Chapter on Long Life” (\**Āyusparivarta*) of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* and somewhat laconically states:

“In all dharmas, there is peaceful bliss (安樂性).”<sup>343</sup>

Chi-tsang obviously understands the sentence to mean that all dharmas, including insentient things, have the nature (性) of (or: a nature consisting in) peace-and-bliss (安樂, which often simply represents Skt. *sukha*), and he takes this blissful nature to be the same as Buddha-nature.<sup>344</sup> Yet, even if this interpretation were justified, the evidential value of the passage is marred by the fact that it is found only in Dharmakṣema’s version and has no counterpart in Fa-hsien’s or in the Tibetan translation.<sup>345</sup> It thus appears to be an interpolation, perhaps inserted by Dharmakṣema himself. Even so, one could argue

<sup>342</sup> See fn. 340. Actually, there is only one more occurrence of the term ‘Buddha-nature’ (佛性) in SāgDh, and (as far as I can see) none at all in SāgW. SāgT remains to be checked, but in the two passages where 佛性 appears in SāgDh (viz., 60a5-6 and 71a12) no equivalent is found (see SāgT 57a1 and fn. 340).

<sup>343</sup> MPSDh 380a25 (= T 12.375: 620a4): 又涅槃云。一切諸法中 悉有安樂性。

<sup>344</sup> Thus already Fa-yao (法瑤, 409–489: KRAUSE 2003: 407), according to T 37.1763: 477b7-11: “Fa-yao says: ... [The chapter named after the bodhisattva] Lion’s Roar (= chapter 11 in MPSDh) extensively elucidates the Buddha-nature. This [corresponds] precisely [to the topic] ‘peaceful happiness’ in the above[-listed set of] questions. Peaceful happiness (= Buddha-nature) functions as the direct cause [of Awakening]. ...” (法瑤曰。... 師子吼 廣明佛性。即前問中 安樂性也。安樂性爲正因。).

<sup>345</sup> In MPSFa (863c9-24) the series of questions ends with what is the eighth verse in MPSDh (cf. TAKASAKI 1974: 134 f), followed by three lines of request (none of which corresponds to the passage under discussion). As against this, MPST (S 90b5–91b6; P 38a3–39a1; no Skt. available acc. to HABATA 2007: xxxviii f) has the same set of verses as MPSDh *except* for the verse referring to ‘peaceful happiness’.

that this would not suffice for rejecting the Indian origin of the idea, since Dharmakṣema hailed, after all, from Central India.<sup>346</sup> This is no doubt correct, but we still have to check the purport of the passage in the context of the sūtra. There it occurs towards the end of a series of verses containing a number of questions and is itself, too, embedded in a question, or rather in the request that the Buddha explain this matter. Now, as is the case with most of the other questions, the subject-matter of this question, too, has no significant connection with the preceding items. And whereas in the first two-thirds of the series the questions admit of contextualization in so far as they anticipate subjects subsequently addressed in the sūtra (more precisely: in its 'common part': see § 53.2.2),<sup>347</sup> such correspondence is not easily verified in the case of the last third, including the item under discussion.<sup>348</sup>

64. If the question under discussion were to correspond to a theme dealt with in the 'common part' of the sūtra, its position at the end of the series of questions would suggest that we should look for such a theme toward the very end of this part of the text. Actually, the last line of the last group of verses discussed in the final chapter of this part declares, in Dharmakṣema's version, that all those who practise a religious or ascetic life (*brahmacarya*) will obtain happiness,<sup>349</sup> though this does not hold good for some non-Buddhist forms of se-

---

<sup>346</sup> *HōbRēp* 243b.

<sup>347</sup> SHIMODA 1993: 211–213. For the verses 8cd–14 (of which only 8cd is represented in MPSFa), SHIMODA summarily refers to chapter 17 of Fa-hsien's version (MPSFa 891b23–896a4, corresponding to MPSDh 417b21–423c23 and MPST S 218a5–237a4). There, most of the items are indeed clearly recognizable (e.g., the last item with the key-word "blind by birth" is treated in MPSFa 895c18–24 ≈ MPSDh 423c2–9 ≈ MPST S 236b2–5).

<sup>348</sup> SHIMODA (1993: 216–218) does not indicate any correspondence from verse 15 (MPST S 91b1; MPSDh 380a13) onward.

<sup>349</sup> MPSDh 427c6: 一切修淨行而得受安樂. The passage seems to be concerned with happiness entailed by religious conduct in this very life, not with its after-life results.

vere asceticism. If the passage under discussion was indeed meant to anticipate this subject, we would have to understand the word \**dharma* (法) in the sense of “[correct] religious practice”:

“I humbly request the Great Sage to explain to me in detail how [it can be stated that] all religious/ascetic practices have the nature of peaceful bliss.”

If this is indeed the original purport of the passage, it would definitely have no bearing on the question of the sentience or Buddha-nature of plants or other insentient things.

**65.0.** Yet even if we accept Chi-tsang’s understanding of the “nature of peaceful bliss” (安樂性) as pointing to Buddha-nature, the passage would still seem to be open to more than one interpretation. Not being sufficiently familiar with Dharmakṣema’s version as a whole, I can only offer some provisional reflections.

**65.1.** In his running commentary on the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* (*Ta pan-nie-p’an ching shu* 大般涅槃經書疏: T 38.1767), the T’ien-t’ai master Kuan-ting 灌頂 (561–632) juxtaposes the passage under discussion with a quotation from the “Samantabhadra-Meditation Sūtra” (*P’u-hsien kuan ching* 普賢觀經)<sup>350</sup> which proclaims the all-pervasiveness or omnipresence of Vairocana.<sup>351</sup> This suggests an interpretation of the passage in terms of the omnipresence of the Buddha, or, more precisely, his true body, or *dharmakāya*. In fact, in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* the Buddha or his *dharmakāya* is sporadically qualified as blissful.<sup>352</sup> It is, however, mostly in the perspective of his

<sup>350</sup> T 9.277: 392c16.

<sup>351</sup> T38.1767: 176a28-29: 上文云: 一切諸法中 悉有安樂性。普賢觀云: 毘盧遮那遍一切處。

<sup>352</sup> As for Dharmakṣema, an explicit statement is MPSTh 383b17: “The Tathāgata’s body is the permanent *dharmakāya* (cf. also 374c9; 388b26-27 and c3), a body of peaceful bliss” (如來之身 是常法身 安樂之身). However, MPST (S 103a4; P 47a8-b1) has “peaceful” (*zhi ba*) instead of “peaceful bliss”: “The Tathāgata is the *dharmakāya*: permanent, stable, eternal, peaceful” (*de bzhin gshegs pa ni chos kyi sku ste | rtag pa dang | brtan pa dang | ther zug pa dang | zhi ba’o*). Similarly MPSTa 866b28 寂滅 (“calm and extinct”); both “peaceful” and “peaceful bliss” are

nirvāṇa, or his perfect liberation, that this qualification as blissful occurs,<sup>353</sup> and not in connection with his all-pervasiveness. Indeed, this aspect, which is often referred to in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* (§ 108.3.1), does not seem to be of crucial importance to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, at least to its ‘common part’,<sup>354</sup> in which the emphasis is rather on the supramundane status, perfection and permanence (i.e., temporal, not spatial omnipresence) of the Buddha (viz., in SHIMODA’s stratum 1 of the text)<sup>355</sup> and on the presence of a ‘Buddha-element’ as an inherent potential of unawakened beings (viz., in stratum 2, especially 2-2: see § 53.2.2). In addition, the central purport of the idea of the all-pervasiveness of the Buddha would seem to be his omnipresence as a teacher and saviour, and it is hard to see why in this connection special emphasis should be laid on the blissfulness of Buddhahood.

65.2. On the other hand, reference to bliss would make excellent sense in connection with the idea of the presence of a ‘Buddha-element’ (*buddhadhātu*) or ‘Tathāgata-embryo’ (*tathāgatagarbha*) in all unawakened beings, i.e., with the idea of their Buddha-nature in the sense of a potential or latent presence enabling them to attain,

---

probably renderings of Skt. \*śīva (SHIMODA 1993: 247 and 266 n. 67; cf. RGVV 12,12-13 and 54,13). — Cf. also MPSDh 399a6-7 (MPSFa 877c5-6; MPST S 156b5-6; P 86b1-2; HABATA 2007: 87), where the Tathāgata (*Bhagavat*) is qualified as permanent (*nityo dhruvaḥ śāśvataḥ*), immovable (*acala*) and (absolutely) blissful (*sukha*, *shin tu bde ba*; Dh 畢竟安樂, Fa 安隱快樂); MPSDh 407a12: “blissful (*sukha*): i.e., the Tathāgata” (樂者 即是如來). Cf. also MPST S 131b1 (P 69a3), where the Tathāgata is qualified as permanent and blissful (*de bzhin gshegs pa rtag pa dang ... bde ba ... ni ...*; cf. MPSFa 872c7: 快樂; not represented in MPSDh [391b27-28]).

<sup>353</sup> E.g., MPSDh 395b1 (cf. MPST S 144a4; P 78a1-2; not represented in Fa [875a1]), where true liberation, equated with the Tathāgata (b5-6), is called unconditioned bliss (無作樂, *bcos ma ma yin pa'i bde ba*); cf. 395c14; 396a6-7. At MPSDh 377b21-22 and c10-11 (MPSFa 862a13-14; MPST S 83b3; P 32b5), permanence and bliss are distributed on (the Buddha’s) *dharmakāya* and nirvāṇa, respectively.

<sup>354</sup> The only passage I have noted is from the part confined to Dharmakṣema’s version, viz., MPSDh 495b7-8: 猶如虛空 無處不有, 如來亦爾 遍一切處.

<sup>355</sup> SHIMODA 1997: 163 ff; English summary 13 ff.

sooner or later, the blissful state of actual Buddhahood. Since this ‘Buddha-element’ is uncreated and indestructible,<sup>356</sup> it can hardly change its essence and should thus, albeit in an undeveloped or hidden form, share the essential qualities of the actual Tathāgata. Of special interest in connection with the passage under discussion is a statement according to which, as Dharmakṣema puts it, spiritually immature *people* do not know that in their own body there is a blissful nature,<sup>357</sup> or, as the other versions have it, a “seed of bliss” (\**sukhabīja*),<sup>358</sup> which a few lines later is called the “seed of [one’s own actual] Buddha-nature”<sup>359</sup> or *dharmakāya*<sup>360</sup> and is hence obviously identical with the *buddhadhātu* or *tathāgatagarbha*. But in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* the *buddhadhātu* or *tathāgatagarbha* is consistently stated to be present in *sentient* beings (*sattva*) or their bodies,<sup>361</sup> including, to be sure, animals,<sup>362</sup> but is never asserted to be present also outside their bodies in insentient things (see § 53.2.3). Therefore, if it is this aspect of Buddha-nature that is addressed by the passage under discussion, there is some probability that the *dharma*s in which peaceful bliss is stated to be present are, de facto, meant to refer to the *dharma*s of sentient beings, perhaps in the sense of all possible *states of existence*.

---

<sup>356</sup> Cf. fn. 287 and fn. 288.

<sup>357</sup> MPSPDh 410c10-11: 愚人 ... 復不能知 身有樂性.

<sup>358</sup> MPST S 194b7-195a1 = P 113a8-b1 (*nga'i lus la bde ba'i sa bon de lta bu yod*); MPSFa 886a9 (我身中有安樂種子). Cf. TAKASAKI 1974: 153; SHIMODA 1997: 281.

<sup>359</sup> MPSPDh 410c13-14: “Wise persons must clearly know that in their body there is the seed of Buddha-nature” (有智之人 應當分別 ... 我身即有佛性種子).

<sup>360</sup> MPST S 195a3-4; P 113b2: “The wise know that in their body there is such a seed of the *dharmakāya*” (*shes rab can rnam kyis ni nga'i lus la chos kyi sku'i sa bon de lta bu yod do snyam du shes pas ...*); similarly MPSFa 886a12-13.

<sup>361</sup> See § 53.2.2 with fn. 281.

<sup>362</sup> Cf. MPST S 186b1-2 and 187b3-5 (P 107a5-6 and 108a2-4; MPSPDh 407c23-25 and 408a24-27), indicating that “all sentient beings” comprise not only men but also animals (MPSFa 883c12 does not mention animals, but 883c29-884a2 implies them by referring to the three evil destinies).

65.3. In this connection, an interesting discussion is to be found in Kuan-ting's *Ta pan-nie-p'an ching hsiian-i* (大般涅槃經玄義: T 38.1765).<sup>363</sup> There, he points out in detail that some form of peaceful bliss or happiness (安樂) occurs in all the ten spheres of existence (界, i.e., [*dharma*]*dhātu*), from the hells and animals up to the sphere of the Buddha, and that this so-called happiness is also called *nirvāṇa*, though it is only in the sphere of the Buddha that it deserves the name "great, perfect *nirvāṇa*" (大般涅槃, i.e., *mahāparinirvāṇa*).<sup>364</sup> Similar ideas are indeed expressed in several passages of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* — more precisely: in passages of the part that is only contained in Dharmakṣema's version<sup>365</sup> —, to which Kuan-ting actually refers or alludes.<sup>366</sup> Since the passage under discussion, too, occurs only in Dharmakṣema's version, it would not seem impossible that it was originally inserted in order to have the Buddha requested to explain the fact that in all states of existence there is at least some trace of happiness. In spite of the different character of this happiness in the respective spheres of existence, Kuan-ting seems to understand its peace-and-bliss-nature (安樂性) as such to be identical with the Buddha's bliss, which is one of his four essential virtues or excellent

---

<sup>363</sup> Something like "[Explanation of the] dark meaning (or: hidden intention) of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*". On the term *hsiian i* (玄義) see PLASSEN 2002: 12, referring to *BDJ* 1: 930c.

<sup>364</sup> T 38.1765: 3b26–c23.

<sup>365</sup> Cf. fn. 509.

<sup>366</sup> Viz., MPSDh 480b4-5 (hells, cf. T 38.1765: 3b28-29), 485c16-18 (heavenly beings, cf. T 38.1765: 3c12-13) and especially 502a22–b6 and b24–c1 (cf. T 38.1765: 3c3-6; 10-12; 13-18; 21-22). The passage on bodhisattvas in T 38.1765: 3c20-21 is based on MPSDh 527c20-28, and the statement "Just this present body of mine is *nirvāṇa*" (T 38.1765: 3c7) occurs at MPSDh 513b28 and 591a28-29, but Kuan-ting seems to quote from Gautama Saṅghadeva's translation of the *Jñānaprasthāna* (T 26.1543: 778c15-17), which in view of Hsüan-tsang's rendering of the passage (T 26.1544: 924b16-19) may go back to a version of the *Māgandhiya-sutta* (MN no. 75, esp. I 509,10-13 ≈ T 1.26: 672b6-7); Ārāḍa and Udraka Rāmaputra (T 38.1765: 3c8-10) are mentioned at MPSDh 528b18-21.



qualities,<sup>367</sup> and with Buddha-nature. It is remarkable that even Kuan-ting, immediately after quoting the passage under discussion, refers to Buddha-nature merely as present in all *sentient* beings,<sup>368</sup> without any reference to insentient things,<sup>369</sup> and that also in discussing the differ-

---

<sup>367</sup> Viz., permanence, bliss, autonomy (*ātman*: ‘self’) and purity (cf. NAK. 528c). As Ch’eng-kuan (T 36.1736: 186c22: 名我) points out, the concept of *ātman* indicates autonomous freedom or mastery, i.e., *svātantrya*, an understanding which is basically in line with the implications *ātman* (Pā. *attan*) has already in the old pericope Vin I 13,18–14,5.

<sup>368</sup> T 38.1765: 4a13-14: 一切眾生 悉有佛性. Cf. also T 33.1716: 792b11-12 (Chih-i, non-authorized record acc. to NG 1993:9): “That in all dharmas there is peaceful happiness is [the same as saying] that all *sentient* beings have Buddha-nature” (一切諸法中 悉有安樂性, 是諸眾生 皆有佛性.).

<sup>369</sup> The references, at T 38.1765: 4a15-16, to the person uttering, in his sleep, the words “sword, sword” and to the yellow leaves of a willow tree as indicating the pervasiveness of the four virtues (see fn. 367) of Buddha-nature (寢言刀刀 又楊樹黃葉等 豈非四德通耶), are not counter-evidence. They rather refer to similes used in the MPS for the sake of illustrating how the teaching of the presence of the true Self (真我, *bdag*, \**ātman*) or Buddha-nature (MPSDh 412c25-26; cf. MPST S 202a2-3) is either misunderstood by common people or taught to them in disguise for pedagogical reasons. The yellow leaves of a willow (or wooden figures of cows, horses, men and women) given to a child in order to make it stop weeping represent the Buddha’s provisional attribution of the four virtues (see fn. 367) to Indra’s heaven, in order to stimulate people to virtuous actions (MPSDh 485c10-21). The simile of the person talking in his sleep is intended to illustrate how the teaching of the true character of Self (*bdag gi de kho na nyid*, \**ātmatattva*) came to be misunderstood by foolish people in terms of an individual soul in the form of a thumb-sized little man (*skyes bu mthe bo tsam*), etc. (MSPDh 412c14-26; cf. MSPT S 201b3–202a3; P 118a4–118b1). According to MSPDh (412b17–c13) and MSPT (S 200b7–201b3; P 117b3–118a4), a poor man who was on friendly terms with a prince was thrilled at the sight of a beautiful sword (刀, *ral gri*) that belonged to the prince, and after the latter had taken it with himself to another country, the poor man talked about it in his sleep. Taken to the king and asked what the sword looked like, he compared it to the horn of a goat (*ra ru*, 羊角), thereby giving rise to all kinds of fanciful elaborations. In Fa-hsien’s version (MPSFa 887b18-c9), by the way, the object is not a sword but a rhinoceros (兕), showing that the Sanskrit original had the word ‘*khaḍga*’, which can mean both “sword” and “rhinoceros”. At least according to the Indian lexicographers, ‘*khaḍga*’ may even mean “horn of a rhinoceros”, and it was probably such a horn that belonged to the prince in the

ent aspects of peaceful bliss or happiness he is only concerned with the various classes of *sentient* beings.<sup>370</sup>

#### 1.4. *Vimśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*

66. Chi-tsang's fourth scriptural proof is not taken from a sūtra but from a treatise, viz., Vasubandhu's "Proof of [the whole world] being nothing but representation"<sup>371</sup> in twenty stanzas" (*Vimśatikā Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*). In the Chinese translation by Gautama Prajñāruci (active 516–543), the first quarter of the initial verse (*vijñaptimātram evêdam*)<sup>372</sup> is rendered as

"[There is] only representation (/consciousness), without an object" (唯識無境界).<sup>373</sup>

After quoting this passage, Chi-tsang first paraphrases the literal meaning:

"[The passage] makes clear that mountains and rivers, grasses and trees are all [just] imaginings of the mind; there is no

---

original story, for it is only on this assumption that the description of the object as comparable to the horn of a goat makes good sense.

<sup>370</sup> This holds good both for the passage referred to in fn. 364 and for the discussion of various aspects of happiness in T 38.1765: 4a16–c5. However, in his running commentary on MPSDh 459b23-25, Kuan-ting takes the *dharma*s of our passage (MPSDh 380a25) to include the so-called insentient things and to imply their basic sentience (see fn. 524).

<sup>371</sup> I prefer this rendering because it is non-committal as to whether *vijñapti* is used for the *act* of cognition/perception, i.e., the *function* of *vijñāna*, or for the *contents* appearing in it. Moreover, it does not preclude subconscious mental processes and their contents. Skt. *citta* (Ch. 心) is rendered by "mind", Skt. *vijñāna*, in the present context practically equivalent to *citta*, by "consciousness" as long as it refers to conscious psychic events or processes, but, just as *citta*, by "Mind" when it refers to a meta-psychic, 'metaphysical' level. In the case of Ch. 識, which may stand for *vijñāna* as well as for *vijñapti*, my translation varies in accordance with the context.

<sup>372</sup> Cf. HANNEDER 2007: 211.

<sup>373</sup> T 31.1588: 63c27; Chi-tsang's quotation: T 45.1853: 40c11.

separate entity (*dharma*) outside the mind.”<sup>374</sup>

He then goes on to draw his own conclusions:

“This shows: Inside the ‘principle’, in the case of all things (*dharma*; or perhaps: in all states of existence?), ‘support’ and ‘primary [karmic retribution]’ (i.e., environment and sentient beings) are not two [separate entities]. Since ‘support’ and ‘primary [karmic retribution]’ are not two [separate entities], [it follows that] if sentient beings have Buddha-nature, grasses and trees (= the environment) must have Buddha-nature [as well]. For this reason, not only sentient beings have Buddha-nature, but grasses and trees, too, have Buddha-nature.”<sup>375</sup>

In this way, Chi-tsang concludes, from the fact that the various components of the environment are in reality mere images in the mind and thus integrated into sentient beings, that they must also participate in the Buddha-nature of the latter.

67. Looking at the matter from the point of view of the Indian source, we first have to note that the Sanskrit text of the *Vimśatikā* contains no term corresponding to ‘Buddha-nature’. The text simply does not seem to be concerned with the issues addressed by this concept or its Indian equivalents. Thus all we can do is to speculate, like Chi-tsang, on the implications the position set forth in the *Vimśatikā* might have for the soteriological status of the environment, provided that we follow Chi-tsang in presupposing that sentient beings have, in some sense, Buddha-nature and disregard the problems involved in such an unqualified presupposition in the Yogācāra context.

68. The *prima facie* system developed in the *Vimśatikā* rejects the existence of objects (*artha*) of (perceptual as well as conceptual) con-

<sup>374</sup> T 45.1853: 40c11-2: 明: 山河草木 皆是心想。心外無別法。 Cf. KOSEKI 1980: 25.

<sup>375</sup> T 45.1853: 40c12-15: 此明: 理內 一切諸法 依正不二。以依正不二故, 眾生有佛性 則草木有佛性。以此義故, 不但眾生有佛性, 草木亦有佛性也。 Cf. KOSEKI 1980: 25-26.

sciousness as ordinary people conceive of them. Just as in a dream<sup>376</sup> or in the case of a person who perceives non-existent tufts of hair or the like due to a certain visual disorder (viz., *timira*), so in ordinary perception, too, there is no object outside its representation.<sup>377</sup> What is experienced is only a mental appearance or image (*ābhāsa*, *prati-bhāsa*) of an object.<sup>378</sup> Just like a dreaming person, ordinary people are not aware of this fact and *think* they directly perceive *things*. But actually this thought takes place only *after* the perception itself, and is nothing but a recollection (*smṛti*) which conceptualizes and misinterprets its own image of the preceding perception and its content, without having direct access to the perception itself, which, for ordinary people, remains irretrievable.<sup>379</sup> In spite of this ‘epistemic solipsism’ of each moment of perception or cognition, the *Vimśatikā* admits, however, *causal* connections not only between the subsequent moments of one continuum of consciousness ((*viññāna*)-*saṃtāna*, equivalent to ‘sentient being’) but also between different continua, the existence of which is accepted as a matter of course.<sup>380</sup> However, in a couple of places Vasubandhu emphasizes that this system is preliminary and that in their true, indescribable nature (*anabhilāpyenātmanā*) dharmas, or one’s own mind (*citta*) as well as the minds of others, or a full understanding of the principle of representation-only (*viññaptimātratā*), are accessible only to the Buddhas (*buddhānām viṣayaḥ* or *gocaraḥ*).<sup>381</sup>

69. If applied to the *prima facie* level of the *Vimśatikā* system, Chitsang’s argument could be taken to mean that the attainment of

<sup>376</sup> Vś 3,20-21: *svapne vināpy arthena ... strīpuruṣādikaṃ dṛśyate.*

<sup>377</sup> Vś vs. 1b-d (see HANNEDER 2007: 211): ... *asadarthābhāvabhāsanāt | yadyat taimirakasyāsatkeṣaṇḍukādīdarśanam ||*

<sup>378</sup> Vś 9,5: *vināpy arthena ... arthābhāsā cakṣurviññānādikā vijñaptir utpadyate;* cf. 5,16: *viññānam eva rūpādipratibhāsam ..., na rūpādiko ’rthaḥ.*

<sup>379</sup> Cf. Vś 8,25–9,16.

<sup>380</sup> Cf. Vś 9,20-23 and 10,3-9.

<sup>381</sup> Vś 6,18; 10,25-27; 10,29–11,5.

Buddhahood by a sentient being would necessarily entail a transformation not only of the subjective aspects of the continuum of consciousness of that being (like extirpation of all defilements, attainment of omniscience, etc.) but also of the objective aspect, including the respective being's *image* of the environment. There would be various options. The transformation might consist in simply transcending the wrong conceptualisation of the images, in additionally changing them into representations of a glorious pure land (cf. § 132.2), or in just dissolving them. But Vasubandhu's own relativization of his system with regard to the level of understanding of a Buddha warns us against becoming specific. By becoming a Buddha, the respective continuum of consciousness would cross over to the higher level, the full realization of the unfathomable *viññaptimātratā* as the indescribable true nature of everything, on which Vasubandhu, wisely enough, does not elaborate.

70. It is worth noting, however, that Gautama Prajñāruci (or Bodhiruci?)<sup>382</sup> in his Chinese translation of the *Vimśatikā* does equate this indescribable domain of the Buddha with the True or Real Mind and with Buddha-nature.<sup>383</sup> This suggests a concept of Buddha-nature as identical with a permanent, meta-psychic Mind, constituting the true nature or Suchness of the ordinary forms of mind, and thus also of the mental images of the environment they contain. This clearly goes beyond at least the wording of Vasubandhu's text but may have

---

<sup>382</sup> Thus according to Wōnch'ūk 圓測 (TAKEMURA 1985: 130, referring to H. UI). But see also GIMELLO 1976: 293 n. 171, where the ascription to Gautama Prajñāruci (active in Loyang around the same time as Bodhiruci) is preferred on the basis of *Hsü kao seng chuan* 續高僧傳 (T 50.2060) 429a29–b3.

<sup>383</sup> T 31.1588: 67a17–20: “Thus, [on the level of the Buddha] there is only the True Mind, there is no other [form of] mind (/consciousness) beyond [that]. ... In this way, taking the mind (/consciousness) as the base, we explain how to gain access to the essencelessness (*nairātmya*) of all dharma, [but] this is not meant to absolutely negate [every essence, including] the essence (*ātman*, ‘self’) consisting in the True Mind, and to assert that there is not even the Real Mind, which is [the same as] Buddha-nature” (如是 唯有真識 更無餘識。... 如是依識說入一切諸法無我。非謂 一向謗真識我, 說言無有佛性實識。).

inspired Chi-tsang's argument. And indeed, if this identification of the indescribable Suchness of things with Buddha-nature is accepted, there is some plausibility in Chi-tsang's argument. But all it could prove is that a pristine presence of Buddhahood in the mind of sentient beings would make it difficult to limit this presence to sentient beings in contrast to the environment if the latter exists only in the form of images in the latter's consciousness. This may be taken to imply some passive participation of the image of the environment in the purification process that leads up to the realization of Buddhahood. But neither of the two levels in the system of the *Vimśatikā* offers any clue for the assumption (probably not intended by Chi-tsang either) that plants or other elements of the environment are, or can develop into, sentient individuals that may become, or already are, Buddhas in their own right.<sup>384</sup>

### 1.5. *Buddhāvataṃsaka* (1): *Cittamātra* Passages

71. In connection with Chi-tsang's reference to the *Vimśatikā*, it may be worth noting that a similar line of argument is found in the record of Nan-yang Hui-chung (see § 57).<sup>385</sup> He too argues against the exclusion of the insentient from Buddha-nature by referring to the teaching that the whole world is nothing but mind or representation (三界唯心 万法唯識), quoting, in support, a line from the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*:

“The dharmas of the three world-spheres are all produced by the mind” (三界所有法 一切唯心造).

He then argues that since one can hardly claim that the insentient things do not belong to the triple world, they must, if the *sūtra* is cor-

<sup>384</sup> Cf., in this connection, Shōshin's argument that if an image in the mind could become a Buddha in its own right, this would result in the splitting of the respective sentient being (*Shikan shiki* 248b10-15).

<sup>385</sup> *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 11,19-24 (Taiw. 61b5-10; YANAGIDA 1990: 163 f; ANDERL 2004a: 620 f; 2004b: 188 f).

rect, be mind. Mind, however, is, for Hui-chung, essentially equivalent to Buddha-nature.

72. As far as I can see, the line quoted by Hui-chung has no literal equivalent in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, but is, of course, reminiscent of the famous *cittamātra* passage in the 6<sup>th</sup> chapter of the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* (see ch. 1.5.1),<sup>386</sup> as well as of a series of ten verses from a chapter of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* entitled ‘Verses recited by bodhisattvas assembled in the heavenly palace of Suyāma’<sup>387</sup> (see ch. 1.5.2). In addition, in the ‘Chapter on religious practice (\**brahmacarya*)’ there is yet another passage which, although in view of its phraseology it cannot be regarded as the passage Hui-chung had in mind in the first place, still may deserve attention (see ch. 1.5.3).<sup>388</sup>

### 1.5.1. *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* VI

73. In the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* (DBhS VI.E),<sup>389</sup> the sentence “This [here], i.e., the triple world,<sup>390</sup> is nothing but mind” (*cittamātram idaṃ*

<sup>386</sup> The phrase *cittamātram traidhātukam* also occurs in the *Lokottara-parivarta* (BAvT S nga 237a2; BAvB 642a14-15; BAvŚ 288c5-6): The bodhisattva understands (*avatarati*) that the whole world consisting of the three spheres is only mind and that the same holds good for the three times (*dus gsum*), and thus comprehends that the mind is ‘without extremes and middle’ (*anantamadhya*), which may mean: infinitely varied (cf. BHSD 19b). The passage is partly quoted in Kamalaśīla’s first *Bhāvanākrama* (ed. G. TUCCI, *Minor Buddhist Texts* pt. II, Rome 1958: 217,9-11), where *anantamadhya* is interpreted as devoid of arising and vanishing (= *anta*) and hence also of abiding (*sthitī* = *madhya*), which means that the mind itself also is merely an illusion (cf. LINDTNER 1997: 161).

<sup>387</sup> *Rab mtshe ma’i gnas su byang chub sems dpa’ ’dus pas tshigs su bcad pa bstan pa’i le’u* (chapter 25 in BAvT., corresponding to chapter 20 in BAvŚ and to chapter 16 in BAvB). Suyāma is the head of the Yāma gods (BHSD 602a).

<sup>388</sup> *Tshangs par spyod pa’i le’u* (chapter 21), corresponding to chapter 16 (梵行品) in BAvŚ and to chapter 12 (梵行品) in BAvB.

<sup>389</sup> DBhS R 49,10 = K 98,8-9. Cf. also K 108,2 (vs. 6a) = RS 53,22 (vs. 16a): *te cittamātra ti traidhātukam otaranti*.

<sup>390</sup> The expression *traidhātuka* is used both as an adjective in the sense of “belonging to the three world-spheres (viz. *kāma*-, *rūpa*- and *ārūpya-dhātu*)” and as a neuter substantive in the sense of “[the world] which consists of the three spheres”,

*yad idam traidhātukam*) appears, somewhat abruptly and without further explanation, in an exposition of origination in dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*). The precise purport of this sentence in its context in the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* has not only been the subject of much debate in modern scholarship but was controversial already among the Indian exegetes. Since a detailed discussion would exceed the limits of this study, I must confine myself to a brief outline of how I understand the Indian source material.

74. Judging from the immediate context,<sup>391</sup> the original purport of the Sanskrit text may well have been, as Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti propose, that the saṃsāric world functions without a personal agent.<sup>392</sup> In the wider context,<sup>393</sup> however, it would also seem possible

---

or “the three world-spheres”, in a collective sense (cf. *SWTF* II 409b; *AKBh* 113,20; *Abhisamayālaṃkāṛalokā* [ed. P.L. VAIDYA] 393,22, replacing Aṣṭ 78,12 *traidhātuka* with *kāmādidhātutraya*). WAYMAN’s criticism (*Philosophy East and West* 46/1996: 453 f) is ingenious but baseless.

<sup>391</sup> DBhS R 49,5-8 (VI.D end) = K 98,6-8: This whole mass of suffering which is the result of the twelve-membered chain of origination in dependence arises without an entity functioning as the subject of action and experience (*kāraṇavedakarahita*), and without an actor there is no action in the proper sense of the word (*kriyāpi paramārthatō nopalabhyate*). Cf. also DBhS R 48,2-5 and 20-22 (VI.C) = K 96,16-97,1 and 97,11-13; R 50,31-32 (VI.I) = K 101,5 (*nirātmakam ātmātmīyarahitam*); R 52,2 (VI.N) = K 102,3-4.

<sup>392</sup> *Madhyamakahrdaya* 5.28cd (ECKEL 2008: 242 f; 404 f); *Prajñāpradīpa* ch. 25 (LINDTNER 1984: 89,14-90,3: no *īśvara*, etc.); *MAvat* 182,2-18 (no permanent *ātman*). This interpretation is, indirectly, supported by the somewhat unexpected gloss *ātmātmīyarahitam* or *-vigatam*, which almost regularly follows the phrase *cittamātram idam traidhātukam* (or extended versions of it) in the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra* (80,7; 123,16-124,1; 212,7-8) — somewhat unexpected because in this text the illusionist purport is beyond doubt. See also § 75 with fn. 402. For *cittamātra* in the sense of excluding a Self (*ātman*), see also ŚrBh Sh 490,21-23: *indriyamātram aha(m?) upalabh{at?}e* (cf. Tj P wi 225b6: *bdag gis ... mthong bar zad kyi*), *viṣayamātram, tajjam anubhavamātram cittamātra(m), ... ātmeti nāmamātram*; AS Go 29,26-28 (Pr 34,20-23); SAVBh P tsi 123a8 f. Cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 1973: 172-175; SCHERRER-SCHAUB 1991: 257.

<sup>393</sup> Cf. DBhS R 47,10-18 (VI.A) = K 96,7-12, esp. R 47,15-16 (contemplation of all dharmas as similar to illusory phenomena like a conjurer’s display, a dream,



to understand the passage, perhaps additionally, in more or less the same sense it has in the source from which it was, presumably, inspired, namely, the “Sūtra on the *Samādhi* of Direct Encounter with the Buddhas of the Present” (*Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṃmukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra*: PratyS),<sup>394</sup> viz., that the whole world of transmigration, including the environment, is nothing but an *illusory* product of our mind. This is what Kumārajīva, Buddhābhaddra and also Bodhiruci suggest when they insert, in their translations, the predicate “unreal” or “illusory” (虛妄): “The three realms are illusory, produced merely by the mind”.<sup>395</sup> In a similar way, the passage is also understood in Indian Yogācāra treatises like the *Mahāyānasamgraha* or the *Viṃśatikā*, though with more emphasis on the *mind* as the creative principle.<sup>396</sup>

75. Of special interest is the explanation of the passage under discussion (DBhS VI.E) in the commentary attributed to Vasubandhu (DBhVy). Here, the explanation of paragraph VI.E is closely related to that of the following paragraph VI.F, according to which all the twelve members of the chain of origination in dependence are based (*samāśrita*) on the mind (*citta*), or rather on ‘one mind’ (*ekacitta*°),<sup>397</sup>

---

etc.); cf. also R 52,4 (VI.N) = K 102,5 (*svabhāvaśūnyataḥ*) and K 110,4-7 (vs. 14) ≈ RS 55,1-4 (vs. 24).

<sup>394</sup> PratyS 3L.

<sup>395</sup> 三界虛妄 但是心作: T 10.286: 514c26; BAvB 558c10. Similarly Bodhiruci (DBVyC 169a15): 三界虛妄但是一心作. (“merely by the mind alone” or “merely by the One Mind”? Cf. fn. 409 and fn. 753).

<sup>396</sup> MSg II.7.1; Vś 3,2-4 (probably quoting from the *Lokottaraparivarta*).

<sup>397</sup> DBhS K 98,9-10: *yāny apīmāni dvādaśa bhavāṅgāni tathāgatena prabhedaśo vyākhyātāni, tāny api sarvāṇy ekacittasamāśritāni*. R 49,12-13 has *sarvāṇy eva citta*° instead, which K mentions as a v.l. of ms. K'. The reading *eka*° is, however, confirmed not only by the Tibetan (*sems gcig la gnas pa*: DBhST S ga 86b4; BAvT S ga 131b2) and most Chinese versions (except Kumārajīva [T 10.286: 514c27: 皆依心] and Buddhābhaddra [BAvB 558c11: id.] but including Dharmarakṣa [see fn. 400] and Bodhiruci [DBhVyC 169a21: 皆依一心]) but also by the corresponding verse (DBhS K 108,3 [vs. 6b] = RS 53,23 [vs. 16b]): *api cā bhavāṅga iti dvādaśa ekacitte*.

for both paragraphs are subsumed under the label of examining origination in dependence “in terms of its being contracted into, or reduced to, ‘one mind’” (*ekacittasamavasānatah*).<sup>398</sup> This label is used with reference to the paragraphs VI.E and VI.F already in the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* itself in paragraph VI.M in connection with summing up the reflections of the preceding paragraphs.<sup>399</sup> But whereas in the sūtra the expression ‘one mind’ (*ekacitta*°) may be deliberately ambiguous, admitting of being understood not only as ‘one [moment of] mind’<sup>400</sup> but also as ‘the mind alone’, the commentary presupposes the meaning “the mind alone” throughout. The commentary offers three different (though not mutually exclusive) explanations of the purport of VI.E and VI.F, which I shall deal with in reverse order:

---

<sup>398</sup> DBhVyT 254b2: “This (i.e., the paragraphs VI.E and VI.F) should be understood as the examination of origination in dependence in terms of its ‘coming together’ in (i.e., being reduced to or collectively based on) the mind alone by distinguishing the two truths (see § 75c)” (*’di ni bden pa gnyis rnam par bzhag* [P : *gzhag* D] *pas sems gcig tu yang dag par ’du bar rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba yongs su brtags* [P : *brtag* D] *par rig par bya’o* ||). Cf. DBhVyC 169a28-29.

<sup>399</sup> DBhS R 51,25 = K 102,1.

<sup>400</sup> Both from the idiomatic point of view (for “based on the mind alone” one would rather expect *cittaikasamāśrita*) and from that of content, the natural way of interpreting DBhS VI.F as it stands is in terms of the so-called ‘origination in dependence taking place in a single moment’ (*kṣaṇikāḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ*), as explained, e.g., at Vi 118c7-14 (≈ T 28.1546: 93c23-29) and AKBh 133,1-7 (cf. SAKAMOTO 1964: 355; SCHMITHAUSEN 1973: 173 n. 38a; cf. also Vibh 141 ff and Vibh-a 206 ff). This is also the opinion of Ch’eng-kuan (T 35.1735: 807b6-7 and 13 ff), and it seems to be corroborated by the earliest Chinese version, viz., that of Dharmarakṣa, who translates: “... these also (= *tāny api*, viz., the twelve members) all come about together at the same time in a single mind[-moment] of one kind” (T 10.285: 476b11: 又此一切 一種一心 同時俱成). Cf. also Hui-yüan, who proposes an illusionist single-moment interpretation (T 44.1851: 550a14-29: “same time and same ‘substance’” 同時同體, i.e. one entity simultaneously displaying different aspects) distinguished from the Abhidharmic one (550a1-14: “same time but different ‘substance’” 同時別體, i.e. different entities arising simultaneously).

a) According to the *third* explanation, the two paragraphs examine the basis of origination in dependence.<sup>401</sup>

b) According to the *second*, they are directed against the attitude of people who, instead of striving for liberation in terms of subliminal and manifest consciousness (*ālayavijñāna* and *pravṛttivijñāna*), wrongly do so in terms of Self (*ātman*) and Mine (*ātmīya*).<sup>402</sup> This implies that the basis of bondage, and hence of origination in dependence, is not a substantial Self but the mind alone, specified in terms of the Yogācāra system.

c) It is only in the *first* (probably innovative) explanation that a distinction between the purport of VI.E and that of VI.F is expressed: while both paragraphs trace origination in dependence, or its basis, to the mind alone, VI.E does so from the perspective of the highest truth (*paramārthasatya*), VI.F from the perspective of conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*).<sup>403</sup> In concrete terms, VI.E teaches that the whole

---

<sup>401</sup> DBhVyT P 259a5 (D 203b7): *rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba ci la brten te 'byung zhes rten yongs su brtag pa.*

<sup>402</sup> DBhVyT P 258a2-4 (D 202b6–203a1): “Of what kind is the search for liberation in wrong terms? While they ought to search for liberation in terms of *ālaya-vijñāna* and *pravṛttivijñānas* (Chin.: *ādānavijñāna*), those persons, being disorientated (*\*saṃmūḍha*) and mistaken (*\*viparyasta*) in this way (i.e., with regard to the cause of bondage), search for liberation in a different (i.e., wrong) way (cf. subcomm. *nam pa gzhan gyis*), i.e., in terms of Self (*ātman*). As a remedy for this attitude, the Buddha has taught DBhS VI.E-F” (*gzhan las thar pa yongs su tshol ba ji lta bu zhe na | kun gzhi dang 'jug pa'i nam par shes pa rnam las thar pa yongs su btsal bar bya ba'i rigs pa las | de ltar kun tu rmongs shing phyin ci log tu gyur pa de dag gzhan du bdag las yongs su tshol te | de'i gnyen por ... zhes gsungs pa*). My rendering of *bdag las* as “in terms of Self” (and not “from ...”) is based on DBhVyC (170c20-24; cf. GIMELLO 1976: 288) which has 於...中 (“in”, “with reference to”) instead, and on the subcommentary (Tj mdo-'grel D ji 79a4-6; P ji 92b6–93a1), which points out that those persons, instead of realizing that what is polluted and hence to be purified are the *vijñānas*, adhere to the idea of a Self as the subject of bondage and liberation. Chin. *ādānavijñāna* (阿陀那識) for *pravṛttivijñāna* is almost certainly a deliberate alteration by the translator.

<sup>403</sup> See fn. 398. For DBhS VI.E as expressing the comprehension (*yongs su shes pa*) of the highest truth (*don dam pa'i bden pa = \*paramārthasatya*), see DBhVyT P 254a1-2 (D 199a3-4; DBhVyC 169a13-15). For VI.F as describing, in the perspec-

world with its three spheres is “nothing but [the result of] a transformation of the mind” (\**cittapariṇāmamātra*),<sup>404</sup> whereas VI.F is taken to point out that the twelve members of the chain of origination in dependence, i.e., of bondage or pollution (*saṃkleśa*), are based on the mind alone (*cittamātra*), which is devoid of a Self (\**ātmarahita*).<sup>405</sup> These two levels of truth correspond exactly to the two levels of essencelessness of dharma (*dharma-nairātmya*) and essencelessness of person (*pudgala-nairātmya*) as described (in reverse sequence) in Vasubandhu’s *Viṃśatikā*<sup>406</sup> — a relationship corroborated also by the specific phraseology of the DBhVy which is strongly reminiscent of the term *viññānapariṇāma*, typical of *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā*.<sup>407</sup>

76. For my part, I have not been able to discover any conclusive evidence for the assumption that the author of the *Daśabhūmika* commentary departs, in his understanding of the saṃsāric world as being mind only (*cittamātra*), from mainstream Indian Yogācāra sources. That the understanding of the world as merely the result of a transformation of the mind (\**cittapariṇāmamātra*) is assigned to the level of the highest truth can be explained by the fact that it proceeds from *pudgala-* to *dharma-nairātmya*. Still, in the *Viṃśatikā*, the understanding of mind-only has also a transconceptual dimension (see § 68). As pointed out in § 70, it is in this connection that Gautama

---

tive of conventional truth (*kun rdzob kyi bden pa = saṃvṛtisatya*), the examination (*yongs su brtag pa*) of the basis of pollution (*saṃkleśa*), see DBhVyT P 254a3 and 5 ff (D 199a5-6 and 7 ff; DBhVyC 169a17 and 20 ff).

<sup>404</sup> DBhVyT 254a2-3 (D 199a4-5): *kham s gsum pa ni sems gyur pa tsam du zad pa'i phyir ro*; DBhVyC 169a16: 一切三界唯心轉故。

<sup>405</sup> DBhVyT 254a5-6 (D 199a7): *srid pa'i yan lag rnam bdag dang bral ba'i sems tsam la brten pas* [D: *nas P*] *sams gcig la brten pa'i phyir ro*. The explanatory element “being based on the mind alone, devoid of a Self” is missing in the Chinese version (DBhVyC 169a20), which is thus merely a rephrasing of the sūtra text.

<sup>406</sup> Vś 6,4-13.

<sup>407</sup> Vś 5,14; cf. also 5,7 (vs. 6cd); *Triṃśikā* vss. 1c and 17a; cf. also 18ab.

Prajñāruci (or Bodhiruci?)<sup>408</sup> introduces, in his Chinese version of the *Vimśatikā*, the idea of a True Mind, equated with the Buddha-nature. And it is in this sense that he appears to have understood the ‘mind’ of the *cittamātra* passage of the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* (VI.E) quoted at the beginning of the *Vimśatikā-vṛtti*, for he obviously refers this passage to the “Mind that is pure by nature (\**prakṛti-prabhāsvara*), the highest truth (or: reality), permanently subsisting and unchanging”.<sup>409</sup> Still, there is no indication that this is felt to imply a participation of objective phenomena in Buddha-nature. Rather, emphasis continues to be on their illusory nature, on their being erroneous fictions (妄生

<sup>408</sup> See fn. 382.

<sup>409</sup> T 31.1588: 64b27-29: 不相應心者, 所謂 第一義諦 常住不變 自性清淨心。故言: 三界虛妄 但是一心作。This passage is part of a paragraph which has no equivalent in the *Vimśatikā-vṛtti* and was perhaps added by the translator himself. Starting from Vasubandhu’s statement that in DBhS VI.E the expression ‘mind’ (*citta*) is meant to denote the mind along with the associate mental factors (Vś 3,3: *cittam atra asaṃprayogam abhipretam*), the translator adds that it does not denote the mind that is not associated (with such factors) (不相應心). He then expressly states that there are two kinds of mind: the associated and the unassociated. This is followed by a definition of both, each definition being followed by a reference to Vasubandhu’s text: to the statement that *citta*, *manas*, *viññāna* and *viññapti* are synonyms (*pariyāya*) in the case of the ‘associated’ mind, and to the quote of DBhS VI.E in the case of the ‘unassociated’ mind. This strongly suggests that the translator wants to identify the *citta* of the DBhS passage with the ‘unassociated’ mind (thus also TAKEMURA 1985: 131). He thus seems to understand the *citta* in DBhS VI.E as an underlying absolute Mind in the sense of MSA XIII.19, or of Lañk 220,9 ff, where the *tathāgatagarbha* is equated with the *ālayaviññāna* and even called the agent of all forms of rebirth (*sarvajanmagatikarṭṛ*). Still, such an understanding of DBhS VI.E is clearly at odds with Vasubandhu’s text, where the statement that *citta*, etc., are synonyms refers precisely to the *citta* of DBhS VI.E, with no indication of a theory of two kinds of mind. This is obviously also Ch’eng-kuan’s view, for after quoting the passage under discussion from Gautama Prajñāruci’s (Bodhiruci’s) translation he expressly adds, after the DBhS passage, that the mind [mentioned in it] is the ‘associated’ mind (T 36.1736: 525b7-8). Such, at least, is the *fa-hsiang* position (法相宗), whereas from the *fa-hsing* position (法性宗: cf. HAMAR 2007: 195–220), indicated by the reference to the highest truth in the DBhVy, the passage refers to the Ultimate Mind as the agent (ib. 525b8-9: 云第一義心 以爲能作; cf. a19-20 and 23-24).

分別) of the mind within (內心),<sup>410</sup> which is alienated from its true nature by pollution. It seems to be only with Hui-yüan (慧遠, 523–592) — who also understands the mind of the *cittamātra* passage of *Daśabhūmika* VI.E in the sense of the True Mind<sup>411</sup> or *tathāgata-garbha*<sup>412</sup> and supplements the emphasis on the illusionary character of phenomena with a perspective focussing on their being, ultimately, produced from the True Mind, which is Buddha-nature, and thus not separate from it<sup>413</sup> — that the question of the presence of Buddha-nature in the insentient is raised (see § 127.2).

### 1.5.2. ‘Verses Recited in the Palace of Suyāma’

77. In the ‘*Suyāma gāthās*’<sup>414</sup> — more precisely: in the ninth of ten decades of verses —, we read that the whole world is produced by the mind (*citta*), which is compared to a painter,<sup>415</sup> and the last line of

<sup>410</sup> T 31.1588: 64c4-5; 66c12-13.

<sup>411</sup> T 44.1851: 527b22 f: 故經宣說: 一切虛妄 唯一心作。所謂: 唯一真心所作; 632a2-3: 故經中說: 三界虛妄 皆一心作。論自釋言: 皆心作者, 謂真心作。

<sup>412</sup> T 44.1851: 486b19-21: 依 ... 真實如來藏體 緣起集成生死涅槃。是其用也。如經中說: 三界 一心作。

<sup>413</sup> T 44.1851: 526a22-23: “If we establish one more level, tracing the branches back to the root and assembling the unreal in the real, all dharmas are created by the True Mind which is Buddha-nature” (更作一重 攝末從本 會虛入實。一切諸法 皆是佛性 真心所作。). For details on Hui-yüan’s interpretation of the mind-only system, see LIU 1985b, for the present passage LIU 1985a: 175.

<sup>414</sup> BAvT P ri 63a6–b6; S kha 63a4–b7; D ka 304a5–b5; BAvB 465c14–466a6; BAvŚ 102a9–b1 (CL. 451–452).

<sup>415</sup> Cf. § 80 with fn. 428. — A precursor of the comparison of the mind with a painter (see KIMURA 1989) can already be found in a sūtra from the Early Buddhist canon (SN III 151–152; T 2.99 no. 267, esp. 69c11–70a3; cf. VETTER 2000: 248–249; HAKAMAYA 2009: 68–74). A straightforward formulation occurs, e.g., in KP # 99, and the comparison is developed in detail in the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra* (cf. LIN 1949: 65–71, corresponding to T 17.721: 23b21 ff [Kj P ’u 144a6 ff], 287a3 ff and 135a17–b5 [Kj P yu 90b5–91a2: verses, = DhSam XIII.52–54, 56, and XI.22–26]; cf. also 114b3-6). According to these texts, the mind of sentient beings is like a painter because it ‘paints’ or creates all sorts of future existences by means

Śikṣānanda's version<sup>416</sup> is identical with the second part of Hui-chung's quotation. Nonetheless, my investigation into the original purport of the passage can only be provisional,<sup>417</sup> last but not least

---

of its karmic impulses and their retribution. — For another occurrence of this comparison in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, see fn. 432.

<sup>416</sup> BAṽŚ 102b1: "Everything is merely produced by the mind" (一切唯心造).

<sup>417</sup> [1.] A detailed attempt at interpreting, on the basis of all the three versions, these ten verses in an Indian context was quite a long time ago presented by Susumu YAMAGUCHI (1949). Hoping to have grasped at least the main points correctly, I would summarize the gist of his interpretation as follows: The verses first emphasize the "origination in dependence of the mind" (心の縁起: 25a1 f, 6 and 17; 30b13), in the sense that the 'world', i.e., our concrete existence in the three realms (具體的な三有に於ける我々の存在: 20b1), is led or controlled by the mind, i.e., appears in a way determined by our mind. As the mind in its turn likewise arises dependently, in a beginningless process which does not presuppose an entity existing by itself (13b11-13; 15b17), both 'world' and mind are equally empty (空) (30b7-10). In a second step, the verses point out that by understanding the true nature of this principle of origination in dependence just as it is, Buddha[hood] is achieved (30b10-11). The Buddha's physical appearances and salvific activities in the world, manifested by him in a similar way as our 'world' is manifested by our mind (25a7-9), must not be mistaken for the true Buddha (27a16-b2). It thus seems that YAMAGUCHI confines the creative activity of the Buddha to the manifestation of illusory bodies and the conceptual and verbal teachings they represent (27b2-3), and that of the mind to the realm of sentient beings (23b11-12; 25a4-5), as a kind of subjective configuration. If the expression 'realm of sentient beings' (有情界, i.e., *sattvadhātu*) is used here in the technical sense of the term 'world of sentient beings' (*sattvaloka*), this would mean that the environment (*bhājanaloka*) is not involved. In this case, YAMAGUCHI's understanding of the purport of the text would imply that there is no connection at all with the issue of the Buddha-nature of the insentient. Although this would essentially agree with my own view, my understanding of the original purport of the verses diverges from YAMAGUCHI's not only in certain details of interpretation but also in basic respects. One is that he does not always sufficiently distinguish between the level of the comparison (*upamāna*: verses 1-5c) and that of the thing compared (*upameya*: from vs. 5d onward; cf., e.g., fn. 426). Another is the fact that his interpretation, though highly stimulating, is too heavily influenced by the material adduced from systematic treatises, with the effect that he interprets the sūtra in terms of a critical refutation of conceptually developed theoretical positions like 因中有果説 and 因中無果説, i.e., *sat-* and *asatkāryavāda* (6b-9a). As against this, I have tried to understand the purport of the verses as much as possible in keeping with the context and phraseology of the *Suyāma*

because the original Indic text has (to my knowledge) thus far not come to light, so that we have to rely on the three transmitted translations (two into Chinese and one into Tibetan)<sup>418</sup>, which do not always agree.

78. As far as I can see, the central concern of the text is similar to that of the immediately preceding verse decades: The world of transmigration, consisting in the first place of the five *skandhas* of which sentient beings are made up,<sup>419</sup> but surely also including the environment as a kind of by-product,<sup>420</sup> is shown to be illusory,<sup>421</sup> as are the

---

chapter itself and other early texts that seem closely related. — [2.] For this reason, there is no need to discuss in detail the articles on the verse decade under discussion that are assembled in no. 61–62 (1989) of the journal *Nantō Bukkyō* 南東佛教 (of the Tōdaiji in Nara), for most of them are either dedicated to or essentially influenced by the exegesis (or ‘eisegesis’) of Chinese and Japanese masters (cf. also the interesting materials collected by JŌSHI Kaiun 上司海雲 in *Nantō Bukkyō* 7/1959: 79–120). The only exception is, apart from KIMURA’s investigation into the historical background of the comparison of the mind with a painter (see fn. 415), the contribution by Kōshirō TAMAKI, who, as far as the text of the verses (偈文, in contrast to their unexpressed original background 根源的な背景) is concerned, proposes an interpretation in terms of the three *svabhāvas* of the Yogācāra tradition. However, in spite of certain analogies, the superimposition of this pattern on the verses is, in my opinion, not sufficient to explain their specific message, quite apart from the fact that, similar to YAMAGUCHI, TAMAKI, too, does not clearly set the level of comparison apart from that of the matter compared.

<sup>418</sup> See *Abbreviations* s.v. BAvB, BAvŚ and BAvT. Cf. also § 102.1a and, for a short characterization of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* collection, § 102.2.

<sup>419</sup> Cf. the context of \**jagat* in fn. 424 and the express statement of vs. 6 of the 7<sup>th</sup> decade (BAvT S kha 62a5; D ka 303b3): “The *skandhas* wandering through the three periods: this is the ‘world’” (*duṣ gsum dag tu rgyu ba yi || phung po ’di ni ’jig rten yin ||*).

<sup>420</sup> See § 132.1. Cf. also the last line of the passage quoted in fn. 432.

<sup>421</sup> See fn. 424 and fn. 430. Cf. also BAvT S kha 62b6-7 (D ka 304a2; BAvB 465c2-3): “Just as, [in the case of the bodies of sentient beings], [due to] the continuity of karma (\**karmaploti*?), [which is] inconceivable (or: [in an] inconceivable [variety]?), colours and shapes appear but are not [really] there, ...” (*ji ltar kha dog dbyibs kyi rnamṣ || las kyi rgyud [D : rgyu S] ni bsaṃ mi khyab || snang yang de dag de na med || ...*). This is, to be sure, a comparison, but in the preceding verse (no



physical appearances or conceptual representations of the Buddha.<sup>422</sup> It is only by understanding this nature of things that one comes to 'see' the true Buddha.<sup>423</sup>

79. In a passage from the seventh decade, the illusory character of the world of transmigration (\**jagat*) is derived from its being, ultimately, rooted in [one's own] mind (*citta*):

"All those sentient beings (\**sattva*) are called so on the basis of the five *skandhas*. The *skandhas* arise from karma, which in its turn is rooted in the mind (\**citta*). The mind has been declared to be like jugglery (\**māyā*). [Therefore] this world (\**jagat*, cf. B 眾生 and Ś 世間) is just an illusion (\**māyābhūta*

---

comparison!) even the bodies themselves seem to be stated to be illusory (thus clearly BAvB 465b27: 眾生身非真).

<sup>422</sup> BAvT S kha 62a7-b1 (D ka 303b5; BAvŚ 101c12-13 [CL. 450]; BAvB 465b17-18): "Just as the world (Ś: sentient beings), so are the Buddhas and also the Buddhas' properties (or teachings: \**dharma*): [even] the Buddhas' properties (/teachings) and the Buddhas have, by nature, no [true] being of their own (\**niḥsvabhāva*)" ('jig rten ji bzhin sangs rgyas te || sangs rgyas chos kyang de bzhin no || sangs rgyas chos dang sangs rgyas rnams || ngo bo nyid kyis rang bzhin med || [vs. 9 of the 7<sup>th</sup> decade]). — BAvT S kha 62b7-63a1 (D ka 304a2-3; BAvŚ 101b28-c2 [CL. 244]; BAvB 465c4-7): "In the same way the bodies of the Eminent Beings, inconceivable, appear in countless colours in all 'fields'. [But such physical] bodies are not the Fully Awakened One (\**sambuddha*), nor do the Awakened Ones have a [physical] body; the Great Heroes have the Dharma as their 'body' ..." (*de bzhin sems can gto bo yi || sku ni bsam gyis mi khyab pa || brjod pa rnams kyang tshad med par || zhing rnams kun na rab tu snang || sku [D : skus S] ni rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas min || sangs rgyas rnams la sku mi mnga' || dpa' bo chen po chos sku ste || ...*). This is vs. 6a-7c of the 8<sup>th</sup> decade. In the third pāda, I follow the Chinese versions, which have 色 for *brjod pa*; the Skt. probably had *varṇa*, which may mean both "colour" and "praise".

<sup>423</sup> BAvT S kha 62b1-2 (D ka 303b5-6; BAvŚ 101c14-15; BAvB 465b19-20): "When one has correctly understood this true nature of all things (*dharmatā*), the all-seeing, omniscient Buddha manifests himself everywhere" (*ma nor yang dag ji bzhin pa'i || chos nyid 'di ni rtogs gyur nas || kun gzigs thams cad mkhyen pa yi || sangs rgyas kun na rab tu snang ||*).

or *\*māyāgata*).<sup>424</sup>

It is on this idea of the mind as a creator of illusory appearances that the ninth decade focuses, whereas karma as an intermediate agent is not mentioned here.<sup>425</sup> In its first half, the text elaborates the comparison of the painter and the painting, pointing out that the picture and its colours are merely imagined (*\*parikalpita*) by the mind (*\*citta*) [of the painter and, probably, also the spectator] (vs. 1d). What is actually there (on the level of the comparison!)<sup>426</sup> is only the four elements, which are the same throughout the picture (since they have no colour) (vs. 1c). The illusory character of the picture and its colours is demonstrated by pointing out that they cannot be found anywhere: the colours are not in the elements and the elements are not in them, nor do the colours exist apart from the elements (vs. 2); the picture does

<sup>424</sup> BAvT S kha 62a1-2 (D ka 303b1; BAvŚ 101b26-28 [CL. 449]; BAvB 465b2-4): *sems can de dag thams cad kyang || phung po lnga las shin tu brjod || de rnams las kyi phung chen yin || las kyi rtsa ba'ang sems yin te || sems ni sgyu ma bzhin du bshad || sgyu mar gyur pa 'gro 'di'o ||* (vs. 1c–2d of the 7<sup>th</sup> decade). In the 2<sup>nd</sup> pāda, *X las shin tu brjod* (which I have rendered by “are called so on the basis of X”) corresponds to 爲 X 攝 (“are comprised in X”) in BAvB and to 住 X 中 (“dwell in, or rest on, X”) in BAvŚ; I am unable to make a well-founded suggestion for the underlying Sanskrit. In the 3<sup>rd</sup> pāda, I follow the Chinese versions, esp. BAvB (五陰從業起). If this is hypothetically reconstructed to something like *\*te ca karma-mayāḥ skandhāḥ*, Tib. could be explained as being based on a defective manuscript which read *\*te ca karmamahāskandhaḥ*. The original of the 4<sup>th</sup> pāda (BAVŚ: 諸業心爲本) may have been something like *\*karmāpi cittamūlakam*.

<sup>425</sup> The reason for this may be that this decade focuses on the mind not so much as a creator of the various realms of saṃsāric existence as of physical appearances of the Buddha (see below). Cf., in this connection, also T 46.1911: 52a10-15 (cf. KIMURA 1989: 67), where Chih-i contrasts the purport of the present text with that of the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra* (see fn. 415).

<sup>426</sup> YAMAGUCHI (5a12 ff) treats the objective existence of the elements presupposed in the comparison as if it were a theoretical position on the *upameya* level, and on this basis he considers the text to advocate a kind of “critical idealism” close to that later on ascribed to the Sautrāntikas. It may be worth mentioning in this connection that in vs. 1 of the eighth decade (BAvT S kha 62b3; D ka 303b6-7; BAvŚ 101c18-19 [CL. 450]; BAvB 465b23-24) it is stated even on the level of comparison that the element earth has no [true] being of its own (*\*svabhāva*).

not exist in the mind, nor the mind in it, nor does it exist apart from the mind (vs. 3). Its colours have no awareness of each other (which seems to be another sign of their unreality).<sup>427</sup> Still, the mind is not a permanent entity; it is simply incomprehensible (\**acintya*) and unfathomable [in its illusory creativity (?)] (vs. 4ab). Even the painter himself is not aware of the [creative function of the] mind through which he is painting (vs. 5a-c).

#### 80. The text then continues:

“The mind is similar to the painter. The mind creates the *skandhas*; all these worlds (*loka*) in the universe (*lokadhātu*) are ‘painted’ by the mind.”<sup>428</sup> (vs. 6)

In view of the preceding decades, there is good reason to assume that what is meant with these ‘worlds’ is in the first place the various forms of transmigratory existence that sentient beings may find themselves in, but this does not necessarily imply that only the five *skandhas* that constitute sentient beings in these existences (i.e., *sattvaloka*), to the exclusion of their respective environment (*bhājana-loka*),<sup>429</sup> are regarded as being imagined<sup>430</sup> by the mind. The Chinese

<sup>427</sup> BAvT S kha 63b1-2 (P ri 63b1-2): *phan tshun shes pa med pa yi || gzugs rnams ... ||*. Cf. BAvT S ka 289b4-5 (D ka 203b7): “These dharmas are motionless, entirely devoid of reality; therefore they do not know each other’s nature either” (*chos rnams ’di dag g-yo ba med || shin tu dngos po med pa ste || de phyir gzhan gyis gzhan dag gi || ngo bo nyid kyang mi shes so ||*, corresponding to BAvS 66b6-7 [CL. 298]: 諸法無作用 亦無有體性 是故彼一切 各各不相知; cf. BAvB 427a13-14).

<sup>428</sup> BAvT S kha 63b3 (P ri 63b2-3; BAvB 465c26-27; BAvS 102a21-22): *sems ni ri mo mkhan dang ’dra || sems ni phung po byed pa ste || ’jig rten khams na ji snyed pa’i || ’jig rten ’di dag sems kyis bris ||*

<sup>429</sup> As YAMAGUCHI seems to assume (see fn. 417). Also in Fa-tsang’s (法藏) commentary on the ninth decade of the ‘*Suyāma gāthās*’ (T 35.1733: 215b11 and c1), only the bodies [of sentient beings] in the six destinies (六道身) or their individual existences consisting in the five *skandhas* (五蘊身) are mentioned as being manifested by the mind.

<sup>430</sup> Although the expression *parikalpita* occurs only in the comparison, its application to the *upameya* is central to what the comparison is intended to illustrate. Cf. BAvT S kha 62a6 (D ka 303b4: 7<sup>th</sup> decade, vs. 8), declaring the *skandhas* to be

versions, at any rate, take pains to add that there is no dharma in the whole world (thus Buddhābhaddra) that is not created by the mind.<sup>431</sup> And in another chapter of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* (chapter 9 acc. to Tib.) we find a passage which explicitly states that the mind, here too compared to a painter, ‘paints’ the ‘fields’ (*kṣetra*) as well.<sup>432</sup>

81. The remaining four verses move on to the issue of the Buddha, somehow connecting it with the preceding treatment of the creative function of the mind.

### 81.1. The first of them runs as follows:

“The Buddha is similar to the mind. Just as the Buddha, [so] is the world (*\*jagat*; Ch.: so are sentient beings). Both the mind and the Buddhas are, essentially, inexhaustible.”<sup>433</sup> (vs. 7)

---

*\*vikalpita* (*rnam brtags*). Cf. also BAvT S ka 290a4-5 (D ka 204a5-6; BAvB 427b3; BAvŚ 66b25), where all things, whether true or false, mundane or supramundane, are stated to be mere products of speech (*tshig gi lam gyis* [S : *las kyis* D] *brjod pa*, 但有假言說), which means: imagined (*yongs su brtags pa* = *\*parikalpita*, cf. ib. 290a3).

<sup>431</sup> BAvB 465c27: 一切世界中 無法而不造 (last pāda also in BAvŚ 102a22).

<sup>432</sup> BAvT S ka 199b3-5 (D ka 142a5-7; BAvŚ 51c19-23 [CL. 244]; cf. BAvB 415b9-13): “... In the same way due to the karma of sentient beings [an] inconceivable [variety of] ‘fields’ (*\*kṣetra*) emerge[s]. Just as the coloured figures (*\*rūpa*) of a picture are painted by a painter (*\*citrakarman*), so all these ‘fields’ are painted by the mind (*\*citta*). Just as the various kinds of bodies of sentient beings are fabricated (*\*kalpita*?) by the mind, so also the various kinds of ‘fields’ (*\*kṣetra*) are all painted by the karma [of sentient beings]” (... *de bzhin sems can las rnam kyis* || *bsam gyis mi khyab zhing* ‘byung ngo || *ji ltar ri mo’i gzugs kyi rnam* || *ri mo’i las kyis bris pa ltar* || *de bzhin zhing rnam* ‘di dag kun || *sems kyis ri mor bris pa yin* || *sems can lus kyi rnam pa dag* || *ji ltar sems kyis brtags pa ltar* || *de bzhin zhing gi rnam pa yang* [D : *de bzhin du ni zhing gi mtshams* S] || *thams cad las kyis rnam par bris* ||). — ‘Field’ (*kṣetra*) is of course an abbreviation of ‘Buddha-field’ (*buddha-kṣetra*) and is often practically equivalent to “world-system” (*lokadhātu*), presumably as potential field for a Buddha (see BHSD 401a).

<sup>433</sup> BAvT S kha 63b3-4 (P ri 63b3): *sems dang* ‘dra ba sangs rgyas te || *sangs rgyas ji bzhin* ‘gro ba’o || *sems dang sangs rgyas dag-la yang* || *ngo bo nyid kyis zad pa med* ||; BAvŚ 102a23 f: 如心佛亦爾 如佛眾生然 應知佛與心 體性皆無盡. Hypothetically and presupposing the metre to have been *anuṣṭubh*, the first half may be reconstructed as *\*cittena sadṛśo buddho yathā buddhas tathā jagat* (assuming that

1. The precise purport of this verse is not easy to grasp. One could perhaps understand the first pāda in the sense that the Buddha is similar to the mind in that he, too, creates manifold appearances by manifesting himself in various forms to sentient beings for the sake of teaching and guiding them. In this case, however, the second pāda (“as the Buddha, so the world”) does not easily connect.<sup>434</sup> I therefore prefer to look for a different solution. In view of parallels in the preceding decades (especially vs. 9 of the seventh decade: “As the world, so the Buddha”)<sup>435</sup> it may not be out of place to expect the present verse, as a connecting link between the treatment of the world and that of the Buddha, to express the idea that just as the world is merely imagined by the mind, so also the (physical appearances of) the Buddha.

2. Unfortunately, this is not exactly what the text says, and the second pāda even puts the matter the other way round. Still, I think this is the right track, provided that we introduce a slight change into the scenario. To bring the situation to life, let me assume that after vs. 6 somebody might, perhaps doubtfully, have asked whether the statement that the five *skandhas*, in all forms of existence, are merely ‘painted’ by the mind indeed holds good even for physical appearances of the Buddha; and, so this person might have added, if, on the

---

an equivalent of *tathā* is not required by the Tibetan syntax and could thus be spared on behalf of the metre). As for the Indic word represented by Tib. *'gro ba*, YAMAGUCHI (1949: 21b) opts for *gati*, which is well documented as an equivalent of *'gro ba* but not of Ch. 眾生 (cf. HIR. 1040), whereas *jagat* is well attested for both. BAvB (465c28-29) is identical with BAvŚ in the first half but differs in the second: “Mind, Buddha(s) and sentient beings: between these three, there is no difference” (心佛及眾生 是三無差別).

<sup>434</sup> YAMAGUCHI, who seems to presuppose the aforementioned understanding of the 1<sup>st</sup> pāda, proposes the following interpretation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> pāda: “The Buddha, while remaining in the state of Awakening (i.e., without moving away from the *dharma*kāya consisting in *nirvikalpa*jñāna [22a19 f]), acts and appears in a worldly way” (22a16-18: その佛は覺證せるまゝに世間的な態に於いて行用し顯現する). But from a syntactical point of view this interpretation looks quite forced.

<sup>435</sup> See fn. 422.

contrary, the Buddha-appearances are real, why not also ordinary appearances. To this question vs. 7ab would answer: Even the Buddha (as a physical appearance) is created by one's own mind, for "the Buddha is similar to the mind", i.e., he appears to sentient beings (e.g., in meditative concentration) just as they imagine him to be. And "just as the Buddha, so the world", i.e., if this is true of the Buddha, it *a fortiori* holds good for the world, or ordinary beings.<sup>436</sup> This argument would basically agree with what we find in the *Pratyutpanna-buddhasammukhāvasthitasamādhī-sūtra* (see § 74), where the meditator, after having realized that the Buddha perceived in meditative concentration was not really encountered in person, understands that "this Triple World (\**traidhātuka*) is nothing but mind, because however I imagine things, that is how they appear."<sup>437</sup>

3. If this interpretation of vs. 7ab is accepted, vs. 7cd may tentatively be taken to refer to the inexhaustible variety of the mental dispositions and expectations of sentient beings and of the respective appearances of Buddhas, or, perhaps, to the fact that since there will always be sentient beings, the response of the Buddha to their expectations, too, will never end.

---

<sup>436</sup> It is interesting that even Fa-tsang (法藏) and Ch'eng-kuan (澄觀) take the passage to express the idea that ordinary beings and the Buddha are alike in that they are both a product of the mind. Fa-tsang explains (T 35.1733: 215c14-16): "Verse 7a compares (or: parallels) the Buddha with the common person: just as the mind creates the common person, so does it create the Buddha. All of them originate from the mind. Verse 7b compares (or: parallels) the common person with the Buddha" ('如心佛亦爾': 將凡類佛。如心造凡, 作佛亦爾; 皆從心起。'如佛眾生然': 將佛類凡。). Ch'eng-kuan comments (T 35.1735: 658c5-7): "Just as the mundane five *skandhas* are created (i.e., issue) from the mind, so also the five *skandhas* of the Buddhas. Just as the five *skandhas* of the Buddha(s), so also all other sentient beings: they all are created (issue) from the mind" (如世五蘊從心而造, 諸佛五蘊亦然。如佛五蘊, 餘一切眾生亦然。皆從心造。). — For a detailed discussion of the exegesis of the verse decade under discussion in Chinese Hua-yen, see the articles mentioned in fn. 417[2] and YOSHIZU 1991: 360–375.

<sup>437</sup> PratyS 3L, esp. 36,21-23: *kham s gsum pa 'di dag ni sems tsaṃ mo || de ci'i phyir zhe na | 'di ltar bdag ji lta ji ltar rnam par rtog pa de lta de ltar snang ngo ||*. Translation adapted from HARRISON 1990: 42.

81.2. Among the following verses, the first one is the most problematic, the reason being that the Tibetan translation and the Chinese versions diverge radically.<sup>438</sup> Since the latter basically anticipate the idea of vs. 10, I confine myself here to the Tibetan:

“Of what[ever] kind the mental continua (or: mental dispositions) [of sentient beings] are, the Buddha knows (or: the Buddhas know) them.”<sup>439</sup> Therefore, the Buddha appears (or: the Buddhas appear) by nature as having become (i.e., having adopted the form of) various living beings.”<sup>440</sup> (vs. 8)

Understood in this way, the verse would explicate the purport of the preceding verse by expressly stating that the appearances of a Buddha (be it in one’s own or another world or in meditative concentration) vary in accordance with the mental dispositions of sentient beings and are at the same time somehow directed or controlled by the Buddha in response to these dispositions.<sup>441</sup> But even so they are illusions, as is clear from the next verse, which connects well with the Tibetan version of the two verses preceding it, underlining as it does the imaginary character of the physical appearances of the Buddha<sup>442</sup> by means

---

<sup>438</sup> For the Chinese versions, see fn. 447. I have no idea what a common original could have looked like. YAMAGUCHI’s (24–25) proposal does not convince me, quite apart from its being unmetrical.

<sup>439</sup> TAMAKI (1989: 27: これらは仏を知っている) takes sentient beings as the grammatical subject and the Buddha as the object. It would indeed make good sense to translate the line as “... [so] they experience the Buddha”, but as far as the Tibetan translation is concerned such an understanding is precluded by the use of the honorific verb *mkhyen*, which requires the Buddha(s) as the subject.

<sup>440</sup> BAvT S kha 63b4-5 (P ri 63b4): *sems kyi rgyud rnam ci 'dra ba || de dag sangs rgyas rab tu mkhyen || de phyir sangs rgyas rang bzhin gyis || 'gro ba sna tshogs gyur par snang ||*.

<sup>441</sup> Provided that the Tibetan translation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter (cf. fn. 439) is a faithful rendering of the Indic original.

<sup>442</sup> The use of *lus* (not *sku*) may be motivated by the fact that these physical appearances are mere imaginings. At any rate, in view of the reference to the “activities of a Buddha” in the 3<sup>rd</sup> pāda I fail to see how these bodies could be anything but physical appearances of the Buddha. Thus also YAMAGUCHI (27a13 ff).

of an argument which follows a pattern similar to the one used to show the imaginary nature of the coloured picture in the comparison (vs. 2–3):<sup>443</sup>

“There is no mind in these [Buddha-]bodies [appearing to sentient beings] nor do they really exist within [one’s] mind (nor, we may add, outside the mind). Even so, they accomplish the salvific activities of a Buddha — a really marvellous performance!”<sup>444</sup> (vs. 9)

81.3. The last verse of the decade finally turns to the central issue of how to ‘see’ the true Buddha:

“Whoever wants to comprehend all the Victors (\**jina*) of all<sup>445</sup> the three times should realize [the fact] that all those Buddhas are [merely] mind (\**citta*) to be the true nature of things (\**dharmadhātu*).”<sup>446</sup> (vs. 10)

<sup>443</sup> Cf. also the pattern of the parallel argument in BAvT S kha 63a1 (see fn. 422).

<sup>444</sup> BAvT S kha 63b5-6 (P ri 63b4-5): *lus kyi rnam la sems med de || sems la’ang lus rnam yod pa min || sangs rgyas mdzad pa’ang rab tu byed || de ltar spyod pa ngo mtshar che ||*.

<sup>445</sup> Sounds superfluous and is not represented in the Chinese versions.

<sup>446</sup> BAvT S kha 63b6-7 (P ri 63b5-6): *gang zhig dus gsum thams cad kyi || rgyal ba thams cad shes ’dod na || sangs rgyas thams cad sems kyi dngos || chos kyi dbyings su blta bar gyis ||*. YAMAGUCHI (1949: 29a5-6) seems to understand: “... one should contemplate all Buddhas in (or: in terms of) the *dharmadhātu* which is the real nature of the mind (i.e., its origination in dependence: 29b)” (一切佛を、心の體性なる法界 ... に於て觀ずべし), i.e., he seems to construe *rgyal ba thams cad* as the object of the periphrastic imperative *blta bar gyis*, and *sems kyi dngos* as an epexegetic complement of *chos kyi dbyings*. Such a construction of *sems kyi dngos* is, to be sure, possible but does not seem to be supported by the Chinese versions, which rather suggest a closer syntactical connection of *sems kyi dngos* with *sangs rgyas thams cad*. Without excluding other possibilities for explaining the ambiguous Tibetan text, I prefer to take *sangs rgyas thams cad sems kyi dngos* as representing a nominalized sentence functioning as the object (A) of *blta bar gyis*, and *chos kyi dbyings su* as the predicative complement (B): “contemplate A as B!”, or “realize that A is B!”. In A, I take *sangs rgyas thams cad* as the logical subject, and *sems kyi dngos* as representing the predicate. In view of the purport of the Chinese versions, I tentatively propose to take *sems kyi dngos* as representing something like



The Chinese versions, which had anticipated this subject already in vs. 8,<sup>447</sup> differ slightly in the second half in that according to them one should contemplate the fact that “the mind creates the Tathāgatas”,<sup>448</sup> or that “the nature of the universe (or: the *dharmadhātu* [in the sense of true] nature?) consists in everything being merely created by the mind”.<sup>449</sup>

82. If this interpretation is correct, the verses under discussion do not teach an identification of mind with the true Buddha or vice versa. The mind is rather envisaged as the mind of ordinary beings, impermanent (vs. 4a) and a source of illusions, including illusory representations of the Buddha.<sup>450</sup> For seeing the true Buddha, one must be-

---

\**cittabhāva* (cf., e.g., *dge slong gi dngos po = bhikṣubhāva, rgyu'i dngos po = hetu-bhāva*), °*bhāva* functioning as a nominalization of the copula, almost equivalent to the abstract suffixes °*tva* and °*tā*. The sentence would then mean: Contemplate /realize [the fact] that all Buddhas are (produced by the) mind as the *dharmadhātu* — a term which in this context appears to be equivalent to *dharmatā*, designating the way things are by their very nature, in truth, in reality (cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 1969: 146–147).

<sup>447</sup> BAvŚ 102a25-26: “If a person knows that the activity of the mind creates the whole world, then this person [truly] sees the Buddha, [i.e.,] comprehends the real nature of the Buddha (or: then this person, when seeing the Buddha [in *samādhi*?], comprehends ...)” (若人知心行 普造諸世間 是人則見佛 了佛真實性). Buddha-bhadra’s rendering conveys the same idea, though it is somewhat differently embedded: “All the Buddhas know that everything proceeds from the mind. If one is able to understand this, then this person sees the true Buddha” (BAvB 466a1-2: 諸佛悉了知 一切從心轉 若能如是解 彼人見真佛).

<sup>448</sup> BAvB 466a6: 應當如是觀 心造諸如來。

<sup>449</sup> BAvŚ 102b1: 應觀法界性 一切唯心造。

<sup>450</sup> NAMAI (1995: 177–178 [r1°876–875]), in a brief discussion of the ‘*Suyāma gāthās*’, proposes a different interpretation. According to him, if I understand him correctly, the main import of the verse decade (he seems to start from BAvB) is not the mind as the source of phenomena (現象の根源) but rather the recognition of an original state of perfection of the mind in sentient beings (心の本源態の認識; 衆生の本源に完成態を見いだす), as a ‘place’ (場) where the absolute principle (絶対的真理) and the illusory phenomena are not separate from each other but meet (その両者が出会う場). I must admit that I have difficulties to find this idea expressed in the text.

come aware of precisely this fact and realize that in reality all physical or conceptual appearances of the Buddha are nothing but illusory creations of one's own mind. If we understand the true Buddha to be just this true nature of things (*dharmadhātu*), 'he' would, in a sense, be present in all appearances, including the environment, as their true nature. Still, this has no salvific meaning for the appearances as such (which are merely imagined); it has import only for the mind, i.e., for sentient beings as meditating subjects — cf. the Chinese versions, speaking, in this connection, of "human beings" (人)<sup>451</sup> — able to become aware of the deceptive activity of their own mind. In any case, in the Indian context the verses were surely not intended to express or imply the idea of a Buddha-nature of plants or any other insentient things in the sense of an individual attainment of Buddhahood on their part.

### 1.5.3. The 'Chapter on Religious Practice'

83. Towards the end of the 'Chapter on religious practice (\**brāhmacarya*)', we read in Śikṣānanda's version that the bodhisattva, knowing all dharmas to be of the nature of the mind (\**citta-svabhāva*),<sup>452</sup> becomes endowed with a 'body of insight (\**prajñā*)' without depending on others for his Awakening.<sup>453</sup> The wording is essentially confirmed by the Tibetan,<sup>454</sup> but in Buddhahadra's translation the reference to the mind is missing. Here, the bodhisattva is

<sup>451</sup> See fn. 447 and the Chinese versions of vs. 10 (BAvŚ 102a29 and BAvB 466a5).

<sup>452</sup> I take 心自性 and *sems kyi rang bzhin* as rendering a Skt. bahuvrīhi. Cf., e.g., AKBh 279,16 *pañca drṣṭisvabhāvāḥ* and 279,17 *pañcādrṣṭisvabhāvāḥ* (so read with Tib. and Ch.), i.e., "five have / do not have the nature of [wrong] views", rendered in Tib. (Tj, mNgon pa ku 228a4-5) as *lta ba'i rang bzhin* (*/rang bzhin ma yin pa*) *lnga*, and by Hsüan-tsang (T 29.1558: 99a3 and 4-5) as 五是(非)見性.

<sup>453</sup> BAvŚ 89a2-3: 知一切法即心自性 成就慧身 不由他悟。

<sup>454</sup> BAvT S kha 6a3: *chos thams cad sems kyi rang bzhin du shes pas gzhan gyi dring mi 'jog par shes rab kyi phung po dang yang ldan par 'gyur rol*

instead stated to know the true nature of all dharmas.<sup>455</sup> Thus, at the time when the idea of the Buddha-nature of the insentient was first articulated, the passage was not yet available for Chinese readers in terms of a statement of everything being *mind*. It would be very interesting to investigate the exegesis and utilization of Śikṣānanda's rendering of the passage by somewhat later Chinese authors like Ch'eng-kuan,<sup>456</sup> but this would lead me too far astray. The Indic original, at any rate, does not seem to have been concerned with the question of whether Buddha-nature is present in all sentient beings or even in insentient things. Even in Śikṣānanda's version, the text is entirely focused on describing how a bodhisattva may most quickly attain Perfect Awakening: by realizing that even the religious practice regarded to lead to this goal cannot be spotted as a definite entity (BAvŚ 88c13-17), by concentrating on the ten 'powers' (*bala*) of the Tathāgata (88c21-26), by not abandoning sentient beings (88c26 f) and yet remaining aware of the illusory nature of everything (88c28 f). It would seem that we have to understand the aforementioned sentence in this context, viz., in the sense that all dharmas, whether to be abandoned or to be accomplished, are just mind, i.e., merely imagined (see ch. 1.5.1-2), and that a person who fully realizes this will acquire autonomous control over them (cf. § 113).

### 1.6. *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa*

84. After his interpretation of the *Vimśatikā* passage (see ch. 1.4), Chi-tsang continues with what seems to amount to summing up the result of his interpretation of the passages adduced thus far:

"When one comprehends the equality of all dharmas, one no [longer] perceives the two [opposite] characteristics of 'support' and 'primary [karmic retribution]' (i.e., environment and sentient beings). Therefore, [from the perspective of the] 'principle', there is, in reality, [no justification for attributing to the

<sup>455</sup> BAvB 449c14-15: 知一切法真實之性。

<sup>456</sup> Cf., e.g., T 35.1735: 526b17-c1 with T 36.1736: 123c8-124a3.

latter the distinctive] characteristic of becoming [Buddha] and [to the former that of] not becoming [Buddha]. Because there is [thus] nothing [that can be characterized as] not becoming [Buddha], [even grasses and trees] are provisionally said to become [Buddha]: For this reason, when sentient beings become Buddha, all grasses and trees, too, become (or: turn out to be) Buddha.”<sup>457</sup>

Chi-tsang then proceeds to support his argument with a quotation from Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa*:

“All dharmas are [basically] Such[ness] (如 = *tathatā*, ‘True Nature’). Up to Maitreya: he too is Such[ness]. When Maitreya attains Awakening, all sentient beings must likewise attain [it].”<sup>458</sup>

In Kumārajīva’s text<sup>459</sup> as well as in the original Sanskrit,<sup>460</sup> the statement that all dharmas are Suchness is preceded by the statement that all *sentient beings* are [basically] Suchness. This statement is also presupposed by Chi-tsang’s subsequent explanation of the passage:

“This shows: Since sentient beings and Maitreya are one and the same Such[ness], without duality, [it follows that] when Maitreya attains Awakening, all sentient beings, too, must attain [it]. Since such is the case with sentient beings, it must likewise hold good for grasses and trees as well.”<sup>461</sup>

---

<sup>457</sup> T 45.1853: 40c15-18: 若悟諸法平等，不見依正二相。故理實無有成不成相。無不成故假言成佛。以此義故若眾生成佛時一切草木亦得成佛。

<sup>458</sup> T 45.1853: 40c18-19: 一切諸法皆如也。至於彌勒亦如也。若彌勒得菩提，一切眾生皆亦應得。

<sup>459</sup> T 14.475: 542b12-13 and 15-16.

<sup>460</sup> Vkn III.51: *yā ca sarvasatvānām tathatā, yā ca sarvadharmānām tathatā, saiva Maitreyasyāpi tathatā | ... tad yadā Maitreyo bodhim abhisambhōtsyate, sarvasatvā api tasmin samaye tādrśīm eva bodhim abhisambhōtsyante* | Cf. LAMOTTE 1962: 193.

<sup>461</sup> T 45.1853: 40c20-21: 此明：以眾生彌勒一如無二故，若彌勒得菩提，一切眾生皆亦應得。眾生既爾，草木亦然。

In other words: According to Chi-tsang, the identity of Suchness (i.e., for Chi-tsang, Buddha-nature)<sup>462</sup> in Maitreya, all sentient beings and all dharmas (including insentient things) does not merely imply that when Maitreya attains Awakening (i.e., realizes his inherent Buddha-nature), all sentient beings will also attain Awakening.<sup>463</sup> For him, it equally implies that all dharmas, including the insentient (represented by grasses and trees), will attain Awakening, too. Yet it is of fundamental significance that the Indian text, even in its Chinese version, does not proceed to this latter consequence and only states that the identity of Suchness implies that Maitreya's Awakening entails the Awakening of all *sentient* beings. Thus, the additional step of concluding, from the premise of the identity of Suchness in Maitreya, sentient beings and dharmas, that dharmas (i.e., insentient things like plants) must attain Awakening as well, is conspicuously Chi-tsang's innovation. It is worth noting that no such conclusion is found in Chi-tsang's commentaries on the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* (which seem to be earlier works of his).<sup>464</sup>

### 1.7. *Buddhāvataṃsaka* (2): 'Eulogies on Mount Sumeru'

85. The *Buddhāvataṃsaka* passages adduced by Chan-jan (湛然)<sup>465</sup> in order to prove the presence of Buddha-Nature even in insentient

<sup>462</sup> Cf. T 38.1780: 860a25 (see fn. 463).

<sup>463</sup> According to Skt.: "attain precisely the same kind of Awakening" (*tādṛśīm eva bodhim*). I am inclined to take this to mean that Maitreya's attainment of Awakening means that his experience dissolves into ultimate truth where there are no distinctions and, in a sense, all sentient beings have always been Awakened. Cf. Chi-tsang's remark at T 38.1780: 860a25-26: "Suchness is Buddha[hood]. All sentient beings are basically Suchness, [hence] they are also basically Buddha" (如即是佛也。一切眾生本來是如。亦本來是佛。), and the subsequent (860b2 ff) rebuttal of the objection that if both common and holy persons share one and the same Suchness, then when one person comes to see Suchness, all should come to see it as well (in the conventional sense of a mental experience taking place in time).

<sup>464</sup> Viz., T 38.1780: 860a29-b2 and T 38.1781: 950b7-13. Cf. OKUNO 2002: 390-391.

<sup>465</sup> *Chin-kang-pei* 783a21-29 (PENKOWER 1993: 484-486).

things are taken from Śikṣānanda's translation of the chapter 'Eulogies on Mount Sumeru' (須彌頂上偈讚品):

1. "[One must] comprehend that all dharmas have no [true] nature of their own (\*svabhāva). Understanding the true nature of dharmas (\*dharmatā) in this way, one will see Vairocana."<sup>466</sup>

2. "The nature of dharmas is fundamentally empty and still; there is nothing to grasp and nothing to see. [Their] being empty of an [individual] nature is the Buddha; it cannot be assessed in thought."<sup>467</sup>

3. "The nature of dharmas is fundamentally pure; like space, it has no characteristic properties (\*lakṣaṇa). [... Removing the concept of dharmas, not indulging in any dharma, and] not even cultivating this, one can see the great Sage."<sup>468</sup>

4. "All dharmas are without characteristic properties (Tib. *mtshan nyid* = \*lakṣaṇa); this is the real body (or: essence) of the Buddha."<sup>469</sup>

According to Chan-jan, these passages show that *all* dharmas have, basically, the same nature as Vairocana,<sup>470</sup> i.e., Buddha-nature, and that it is precisely for this reason that one who understands the true

<sup>466</sup> BAvŚ 82a6-7: 了知一切法 自性無所有 如是解法性 則見盧舍那. Transl. CL. 374 (with minor adaptations). The 3<sup>rd</sup> pāda is quoted by Chan-jan as 若能如是解, thus omitting the equivalent for "the nature of dharmas" (\*dharmatā).

<sup>467</sup> BAvŚ 81c15-16: 法性本空寂 無取亦無見 性空即是佛 不可得思量. Transl. adapted from CL. 373. In BAvB, the 3<sup>rd</sup> pāda says: "The Buddhas are originally empty" (442b15: 諸佛本來空).

<sup>468</sup> BAvŚ 82b29-c3: 法性本清淨 如空無有相 ... 遠離於法想 不樂一切法 此亦無所修 能見大牟尼. Transl. adapted from CL. 377. For Tib. see fn. 473.

<sup>469</sup> BAvŚ 83b1: 一切法無相 是則佛真體. Transl. adapted from CL. 380. Chan-jan reads 真佛體.

<sup>470</sup> *Chin-kang-pei* 783a24 (PENKOWER 1993: 484-485): 豈非諸法本有舍那之性耶.

nature of the dharmas (i.e., their fundamental purity and emptiness) can, without further cultivation, see the Buddha.<sup>471</sup>

86. Buddhahadbra's version of the verses<sup>472</sup> is basically in agreement with Śikṣānanda's. The Tibetan translation, on the other hand, diverges considerably in all but one case (viz., no. 3),<sup>473</sup> but in other places it too confirms, at least indirectly, the connection between understanding the unreality of all dharmas, or no longer perceiving them as such, on the one hand, and seeing the Buddha on the other.<sup>474</sup>

87. There can hardly be any doubt that Chan-jan is right in interpreting these passages in the sense of an equation of the [true] nature of dharmas (i.e., their emptiness, or lack of constitutive properties) with Buddha-nature, provided that 'Buddha-nature' is taken to denote the true, ultimate nature of the Buddha, and in the sense that realizing

<sup>471</sup> Cf. *Chin-kang-pei* 783a27-28 (PENKOWER 1993: 485): "In case [dharmas] were devoid of [Buddha-]nature, how could [the sūtra] say that without [further] cultivation one can see the Muni?" (豈於無性又云無修能見牟尼.)

<sup>472</sup> BAvB 442c5-6 (1.); 442b14-15 (2.); 443a28-b2 (3.); 444a7 (4.).

<sup>473</sup> BAvT S ka 345a4-6 (D ka 242b5-6): *de dag rang bzhin rnam par dag || nam mkha' bzhin du mtshan nyid med || ... (chos rnams la ni mos myed de || chos kyi 'du shes rnam bsgoms [see fn. 474] shing ||) shes pa de yang ma bsgoms pa || des ni thub chen mthong ba yin ||*. For the other passages, see BAvT S ka 343b4 = D ka 241b4-5 (1.); S 343a2-3 = D 241a6 (2.); S 346b7 = D 243b6-7 (4.).

<sup>474</sup> Cf., e.g., BAvT S ka 344a1-2 (D ka 241b7-242a1): *... gzugs kyi 'du shes rnam par bsgoms || chos rnams mthong ba med pa yis (D : yin S) || 'od mdzad rab tu mthong ba yin ||*, where *rnam par bsgoms* seems to correspond, in view of BAvS 82a16 捨離, to a form of Skt. *vibhāvayati*, which is, in Buddhist texts, often used in the sense of "to make disappear", "to dissolve", "to remove". Therefore, I understand the original meaning of this passage as follows: "Due to the fact that, after one has dissolved the notion of visible/material things (*rūpa*), there is no [longer any] perception of dharmas, one is [capable of] seeing Vairocana." To be sure, the Tibetan translators (just like Buddhahadbra: BAvB 442c15 觀察, with 法 *dharma* instead of *rūpa*) took *\*vibhāvayati* in the sense of "contemplating", but probably with the implication of "contemplating critically [and recognizing their untenability]". Similarly BAvT S ka 346a1 (D ka 243a5): *gang gis 'du shes rnam bsgoms pa || des ni sangs rgyas mthong ba ste ||*, where BAvS (82c26: 除滅) again confirms the meaning "to remove" for *\*vibhāvayati*. Cf. also BAvS 82c2 遠離 (see fn. 468), corresponding to *rnam bsgoms* in BAvT (see fn. 473).

the true nature of dharmas immediately entails, or is even equivalent to, seeing the Buddha (as he is in reality, in his true nature). There is also no reason to restrict the [true] nature of dharmas equated with the [true] nature of the Buddha to a particular class of dharmas. Rather, it is expressly stated to be the true nature of *all* dharmas (passages no. 1 and no. 4), comprising both sentient beings and insentient things, as another *Buddhāvataṃsaka* passage adduced by Chan-jan makes explicit.<sup>475</sup> Thus, Chan-jan is right in deriving, from passage no. 4, the thesis that the true body or essence of the Buddha is present in *all* dharmas,<sup>476</sup> or that all dharmas have, fundamentally, the same [true] nature as the Buddha.<sup>477</sup> It is, however, crucial to be aware of the *perspective* in which these ideas are embedded in the chapter of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* from which the quotations have been extracted. Time and again, and especially towards the end of most of the verse decades, the text refers to *seeing* the Buddha, and more precisely to ‘seeing’ him as he *really* is, viz., as the true nature or emptiness of all dharmas, instead of perceiving him in the form of an imagined physical appearance.<sup>478</sup> Thus, emphasis is not on ascribing a Buddha-like nature to all dharmas (as Chan-jan puts it) but rather on the transconceptuality and transphenomenality of the Buddha as he really is.

---

<sup>475</sup> *Chin-kang-pei* 783b5 f, quoting BAvŚ 101b7 f (cf. BAvB 465a12 f): “sentient [beings] and insentient [things], both lack true reality (i.e. have no true nature or being of their own) ...” (眾生非眾生 二俱無真實 ...; cf. BAvT S 61a7 f: *sems can sems can ma yin pa* || *ngo bo nyid kyis rang bzhin med* (\**niḥsvabhāva*) || ...).

<sup>476</sup> *Chin-kang-pei* 783a29: 既真佛體 在一切法。

<sup>477</sup> *Chin-kang-pei* 783a24 (see fn. 470).

<sup>478</sup> Cf. BAvT S ka 342b6 (D ka 241a3-4): “Even to have seen the Leaders for many *kalpas* does not mean that one understands the [true] nature of those Protectors of the world” *'dren pa rnam ni mthong nas kyang* || *bskal pa mang po 'dās gyur te* || *'jig rten mgon skyob de dag gi* (S : *gis D*) || *chos nyid de ni shes pa min* ||, corresponding to BAvB 442b6-7 and BAvŚ 81c7-8 (CL. 373). Cf., e.g., also, apart from the passages quoted in fns. 466, 468, 473 and 474: BAvŚ 82a17 and 19; b5, 12, 18, 20; c4, 17, 21, 27.



### 1.8. *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka: Oṣadhiparivarta*

88. Both OKADA<sup>479</sup> and FINDLY<sup>480</sup> refer to the “Chapter on Herbs” (*Oṣadhiparivarta*) of the *Lotus Sūtra*<sup>481</sup> in connection with their attempt to prove that in early Buddhism, and in some strands even later on, plants were regarded as living, sentient beings. And at least in medieval Japan, the chapter was adduced as evidence for plants attaining Buddhahood, e.g., by the Tendai master Sonshun 尊舜 (1451–1514)<sup>482</sup> and in Noh plays.<sup>483</sup> However, as has already been pointed out by SHIVELY and GROSニック,<sup>484</sup> in the text itself herbs and trees are only referred to in the context of a *simile*. It is only the various categories of persons, *compared* to or *metaphorically* equated with the various categories of plants, who are stated to hear teaching and to respond, but not the plants themselves. The latter are merely described as drinking the water of the big rain cloud and as thriving thereby in different ways according to their respective dispositions — a description that merely reflects the everyday world-view. The passage is thus of no doctrinal validity with regard to the issue of the sentience of plants.

---

<sup>479</sup> OKADA 1999: 107a # 3.4.

<sup>480</sup> FINDLY first quotes the passage as evidence for plants having the sense of touch because they respond to moisture and drought (2008: 136 f), and then in the context of trees as metaphors for spiritual advancement (246: “the various plants symbolize ... sentient beings”, “large trees are like mature meditators”). In the context of FINDLY’s argument, this is meant to imply their sentience or saintliness (see §§ 29 and 44.1). This becomes fully explicit when she takes the parable to imply that “trees can hear teaching and respond” (300).

<sup>481</sup> Saddhp 121–131, esp. 121,11–122,8, etc., corresponding to T 9.262: 19a18–20b24, esp. 19a28–b6, etc.; 9.263: 83b1–85a18, esp. 83b9–25, etc.; 9.264: 151c24–153a28, esp. 152a4–12, etc.

<sup>482</sup> WATANABE 2008: 77–78.

<sup>483</sup> SHIVELY 1957: 140; GROSニック 1994: 199–200.

<sup>484</sup> See preceding fn.

## 1.9. Résumé

89. The result of the preceding examination of the non-specific passages adduced by Chi-tsang, Hui-chung and Chan-jan may be summed up as follows:

1. Some of the passages (cf. especially §§ 60; 64; 67; 74) are rather problematic as to their original purport, which may have been entirely unrelated to any of the aspects of Buddha-nature pointed out in §§ 53.1–4, and certainly unrelated to the Buddha-nature of plants or insentient things in general.

2. A number of passages are concerned with the true nature of all dharmas, and in this connection some of them state that the true nature or Suchness of all things (§§ 62; 81.1; 81.3; 84; 85–87) or the True Mind (§ 70) is the same as the true nature of Awakening or the True Buddha, and not different. Structurally, this corresponds to the second interpretation of the term *tathāgatagarbha* in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (§ 53.3), but in contrast to the latter, Suchness is not merely envisaged as the true nature of all sentient beings but rather, as a matter of course, as extending to all dharmas. In this respect, Chi-tsang's and Chan-jan's claim seems, in a sense, justified.

3. The perspective from which the examined passages envisage the true nature of all dharmas and its non-difference from the true nature of the Buddha, or from the True Buddha, is, however, different from the one suggesting itself in the context of the discussion on the status of plants in early Buddhism. What would be at stake in this connection would be the question whether they partake of Buddha-nature in the sense of the third interpretation of the term *tathāgatagarbha* in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, i.e., that they are Buddha-natured in the sense of being able to attain, or having already attained, Buddhahood themselves, individually. Such an idea is, however, not expressed or implied in any of the passages. When it comes to the aspect of individually attaining or actualizing Buddhahood, the scope of the texts is invariably confined to sentient beings (cf. §§ 62; 65.2–3; 84) or, in a more practical perspective, to spiritual practitioners (cf. §§ 82; 83;

85–87), and it is only with a view to guiding them that the true nature of all dharmas and its relation to the Buddha are discussed.

## 2. Specific passages

90. Let us now turn to the passages according to which insentient beings may become sentient or perform functions that normally presuppose sentience. Two such passages are adduced by Annen (安然, cf. § 54), Shōshin (證眞, cf. *ibid.*) and some other authors. But whereas Annen adduces them as scriptural evidence for his contention that even insentient things like ‘grasses and trees’ may become Buddhas, Shōshin submits their evidential value to a critical examination.<sup>485</sup> The first of these passages is from the *Dharmadhātu-prakṛty-asambheda-nirdeśa* (ch. 2.1), the other one from the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* (ch. 2.2). A further two passages are quoted in the record of Nan-yang Hui-chung (南陽慧忠: see § 129.3.0). According to this text, Hui-chung would have shared the view of some Ch’an/Zen masters<sup>486</sup> that even insentient things — not only plants but also mountains, the sea and the sky, or the four elements, or rubble (‘tiles and stones’), and even artefacts like a wall, a pot, a post or a house<sup>487</sup> — expound the Dharma,<sup>488</sup> albeit in a way inaudible to or-

---

<sup>485</sup> The same happens in two texts which seem to be based on drafts by Genshin 源信 (942–1017) that were reworked later on, one (the *Rokusoku senyō ki* 六即詮要記) by Genshin’s student Kakuchō 覺超 (952/960–1034), and the other (the later version of the *Sanjin-gi shiki* 三身義私記) by an unknown person (see HANANO 1976b: 127 f). For the passage concerned, see fn. 726.

<sup>486</sup> In the Ch’an tradition, the question of the Buddha-nature of insentients was controversial (see § 129 and fn. 788).

<sup>487</sup> See fn. 505 and fn. 506. Cf. *Leng-ch’ieh shih-tzū chi* 楞伽師資記 (“Records of the Masters and Disciples of the *Laṅkāvatāra*”, by Ching-chüeh 淨覺, 683–ca.750; cf. YAMPOLSKY 1967: 16 and 18 f), ed. YANAGIDA 1971: 122,6-7 (cf. T 85.2837: 1284c18-20; MCRAE 1986: 92): 又云。樹葉能說法, 瓶能說法, 柱能說法, 屋能說法, 及地水火風 皆能說法, 土木瓦石 亦能說法者, 何也。For the sky, see *Tsu-t’ang-chi* ch. 14, fol. 4,23 (Taiw. 263b9; YANAGIDA 1990: 282): “When the sky

dinary people;<sup>489</sup> for insentient things, too, have Mind and hence Buddha-nature (see § 129.3.1).<sup>490</sup> According to the *Tsu-t'ang-chi*, Hui-chung adduced, in support of insentient beings preaching the Dharma, two scriptural passages: 1. a passage stated to be from the 'Amitā(bha)- or 'Amitā(yuh)-sūtra' (彌陀經: ch. 2.3), and 2. a line from Buddhābhaddra's translation of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* (ch. 2.4).<sup>491</sup>

## 2.1. Dharmadhātu-prakṛty-asambheda-nirdeśa

91. The *Dharmadhātu-prakṛty-asambheda-nirdeśa* <sup>492</sup> (DhPAN) forms part of the *Mahāratnakūṭa* collection and is available only in

---

recites the Sūtras, what [kind of] people are the audience?" (虛空講經, 什麼人爲聽眾。). These references I owe to a (to my knowledge) still unpublished paper by YANAGI Mikiyasu 柳 幹康, entitled 無情說法と虚空講經 ("Insentient beings expound the Dharma and the sky recites the Sūtras") and kindly made accessible to me by the author in Dec. 2006.

<sup>488</sup> *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 11,25–12,12 (Taiw. 61b11–62a12; YANAGIDA 1990: 164–165 [# 254]; ANDERL 2004a: 621–623; 2004b: 190–194); parallels: *Ch'uan-teng lu* 438a17–27; T 47.1986A (筠州洞山悟本禪師語錄): 507b12–24 ≈ T 47.1986B (瑞州洞山良价禪師語錄): 519c2–13; X 67.1309 (*Cheng-fa yen-tsang* 正法眼藏 of Master Ta-hui tsung-kao 大慧宗杲, 1089–1163, cf. DUMOULIN 1985, I: 229–231 and 238–244; ISHII Shūdō 1991: 296–308): 593a16–b1; *Shōbōgenzō* (*Mujōseppo* 無情說法) 398,1–6; cf. TAKASAKI 1998: 6–9; OGAWA 2006: 69–70.

<sup>489</sup> See § 129.3.3.

<sup>490</sup> *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 11,25–26 (Taiw. 61b11–12; YANAGIDA 1990: 164; ANDERL 2004a: 621; 2004b: 190; MATSUMOTO 2000: 326 [text 71]): "The visiting Ch'an monk (see fn. 804) asked: 'Since insentients have Mind, do they [also] expound the Dharma?' The master answered: 'Obviously they expound [the Dharma]; they always and continually do so, without interruption'" (禪客曰。無情既有心 還解說法也無。師曰。他熾然說恒說常說 無有間歇。). Cf. *Ch'uan-teng lu* 438a9 ff, esp. 17–19: "... Since insentients have Mind and [Buddha-]nature, ..." (無情既有心性 ...).

<sup>491</sup> *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 12,8–12 (Taiw. 62a8–12; YANAGIDA 1990: 165 and 392 [note to # 254]; ANDERL 2004a: 622 f; 2004b: 193 f). Cf. TAKASAKI 1998: 7b, and, for more details regarding the parallel materials (see fn. 488), ISHII Shūdō 1967.

<sup>492</sup> Tib. *Chos kyi dbyings kyi rang bzhin dbyer med par bstan pa*, Ch. *Fa-chiai t'i-hsing wu-fen-pie hui* 法界體性無分別會. Thus, the title may mean something

Tibetan and Chinese, the latter translated by \*Mand(a)ra(sena)[?] (曼陀羅(仙))<sup>493</sup> in 503.<sup>494</sup> Towards the end of the text,<sup>495</sup> the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī makes Māra the Evil One appear as the Buddha, sitting on the lion throne and enouncing profound statements about the attainment of Awakening, to the effect that in reality there is no attainment at all, and that to be Awakened means that a bodhisattva, when hearing this, does not shake (i.e., challenge?) (*rnam par 'khrugs par mi byed pa, \*na vikopayati?*)<sup>496</sup> the essential character (\**svabhāvalakṣaṇa*) of all dharmas. Śāriputra is bewildered at this astounding transformation of Māra brought about by Mañjuśrī's miraculous control or in-

---

like “Elucidation [of the fact] that the *dharmadhātu*, [i.e.,] the true nature [of all dharmas], does not admit of [any] distinctions”, or “Elucidation [of the fact] that the true nature of the universe (*dharmadhātu*, see fn. 868) does not admit of [any] distinctions”. The former alternative appears more probable because the ideas propounded in the text are close to the *Prajñāpāramitā* strand: All dharmas have<sup>a</sup> the *dharmadhātu* — the term is used as equivalent to *tathatā* and *bhūtakoti* (DhPAN D 157b2) — as their true nature (*rang bzhin, \*prakṛti*) (ib. 141a3 and 6). This means that as distinct dharmas they are illusory (144b5; cf. 148b7) and empty (150a4; 155a1), and that dichotomies like wholesome and unwholesome, pollution and purification, or saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are mere superimpositions (145b6–146a1; 146a6–b1). Thus, in reality all dharmas are without distinctions and equal (148a1), in a non-predicative sense because there are no dharmas to be predicated as equal or unequal (146a2–3), like empty space (146a6, b2). For this reason, I follow the Tibetan and Chinese rendering of the title in taking *sambheda* as “distinction” and not as “being mixed up” (for the ambiguity, see BHSD s.v. *sambhinna*).

<sup>a</sup> I take the predicate noun *X kyi rang bzhin* as representing a Skt. bahuvrīhi (cf. fn. 452), as in 141a5 where the text has indeed *X kyi rang bzhin can*.

<sup>493</sup> Cf. *Li-tai san-pao chi* 歷代三寶紀 (T 49.2034; end of the 6<sup>th</sup> century) 98b2 and *Ta-t'ang nei-tien lu* 大唐內典錄 (T 55.2149) 265c10. The name of the text is mentioned on p. 197c9 of the *Fo ming ching* 佛名經 (*Buddhanāma-sūtra*: T 14.441, by an anonymous translator, between 502 and 557 according to *HōbRÉp* p. 52).

<sup>494</sup> Cf. PAGEL 1995: 425 n. 2.

<sup>495</sup> DhPAN D 160b3–161a1 (P 179a7–180a6; S 236a1–237a6); Ch (T 11.310): 149c19–150a15.

<sup>496</sup> On *vikopeti/vikopayati* see HARA 2005: 240–243. Chinese has “is able [to re-alize] that there is nothing to distinguish” (150a8: 能 ... 無所分別, *\*na vikalpayati?*).

fluence (*byin gyi rlabs*, \**adhiṣṭhāna*),<sup>497</sup> but Mañjuśrī tells him that even things devoid of mind, like trees, grasses and forests, would as-

<sup>497</sup> Cf. DhPAN D 160b3 and 5; 161a5; Ch 150a11. There are, apart from the entries in the relevant dictionaries, several special studies on the use of *adhi-√ṣṭhā* and *adhiṣṭhāna* in Buddhist Sūtra and Śāstra texts, esp. (without claiming to be exhaustive) WATANABE 1977 (unfortunately unavailable to me at present), ECKEL 1991: 90–94, TAGUCHI 1997, ELTSCHINGER 2001: 62–74, id. 2008: 278–280, YAGI 2007, and HIRAGA 2007 and 2009. A detailed study would require much more time than I can afford at present, but if I may express a provisional opinion, I tend to agree with *SWTF* I 38 f (cf. also my review in *ZDMG* 132.2/1982: 409 f) in that most Buddhist applications of the term as an action noun can (just like the meaning “basis”, i.e., “that on which someone or something stands”) be derived from the basic meaning of *adhi-√ṣṭhā*, viz., “to stand or tread upon”, “to mount” (e.g., a chariot), which admits of various metaphorical uses, like “to take possession of”, “to detain, prevent from escaping or elapsing, stabilize, sustain” (e.g., the life-span impulses: cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 1969: 171 and AKVy 650,11, or bodily manifestations even after one’s death: BoBh 45,12 f; cf. ECKEL 1991: 91), “to engage in” (protecting somebody), “to resort to” (a certain thought: YAGI 2007: 607), “to determine, resolve”, or “to control or take control of”. For *satyādhiṣṭhāna*, YAGI (608–610) suggests, in most cases, the meaning “(to) resort, i.e., appeal, to a true statement”, but perhaps what is implied is rather to take, by means of a true statement, control of truth (as a powerful substance) and direct it to a certain goal or purpose. A similar meaning would also seem to hold good for *adhiṣṭhāna* in connection with a *mantra*. ELTSCHINGER (2001), to be sure, prefers in this connection the rendering “soutien surnaturel” / “soutenir surnaturellement” — and “keeping the mantra directed towards the fixed purpose” may indeed be implied —, but on p. 119 he himself explains: “... il soutient surnaturellement ce *mantra*, c’est-à-dire l’investit du pouvoir d’octroyer le fruit escompté de son utilisation”, and in his recent paper (2008) he mostly uses the renderings “controlling power” and “empowerment”. In many cases, the term *adhiṣṭhāna* implies indeed the application of supranormal or miraculous power, as is also confirmed by its usual Tibetan equivalent *byin gyis rlob pa*, meaning something like “to inundate with extraordinary power” (cf. *rlabs* “wave”), and by the occurrence of *adhiṣṭhāna* along with *anubhāva* and *tejas* (Aṣṭ 17,7) or *pari-grāha* (“taking possession of” in the sense of “inspiration”: Aṣṭ 111,9), or with *vṛṣa-bhīta*, *ādhipateyatā*, *vikurvita* and *prabhāva* (Gv 12,28-29) as quasi-synonyms. This application of supranormal power is mostly benign (esp. if wielded by the Buddha), but not necessarily so (e.g., if exercised by Māra, as in Aṣṭ 92,18 *mārādhiṣṭhita*, *bdud kyis byin gyis brlabs pa*). In the context of the present study, the two most important nuances are: 1. to take control of a person’s mind, practically amounting to “inspiration” (or, in the case of Māra, demonic possession); 2. to take control of persons or things with the aim of changing their appearance (cf. the alternation of

sume the appearance of the Buddha's body and expound the Dharma as eloquently as the Buddha himself (*sangs rgyas kyi spobs pas*, \**buddhapratibhānena*?)<sup>498</sup> if he, Mañjuśrī, were to exercise this influence on them.<sup>499</sup>

---

*adhitiṣṭhati* with *ādarśayati* in DBhS R X.I; cf. also fn. 528) or transforming them. In this case, *adhi-√ṣṭhā* tends to acquire the meaning "to make X appear as Y (or Y in X), or transform X into Y, by means of applying one's miraculous power" (cf. the explanation of such activities as *yongs su bsgyur ba* (\**pariṇāmana*?) in the commentary on DBhS R X.I [Tj P ngi 323a3; cf. ji 142a4; DBhVc 199a2-4]).

<sup>498</sup> I am not quite sure about the meaning of this expression, which also occurs in connection with Mañjuśrī's miraculous transformation of Māra (DhPAN D 160b2-3) and, later on, of Śāriputra (D 161a7-b3; Ch 150a14-15), into the (or: a) Buddha expounding the Dharma. In the case of Māra, both versions agree in expressly stating that this preaching, too, is the effect of Mañjuśrī's miraculous control (D 160b5: *de nas 'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pa'i byin gyis rlabs kyis bdud sdig pa can gyis 'di skad ces smras so ...*; Ch 149c24-25: 以文殊師利力所持故 魔波旬言。...). It is only in the Chinese version that in a preceding sentence Māra's preaching had, by contrast, been stated to be due to the power of the *Buddha*, but even there this statement does not render the expression \**buddhapratibhānena* but merely *explains* it: "..., making Māra the Evil One sit on the lion throne and, due to the Buddha's power, expound the Dharma with the Buddha's eloquence (i.e., as eloquently as the Buddha himself)" (DhPAN Ch 149c18 f: ... 令魔波旬坐獅子座, 以佛力故佛辯說法。).

<sup>499</sup> DhPAN Ch 150a13-14; D 161a6-7 (P 180a4-5; S 237a3-6): *'jam dpal gyis smras pa | bisun pa sha ra dwa ti'i bu kho bos ni sems med pa'i dngos po shing dang | rtswa dang | nags tshal 'di dag la de lta de ltar byin gyis brlabs* (DS : *kyis rlabs* P) *na yang 'di dag kyang de lta bu'i mtshan dang ldan zhing sangs rgyas kyi spobs pas chos ston par 'gyur ro ||*. — Without the aspect of plants, etc., assuming the Buddha's body, a similar idea is also expressed at Lañk 102,5-8 (Guṇabhadra: T 16.670: 492c17-19): "Due to the miraculous influence of the Tathāgata's arrival (cf. Tib. *byon pa*; Guṇabhadra: entering the city [入城]), even herbs, shrubs, trees and mountains and all kinds of musical instruments ... emit [inspired] sounds [as if they were sentient/rational]; how much more [will this hold good for beings who are actually] sentient/rational" (*trṇagulmavṛkṣaparvatā api ... vividhāni ca vādyabhāṇāni ... tathāgatapraveśādhiṣṭhānena pravādyante, kiṃ puna(h) ... sacetanā(h)*). The commentator Jñānavajra remarks that *pravādyante* refers to sounds of expounding the Dharma (Tj P pi 175a4: *sgra 'byin zhes pa ni chos ston pa'i sgra ste*). He adds (ibid. a7-8) that external things do not really assume such a nature (*phyi rol de lta bu'i ngo bor gyur pa ni med do*); rather, through the miraculous influence of the Buddha they merely appear like this (*de ltar snang ba tsam du zad kyi*) to sentient beings who have accumulated sufficient merit.

92. The passage has already been discussed by W. SHIRATO (1998: 15b). Drawing attention to the fact that the text expressly characterizes plants as being devoid of mind (*sems med pa*, 無心), which probably indicates insentience,<sup>500</sup> she is careful enough not to connect this passage with the pre-doctrinal early Buddhist view on plants. She merely takes it to express an idea that is, in certain Far Eastern texts, somehow associated with the concept of the Buddha-nature of plants. I agree, provided that this is not meant to suggest that this concept is already, albeit tacitly, presupposed by the DhPAN. Even if this were the case, it would be an idea based on specifically Mahāyāna presuppositions, without any evidential value for early Buddhism. But I should rather understand the passage in a sense similar to those which describe plants, as well as other insentient things, as miraculously reacting to an extraordinary event and paying homage to the Buddha or Bodhisattva (see Pt. I, ch. 5.2.2). To make Māra the Evil One, and afterwards also Śāriputra,<sup>501</sup> or even insentient things like plants, appear like the Buddha and teach the Dharma is, as is explicitly stated in

---

<sup>500</sup> Skt. *\*acittaka*. Even if we take “devoid of mind” to correspond to Skt. *acetana* and to mean, in the first place, “lacking intellect”, there is no indication in the text that this is meant to contrast with mere sentience (as a property which even plants should *not* be denied), even less so in view of the other things, like walls or the sky, which the power of the Buddha may also make preach (see § 93). The passage DhPAN D 148b4 ≈ Ch 145c16-17 (on the application of mindfulness to the body) may not be relevant to the issue. In a list of items with which the meditator should compare the present body, the passage seems, at first glance, to enumerate grasses and trees (*rtswa dang shing*, 草木) along with definitely insentient and lifeless things like walls (*rtsig pa*, 牆壁) and lumps of clay (*bong ba*, \**loṣṭa*), or rubble (‘tiles and stones’ 瓦石). However, in this passage, the underlying Sanskrit expressions are probably *tṛṇa* (“grass” but also “straw”) and *kāṣṭha* (“[piece of dead] wood”, cf. § 19.1), not *vrkṣa*, i.e., what is meant is not so much living plants but things of little value, as is corroborated by the fact that the Tibetan version adds “reflected image” (*mig yor*, \**pratibhāsa*). On the other hand, in the case of Mañjuśrī’s exercise of miraculous control, there is no reason why the grasses and trees should not be living plants.

<sup>501</sup> DhPAN D 161a7–b3; Ch 150a14–21.



the case of Māra and Śāriputra,<sup>502</sup> merely a *temporary* change of appearance and is, in the first place, meant to illustrate Mañjuśrī's (or, indirectly, the Buddha's) extraordinary miraculous power (*adhiṣṭhāna*).<sup>503</sup>

93. In Sthiramati's commentary on the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, the capacity of the Buddha to make insentient things like trees or walls or the sky expound the Dharma<sup>504</sup> is classified as "miraculous production of speech" (*vān-nirmāṇa*).<sup>505</sup> The same explanation is found in the *\*Buddhabhūmisūtra-upadeśa*,<sup>506</sup> compiled by Hsüan-tsang on the

<sup>502</sup> DhPAN D 162b1-2 (P 181a7-8; S 238b6-7; Ch 150b14-15): "Then, Mañjuśrī the youth withdrew this [exercise of] miraculous control (*adhiṣṭhāna*). Thereupon, the Elder Śāradvatīputra as well as Māra the Evil One reassumed their respective original bodily appearance" (*de nas 'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pas byin gyis brlabs de* [DS : *te P*] *phyir bsdus so || de nas gnas brtan śa ra dwa ti'i bu dang | bdud sdig can yang rang rang gi gzugs kyi mtshan dang ldan par gyur* [DS : 'gyur P] *to ||*).

<sup>503</sup> An ingenious answer to the question why, on some occasions, the Buddhas make animals or even trees preach is quoted by DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN (1929: 797) from the MPPU (712a17-26): Since a preaching animal is quite uncommon, most people will trust it. But some might think that all sentient beings, hence also animals, are deceitful. If, however, insentient things like trees utter sound, there is no reason for distrust.

<sup>504</sup> For this idea, cf. also Śikṣ 284,8-9.

<sup>505</sup> SAVBh, P mi 151a5-6 (D mi 134b7-135a1; ad MSA IX.58ab): "That due to [the Buddha's] miraculous power (*\*adhiṣṭhāna*) the sound of preaching the Excellent Doctrine (*saddharma*) arises even from things like the sky, walls and trees: this means that [the purified *dharmadhātu* of the Buddhas] is endowed with salvific (*upāya*) action consisting in the miraculous production of speech (*vān-nirmāṇa*)" (*byin gyis brlabs kyi nam mkha' dang| rtsig pa dang| shing la sogs pa las kyang dam pa'i chos 'chad pa'i sgra 'byung ba ni ngag sprul pa'i thabs kyi las can zhes bya'o||*). Similarly: *ibid.* 151b3-4 (D 135a5).

<sup>506</sup> T 26.1530: 325a22-24: "(There are three kinds of miraculous transformation with regard to speech (語化 = *vān-nirmāṇa*): 1. connected with one's own body ...; 2. connected with another's body ...;) 3. not connected with any body: when [the Buddha miraculously] transforms things like mountains, the sea, grasses and trees or even the sky [in such a way that they] emit sounds and preach the Great Doctrine. Such [actions] are all called 'acts of speech [due to] miraculous transformation'." (三, 非身相應。謂 化山海草木等類 乃至虛空 亦出音聲 說大法等。如是皆名變化語業。) The three kinds of *vān-nirmāṇa* are already found in BoBh 46,6-11, where the

basis of Indian sources, which even echoes our DhPAN passage.<sup>507</sup> Mañjuśrī's power may, as SHIRATO suggests, be rooted in his awareness of the "essential character" of all *dharma*s, i.e., their ultimate emptiness, but this hardly warrants far-reaching conclusions; it may simply mean that his deep experience of the illusory nature of phenomena enables him to make them appear in any form he wants. When, however, the True Essence of all *dharma*s was identified with Buddha-nature in the sense of a potential for, or hidden presence of, Awakening and when the possible implications of this identification were fully realized and accepted, the teaching of the Dharma by insentient things — which came to play an important role in the Far Eastern context — could easily come to be explained by, or used to corroborate, the fact that Buddha-nature is present even in them and is actualized by the Awakening and the resulting spiritual power of a sentient being. In fact, our DhPAN passage is expressly adduced by Annen (安然) in support of the idea that under the influence of someone else's mind even "grasses and trees" may resolve to awaken, cultivate the Path and attain Buddhahood,<sup>508</sup> whereas Shōshin (證眞) and others confute such an interpretation (cf. § 143).

## 2.2. *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (2): 'Chapter on Religious Practice'

94. The second passage adduced by Annen and discussed by Shōshin does not refer to insentient things expounding the Dharma but does mention the possibility of their transformation into sentient beings. It comes from Dharmakṣema's version of the (Mahāyānist)

---

'miraculously created speech not connected [with any living body]' (*asambaddham vān-nirmāṇam*) is speech that issues from the sky or from a miraculously created sentient being, due to the miraculous power (*\*adhiṣṭhāna*) of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, as \*Sāgaramegha explains (Tj sems-tsam D yi 84a3).

<sup>507</sup> T 26.1530: 325a11 f: "Secondly, [miraculous transformation regarding the body that is] connected with another's body: when, e.g., [the Buddha, or Mañjuśrī,] transforms King (<\*devaputra) Māra[']s body] into the Buddha's body." (二, 他身相應。謂化魔王爲佛身等。)

<sup>508</sup> *Bodaishin* 484c9-12; SUEKI 1991: 45.

*Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* (MPS), more precisely: from its latter part, which is not represented in the other versions.<sup>509</sup> The passage is found in the ‘Chapter on Religious Practice (*brahmacarya*)’, in the context of a statement that asserts that the benevolence (*maitrī*) of Buddhas and bodhisattvas is distinguished from that of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas in that it is not mere wishful thinking but actually has effect.<sup>510</sup> This is corroborated by pointing out that when Buddhas or (advanced) bodhisattvas contemplate earth as gold, or earth as water, etc., and vice versa, such a transformation really takes place,<sup>511</sup> in accordance with their wish.<sup>512</sup> Their transformative power is, however, not confined to the elements. Rather, they may even transform, by means of their contemplation, real sentient beings (實眾生) into non-sentient things (like plants)<sup>513</sup>, and non-sentient things into real sentient beings.<sup>514</sup>

<sup>509</sup> The Indian origin of this part of the text is doubtful. According to Hubert DURT (1994: 66), it “is probably a product of Indianized Central Asia”.

<sup>510</sup> MPSDh 454b18-20. For a similar idea with regard to compassion, see *Fo-hsing lun* 佛性論 (T 31.1610) 797a8-10: “In the case of compassion (*\*karuṇā*), there is only the thought of saving [sentient beings] from suffering, but no real saving from suffering. In the case of Great Compassion (*\*mahākaruṇā*), there is both the thought and real [saving]” (悲者, 但有拔苦之心, 無拔苦事。大悲者, 有心有事。).

<sup>511</sup> The situation is thus entirely different from the case of a magician or juggler (*māyākāra*) who tricks people into seeing earth as gold [even when they have the (untransformed) object] before their very eyes (cf. T 32.1646: 313c10-11: 如幻師能現前誑人 令見土爲金。). The gold that results from the transformative volition of Buddhas and advanced bodhisattvas serves the purpose and can be forged into golden vessels (T 48.2016: 771a9-13 and 19-24; as for śrāvakas, see *ibid.* 771a25-b2).

<sup>512</sup> MPSDh 454b20-23: 菩薩摩訶薩 ... 觀土爲金 觀金爲土 地作水相 水作地相 ..., 隨意成就 無有虛妄。

<sup>513</sup> Cf. T 38.1767: 139b12: “Non-sentient things: i.e., grasses and trees” (非眾生者 即是草木。).

<sup>514</sup> MPSDh 454b23-25: 觀實眾生爲非眾生, 觀非眾生爲實眾生, 悉隨意成 無有虛妄。

95. In an Indic Buddhist context, this is, admittedly, a somewhat unusual idea.<sup>515</sup> In the case of the elements, the idea that one of them may be transformed into another through the power of meditative concentration is well attested from the canonical period onward, on the premise that one element or mineral contains all the others in a latent form.<sup>516</sup> The idea, however, that a Buddha or bodhisattva may

<sup>515</sup> A transformation of humans into trees and vice-versa (for a couple of instances see FINDLY 2008: 302–311) does not, of course, pose serious problems for most Hindus or for the Jainas, for whom plants are included in the realm of sentient beings participating in karma-directed *saṃsāra*; nor does a *temporary* transformation into an insentient object, as, e.g., the transformation of Ahalyā into a stone due to a curse. Cf. also fn. 525.

<sup>516</sup> AN III 340,29–341,11; *Saṃyuktāgama* (T 2.99) 128c23–129a5; MPPU 148a7-13 (with v.l. 木, cf. LAMOTTE 1949: 731–732), referred to by Chih-i in the *Mo-ho chih-kuan* 摩訶止觀 (T 46.1911: 32c2-4) and quoted *in extenso* in Chan-jan's commentary (T 46.1912: 246b27–c3); cf. YBh 56,10-14; BoBh 42,1-14; T 15.614: 278b19-22; AKVy 33,10-15; 125,9-11 (ad AKBh 53,14). — Though embedded in a different context, the idea shows some similarity to the Sāṅkhya “theory of everything consisting of everything else” (*sarvasarvātmatkatva-vāda*, for which see WEZLER 1981, esp. 388–400 and 406–407; 1987a: 170–181; 1992a: 287–300), or, if we look at the matter from the more specific point of view of the latent presence of the result in the cause, the “theory of the product [pre]existing [in the cause]” (*sat-kārya-vāda*). It may be interesting in this connection to mention the fact that at least much of the phraseology and imagery of the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*, the presumably earliest text propounding the doctrine of *tathāgatagarbha*, has a strong (though probably unreflected) tinge of *satkārya-vāda* (see ZIMMERMANN 2002, e.g., pp. 80; 87; 141). In terms of the categories “nature” (性) and “function” (用), the necessity of a latent pre-existence of the product is explicitly asserted in the *Ta-sheng chih-kuan fa-men* 大乘止觀法門 (T 46.1924: 642b5-22), a text of disputed authorship (see MAGNIN 1979: 80–104), ascribed to Hui-szu (慧思, 515–577) or T'an-ch'ien (曇遷, 542–607; MAGNIN 1979: 97–98 n. 106): Unless sentient beings had Buddha-nature, they could not become Buddhas, even if they practised the Path (642b20). Only on the basis of being endowed with the nature (性) of the cause, the practice and the fruit are they able to actualize these (642b21-22). It is just as gold could never become a vessel and function as such were it not already endowed with the nature of a vessel from the outset (642b13-18). It may thus perhaps be worth considering the possibility that one root (and meaning) of the T'ien-t'ai (and Hua-yen) idea of everything being contained in everything may be the fact that everything may, either in the course of *saṃsāra* or through miraculous transformation, become,

transform sentient beings into insentient things and insentient things into sentient beings is more problematic. If we were to assume that 'sentient' and 'insentient' refer merely to a conventional distinction while in reality the so-called 'insentient things' like plants and perhaps even pebbles, etc., also have life and rudimentary sentience, this would render the transformation conceivable but contradict another passage of the text according to which belief in the sentience of trees is a false, i.e., non-Buddhist, view.<sup>517</sup> If, however, the expression 'in-

---

or appear in, everything, or has been everything in the past (which holds good even for the Buddha, and may be regarded as a presupposition of his compassion: see STONE 1999: 181). This would, regardless of considerable differences in systematic embedding and application, basically correspond to the two aspects of the *sarva-sarvātmakatva-vāda*: the latent presence of the product in the cause before its manifestation as well as after its disappearance (see WEZLER 1992a: 295–296 n. 20). Cf. also the expression "one is (in) all, all is (in) one" (一即一切 一切即一, 一中一切 一切中一, etc.), frequent in Hua-yen treatises (e.g., T 35.1732: 18c27-28; 1733: 111a25; 144c20; 45.1883: 680c18; 1868: 514b17 and 19-20) and (if we disregard the sequence) exactly corresponding to the Sāṅkhya phrase *sarvam ekaṁ ekaṁ ca sarvam* (WEZLER 1981: 371; 388; 406). Whether this no doubt striking correspondence (cf. also fn. 528) is the result of Sāṅkhya influence, or rather a parallel development remounting, somehow, to a common pattern of early Indian thinking, or just a coincidence, is a question I must leave unanswered. — Cf., in this connection, also the dGe-lugs-pa explanation of the different *perception* of water as water, pus or nectar by humans, *pretas* and celestial beings, respectively: the liquid contains *three parts*, serving, respectively, as the material cause of water, pus and nectar under the influence of the karma of the three types of beings, whereas the *whole* liquid turns into water, pus or nectar, respectively, when one of these beings tries to drink it (mKhas-grub rJe dGe-legs-dpal-bzang [1385–1438]: *sTong thun chen mo* [sKu-'bum-byams-pa-gling Par-khang 2001] fols. 209b5–218b5 = pp. 418,5–436,5, esp. fols. 211a1–212a2 = pp. 421,1–423,2. I owe this information to Prof. Dorji WANGCHUK).

<sup>517</sup> See § 53.2.3 with fn. 291. According to T 42.1828 (Tun/Tao-lun's comm. on the *Yogācārabhūmi*): 711c9-10, the non-Buddhists who believe that plants have [sentient] life are people of the West (i.e., in this case, India) who are called Nir-granthas because by going naked they want to show that they are free from bonds, i.e., the Jains (西有外道 裸形無衣 以示離縛 故名離繫也。彼計 草木有命). Cf. also the *Vinaya* material referred to in § 13 and the passage from the so-called *Śūraṅgama-sūtra* discussed in § 55. Of particular interest in this connection is a remark by Ch'eng-kuan (T 36.1736: 400a20-22; cf. KAMATA 1965: 453) in which he ex-

sentient' is taken in a strict sense, viz., as the total lack of sentient life, and the distinction between 'sentient' and 'insentient' as a fundamental one (sentient beings subject to suffering and rebirth versus insentient things not involved in karma-directed *saṃsāra*), the transformation from one category into the other, at least if taken as definitive, would pose serious problems. In the case of a sentient being, being definitively reduced to an insentient thing by somebody else would mean escaping from *saṃsāra* without having practised the Path, and the transformation of an insentient thing into a sentient being would amount to the creation of a new sentient being that did not exist before (*apūrvasattva*).<sup>518</sup> In the context of the Far Eastern concept of the Buddha-nature of plants, however, the transformation from insentient to sentient would make sense if taken to mean that a so-called insentient (but subliminally or potentially sentient) being is, somehow, stimulated to develop full sentience in order to realize its Buddha-nature.<sup>519</sup> But there is no indication in the context of the passage un-

---

pressly rejects a (definitive) transformation of sentient beings into insentient things and vice versa because it amounts to a wrong view not different from that of [certain] non-Buddhist people (外道眾生) who think that fresh, growing (生, i.e., vegetatively alive) plants have [sentient] life (命) (情變非情, 非情變情。斯爲邪見 不異外道眾生 計生草木有命)。What Ch'eng-kuan has in mind in this passage is, however, not so much the MPDh. He (400a19-20) rather alludes to the aforementioned *Śūraṅgama-sūtra*. According to this text (Śūr 138c23-25 u. 139a10-11; HSUAN HUA 2003: 203 f), which seems to make use of popular belief, the spirit (精神) [of certain sentient beings] may, on account of habitual dullness and 'dried-up' disturbed thoughts (枯槁亂想), transform into earth, wood, metal or stone (化爲土木金石), and certain birds generate offspring by incubating a clod or a fruit, the parents ending up becoming the food of their offspring (如土梟等 附塊爲兒, 及破鏡鳥 以毒樹果 抱爲其子, 子成 父母 皆遭其食; cf. *HDC* 7: 1041a s.v. 破鏡 ③; cf. also *X* 12.275: 429a16-17: 此鳥不卵 但取污穢之土塊 孕之成雛)。

<sup>518</sup> Cf. *Shikan shiki* 250a1-2 and 248b5-7. For the rejection of sentient beings really becoming insentient beings and vice-versa, see also Saichō's *Hokke shūku* 法華秀句, quoted in *Shinjō shiki* 713,11: 有心眾生不成無心, 無心之物 不成有心。

<sup>519</sup> This is how Annen (*Bodaishin* 484c12-16) uses the passage, significantly mentioning only the contemplation of non-sentient beings as sentient beings but not the opposite case. Annen's quotation of the passage (觀非眾生以爲眾生) is somewhat ambiguous (perhaps a blend of MPDh 454b24 [see fn. 514] and 453a8 [see

der discussion that this is the idea the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* wants to convey.

96. In his commentary (*Ta pan-nie-p'an ching shu* 大般涅槃經書疏)<sup>520</sup> on the passage,<sup>521</sup> Kuan-ting (灌頂: 561–632) starts with the suggestion that the transformation, as far as sentient and insentient beings are concerned, should be taken as a purely phenomenal one, i.e., in the sense that they are merely caused to *appear* as the opposite, in contrast to the elements, in the case of which the transformation is admitted to be *real*.<sup>522</sup> But this, too, is problematic because, as Kuan-ting has another master object,<sup>523</sup> the phraseology is exactly the same in both cases, stressing as it does the reality of the process (“there is no deception”: 無有虛妄). Nor does the phraseology favour an interpretation of the passage as purporting merely a switching over to a different level of understanding, like, e.g., the recognition that where we normally perceive a sentient being (in the sense of an enduring unit) there is, in reality, nothing of the kind but only a cluster of transient *skandhas*, or, conversely, the deliberate treatment, in conventional terms, of the *skandha* cluster as a sentient being.<sup>524</sup>

---

fn. 524]). His explanation, too, is not quite clear, but as I understand it he takes the sentence to cover both a change of perspective (i.e., recognizing the Buddha-nature in grasses and trees and thus coming to know their being on a par with sentient beings) and a real transformation (i.e., their definitive transformation into actual Buddhas, see § 146). Cf. also WATANABE 2008: 73b, quoting from the *Hyakudai jizaibō* (百題自在房), where it is stated that because sentient and insentient beings have the same nature (一體) one may transform into the other.

<sup>520</sup> On Kuan-ting's commentary on the MPS (T 38.1767), transmitted in a form revised by Chan-jan, cf. PENKOWER 1993: 478.

<sup>521</sup> T 38.1767: 139b8–b22, quoted, with explanations from subcommentaries, in *Shikan shiki* 250a5–b7. Cf. *Sanjin-gi shiki* 331a2–11 and *Rokusoku senyō ki* in HANANO 1976b: 129b1–14.

<sup>522</sup> T 38.1767: 139b8–10.

<sup>523</sup> T 38.1767: 139b10–13.

<sup>524</sup> Cf. T 38.1767: 139b13–15. The converse aspect (viz., that of a cluster of *skandhas* being conventionally termed a sentient being) is taken from Hui-yüan's (慧遠, 523–592) comment on the phraseologically similar passage MPSDh 453a8–9

97. The most probable interpretation, in my opinion, would be to understand the transformation as a *real* but *temporary* transformation, in the sense that a certain sentient being is made to assume, for a certain period, not only the physical shape but also the *function* of a certain insentient thing, and vice versa (like the tree in the DhPAN passage discussed in ch. 2.1). If this is correct, we would still have to ask whether the transformation of the sentient into something insentient is indeed meant to involve a (temporary) lapse into an unconscious state<sup>525</sup> or whether the transformed sentient being merely assumes, in

---

(於非眾生說爲眾生。於實眾生說非眾生。), viz., T 37.1764: 749b21-25, where the explanation comprises both aspects (as well as an alternative). In Kuan-ting's commentary (T 38.1767: 139b14-15), the converse aspect is illustrated by a reference to the statement of MPSDh 380a25 that in all dharmas there is the nature of bliss (安樂性, see § 63). In view of the context this can perhaps be understood in a similar sense as Hui-yüan's example (viz., in the sense that in all those dharmas = *skandhas* that make up what is conventionally called a sentient being there is, somehow, the nature of bliss), and this would also agree with Kuan-ting's understanding of the phrase in other contexts (see § 65.3). But there may be other ways of interpreting Kuan-ting's remarks, which have indeed given rise to controversial interpretations in the tradition (cf. HANANO 1976b: 139b-149a; for HANANO the aforementioned statements refer to the interpretation of the text by the "other master", whom he identifies as Chi-tsang). — Kuan-ting's commentary (T 38.1767: 139b16-19) continues with a remark that has, in view of the introductory "I ask ..." (私問), to be taken as Chan-jan's addition (cf. PENKOWER 1993: 478). According to this remark, the MPS passage under discussion (sc. 454b23-25) presupposes the T'ien-t'ai view that for Buddhas and (advanced) bodhisattvas the sentient individual (as the primary result of karma: 正 = 正報) and the insentient 'support' or environment (as the by-product of karma: 依 = 依報) are not two and yet two (不二而二), two and yet not two (二而不二), and is aimed at pointing out that they can make other sentient beings [have?] the same [experience?] (能令眾生亦復如是), which is a definitive transformation (永轉). The commentary adds that such an interpretation would not be impossible in the case of a temporary transformation either (T 38.1767: 139b19-20: 若暫轉者 不無斯義), which could perhaps mean that a Buddha or bodhisattva may also manifest the non-duality of sentient beings and the environment to others temporarily (as in the DhPAN passage discussed in ch. 2.1), and that this is done in such a way that what is being transformed is itself not aware of the transformation (139b20: 亦令轉者 不自覺知).

<sup>525</sup> Cf. Tzŭ-hsüan (子璿, see § 55), who in his commentary on the passage of the *Śūraṅgama-sūtra* referring to the transformation of sentient beings into earth, wood,



actuality but only temporarily, the *outward* form and the function of an insentient thing while still remaining sentient *within*.<sup>526</sup> Likewise,

etc. (see fn. 517), emphasizes that the transformation does not involve insentience forever and that those beings, when their karmic retribution is exhausted, re-enter ordinary saṃsāric life, just like the 'unconscious heavenly beings' (cf. § 21), who also 'come down' when their karma is used up (T 39.1799: 924b10-11: 非畢竟無情。報盡入輪，如無想天墮)。Cf. also X 37.661: 230b22-23, referring to non-Buddhists being capable of transforming themselves into a stone until the end of the cosmic period (*kalpa*).

<sup>526</sup> This seems to be the opinion of Kakuchō (HANANO 1976b: 129b11-13; cf. fn. 485) when he suggests that the MPS passage under discussion should be understood in terms of a transformation of matter only, viz., of external matter into a (part of the) body and vice versa (依正二色互轉), in analogy to Revata's making the member of another's body a member of his own body (如離婆多攬他身分爲己身分; I don't know the story). In this case there is a transformation of the body but the mind remains the same as before (身雖已轉心猶如舊). The transformation of the body of a sentient being into the shape of an external thing and vice versa can be understood analogously (依正互轉準而可知); it does not involve a transition from sentient to insentient or vice versa. — Another text which comes to mind in this connection is a passage of the *Saṅgharakṣitāvadāna* (cf. PANGLUNG 1981: 8–9 [with further references]), viz., *GM* III.4: 38,14-17 and, with an explanation of the karmic background, *GM* III.4: 44,16 ff (see also VOGEL & WILLE 1996: 256,33-36 and 263,15 ff; Divy 209,6-8 and 211,27 ff). In this passage, the Venerable Saṅgharakṣita is reported to have seen, on a journey to places turning out to be special hells, sentient beings (*sattva*) that have been reborn in the form of posts and walls, *trees*, leaves, flowers and fruits, ropes, brooms, mortars, bowls (*taṭṭu*, cf. *BHSD* s.v. *taṭṭu* and *khaṭṭu*(2)) and cauldrons. This need not, however, mean that these sentient beings have become insentient, and it surely does not imply that ordinary posts, walls, and trees, etc., are, somehow, sentient beings. Rather, what has happened in these cases is that persons who had formerly spoilt certain objects belonging to the Saṅgha or had made illegitimate use of them for personal needs, etc., were reborn in the form of precisely these objects. It is therefore highly probable that being reborn in these forms, since it is a punishment, entails suffering. This is made clear in a reference to this passage found in Chih-i's *Mo-ho chih-kuan* (摩訶止觀: T 46.1911: 124a3-5): "Just as the hell-features of the hells described in the sūtra of Saṅgharakṣita are different: in some [hell, Saṅgharakṣita] sees that the flesh has become earth and is ploughed by others, in others the body is like a tree or forest and cut off by a crowd, in yet others it is like a mountain, a house or a garment" (如僧護經所說地獄獄相不同。或見身肉爲地爲他所耕，或見身如樹林衆所摧折，或身如山如屋如衣。). Actually, in a Chinese version of the Saṅgharakṣita story (T 17.749, esp. 567b13 ff and 568c17 ff) most objects (a large piece of ground, a jar,

we may ask whether the transformation of an insentient object into a sentient being involves the object actually becoming conscious (perhaps due to the transformed object being temporarily entered or possessed, so to speak, by the Buddha's or bodhisattva's mind) or whether it is merely caused to perform the outward functions of a being endowed with consciousness. But I do not perceive any clues that might help to answer these questions in the case of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* passage under discussion. In any case, I seriously doubt that the transformation is meant to imply a definitive, final transference into the opposite category. That this is not the case would also seem to be supported by a parallel statement in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, according to which the playful displays (*vikrīḍita*) of advanced bodhisattvas include stuffing the body of a sentient being (*\*sattvakāya*) with, or transforming it into, a 'field-body' (*\*kṣetrakāya*)<sup>527</sup>, i.e., a world or Buddha-field, and vice-versa, *without* impairing the original status of either.<sup>528</sup>

---

a post, a wall, a rope, etc., and also a forest and trees) are explicitly stated to consist of flesh and to suffer pain.

<sup>527</sup> See fn. 588.

<sup>528</sup> BAvT S nga 270a3-7 (D ga 202b2-5; BAvB 649a22-28; BAvŚ 295a25-b1; T 10.292: 634c18-24; from the *Lokottara-parivarta*, in a list of ten playful displays of miraculous power (*rnam par rtse ba = \*vikrīḍita*) of bodhisattvas): "[1] On [the basis of] the body of a sentient being, the bodhisattva miraculously creates/displays (*\*adhitiṣṭhati*, see fn. 497) a 'field-body', and yet does not cause the body of the sentient being to burst open. ... [2] On [the basis of] a 'field-body', he miraculously creates/displays the body of a sentient being, but does not cause the 'field-body' to be compressed. ... [3] On [the basis of] a Buddha's body he creates/displays the body of an ordinary sentient being (Ch.: of a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha), without however degrading (B, Ś: diminishing) the Buddha's body. ... [4] On [the basis of] the body of a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha, he displays (*\*ādarśayati*?) the body of a Tathāgata, without however enlarging the body of the śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha" ([1] *byang chub sems dpa' sems can gyi lus la zhing gi lus byin gyis rlob pa byed kyang* | *sems can gyi lus 'byed par mi byed pa ...* || [2] ... *zhing gi lus la sems can gyi lus byin gyis rlob kyang* | *zhing gi lus 'dres par yang mi byed pa ...* || [3] ... *sangs rgyas kyi sku la sems can gyi lus byin gyis rlob kyang* | *sangs rgyas kyi sku dma' bar mi byed pa ...* || [4] ... *nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas kyi lus la de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku yongs su ston kyang* | *nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas kyi lus rgya chen por*

## 2.3. 'Amitābha-sūtra'

98. Of the two passages quoted in the record of Nan-yang Hui-chung (see § 90) in support of the idea that insentient things expound the Dharma, the one stated to be from the 'Amitābha-sūtra' runs as follows: "Water, birds<sup>529</sup> and groves, they all recite [the name of]<sup>530</sup>

*yang mi byed pa* ...). The processes described in this passage presuppose an apparent incongruity (*kyang*) between the object on which the bodhisattva displays his miraculous power on the one hand and the changed appearance on the other, and at least in [1] and [2] this incongruity would seem to result from a difference in size. In the case of [1], it is easy to see that filling the limited body of a sentient being with the whole world would normally explode it, but as for [2], there would not be any problem in conceiving the 'field' as containing the body of a sentient being, or even being filled with lots of them (cf. fn. 607). The incongruity only arises when the display is understood to imply that the 'field' is practically transformed into the body of a single sentient being, which would seem to imply its being compressed into the size of the latter. This is why I have translated '*dres pa*' as "compressed",<sup>a</sup> presupposing it to represent a form of Skt. *saṃ-√bhid* (cf. Gv 64,27 *asambhinna* = BAvT D ga 344b7 *ma 'dres pa*), which may mean "to mix" but also "to contract" (cf. APTE s.v. *sambhid* and PW s.v. *bhid* + *saṃ*, quoting the expression *sambhinna-sarvāṅgaṃ kūrmam*, i.e., "a tortoise which has contracted, or drawn in, all its limbs"), and would moreover explain the Chinese renderings as "to destroy" (壞: BAvŚ, 損耗: T 10.292) and "to separate" (離: BAvB) because *saṃ-√bhid* is also used in the sense of "to break asunder". — For the idea that while undergoing miraculous transformation things still remain what they are, see also DBhS R 90,26-28 (K 192,2-3; cf. fn. 584): "In one single minute mote, [the bodhisattva of the tenth stage] miraculously creates/displays one whole world-system ..., *without increasing* that minute mote" (... *ekasmin paramāṇurajasy ekām ... lokadhātum ... adhi-tiṣṭhati, tac ca paramāṇurajo na vardhayati*). — Cf. also the analogous contention of the Sāṅkhya proponents of the *sarvasarvātmakatva-vāda*, viz., that each thing, although having the nature of everything, is at the same time also itself (WEZLER 1981: 395–396 and 406–407; cf. fn. 516).

<sup>a</sup> Yet, "mixed up" may also do since the compression of the world may be viewed as entailing a collapse of the spatial delimitations of its constituents.

<sup>529</sup> Not "water birds" (as in passages like T 3.165: 395c28, etc., or T 54.2128: 375a14, etc.), because Hui-chung immediately after the quotation adds the rhetorical question: "Birds are, to be sure, sentient beings; but are water and trees sentient beings?" (*Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 12,10-11 [Taiw. 62a10-11; YANAGIDA 1990: 165; ANDERL 2004a: 622–623]: 鳥是有情。水及樹豈是有情乎。).

the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṅgha” (水鳥樹林 皆是<sup>531</sup>念佛念法念僧).

99. Normally, one would expect the quotation from the ‘*Amitābha-sūtra*’ to be from the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*. Actually, according to the Smaller *Sukhāvatīvyūha*,<sup>532</sup> the Blissful Land abounds in various kinds of colourful birds, stated to emit sounds proclaiming various Buddhist teachings, which make the listeners recollect the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṅgha (其土眾生 聞是音已 皆悉念佛、念法、念僧). Sounds produced by the jewel-trees stirred by soft breezes have the same effect, but in this case the text does not say that the sounds proclaim Buddhist teachings; they are merely qualified as delicate or sweet (微妙, Skt. *valgu* and *manojña*), comparable to the sound of diverse musical instruments. Thus, taken by itself, the passage does not serve the purpose of scriptural evidence for insentient beings expounding the Dharma. But it may be understood to corroborate this idea if it is read in the light of the “Sūtra on the Contemplation of Amitāyus” (*Kuan wu-liang-shou ching* 觀無量壽經).<sup>533</sup> Actually, two statements of this sūtra, taken together, come much closer to the wording of Hui-chung’s quotation. In connection with the sixth contemplation of Sukhāvatī to be practised by a person who wants to be reborn there, the text describes one feature to be contemplated as follows: “The sounds emitted by water, birds, groves and the Buddhas all proclaim

---

<sup>530</sup> The reason for rendering 念佛, etc., in this way instead of “recollecting the Buddha” will be given below (§ 99).

<sup>531</sup> The same quotation at T 47.1986: 507c10-11 reads 悉皆 instead of 皆是.

<sup>532</sup> T 12.366 (transl. by Kumārajīva, ca. 402): 347a12-24; (INAGAKI 1994: 354–355; GÓMEZ 1996: 147 [## 11–13]); Skt.: Sukh-2 ## 6–7 (M 94,17–95,14; V 255,10–23; GÓMEZ 1996: 17–18 [## 11–13]).

<sup>533</sup> Said to have been translated by Kālayāśas between 424 and 442, but of disputed origin: cf. FUJITA 1990; PAS 1995: 35–52; YAMABE 1999: 19–22 and 499–500 (suggesting the area around Turfan as the likely point of origin and emphasizing the importance of cross-cultural interactions for the production of this type of texts.).

the excellent Dharma” (水鳥樹林 及與諸佛 所出音聲 皆演妙法).<sup>534</sup> Another passage (fifth contemplation) states that colourful birds with melodious voices “constantly praise the recollection of the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṅgha” (百寶色鳥 和鳴哀雅 常讚念佛念法念僧).<sup>535</sup> By combining the subject of the first passage with the predicate of the second one (which evokes the wording of the paragraph from the Smaller *Sukhāvatīvyūha* from which I started), we almost arrive at the wording of Hui-chung’s quotation, provided that 念佛 (etc.) is no longer understood as “recollect the Buddha” but as “recite [the name of] the Buddha”.

100. Even though the above-quoted passage of the ‘Contemplation Sūtra’ juxtaposes the expounding of the Dharma by birds and trees with the expounding of the Dharma by the Buddhas, this is hardly sufficient to justify the assumption that the passage presupposes, in its original context, anything like the Buddha-nature of plants, or their sentience. That even birds and trees preach the Dharma may simply be just one of the miraculous features of Sukhāvatī due to the immeasurable ‘merit’ (*punya*) and the Vow of the Buddha Amitāyus, or may be an effect of his miraculous influence (*adhiṣṭhāna*, cf. § 91), his capacity for miraculous productions (*nirmāṇa*).<sup>536</sup> Actually, in the case of the birds, the Smaller *Sukhāvatīvyūha* expressly states that even the birds themselves are indeed miraculously produced (*nirmita*) by Amitāyus,<sup>537</sup> and in the ‘Contemplation Sūtra’, too, they are stated

<sup>534</sup> T 12.365: 344b18-19 (INAGAKI 1994: 338). Cf. also 343b7-8 (INAGAKI 1994: 331): The practitioner will hear water currents, light, jewel-trees and water birds preach the Excellent Dharma (行者當聞 水流光明 及諸寶樹 鳧鴈鴛鴦 皆說妙法). For water preaching the Dharma, see also 342b29-c1 (INAGAKI 1994: 327).

<sup>535</sup> T 12.365: 342c3-4 (INAGAKI 1994: 327).

<sup>536</sup> Occasionally (e.g., T 12.365: 343c15-16 and 21-22; INAGAKI 1994: 334), even the hosts of Buddhas and bodhisattvas that manifest themselves time and again are expressly declared to be “transformations” (化), i.e., miraculous productions (*nirmāṇa*).

<sup>537</sup> Sukh-2 # 6 (M 95,3-4; V 255,15-16; GÓMEZ 1996: 17 [# 12]): *te punaḥ pakṣi-saṃghās tenāmitāyusā tathāgatena nirmitā dharmaśabdam niścārayanti*.

to be [miraculous] transformations of light.<sup>538</sup> Sukhāvātī is a realm without evil destinies, which include that of animals; hence, the presence of real birds is ruled out. On the other hand, it has to be a beautiful realm, and without sweet-voiced colourful birds an essential element of the concept of a beautiful place would be missing. But Sukhāvātī is also conceived of as a place most suitable for spiritual perfection, and for this reason Amitāyus makes the birds appear not just for the sake of embellishment but also with a salvific function, viz., preaching the Dharma. As for plants, their real presence is less problematic because they are not sentient beings at all. Still, their being subject to withering and decay was felt unsuitable for an ideal realm. For this reason, plants in Sukhāvātī are ‘mineralized’ by being conceived of as consisting of jewels and precious metals. At the same time, in their case, too, the sound they are made to emit when touched by the wind is attributed a salvific function, which in the ‘Contemplation Sūtra’ is developed into trees preaching the Dharma. As in the case of the birds, it suggests itself to understand this preaching, in its original context, as a miraculous activity due to the influence of the Buddha Amitāyus, taking place in an ideal realm altogether different from our earth. In the ‘Contemplation Sūtra’, this realm is, to be sure, imagined in a visual form,<sup>539</sup> and thus in a sense created in the mind of the meditator, but on the whole<sup>540</sup> the sūtra does not give the impression that this is intended to invalidate the existence of Sukhāvātī

---

<sup>538</sup> T 12.365: 342c3: 其光化爲百寶色鳥.

<sup>539</sup> For details see BRETTFELD 2003: 190–192, and PAS 1995: 173–177.

<sup>540</sup> I.e., unless one takes the occasional references to *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* (T 12.365: 341c22; 345a2 and 21; cf. DELEANU 2000: 70) to point to an ultimate level of emptiness. But these references look somewhat perfunctory. They do not occur in the central part of the text that teaches the visual imagining and contemplation of Sukhāvātī, and do not seem to have any organic connection with its message. They may even be secondary additions (two of them occur in the 14<sup>th</sup> contemplation which according to PAS 1995: 46–47 belongs to a secondary stratum of the text). Cf. also the remarks in VETTER 2004: 69–70.

as a yonder realm where one would like to be reborn.<sup>541</sup> Water, birds and trees preaching the Dharma are elements of this miraculous realm, not of our world. In a historical perspective, there is little reason to understand their preaching, already in the original intention of the sūtras, as symbolizing a non-verbal self-manifestation of an original Buddha-nature inherent in *all* phenomena to spiritually mature persons (cf. § 129.3.3).

#### 2.4. *Buddhāvataṃsaka* (3): *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa*

101. The *Buddhāvataṃsaka* passage adduced by Hui-chung from Buddhābhadrā's translation of the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa-parivarta*<sup>542</sup> may, if we follow his interpretation, be rendered as follows:

“(The Buddhas preach,<sup>543</sup> the bodhisattvas preach,) the [Buddha-]fields preach, [ordinary] sentient beings preach, [in?] the three times, everything preaches: (the bodhisattvas distinctly know [all this preaching]).”<sup>544</sup>

Appearing side by side with sentient beings, the ‘fields’ (刹 = *kṣetra*, cf. Tib. *zhing*) are clearly the insentient, i.e., the ‘container-world’ (*bhājanaloka*) or environment, of which plants form part, as Ch’eng-kuan (澄觀, 738–839) explicitly states in a casual remark on the passage.<sup>545</sup> Hence, provided that the proposed translation, which (at least in the crucial point) agrees with the understanding presupposed by

<sup>541</sup> Just as in traditional Buddhism the *dhyaṇas* and *ārūpyas* as levels of meditative concentration correspond to cosmological realms where one may be reborn.

<sup>542</sup> 普賢(菩薩)行品 (BAvB 607a1–611a29 and BAvŚ 257c7–262a9.), Tib. *Kun tu bzang po'i spyod pa bstan pa'i le'u* (BAvT D ga 63a5–75a4; P shi 63b1–75b1; S nga 85b5–102a7). The Sanskrit title is confirmed by the manuscript indicated in fn. 549 (see also ŌTAKE 2007: 89).

<sup>543</sup> Lit.: expound [the Dharma].

<sup>544</sup> BAvB 611a24–25: (佛說菩薩說) 刹說眾生說 三世一切說 (菩薩分別知).

<sup>545</sup> T 35.1735: 506b19–21 (quotation of the verse under discussion) and, as an example for the preaching of the ‘field(s)’, b24: “[When] the bodhi tree, etc., [preach,] then [this means that] the environment preaches” (菩提樹等即器界說).

Hui-chung and Ch'eng-kuan, is accepted, the verse can rightly be adduced as an instance for insentient beings like plants expounding the Dharma.

102.0. However, two questions arise. First, does this understanding correspond to the original meaning of the verse, i.e., to what the verse was intended to convey by the Indian author(s) of the text? Second, if this question can be answered in the affirmative or if we take it for granted that at least the translator, the Indian master Buddhābhaddra, understood the verse in this way: what are we entitled to conclude, in the Indian context, from the statement that the 'fields' preach?

102.1. a) As for the first question, caution is called for, because when comparing Buddhābhaddra's translation of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* with other translations (i.e., translations of single chapters apart, Śikṣānanda's Chinese version and the Tibetan translation) or, if available, the Sanskrit original, one is, especially in the case of verses, frequently confronted with serious disagreements and sometimes misunderstandings,<sup>546</sup> a fact not exactly surprising in view of the terseness of the style and the specific ambiguities of Buddhist Sanskrit. To

---

<sup>546</sup> As an example, let me adduce a passage quoted by Fa-tsang 法藏 (T 35.1733: 363b19-21) as scriptural basis for the principle of mutual conditioning (緣起相由), viz., Buddhābhaddra's rendering of DBhS VIII, final *gāthā* 15cd: "The bodhisattvas have free command over the assemblage of causes and conditions, to the extent that they can manifest physical appearances of Buddhas at will" (BAvB 567a20-21: 菩薩於因緣和合中自在乃至能隨意爲現於佛身, practically identical with Kumārajīva's translation [T 10.286: 523c10-13]). The Sanskrit is given in DBhS K 151,12-13 as *vaśīpratyayāśrayajinātmānāśrayāṃś ca | darśenti te sugatakāyavibhūṣitāṅgān* ||. In accordance with the corresponding prose section (DBhS K 141,3-6), Tibetan (BAvT P li 134a3) and Śikṣānanda (BAvS 201b28), this should be slightly emended and re-organized to *vaśīpratyayāśraya jinātmaja-āśrayāṃś ca | darśenti te sugatakāya vibhūṣitāṅgān* ||, and translated as "They (= the bodhisattvas of the eighth stage) manifest bodies of [self-]controlled [persons] (i.e., śrāvaka-arhats, cf. BHSD 474a) and [persons awakened by a particular] cause (i.e., pratyekabuddhas, cf. BHSD 375b), as well as bodies of bodhisattvas [and] Sugatas (= Tathāgatas), their limbs adorned." Thus, in this case, the translation given by Kumārajīva and Buddhābhaddra is entirely misleading (perhaps due to a corrupt ms. reading something like \**vaśī pratyayācaya jinātmaja, āśayāc ca darśenti te sugatakāya ...?*).



be sure, in the case of the verse under discussion, Śikṣānanda's rendering<sup>547</sup> substantially agrees with Buddhahadbra's, apart from omitting the reference to the bodhisattvas' preaching. But the Tibetan translation<sup>548</sup> is, in addition, somewhat ambiguous as regards the syntactical relation between the Buddhas, etc., and the act of preaching or expounding.

b) Fortunately, the original wording of the verse has been preserved in a fragmentary manuscript of the last third (from vs. 78d onward) of the verse portion of the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa* kept in St. Petersburg and catalogued by MIRONOV. According to MIRONOV's faithful reproduction of the manuscript text (ms. verso line 4bc), the verse reads thus:<sup>549</sup>

*buddhānām ca nirdeśam satvanirdeśa kṣetranirdeśam |*  
*buddhānām ca nirdeśam vividham jānanti te ca vaimātram || 19*

The verse is, like the other verses of the preserved portion of the text, in the metre *gīti*, but the 2<sup>nd</sup> *gaṇa* in both lines (---, one mora too many) and the 4<sup>th</sup> *gaṇa* in the first line (---, one mora missing) are

<sup>547</sup> BAvŚ 262a3-4 (once again with the proviso that Hui-chung's and Ch'eng-kuan's understanding of the purport of the verse is correct): "Buddhas preach, sentient beings preach, and lands preach too. [They] preach thus in [all] the three times. [The bodhisattvas] completely know [these] various [preachings]" (佛說眾生說及以國土說三世如是說種種悉了知; cf. CL. 969). DOI's (1982: 113 n.) critical remark on BAvŚ ("... übersetzt die Stelle platt und banal wie folgt: Buddhas predigen ... mit den Ländern") is off the mark because it is based on a misunderstanding of 及以, which does not mean "mit" (i.e., "with, by means of") but simply "and"; see KARASHIMA 2001: 124; for BAvŚ cf., e.g., 198c7 (A 及以 B) = DBhS K 132,10 (A B ca); 205a21-22 (A 及以 B) = DBhS K 178,8-9 (A B ca); 207c9 (A B 及以 C) = DBhS K 193,12-13 (A,B,C).

<sup>548</sup> BAvT D ga 75a1-2 (P shi 75a6-7; S nga 102a3-4): "The detailed (*shin tu* = \**nir*-) exposition of the Buddhas and the exposition of sentient beings, and likewise the exposition of the 'fields', the detailed exposition of the three times: [all] this manifold exposition they (= the bodhisattvas) also understand [in] all aspects" (*sangs rgyas shin tu bstan pa dang | sems can bstan dang de bzhin zhing mams bstan pa dang | dus rnamshin tu bstan pa dang | bstan pa sna tshogs rnam pa kun kyang shes ||*).

<sup>549</sup> MIRONOV 1914: 332 (no. 422). Cf. ŌTAKE 2007: 89.

faulty. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> *gaṇa*, the metre can easily be restored by reading °*na* (/°*nā*) for °*nām* (cf. °*nirdeśa* *kṣetra*° for *nirdeśam kṣetra*° in the 5<sup>th</sup>–6<sup>th</sup> *gaṇa* of the first line, where *kṣ* does not make position), and *satva*° in the 4<sup>th</sup> *gaṇa* of the first line may perhaps be read as *satt<sup>va</sup>*° (—~), with geminate and split-vowel,<sup>550</sup> or with doubling of the following consonant (*sattvannir*°).<sup>551</sup> In addition, *buddhānām* in the second line is repetitive and, in view of Ch. 卐 and Tib. *duṣ rnam*s, surely a corruption of *adhvāna* (/°*nā*).<sup>552</sup> The fully written verse number would of course be 119.<sup>553</sup> With the proposed emendations, the verse would read thus:

*buddhāna ca nirdeśam sattvannirdeśa kṣetranirdeśam |*  
*adhvāna ca nirdeśam vividham jānanti te ca vaimātram || 119*

My translation:

“They (sc. the bodhisattvas) also know the manifold, varied<sup>554</sup> exposition of the Buddhas, of sentient beings, of the ‘fields’ and of the [three] times.”

c) I have rendered *nirdeśa* by “exposition”, because in Buddhist texts the expression usually refers to a more or less detailed explanation of a subject, or several subjects (sometimes contrasted with *uddeśa* as their mere enumeration). This is not incompatible with “preaching” if preaching is understood as a detailed explanation of the Dharma. The crucial problem with the verse is rather the one already indicated in connection with the Tibetan translation, viz., the syntactical relation between the Buddhas, etc., and the exposition (i.e., the act of expounding), in other words: the function of the genitives (or virtual genitives in the compounds). Presupposing that all of them are syntactically parallel: are they to be taken as subjective genitives,

<sup>550</sup> Cf. OBERLIES 2001: 112–113 (# 21).

<sup>551</sup> Cf. BHS# 2.80.

<sup>552</sup> Cf. BHS# 17.20 and 8.117–119.

<sup>553</sup> The ms. omits the sign for one hundred throughout, except for the last verse (121).

<sup>554</sup> For *vaimātra* used as an adjective see BHSD s.v.

as we would obviously have to take them if we follow Buddhābhaddra's or Śikṣānanda's version, at least if interpreted in line with Hui-chung's and Ch'eng-kuan's utilization of the passage? Or should we rather understand them as objective genitives?<sup>555</sup> In the latter case, the verse would probably mean that the bodhisattvas know how to elucidate or describe, in many ways, the Buddhas, [other] sentient beings, the 'fields' and the three times (i.e., all beings and all dimensions of space and time). This would seem to make excellent sense, and to my mind sounds more natural than the idea that the bodhisattvas know (i.e., understand, or can hear?) the exposition of the Dharma by the Buddhas, [other] sentient beings, the 'fields' and the three times. For we may, to be sure, interpret the last item as referring not to the three times themselves but to the Buddhas, etc., in the three times as the agents of preaching. But if the verse were intended to enumerate the possible agents of preaching, one would surely expect special mention to be made of bodhisattvas since they are by far the most frequent agents of preaching in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*.<sup>556</sup> Unfortunately, as far as I can see, the closer context of the *Samantabhadra-caryā-nirdeśa* offers no help in deciding the matter. The surrounding

---

<sup>555</sup> Both constructions are possible. E.g., in the sūtra titles *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* or *Akṣayamati-nirdeśa*, the first member of the compound would seem to denote the subject presenting the exposition (cf. Tib. *Dri ma med par grags paṣ bstan pa* and *Blo gros mi zad paṣ bstan pa*; similarly Kumārajīva 維摩詰所說經, but Hsüan-tsang: 說無垢稱經); in the titles *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa* (cf. fn. 542) or *Sarva-dharmāpravṛtti-nirdeśa*, on the other hand, the first member is clearly the object of exposition.

<sup>556</sup> In view of the metre, the absence of an equivalent to Buddhābhaddra's reference to the preaching of bodhisattvas in the original Sanskrit cannot be secondary. On the other hand, the fact that in the BAv it is mostly *bodhisattvas* who expound the Dharma may well have been a strong motive for Buddhābhaddra to add an apposite reference to them in his translation if he indeed considered the verse to list the agents of preaching. Still, in the case of the alternative interpretation, too, an enumeration of bodhisattvas as a separate category would make sense as well. To be sure, here the motive for adding it may appear less strong than in the other case, but in fact a corresponding item appears in both Buddhābhaddra's and Śikṣānanda's translation of Gv 104,10-16 (see fn. 557).

verses, too, are concerned with aspects of the knowledge or understanding of bodhisattvas, but I for one cannot recognize a systematic connection between these aspects, or a logical principle of their sequence, that would help us to determine the precise meaning of the verse under discussion.

d) There is, however, a passage in the *Gaṇḍavyūha* that strongly supports taking the genitives (and first members of the compounds) in the sense of objective genitives. In this text,<sup>557</sup> the monk Indriyeśvara instructs Sudhana in a method of counting, or knowledge (*jñāna*), employed by bodhisattvas when enouncing (*nirdeśa*) one after the other the names of the [ever remoter] world-systems (*lokadhātu* ≈ *kṣetra*) in the ten directions, of the aeons (*kalpa*, i.e., the temporal dimension and thus corresponding to *adhvan*), of the Buddhas, of their teachings (*dharma*), of the [classes of??] sentient beings (*sattva*) [they instruct?], and of [their salvific?] activities (*karman*). In view of the striking coincidence of most aspects addressed in this passage as objects of *nirdeśa* with those mentioned in the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa* verse under discussion it seems justified to understand the original purport of the latter in line with this *Gaṇḍavyūha* passage, i.e., to take the genitives (and the first members of the compounds) in the sense of objective genitives. The original meaning of the verse would thus have been that the bodhisattvas know how to enumerate the names of countless Buddhas, the sentient beings [converted or trained by them], their Buddha-fields and the aeons of the past, present and future [in which those Buddhas were, are or will be active]. I wonder whether Buddhābhaddra's translation, and perhaps even Śikṣānanda's,

---

<sup>557</sup> Gv 104,10-16 (BAvB 704c17-20; BAvŚ 351a14-19): *eṣa ... gaṇanānayo daśasu dikṣu lokadhātu-nāma-paramparā-nirdeśeṣu pravartate bodhisattvānām | anena gaṇanānayaena bodhisattvā daśasu dikṣu lokadhātu-nāma-paramparām gaṇayanti | yathā lokadhātu-nāma-paramparā-nirdeśeṣu, evaṃ ... kalpa-nāma-paramparā-nirdeśeṣu buddha-nāma-paramparā-nirdeśeṣu dharma-nāma-paramparā-nirdeśeṣu sattva-nāma-paramparā-nirdeśeṣu karma-nāma-paramparā-nirdeśeṣu | ... etam ahaṃ ... bodhisattva-jñānālokaṃ jñāmi* | Cf. perhaps also Gv 376,21-22 (vs. 45), where it is stated that high-level bodhisattvas reflect without hindrance on the number of all [Buddha-]fields, *kalpas*, teachings (*dharma*) and Buddhas.

might not originally have been intended to convey exactly this meaning as well.<sup>558</sup>

**102.2.** But even if we adopt Hui-chung's and Ch'eng-kuan's understanding of Buddhābhadrā's (and Śikṣānanda's) interpretation of the genitives as subjective genitives, we are still left with the second question, viz., the question of what we are, in the *Indic* context, entitled to conclude from the statement that even the 'fields' expound the Dharma. Does such an idea receive some confirmation from other passages of the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa*, or at least from other texts belonging to the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* collection? As we shall see, there are indeed passages in which elements of the environment are declared to emit sounds of preaching. Even so, the crucial question in the context of the present study is whether we are justified to assume that this was considered, by the Indian masters, to be a conscious activity, i.e., to imply the idea that these elements of the environment, and especially plants, are sentient or even saintly beings. An exhaustive investigation of this question would, however, by far exceed the limits of the present investigation. The *Buddhāvataṃsaka*<sup>559</sup> is a huge collection of various texts stemming, it seems, somehow from a common ambience, but composed and amplified over some time<sup>560</sup> and thus by no means entirely homogeneous. Therefore a comprehensive utilization of the whole text, which would do justice to different strands of thought and historical developments, would require much more time than is available to me in the context of this study. Besides, many verses of the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa* pose seri-

---

<sup>558</sup> I.e., if 佛, etc., in 佛說, etc., were originally not meant to denote the grammatical subject of the verb 說 but were used adverbially ("exposition with reference to the Buddhas", etc.).

<sup>559</sup> For the Sanskrit title of the sūtra, see ŌTAKE 2007: 87–89.

<sup>560</sup> For examples see VETTER 2004: 75–76 (Gv); NATTIER 2005 and 2007; ŌTAKE 2007: 95–105. Though the question whether the collection as a whole was compiled in India or rather in an Indianized ambience in Central Asia is controversial (cf. HAMAR 2007b: 142; ŌTAKE 2007: 92–95), at least a number of important texts of the collection (like DBhS, Gv or TUSN) are doubtless of Indian origin.

ous problems and would require a separate in-depth study on the basis of all transmitted versions,<sup>561</sup> including the Sanskrit fragment, which still awaits full publication and critical editing;<sup>562</sup> MIRONOV's catalogue reproduces only the first five and the last three verses of the fragment. Thus, all I can offer for the time being is a very provisional discussion of the question of what the preaching of elements of the environment may have been considered to imply in the *Samantabhadracaryānirdeśa* and other texts of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* in which similar ideas are expressed.

103. For this purpose, I should like to start from the short explanatory remark which Ch'eng-kuan (澄觀) makes in his commentary on the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* on the phrase that the 'fields' also preach,<sup>563</sup> using it as a kind of heuristic tool. As I am going to show, even the explanations given by this representative of systematized Hua-yen draw on conceptions that are basically Indian.

104. According to Ch'eng-kuan's commentary, the phrase that the 'fields' preach admits, briefly, of three (not necessarily mutually exclusive) explanations: It may be understood as referring to

1. the unimpeded miraculous, supranormal power (通力) [of the Buddhas or advanced bodhisattvas],

---

<sup>561</sup> Contrary to *HôbRép* 38–39, T 10.293 ch. 40, T 10.296 and T 10.297 have nothing to do with the *Samantabhadracaryānirdeśa* but correspond to the *Samantabhadracaryāpranidhāna* (Gv 428–436).

<sup>562</sup> Though the handwriting of the ms. is quite clear, the fragment (1 folio) is damaged on the left side, resulting in a loss of about two pādas in every third verse. In addition, there are, as in the verse discussed in § 102.1b, some more or less obvious textual corruptions. But the main problem consists in the terse style of the verses and the morphological and syntactical ambiguities of Buddhist Sanskrit, on account of which quite a few verses remain, at least for me, quite enigmatic. Fortunately, most of them seem to be irrelevant for the present study. For an example illustrating the difficulties, see § 107.2.3.

<sup>563</sup> On the biography of Ch'eng-kuan, see HAMAR 2002; on his commentary on the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* (the *Hua-yen-ching shu* 華嚴經疏: T 35.1735, written 784–787), *ibid.* 50–53.

2. [universal] pervasion or interpenetration (融通), implying that if one [element of the universe, e.g., the Buddha,] preaches, everything preaches, and
3. the manifestation of the principle (顯理), in the sense that bodhisattvas, by merely coming into contact with an object, understand [the truth] clearly and completely, so that contact with things functions as teaching, as in the case of the fragrant food [in the realm of the Tathāgata Gandhottamakūṭa].<sup>564</sup>

### 2.4.1. First Explanation

105. 1. Ch'eng-kuan's first explanation suggests, at first glance at least, a situation similar to that of the passages discussed in ch. 2.1 and ch. 2.3: Though preaching is, in the first place, the function of the omniscient Buddhas and next-to-omniscient high-level bodhisattvas, they may, through their miraculous spiritual power or influence (*anubhāva*, *adhiṣṭhāna*), not only inspire other persons,<sup>565</sup> especially (less advanced?) bodhisattvas,<sup>566</sup> to expound the Dharma but even cause

---

<sup>564</sup> T 35.1735: 871c7-10: 刹說等者，略有三。一 約通力。二 約融通，一說一切說故。三 約顯理。是說菩薩觸境皆了知故。則觸類成教 如香飯等。

<sup>565</sup> Like Māra in the passage discussed in ch. 2.1, or all kinds of deities and spirits in the initial chapter of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*: BAvB 397b20-22, c24-25, etc., up to 403c16-17, corresponding to BAvŚ 5c19-21, etc., up to 21b2-3, and BAvT P yi 14b6-7, etc., up to 58a8-b1 (*sangs rgyas kyi mthus = \*buddhānubhāvena*).

<sup>566</sup> Cf., e.g., Gv 17,13-14, 18,5-6, etc. In the initial chapters of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, it is only in the later translations that the bodhisattvas who speak after the deities and spirits also do so under the influence or inspiration of the Buddha: see BAvŚ 21c18-20, etc., ≈ BAvT P yi 59a8-b2, etc. (*sangs rgyas kyi mthus*), and BAvŚ 31a6-7, etc., ≈ BAvT P yi 87a4-5, etc. (*sangs rgyas kyi byin kyi rlabs kyis = \*buddhādhiṣṭhānena*). In Buddhābhaddra's version, however, the reference to the Buddha's power or inspiration is, in this part of the text, missing in the case of the bodhisattvas as speakers (see BAvB 404a18-19, etc., and 408a19, etc.). In other chapters, however, in Buddhābhaddra's version, too, the bodhisattvas presenting stanzas are stated to be inspired by the Buddha (cf., e.g., BAvB 463c10-11, etc., 485c1, etc., and also the portion corresponding to Gv 17,13-14, etc., viz., 680c11-12, etc.).

insentient things like offerings,<sup>567</sup> rays of light,<sup>568</sup> or a tree,<sup>569</sup> and why not a whole Buddha-field, to do so.

2. Actually, at least in Śikṣānanda and in the Tibetan translation of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, such a statement can indeed be found:

“Through the spiritual power of the Buddha(s) (*\*buddhānu-bhāvena*) and through the natural effect (*\*dharmatāprati-*

---

<sup>567</sup> BAvB 405b5-6: “Then, a spontaneous sound arising from (lit.: in) all these offerings through the spiritual power of the bodhisattvas proclaimed [the following] verses: ...” (時諸菩薩神力故 一切供養具中 出自然音 而說偈言。...), ≈ BAvŚ 26b7-8 and BAvT P yi 72a5-6 (*de nas byang chub sems dpa' de dag gi byin gyi rlabs kyis mchod pa'i dkyil 'khor gyi sprin de dag la tshigs su bcad pa 'di dag byung ngo*).

<sup>568</sup> DBhS R 79,32–80,1 (K 163,15): *ākāṅkṣan raśmimukhopasamhārair dharmamukhāni niścārayati*. Cf. also BAvŚ 26c11-12 (以佛神力 其光 於彼一切菩薩眾會之前 而說頌言; CL. 152), ≈ BAvT P yi 73a8–b1 (*'od gzer de dag thams cad kyi sgo nas kyang sangs rgyas kyi byin gyis rlabs kyis tshigs su bcad pa 'di dag byung bar gyur tol*); the corresponding passage BAvB 405c5-6 is syntactically ambiguous). At DBhS R 8,16–9,9 (K 12,2–13,6), rays of light emanating from the Buddhas form a palace in the air, from which sound in the form of a hymn issues due to the miraculous power (*anubhāva*) of the Buddha. The idea that the light spreading from the body of a Buddha or bodhisattva may emit sounds and expound the Dharma is explicitly confirmed by Fa-tsang (T 45.1871: 592c5-6 and 10-12, with reference to the 2<sup>nd</sup> chapter of BAvB).

<sup>569</sup> As in ch. 2.1. From the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, I can only adduce two passages from Śikṣānanda's translation, both referring to the bodhi tree: 1. BAvŚ 1c9-11 (CL. 55): “Also, by virtue of the awesome spiritual power of the Tathāgata, the bodhi tree continuously emitted wonderful sounds expounding various teachings” (又如來威神力故 其菩提樹 恒出妙音 說種種法). 2. 23c20-21: “By virtue of the Tathāgata's wholesome karma (*\*puṇya*) and miraculous powers, the ground [at the site of Awakening] and the bodhi tree alternately emit light and sounds expounding the Dharma” (如來福德神通力 ... 其地及以菩提樹 遞發光音而演說; cf. CL. 139; not in BAvB; BAvT P yi 65a5-6 differs). — In Gv 93,23 ff, it is reported that sounds praising the Buddhas and bodhisattvas and their achievements issued from trees (and other objects) on the occasion of the ascetic practices of a pious brahmin, but in this case there is no mention here of the Buddha's miraculous influence. At BAvŚ 41a23-24 (CL. 210; not in BAvB; BAvT P ka 108a3-4 differs), the (jewel-)trees (in Vairocana's Buddha field) are stated to emit delicate sounds, speaking of the great vows cultivated by all the Buddhas in all ages (其樹復出微妙音聲, 說諸如來 一切劫中 所修大願), most probably due to Vairocana's *adhiṣṭhāna* or *pūrva-praṇidhāna*, even though this is not expressly stated.



*lambha*) of the bodhisattva Samantabhadra's meditative concentration (*samādhi*), all the 'oceans' (= masses) of world-systems in the ten directions without exception trembled slightly, were now adorned with all kinds of precious substances, and resounded with the sound of all 'oceans' of teachings (*dharma*) (BAvŚ: ... each world-system ... emitted wondrous sounds proclaiming all teachings)."<sup>570</sup>

3. According to the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, a bodhisattva on the ninth stage may, if he wants to do so, make Dharma sounds issue from any physical appearance (*rūpāvabhāsa*) or musical instrument in the cosmos, or from every single minute particle of the four elements — earth, water, fire and wind — in countless world-systems.<sup>571</sup> Here, too,

<sup>570</sup> BAvT P yi 93b7–94a1 (D ka 86b7–87a1; S ka 120a6–b1): *sangs rgyas kyi mthu dang | byang chub sems dpa' kun tu bzang po'i ting nge 'dzin gyi chos nyid rab tu thob pas | phyogs bcu'i 'jig rten gyi kham rgya mtsho thams cad ma lus par bag langs pa* (DP : om. *pa S*) *tsam du g-yos te | rin po che thams cad kyis rab tu brgyan par gnas shing chos rgya mtsho thams cad kyi sgra yang shin tu grags* (D : *grag PS*) *par gyur* (DS : 'gyur P) *te |* BAvŚ 33c12-14: 爾時 十方一切世界海 以諸佛威神力 及普賢菩薩三昧力故 悉皆微動。——世界 眾寶莊嚴 及出妙音 演說諸法。BAvB 409a19-20 does not mention preaching. Cf. also BAvŚ 37a10-11 (菩薩無邊功德海 種種大願所莊嚴 此土俱時出妙音 普震十方諸刹網), which may be taken to mean that due to the virtues and resolves (*praṇidhāna*) of the bodhisattvas the respective lands emit a wonderful sound, which shakes all the Buddha-fields (*kṣetra*) of the ten directions (thus CL. 193: "These *lands* simultaneously produce sublime sound"). But this interpretation is not corroborated by BAvT P yi 103b3-4 (D ka 96b3-4; S ka 133a3-4), which suggests a locative: "The 'oceans' (= masses) of virtues of the bodhisattva(s), they all resound (= are celebrated) in the ocean[-like] 'fields'; the various 'clouds' (= masses) of adornments and resolves, they also emit sounds in the 'ocean' of the many 'fields'" (*byang chub sems dpa'i yon tan rgya mtsho rnams || de dag kun kyang rgya mtsho'i zhing na grag || sna tshogs rgyan dang smon lam sprin kyi* [P : *gyi DS*] *rnams || de dag zhing mang rgya mtshor sgra yang 'byin ||*). BAvB 411b9-10 basically confirms the Tibetan: "The sublime sound of (i.e., celebrating?) the 'ocean' of the countless virtues of the bodhisattvas fills all *kṣetras*; the sound of the 'clouds' of resolves by which they are entirely adorned shakes the 'oceans' of worlds in the ten directions" (菩薩無量功德海 妙聲遍滿一切刹 諸誓願雲具莊嚴 聲震十方世界海).

<sup>571</sup> DBhS R 80,1-10 (VIII.Z; K 164,1-7): (a) *ākāṅkṣan yāvat trisāhasramahāsāha-srāyām lokadhātau rūpāvabhāsās tebhyaḥ sarvarūpāvabhāsebhyo dharmarutāni*

it is clearly the miraculous spiritual power of the bodhisattva that makes insentient things preach.<sup>572</sup>

4. Likewise, the *Gaṇḍavyūha* is unambiguous in stating that a decisive cause of Sudhana's experiences in Maitreya's palace, which include hearing preaching sounds issuing from various kinds of insentient objects (see § 58), is Maitreya's miraculous influence (*adhiṣṭhāna*).<sup>573</sup>

5. It is, by the way, in such a literal sense of *verbal* preaching under the influence of the Buddhas that the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa* verse under discussion (see § 101) is interpreted in Fa-tsang's (法藏, 643–712) *Hua-yen-ching chih-kuei* 華嚴經旨歸 (“Purport of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*”).<sup>574</sup> As has already been pointed out (ch. 2.1), at

---

*niścārayati* | ... (b) *ākāṅkṣan sarvalokadhātuparyāpannebhya gītavādyatūryaśabdebhya dharmarutaṃ niścārayati* | ... (c) *ākāṅkṣan anabhilāpyānabhilāpyalokadhātuparyantataḥ prthivyaptejovāyuskandhebhyaḥ ... ekaikaparamānurajo 'nabhilāpyāni dharmamukhāni niścārayati* | The sentences b and c are missing in the oldest Chinese translations (by Dharmarakṣa [cf. T 10.285: 487c25], Kumārajīva [cf. T 10.286: 526a23] and Buddhahadra [cf. BAvB 569b22]), appearing only from Bodhiruci's (active from 508 until ca. 535) translation of the sūtra text with Vasubandhu's commentary onward (T 26.1522: 192c4-8; cf. also BAvŚ 203b22-27 and T 10.287: 565b20-24) and in Tibetan (BAvT S ga 176a7–b2; DBhST S ga 122b6–123a1). The syntax of c seems somewhat puzzling. Instead of °*aparyantataḥ pr*°, ms. B (52a3b: MATSUDA 1996: 95; ms. A is lacunary here) reads °*aparyantapr*°. If the reading °*rajo* is kept, *niścārayati* in c must be a double causative (“he makes each single mote emit teachings”), and °*skandhebhya* would have to be taken as a partitive ablative. Otherwise I would expect °*rajaso* (abl.: “he makes teachings come out from each single mote”), as is in fact suggested by DBhST *rdul phra rab kyi rdul re re las* and BAvT *rdul shin tu phra ba re re las*; ms. B has °*raja* at the end of fol. 52a3c, with a visarga added in the margin, and continues with *nabhi*° in line 4a (°*jana*° < °*jasona*°?).

<sup>572</sup> Cf. T 35.1735: 833b27-28, stating that the DBhS passage illustrates [the bodhisattva's] autonomous power to arouse preaching (明起說自在).

<sup>573</sup> Gv 408,15 (*Maitreyasya bodhisattvasya adhiṣṭhānabalena*); 414,25; 415,8, 12 and 24-25 (read °*praveśena* for °*pradeśena*?); cf. also 415,26 and 30, 416,2-3 (*kalyāṇamitrādhīṣṭhānena kalyāṇamitrāprabhāvena*), etc.

<sup>574</sup> T 45.1871: 592c16-17: 十, 以一切法中 皆出聲說法故。普賢行品頌云: 佛說菩薩說 刹說眾生說 三世一切說。This tenth item is just the totality of the preceding

least in the Indian context this kind of explanation can hardly be taken to imply that the preaching objects possess sentience or are saintly beings in their own right.

#### 2.4.2. Second Explanation

106. The second explanation is commented upon by Ch'eng-kuan himself in his subcommentary:<sup>575</sup>

“‘Interpenetration’ means: one [particle of] dust<sup>576</sup> indeed comprises everything. How could [anything] in the ‘field’ (i.e., environment) be without preaching?”<sup>577</sup>

107.1. 1. In the texts included in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* that are completely available in the original Sanskrit, i.e., the *Daśabhūmika*- and the *Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra*, pervasion or interpenetration occurs, mostly if not always, in the context of *visions* or miraculous *displays*, primarily such as are obtained or enacted by advanced bodhisattvas. Advanced bodhisattvas, and indeed Buddhas, may not only, e.g., perceive or manifest themselves simultaneously in countless worlds,<sup>578</sup> or

---

nine items, viz., 1.-3. the Buddhas themselves preach through their mouths, their hair-pores or light issuing from them, 4.-6. they make bodhisattvas preach in the same three ways, 7. they make ‘oceans’ (= masses) of *fields emit sound* and expound the Dharma (七, 令諸刹海 出聲說法), 8. they make ordinary sentient beings preach, and 9. they preach by means of sounds of the three times.

<sup>575</sup> On Ch'eng-kuan's BAv subcommentary (the *Hua-yen-ching sui-shu yen-i ch'ao* 華嚴經隨疏演義: T 36.1736), recorded by his disciples, see HAMAR 1998b: 333; cf. also 2002: 62.

<sup>576</sup> For minute particles of dust (atoms) to be understood as parts of the ‘container world’ (environment) see T 35.1735: 506b18-19 with T 36.1736: 33b16-18.

<sup>577</sup> T 36.1736: 614b29-c1: 言融通者, 一塵即攝一切。何得刹中無說。

<sup>578</sup> Cf., e.g., Gv 6,2-3 (Tathāgatas suffusing all Buddha-fields with clouds of miraculously created [bodies] as many as the atoms of all world-systems, issuing from a single hair-tip); 32,18-25 (cf. GÓMEZ 1967: 14 and 38); 267,1-2 (of bodhisattvas: *sarvabuddhakṣetra-kāyajāla-spharaṇa*, i.e., “filling all Buddha-fields with multitudes of [their] bodies”); 369,4-11; 410,17-20 and 29-30; DBhS K 192,12-13 (R 91,5-7). This miraculous display of self-multiplication ultimately goes back to the description of supranormal capacities, deriving from the fourth *dhyāna*, in the early canonical texts (*eko hutvā bahudhā hoti*: e.g., DN I 78,1-2; cf., e.g., FRAUWALLNER

pervade the universe with a single body.<sup>579</sup> They may also abide in a state where one aeon enters into all aeons and all into one (or all the [three] times into one moment)<sup>580</sup>, where one Buddha-field becomes inseparable from all Buddha-fields and all from one, where one sentient being is no longer different from all sentient beings and all from one,<sup>581</sup> and where one Buddha is in union (*advaya*) with all Buddhas

---

1953: 180; SCHLINGLOFF 1962: 62); cf. also the reference to these miraculous capacities of the śrāvakas at Śikṣ 345,13-16, being a quotation of the BAv (BAvT D ka 233b7-234a1 ≈ BAvB 439a29-b5.4 ≈ BAvŚ 78b28-c3 [CL. 359]). In the case of the Buddha, considerably extended forms of self-multiplication are also found in mainstream sources like Divy 100,10-26 and 257,30-258,4 (cf. SCHLINGLOFF 1963: 53, with 126,2-3), and the connection with the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* is obvious even on the terminological level in that the *Divyāvadāna* uses, for the miraculously produced multiplication of the Buddha, the expression *buddhāvataṃsaka* (cf. also ŌTAKE 2007: 89-90).

<sup>579</sup> E.g., Gv 5,29-30: “Incomprehensible is the miraculous activity by which the Tathāgatas pervade the whole universe with one single body” (*acintyaṃ tathāgata-sarva-lokadhātū-eka-kāya-spharaṇa-vikurvitaṃ*); 186,5-7 (vs.): “The Buddha’s body is incomprehensible and so vast that (*yena*) it completely pervades the universe (cf. fn. 868), and [thus] it is equally seen everywhere ...” (*buddhakāyū vipulā acintīyo dharmadhātū phari yen’ aśeṣato | so ca dṛśyati samantataḥ samam* ...); 31,14 (bodhisattvas qualified as “pervading all the expanses of ‘fields’ with one body” (*sarva-kṣetra-prasaraṇa-kāya-spharaṇa*)). On the meaning of *vikurvita* compared with that of *adhiṣṭhāna* see TAGUCHI 1997: 39 (r1°84), on the spectrum of *vikurvita* activities ibid. 27 (r1°96), referring to KAJIYAMA Yuichi 梶山雄一: “Jinben” 神変, in *Bukkyō daigaku sōgō kenkyūjo kiyō* 仏教大学総合研究所紀要 2 (1995), which is unfortunately not available to me.

<sup>580</sup> Gv 370,18: *ye te sarvādhvaikakṣaṇa-praveśa-vihāra-vihāriṇaḥ* (text *sarvārīṇai°*, but BAvT D a 292b6 *dus thams cad*); 376,15-16.

<sup>581</sup> Cf. also Gv 138,30: highly advanced bodhisattvas “have attained a meditative concentration in which their own body and the bodies of [all] sentient beings are no longer separated<sup>a</sup>” (*svakāya-sattva<sup>b</sup> kāyāsambheda-samādhi-pratilabdhanām* (sc. *bodhisattvānām*)).

<sup>a</sup> Thus with ed., Tib. *tha mi dad pa* and BAvŚ 360b27 無分別, against BAvB 712c2 where the negation is lacking. Cf. also the use of *asambheda* in Gv 370,16 (see fn. 582).

<sup>b</sup> Ed. °*sarva°*, but BAvT D a 45b1 *sems can* and BAvŚ 眾生; BAvB 一切眾生 (“all sentient beings”) is ambiguous.

and all with one.<sup>582</sup> Bodhisattvas of the highest level may even make a whole world-system, nay, an infinite amount of world-systems, enter into, or appear in, a single mote<sup>583</sup>,<sup>584</sup> or the sentient beings of countless world-systems into one world-system, and vice-versa.<sup>585</sup>

2. According to a passage in the eighth chapter of the *Daśa-bhūmika-sūtra*, a bodhisattva of the eighth level, aware of the varying mental dispositions of sentient beings, may at will make use of his miraculous power (*adhitiṣṭhātī*) to transform his body into the body of any sentient being (*sattvakāya*),<sup>586</sup> [i.e.] the karma-produced body of

<sup>582</sup> Gv 370,15-18: *ye te ekakalpa-sarvakalpa-sarvakalpaikakalpānupraveśa-vihāra-vihāriṇaḥ, ye te ekakṣetra-sarva(kṣetra-sarva)kṣetraīkakṣetrāsambheda-vihāra-vihāriṇaḥ, ... ye te ekasattva-sarva(sattva-sarva)sattvaīkasattvānānātva-vihāra-vihāriṇaḥ, ye te ekabuddha-sarvabuddha-sarvabuddhaīkabuddhādvaya-vihāra-vihāriṇaḥ, ...* (emendations confirmed by Tib. [BAvT D a 292b4-5]; cf. also VETTER 2004: 73).

<sup>583</sup> *paramānuraḥas*, lit. “extremely minute [particle of] dust”, Tib. *rdul phran*, Ch. 微塵, often rendered as “atom”, which is indeed the meaning of *paramāṇu* in Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist systematical treatises.

<sup>584</sup> R 90,26-28 (X.I; cf. DBhS K 192,2-3; cf. fn. 528): *sa<sup>1</sup> ākāṅkṣann ekasmin paramānuraḥasy ekām<sup>2</sup> api lokadhātum sarvāvatīm<sup>3</sup> ... adhitiṣṭhātī, tac ca paramānuraḥo na vardhayati ... dve api<sup>4</sup> tisro 'pi<sup>5</sup> ... yāvad anabhilāpyā api lokadhātū<sup>6</sup> ekasmin paramānuraḥasi ... adhitiṣṭhātī | ...*

<sup>1</sup> *sa* K : om. R; <sup>2</sup> *ekam* K; <sup>3</sup> *°vantam* K; <sup>4</sup> *dve api* K ms. T : *dvāv api* K : *dve 'pi* R; <sup>5</sup> *trīṇ api* K; <sup>6</sup> *anabhilāpyānabhilāpya-lokadhātūnn* (sic!) K. Both ms. A and ms. B lack the respective folio.

<sup>585</sup> DBhS R 90,33–91,3 (X.I; cf. K 192,8-10): *ākāṅkṣan yāvad anabhilāpyāsu<sup>1</sup> lokadhātuṣu yaḥ sattvadhātus tam ekasyām<sup>2</sup> lokadhātāu saṁdadhātī<sup>3</sup>, na ca satvān viheṭhayati | ākāṅkṣann ekasyām<sup>2</sup> lokadhātāu yāvān<sup>4</sup> sattvadhātus tam anabhilāpyāsu<sup>1</sup> lokadhātuṣu saṁdadhātī<sup>3</sup> ... |*

<sup>1</sup> *°pyeṣu* K; <sup>2</sup> *ekasmiḥ* K (for *ekasmiḥ*); <sup>3</sup> *saṁdadhātī* = Tib. *sdud* : *saṁdarśayati* K; <sup>4</sup> *yāvat* K.

<sup>586</sup> It is tempting to take *sattva*, contrasting with *kṣetra*, as comprising sentient beings in the broadest sense, including the various categories of saints, but the text's own definition of *sattvakāya* (DBhS R 69,20-22) seems to presuppose a restricted concept of *sattva* in the sense of ordinary, saṁsāric sentient beings. The category of *sattvakāya* would thus more or less coincide with the category of

any ordinary, saṃsāric being, but also into the body of a Hīnayāna disciple (*śrāvaka*), a pratyekabuddha, a bodhisattva or a Buddha, or into (a part of?)<sup>587</sup> the environment (*kṣetrakāya*),<sup>588</sup> or even into empty space (*ākāśakāya*), and vice versa.<sup>589</sup>

*karmavipākakāya*, and the enumeration of the bodies of the different categories of saints would be an extension.

<sup>587</sup> Cf. MPSDh 495b16-21: The Tathāgata is not deceitful (非幻, i.e., does not deceive people with jugglery), but is not unable to produce illusions either (非非幻) because he is able to miraculously transform his body in many ways, which includes becoming a town, a village, a house, a mountain, a river, or a tree (或爲城邑聚落舍宅山川樹木. Cf. 494a12-14, where the same things are said to be conjured up by a juggler).

<sup>588</sup> The precise function of the element *kāya* in this compound is not quite clear to me. The compound may mean “a mass of ‘fields’”, but in the present context “a ‘field’ (or something forming part of it?) as a body (or: body-like structure)” would seem to fit better (cf. ARAMAKI<sup>3</sup> 1978: 254,6: 国土の本性ある身体, i.e., a body that has the nature of a land/world). This is, at any rate, how the Hua-yen exegetes seem to understand the compound when they identify ‘field’ and ‘field’-body (e.g., T 36.1736: 94b12-13: 刹土 即國土身). Fa-tsang (T 35.1733: 132c13 and 1734: 498b17-18) takes BAvB 439b9 (或作河池井泉水) as indicating the *kṣetrakāya*, i.e., takes the line to mean that bodhisattvas may act as (i.e., deliberately adopt the form of) rivers, ponds, wells, or springs. Yet, in BAvŚ (78c6-8) and BAvT (D ka 234a2-3) the passage is merely part of a comparison: Just as the sun and the moon are reflected in the water of rivers, etc., so physical appearances of the bodhisattvas appear everywhere. This interpretation is confirmed by the Sanskrit original quoted Śikṣ 345,17-18 (where I suggest *candrama-sūrya* for *candra sa sūrya*).

<sup>589</sup> DBhS K 141,11-16 (cf. R 69,14-18 [VIII.N]): *sa sattvānām cittāśayābhinirhāram ājñāya ... ākāṅkṣan* (R : °*mṅkṣam* K) *sattvakāyaṃ svakāyaṃ adhiṭṭhanti | evaṃ kṣetrakāyaṃ karmavipākakāyaṃ śrāvakakāyaṃ pratyekabuddhakāyaṃ bodhisattvakāyaṃ tathāgatakāyaṃ ... ākāśakāyaṃ ātmakāyaṃ adhiṭṭhanti* |, and vice-versa. The vice-versa portion (K 141,13 f: ... *svakāyaṃ sattvakāyaṃ* ...) is missing in R, and not extended to *kṣetrakāya*, etc., in K, where we find the transformation of *kṣetrakāya*, etc., into *sattvakāya* instead (as in Bodhiruci’s version: T 26.1522: 182c20-26). But cf. the separate translation of DBhS into Tibetan (DBhST S ga 110a1-3) as well as T 10.287: 560c23–561a1 (Śīladharma). Another, more complex version is found in T 10.286: 522a9-16 (Kumārajīva) = BAvB 565b19-26 (Buddhabhadra), slightly supplemented in BAvŚ 200a22-27 (Śikṣānanda), and yet another one in BAvT P li 127b5–128a2 = S ga 160b5–161a3, partly agreeing with the ms. A (fol. 37b5-7) in MATSUDA 1996: 39. In most versions, it is anyway stated at the end of the passage that the bodhisattva may superimpose any body on any other: *yaṃ*

3. An example of bodhisattvas transforming themselves into elements of the environment can be found in another chapter of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*,<sup>590</sup> quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* under the title of *Ratnolkadhārāṇī*, where it is stated that in order to help others<sup>591</sup> bodhisattvas may become (shadowy) big trees in the jungle (wasteland), medicinal drugs, precious treasures, or wish-fulfilling gems or trees.<sup>592</sup>

107.2. Similar visions or displays are also referred to in other parts of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*,<sup>593</sup> including the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa*.

107.2.1. In the prose portion of this text, we read that bodhisattvas come to know ('jug pa, 入: \*ava-tī?) how, e.g., to stuff (*yang dag par*

---

*yam eva kāyaṃ yasmin kāye ākāṃkṣati taṃ tam eva kāyaṃ tasmin kāye {svakāyaṃ} adhiṭṭhāti* (DBhS K 141,16–142,1; delete *svakāyaṃ* in accordance with ms. A, Tib., and those Chinese versions in which the sentence is present, viz., Bodhiruci, Śikṣānanda and Śīladharma). Cf. also BAvB 649a22-29 (BAvŚ 295a25–b1; CL 1062; BAvT D ga 198b1-3; T 10.292: 634c18-24).

<sup>590</sup> Cf. J. W. DE JONG in *Indo-Iranian Journal* 23 (1981): 240.

<sup>591</sup> This is clear from the overall context, cf. Śikṣ 328,1: *satva vinenti upāya-sahasraiḥ*.

<sup>592</sup> Śikṣ 331,3-4 (cf. BAvB 435c21-22; BAvŚ 75a16-17; CL 344): *te aṭavīṣu mahādruma bhontī auṣadha akṣayaratnanidhānāḥ | cintamaṇi druma kāmadaḍṣ ca ... ||*.

<sup>593</sup> E.g., in the *Lokottara-parivarta*: [1.] BAvT S nga 263a4–b5 (D ga 197b1-7; BAvB 647c13-24; BAvŚ 293c26–294a7; T 10.292 [Dharmarakṣa, cf. HAMAR 2007b: 144]: 633b27–c7): ten kinds of miraculous activity (*rnam par 'phrul pa* = \*vikurvita) of bodhisattvas with regard to the 'field' (*kṣetra*), i.e., the environment, like making all 'fields' into one, or stuffing them into one pore of a hair; [2.] 264a7–265a1 (D 198a7–b6; BAvB 648a10-20; BAvŚ 294a20–b2; T 10.292: 633c19-27): ten kinds of miraculous activity of bodhisattvas with regard to the body, like making the bodies of all sentient beings enter, or appear in, the bodhisattva's own body; [3.] 268a6–269a4 (D 201a4–b6; BAvB 648c16–649a4; BAvŚ 294c24–295a10; T 10.292: 634b19–c4): ten kinds of *ṛddhivikurvita*, like stuffing countless worlds into one minute particle of dust; [4.] 270a3-4 (see § 97 with fn. 528). — Cf. also, e.g., the passages referred to in T 45.1871: 595a-b (esp. BAvB 412c7-8; 414b21; 423a1; 434c12-19; 447b2; 591c6-10; 601a1-14), or BAvB 450c18-23 and 451a20-21, quoted in ZACCHETTI 2000: 70 with n. 134.

*gzud pa*, 入) all worlds into one tip or pore of a hair or to expand or export (?) (*mngon par bsgrub pa*, 出: \**abhinir√hr*) a tip or pore of a hair into countless worlds, how to assemble or concentrate (*bsdu*, 入) the bodies of all sentient beings in the body of one sentient being or expand or export one body into countless bodies, or how to stuff (*gzud*, 入) innumerable aeons into one moment or make (令) one moment enter ('*jug pa*, 入) into innumerable aeons.<sup>594</sup>

107.2.2. In the verse portion, however, emphasis is not so much on the miraculous power<sup>595</sup> of bodhisattvas as on their all-pervading knowledge, and when aspects of pervasion or interpenetration are addressed the phraseology oscillates to the extent that occasionally, even in one and the same passage, the different translators put the matter differently.<sup>596</sup> Sometimes bodhisattvas are stated to make things enter into, or appear in, other things,<sup>597</sup> or to perceive<sup>598</sup> things

<sup>594</sup> BAVT D ga 66a5–b5 (P shi 66b5–67a5; S nga 89b7–90b2): *de de ltar ... yang dag par gzud pa* (D : *gzung ba P*) *la 'jug pa bcu 'thob ste* ... '*di ltar 'jig rten gyi khams thams cad* (S adds *du skra'i sbubs su gzud pa* (DS ? : *gzung ba P*) *la* (S om. *la*) '*jug cing* | *skra'i sbubs gcig 'jig rten gyi khams bsam gyis mi khyab par mngon par bsgrub pa la 'jug pa dang* | *sems can thams cad kyi lus sems can gcig gi lus su bsdu zhing sems can gcig gi lus brjod du med pa'i lus su mngon par bsgrub pa la 'jug pa dang* | *bskal pa brjod du myed* (DP : *med S*) *pa sems kyi skad cig tu gzud pa* (DS : *gzung ba P*) *la 'jug cing sems kyi skad cig brjod du med pa'i bskal par 'jug pa bstan pa dang* | ...; BAVB 607c17-29: ... 一切世界 入一毛道, 一毛道 出不可思議刹。一切眾生身 悉入一身, 於一身 出無量諸身。不可說劫 悉入一念, 令一念入不可說劫。...; BAVŚ 258b25–c6, replacing Buddhābhaddra's literal rendering of \**abhinir-√hr*, viz., 出 in the first sentence, as well as his 於...出 ("draws out from ...") in the second sentence, with 入 (which CL. 955 consistently takes in an intransitive sense).

<sup>595</sup> Concepts like *vikurvita* or *adhiṣṭhāna* do occur but not frequently. For *vikurvita*, see BAVT D ga 71a4 (SbhCN vs. 45a: *rdzu 'phrul rnam par 'phrul pa* = \**rddhivikurvita*) and 71b2 (vs. 51d): "they display all kinds of miraculous activity" (*rnam par 'phrul pa thams cad ston pa mdzad*); *adhiṣṭhāna* is mentioned in BAVT D ga 71b7 (vs. 59b: *byin rlabs dam pa*) and 73b2-3 (vs. 91c: *byin gyis rlob la mkhas pa* = \**adhiṣṭhānakusāla* [lacuna in the Skt. ms.]).

<sup>596</sup> Cf. fns. 601, 603, 604 and 605.

<sup>597</sup> Cf. fns. 601, 603, 605, 607, and 608 (內, 令入, '*dzud* (par byed)).

<sup>598</sup> Cf. fns. 601, 602, and 604 (見).



in this way, but more often they are told to just recognize or know<sup>599</sup> the various facets of pervasion, or one thing is simply stated to pervade another.<sup>600</sup> This may indicate the conviction that those visions do indeed manifest a reality, at any rate one superior to the reality taken for granted in ordinary experience. From the point of view of contents, the facets of pervasion and interpenetration addressed in the verses are more or less the same as in the prose and in the *Daśa-bhūmika* and the *Gaṇḍavyūha*. Thus, according to Buddhahadra's translation (which is the oldest and also the one from which the verse under discussion is quoted by Hui-chung), bodhisattvas may, e.g., make all 'fields' enter into one single mote (微塵), see [there] the countless Buddhas of these 'fields', and listen to all their preaching.<sup>601</sup> In the same way, they may see those 'fields' as well as their Buddhas in all other motes.<sup>602</sup> Hence, in each mote there appear countless Buddhas and 'fields',<sup>603</sup> including those of the past, the present and the future,<sup>604</sup> for the bodhisattvas know that the three times, or count-

---

<sup>599</sup> Cf. fns. 601, 605, 606, 607, and 608 (知, 了知, 解, *shes pa*).

<sup>600</sup> Cf. fns. 603 and 605 (有, 即, 是, 即是).

<sup>601</sup> BAvB 609a10-11 (SbhCN vs. 25): 於一微塵中 悉內一切刹 見彼無量佛 具聞演說法. For Śikṣānanda's 見 "to see" and Tibetan *shes pa* "to know" instead of Buddhahadra's 內 (*na*) "to make enter", see § 108.2 with fns. 623 and 624.

<sup>602</sup> BAvB 609a12-13 (SbhCN vs. 26): 如一微塵中 一切塵亦然 見刹及諸佛 是不思議智。

<sup>603</sup> BAvB 609a16 (SbhCN vs. 28ab): 一一微塵中 有無量佛刹. Strictly speaking, the passage does not refer to a vision but merely states the presence of countless Buddha-fields in each mote. The same is true of Śikṣānanda (BAvŚ 259c24), but BAvT D ga 70a5 says that [the bodhisattva] *stuffs* countless fields into each mote (*rdul phran thams cad re re la || zhing rnams brjod du med pa mang po 'dzud par byed ||*).

<sup>604</sup> Cf. BAvB 609a14 (SbhCN vs. 27ab): "In each single mote, everywhere they display (/perceive) the dharma of the three times" (一一微塵中 普現[v.l.見]三世法). In this case, it is Śikṣānanda (BAvŚ 259c22) who merely states the presence of the dharma of all the three times in each mote.

less aeons, are just one moment.<sup>605</sup> They thus recognize innumerable things in one thing, and one thing in innumerable things.<sup>606</sup> Likewise, they display, or recognize, countless fields in a [single] body and countless bodies in a single field,<sup>607</sup> or countless fields as one and one as many.<sup>608</sup>

<sup>605</sup> [1.] BAvB 609a22 (SbhCN vs. 31ab): 知 (corr. CBETA; cf. BAvS 260a1) ... 三世即一念. [2.] 610a9 (vs. 68ab): "Innumerable, countless aeons they understand to be just one moment" (無量無數劫 解之即一念, = BAvS 260c17 [CL. 964]), but BAvT D ga 72a6-7 has "Countless aeons they *stuff* into one moment of thought (lit. [act of] producing a thought, *cittotpāda*, here not in its technical meaning) so that they assemble [there]" (*bskal pa brjod du med pa rnam* || *sems bskyed gcig la yang dag 'du bar 'dzud byed cing* ||). [3.] 610a13 (vs. 70ab): "Countless *kalpas* are just one moment" (不可說諸劫 即是一念頃), similarly BAvS 260c21, but BAvT D ga 72b1 "Countless aeons they *stuff* into one day or one moment" (*bskal pa brjod du med pa dag* || *nyi ma gcig dang yud tsam gcig tu 'dzud byed ...* ||). [4.] 611a26-27 (vs. 120): "The past is the future, the future is the past, the present is the past and the future: the bodhisattva understands [this] completely" (過去是未來 未來是過去 現 [=v.l.] 在是去來 菩薩悉了知). BAvS (262a5-6) has: "The future is in the past, the present in the future; the three times appear in one another: ...". Skt. (MIRONOV 1914: 332; ms. verso line 4c): *keṣāmcid iha atītāḥ anāgatā bhonti anya-m-anyāni | atha cā anāgatādhvaṃ<sup>2</sup> pratyutpannam prajāñiṣū<sup>3</sup> a(nye)<sup>4</sup>* ||, i.e.: "To some [bodhisattvas] here past [dharma?] become future and vice-versa, whereas others cognize what belongs to the future as present."

<sup>1</sup> My em. (m.c.): *ca* MIR., ms. <sup>2</sup> Sic ms.: *°rtham* MIR; cf. BAvT D ga 75a2 *ma 'ongs dus kyi rnam*, which may, however, presuppose *°dhvām pratyutpannām* (acc.pl.). <sup>3</sup> My em. (m.c.): *°ṣu* MIR., ms. <sup>4</sup> Cf. Tib. *la las*.

<sup>606</sup> BAvB 609a17 (SbhCN vs. 28cd): 一中知無量 無量中知一. BAvS 259c25 has only 於一塵不知 (CL. 959: "They know all in one.").

<sup>607</sup> BAvB 609a25 (SbhCN vs. 32cd): "In one body (cf. BAvS 260a4: 一身) countless fields, [in] one field countless bodies" (身中無量刹 一刹無量身). But BAvT D ga 70b1-2 has: "In [one] body he recognizes [many] fields, and into [one] field he likewise enters many bodies" (*lus la zhing rnam de shes te* || *zhing la'ang de bzhin gcig min lus 'dzud do* ||).

<sup>608</sup> [1.] BAvB 609b7 (SbhCN vs. 38ab): 無量無邊刹 即知爲一刹. [2.] 609b9 (vs. 39ab): 一切諸世界 令入一刹中; similarly BAvS 260a17 and BAvT D ga 70b6, the latter with *yang dag 'dzud pa* (D,P,S) *byed* for 令入. [3.] 609b14 (vs. 41cd; = BAvS 260a22; cf. CL. 61): "They know that different [fields] are one, they know that one [field] is different" (知種種是一 知一是種種).

107.2.3. 1. As mentioned before, Buddhahadra's version of the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa* (vs. 25) mentions the idea of the presence of countless Buddhas in each particle of dust. In another verse (vs. 81), all versions refer to the Buddha's Dharma Body (法身, *chos kyi sku*), i.e., the *dharmakāya* or, as the Sanskrit has it, probably for metrical reasons, *dharmasārīra*. Originally, the expression '*dharmakāya*' was used as an adjective expressing the idea that the true 'body' of the Buddha is not his physical body but his teaching, the Dharma,<sup>609</sup> but later on it developed into a substantive designating the Buddha as 'embodied' in his teaching (*Dharma*) or in his specific properties (*dharmā*), and ultimately the Buddha as he 'exists' on the level of absolute truth or True Reality (*dharmatā*). According to Śīkṣānanda's rendering of vs. 81, the *dharmakāya* of the Tathāgata *pervades* (普入) the whole world,<sup>610</sup> whereas Buddhahadra's rendering may perhaps be taken to mean that the pure *dharmakāya* encompasses or *contains* all worlds.<sup>611</sup>

<sup>609</sup> Cf. BHSD 277 and HARRISON 1992, pointing out that this use continues into early Mahāyāna and is frequent even in later sources. Cf. also passages like BAvŚ 31c18 (佛以法爲身) or 102a2 (但以法爲身) and the observations made in fn. 637.

<sup>610</sup> BAvŚ 261a14 (cf. CL. 965): "The treasure of the Tathāgata's *dharmakāya* (or: the *dharmakāya* of the Tathāgata as his innermost [essence] (\**garbha*)?) enters into the world everywhere" (如來法身藏 普入世間中); cf. a17 (SbhCN vs. 82c): "The *dharmakāya* pervades the world" (法身遍世間). See also fn. 867.

<sup>611</sup> BAvB 610b6: "The pure *dharmakāya* contains all the worlds" (清淨法身藏 一切諸世間). I am not at all sure whether my rendering, which presupposes that 藏 is used here in a verbal function, is correct. The result would be the same if 藏 is understood as a noun in the sense of "storehouse" and as a locative ("In the pure *dharmakāya* as the storehouse, all worlds [are contained]"). In order to arrive at the opposite meaning, one would have to take 藏 in the sense of "treasure" and the second quarter in a locative sense, in accordance with BAvŚ (see fn. 610). In any case, Dör's translation (1982: 111: "Die Schatzkammer vom reinen 'Kosmos-Leib' Buddhas ragt über alle weltlichen Dinge empor"), introducing a verb "towers over", which I do not find in the text, seems unacceptable. — For the idea that the Buddha's (Dharma-) Body encompasses the world, cf. also fn. 869.

2. The Sanskrit original,<sup>612</sup> basically confirmed by the Tibetan translation,<sup>613</sup> is, however, more complex and seems to be concerned, in the first place, with the body of the advanced *bodhisattva*. For here it is rather into *his* body (cf. Tib. *lus*, not *sku*!) that the whole world is stated to enter or to be assembled (*samosarati*, *gzud byas*), and the connection with the Buddha's *dharmakāya*, expressed by the phrase *dharmāśārīragarbha*, is an additional qualification. In the Tibetan translation, this phrase is rendered as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, i.e., taken to mean "containing the Dharma Body", but it could as well be a *tatpuruṣa*, qualifying something as "being inside, or contained in, the Dharma Body". In the Sanskrit as found in the ms., the phrase seems to be an attribute of the world (*loka*). This would amount to the idea, expressed in the Chinese versions, that the world either contains (i.e., is pervaded by) the Dharma body or is contained in (or encompassed by) it. Since the world is, in its turn, stated to be assembled or concentrated in the *bodhisattva*'s body, the latter would indirectly also contain the Dharma Body.

3. However, two passages of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* suggest a more direct relation between the *bodhisattva*'s body and the Dharma Body. At Gv 231,23 (vs.),<sup>614</sup> we read about an advanced female *bodhisattva* whose

<sup>612</sup> MIRONOV 1914: 332 (ms. recto line 1c): *dharmāṣārīragarbham yasya kāye samosarati lokam | lo ///* (lacuna). The metre requires -- for *yasya*; we may read *yasyā* or *yasyo* (BHS# 3.7 and 3.86). Since the construction A<sup>loc</sup> *samosarati* B<sup>nom</sup> is well attested to in verses (e.g., Gv 176,24; 181,15; 200,7; 242,13; 304,10; cf. also fn. 615), I tend to take *lokam* as nom. (neuter ending for masc., cf. BHS# 8.26) and as the grammatical subject of *samosarati*, but I do not dare exclude other possibilities. Tibetan *gzud byas* (see fn. 613) may presuppose *samosaritā* (taken in a causative sense). The expression *dharmāṣārīragarbham* (for *dharmāṣa* as prior member of a compound see BHS# 8.12) will be discussed below.

<sup>613</sup> BAvT D ga 73a2 (P shi 73a8–b1; S nga 99b1–2): *chos kyi sku yi snying po can || de yi lus la 'jig rten thams cad gzud byas shing ||* (...). Though not without some uneasiness, I would translate as follows: "The whole world has been stuffed into the body of the [bodhisattva], who (or: which, sc. body?) has the *dharmakāya* as his (its) essence (*garbha*)."

<sup>614</sup> *kāyo hi te dharmāśārīragarbhaḥ* (verse addressed to the night goddess Praśāntarutasāgaravatī).

body contains, in an embryonic, not yet fully-fledged form, the Dharma Body (*dharmasārīra*), and at Gv 181,5-8 (vs.)<sup>615</sup> it is the (nascent?) Dharma Body (*dharmasārīra*) of a bodhisattva into which the whole world has entered (*samosari*). Actually, in the Tibetan version of the verse under discussion (viz., SbhCN vs. 81) the expression “containing the Dharma Body” is more likely to be construed with the bodhisattva or his body than with the world.<sup>616</sup> This would probably mean that the whole world can appear in the bodhisattva’s body because the latter contains, or prefigures, the *dharmakāya*, or ‘cosmic’ body, of a Buddha.<sup>617</sup> However this may be: the Tibetan version, in any case, continues by stating that although the world is [part of?] the bodhisattva’s body, he is not polluted by the world.<sup>618</sup> In the subse-

<sup>615</sup> *dharmasārīru tavātivisuddham ... yatra samosari loka aśeṣaḥ* (verse addressed to the night goddess Vāsantī). Cf. also Gv 346,2, qualifying (highly advanced) bodhisattvas as “having purified (or: being purified with regard to) their meta-physical (spiritual) body” (*dharmakāyapariśuddha*, BAvT S cha 181a4: *chos kyi lus yongs su dag pa*). According to SBhCP vs. 110d (BAvT D ga 74b2 = S nga 101b2-3: ‘*jig rten mgon po kun gyi rjes su skyes*; ms. verso line 1c [end]: *anujā[na]ḥ sarva(lokanāthānām?)<sup>a</sup>*), bodhisattvas are the spiritual offspring of all World-Protectors (= Tathāgatas), i.e., born from their Dharma. They are thus consanguineous with all Buddhas (Gv 287,10-12: *bodhisattvo ... ekaśārīro bhavati sarvabuddhaiḥ*), i.e., participate in their *dharmakāya*.

<sup>a</sup> The syllable *na* has been deleted by the scribe. Letters within ⟨ ⟩ are my addition.

<sup>616</sup> See fn. 613.

<sup>617</sup> Perhaps *dharmasārīragarbham* in the Sanskrit text may be taken in a causal sense: “In whose body the world is assembled [because it is] contained in the Dharma Body [and because the body of the (high-level) bodhisattva has (almost) been transformed into a/the Dharma Body].”

<sup>618</sup> BAvT D ga 73a2-3 (P shi 73b1; S nga 99b2): “Although the world is [thus part of] his body, he does not incur pollution by any world[ly factor]” (‘*jig rten de yi lus yin yang || jig rten kun gyis* [PS : D gyi] *de la gos pa med ||*); BAvS 261a15 (SbhCN vs. 81cd): “Although [the *dharmakāya*] is in the world, it nowhere sticks to the world” (雖在於世間 於世無所著). The Sanskrit ms. has a lacuna here, but cf. SbhCN vs. 83a (MIRONOV 1914: 332; ms. recto line 2b): *evam anupaliptaḥ sarvalokena ...* (thus ms., but how to scan? *evam anūpaliptaḥ sarvallokena* [cf.

quent verse (vs. 82), the relation is reversed: the body [of the bodhisattva] (but in the Chinese versions: the *dharmakāya*) pervades the whole world and yet does not really go there, just as a reflected image appears in clear water without any physical crossing over of the object reflected.<sup>619</sup>

108.0. As for explaining the statement under discussion — viz., that even the environment preaches (§ 101) — in terms of facets of interpenetration traceable in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* itself, I must confine myself to making three suggestions based on the material presented in § 107.1-2, without claiming to be exhaustive. Once again I proceed from the premise that preaching is, in the first place, the function of the Buddhas and highly advanced bodhisattvas. Thus, in order to explain the fact that the environment preaches in terms of interpenetration, I shall start from passages that confirm and concretize the interpenetration obtaining between the fields on the one hand and the Buddha(s) and high-level bodhisattvas on the other.

108.1. My first proposal starts from the passage in the eighth chapter of the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* referred to in § 107.1. In the case of a bodhisattva exerting his miraculous power (*adhitiṣṭhāti*) on (an element of) a ‘field’, i.e., the environment, so as to transform it into, or at least make it appear as, his own or even a Tathāgata’s body, or vice versa, it would seem that this (element of the) environment, now embodying the bodhisattva or Tathāgata, may indeed preach, even ver-

---

fn. 551] ...?). In being unpolluted by the world, the high-level bodhisattva is like the Buddha (cf. Gv 21,25-26: *buddhakāyaḥ ... trailokyānupalīptāḥ*).

<sup>619</sup> Ms. recto line 2a-b (MIRONOV 1914: 332): “Just as in clear water a reflected image is seen but does not [really] go there, so also the body [of the bodhisattva] pervades the whole world and yet does not [really] go there” (*yatha cāpi accha udake pratibhāso dṛśyate na ca tadgāmīya | evaṃ ca sarvaloke kāyam anugacchi na ca tadgāmīya* ||; MIRONOV reads *tadbhāmīya*; I take *tadgāmīya* to represent *tadgāmika* [cf. BHSG # 22.20], cf. Tib. *der song 'phos pa*; the metre in pādas b and d is disturbed); cf. BAvŚ 261a16-17; BAvT D ga 73a3 (P shi 73b1-2; S nga 99b2-3); BAvB 610b8-9: “Just as in clear water one sees a reflected image [and yet] there is none, so the *dharmakāya* extends to the ten directions and yet does not extend anywhere” (譬如淨水中 見影無所有 法身至十方 而亦無所至).

bally.<sup>620</sup> Yet this explanation of the environment's preaching would not be essentially different from the first one (ch. 2.4.1 / § 105). It would still be the bodhisattva's (or Buddha's) miraculous influence (*adhiṣṭhāna*) that transforms, e.g., a tree into his own body or his own body into a tree, so that the tree may preach, without it necessarily having to be a sentient or saintly being in its own right. Although the aspect of miraculous power or influence is less prominent in the *Samantabhadracaryānirdeśa*, it is not absent either<sup>621</sup> and may well be presupposed as instrumental in making (parts of) the environment preach.

108.2. 1. Alternatively, one might start from the above-mentioned verse in Buddhābhaddra's version of the *Samantabhadracaryānirdeśa* according to which the bodhisattvas see countless Buddhas in one or even in each mote and hear their preaching.<sup>622</sup> This, too, however, seems to be, according to Buddhābhaddra's rendering, the outcome of a miraculous act or of imagination, viz., making all 'fields', together with their Buddhas, *enter* into one mote. According to Śikṣānanda's translation, the presence of all fields in one mote is perceived (見) in a vision,<sup>623</sup> and according to the Tibetan it is simply known or recognized (*shes pa*) by the bodhisattvas,<sup>624</sup> but neither of these versions mentions the Buddhas and their preaching.<sup>625</sup>

---

<sup>620</sup> It is, perhaps, for this reason that the text (see fn. 589) adds, after *tathāgata-kāyaṃ*, the items *jñānakāyaṃ* and *dharmakāyaṃ* (omitted in fn. 589), which may be taken as representing the essential qualities of, especially, a Buddha and advanced bodhisattva, viz., a vast 'body', or accumulation, of understanding and teachings, respectively.

<sup>621</sup> See fn. 595.

<sup>622</sup> SbhCN vs. 25: see fn. 601. No Sanskrit available.

<sup>623</sup> BAvŚ 259c18-19: 於一微塵中 悉見諸世界 眾生若聞者 迷亂心發狂 (CL. 959: "In a single atom They see all worlds; If sentient beings should hear of this, They'd go mad in confusion." 迷亂心發狂 may correspond to a form or derivative of *vi-muḥ*).

<sup>624</sup> BAvT D ga 70a3-4 (P shi 70b2-3; S nga 95a6-7): "How many world-systems there are in a particle [consisting in] one mote, those they know (or: recognize); when they come to hear of [their] vast practice, all those worlds (/people?) become

2. Yet, in another chapter of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* it is precisely in these two translations (Buddhabhadra's obviously has a lacuna here)<sup>626</sup> that we find a more detailed version of the same idea:<sup>627</sup> In a

---

convinced-and-pleased (\**(a)dhi-√muc*\*)” (*rdul phran gcig gi cha shas la || 'jig rten khams rnams ji snyed de dag shes pa dang || spyod pa rgya che* [DP : *chen S*] *thos gyur na || 'jig rten de dag thams cad mos par 'gyur ||*).

<sup>625</sup> See fn. 623 and fn. 624, respectively.

<sup>626</sup> Just as in Śikṣānanda and in the Tibetan (BAvT P yi 98a3–b1; BAvŚ 35a17–25), so in Buddhabhadra (BAvB 409c10–16), too, ten aspects under which the multitudes of worlds are explained by the Buddhas are announced and enumerated, but in Buddhabhadra the subsequent detailed treatment of these aspects breaks off all of a sudden in the midst of the prose portion of the explanation of the eighth aspect (BAvB 412a16–19). Obviously, the manuscript used by Buddhabhadra was incomplete here. This would seem to be corroborated by the fact that in his enumeration of the ten aspects the tenth is defective, perhaps due to a corruption in his manuscript (from Khotan, cf. SHIH 1968: 97; HAMAR 2007b: 147) which he was not able to remedy just because the respective explanatory section was missing. We cannot therefore automatically conclude that if a text portion of the later translations has no equivalent in Buddhabhadra's translation, it must be a later accretion. Each case has to be judged on its own.

<sup>627</sup> BAvT P yi 108b7–109a8 (D ka 101b4–102a5) ≈ BAvŚ 38c17–39a7 (CL. 198–199).— Cf. BAvT P yi 100b5–7 (D ka 93b5–7; S ka 129a6–7; BAvB 410b27–c2; BAvŚ 36a13–16; CL. 189): “In all motes, all the ‘oceans’ (= masses) of [Buddha-]fields (*kṣetra*) of the vast universe (*dharmadhātu* [cf. fn. 868]) abide, covered and filled (or: nourished) by clouds of Buddhas with their miraculous power (\**adhi-ṣṭhāna*). Just as miraculous activity (\**vikurvita*) [works] in one mote, so does it in the whole world (\**jagat*). [In this way,] the Buddha Vairocana displays his prodigious miraculous activity (\**vikurvita*)” (*rdul rnams kun na chos dbyings yangs pa'i zhing rnams rgya msho kun kyang gnas || sangs rgyas sprin gyis byin kyis brlabs pas kun kyang yog cing yongs su rgyas || ji ltar rdul phran gcig la rnam 'phrul de bzhin 'gro ba kun na'o || rnam par snang ba'i sangs rgyas rnam 'phrul rgya chen rab tu ston pa mdzad ||*).— Cf. also BAvB 410c25–27: “In one single mote, subtle lands (\**kṣetra*) as many as all motes are contained. In all [these] worlds there are various [Buddha-]appearances, all of them turning in those [worlds] the wheel of the Venerable's Dharma” (於一塵內 微細國土 一切塵等 悉於中住 一切世界 有種種形 悉於其中 轉尊法輪; BAvŚ 36b13–14 is somewhat different in that it has the Buddha [no pl.-marker!] go to all those lands to operate the teaching; cf. CL. 190).— One could probably also adduce Gv 178,5–12 (BAvT S ca 294a1–2; D nga 87a6–7): “In every mote I (*ahu*) see ‘oceans’ of [Buddha-]fields ..., and in them I see ‘oceans’ of Buddhas. ... Look at the Shining One, who, just Awakened, per-



single mote, many Buddha-fields exist, without damaging each other or getting mixed up,<sup>628</sup> and within each mote inconceivably many Buddhas make their appearance,<sup>629</sup> pervading all those Buddha-fields, sitting under beautifully adorned bodhi trees, surrounded by large audiences, emanating rays of light and miraculous creations (\**nir-māṇa*), and expounding many *teachings*.<sup>630</sup>

3. In Śikṣānanda's translation, the next verse<sup>631</sup> may even be understood to state that "one atom emanates all Buddha's voices" (CLEARY 1993: 201), which would make the atom, or mote, i.e., an element of the environment,<sup>632</sup> the subject of preaching and thus come close to the statement of the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa* (vs. 119) from which we started (§ 101). Yet, even if this interpretation of the verse were accepted (against the Tibetan translation)<sup>633</sup>, it would surely be

---

vades the fields in all directions and, within each mote, under the stately (-*indra*) bodhi tree loudly proclaims this (*ima*) peaceful Dharma" (*sarvaraje ahu kṣetra-samudrān paśyami ... | tatra ca paśyami buddhasamudrā(n?) ... || paśya Virocana bodhivibuddham | sarvadiśāsu sphaṛitvana kṣetrā | sarvarajaḥpathi bodhidrumendre śānt' ima dharma nigarjayamānam ||*; ed. *sāntima ... nisarja*°, but cf. BAvT D nga 87a7: *zhi ba'i chos rnams ... sgrog pa* and BHSD 294b f; for *sarvarajaḥpathi* Tib. has *rdul sbubs kun* and BAvŚ 370c23 塵內). Similarly Gv 206,15-18.

<sup>628</sup> BAvT P yi 108b7-8 (D ka 101b4-5; S ka 140a3-4; BAvŚ 38c17-18; CL. 200): "On (Ch.: In) one mote, there are many [Buddha-]fields, 'oceans' [of them], ... without disturbing [each other], without any getting mixed up (\**asambhinna*, cf. Ch. 無雜越)" (*rdul gcig steng na zhing mang rgya mtsho ste || ... gnod pa med cing 'dre [S : 'dra DP] ba gang yang med ||*).

<sup>629</sup> BAvT P yi 108b8 (BAvŚ 38c19): *rdul rnams kun la bsam yas sangs rgyas bzhugs*.

<sup>630</sup> BAvT P yi 109a5 (BAvŚ 38c29): "In all motes they expound ocean[-like] teachings, and they make the Wheel [of the Dharma] roll in the right way" (*rdul rnams kun la rgya mtsho'i chos brjod de || de dag 'khor lo tshul bzhin 'khor mdzad cing || ...*).

<sup>631</sup> BAvŚ 39a2: 一塵普演諸佛音 充滿法器諸眾生.

<sup>632</sup> See fn. 576.

<sup>633</sup> BAvT P yi 109a5-6 (D ka 102a3; S ka 140b4): "In a single mote *they* have uttered the voice of all the Victors for those living beings (*jagat*) who are in a state of receptivity" (\**bhājanabhūta*)" (*rdul gcig la ni rgyal ba kun kyi [P : gyi D : gyis S]*

merely a *metaphorical* mode of expression. It is quite clear from the phraseology of the passage as a whole that properly speaking it is the Buddhas within the mote who preach, and in the concluding verses, the scenario is expressly ascribed to the miraculous activity of the Buddhas.<sup>634</sup> Therefore, if interpreted in terms of this form of interpenetration, the statement of the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa* (vs. 119) that the environment preaches would also rather have to be understood as a *metaphor* for the preaching of the myriads of Buddha-appearances pervading it or made to pervade it by the miraculous activity of the Buddhas.

108.3.1. The third possibility I should like to consider is basing the explanation of the statement of the environment's preaching on the idea that the Buddha's body pervades or encompasses the whole world, including the environment.<sup>635</sup> In a sense, this idea (more precisely: the aspect of pervasion) is already implied in the pattern discussed before (§ 108.2), viz., that each mote contains countless

---

*gsung* | 'gro ba snod du gyur la de dag brjod byas te [DS : ste P] || ...). I do not perceive any reason why the Chinese (see fn. 631) could not be construed in a similar way, viz., as "[In] one mote, [they] emit, into all directions, the voices of all Buddhas, filling (/satisfying) those beings who are vessels (/recipients) of the Dharma."

<sup>634</sup> Cf. BAvT P yi 109a6-7 (S ka 140b5-6; D ka 202a3-4; BAvŚ 39a4-5; CL. 201): "They stuff all the countless adornments of 'oceans' of worlds into a single mote: look at the miraculous power of the Victors!" (*zhing rnams rgya mtsho mtha' yas rgyan kyi* [P : gyi DS] *rnams* || *thams cad rdul sbubs gcig tu rab tu 'dzud* || *rgyal ba rnams kyi rdzu 'phrul mthu la ltos*). Cf. also BAvT P yi 100b5-7 quoted in fn. 627.

<sup>635</sup> See § 107.2.3 with fn. 610 and fn. 611. Cf. also fn. 641 and fn. 644, as well as Gv 370,26-27 (BAvT S cha 218a4-5; D a 293a5; BAvŚ 423c1-3; BAvB 770b18-19), characterizing high-level bodhisattvas as [1.] those whose bodies pervade *the bodies* of all living beings (*sarva-jagac-charīrānugata-kāyāḥ*; "the bodies of" is missing in Tib. and Ś; B: "who know (了 = *anugata*) the bodies of ...") and [2.] those whose bodies *have entered* all world-systems (*sarva-lokadhātva-antargata-kāyāḥ*). In BAvB, the latter characterization is taken to mean that those bodhisattvas *encompass* all world-systems in their own body (自身容受一切世界), which is also possible and perhaps even preferable.

Buddhas.<sup>636</sup> Actually, when the idea of the Buddha's body pervading or encompassing the whole world is expressed in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* (especially in its initial chapters), it is not always clear whether what is meant is indeed the *dharmakāya* in the sense of the Buddha as he 'exists' on the spiritual level or on the level of True Reality, and not rather a kind of sublime physical body, or even a host of visible bodily appearances. In most of the passages concerned it is only Buddhābhaddra's translation that has 法身, which normally corresponds to Skt. *dharmakāya*, whereas Śikṣānanda usually merely speaks of "the Buddha-body". The same is true of the Tibetan translation, where even plural expressions occur.<sup>637</sup> In addition, the meaning

---

<sup>636</sup> In a similar way, the idea that the Buddha's body *encompasses* the whole world is implied in the more sophisticated vision or display of the whole universe in each and every hair-pore of the Buddha's body: e.g., BAvŚ 30a10-11 (CL 162; similarly BAvT P yi 85a3-4; BAvB 408a17-18), or Gv 374,25-27 (BAvT S cha 222a4-5; D a 296a4-5; BAvŚ 424b28 vs.): "[Those high-level beings] who stuff immeasurable 'fields', Buddhas, [other] sentient beings as well as infinite aeons into a single tip of a hair (Tib. *skra rtse*; Ś 毛端) ..." (*ye eki vālapathi uttar(i)māna kṣetrān buddhāṃs ca sattva tatha kalpa anantamadyān | praviśanti ...*; ed. reads *uttaramāna kṣetrāt*, but cf. Ś 無量刹 and BHSD s.v. *uttari*, and the 'fields' should be parallel to the nouns in pāda b; in Tib. *praviśanti* is rendered by 'dzud, i.e., as a causative; cf. BHSG # 38.24; we may perhaps read *praviśēnti*; if *praviśanti* is taken in an intransitive sense, we would have to read nominatives instead of the accusatives in pādas a and b).— Cf. also the description, in the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, of Sudhana's vision of the bodhisattva Samantabhadra's playful miraculous display (*vikrīḍita*: 424,30) of the whole universe emanating from each of his hair-pores (*ekaikasmād romavivārāt*) (Gv 423,29–424,29).

<sup>637</sup> [1.] Cf., e.g., BAvB 408b5: "The *dharmakāya* is stable and indestructible; it fills the whole universe (*dharmadhātu*)" (法身堅固不可壞 充滿一切諸法界). However, in BAvŚ 31a22, the first quarter merely says: "The Buddha-body is without distinction" (佛身無差別; cf. CL 168). Nor is the occurrence of the term *dharmakāya* in this verse confirmed by the Tibetan (BAvT P yi 87b2; S ka 112a2), where we have *sku dag*, which need not necessarily correspond to a plural but most probably does, especially in view of the way the Tibetan translators have rendered the attribute or apposition (most likely *\*asambhinna*): "[Buddha-]bodies that are not mixed up irradiate (*\*sphaṛ/sphur*, cf. BHSD 613) the universe" (*kun tu ma 'dres sku dag gis || chos dbyings yongs su rab gsal te ||*). — [2.] For another case of 法身 in Buddhābhaddra being represented by 佛身 in Śikṣānanda and a plural (*sku yi nams*)

of the term *dharmakāya* as reflected in Buddhahadbra's translation is by no means homogeneous,<sup>638</sup> and may merely point to a higher level of reality than the physical appearance of the Buddha as it may be experienced by ordinary people.

108.3.2. Anyway, what matters in the present context is that quite a few passages simply state that the Buddha's (particularly: Vairocana's) preaching fills the whole universe,<sup>639</sup> or that due to his mi-

---

in Tibetan see fn. 641. — [3.] Yet another passage where Buddhahadbra's 法身 (*dharmakāya*) is not confirmed by Tibetan is BAvB 399b29: 如來法身等法界, i.e., "The *dharmakāya* is [all-pervasive] like the universe (*dharmadhātu*)". Here, Śikṣānanda (BAVŚ 7c26) and Tibetan (BAvT P yi 20b4) have "the Buddha-body" (佛身) and "the Sugata's body" (*bde bar gshegs pa'i sku*), respectively. — [4.] There are many more examples, especially in the 20<sup>th</sup> chapter of Buddhahadbra's translation, where only one out of eleven occurrences of 法身 (viz., BAvB 486b18) is confirmed by Śikṣānanda (BAVŚ 122b25) and the Tibetan (BAvT D ka 372b4: *chos kyi sku*). — [5.] On the other hand, there are also passages where Buddhahadbra and Śikṣānanda agree in simply asserting the Buddha-body (佛身) to be all-pervasive, as e.g., at BAvB 408a13 ≈ BAVŚ 30a6, BAvB 414b25 ≈ BAVŚ 42b21, or BAvB 401a22 ≈ BAVŚ 9b21, but in the latter case the Tibetan once again seems to presuppose a plural: "The many Buddha-bodies, having pervaded (*spharitvā?*) [all] directions, ..." (BAvT P yi 25a7: *sangs rgyas sku mang phyogs su rgyas byas shing* ...). — [6.] In view of the far-reaching agreement of Śikṣānanda and Tibetan, it would thus seem that we either postulate a thorough terminological revision of the original text after Buddhahadbra, or (most probably, in my opinion) have to regard the frequent occurrence of the expression 法身 (*dharmakāya*) in Buddhahadbra as an element of his personal interpretation of the text.

<sup>638</sup> For the fluctuating use of the term *dharmakāya* in Buddhahadbra's translation of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, cf. ZACCHETTI 2000: 56–57. A detailed investigation into the views on the Buddha's bodies in the various parts of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* and their representation by the different translators is clearly far beyond the scope of this study. However, a distinction between the Buddha as he is in reality, or for himself, and the Buddha as he appears to others seems to be basic (cf. also WILLIAMS 1989: 123).

<sup>639</sup> E.g., [1.] BAvT P yi 58b3-4 (BAvB 403c24; BAVŚ 21b10; CL. 129): "The Buddha's 'circle' of speech proclaims [the Dharma] in all 'fields'" (*sangs rgyas gsung gi dkyil 'khor ni || zhing rnams kun tu rab tu sgrog ||*). [2.] BAvT P yi 87a8-b1 (D ka 80a7-b1): "Over countless billions of eons, within the motes of all 'fields', Vairocana's voice proclaims his former practice" (*bskal pa bye ba grangs med par || zhing kun rdul phran sbubs dag tu || nram par snang ba mdzad pa'i gsung || sngon*

raculous influence (*adhiṣṭhāna*) the sound of the Dharma spreads to all ‘fields’.<sup>640</sup> Occasionally, this all-pervasive spreading of the Dharma is expressly associated with the omnipresence of the Buddha’s real body.<sup>641</sup> Some passages suggest that the preaching of the

*gyi spyod pa rab tu sgrog* ||); similarly BAvB 408b1-2; in BAvŚ 31a18-19, the syntax differs: cf. CL 167. [3.] BAvB 398b16: “The Buddhas’ right Dharma, without obstacle, completely fills countless worlds in the ten directions” (諸佛正法無障礙周滿十方無量界; v.l. 眾 for 界, but BAvŚ 6c6 無量刹 supports 界). [4.] BAvŚ 31a8-9 (CL 167): “The Buddha Vairocana turns the wheel of the right Dharma; all lands of the universe are filled [by it] as by a cloud” (毘盧遮那佛 能轉正法輪 法界諸國土 如雲悉周遍; however, instead of “lands” BAvT P yi 87a5 [D ka 80a4-5; S ka 111b4] and BAvB 408a20-21 have “methods” (*tshul rnams*, 方便), which is not clear to me). [5.] BAvŚ 32c11-12 (BAvT P yi 90a8-b1; not in BAvB). [6.] Cf. also BAvB (TUSN) 618c17-19 and 619c24-26, or Gv 185,28-31 (... *sugato Virocano | dharmadhātu vipulaṃ spharīṭvanā cakru vartati jage yathāśayam* ||).

<sup>640</sup> BAvB 408a26-27: “Vairocana, through his miraculous spiritual power (*\*adhiṣṭhāna*, cf. Tib. *byin gyi rlabs*), turns the wheel of the Dharma in all ‘fields’; the sound of the bodhisattva Samantabhadra’s resolve (*\*pranīdhāna*) pervades all the ‘oceans’ of worlds” (盧舍那佛神力故 一切刹中轉法輪 普賢菩薩願音聲 遍滿一切世界海); cf. BAvT P yi 87a7-8 and BAvŚ 31a14-15 [CL 167]: different syntax. — Cf. also BAvT P yi 87a5-6 (D ka 80a5; BAvB 408a22-23; BAvŚ 31a10-11): “Whatever ‘oceans’ of world systems there are in the ten directions, in all of them the wheel [of the Dharma] is being turned; this is the miraculous effect (*\*vikurvita*) of [Vairocana’s] resolve” (*\*jig rten kham s rnams rgya mtsho dag || phyogs bcu kun na gang yod pa || thams cad kun tu ’khor lo ’khor || de ni smon lam rnam par ’phrul pa’o* ||).

<sup>641</sup> E.g., [1.] BAvB 408a28: “The *dharmakāya* fills all ‘fields’, everywhere raining the rain of all teachings (*dharmā*)” (法身充滿一切刹 普雨一切諸法雨). However, BAvŚ 31a16 (CL 167) speaks of Buddha-bodies as numerous as the motes of a ‘field’ (佛身等刹塵), and BAvT P yi 87a8 (D ka 80a7; S ka 111b7) seems to mean that all the bodies (*sku’i rnams*) [of the Buddha, or Buddhas] pour down the rain of the Dharma on [each?] mote of all ‘fields’ (or: on all ‘fields’ [as many as] motes?) (*zhing kun rdul la sku yi rnams || thams cad chos char [S : rab DP] rab tu ’bebs* ||). [2.] BAvT P yi 86a4-5 (S ka 110a6-7; D ka 79a4-5; BAvŚ 30b22-23; not in BAvB): “Completely pervading the universe (*dharmadhātu*, pl. in Tib!), the Buddha’s body shines forth; his far-reaching voice, spontaneously arisen, proclaims [the Dharma] in an ‘ocean’ of ‘fields’”, or: “... [with his] far-reaching voice, the Self-arisen One (*\*svayambhū*, i.e., the Buddha who attained Awakening without relying on anybody else), proclaims ...” (*chos kyi dbyings rnams kun khyab par || sangs rgyas sku ni rnam par mdzes || rgya chen gsung ni rang byung ba || zhing rnams rgya mtshor shin*

Buddha is a single, permanent mysterious sound,<sup>642</sup> but that on the phenomenal level sentient beings hear his preaching in accordance with their dispositions and expectations.<sup>643</sup> This adaptation to the requirements of the listeners is often described as mediated by a host of

*tu sgrog* ||). [3.] Cf. also BAvB 408c23 (not in BAvS and BAvT); BAvS 22c19-20 (CL. 134) ≈ BAvT P yi 62a7-8 (not in BAvB).

<sup>642</sup> E.g., [1.] BAvB 399b4 (BAvS 7b25; BAvT P yi 19b4): “‘Oceans’ of teachings, as many as motes in one Buddha-field, [the Buddha] expounds by a single word, completely without a remainder” (一佛刹塵諸法海 一言演說盡無餘). [2.] BAvB 400a11-12 (≈ BAvS 8b8-9; BAvT P yi 22a2-3 differs): “Among all the sublime sounds and voices in the world, there is none at all that can compare to the Buddha’s sound; [with] one sound, resounding like thunder to a great distance, he fills all directions” (一切世界妙音聲 悉無能及如來音 一音遠震遍十方). [3.] BAvS 32b24 (CL. 174): “The Buddha emits a single wondrous sound, which is heard everywhere in the ‘fields’ of the ten directions” (佛演一妙音 周聞十方刹), slightly different BAvT P yi 90a3 (D ka 83a4): *zhing rnam s rgya mtsho thams cad du || de dag gsung ni zab mo ’byung* (D : *byung* P); not in BAvB. [4.] BAvB 399c6-7 (BAvS 8a3-4; CL. 74; BAvT P yi 20b7-8; D ka 18b3). [5.] BAvB 404b15-17. [6.] BAvT P yi 49b2 (D ka 45a2; BAvS 18a23; CL. 116; not in BAvB): *rgyal ba’i gsung* (D : *gsungs* P) *gcig las ni mtha’ yas pa’i || chos kyi sgo mo thams cad kun kyang ’byung* ||. [7.] BAvT P yi 52a3-4 (D ka 47a7-b1; BAvS 19a12; CL. 120; not in BAvB): *chos sgo rgya mtsho mi zad tshad med pa || sangs rgyas gsung gcig sems can kun la gsung* ||. [8.] Cf. also BAvB (TUSN) 619b27-c4 ≈ BAvS 269a7-14 (CL. 992).

<sup>643</sup> [1.] BAvS 22c17-18 (CL. 134): “The *dharmakāya* of the Buddha, [with its] vast light, ... rains teachings everywhere in accordance with what the minds of sentient beings aspire to [and] conforming to their faculties” (廣大光明佛法身 ... 普隨眾生心所樂 悉稱其根而雨法), ≈ BAvT P yi 62a6-7 (... *dbang po ji bzhin chos kyi char yang ’bebs || sangs rgyas chos sku yangs pa nam par mdzes* ||). The passage is missing in BAvB, but cf. 408b5-6 (see fn. 644) and 412a10: “In some [worlds, there is only] the Buddha’s voice, resounding like thunder in the ten directions, in accordance with what sentient beings aspire to” (或佛音聲震十方 隨諸眾生所欲樂). [2.] BAvS 32a23+26: “As for the marvellous wheel of the Dharma which he turns, it is by nature undifferentiated; ... [yet] it displays infinite modes of teaching in accordance with the different [levels] of their (i.e., the *vineyas*) understanding” (所轉妙法輪 法性無差別 ... 隨其解差別 現無盡法門). Similarly BAvT P yi 89b1-2: *tha dad med pa’i chos kyi dbyings || chos kyi ’khor lo rab tu ’khor || ... dad pa rgya mtsho’i ishul dag gis || mi zad tshul rnam rab tu ston* ||; missing in BAvB. [3.] BAvS 21b10-11 (CL. 129) ≈ BAvT P yi 58b3-4 and BAvB 403c24-25. [4.] BAvB 399b6 ≈ BAvS 7b27 (CL. 72). [5.] Cf. also BAvB 619b27-c4 (see fn. 642) and DBhS R 79,29-31 and 80,6-7 (K 163,13-14 and 164,4-5; bodhisattva on the ninth stage).

miraculously displayed, apparitional Buddha-bodies,<sup>644</sup> sometimes compared to reflected images (as in the *Samantabhadracaryā* chapter) or to a juggler's display.<sup>645</sup> According to a passage of the *Gaṇḍavyūha*,<sup>646</sup> miraculously created bodies (*nirmāṇakāya*) may preach with the sounds of all kinds of sentient beings, and even with that of insen-

<sup>644</sup> E.g., [1.] BAvB 408b5-6: "The *dharmakāya* pervades the whole universe, everywhere manifesting physical bodies, [by means of which the Buddha] guides living beings in accordance with how they are to be trained" (法身 ... 充滿一切諸法界 普能示現諸色身 隨應化導諸群生), ≈ BAvŚ 31a22-23 (能令見色身 隨機善調伏; CL. 168) and BAvT P yi 87b2 (... 'gro rnamś 'dul ba ji bzhiṅ du || gzugs kyi sku yang rab tu mihong), with differences in the first half (see fn. 637). [2.] BAvT P yi 85b5-8 (S ka 109b5-110a1; D ka 78b5-7; BAvŚ 30b2-3, 8-9; CL. 163 f; not in BAvB): "The true *dharmakāya* of the Buddha is not mixed up [with mundane things] (\**asambhinna*, which Chin. 無差別 takes as "undifferentiated") and depends on nothing; even so, sentient beings see it as a physical body in accordance with their [respective] wishes. ... From the [real] bodies of the Tathāgatas (BAvŚ: On the basis of one Buddha-body), endless phantom-Buddhas [emerge] and, [their voice] resounding in all 'fields', set forth 'oceans' of teachings" (yang dag [P adds an unmetrical pa] sangs rgyas chos kyi sku || 'dres pa med cing gnas pa med || sems can thams cad yid [DS : yod P] bzhiṅ du || gzugs kyi skur yang rab tu mihong || ... de bzhiṅ gshegs pa'i sku dag las [BAvŚ: 於一佛身上] || mi zad sangs rgyas sprul pa'i [PS : pa D] rnamś || zhiṅ rnamś kun tu rab sgrog cing || chos kyi rgya mtsho shin tu ston ||). [3.] BAvB (TUSN) 620b27-c10 (BAvŚ 270a8-17; CL. 994) enumerates several types of bodies the Buddha may manifest to sentient beings when he is about to teach them.

<sup>645</sup> E.g., [1.] BAvB 399b10-11 (cf. BAvT P yi 19b8-20a1; BAvŚ 7c6-7; CL. 73): "The Buddha's body is inexhaustible like space, without characteristics (or: specific appearance), unhindered, [and yet] manifesting everywhere; what is adaptively manifested is like a juggler's display" (佛身如空不可盡 無相無礙普示現 所可應現如幻化 ...). [2.] BAvT P yi 90a6-7 (D ka 83a7; S ka 115b5-6; BAvŚ 32c3-4; CL. 174; not in BAvB): "The *dharmakāya* is non-different and unhindered, like space; its being perceived (\**vijñapti*?) as a physical body has the [same] character [as] the appearance of a reflection" (chos kyi sku ni tha dad min || nam mkha' bzhiṅ te chags pa med || gzugs kyi skur ni [DS : na P] rnam dmigs pa || mig yor snang ba'i mtshan nyid do ||). [3.] BAvT P yi 89b2-3 (D ka 82b3; S ka 114b5-6; BAvŚ 32a27-28; CL. 173; not in BAvB): "In all Buddha-fields the Victors appear on the seat of Awakening like reflections" (sangs rgyas zhiṅ rnamś kun na yang || rgyal ba rnamś ni mig yor 'dra || snying po byang chub rnamś na snang || ...).

<sup>646</sup> Gv 194,15-28.

tient things like a whirlwind, masses of water, flames of fire, the ocean, an earthquake, or heavenly musical instruments. This idea is parallel to the view that other persons or even insentient things may preach if inspired or controlled by the Buddha (see § 105). It is thus reasonable to postulate some act of miraculous creation or influence also when this is not explicitly stated, especially in the case of insentient things. When, e.g., *light* issuing from the pores of the Buddha is stated to proclaim the Dharma or names of the Buddha(s),<sup>647</sup> the light is actually a kind of extension of the Buddha's body. In Vairocana's purified Buddha-field, the jewel *trees* emit subtle sounds through which the great resolves (*\*prañidhāna*) cultivated by the Buddhas in all aeons are articulated,<sup>648</sup> but we can safely assume that this is part of the effect of Vairocana's previous resolve or of his miraculous power. Likewise, when at the seat of Awakening (*bodhimāṇḍa*) the bodhi tree<sup>649</sup> and the ground,<sup>650</sup> or just the trees,<sup>651</sup> or all things present

---

<sup>647</sup> [1.] BAvB 399c14 (BAvŚ 8a11; BAvT P yi 21a3). Similarly BAvŚ 30b10-13 (CL. 164) ≈ BAvT P yi 85b8-86a1. [2.] The situation is different in the verses BAvT P yi 103b2-4 (D ka 96b2-4; S ka 133a2-5) ≈ BAvB 411b7-12 ≈ BAvŚ 37a8-13, describing worlds adorned by clouds of light and ornaments that emit sound; the last line, however, makes clear that here, too, the miraculous power (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the Buddha(s) is at work. [3.] At BAvB 408b3-4 ≈ BAvŚ 31a20-21 ≈ BAvT P yi 87b1-2 (D ka 80b1; S ka 112a1-4), it is not the rays of light themselves that train (i.e., teach) sentient beings but rather Buddhas within them. Similarly, at BAvB 407c5-6 ≈ BAvŚ 29b13-14, both Chinese versions may be taken, with CL. 160, to mean that it is the bodhisattvas in the light who preach, but Tib. (BAvT P yi 83a4-5, S ka 106b2-3: *byang chub sems dpa' de dag gi 'od gzer gyi sgo thams cad nas kyang tshigs su bcaḍ pa 'di lta bu dag byung bar gyur to || 'od gzer thams cad sgo nas sgra 'byung ste | ...*) is unambiguous in stating that sound (in the form of stanzas recited) arises from the rays of light of the bodhisattvas.

<sup>648</sup> BAvŚ 41a23-24: 其樹復出微妙音聲，說諸如來 一切劫中 所修大願; see CL. 210. The passage is not represented in BAvB (one would expect it in the paragraph 414a19-21). In BAvT (D ka 108a3-4), it seems to be the jewels themselves that emit the sound.

<sup>649</sup> BAvŚ 23c28-29 (CL. 139) ≈ BAvT P yi 65b1-2: The bodhi Trees of all the Buddhas appear in the seat of Awakening and expound the Buddhas' pure Dharma. Not in BAvB.



there,<sup>652</sup> emit sounds of praise or teaching,<sup>653</sup> this is easily explained either as an effect of the Buddha's spiritual power or as a literary stratagem to highlight the extraordinariness of the event of the Buddha's Awakening (cf. Pt. I, ch. 5.2.2).

108.3.3. The situation would be fundamentally different only if we understand the *dharmakāya*, or the omnipresent body of the Buddha, not as just pervading or encompassing the environment but as constituting its *true nature*, or as including the environment as an *integral part* of this body.<sup>654</sup> If the environment *is* in its essence the *dharmakāya*

---

<sup>650</sup> BAvŚ 24a1 (CL. 139) ≈ BAvT P yi 65b2-3: The *ground* around the seat of Awakening emits wondrous sounds, in accordance with the inclinations of sentient beings. Not in BAvB.

<sup>651</sup> BAvŚ 25b18 (not in BAvB): 樹中演暢此法音, rendered in CL. 147 as "The voice of these teachings comes from the trees". In BAvT P yi 69a6 (S ka 88b6), however, the sound "issues from this great Bodhi-tree" (*byang chub shing chen 'di las brag*).

<sup>652</sup> BAvŚ 20b3 (not in BAvB): 道場一切出妙音 讚佛難思清淨力; CLEARY (1993: 125) translates: "Everything at the site of enlightenment produces exquisite sound Extolling the pure, inconceivable powers of the Buddha." BAvT (P yi 55b2: *sangs rgyas stobs rnam yongs dag bsam mi khyab || snying po byang chub 'dir ni kun kyang brag*) is less explicit: "The powers of the Buddha, completely pure, inconceivable, at this seat of Awakening, [they] all resound (/are celebrated)."

<sup>653</sup> It may be worth noting that I have not found any similar passage in BAvB.

<sup>654</sup> The Tibetan text of SBhCN vs. 81c (see § 107.2.3 with fn. 618) *could* be understood in this sense, though I wonder whether this is actually its original purport. At Gv 183,28-29, the night-goddess Vasanī declares herself capable of comprehending (or visualizing) the fact that the Tathāgatas have the infinite universe as their body (*anantadharmadhātusārīratām avatārāmi*), but the original purport of the passage may well be that their body is as vast as the universe; cf. Buddhahadra's rendering: "the *dharmakāya* is pure and *fills* the universe" (BAvB 723a20: 法身清淨充滿法界). As for Gv 138,30, characterizing advanced bodhisattvas as *sarvajaganmaya-sārīra* ("whose body consists of the whole world"), the reading is doubtful, for VAIDYA's ms. S has *sarvajagatsama*<sup>o</sup>, which rather means that bodhisattvas may adopt bodies similar to any kind of (or: as numerous as there are) living beings, and this is the reading confirmed by the Tibetan (BAvT D a 45b1; S ca 239b4-5: 'gro ba thams cad dang mnyam pa'i lus dang ldan pa) as well as the Chinese versions (BAvB 712c1-2 and BAvŚ 360b26-27, both reading 身與一切眾生數等; cf. also T 10.293: 725b6-7).

*kāya*, embodying true reality, or is *essentially* (and not just by an act of miraculous transformation) integrated into the Buddha's body as his 'field'-body (*kṣetrakāya*),<sup>655</sup> then the preaching of the 'field(s)' may be understood as the *dharmakāya*'s, or the 'cosmic' Buddha's, self-revelation in the environment or parts of it. This, however, would seem to come close to Ch'eng-kuan's last proposal, to be discussed in the next paragraph.

### 2.4.3. Third Explanation

109. Ch'eng-kuan's third explanation, viz., that the environment preaches in the sense that even objects, i.e., external things, when apprehended, may directly disclose their true nature, points to non-verbal forms of transmitting the Truth, i.e., to a *metaphorical* use of the verb "to preach". It thus probably comes closer to how Hui-chung, as a Ch'an master, may have understood the passage. In any case, the idea of preaching in the form of non-verbal communication,<sup>656</sup> be it by the Buddha or bodhisattvas or by ordinary sentient beings or insentient things, is by no means alien to the Indian tradition. Ch'eng-kuan himself, by referring to fragrant food as an example, points to a passage of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa*, according to which in the realm of the Tathāgata Gandhottamakūṭa bodhisattvas are trained not by means

---

<sup>655</sup> As is explicitly the case in Hua-yen exegesis, e.g., T 36.1736: 94b12-13: "The 'fields' are [identical with] the 'field-body' (*kṣetrakāya*)" (刹土即國土身); T 35.1733: 160a29-b1: "Since Vairocana has the 'field-body', etc., therefore the whole world is the Buddha's body" (以舍那佛有國土身等, 是故世界悉是佛身). Cf. also T 35.1735: 504b13-15 (comm.: T 36.1736: 20c18-21a2), formulating four aspects which taken together circumscribe the fact that the Buddha and his field merge with each other: "the Buddha is the field" (佛即刹), "the field is the Buddha" (刹即佛), "both [somehow preserved]" (俱), "[both] dissolved [as separate entities]" (泯).

<sup>656</sup> Cf. Lañk 105,5-12, referred to also by Ch'eng-kuan (T 35.1735: 519a23-26; 36.1736: 93b19-c1). Cf. also Gv 194,15-28 (see § 108.3.2 with fn. 646), 427,5-15, and 270,26-29. For the Ch'an tradition, cf., e.g., MCRAE 1986: 74.

of verbal instruction but by means of fragrant smells.<sup>657</sup> According to another passage of this same sūtra,<sup>658</sup> in some Buddha realms, the work of a Buddha (*buddhakṛtya*) is not carried out by the Buddha himself but by other persons (sc. bodhisattvas) or, among other things, by light, by the bodhi tree,<sup>659</sup> by clothes or food, or by groves, palaces, mansions or even the empty sky (*gaganam antarikṣam*), and it does not necessarily involve verbal instruction; it may also be accomplished through silence.<sup>660</sup> It is possible that in the Indian Mahāyāna milieu the salvific activity of such persons or objects, whether verbal or non-verbal, was often considered to be, somehow, due to the Buddha's miraculous influence or at least presence.<sup>661</sup> But this is not necessarily so, for even in mainstream Indian Buddhism, natural things (like falling leaves or withering flowers) as well as artefacts may, as objects of meditative contemplation, directly 'speak' to the yogi by manifesting their impermanence, etc. (cf. § 44.2). Most telling are the stories (shared by the Buddhist and the Jain traditions)

---

<sup>657</sup> Vñ IX.14. Cf. also X.7, where fragrant food brought from Gandhottamā-kūṭa's world is stated to carry out a Buddha's work (*buddhakṛtya*) by causing, or inducing, spiritual advancement. According to IX.14, the perception of the fragrance leads to a *samādhi* which is the source of bodhisattva virtues.

<sup>658</sup> Vñ X.8(-10), referred to by Ch'eng-kuan in T 35.1735: 519a19-23 and 36.1736: 93a19-b10. The Sanskrit text of Vñ X.8 seems to be lacunary due to *aberratio oculi* (easily explicable in view of the repetitive phraseology), since both the Tibetan and the three Chinese versions confirm additional phrases.

<sup>659</sup> Cf. fn. 569 and fn. 649.

<sup>660</sup> Vñ X.9. The distinction of verbal and non-verbal teaching does not coincide with the distinction of teaching carried out by persons on the one hand and objects on the other, since even the latter may miraculously emit verbal instruction (see § 105).

<sup>661</sup> Cf. § 105 and § 108.3.2, esp. the reference to Gv 194,15-28. Cf. also MPPU 313c4-12 (LAMOTTE 1980: 2358-2359), where it is stated that there are Buddhas who make sentient beings attain Awakening through verbal preaching, whereas others do so by other means including emitting light or fragrant smell or in that they "perform the work of a Buddha by means of all [kinds of?] sounds of (or: voices resounding from?) *grasses and trees*" (c10-11: 有佛能以一切草木之聲而作佛事令眾生得道者。).

relating the sudden Awakening of the so-called pratyekabuddhas (see *ibid.*), which takes place on the occasion of a shocking experience, e.g., upon coming across a tree seen earlier in full blossom that had been completely stripped of its flowers in the meantime.<sup>662</sup> Ch'eng-kuan's own explanation, in his subcommentary, is basically in the same vein, for he exemplifies the 'preaching' of the environment with corporeal things (色, *rūpa*) immediately disclosing [to the open-minded observer] their materiality (質礙, = Skt. *mūrta(tva)*), dependent arising, impermanence, essencelessness, etc.<sup>663</sup> It is obvious that fulfilling this function does not require an active participation on the part of the object, let alone its sentience or saintliness.

#### 2.4.4. Conclusions Regarding the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*

110. I hope that the preceding discussion, albeit provisional, has shown that even the explanations proposed by a representative of systematized Hua-yen thought do not force us to understand the passage from the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa* adduced by Hui-chung, taken in its original context, as presupposing a view according to which plants are sentient or even Awakened beings in their own right, such that this passage might form a link between an archaic view of plants as sentient or even saintly beings in early Buddhism and the Far Eastern idea of plants as Buddha-natured.

111. If we follow Ch'eng-kuan's *first* explanation, the preaching of plants is merely the effect of a Buddha's or highly advanced bodhi-sattva's miraculous influence and does not require the plant itself being sentient or Buddha-natured. Nor is this necessarily required by

---

<sup>662</sup> For the reception of this idea in China in a doctrinal context cf. Chih-i's *Mōho chih-kuan* 摩訶止觀 (T46.1911) 136c17 (passage kindly pointed out to me by Prof. Waka SHIRATO in 1999), referring to the idea that even insignificant events like old blossoms drifting in the wind or leaves stirred by a gust (華飛葉動) may occasion a pratyekabuddha's Awakening. For a connection of this idea with the theme of the 'preaching of the non-sentient' see also FAURE 1996: 192–194.

<sup>663</sup> T 36.1736: 614c1-3: 言顯理者, 如色即顯質礙, 即顯緣生, 即顯無常, 即顯無性等。

the *third* explanation, which in the conservative Indian sources would merely mean that to an appropriately prepared observer, phenomena like seasonal change or the fragility of flowers may reveal the fundamental truth of impermanence, without, of course, any agency on the part of the plant itself. The situation may eventually become different if the true nature of things is 'sacralized' by being *equated* with the true nature of the Buddha or with his *dharmakāya*,<sup>664</sup> or if interpenetration is understood in a strong sense implying essential identity, the environment *being* the Buddha (i.e., his *kṣetrakāya*) and the Buddha *being* the environment (see § 108.3.3). The decisive issue is thus Ch'eng-kuan's *second* explanation of the environment's preaching.

112. Yet even as regards this second explanation, my (admittedly preliminary) investigation makes me very hesitant to assume that in the original texts themselves that make up the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* collection the idea of universal interpenetration was consciously taken to imply an individual sentience of plants as such, or even their being actually and individually Awakened (or at least capable of Awakening). My impression is rather that this question is simply outside the focus of the interest of the authors of these texts. As pointed out above, it is, originally, mainly in the context of visions and miraculous displays that aspects of pervasion or interpenetration are described. What catches one's eye is the central role, in this context, of miraculous power and activity, i.e., of the factor Ch'eng-kuan had referred to in his first explanation of the phrase that even the environment preaches. In the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, the verb preferably used for the miraculous displays of advanced bodhisattvas is *adhi-tiṣṭhati*, in the sense of transforming something, or making it appear in a certain form or place, by means of a supranormal act of control.<sup>665</sup> In the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, Sudhana's vision of the interior of Maitreya's jewelled palace, in which hundreds of thousands of similar

<sup>664</sup> For a more detailed discussion of this point see Pt. II.B, ch. 1.1.

<sup>665</sup> On *adhi-tiṣṭhati* and the verbal noun *adhiṣṭhāna* see fn. 497.

palaces are reflected in each single reflecting object without being mixed up,<sup>666</sup> is essentially due to Maitreya's beneficial miraculous influence (*adhiṣṭhāna*),<sup>667</sup> probably in the sense of taking control of Sudhana's mind (which, of course, presupposes the latter's spiritual quest and maturity)<sup>668</sup>. In the *Lokottara-parivarta*,<sup>669</sup> facets of interpenetration are discussed especially in the paragraphs on miraculous activities (\**vikurvita*) and playful displays (\**vikrīḍita*).<sup>670</sup> Moreover, it is expressly stated that when the bodies of sentient beings are made into [a part of?] the environment, or vice-versa, this happens *without impairing their original status*.<sup>671</sup> This means that insentient things like plants remain essentially insentient even if miraculously transformed into the body of a sentient being. In the *Samanta-bhadra-caryā-nirdeśa* the aspect of miraculous activity and influence is, to be sure, less conspicuous, but it is not missing either.<sup>672</sup> Even in systematized Hua-yen treatises it continues to be reckoned among the reasons for the interpenetration of phenomena.<sup>673</sup>

<sup>666</sup> Gv 408,3-8: *tasya ca mahākūṭāgārasya abhyantare tadanyāni kūṭāgārasata-sahasrāṇy ... apaśyat ... | te cāsya kūṭāgāravayūhā anyonyāsaṃbhinnā anyonyāmiśrī-bhūtā* (my emendation; ed.: °*maitrī*°, but cf. 415,14) *anyonyāsaṃkīrṇā pratibhāsaya-yogena ābhāsam agaman ekasminn ārambaṇe | yathā ca ekasminn ārambaṇe, tathā śeṣasarvārambaṇeṣu* | Cf. McMAHAN 2002: 136.

<sup>667</sup> See fn. 573.

<sup>668</sup> Gv 416,11-12, stating that Sudhana's experience is due to the miraculous power of the bodhisattva (sc. Maitreya) and Sudhana's being a suitable recipient (*bodhisattvādhiṣṭhānena tava ca subhājanatayā*). Cf. also *pūrvakuśalamūla-balā-dhāna* beside *tathāgatādhiṣṭhāna* as a condition for Muktaka's vision (Gv 64,21).

<sup>669</sup> Tib. 'Jig rten las 'das pa, Ch. 離世間品. The Sanskrit title is confirmed by Śikṣ 151,13 (cf. HAMAR 2007b: 142).

<sup>670</sup> See fn. 593 and fn. 528.

<sup>671</sup> BA vT D ga 202b2-3 (see § 97 with fn. 528).

<sup>672</sup> See § 107.2.2 with fn. 595.

<sup>673</sup> In Fa-tsang's commentary on DBhS R VIII.N (T 35.1733: 363b17-21), the bodhisattvas' mastery of autonomous comprehension (菩薩自在智力) is, along with the all-pervasiveness of the *dharma*tā (法性融通) and the mutuality of dependent arising (緣起相由), reckoned as one of the conditions for the miraculous transfor-

113. 1. A comprehensive discussion of the meaning and function of these visions and displays of pervasion and interpenetration would exceed the limits of the present study. Provisionally, I am inclined to understand them as the expression of a level of spiritual purity and mastery on which the world is no longer experienced as determined by the adamant limitations of space and time, number (vision gradually extending to *countless* items),<sup>674</sup> and discrete individuality. For advanced bodhisattvas, the universe has assumed (or reveals itself as having) a fluid and dynamic,<sup>675</sup> malleable,<sup>676</sup> ‘protean’<sup>677</sup> nature, to the

---

mation of one body into another. Later on (430b21-25), when commenting on the bodhisattvas’ miraculous exploits (*vikurvita*) concerning the environment (*kṣetra*) (BAvB 647c13-24), Fa-tsang enumerates five reasons, replacing the bodhisattvas’ mastery of autonomous comprehension with their power of concentration entailing supranormal faculties (定力自在起勝通故), their having obtained the power of freedom [from limitations] (*\*vimokṣa*) enabling them to transform things (得解脫力能迴轉故), and their power of comprehension by which they understand the fact that phenomena are like hallucinations and dreams, so that they attain autonomous mastery with regard to [making them] appear in accordance with their own mind (智力了如幻夢法 隨自心現得自在故; see § 113). In other places, we find ten reasons for the convertibility of phenomena, including the power of supranormal faculties, concentrations and freedom [from limitations] (解脫, *\*vimokṣa*) (T 45.1871: 594c25–595a1, with detailed explanation 595a1–b29), or at least the latter two (T 35.1735: 515c25–516a1, explained in detail 516a8–517c13).

<sup>674</sup> Cf. VETTER 2004: 65 and 77–78 (Meghaśrī’s vision of ever increasing numbers of Buddhas: Gv 48,27 ff). Historically speaking, the vision or visualization of countless Buddhas is probably, as VETTER (2004: 66–69) suggests, a reshaping and development of the canonical practice of recollecting the Buddha (*buddhānusmṛti*, which originally did not normally involve visualization) under the influence of various practices of a more visual nature, some of which, like the contemplation of the repulsive (*aśubhabhāvanā*) or the contemplative practice of benevolence (*maitrībhāvanā*), developed into imagining the multiplication or extension of the visualized object to the extent that it fills the whole world (cf., e.g., SCHMITHAUSEN 2007a: 228–230). In addition, the visions of countless Buddhas in the Gv may have also been inspired by more developed conceptions of the Buddha’s display of self-multiplication (see fn. 578), of which they are, so to speak, the recipient counterpart.

<sup>675</sup> ZACCHETTI 2000: 70,1-2. Cf. also WILLIAMS 1989: 123: “the quicksilver universe of the visionary perspective wherein all is empty and therefore is seen as a flow lacking hard edges.”

effect that the aforementioned limitations may now be shifted, transcended, interfused or effaced at will.

2. In this perspective, in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* texts discussed in the present chapter<sup>678</sup> comparisons of the world, or even of the contents of visions, with a dream, a hallucination (*māyā*) or the like may not only have the purpose of undermining the objective reality of the ordinary world,<sup>679</sup> or putting the visions or miraculous displays into perspective in order to prevent the spiritual wayfarer Sudhana (and

---

<sup>676</sup> MCMAHAN 2002: 115 and 128, though the equivalent *aviṣṭhapana* [Gv 415,28] for “malleability” is problematic because the reading is doubtful (cf. *BHSD* 502b and 486b); the negation is indeed missing in Tib. (BAvT D a 339a7).

<sup>677</sup> Cf. GRANOFF 1998: 355.

<sup>678</sup> In the ‘*Suyāma gāthās*’ (ch. 1.5.2) and the ‘*Eulogies on Mount Sumeru*’ (ch. 1.7), emphasis is rather on not misinterpreting the physical appearances of the Buddha.

<sup>679</sup> Cf., e.g., Gv 360,8-20: *māyāgato nāma bodhisattvavimokṣaḥ*, characterized by seeing the [ordinary, ‘non-protean’] world as a hallucination and somehow setting the stage for the vision of Maitreya’s palace. In the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, these comparisons appear at the beginning of the sixth *bhūmi* (DBhS R 47,15-16 [VI.A] ≈ K 96,10-11), in a set of anti-substantialist phrases preparing for the contemplation of dependent origination and in the verse (DBhS K 110,4-7: vs. 14) which corresponds to the résumé of this contemplation in DBhS R VI.N (K 102,3-5). They appear again at the beginning of the seventh *bhūmi* (DBhS R 55,15-17 [VII.A] ≈ K 114,13-15), characterizing a world-transcending perspective in a set of phrases contrasting this perspective with a world-affirming one as two poles of a bodhisattva’s spirituality. At the beginning of the eighth *bhūmi*, the bodhisattva is described as tending towards complete detachment (*viveka*: DBhS R 64,12 [VIII.C] ≈ K 134,15) and inactivity, an attitude from which he has to be aroused by the Buddhas, and it is only thereafter, and on the basis of his having rid himself of imagining bodies as ultimately discrete entities (DBhS K 141,7-8; DBhS R 69,10 [VIII.N]), that the text refers to the display of a miraculous transformation of his own body into that of other sentient beings, etc. (see § 107.1 with fn. 589). In the verses of the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa*, too, comparisons of the world with illusory phenomena occur (BAvB 610a5-6, a17-18, a23-24 and b16-23 ≈ BAvŚ 260c13-14, c25-26, 261a2-3 and a24-b2 ≈ BAvT D ga 72a5-6, b2-3, b5 and 73a6-b1 [verses 66, 72, 75 and 86–89]), but a precise ascertainment of their function would require a more detailed investigation. An important aspect seems to be that they are intended to illustrate that phenomena are insubstantial and indeterminable.



thus also the reader, or the audience) from misinterpreting these visions or displays in terms of the ordinary spatio-temporal world.<sup>680</sup> These comparisons may also, and perhaps in the first place, be employed with the purpose of illustrating precisely the above-mentioned overruling of all ordinary limitations,<sup>681</sup> as seems to be also supported by the remarks of Hua-yen masters on these comparisons in the context of interpenetration.<sup>682</sup> Similar functions may also hold good for statements that emphasize, in connection with visions or with the experience of the (or: a) world, the role of one's own mind (*citta*) or (imaginative) thinking (*saṃjñā*).<sup>683</sup>

---

<sup>680</sup> As in the case of Muktaka's Buddha-visions (Gv 66,28-33; cf. VETTER 2004: 64–65; NAMAI 1995: 178–179 [rl°875–874]), or in the case of the punishment of phantom-criminals by the bodhisattva-king Anala (Gv 122,31–123,17). Cf. also Gv 369,13-15 and 28-30.

<sup>681</sup> Especially Gv 414,14-28 (comparing the miraculous visions of bodhisattvas with dream experience under the aspect of transcending the limitations of space and time) and 415,23-25 (comparing them with hallucinations under the aspect of both being induced by the powerful influence (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of another person). Cf. also the comparison of the bodhisattvas' visions with a mirage (*gandharvanagara*: 415,19-20) and with a *yakṣa*-palace spatially overlapping with a human mansion (415,20-21), illustrating mutual pervasion (without intermixture) and non-obstruction. In this sense probably also Gv 123,17-21.

<sup>682</sup> Cf., e.g., T 45.1871: 595a9-14: the comparisons with hallucinations and dreams are intended to illustrate the overruling of the limitations of space and time: in a hallucination, there is no obstacle to big things being displayed in a small place; in a dream, long and short are not incompatible; in a dream one may experience the passing of a year, but when one wakes up it was only a moment. Cf. also T 35.1735: 517b20-26: a conjurer may turn one thing into many or many into one; in a dream, what one sees is huge but one has not moved away from one's pillow; the period that has elapsed appears to be very long but actually not even a moment has passed.

<sup>683</sup> Cf. Gv 66,27–67,11 (cf. VETTER 2004: 64–65) and 231,27-30 (vs. 17; cf. GÓMEZ 1967: lxxx–lxxxi). Cf. also § 83. In Śikṣānanda's version of the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa*, one verse (SbhCN vs. 71) expresses a mutual dependence of the mind and the world: “The mind dwells in (or: rests on) the world, and the world dwells in (or: rests on) the mind; [the bodhisattvas] do not wrongly conceptualize these as two or not two” (BAvŚ 260c23-24: 心住於世間 世間住於心 於此不妄起 二非二分列; cf. CL. 964; BAvB 610a15-16 and BAvT P shi 72b8–73a1 [S nga 98b5-6; D ga 72b2] are slightly different). In another verse (SbhCN vs. 63ab), we find the

3. With their ideal of an almost<sup>684</sup> unlimited control over the universe, the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* texts would seem to form part of an old strand of Indian religiosity according to which the goal is not radically world-transcending but rather a state of unimpeded autonomy and ‘wandering at will’ (*kāmacāra*) through heavenly realms,<sup>685</sup> or, in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, through a freely transformed, ‘jewelled’, glorified universe. But the goal of a bodhisattva is not just his own glorious freedom and welfare (*svārtha*) but also the welfare of others (*parārtha*),<sup>686</sup> and for this purpose, too, the free command over the universe, transcending all kinds of limitations and thus enabling an all-embracing salvific activity, could easily have appeared more suitable than a purely world-transcending spirituality did.<sup>687</sup> This picture

---

idea of manifold worlds being ‘painted’ by *saṃjñā* (BAvT D ga 72a3: ‘*du shes rnam pa du ma ste | des ni ’jig rten sna tshogs ma lus rnam par bris*, corresponding to BAvŚ 260c7: 世間種種別 皆由於想住), but Buddhābhaddra (BAvB 609c28) is somewhat different and has *karman* (業) instead of *saṃjñā*. On the idea of the mind as a painter and its connection with karma see §§ 77 (with fn. 415) and 80.

<sup>684</sup> The power of Buddhas and advanced bodhisattvas holds full sway over the insentient environment and may, to a certain extent and temporarily, even change the physical appearance of sentient beings and influence their thought and feelings, but ultimately the efficacy of their salvific activity is dependent on the receptivity and maturity of the sentient beings themselves, and basically it is the latter’s own karma that determines their environment, or perhaps rather the way they experience it.

<sup>685</sup> SCHMITHAUSEN 1995a: 52–59; 1995b: 144–148. The idea of “wandering at will” seems to have been integrated into Mahāyāna Buddhism in the form of the assumption that advanced bodhisattvas can choose their rebirth deliberately (cf., e.g., Pañc I:80,7 and 185,8; Śāt 1470,14–16: *saṃcintyātmabhāvaṃ parigrhṇāti / upādatte*), i.e., have the power to assume, keep and abandon their body at will (BoBh 265,6–7: *sve ... ātmabhāve yathākām(am?)*)\* *ādāna-sthāna-cyuti-vaśavartitā*; cf. ASBh 129,6–7: *yathākāmam āśrayasyōpādāna-sthāna-parityāgānām samyaddhau* (sc. *samādhiḥ*, etc.)). \* Patna ms. (350b5) reads °*kāmayādāna*°.

<sup>686</sup> It would seem to be for this reason that in Sudhana’s vision of the universe reflected in Maitreya’s palace the evil destinies, too, show up (Gv 412,6–7).

<sup>687</sup> Cf. VETTER 2004: 78. VETTER rightly calls the spirituality of the Gv world-encompassing, but it is also world-transforming. Diversity is affirmed, but not this-worldly diversity with its limitations and shortcomings. Since this world is not the

of a state, attainable, in the long run, by everyone,<sup>688</sup> of glorious mastery and, in a sense, even creatorship enabling, at the same time, a powerful engagement for the welfare of others surely also functioned as an appealing ideal in the context of competition with other, especially theistic religious movements of the time.<sup>689</sup>

114. In this way, at least in the *Daśabhūmika* and the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, the idea of interpenetration seems to figure, primarily, in the dynamic context of descriptions of visionary experiences and displays of autonomous mastery over ordinary limitations and of salvific resourcefulness, descriptions that reveal hardly any interest in a systematic exploration of theoretical implications.<sup>690</sup> The same would also seem to hold good for the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa*, whose main subject is the comprehensive knowledge of advanced bodhi-

---

creation of an almighty and benevolent creator but rather the product of the karma of imperfect sentient beings, there is no reason to gloss over its fundamental unsatisfactoriness. The *Buddhāvataṃsaka* does not, however, confine itself to indicating a method for transcending this unsatisfactory world but rather depicts the possibility of radically transforming it into, or superseding it by, a glorious universe, malleable at will and expected to be more satisfactory.

<sup>688</sup> Cf. the fact that in the Gv the *kalyāṇamitras* visited by Sudhana comprise persons from different social groups, male as well as female, renunciators as well as lay persons (see MCMAHAN 2002: 122).

<sup>689</sup> Cf., in this connection, the conceptual similarities with Sāṅkhya and Vaiṣṇavism hinted at in fn. 690 and § 137. Cf. also MCMAHAN 2002: 114, comparing certain visions of the Gv with the vision of Kṛṣṇa's cosmic body in the *Bhagavadgītā*.

<sup>690</sup> Cf. also WILLIAMS 1989: 124: "Thus, the *sūtra* (viz., Gv [L.S.]) is less concerned with describing the world this way as with recounting the [b]odhisattva's attainments by which he can see the world in such a light, and the [b]odhisattva's miraculous powers by which ... he can cause things to interpenetrate." — Even so, the curious similarity between the visionary worlds of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* and the ontology of the Sāṅkhya (which seems to have been shared by a certain theistic school: WEZLER 1981: 386–387; 403; 406; 1987a: 174–175; 180; 1992a: 290), according to which everything is, or is contained in, everything (see fn. 516 and fn. 528), may deserve closer investigation; cf. also statements like "in the tip of a finger there is the whole triple world" (*aṅgulīśikhare lokatrayam apy asti* : WEZLER 1981: 378–379).

sattvas, an important aspect being their awareness and also display of universal interpenetration.

115. Similarly, the idea of the ubiquity of the Buddha's body (or bodies), or the *dharmakāya*, appears to be viewed not so much in an ontological sense<sup>691</sup> as in the perspective of the Buddha's mastery over things and his all-pervading helpful presence. In this perspective, it makes sense that the Buddha is present within us as well as in the outside world. Similarly, when the Buddha's true nature is envisaged as being identical with the true nature of everything, its omnipresence naturally extends to sentient as well as insentient things. However, when the perspective shifts to immanent Buddhahood as a potential of the unawakened individual to attain Awakening, the perspective automatically narrows to sentient beings only,<sup>692</sup> because only these are traditionally considered to be in need of liberation. Thus, in the *Tathāgatopattisambhava-nirdeśa* chapter of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, only sentient beings (*sattva*) are stated to contain, from the outset, i. an encapsulated, hidden form, the complete knowledge of a Buddha (*tathāgatajñāna*).<sup>693</sup> The same also holds good for those Indian texts, beginning with the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*, that develop this idea into the view that all sentient beings, including even animals,<sup>694</sup> have a Buddha within (*tathāgatagarbha*; see §§ 53.2.2 and 53.3). The — somewhat casual — reference to “even animals” can, in the Indian context, hardly mean anything else than that animals are regarded

---

<sup>691</sup> In the Chinese versions of the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa*, the presence of the *dharmakāya* in the world is expressly compared with the presence of a reflected image in clear water (see § 107.2.3 with fn. 619).

<sup>692</sup> If the perspective is not so much theoretical as practical, it may even focus on human beings only.

<sup>693</sup> BAvB 623c23–624a22 ≈ BAvŚ 272c3–273a4; ≈ T 10.291 (Dharmarakṣa): 607c1–608a2. The Sanskrit original of the passage is quoted RGVV 22,10–24,8; cf. TAKASAKI 1966: 35–36 and 189–192; 1974: 574–602; ZIMMERMANN 2002: 65–66, ZACCHETTI 2000: 61–62.

<sup>694</sup> TGS # 7B (ZIMMERMANN 2002: 302–303 and 133 (transl.)). Cf. also RGV I.119 and 120.

here as the lowest grade of sentient beings (*sattva*), implying that *plants* are, as a matter of course, *not* included. They are rather reckoned as part of the 'container world' (*bhājanaloka*), i.e., of the surrounding world or environment, which is subordinate to sentient beings in the Indian Buddhist perspective (see § 132.1) and is, in itself, not in need of liberation because, being insentient, it does not suffer. In the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, the focussing on sentient beings in connection with the concept of *tathāgatagarbha* has entailed the consequence that even the all-encompassing presence of the *dharmakāya* and of the Buddha's true essence (*tathatā*) is expressed only with reference to sentient beings.<sup>695</sup> The subordinate position of the environment finds its most radical expression in the fully developed Yogācāra system where the 'container world' comes to be reduced to mere images in the minds of sentient beings (cf. § 132.2). The *Buddhāvataṃsaka* texts occasionally express themselves in a similar way, with the purpose, it seems,<sup>696</sup> of indicating either the illusory nature of the world or, more characteristically, the idea of a fluid, malleable universe not subject to the ordinary limitations of space, time, etc.

116.1. Thus, in the Indian *Buddhāvataṃsaka* materials and related texts, systematic consequences from interpenetration or from the ubiquity of the *dharmakāya* — i.e., from its presence not only in sentient beings but also in the environment — for the soteriological perspectives of the environment itself do not seem to have been drawn. As far as I can see, this problem came to be discussed only, albeit sporadically, in the treatises and commentaries of the Chinese exegetes of the sūtra.

a) Thus, the second Hua-yen patriarch, Chih-yen (智儼, 602–668), states that according to the One Vehicle (一乘, *ekayāna*) as repre-

---

<sup>695</sup> See § 53.3 with fn. 295 and fn. 296. Cf. also MSA IX.15, quoted RGVV 71,1-4.

<sup>696</sup> Cf. § 113.2 with fn. 683, but also ch. 1.5.1-3.

sented by the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, all sentient beings with both their personality (正) and environment (依) become Buddha.<sup>697</sup>

b) Likewise, Fa-tsang (法藏, 643–712) declares that in the context of the Perfect Teaching (圓教) — and hence only on the level of accomplished Buddhahood (局唯佛果), which this teaching reflects — Buddha-Nature (佛性) as well as its actualization (性起) cannot be limited to sentient beings but equally extends to the environment, since the environment is, as the ‘field-body’ (國土身, *kṣetrakāya*), one of the Buddha’s bodies.<sup>698</sup>

c) In his commentary on Śikṣānanda’s version of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* (*Hsin Hua-yen-ching lun* 新華嚴經論), the layman Li t’ung-hsüan (李通玄, 635?–730)<sup>699</sup> expressly relegates the view that only sentient beings have Buddha-nature and that grasses and trees cannot attain Buddhahood, turn the wheel of the Dharma, etc., to the provisional teaching of the apparitional Buddha.<sup>700</sup> The true doctrine (實教) is rather that in ‘fields’ of purified vision there is no distinction between sentients and insentients (無有情無情) or between beings at-

<sup>697</sup> T 45.1869: 519c13-14: 依一乘義 一切眾生 通依及正 竝皆成佛, 如華嚴經說. Cf. KAMATA 1965: 444.

<sup>698</sup> T 35.1733: 405c28–406a1: 若圓教中 佛性及性起 皆通依正。... 國土身等 皆是佛身。是故 局唯佛果 通遍非情。 Cf. KAMATA 1965: 445–447; AKAO 1984; PEN-KOWER 1993: 474–475 (concluding that in Fa-tsang’s case “there is no obvious interest in working out the details of Buddha-nature of the insentient”). For the compound *kṣetrakāya*, see fn. 588. Cf. also T 45.1876: 637c27–638a4 (cf. CLEARY 1983: 154) where Fa-tsang states that in view of the fact that principle and phenomena, and hence phenomena among each other, interpenetrate without obstruction (理事無礙, 事事無礙), mountains, rivers, trees (若山若河 乃至樹林) and even a single mote/atom (一塵) are both environment and body (即依即正), insentient and sentient (即情即非情).

<sup>699</sup> On Li T’ung-hsüan see, e.g., GIMELLO 1983; HAMAR 1998b: 337 with n. 17; KIMURA 2007: 228. A detailed treatment of Li T’ung-hsüan’s interesting exposition concerning the Buddha-nature of non-sentients is beyond the limits of this study.

<sup>700</sup> T 36.1739: 754c23-25: 如化佛權教中 說有情有佛性 無情無佛性。一切草木 不能成道轉法輪等。

taining and beings not attaining Buddhahood (無成佛者無不成者).<sup>701</sup> It is thus because there is no [dichotomy of] sentient and insentient beings and only the [non-dual] realm of ultimate insight that all mountains, rivers and trees may manifest themselves in the bodily form of Buddhas and bodhisattvas and expound the Dharma.<sup>702</sup>

d) Likewise, Ch'eng-kuan (澄觀) states that from the perspective of insentience being interfused with the nature of understanding and Awakening (覺性), there are no insentients cut off from Awakening.<sup>703</sup>

e) Finally, in the *Kegonshū shūshō gishō* (華嚴宗種性義抄)<sup>704</sup> written by the Japanese Kegon master Shin'en (親圓) in 1019 it is stated that on the level of the Perfect Teaching (圓教) it is indeed correct to say that because of the principle of the unhindered [interfusion] of sentient beings and environment (依報國土 正報眾生 無礙道理) insentients like grasses and trees, too, 'become Buddha' (成佛).<sup>705</sup> They do not do this, however, individually by their own effort, but it rather occurs in the sense that when sentient beings convert the fundamental layer of their minds so as to attain Awakening, the whole environment is, so to speak, automatically, passively,<sup>706</sup> drawn along into Awakening as well, because it is nothing but a manifestation developed by a sentient being's mind (識所變, *vijñānapariṇāma*), or an

<sup>701</sup> T 36.1739: 754c25–755a1. Cf. also fn. 219.

<sup>702</sup> T 36.1739: 755a23–24: 無有情與非情，但爲智境界。一切山河樹木 皆能現佛菩薩身及說法。

<sup>703</sup> T 36.1736: 400b4–5: 三，無非覺悟，以無情性融覺性故。This is the third of three positions, the first being that of the MPS according to which Buddha-nature is defined, in a phenomenal sense, as being based on the capacity of understanding, thus excluding the insentient (cf. also ZHANG 2008: 676–678), whereas in the second position Buddha-nature is taken as the true nature or ultimate emptiness of all *dharma*s, which transcends all distinctions, like 'mind' and 'object'. Cf. KAMATA 1965: 452; PENKOWER 1993: 475–477.

<sup>704</sup> Cf. KIM 2008, esp. 657–658.

<sup>705</sup> T 72.2328: 61c4–5 and 7–8.

<sup>706</sup> Cf. KIM 2008: 658a10–11: 非情の受身的な成仏論。

effect of Suchness developing in accordance with conditions (真如隧緣).<sup>707</sup> Participating in the Buddha's Awakening, the whole environment is his 'field-body' (國土身, *kṣetrakāya*) or the cosmic Buddha (法界佛).<sup>708</sup> For the same reason, even insentient things may expound the Dharma, and in support Shin'en quotes the verse of the *Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa* from which I started (§ 101).<sup>709</sup>

116.2. Still, even if such a position were accepted as a justifiable interpretation of the purport of this verse as well as of the remaining *Buddhāvataṃsaka* material adduced in the course of the preceding discussion,<sup>710</sup> it surely represents a new development resting on presuppositions entirely alien to early Buddhism. Apart from this, the aforementioned statements of the Hua-yen masters do not necessarily establish *individual* sentience or individual Awakening, and if they did, this would hold good for *all* insentient things, including even artefacts, and would certainly not establish plants alone as the only sentient and saintly beings among them.

## 2.5. Résumé

117.1. If my analysis of the more specific passages from Mahāyāna sūtras discussed in this chapter is correct, they, too, hardly present unambiguous evidence for the assumption that plants were regarded, by their Indic authors, as sentient or even saintly beings. Even if we

<sup>707</sup> T 72.2328: 61c8 ff, esp. 13-15: 正報眾生 轉因位八識成佛時 依報國土草木等皆成佛, 識所變故, 真如隧緣故。

<sup>708</sup> T 72.2328: 61c25-27.

<sup>709</sup> T 72.2328: 61c15-25; read 刹 for 羅刹 in c16.

<sup>710</sup> I.e., if we were entitled to interpret the sūtra in terms of Chih-yen's (T 45.1868: 516b20-24; cf. CLEARY 1983: 136) assertion that according to the position of the Sole Vehicle (*ekayāna*) universal interpenetration is the real quality (實德) of the universe's (*dharmadhātu*) origination in dependence (法界緣起, cf. GIMELLO 1976: 424 f; NAK. 1249d-1250a), and not merely the effect of miraculous displays based on supranormal faculties (神力變化), or the power (力) of bodhi-sattvas, or [mere] non-duality (不二) [on the ultimate level], as ordinary Mahāyāna puts it. Cf. also 516c22-23; 517b18-19; 518c2-3.



disregard the fact that the original purport of one passage was probably quite different (§ 102.1) and take it in the sense attributed to it by the Chinese tradition (§ 102.2), this does not alter the fact that the passages are limited to the following statements:

- a) plants, or any insentient things, may preach, or at least emit sounds of praise or exhortation (ch. 2.3-4);
- b) insentient things may be transformed into sentient beings or vice versa (ch. 2.2);
- c) even insentient things like plants may preach after having been transformed (ch. 2.1).

Quite frequently, these phenomena are expressly ascribed to the miraculous power of the Buddha or high-level bodhisattvas (ch. 2.1-2 and §§ 105 and 107.1), and even in most instances where this is not the case some direct or indirect influence may safely be presupposed (cf. §§ 100 and 108.3.2). In the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, it is sometimes the Buddhas manifesting themselves in elements of the environment who preach, and hence the preaching of insentient things may occasionally be just a metaphor for the preaching of these Buddhas (§ 108.2) or, alternatively, of the omnipresent True Buddha (§ 108.3). The latter possibility would come close to the preaching of insentients as a metaphor for the 'self-revelation' of the true nature of everything in any object perceived or contemplated by an open-minded observer (§ 109). Neither of these interpretations implies an agency, and hence sentience or saintliness, of the plants or objects as such. To call them 'Buddha-natured' would be, at best, possible under the aspect of their being pervaded or encompassed by the omnipresent True Buddha or his real body (in analogy to the first interpretation of the term *tathā-gatagarbha* in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*: see § 53.3) or under the aspect of the non-duality of the true nature or Suchness (*tathatā*) of all dharmas and the true nature of the Buddha (in analogy to the second interpretation: see *ibid.*). But nothing indicates that they were taken to have Buddha-nature in the sense of the third interpretation, viz., to possess Buddha-nature as a potential or hidden presence enabling them to individually attain Buddhahood, or taken to have already attained this goal.

117.2. It may well be that more pertinent material will come to light, especially through a comprehensive and penetrating scrutiny of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* material and of Tantric Buddhist sources (with which I am, unfortunately, insufficiently familiar). But the influence of Tantric Buddhism on Far Eastern Buddhism seems to postdate the emergence of the idea of insentients having Buddha-nature, though there are indeed influences on later developments (cf. §§ 136 and 141). In any case, Tantric sources are, in my opinion, even more unlikely than Mahāyāna sūtras to have preserved or deliberately revitalized an early Buddhist attitude in which plants (but hardly any other 'insentients') were still tacitly regarded as somehow sentient (or at least not yet doctrinally denied rudimentary individual sentience) or, allegedly, even regarded as saintly beings.

## Pt. II.B: An Attempt at a Structural Comparison

118. The critical examination, in Pt. II.A, of a number of pertinent passages from Indian Mahāyāna sources has shown that none of these passages offers conclusive evidence for a substantial continuity between the (actual or alleged) early Buddhist view on plants and the Far Eastern idea of their Buddha-nature. We may now ask whether there is at least some structural similarity between the two concepts. It is, however, definitely beyond the limits of this paper and also beyond the range of my competence to present a comprehensive outline, let alone a full picture, of the genesis and the various facets and developments of the Far Eastern concept of the Buddha-nature of “grasses and trees”.<sup>711</sup> I have to confine myself to casting some light on a few aspects, special developments and functions of this concept, which lend themselves to being compared, or contrasted, with the early Buddhist view on plants, or rather with the early Buddhist view of plants as sentient or even saintly beings<sup>712</sup> as postulated by OKADA and FINDLY, respectively.

---

<sup>711</sup> I am not able to present an exhaustive list of secondary literature on the subject. Let me just mention SHIVELY 1957; SAKAMOTO 1959a; 1959b; 1960a; 1960b; MIYAMOTO 1961 (further references: 692 f, n. 1); KAMATA 1965: 434–474; id. 1968; KAMEI 1966; ISHII Shūdō 1967; LAFLEUR 1973, 1974; YOSHIZU 1973; HANANO 1975–1977; KOSEKI 1980; NAKAJIMA 1983; AKAO 1984; OMINE 1987; GROSNICK 1990; SHINKAWA 1992; PENKOWER 1993; MATSUMOTO 1994: 96–105, id. 2000; 2002; SUEKI 1995a: 363–421; id. 2001; Itō 1996–2008; PLASSEN 1997; SHIRATO 1998; TAKASAKI 1998; ARAMAKI 2000 (esp. 581–587); GRONER 2000; RAMBELLI 2001; OKUNO 2002: 379–400; SHARF 2002: 246–249; FUCHITA 2003; ANDERL 2004b; OGAWA Takashi 2006: 66–71; HORIBATA 2006; WATANABE Mariko 2008. References to more specific studies or casual treatments of the subject will be given in the respective footnotes. I apologize for not being able to make mention of pertinent literature in modern Chinese or Korean.

<sup>712</sup> Not, perhaps, Buddhas, but at any rate arhats, a difference which would, however, be explicable by the transition from early Buddhism to Mahāyāna. Apart

119. One fundamental difference has already been mentioned in passing several times (§§ 52.2, 54, 56, 57, etc.). As pointed out in Pt. I ch. 1, there are passages which suggest that in earliest Buddhism the ancient Indian belief in the ubiquity of sentience had not yet come to be consistently discarded as far as *plants* are concerned, but in the case of the *elements* hardly any traces of it are verifiable. As against this, when in Far Eastern Buddhism the restraints limiting Buddhahood to sentient beings (眾生, 有情, i.e., the five or six *gatis*, including, besides otherworldly beings, only humans and animals) are burst, its presence is normally extended not only to plants but to *all* insentient things (無情, 非情),<sup>713</sup> or to the whole environment (器世間, lit.

---

from this, in the Far Eastern traditions the concept of 'Buddhahood' may not always have the same connotations as in early Indian Buddhism or in Indian Mahāyāna.

<sup>713</sup> [1.] In texts translated from Indian originals, both 眾生 and 有情 in most cases render Skt. *sattva* ("living, sentient beings") or quasi-synonyms, occasionally also words denoting a sub-group of sentient beings, like men or animals. Whereas the earlier term 眾生 (lit. "all living [beings]") expresses the aspect of life, the term 有情 (sometimes abbreviated to 情), introduced by Hsüan-tsang (ANDERL 2004b: 151 f),<sup>a</sup> conveys the aspect of sentience or specific functions resulting from it in ordinary beings. For the various meanings of *ch'ing* 情 in Chinese Buddhist texts, the reader is referred to ANDERL 2004b. As far as I can see from a cursory check of some of Hsüan-tsang's translations (including the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* 成唯識論), in the rather few cases where he uses 情 in phrases not corresponding to Skt. *sattva*, etc., it tends to designate mental activities, attitudes or emotions, often (but not always) deluded or unwholesome ones.<sup>b</sup> Thus, there is reason to assume that Hsüan-tsang's choice of the term 有情 for *sattva* was meant to indicate that ordinary sentient beings (in contrast to saints) are enmeshed in deluded thoughts and emotions. This is in fact true of all ordinary sentient beings, including animals, since according to the Yogācāra doctrine even the latter have an innate notion of ego (*sahajā satkāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ*). Still, it is hard to believe that Hsüan-tsang would not have been aware of the current use (e.g., in Kumārajīva's translations, and already in An shih-kao) of 情 in the expression "the five/six sense-faculties" (五情, 六情; cf. ANDERL 2004b: 158 f). Thus, 有情 was probably also intended to convey the idea of "having sense-faculties", i.e., being sentient. Therefore, in the Indian perspective, the characterization of plants and the other elements of the environment as 無情 or 非情 means that they are not only devoid of deluded (or other) thoughts and emotions but also lack sense-faculties, i.e., are insentient. To what extent this holds good for Far

“container world”, Skt. *bhājanaloka*, or 依 = 依報 “[karmic] retribution in the form of the support [for the primary karmic retribution 正報, viz., sentient beings or their bodies]), and in this regard the Far Eastern idea of the Buddha-nature of insentients is, as FINDLY (2008: 253; 376 f) rightly remarks, closer to Jainism and to the Vedic worldview than to early Buddhism. It is true that not only Japanese masters<sup>714</sup> but also some of the earliest Chinese representatives like Chitsang (吉藏, 549–623)<sup>715</sup> or the *Chüeh-kuan lun* (絕觀論, see § 129.1) prefer to speak of “grasses and trees” only, and that the still earlier statement ascribed, in one source, to Tao-sheng (see § 54) identifies just two specific plants with the [Buddha’s] *dharmakāya* and ultimate

---

Eastern Buddhist sources as well, remains to be seen. [2.] Occasionally, 非情 is used to render *acetana* (T 29.1558: 44c20: 外非情精血 = AKBh 121,14-15: *bāhyam evācetanam śukraśōṇitam* [ms.]). According to MATSUMOTO (2000: 613–614, n. 48), *acetana* should be understood as a *bahuvrīhi* meaning “lacking *cetanā*”, i.e., being devoid of thinking in the sense of verbal and conceptual consciousness. But since *cetana* as an adjective is already found in Vedic texts, *acetana* can also be taken (and may indeed originally have been) a *taṭpuruṣa* (cf. VisM-mhṭ 1 # 311, admitting both resolutions: *acetano ti na cetano, cetanārahito vā*). And even though *acetana* often enough indicates lack of reflective thinking or understanding, it can also be used in the sense of being devoid of sense-faculties, i.e., a complete lack of sentience (cf., e.g., the passage adduced in EDS I.iii: 688a from *Carakasamhitā* I.1.48: *sendriyam cetanam dravyam nirindriyam acetanam*), and this would also seem to be the apposite meaning in the AKBh passage quoted above (semen and menstrual blood qualified as external and insentient), or when a dead body is stated to be left lying senseless (*acetana*) like a log (AKBh 73,19-20; cf. MN I 296,9-11).

<sup>a</sup> It may be worth noting that according to KARASHIMA 1998: 598 the expression 眾情 “many sentient beings” occurs already in Dharmarakṣa’s translation of the *Lotus Sūtra*. Although Paramārtha does not normally use 有情 and 無情 for sentient and insentient beings, I have come across two exceptional occurrences in his *Fo-hsing-lun* 佛性論, viz., T 31.1610: 788a11 (see fn. 2) and 789b25.

<sup>b</sup> Cf., e.g., T 31.1585: 1b8, etc.: 妄情; 31a4: 迷情; T 30.1579: 359b26-27: 情無偏黨 (“whose emotions [here neutral!] are free from partiality”) for YBhHetu 530,14: *a-pakṣarāgin* (“not attached to [one] side”); 517b23: 縱情受用 (“giving way to their desires, they enjoy it”) for BoBh 114,8: *upabhoktu-kāmāḥ*.

<sup>714</sup> Cf. RAMBELLI 2001: 1–2.

<sup>715</sup> T 45.1853: 40b18–23, c3, 14-15, 17, 21, etc.

insight (*prajñā*). But this statement, to begin with, is patently poetical, and its author probably picked out two especially appealing objects to highlight the presence of Buddha-nature, or the Buddha, in the whole world. In the case of Chi-tsang and the *Chüeh-kuan lun*, too, we may speculate that the preference for “grasses and trees” was motivated by the fact that they may have been felt to be more persuasive examples than walls and rubble (the items enumerated by the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* as lacking Buddha-nature: see § 53.2.3).<sup>716</sup> But Chi-tsang’s argument is clearly aimed at demolishing any dichotomy (see § 127.3), and, quite apart from the fact that 草木 may also mean “straw and wood”, Chi-tsang himself uses, in one passage, the more comprehensive expression “mountains, rivers, grasses and trees” (山河草木).<sup>717</sup> Chan-jan (湛然, 711–782) on the other hand prefers, at any rate in his *Diamond Scalpel* (金剛鐮論), the comprehensive term “insentients” (無情), taken to include things like grasses, trees, pebbles and motes.<sup>718</sup> In Japan, too, “grasses and trees” alternates with more comprehensive expressions like “grasses and trees, rivers, bricks and pebbles” or “grasses and trees, mountains and rivers, the great ocean and the empty sky” and is therefore merely an abbreviation for all insentients, sometimes including even man-made artefacts.<sup>719</sup>

---

<sup>716</sup> In the case of the *Chüeh-kuan lun*, the choice of “grasses and trees” may also be motivated by their special suitability for the spiritual intention of the passage (see § 129.1).

<sup>717</sup> T 45.1853: 40c11-12. That “grasses and trees” usually stand *pars pro toto* for all insentient things is also clear from a passage in Fa-tsang’s commentary on the BAv, the *Hua-yen-ching t’an-hsüan chi* 華嚴經探玄記 (T 35.1733: 405c27), where he quotes, in connection with the question of the presence of Buddha-nature in the insentient (非情), the famous MPS passage (see § 53.2.3 with fn. 292) in which this presence is denied, but uses “grasses and trees” instead of the MPS’s “walls and rubble”, thus obviously presupposing the equivalence of both expressions.

<sup>718</sup> See § 127.4 with fn. 783.

<sup>719</sup> RAMBELLI 2001: 1–2; STONE 1999: 3; 193. Quite unusual is Raihō’s (賴寶, 1279–1330?) equation of the non-sentient (or non-rational?) beings with “birds and beasts” besides “grasses and trees” (RAMBELLI 2001: 37; FUCHITA 2003: 74).

120.1. Another important point to be paid attention to is the question of the extent to which the Buddha-nature of plants (and other apparently insentient things) and the sentience it may imply is, in the Far Eastern context, conceived of as an *individual* property, as in the ancient Indian context, where sentience implies some, if only rudimentary, experience (sense of touch, feeling of pleasure or pain).<sup>720</sup> In other words: Are plants (etc.) in the Far Eastern view regarded as capable of *individual* experience? And does their possessing Buddha-nature mean that they are *individually* capable of attaining Awakening? Or does it even mean that they are already fully Awakened Buddhas,<sup>721</sup> just as they are, and this is merely hidden *to us*, or they are simply not understood by us in their true nature as long as we ourselves have not Awakened? And if they are indeed already fully Awakened Buddhas, have they attained this status in consequence of spiritual accomplishment in previous lives, or are they in a state of Awakening or perfection just by their very nature, without any prior involvement in saṃsāra?

120.2. It seems to be in the latter sense that MATSUMOTO<sup>722</sup> understands the view of the Buddha-nature of the insentient, calling it the “Buddha-nature Manifestation theory” (仏性顕在論), according to which “Buddha-nature is already manifested as all phenomenal existences, including non-sentient beings (無情) such as trees and stones”, contrasting it with the “Buddha-nature Immanence theory” (仏性内在論), i.e., the Indian type of Tathāgatagarbha theory according to which Buddha-nature “is considered to dwell within the *bodies* of sentient beings” only, as a potential or in a hidden, still inefficient form. According to MATSUMOTO, the ‘Buddha-nature Manifestation theory’ is a “Chinese development of Indian Tathāgatagarbha

<sup>720</sup> See § 1 and § 13 with fns. 58 and 59.

<sup>721</sup> Cf. LAFLEUR 1973: 100; OMINE 1987: 7; RAMBELLI 2001: 11 (“They [i.e., nature, the environment, and inanimate objects] either become Buddhas or are already in a Buddha-like state”).

<sup>722</sup> MATSUMOTO 2002: 364–363 rl = (15)–(16) and, for detailed presentations, 1994: 96–105 and 2000: passim.

thought”, “produced evidently under the influence of Chinese Taoism,” with Seng-chao (僧肇, †414) as the connecting link.<sup>723</sup> Still, from a structural point of view the ‘Buddha-nature Manifestation theory’ bears some similarity to the view FINDLY postulates for early Indian Buddhism, for in both cases plants would be perfect beings, just as they are. But in the ‘Buddha-nature Manifestation theory’ this is true not only of plants but of all insentient beings (see § 119), and their state is hardly viewed as an outcome of a process of spiritual perfection in previous lives. Moreover, it remains to be seen to what extent the manifestation of Buddha-nature in the insentient involves any individual awareness on their part.

120.3. For an exhaustive comparison, however, a closer analysis of the Far Eastern idea of the Buddha-nature of the insentient appears inevitable. The reason is that, while fully recognizing the heuristic value of MATSUMOTO’s dichotomy, I cannot help feeling that it tends to blur the fact that the concept of the Buddha-nature of the insentient is not as homogenous as his treatment suggests, but is, on the contrary, a fairly complex idea, comprising or involving various facets and perspectives,<sup>724</sup> and with regard to the affirmation or rejection of some of these facets there are indeed differences of emphasis or opinion and even disputes among the proponents of the idea of the Buddha-nature of the non-sentient, sometimes within one and the same tradition.

---

<sup>723</sup> MATSUMOTO 2000: 262–265 (referring to KAMATA 1965: 458), comparing Seng-chao’s statement that “heaven and earth have the same root as myself, all things have the same essence as myself” (T 45.1858: 159b28-29: 天地與我同根 萬物與我一體) with an almost identical passage from the *Chuang-tzū* (chapter 齊物論, Harvard-Yenching Concordance p. 5, l. 52 f): “Heaven and earth are born together with me, and all things are one with me” (天地與我並生 而萬物與我爲一).

<sup>724</sup> MATSUMOTO (2000: 62) himself distinguishes between two types of non-sentients attaining Buddhahood, viz.: A. non-sentients attain Buddhahood in the wake of sentient beings, and B. they do so by means of their own resolve and spiritual practice. Yet, to my mind neither A nor B accords with his definition of the “Buddha-nature Manifestation theory”.



121. In the following chapters, I shall first try to give an (admittedly rough and provisional) impression of the various aspects of the idea that plants and other insentients have Buddha-nature (佛性) or may attain Buddhahood (成佛) (ch. 1). Thereafter, I shall present some medieval Japanese developments leading up to the assumption of an individual sentience and an individual (attainment of) Buddhahood of plants, etc. (ch. 2), and finally compare the Far Eastern developments with the old Indian and early Buddhist view regarding the sentience and the status of plants from the point of view of their practical consequences for everyday life (ch. 3).

## 1. Facets of the Far Eastern Idea of the 'Buddha-Nature of Grasses and Trees' and their Indian Background

122.1. In order to exemplify the distinction of various aspects of the Buddha-nature of plants, or of their attainment of Buddhahood, and as an instance of rejecting one of these aspects while, obviously, accepting others, let me start from a statement of the Japanese Tendai master Hōchi-bō Shōshin (寶地房證眞, active 1153–1207). When discussing the DhPAN passage discussed in Pt. II.A ch. 2.1, he states that the concept of grasses and trees becoming, or being established as, Buddha(s) (草木成佛) has four meanings:<sup>725</sup>

1. In terms of the essential nature (理性), "grasses and trees" have always been Buddha.
2. The eye of the Buddha clearly perceives them as Buddha-[natured].
3. Vairocana is omnipresent.
4. The Buddhas may transform "grasses and trees" into Buddhas.

122.2. According to Shōshin, none of the four meanings implies that plants as individuals may become Buddhas by their own spiritual

---

<sup>725</sup> *Shikan shiki* 249b11-12: 草木成佛 且有四義。一 依理性本來是佛。二 依佛眼照見爲佛。三 依遮那遍一切處。四 依諸佛變令作佛。Cf. MIYAMOTO 1961: 683; HANANO 1976b: 150a.

practice. In other words, a fifth meaning of the concept of the Buddha-nature of plants, viz.,

5. “Grasses and trees” make up their mind (i.e., resolve to awaken), practise [the Path], and attain Buddhahood (草木發心修行成佛), is rejected by Shōshin.<sup>726</sup> According to him, this aspect is not confirmed by any sūtra passage or by the authoritative Chinese T’ien-t’ai treatises<sup>727</sup> but is rather a later (probably Japanese) invention.<sup>728</sup> For Shōshin, plants (or any other insentients) cannot, individually, embark on the Path and attain Awakening, because they lack the individual, concrete forms of mind (事心).<sup>729</sup> To assume that they are en-

<sup>726</sup> In a similar way, the idea that insentients attain Buddhahood individually and by way of their own spiritual practice is rejected in the *Rokusoku senyō ki* 六即詮要記 (see fn. 485; text of the passage in HANANO 1976b: 129) and in *Sanjin-gi shiki* 330b3–331a11. Cf. also ITŌ 1996: 25a–27b; HORIBATA 154–157; WATANABE 2008: 64a–b.

<sup>727</sup> *Shikan shiki* 248b3-5: “In the teachings of the Sūtras of [Śākyamuni’s] whole lifetime as well as in the [authoritative] doctrinal texts of the Tendai school, there is no assertion at all that plants become Buddhas. [The exposition of the] ten meanings<sup>a</sup> in [Chan-jan’s] *Fu-hsing*<sup>b</sup> as well as the whole *Diamond Scalpel* treatise merely elucidates the meaning of insentients having Buddha-nature, but does not discourse on plants starting out [for Awakening], practising [the bodhisattva path] and becoming Buddhas” (一代經說一宗教文都無草木成佛之說。輔行十義金鐔一論 只明非情有佛性義，不論草木發修成佛。). Cf. 249b13: “Though there are these [four] meanings [of plants becoming, or being established as, Buddha(s), viz., the four enumerated in § 122.1 with fn. 725], if [the matter] is addressed in terms of an individual, concrete [process], in reality they do not become Buddhas [by their own effort]” (雖有此義，若以事論 實不作佛。).

<sup>a</sup> Viz., of Chih-i’s statement that there is not a single colour or smell that is not the Middle Way.

<sup>b</sup> T 46.1912: 151c20–152a23; cf. MIYAMOTO 1961: 684; PENKOWER 1993: 420–423; SUEKI 1995: 369; 2001: 76–78.

<sup>728</sup> Cf. *Shikan shiki* 248b1-2: “Some former Venerables (like Annen, cf. HANANO 1976b: 136b) have said that plants make up their mind, practise [the Path] and become Buddhas, [but] the senior scholars of the present generation do not consent to this view” (或古德云：草木發心修行成佛。今代先德 不許此義。). Cf. § 145.

<sup>729</sup> *Shikan shiki* 248b15-16: 若云 非情直成佛者，既無事心 云何修行。 Cf. also 251a6: 非謂有事心。

dowed with individual mind, albeit merely a subtle form of it,<sup>730</sup> would, according to Shōshin, not only blur the distinction between sentient and insentient beings<sup>731</sup> but also amount to espousing the erroneous view of the Nirgranthas (= Jains).<sup>732</sup>

**122.3.** A few explanatory remarks on these five aspects may be appropriate. Of special interest in the context of this study is the question of the extent to which they can be shown to have an Indian background. This is, however, a very complex issue, and all I can do in the present study is offer a largely tentative outline.

## 1.1. Buddha-Nature as the Essential Nature of Plants

**123.1.** In early Buddhism, the true nature of our existence, its main cause and the means for overcoming it are expressed in the four Noble Truths.<sup>733</sup> The details of the path to liberation aside, their contents came to be articulated in the form of two invariable principles: 1. the principle that all factors involved in mundane existence are invariably impermanent, unsatisfactory and not a Self or ego nor secure possessions,<sup>734</sup> and 2. the true, invariable principle (*tathatā*) of origination in dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*),<sup>735</sup> which explains why we are

---

<sup>730</sup> Against this alternative (for which see § 149.2–5), Shōshin raises the additional argument that since even for sentient beings, who are endowed with a clear mind, it is difficult to attain Awakening, how can we expect insentients, which have only some subtle form of mind, to succeed in attaining it (*Shikan shiki* 248b17–249a2: 若有細心方成佛者, 有情明心 尚能難成佛, 非情細心 何得成佛.).

<sup>731</sup> *Shikan shiki* 248b17: 若云 草木亦有心者, 則通有情, 云何非情; 249a2: 若有細心, 亦是有情.

<sup>732</sup> *Shikan shiki* 251a8-9: 若草木有事心者, 即同尼犍外道邪計也. Cf. fn. 517.

<sup>733</sup> Vin I 10 and SN V 421. In SN no. 56.20 (V 430-431), the four insights “this is suffering”, etc., are stated to be true (*tatha*), not false (*avītatha*), not otherwise (*anāññatha*, i.e., invariable).

<sup>734</sup> Vin I 14, and especially, in the present context, AN I 286 (no. 3.134): *ñhitā va sā dhātu dhammaññhitatā dhammaniyāmata* “*sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā*” *ti*, etc.

<sup>735</sup> Cf., in this context, especially SN II 25-26 (no. 12.20): *ñhitā va sā dhātu dhammaññhitatā dhammaniyāmata idappaccayatā. ... yā tatra tathatā avītathatā an-*

caught up in suffering and in the chain of deaths and rebirths (*saṃ-sāra*) and how we can free ourselves from this entanglement. The specific relation of the Buddha to these truths or true principles is that he discovered and promulgated them, showing thereby the way to liberation. We may thus call them the *cause* of Buddhahood in so far as they were the *object* of his Awakening. Since especially the exposition of the principle of origination in dependence came to be regarded as the cornerstone of the Buddha's Dharma, and the Dharma as his true 'body',<sup>736</sup> or presence in the world, to see origination in dependence amounts, in a sense, to seeing the Buddha.<sup>737</sup> Still, it would, in early Buddhism, be misleading to *identify* the Buddha with the principle of origination in dependence *as such*, which is just an impersonal law and, in itself, soteriologically neutral, functioning as it does in both directions: liberation and entanglement, according to whether sentient beings succeed in understanding it and practise accordingly or fail to do so.

123.2. In early Buddhism, the spiritual goal is not Buddhahood in the specific sense implying the founding of a dispensation or omniscience but nirvāṇa, liberation from suffering (*dukkha*). Since suffering presupposes sentience, it is a problem for sentient beings only, and it is only sentient beings that are, under certain conditions, capable of generating the antidote, viz., Awakening in the sense of liberating insight, which is a function of the mind (*citta*) or *viññāna*, the principle of sentient life and sensation. The soteriological significance of mind is occasionally expressed by qualifying it as shining or luminous (*pabhassara*) [by nature] but stained by adventitious (*āgantuka*)

---

*aññathatā idappaccayatā, ayaṃ vuccati ... paṭiccasamuppādo*. — Four stages of the development of the doctrine of dependent arising according to Fa-tsang: HAMAR 1998a: 2 n. 4.

<sup>736</sup> DN III 84.

<sup>737</sup> AKVy 293,20-22 (*Śālistambasūtra*, cf. SCHOENING 1995: II 701, no. 2). The Pāli version (MN I 190,37–191,2) and the Chinese *Madhyamāgama* (T 1.26: 467a9-10) lack the equation with the Buddha (ANĀLAYO 2006: 123 n. 261), but this equation is found in It 91,12-14 and also implied at DN II 154,6-8 and III 84,23-25.

defilements (*upakkilesa*).<sup>738</sup> And in two admittedly unusual canonical passages<sup>739</sup> mention is made of a boundless (*ananta*) Mind (*viññāna*), which seems to refer to the sphere of nirvāṇa, suggesting the idea of a final absorption of the individual sensation or sentience, which is occasionally presupposed as the basic transmigrating element,<sup>740</sup> into a cosmic Mind.<sup>741</sup>

124. In the mainstream schools, the principle of origination in dependence is systematically elaborated and applied to all areas of conditioned existence, including the external world. At least in those schools for which sufficient materials have survived, the antisubstantialist tendency of Buddhist spirituality had the effect that *viññāna* was consistently conceived of in terms of moments or chains of actual perception and cognition. In an influential strand of Mahāyāna Buddhism, origination in dependence and antisubstantialism appear in a radicalized form, having developed into the idea that all dharmas are empty (*śūnya*), with no true being (i.e., essence and existence) of their own (*niḥsvabhāva*). As a result, the saṃsāric world, and hence the rigid opposition of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, is reduced to an illusion.<sup>742</sup>

<sup>738</sup> AN I 10 (1.5.9-10 and 1.6.1-2).

<sup>739</sup> Viz., DN I 223,12 and MN I 329,30-31.

<sup>740</sup> Most explicit is DN II 63; cf., e.g., FRAUWALLNER 1953: 204–205; VETTER 1988: 48–51; LANGER 2001: 21–25.

<sup>741</sup> Cf., e.g., VETTER 1988: 65; 2000: 72; LANGER 2001: 51–67. In DN I 223, the somewhat surprising line at the end of the verses which refers to the cessation of *viññāna* looks like an attempt to assert the prevailing view of *viññāna* as an impermanent saṃsāric factor; actually, this line is also found at Sn 1037 (where it fits the thread of thought perfectly) and is missing in the version quoted in Vi 671a14-20.

<sup>742</sup> Cf., e.g., Aṣṭ 89,15-16: *skandhadhātuvāyatanam ... śūnyam viviktam śāntam*; 201,11-12: *sarvadharmāḥ svabhāvena viviktāḥ, sarvadharmāḥ svabhāvena śūnyāḥ* (cf. Pañc V:15,23 ff); 224,26: *sarvadharmeṣu ... śūnyeṣu* (AṣṭL 468a11; Pañc V:66,21); 239,14-16: *sarvadharmā hi svabhāvena śūnyāḥ, ... māyopamāḥ svapnopamāḥ pratiśrutkopamāḥ pratibhāsopamāḥ* (cf. AṣṭL 471c1-2); 20,14-15 and 21 : *sarvadharmā api ... māyopamāḥ svapnopamāḥ | ... nirvāṇam api ... māyopamarāḥ svapnopamam iti vadāmi* (cf. AṣṭL 430a7-8 and 10-11; Pañc II:14,24 ff and 15,20-23).

Strictly speaking, all dharmas, and consequently all sentient beings, have been at rest from the very beginning (*ādiśānta*), are extinguished by their very nature (*prakṛtiparinirvṛta*).<sup>743</sup> Nirvāṇa has thus always been anticipated on the 'ontological' level, and all that is required for liberation is that one become existentially, without any reification,<sup>744</sup> aware of this fact, or of the true nature or 'Suchness' (*tathatā*) of all dharmas, i.e., their emptiness (*sūnyatā*),<sup>745</sup> through abandoning the fiction of an essential dichotomy of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.<sup>746</sup> Even this awareness, as a psychic state, and the excellent qualities that distinguish the Buddha from ordinary arhats are ultimately empty.<sup>747</sup> Thus, the Suchness of the Tathāgata is just the same as the Suchness of all

---

Evidence from early BAv material: NATTIER 2007: 127. As for the historical background of this development, see VETTER 2001: 70–82.

<sup>743</sup> Cf. KP # 125 (62b4): *prakṛtiparinirvṛtā ca sarvadharmān viditvā*; AkṣNird I 69,8 (the *skandhas* are *rang bzhin gyis zhi ba* = *\*prakṛtiśānta*); 127,21-22 (the body is *\*prakṛtiparinirvṛta*); 147,25 (the dharmas are *\*prakṛtiparinirvṛta*); *Ratnamegha-sūtra*, quoted PrasP 225,9-10; Vkn III.51: *parinirvṛtāni te* (sc. *tathāgatāḥ*) *satvāni paśyanti nirvāṇaprakṛtikāni*; Saṃdh VII.1 (p. 66,24-26); MSABh 68,1-2: *yo hi niḥ-svabhāvaḥ ... sa ādiśāntaḥ, ya ādiśāntaḥ sa prakṛtiparinirvṛta(h)*.

<sup>744</sup> Cf. passages like Aṣṭ 6,18-19: *saced rūpaṃ sūnyam iti carati, nimitte carati* (cf. AṣṭL 426c5); 18,18: *rūpaṃ sūnyam asūnyam iti na sthātavyam* (Pañc II:7,29-30; not in T 8.224); 95,5: *rūpaṃ ... sūnyam iti saṅgaḥ* (AṣṭL 442b27-28; Pañc III:166,6); 225,7: *tathatām eva tāvaṇ nopalabhate* (but AṣṭL 468a20 但薩阿竭 = *tathāgatam*, and Pañc V:68,2: *tathāgatatvam*).

<sup>745</sup> Cf. Aṣṭ 134,11-14: *tathā ... tathāgato rūpaṃ jānāti yathā tathatā*, etc. (cf. AṣṭL 449c29; Pañc IV:65,15); 225,3-4: *yad yad eva ... Subhūteḥ sthāvirasya pratibhāti, tat tad eva ... sūnyatām ārabhya pratibhāti* (AṣṭL 468a12-13; Pañc V:67,2-3).

<sup>746</sup> Cf., e.g., *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* vs. 4–6 (LINDTNER 1982: 102–105; cf. SCHERRER-SCHAUB 1991: 132–146); *Ratnāvalī* (ed. M. HAHN, Bonn 1982) 1.42: *bhāvābhāva-parāmarśakṣayo nirvāṇam ucyate*.

<sup>747</sup> Cf. Aṣṭ 20,18-19: *samyaksambuddho 'pi māyopamaḥ svapnopamaḥ | samyak-sambuddhatvam api māyopamam svapnopamam* (cf. AṣṭL 430a9-10; Pañc II:15,17-20); 225,5: *bodhim eva ..., sarvajñatām eva tāvaṇ nopalabhate* (cf. AṣṭL 468a19; Pañc V:67,30-31: *anuttarām eva samyaksambodhin nopalabhate*).

dharmaś, <sup>748</sup> regardless of whether they belong to sentient beings or insentient things. In theory, we could derive from this that all beings, even the insentient, participate in the Suchness of the Buddha, but actually in the Indian context the original purport of such passages is rather almost the opposite, viz., that even the loftiest elements of the Buddhist world view, as long as they are conceived of as particular entities, are just as empty as any other dharmas.

125. As was pointed out in Pt. II.A, ch. 1.7, the equation of the Buddha with the Suchness of all dharmas, i.e., their essential emptiness, is also central to the chapter 'Eulogies on Mount Sumeru' of the *Buddhāvataṃśaka*. Here, the focus is on the transconceptuality and transphenomenality of the Buddha, and on 'seeing' or comprehending him as he really is, instead of perceiving him in the form of an imagined physical appearance.

126.0. However, the perspective changes again when, in connection with the trend to establish Buddhahood as the only ultimate goal, and the Mahāyāna as the only real Way (*ekayāna*), true reality (Suchness) came to be conceived of in terms of an 'ontological' anticipation of not merely nirvāṇa but, more particularly, Buddhahood. As was pointed out above, <sup>749</sup> one of the three interpretations of the expression '*tathāgatagarbha*' in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* was that all sentient beings share the same Suchness (*tathatā*) as the Tathāgata, because Suchness is indivisible. This sounds familiar and, at first glance, does not seem to be much different from what we found in the earlier strand (see § 124). Still, two changes of considerable import are involved.

126.1. One is the fact that Suchness is now no longer mere emptiness or essencelessness, but, in order to function as Buddhahood, is stated to be inseparably endowed with the countless inherent virtues

---

<sup>748</sup> Aṣṭ 134,20-24: *yā sarvadharmatathatā ... sā tathāgatatathatā; iti hi tathāgatatathatā ca ... sarvadharmatathatā ca ... ekaivaiṣā tathatā* (AṣṭL 450a4-8; Pāñc IV:65,24-67,10); similarly 153,17 and 253,12.

<sup>749</sup> See § 53.3 with fn. 296. Cf. also MSA IX.37.

or excellent qualities (*guṇa*) that are typical of a Buddha and form the basis of his salvific activities.<sup>750</sup> As long as Suchness is still – apparently – trapped in *samsāra*, i.e., in the state of a ‘Buddha within’ or ‘Buddha-embryo’ (*tathāgatagarbha*), it is wrapped up in adventitious sheaths of defilements, but even in this state it is essentially pure and the virtues are already there. It is also called the “luminous (i.e., shiningly pure) original nature of the mind” (*cittasya prakṛtiḥ prabhāsvarā*), or simply, in continuation of an old canonical expression (see § 123.2), the “Naturally Luminous Mind” (*prakṛtiprabhāsvaram cittaṃ*, 自性清淨心),<sup>751</sup> which comes to be conceived of as a ‘meta-psychic’, trans-individual form of mind, also called “Unstained Mind” (阿摩羅識, = *amalavijñāna*) in Paramārtha’s translations<sup>752</sup> (cf. the “boundless Mind” in § 123.2!) and “the One Mind” (一心)<sup>753</sup> in

<sup>750</sup> Cf., e.g., RGV(V) 21,8-12; 76,3-4 (I.155); 76,8-9.

<sup>751</sup> Cf., e.g., RGVV 45,3 *prakṛtiprabhāsvaram cittaṃ* (sūtra quotation; cf. § 123.2) side by side with RGV II.3a *buddhatvaṃ prakṛtiprabhāsvaram*. In the context of the RGVV, the expression *prakṛtiprabhāsvaram cittaṃ* unambiguously refers to the *asaṃskṛta tathāgatadhātu* (RGVV 44,6), as is also clear from the fact that in the corresponding verses we find *cittasya prakṛtiḥ prabhāsvarā* (RGV I.62) instead. Quite explicit is MSA XIII.19: “Mind is considered to be radiant by nature. ... But radiance by nature is not ascribed to any other mind (viz., the one characterized by being dependent on other [factors] (*paratantralakṣaṇa*: comm.)) except Mind which is the [true] nature of [all] dharmas (*dharmatācitta* = *cittatathatā*: comm.)” (*matam ca cittaṃ prakṛtiprabhāsvaram ... | na dharmatācittam ṛte ’nyacetasaḥ prabhāsvaratvaṃ prakṛtau vidhīyate ||*).

<sup>752</sup> E.g., T 31.1617: 872a11-12, where the Unstained Mind is equated with the True Suchness (真如如; cf. GIMELLO 1976: 319), or T 31.1616: 863b20, where it is identified with the *prakṛtiprabhāsvaram cittaṃ* (阿摩羅識 是自性清淨心), as is also the case in, e.g., Hui-yüan’s (慧遠, 523–592) *Ta-sheng i chang* 大乘義章 (T 44.1851: 530b7-9; cf. PAUL 1984: 52–64), in Prabhā(kara)mitra’s (active around 630) Chinese version of the commentary on MSA XIII.19 (see fn. 751), or in T 46.1924 (see fn. 516): 642a21-23. Cf. also the use of the term *amalajñāna* at RGV II.26.

<sup>753</sup> A detailed treatment of the applications of this term in the various strands of Chinese Buddhism would exceed the limits of both this study and my competence. Cf., e.g., COOK 1977: 51–53. According to STONE 1999: 7 and 9–10, in Hua-yen, the One Mind (一心) is the basis and even source of diversity, whereas in one



other Chinese sources, including Hua-yen and certain T'ien-t'ai texts.<sup>754</sup>

126.2. The second important point is that the shift of perspective to Buddhahood as a goal to be striven after by everybody entailed that only its presence in *sentient* beings, especially in *human* beings, was a matter of interest. Thus, it is only with regard to them that the *Ratna-gotravibhāga* asserts the identity of their Suchness with that of the

---

strand of T'ien-t'ai it is rather the aspect of unity in diversity. A comprehensive analysis of the purport of the term 一心 in the context of ever deeper levels of the Buddhist tradition (starting with varieties of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda, followed by the position of the *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun* 大乘起信論 ["Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna"], and culminating in aspects of the Hua-yen doctrine of universal interpenetration) is set forth in Fa-tsang's commentary on the *cittamātra* passage of DBhS R V.I.E.<sup>a</sup> For the terminological use of the expression 一心 in Chinese Buddhism, the *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun* (T 32.1666: 576a5 and 13) seems to have played a key role. In this text of controversial origin<sup>b</sup> the term "the One Mind" is used in a sense comprising both Mind as True Suchness (*tathatā*: 心真如門) and mind as arising and perishing (i.e., as a temporary phenomenon: 心生滅門). The Sino-Indian basis of the use of the expression 一心 in the sense of the One Mind as a philosophical term seems to be Bodhiruci's translation of *cittamātra* in DBhS R V.I.E (T 26.1522: 169a15) and Lañk 80,7 (T 16.671: 530a1) and of *ekacitta* in DBhS R V.I.F (T 26.1522: 169a21) and V.I.M (ibid. 170c5).<sup>c</sup> For the original meaning of these passages, see §§ 73–76 and fns. 392 and 400. At T 32.1668 (釋摩訶衍論, "probably an eighth-century apocryphon": STONE 1999: 11): 604c15-16, the equation of the One Mind with the *tathāgatagarbha* in the *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun* (T 32.1666: 579b6-8) is traced back to a passage of Bodhiruci's translation of the *Lañkāvatāra-sūtra* (T 16.671: 519a1-2), but the Sanskrit (Lañk 21,2-4) is not clear (probably faulty), and at any rate in this passage 一心 renders *ekāgra* ("concentrated"), which is one of its common, non-terminological equivalents.

<sup>a</sup> T 35.1733: 346c28–347c4. Similarly Ch'eng-kuan in T 35.1735: 806b28–807a11; cf. also 806b20-28.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. KASHIWAGI 1981: 62–182 and 498–501 [references]; id. in TAKASAKI & KASHIWAGI 2005: 347–356 and 411–415 [references]; TAKASAKI 1987; LAI 1990: 186–189.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. TAKEMURA 1985: 128–130; GIMELLO 1976: 291 n. 168.

<sup>754</sup> For an explicit equation of the One Mind with the Essentially Pure Mind, *tathatā*, *dharmatā*, *dharmadhātu* and Buddha-nature as well as with *dharmakāya* and *tathāgatagarbha* see T 46.1924 (cf. fn. 516): 642a19-24 (followed by detailed explanations of each term).

Tathāgata as well as the soteriological consequences of this equation (see § 53.3), and this seems to be the rule in Indian sources.<sup>755</sup> I do not deny the possibility that there may be exceptions as far as phraseology is concerned. Actually, Paramārtha in his *Fo-hsing lun* (佛性論, *Treatise on Buddha-nature*) once uses the formulation that all dharmas are *tathāgatagarbha*,<sup>756</sup> because none of them is apart from the [true] nature (自性, \**svabhāva*) of the Tathāgata, viz., essencelessness (無我, \**nairātmya*).<sup>757</sup> But such a formulation merely seems to continue the traditional view of the all-pervasiveness of Suchness (*tathatā*). It also makes sense in the perspective of Suchness, revealed by the emptiness or essencelessness of both Person and dharmas, functioning as the cause of Buddhahood by becoming the *object* of insight free from conceptualization.<sup>758</sup> But there is not the slightest

<sup>755</sup> Cf. also RGV I.52 and 156cd and RGVV 49,9-12, quoting from the *Sāgarāmati-paripṛcchā* (see § 62 with fn. 339).

<sup>756</sup> T 31.1610: 796b9-10: 一切諸法爲如來藏。However, in this text, too, the usual phrasing is that all *sentient beings* are *tathāgatagarbha* (T 31.1610: 795c25; 796a19; 808b10-11; cf. also 796a11-14 and 808b3) or have Buddha-nature (e.g., 787a9 and 19; b28; 788c22; 811b21; cf. also 800c20). — The phrase that all dharmas are *tathāgatagarbha* (i.e. contain Buddha[hood]) goes back to Vasubandhu's commentary on MSg II.26.3, where it is indeed used in connection with the omnipresence of Suchness (*tathatā*) — which is pure by nature and constitutes Buddhahood when purified from all accidental impurities — in all *sentient beings* as their common essence (\**sāmānyalakṣaṇa*); see Tj P li 180a6-7 (T 31.1595: 191c21-23; 1596: 290b2-3; 1597: 344a3-5): *sems can thams cad la spyi'i mtshan nyid kyis de* (sc. *de bzhin nyid*) *ni yod pa nyid kyi phyr chos thams cad ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po can zhes gsungs so*. Cf. also MSABh 34,8.

<sup>757</sup> T 31.1610: 796b8-9: 一切諸法 不出如來自性, 無我爲相故。

<sup>758</sup> Cf. T 31.1610: 796b10-12: “As for the right factors, viz., the four applications of mindfulness (\**smṛtyupasthāna*), etc., of all Noble persons (\**āryapudgala*), it is always [by] taking this [Buddha-]nature (\**dhātu*?) as their object (\**viṣaya*) that those not yet arisen come to arise and those already arisen reach perfection” (一切聖人四念處等正法 皆取此性作境 未生得生 已生得滿; cf. TAKASAKI & KASHIWAGI 2005: 76). Cf. also 794b12-13 (一切諸法真如 聖人無分別智境) and c4-5. The antecedents of this view can be found in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*: cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 1969: 115–116.

indication that it might be meant to imply that even insentient dharmas like plants may, individually, become Buddhas.

127.0. It seems to be only in China that the equation of Suchness with Buddha-nature came to be discussed also with reference to its possible consequences for insentient beings like plants. After all, since the all-pervasiveness of Suchness is hardly controversial, they too should have Buddha-nature if Suchness and Buddha-nature are essentially the same.

127.1. Fa-tsang and other authors quote a passage of unknown origin according to which only the Suchness in sentient beings is called Buddha-nature, whereas the Suchness in insentient things is merely named 'nature of the dharmas' (*dharmatā*).<sup>759</sup> Yet, Fa-tsang relegates this distinction to a non-ultimate systematic level.<sup>760</sup>

127.2. In a weak sense, the Suchness of all dharmas is equated with Buddha-nature in the *Ta-sheng i chang* (大乘義章: T 44.1851) of the Ti-lun (地論(宗)) master Hui-yüan (慧遠, 523–592) of the Ching-ying (淨影) monastery.<sup>761</sup> According to Hui-yüan, even the Suchness of all dharmas may be called 'Buddha-nature' in view of the fact that it is

---

<sup>759</sup> T 44.1846: 247c13-14 (cf. AKAO 1984: 405): 論云: 抐(v.l. 在)眾生數中 名爲佛性, 抐(v.l. 在)非眾生數中 名爲法性; T 35.1735: 726b28-29. In Chan-jan's *Diamond Scalpel* (see § 127.4), the interlocutor refers to the passage as quoted from the \**Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa* (Chin-kang-pei 783a5-6: 僕曾聞人引大智度論云: 真如在無情中 但名法性。在有情內 方名佛性。), but as Chan-jan himself (783a7-8) explicitly states, the passage is not found there. For further information, see PENKOWER 1993: 472–473.

<sup>760</sup> T 35.1733: 405c26-27: "If [we answer the question from the perspective of] the 'teaching of the three vehicles', nature consisting in Suchness (*tathatā*) is common to both sentient and insentient [beings], but the Buddha-nature that opens up Awakening is limited to sentient beings" (若三乘教, 真如之性 通情非情, 開覺佛性 唯局有情); cf. KAMATA 1965: 446; AKAO 1984: 962; PENKOWER 1993: 474. For the ultimate level, see § 116.

<sup>761</sup> Cf. KAMATA 1965: 440–441; YOSHIZU 1973: 114a–115b; LIU 1985a: 171–176, esp. 173; PENKOWER 1993: 440–441.

exhaustively understood only by the Buddhas.<sup>762</sup> Thus, what is pervasively present “inside and outside”, i.e., in both sentient beings and insentient things, is merely “Buddha-nature as an object of comprehension” (所知性).<sup>763</sup> Buddha-nature as the comprehending subject (能知性), on the other hand, i.e., the True Mind (真識心), which has the (albeit still hidden) nature of Awakening,<sup>764</sup> is present only in sentient-beings, not in insentient things like walls and rubble.<sup>765</sup> Without consciousness, there would be no misunderstanding, and without previous misunderstanding, correct comprehension does not make sense. It is just as grasses and trees, lacking sentience, do not experience dreams and cannot have the experience of waking up either.<sup>766</sup> Thus, Hui-yüan accords Buddha-nature to the insentient only in a very weak, hardly more than nominal sense.

127.3. In the *Ta-sheng hsüan lun* (大乘玄論: T45.1853) ascribed to Chi-tsang (吉藏, 549–623),<sup>767</sup> Hui-yüan’s separation of a pervasive objective aspect of Buddha-nature from a subjective one reserved for sentient beings is shown to be untenable if the equation of the pervasive principle with Buddha-nature (as inseparably comprising *both* aspects) is taken seriously. In this ‘perspective of pervasion’ (通門), Hui-yüan’s statement, belonging to the ‘perspective of distinctions’

<sup>762</sup> T 44.1851: 472a20-22: “Fourth, [in a] pervasive [perspective], one calls ‘nature’ the [true] essence of all dharmas. This ‘nature’ is exhaustively comprehended only by the Buddhas (cf. Vś 9,20-23: see § 68). Thus, when one [wants to] point out the essence of the dharmas with reference to [its being] comprehended by] the Buddhas, one calls it ‘Buddha-nature’ (i.e., ‘nature [of the dharmas as accessible] to the Buddhas’)” (第四, 通說 諸法自體 故名爲性。此性唯是諸佛所窮。就佛以明諸法體性, 故云佛性。)

<sup>763</sup> T 44.1851: 472a 22-23: 此後一義 是所知性 通其內外; cf. also c22-26.

<sup>764</sup> T 44.1851: 472c13-14: 能知性者, 謂真識心。以此真心覺知性故, ...; cf. a15-16.

<sup>765</sup> T 44.1851: 472c18-20: 此能知性 局在眾生, 不通非情 ...; cf. a19-20.

<sup>766</sup> T 44.1851: 472c16-18.

<sup>767</sup> T 45.1853: 40a22–41b8. Cf., e.g., KAMATA 1968: 80–83; KOSEKI 1980; LIU 1985a: 176–186; NAKAJIMA 1983; PLASSEN 1997; MATSUMOTO 2000: 266–268; OKUNO 2002: 379–382.

(別門), has to be replaced by an *unqualified* statement that “grasses and trees” (i.e., the insentients) have Buddha-nature, just like sentient beings do, because of the omnipresence and non-duality of Suchness (cf. § 84) and because of the non-duality of sentient beings and environment based on the principle of mind-only (cf. § 66). Yet it must be emphasized that for Chi-tsang such an unqualified statement, too, is still preliminary and of no more than pedagogical value.<sup>768</sup> As a Mādhyamika, he is not so much interested in propounding tenets as in “clean[ing] the reader’s mind of the defilement of fixed notions”,<sup>769</sup> one of them being the restriction of Buddha-nature (in the full sense) to sentient beings.

127.4. 1. In the T’ien-t’ai tradition, Chih-i (智顗, 538–597) does not expressly affirm the Buddha-nature of the insentient, but he paves the way<sup>770</sup> in equating Buddha-nature with the true nature of dharma<sup>771</sup> and with the Middle Way<sup>772</sup> and in declaring that there is not a single colour (/visible item) or smell that is not the Middle Way.<sup>773</sup>

2. The implications of this statement with regard to the Buddha-nature of the insentient are made fully explicit by Chan-jan (湛然,

<sup>768</sup> PLASSEN 1997: 7; 13–15.

<sup>769</sup> PLASSEN 1997: 16.

<sup>770</sup> Cf. GROSNIK 1990: 205; NG 1993: 78 and 80. Cf. also MATSUMOTO (2000: 269–277), who regards Chih-i as a representative of the “Buddha-nature Manifestation theory” (see § 120.2).

<sup>771</sup> T 38.1778: 681a26: 佛性即是法性. According to NG 1993: 11, this text is Chan-jan’s abridgement of an authorized record of Chih-i’s exegesis of the VñN.

<sup>772</sup> NG 1993: 62–89. Cf., e.g., T 33.1716 (see fn. 368): 761b4: 佛性即中道; 46.1929 (NG 1993: 9 and 11: authentic work from Chih-i’s later period): 729c17: 佛性即是中道. This statement is, however, taken over from MPS Dh 572a5.

<sup>773</sup> T 46.1911: 1c24-25 (Kuan-ting’s preface; cf. DONNER & STEVENSON 1993: 112–113), 9a19, 27a27-28, 42b2-3 and 75b5-6: 一色一香 無非中道. Cf. also T 33.1716: 761b5; T 38.1777: 521b5-6. That the “Middle Way” in this statement is equivalent to Buddha-nature is made explicit in Chan-jan’s commentary (T 46.1912: 151c23-26).

711–782) in his commentary on the passage,<sup>774</sup> and he further develops them in his *Diamond Scalpel* (*Chin-kang-pei lun* 金剛鐮論).<sup>775</sup> In accordance with Chi-tsang's 'perspective of pervasion', Chan-jan argues:

"The ten thousand things are Suchness because [in essence] they are immutable. Suchness is the ten thousand things because it responds to conditions. If you believe that insentient things lack Buddha-nature, wouldn't that amount to saying that the ten thousand things do not partake in Suchness?"<sup>776</sup>

3. Like Chi-tsang (see § 66), Chan-jan also makes use of the 'mind-only' argument. Since there is nothing outside the mind, the distinction between sentient beings and insentient things is pointless,<sup>777</sup> and properly speaking the designation of the latter as insentients should be given up.<sup>778</sup> As the *Diamond Scalpel* puts it, the mind and the [Buddha-]nature of each sentient being are all-pervasive (遍) and all-containing (具), like space,<sup>779</sup> which means that at every moment my

<sup>774</sup> T 46.1912: 151c20–152a23; cf., e.g., MIYAMOTO 1961: 683 f; PENKOWER 1993: 420–423; SUEKI 1995a: 368–370; 2001: 76–78.

<sup>775</sup> On this work, probably written shortly before Chan-jan's death, see PENKOWER 1993: 363 ff.

<sup>776</sup> *Chin-kang-pei* 782c19–21: 萬法是真如，由不變故。真如是萬法，由隨緣故。子信無情無佛性者，豈非萬法無真如耶。My translation follows PENKOWER 1993: 463–464 (with minor changes). Cf. also SUEKI 1995a: 373. Cf. also T 46.1912: 152a6–7 (no. 3 in SUEKI 1995a: 369; 2001: 77; PENKOWER 1993: 421).

<sup>777</sup> *Chin-kang-pei* 785b8–9 (PENKOWER 1993: 525): 心外無境 誰情無情。Cf. also 783b24–26 (PENKOWER 1993: 490–491) and T 46.1912: 152a12–14 (cf. SUEKI 1995a: 369, 12 and 370, 6–8; 2001: 77 [no. 7]; PENKOWER 1993: 421 [no. 7]).

<sup>778</sup> Cf. *Chin-kang-pei* 784b26–27 (PENKOWER 1993: 511: "I asked, "why do you still use the term 'insentient beings'?"").

<sup>779</sup> *Chin-kang-pei* 784b29–c1: 一一有情 心遍性遍，心具性具，猶如虛空。Among later T'ien-t'ai authors, this sentence gave rise to a controversy. Ts'ung-i (從義, 1042–1091 acc. to *FK* 4558; cf. also CHAN 1999: 435) in his *Chih-kuan i-li tsuan-yao* (止觀義例纂要, a commentary on Chan-jan's *Chih-kuan i-li* [T 46.1913]), e.g., takes the sentence to mean that insentient things (like walls and rubble, grasses and trees), too, must have Buddha-nature, because the essence (體) and [Buddha-]nature

own mind as well as [that of] all the other sentient beings is equal to the mind and (because there is nothing outside the mind) the body and the environment (or 'field') of Vairocana, the Buddha in his actualized glory, [in such a way that] self and other are mutually inter-fused and interpenetrating.<sup>780</sup> It is on account of error and due to their clinging to an Ego that sentient beings ignore their own and their environment's Buddha-nature and construe it as their individual body

(性) of sentient beings is all-pervasive, without excluding (or: being excluded from?) the insentient things (X 56.921: 43c16-17: 故知: 有情性徧 不隔瓦石, 便是無情有佛性矣; 46c4-5: 有情體徧不隔, 是故瓦石草木有性; 46c7-8: 是故 無情有性 即是有情體徧 不隔牆壁瓦石草木焉; cf. also 43c7 and 43c12-13). Ts'ung-i's view is vehemently rejected by Ch'u-yüan (處元, 1030-1119), who stresses the equal rank of mind and matter. According to the latter's *Chih-kuan i-li sui-shih* (止觀義例隨釋), environment and sentient beings are non-dual, abide together in one moment of mind (X.56.923: 159b16: 依正不二 同居一念; 158c13: 依正既居一心), but this is not meant to accord any ontological or causal priority to mind over matter, in the sense that one contains or generates the other (cf. 159c22: 非相含而然, 非相生而然). Rather, all dharmas, mental as well as material, are completely endowed with each other (159a13: 法法互具; cf. 159a19-20: 一塵報色 一念凡心 無不具足). Since things and oneself are one and the same Suchness, it is not possible to distinguish between sentient and insentient, and there is nothing that is not Buddha-natured (159a17-18: 物我一如 誰情無情 無非佛性). Thus, if the opponent assumes that only the (Buddha-)nature in/of the mind of sentient beings pervades insentient things but is not aware of the fact that likewise the Buddha-nature of the insentient pervades sentient beings, this is exactly a one-sided view (159a11-12: 苟如汝之所說 只有有<sup>a</sup> 心性而爲能徧於無情, 不見無情佛性徧於有情, 正是一偏之見). It is absurd to think that the "Middle Way (i.e., Buddha-nature) in colours and smells" should require the Buddha-nature of sentient beings to go there and spread to them and should only then start pervading them (159a13-14: 色香中道 豈待眾生佛性 往而徧之 方始徧耶). For the background of this discussion, viz., the controversy between the 'mountain-school' (山家) and the 'off-mountain' (山外) faction within Sung dynasty T'ien-t'ai, see CHAN 1999; cf. also STONE 1999: 9-10.

<sup>a</sup> Text okay? Read 有有(情)心性 or 有(情)有心性? For 有情心性 facing 無情有佛性 in a similar context in Ts'ung-i's commentary see X 56.921: 97b21-23.

<sup>780</sup> *Chin-kang-pei* 784c14-15: 我心 彼彼眾生 一一刹那 無不與彼遮那果德身心 依正自他互融互入齊等. Cf. also 781a26: 毘盧身土 不逾下凡之一念. See PEN-KOWER 1993: 512 and 390-392; SUEKI 1995a: 371-372.

and its profane external world.<sup>781</sup> Thus, the environment has been, in reality, Buddha-nature all along, and is only misinterpreted by unawakened sentient beings. Its being Buddha-nature does not mean that single elements of the environment have individual sentience and Buddha-nature as a potential due to which they may on their own start cultivating the Path.<sup>782</sup>

4. In fact, it is precisely in this wrong sense that the interlocutor in the *Diamond Scalpel* explicitly admits to having initially misunderstood Chan-jan's statement:

"The guest said: The meaning [of the statement that insentients have Buddha-nature] as you have established it [now] is clearly different from what I heard (= understood) before. When I first heard [your statement], I [took it] to mean that each single [blade of] grass, tree, pebble or mote (/atom) [has] a Buddha-nature of its own, a cause and a result of its own, and is [individually] endowed with the conditions (i.e., pre-

---

<sup>781</sup> *Chin-kang-pei* 784c28-29: 眾生自於佛依正中而生殊見... 一一皆計爲己身土; cf. c22: 眾生以我執取之, 即無佛唯生。

<sup>782</sup> Cf. also the 9<sup>th</sup> item in X 56.942-6, a set of 10 questions raised by the Japanese Tendai master Tokuen (德圓, 785-?) and answered by Tsung-ying (宗穎, according to FK 1343c a second generation pupil of Chan-jan), where Tokuen objects: "If you propound: 'Since the Buddha-way (i.e., Buddha-nature) is [also] established in the realm of insentients (cf. T 46.1913: 450b22-23), grasses and trees, etc., become Buddhas on their own', [then please tell us] which grasses or which trees cultivate the six Perfections on their own, so as to become Buddhas and expound the Dharma? What kind of example for this [can you adduce]?" (X 56.942-6: 697a19-21: 若言於無情境界佛乘故草木等自成佛者, 何草何樹自修六度成佛說法其例如何). Tsung-ying's reply makes clear that he has no intention of defending the view challenged by Tokuen: "If, [because your] wrong belief has not dissolved, you desperately search for grasses and trees that cultivate the six Perfections on their own, this is just as when [a person with] diseased eyes tries to discover a flower [growing] in the sky bearing fruit" (697b8-9: 若妄執不消苦求草木自修六度者, 如以病眼求見空華之結果而已). As against this, Tsung-ying's own explanation is based on the position that all dharmas – environment as well as persons – are only mind (697a22: 萬法唯心), one mind (or the One Mind?). (697 b1-2: 三千依正唯是一心; b6: 諸法即一心), and that all distinctions of self and other merely result from wrong conceptions (697a23-24). Cf. GRONER 2000: 486–485 rl.



paratory activities) and the intellect[ual achievements required for actualizing Awakening]. If this were correct, I certainly could not bear it; for grasses and trees originate and perish, and motes (/atoms) and pebbles exist [for a long time] but [finally] do not exist [anymore] in accordance with the cosmic periods (*kalpa*) [of the cyclic emergence and dissolution of the material world]. [Thus,] not only would they (豈唯) be unable to cultivate the cause and attain the result, but also Buddha-nature would be subject to perishing and originating.”<sup>783</sup>

This argument implicitly contrasts plants, stones, etc., with sentient beings: whereas the latter’s existence is, in spite of birth and death, not limited to one life because they individually participate in karma-directed *samsāra*, this is obviously presupposed not to hold good for plants, etc.

—128. Understood in this way, Chan-jan’s view would not seem unacceptable to Shōshin.<sup>784</sup> He, too, agrees that on the level of Suchness

---

<sup>783</sup> *Chin-kang-pei* 784b20-24: 客曰。仁所立義灼然異僕於昔所聞。僕初聞之。乃謂一草一木一礫一塵各一佛性各一因果具足緣了。若其然者僕實不忍。何者。草木有生有滅。塵礫隨劫有無。豈唯不能修因得果。亦乃佛性有滅有生。My interpretation of the passage is somewhat different from PENKOWER’s (1993: 510) and rather follows SUEKI 1995a: 371 and 2001: 79. This is also the interpretation of Kakuchō (see HANANO 1976b: 129a14-16; 131b) and even Annen (*Bodaishin* 485b6-9). Cf. also X 37.662 (subcommentary on the MPS by the T’ien-t’ai master Chih-yüan 智圓, †1022): 566c4-7, explicitly referring to the *Diamond Scalpel* after having pointed out that the all-pervasiveness of Buddha-nature does not mean that each single herb or tree has its own Buddha-nature (夫言佛性遍一切處者。…非謂一一艸木各一佛性) and that this is what is meant when Kuan-ting’s commentary on the MPS states that grasses and trees lack Buddha-nature (T 38.1767: 184c23: 草木中無佛性). Somewhat later, Chih-yüan argues that if grasses and trees were individually endowed with mind just like sentient beings, one would have to explain why they do not perform good and bad actions and, accordingly, develop into the ten realms (i.e., participate in rebirth and liberation (?!)) (X 37.662: 566c21-22: 問。有情心具。則能隨緣變造十界之事。艸木既具。胡不起善作惡造十界耶。)

<sup>784</sup> In Shōshin’s view, on the level of distinctions (分別門, cf. § 127.3), the True Suchness (真如 = *tathatā*) in insentients would not admit of being called “Buddha-nature” in the stronger sense of a potential to be actualized (*Shikan shiki* 252a15-17; b11-12; cf. § 145). On the level of mutual identity [of all phenomena], however,

the distinction of sentient and insentient is transcended.<sup>785</sup> With a view to their Suchness equated with Buddha-nature, even insentients are, and have been, Buddha-natured all along,<sup>786</sup> and ‘have’ (or rather are) mind, not in the sense of an individual, concrete form of mind, but in the sense of Mind as a universal principle (理心), identical with Suchness and the One Mind.<sup>787</sup>

129.1. Although I am not at all familiar with Ch’an literature, a few remarks at least would seem to be unavoidable. Actually, in the Ch’an tradition the issue of the Buddha-nature of the insentients was controversial.<sup>788</sup> An early representative of the strand in which the presence of Buddha-nature in insentient things is affirmed is the *Chüeh-kuan lun* 絕觀論 (“Treatise on the Transcendence of Discrimination”<sup>789</sup>), a

---

sentients and insentients are alike; insentients are no longer insentients; they are only the One Mind (252a17–b1: 若相即門，情非情同。故非無情。唯是一心; cf. b13–14).

<sup>785</sup> Cf. *Shikan shiki* 251b4–5: “[At the level of the] *dharmadhātu*, ‘support-[recompense]’ (= environment) and ‘[recompense] proper’ (= sentient beings or their bodies) are essentially identical” (法界 依正 本來體一).

<sup>786</sup> A fully explicit statement is found in an early Tendai *hongaku* text, the *Shinnyo-kan* (真如觀, cf. STONE 1999: 191): “All insentient beings, [like] grasses and trees, mountains and rivers, the ocean and the sky, are not anything outside the True Suchness. Since they are all True Suchness, [as] True Suchness they are all Buddha” (TADA 1995: 125, 15–16: ... 一切ノ非情、草木・山河・大海・虚空、皆真如ノ外ノ物ニアラズ。此等皆真如ナレバ、皆真如ハ仏也。 Cf. STONE 1999: 193). Similarly *ibid.* 134, 12–13.

<sup>787</sup> *Shikan shiki* 251a6–7: 非謂有事心。... 木石有理心也, with 251a5–6: 理心是真如 and 252b1 (故非無情, 唯是一心: cf. fn. 784).

<sup>788</sup> On the different attitudes of Ch’an masters with regard to this point see, e.g., KAMATA 1965: 436–439 and 461–465; 1968: 83–86; PENKOWER 1993: 505–507 (with further references); MATSUMOTO 1994: 96–105, etc.; 2000: *passim*, esp. 1–5; 23–69; 278–605; 2002: 15–16; SHARF 2002: 247–249 and 335 n. 64.

<sup>789</sup> McRAE (1983: 211) proposes “cognition” for *kuan* 觀, but since he describes the state to be attained as “beyond all types of discrimination” (210), I suggest that 觀 is used here in the sense it has when rendering Skt. *vicāra*, e.g., in the compound 覺觀 = *vitarka-vicāra*, i.e., discursive thinking.

text of the Ox-head School.<sup>790</sup> In this text, the question whether the *tao* (道) is present only in sentient beings (形靈: “body-and-spirit”) or also in grasses and trees is answered in favour of the latter alternative, because there is nothing the *tao* does not penetrate.<sup>791</sup> The word ‘*tao*’ no doubt evokes the Taoist world principle, but in Buddhist texts it is also used to render ‘*bodhi*’, i.e., in the sense of Awakening. Actually, a few lines later, the text equates “being in harmony with the *tao*” with the attainment of Buddhahood.<sup>792</sup> Grasses and trees are Awakened in the sense that they are always, from the outset, in harmony with the *tao*, i.e., with the true nature of things, because they lack deluded thoughts and emotions (*ch’ing* 情) and have no [feeling of an] ego.<sup>793</sup> Therefore, they do not produce thoughts [of displeasure, or revenge?] when injured.<sup>794</sup> In a similar way accomplished persons, who are free from [the notion or feeling of] an ego and in harmony with the *tao*, regard their bodies as equal to grasses and trees<sup>795</sup> and react like a tree (i.e., remain unconcerned and calm) when they are

---

<sup>790</sup> MCRAE 1983: 171–174 (with further references); KAMATA 1968: 84; MATSUMOTO 2000: 278; SHARF 2002: 40 and 43. The ascription of the *Chüeh-kuan lun* to Niu-tou Fa-jung (牛頭法融, 594–657) is doubtful; the text is rather to be regarded as a work of the Ox-head School compiled in the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the 8<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>791</sup> MATSUMOTO 2000: 278 (text 28): 道者 爲獨在於形靈之中耶, 亦在於草木之中耶。...曰。道無所不遍也。(= TOKIWA & YANAGIDA 1976: 91; the following passages are found on the same page; cf. also KAMATA 1968: 83; SHIRATO 1998: 21; SHARF 2002: 248 f).

<sup>792</sup> MATSUMOTO 2000: 282 (text 30; my transl.): “[Objection:] If grasses and trees have for a long time been in harmony with the *tao*, why aren’t grasses and trees predicted to attain Buddhahood in [any] sūtra? Why are only human beings predicted?” (若草木久來合道, 經中何故不記草木成佛, 偏記人也。). The text then adduces two passages allegedly implying a prediction of insentients as well.

<sup>793</sup> MATSUMOTO 2000: 278 (text 29): 草木無情 本來合道 理無我故 (...).

<sup>794</sup> Ibid.: ... 殺者不計. For the interpretation of this passage, see fn. 991.

<sup>795</sup> From an Indian perspective, one would be tempted to understand: “like grass /straw or a piece of wood” (~ *trṇakāṣṭha*), i.e., as worthless (cf. HARA 2003: 470), but in view of the context the phrase may (also) be intended to mean: “[the way] they regard their body [is] comparable with [how] grasses and trees [abide]”, i.e., in harmony with the *tao*, free from the notion or feeling of an ego.

injured.<sup>796</sup> The main intention of the text is obviously to present insentient things, and particularly plants or trees, as paragons for the spiritual practitioner. For this purpose, the choice of plants may have suggested itself because they are, in a sense, alive<sup>797</sup> and are thus, among the insentient (無情), closest to sentient beings. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that they lack *ch'ing* (情) only in the sense of deluded thoughts and emotions but not in the sense of perceptual sensations. In this regard, the text is simply not sufficiently explicit; the 'harmony with the *tao*' may well refer to a meta-psychic level or may even be a mere metaphor.

**129.2.** In the *Shen-hui yü-lu* 神會語錄 ("Record of Shen-hui's Sayings"),<sup>798</sup> the omnipresence of Buddha-nature is suggested by the Ch'an master Yüan from the Ox-head mountain (牛頭山袁禪師) but rejected by Ho-tsê Shen-hui 荷澤神會 (684–758),<sup>799</sup> who asserts that Buddha-nature is, to be sure, present in all sentient beings but not in insentient things.<sup>800</sup> Shen-hui accordingly discards the famous utterance — adduced by the master Yüan in support of his own view — that the emerald bamboos are all *dharmakāya*, and the chrysan-

---

<sup>796</sup> MATSUMOTO 2000: 279 (text 29): 夫無我合道者 視形如草木, 被斫如樹林。

<sup>797</sup> Cf. fn. 120.

<sup>798</sup> The passage is quoted in ANDERL 2004a: 626–627 (n. 1864, with English transl.; see also 2004b: 200–201 n. 100 and SHARF 2002: 248) and in MATSUMOTO 2000: 303 (text 50) from the editions of HU SHIH and D.T. SUZUKI & KUDA Rentarō, respectively, on which see YAMPOLSKY 1967: 24–25, n. 67 (with further bibliographical references).

<sup>799</sup> Cf. MCRAE 1987. See also ANDERL 2004a: 600 n. 1714 (with further references).

<sup>800</sup> In MATSUMOTO's terminology (see § 120.2), Shen-hui is thus a representative of the "Buddha-nature Immanence theory" (MATSUMOTO 1994: 97; 2000: 303–305; 2002: 363 = (16)). I cannot help feeling that the dissent may (also) be due to the fact that the interlocutors presuppose different concepts of Buddha-nature, viz., its equation with Suchness or the *dharmakāya* against its definition as the full potential for attaining Awakening in a spiritual process.

themums all *prajñā* (see § 54),<sup>801</sup> because it flatly contradicts the *Nirvāṇasūtra*'s statement that insentient things like walls and rubble lack Buddha-nature (see § 53.2.3) and because there is no *sūtra* in which an insentient thing receives the prediction of future Awakening.

129.3.0. Perhaps the most famous and most explicit passage advocating the Buddha-nature of the insentients is found in the record of the Ch'an master Nan-yang Hui-chung (南陽慧忠, ?-775)<sup>802</sup> as contained in the *Tsu-t'ang-chi* (祖堂集). This passage,<sup>803</sup> presented as a dialogue with a "Ch'an guest from the south"<sup>804</sup> (南方禪客), is obviously intended to refute Shen-hui's position and his aforementioned criticism.<sup>805</sup>

129.3.1. Presupposing the omnipresence and indivisibility of Suchness — "matter and mind are one and the same Suchness" — and its identity with the Buddha-nature<sup>806</sup> and, essentially, with the *dharma*-

---

<sup>801</sup> For MATSUMOTO (1994: 100; 2000: 304), the acceptance or rejection of this statement is a kind of criterion for the "Buddha-nature Manifestation theory" and the "Buddha-nature Immanence theory", respectively.

<sup>802</sup> Some information on him is found in DUMOULIN 1985, I:151-153. MATSUMOTO (2000: 329-337) doubts the historicity not only of the record but also of Nan-yang Hui-chung as a person.

<sup>803</sup> *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 11,10-14,18 (Taiw. 61°10-64b4); text and English transl. in ANDERL 2004a (= A.a): 619-630 and ANDERL 2004b (= A.b): 185-209; Japanese transl. in YANAGIDA 1990 (= Y.): 162-171 (## 253-262); critical discussion of some sections in MATSUMOTO 2000 (= M.), esp. 302-337. Cf. also TAKASAKI 1998: 6-8. Most sections of the text have a parallel in *Ch'uan-teng lu* 438a9-c11 ≈ X 67.1309 (see fn. 488): 593a9-c12. For the first part, cf. also *Tsung-ching lu* (宗鏡錄: T 48.2016): 418c17-419a2 (see ANDERL 2004a: 621 n. 1836). See also fn. 488.

<sup>804</sup> *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 11,10-11 (Taiw. 61a10-11). Later on, the term *ch'an k'ê* 禪客 came to designate the monk of a Ch'an monastery who by election or position functioned as the questioner in dialogic instruction (問答): cf. FK 6475a; NAK. 854a.

<sup>805</sup> Cf. YANAGIDA 1990: 391; MATSUMOTO 2000: 303-306; ANDERL 2004a: 619 with n. 1828; 2004b: 185-186.

<sup>806</sup> *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 14,9-10 (Taiw. 64a9-10; A.a: 629; A.b: 207; Y.: 170; M.: 307 [text 54] and 32 [text 12]): ... 佛性身心一如.

*kāya*<sup>807</sup> (cf. also § 140) as well as with *prajñā* (on the ultimate level, as inherent in the *dharmakāya*), Hui-chung sees no difficulty in accepting the utterance concerning the emerald bamboos and the chrysanthemums.<sup>808</sup> On the other hand, he is not impressed by the passage of the *Nirvāṇasūtra*, adduced by the 'Ch'an guest', where insentient things are declared to be devoid of Buddha-nature (see § 53.2.3),<sup>809</sup> and obviously regards it as not to be taken literally.<sup>810</sup> At the very beginning of the dialogue, he equates, in deliberate antithesis to the wording of this passage, Buddha-nature, or the Buddha-Mind, with walls and rubble,<sup>811</sup> and subsequently tries to authenticate his position by referring to the statement of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* that the whole world is only produced by the mind. Since insentient things are clearly part of the world, they too must be mind, or rather Mind, Buddha-Mind (cf. § 71).

**129.3.2.** It is worth noting that Hui-chung tends to *equate* things with Mind or Buddha-nature,<sup>812</sup> in contrast to his interlocutor, who

<sup>807</sup> Cf. the switch from "the emerald bamboos are all Suchness (真如)" (ibid. fol. 13,13 = Taiw. 63a13) to "how can they possibly not be the *dharmakāya*" (翠竹 ... 豈非法身乎: fol. 13,18-19 = Taiw. 63b4-5).

<sup>808</sup> Ibid. fol. 13,13-21 (Taiw. 63a13-b7; A.a: 626-628; A.b: 200-203; Y.: 168 [# 259]; M.: 305 f [text 53]; cf. T 47.1998A: 875a3-12).

<sup>809</sup> Ibid. fol. 11,12-13 (Taiw. 61a12-13; A.a: 619 f; A.b: 186; Y.: 163; M.: 302 f [text 48]).

<sup>810</sup> Cf. Hui-chung's accusing the 'guest' of relying on the words and not on the meaning (ibid. fol. 11,17 = Taiw. 61b3; A.a: 620; A.b: 188; Y.: 163), which seems to presuppose the distinction of sūtras requiring interpretation as against sūtras of explicit meaning (了義經: fol. 13,16 = Taiw. 63b2; A.a: 627; A.b: 202; Y.: 168).

<sup>811</sup> *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 11,10-12 (Taiw. 61a10-12; A.a: 619; A.b: 186; Y.: 162 f [#253]; M.: 302 f [text 48] and 31 [text 7]): 有南方禪客問。如何是古佛心。師曰。牆壁瓦礫無情之物 並是古佛心。 In the subsequent passage, the 'guest' first presupposes the equivalence of the "Mind of the old Buddha(s)" or "pristine (= atemporal?) Buddha-Mind" (古佛心; *Ch'uan-teng lu* 438a9: 佛心) with Buddha-nature (佛性), and a few lines later (fol. 11,17-19) the master justifies the equation of "mind" (心) and "nature" (性) on the level of Awakening.

<sup>812</sup> Cf. *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 11,11-12 (see fn. 811): ... 無情之物 並是古佛心; 11,21-23: 無情之物 ... 爲復是心 爲復不是心。 Cf. also the statement that all coun-

prefers to speak of things *having* mind/Mind or Buddha-nature.<sup>813</sup> This may mean that for Hui-chung phenomena are not so much illusory appearances<sup>814</sup> as manifestations of True Reality,<sup>815</sup> perhaps in accordance with their significance as a model for spiritual perfection in line with the *Chüeh-kuan lun* (§ 129.1). But I have to leave this issue to the specialists.

**129.3.3.** Nor do I find myself in a position to decide whether Hui-chung's statement that the insentients have, or are, Buddha-nature and Mind is not, ultimately, merely intended to overcome dichotomic thinking (as in Chi-tsang) or to illustrate the pristine harmony with True Reality human beings should 'recover', but is indeed meant to imply that in reality even the so-called insentients possess *individual* sentience.<sup>816</sup> To be sure, just as in the *Chüeh-kuan lun* (§ 129.1), in-

---

tries are the body of the Buddha Vairocana (fol. 12,27; see § 140), that the emerald bamboos are Suchness (13,13: 青青翠竹 盡是真如) or the *dharmakāya* (13,18-19: 翠竹 ... 豈非法身乎). Exception: fol. 11,19-20 (汝若定執 無情無佛性者), where the master expressly rephrases the interlocutor's view. Similarly fol. 11,24: 不應言 無情無佛性. Cf. the discussion in Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō*, ch. *Bussō*.

<sup>813</sup> Cf. *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 11,25 (taking the master's view as a premise): 無情既有心; similarly 12,12-13 (既是無情有佛性) and 12,14 (若有情無情俱有佛性). The 'guest' seems to use identifying phraseology only when explicitly rephrasing a statement of the master, as in fol. 11,13-14: 今云 一切無情 皆是佛心.

<sup>814</sup> As they obviously are (at any rate in the form in which we are used to perceive them) in ch. 7 of the *Yüan-ming lun* (圓明論), according to MCRAE (1986: 148 f) probably connected with Shen-hsiu (神秀: †706), where we read (MCRAE 1986:170) that mountains, rivers and the earth are seen only by ordinary persons, whose false thoughts are not exhausted, whereas Buddhas and bodhisattvas do not see them.

<sup>815</sup> This is, at any rate, what MATSUMOTO's concept of "Buddha-nature Immanence theory" is intended to imply; cf., e.g., MATSUMOTO 2000: 572–581, esp. 579; 2002: (15): "... phenomenal things (事), as such, are regarded as Buddha-nature itself, and are, as it were, totally absolutized."

<sup>816</sup> It is in the latter sense that MATSUMOTO (2000: 324–327) seems to understand Hui-chung's view. From Hui-chung's remark that material things, being emptiness, cannot really be obstructive (*Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 13,6-7; A.a: 625; A.b: 199; M.: 324 [text 67]) and thus lose their materiality, as well as from their being equated with the mind/Mind (see fn. 812), MATSUMOTO concludes that they are

sentients are stated to be without deluded thoughts and unwholesome emotions.<sup>817</sup> But what about appropriate thoughts or perceptual awareness? Wouldn't Hui-chung's affirmative answer to the interlocutor's (implicitly critical) question whether the insentients, since they are endowed with the [Buddha-]Mind, shouldn't also expound the Dharma<sup>818</sup> suggest that they individually *know* the Truth and perform acts of preaching?<sup>819</sup> But the insentients' expounding of the Dharma is stated to be altogether different from human teaching: though constantly taking place,<sup>820</sup> it is not heard even by the master,<sup>821</sup> let alone by the 'guest'.<sup>822</sup> Rather, it is 'audible' only to saintly, fully Awakened persons.<sup>823</sup> It is hardly of a verbal nature and may not pre-

---

conceived of as sentient beings (有情) endowed with consciousness or even intelligence (精神性) (326,5 f) and with an active nature similar to that of humans (326,6: "人"と同様の"能動性"). It is, according to MATSUMOTO, due to their intelligent and active nature in connection with the fact that they are free of deluded thoughts and thus already Awakened, i.e., Buddhas, that their capability of expounding the Dharma becomes fully plausible (327,1 f). For MATSUMOTO, Hui-chung's view is similar to that of Kūkai and of the *Kankōruijū* (326,4 f). As far as I can see, it is, however, only in the latter text (and, somewhat earlier, in Shingon) that plants are *expressly* attributed *individual* sentence (see §§ 149.2–5).

<sup>817</sup> See § 153 with fn. 993.

<sup>818</sup> See § 90 with fn. 490.

<sup>819</sup> Later Shingon masters seem to have argued in this way; cf. RAMBELLI 2001: 37: "But, as Raihō (賴實, 1279–1330?) said, the fact that trees preach the Dharma implies that they are sentient and endowed with intelligence." Cf. also FUCHITA 2003: 75,8–9.

<sup>820</sup> See fn. 490.

<sup>821</sup> *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 12,3–4 (Taiw. 62a3–4; A.a: 622; A.b: 192; Y.: 164; M.: 409 [text 159]): 師曰。我亦不聞。

<sup>822</sup> *Ibid.* fol. 11,26–27 and 12,1–2 (Taiw. 61b12–13 and 62a1–2; A.a: 621 f; A.b: 190 f; Y.: 164; M.: 409 [text 159]): "The Ch'an guest said: '[If they expound the Dharma constantly,] why can't I hear it?' ... The Ch'an guest said: 'Being ignorant and [mentally] deaf and blind, I do not hear the insentient objects' expounding of the Dharma'" (禪客曰。某甲爲什麼不聞。... 禪客曰。某甲 愚昧聾瞽 不聞無情說法。).

<sup>823</sup> *Ibid.* fol. 11,28 (Taiw. 61b14; A.a: 621; A.b: 191; Y.: 164): 諸聖得聞 (*Ch'uan-teng lu* 438a20: 諸佛得聞). — See also *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 5, fol. 6,11–12



suppose a mental act. It may rather be a self-revelation or self-manifestation of the original, all-pervading Buddha-nature inherent in all phenomena to persons whose minds are no longer obscured by any deluded thoughts and emotions.<sup>824</sup>

(Taiw. 98a11-12; A.b: 210; M.: 409 [text 158]): “Tung-shan then asked: ‘Who is able to hear insentients expound the Dharma? The master [Yün-yen 雲巖] said: [Only] insentients are able to hear insentients expound the Dharma” (洞山便問。無情說法 什麼人得聞。師曰。無情說法 無情得聞.; cf. *Ch’uan-teng lu* 321c4-5; T 47.1986A: 507c5-6 ≈ T 47.1986B: 519c24-25; X 67.1309: 594a10-11; *Shōbōgenzō* [*Mujōseppō*] 400,2-3; OGAWA 2006: 66,12; ARAMAKI 2000: 582,8-9). One could take this passage to mean that only ‘insentients’, i.e., *persons* who are free from 情, i.e., deluded thoughts and emotions, can hear the insentients’ expounding of the Dharma (cf. § 129.4). However, in another passage (*Tsu-t’ang-chi* ch. 17, fol. 11,26–12,1; Taiw. 324b12–325a1; A.b: 211 f; M.: 429 [text 188]; OGAWA 2006: 68,11-13) the master Ch’ang-sha Ching-ts’en (長沙景岑) answers the question about insentients expounding the Dharma by pointing to the eastern pillar of the temple as the one that can teach, and to the western pillar as the one that can hear it. Still, even this statement need not imply psychic functions on the part of the pillars. Its real purport, if I may speculate, might be similar to that of the *Chüeh-kuan-lun* (§ 128.1), i.e., to point out that in order to be fully Awakened to the Dharma one has to abandon all divisive and distractive thoughts and emotions (情), transcending thereby the predicament of ordinary sentient beings and becoming, in this regard, similar to insentient things, which may be described as both ‘expounding’ and ‘hearing’ the Dharma in that by nature they manifest, and are in harmony with, True Reality.

<sup>824</sup> ARAMAKI (2000: 583) speaks of an “ontological difference, so to speak (いわば存在論的区別), between the preaching of the insentients and the preaching of sentient beings”. According to OGAWA (2006: 68–69), the preaching of the insentients refers to the true form of the universe, before being articulated by speech, i.e., to the fact that all things are merely things just as they are (68 ⑤: 無情說法とは言語によって分節される以前の世界の真相。いわばすべての事物がただ事物のままにあることが無情説法なのであって ...)。Their preaching cannot therefore be heard with the ear or through words. Rather, hearing the preaching of the insentients means clearly and vividly *seeing* the form of the world as it really is (68 ⑩: 無情説法は言語を介しては聞き得ない。世界の相をありありと、ただ如実に見ることこそが真に無情説法を聞くことなのだ。)。Dōgen expressly states that only foolish people take the rustling of the branches of trees or the opening of blossoms and falling of leaves to be the insentient beings’ expounding of the Dharma (*Shōbōgenzō* [*Mujōseppō*] 398,14-15). Elaborating on this issue would, however, exceed the limits of both this study and my competence.

129.4. In connection with the question of the sentience of the insentient, a passage of the record of the Ch'an master Pai-chang Huai-hai (百丈懷海, 749–814) in the *Ku-tsun su yü-lu* (古尊宿語錄)<sup>825</sup> may be worth mentioning.

1. In my (admittedly tentative) understanding, the passage speaks of the awareness of perfect persons or saints, reshuffling the old statement about the emerald bamboos and chrysanthemums into a comparison:<sup>826</sup> In so far as perfect saints do not undergo the changes [which are typical] of [ordinary persons] having deluded thoughts and emotions (情), they are like emerald bamboos, and in so far as they nonetheless do respond to the situation (應機) and do know the [right] time (知時), they are comparable to chrysanthemums.<sup>827</sup>

<sup>825</sup> Cf. MATSUMOTO 1994: 193 n. 34.

<sup>826</sup> In this regard, my understanding seems to be basically in agreement with MATSUMOTO's (see fn. 829).

<sup>827</sup> X 68.1315: 9b24–c1: [a]祇如今鑑覺, [b]但不被有情改變, 喻如翠竹。[c]無不應機 無不知時, 喻如黃華。(no v.l. in the *Chung-hua ta-tsang-ching* 中華大藏經 and the Yung-lo edition 永樂版: this information courtesy of the Ven. DINGYUAN and Prof. Florin DELEANU; cf. also X 17.330: 728a7–8; 78.1553: 460a12–14; 83.1578: 481c5–6). My understanding of the passage is somewhat different from that of ANDERL (2004b: 184) in that I take [b] and [c] as parallel sentences: “[b] it is only that they are not troubled by ..., just like ..., [c] but they definitely respond ..., just like ...”. Moreover, in contrast to ANDERL, who renders [a] as “Now [non-sentient objects] have perception (but they are not changed ...)”, thus supplying the usual non-sentients as the grammatical subject, in my opinion the text returns to the sages: “Now, as for<sup>a</sup> the awareness [of the ‘non-sentients’ = persons free of deluded thoughts], (they are merely not changed/agitated ...)”. I take the immediately preceding reference of the text to the usual insentients (stones, plants, etc.) as a side-remark for the sake of preventing a misunderstanding of the text's use of the term 無情. That the “awareness” (鑑覺) is that of the sages would seem to be confirmed by the passage with reference to which the text from the *Ku-tsun su yü-lu* is adduced by ANDERL as a kind of parallel, viz., *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 9,5–12 (Taiw. 59a5–12; ANDERL 2004b: 180–182). Here we read, in direct connection with the sages no longer belonging to the category of (ordinary) sentient beings, i.e., of beings that have deluded thoughts (有情): “They are clearly aware [of things?], they merely have got rid of clinging to them” (熾然見覺 只是無其繫執). The parallelism of 見覺 and 鑑覺 is obvious. But even if we follow ANDERL (and Florin DELEANU, who kindly communicated his understanding of the passage to me in a letter and

2. Yet, this is merely a comparison, and the expressions may deliberately be used in a slightly ambiguous way. Thus, in the case of the bamboos, not being changed by having *ch'ing* (情) may imply that they are not subject to pleasure and pain resulting from being endowed with sense-faculties, i.e., sentience in the sense of individual, conscious sensations, and in the case of the chrysanthemums responding to the situation (應機) and knowing the time (知時) would seem to mean that they react to outward stimuli and 'know' the seasons.<sup>828</sup> On the other hand, in the case of saints what is intended in this case is rather that they respond to the requirements (應機) of the spiritual trainees and know the right time (知時) for giving appropriate advice.

3. Actually, according to MATSUMOTO,<sup>829</sup> *Pai-chang* belongs to the strand in which the Buddha-nature of the insentients is rejected. Indeed, in the text under discussion the key-phrase of the latter view (viz., "the insentients have Buddha-nature": 無情有佛性) is radically re-interpreted in the sense that *persons* who are completely free from mental attachments (無情 = 無其情繫) have Buddha-nature (有佛性, i.e., have attained Buddhahood), in contrast to ordinary beings, who do have attachments (有情 = 有染愛心) but no Buddha-nature (無佛性, i.e., have not yet attained Buddhahood),<sup>830</sup> and the former cate-

---

agrees with ANDERL in this point) in supplying the (usual) insentients as the logical subject of "awareness" (鑑覺), this 'mirroring sensitivity' would be no more than a primitive response to the change of seasons, etc., which, as the author unmistakably states (see fn. 831), does not entitle us to regard them as Awakened beings.

<sup>a</sup> I am not sure about the precise meaning of 祇如今. According to ANDERL 2004a: 480, 祇如(/只如) is a vernacular topic marker ("as for ..."); cf. also 611 n. 1780 and 2004b: 181 n. 52. According to ANDERL 2004a: 691 n. 2285, 今, too, can have a topicalizing function. On the other hand, there is also 如今 = "now" (*ima, genzai*), "just now" (*tada-ima*) (NAK. 1061a).

<sup>828</sup> In contrast to bamboos, which are evergreen and most of which flower only after many years, chrysanthemums appear, flower and disappear in the course of the seasons. — To know the seasons can, of course, also be interpreted as a symptom of sentience: cf. JACOBI 1884: 10 n. 1 (with reference to the Jaina tradition).

<sup>829</sup> MATSUMOTO 1994: 193 f (n. 34); 2000: 483. Cf. TSUCHIYA 2008.

<sup>830</sup> X 68.1315: 9b17-22; ANDERL 2004b: 183 f.

gory is expressly distinguished from non-sentient objects like trees, stones or the empty space, or, for that matter, emerald bamboos and chrysanthemums, to which Buddha-nature is erroneously ascribed (by others).<sup>831</sup>

130. If the preceding remarks are essentially correct, the Chinese idea that in terms of the 'principle' or Suchness even insentient things (not only plants!) have Buddha-nature can indeed be regarded as being based on Indian Mahāyāna premises, through a fusion of two different perspectives. On the one hand, in an 'objective' perspective Suchness indicated the true nature, i.e., the emptiness, of *all dharmas* and appearances (§ 124), including physical appearances of the Buddha (§ 125), the primary aim of this perspective being to eradicate all attachments. On the other hand, in the *ekayāna* strand Suchness had come to be identified with Buddhahood, both in the sense of *dharmakāya*, i.e., the Buddha on the absolute level, endowed with unconditioned virtues (§ 126.1), and in the sense of *tathāgatagarbha*, i.e., the potential of *sentient beings* to attain Buddhahood (§ 126.2), and it would seem to be in this perspective that Suchness is also understood as Mind (§ 126.1). From a pragmatic point of view, it would seem reasonable to keep these perspectives apart. But as a theoretical fixation this distinction provoked the criticism of a *Mādhyamika* like Chi-tsang and had, from the perspective of pervasion, to be replaced, or relativized, by an unqualified statement that plants (or insentients), too, have Buddha-nature (§ 127.3). Both Chan-jan (§ 127.4) and Nanyang Hui-chung (§ 129.3.1-2) also applied this line of thought to the aspect of sentience. But at least in the case of Chan-jan this does not imply that he considered plants or other insentients to be endowed

---

<sup>831</sup> X 68.1315: 9b22-23: 不同木石太虛黃華翠竹之無情 將爲有佛性. ANDERL 2004b: 184: "This is different from the assumption that<sup>a</sup> non-sentient [objects] like trees, stones, air, the chrysanthemum and the green bamboo, had Buddha-nature." The text adds that if insentient things had Buddha-nature it would be inexplicable why they are nowhere in the Sūtras predicted for Awakening.

<sup>a</sup> For 將爲 "to regard as", "to consider as/that", "to assume that" see ANDERL 2004a: 249; 286; 779 n. 2847.

with *individual* sentience or an *individual* Buddha-nature. The Buddha-nature and sentience of plants in terms of Suchness would thus seem to be quite different from what FINDLY assumes for early Buddhism. A certain analogy may, however, be perceived in the idea of the *Chüeh-kuan-lun* that plants are a paragon for the spiritual practitioner because they are in harmony with the *tao*. (§ 129.1), but it should be kept in mind that this is just their nature and not a result of previous spiritual practice on their part.

## 1.2. The Buddha-Nature of Plants as Experienced by Awakened Beings

131. As a fully Awakened person, the Buddha is, in contrast to ordinary beings, aware of the true nature or 'Suchness' of things. In early Buddhism, this awareness manifests itself, in the first place, in his comprehension of the four Noble Truths and the two principles of impermanence and origination in dependence derivable from them (see § 123.1). In the course of the development of the idea of the true nature of things as sketched in ch. 1.1, the awareness of the Buddha can only be conceived of as comprising these new aspects as well. Thus, when Suchness even in the so-called insentient things, or the environment, comes to be regarded as Buddha-nature (§§ 127–128; 129.1; 129.3.1), the implication is that the Buddha must be fully aware of this fact. Hence it makes perfect sense when Shōshin states that from the point of view of insight realizing [Suchness], at the moment a sentient being becomes Buddha, all the ten thousand things, too, become Buddha, because when they are perceived with the Buddha-eye, they all turn out to have in reality been Buddha-natured all along.<sup>832</sup>

132.0. Still, it may be meaningful to approach the Buddha's experience of the environment also from another angle, viz., from the perspective of the Buddhist idea of a *correspondence* between sen-

---

<sup>832</sup> *Shikan shiki* 251a15-16: 若約證見, 有情成佛時 萬法皆成佛, 以佛眼見皆佛法故。

tient beings and their environment,<sup>833</sup> the latter normally being considered subordinate to, and dependent on, the former (cf. § 115).

**132.1.** This idea goes back to the canonical texts of early Buddhism. In the *Aggañña-sutta* of the *Dīghanikāya*,<sup>834</sup> e.g., the environment of primeval beings gradually deteriorates in consequence of their increasing spiritual and moral depravation. According to Sarvāstivāda and early Yogācāra treatises,<sup>835</sup> the environment is the by-product (*adhipati-phala*) of the common (*sādhāraṇa*) karma of sentient beings, in such a way that the world is structured into a set of realms distinguished by more or less agreeable or disagreeable circumstances, where sentient beings may be reborn in accordance with their respective individual karma. Moreover, the collective predominance of unwholesome karma in a region has bad effects on the environment, especially on the vegetation; the predominance of wholesome karma has the opposite effect.<sup>836</sup> Even the formation of pure worlds in Mahāyāna Buddhism is sometimes explained in line with this traditional idea.<sup>837</sup> Still, it appears natural that preponderance is accorded to the

<sup>833</sup> Cf. also TAKASAKI 1998: 1b–5b.

<sup>834</sup> DN no. 27, especially III 84,26 ff.

<sup>835</sup> E.g., Vi 41b4-5; 106c12-13; c26-27; 107a1-2; T 28.1546: 87b7-12; AKBh 95,15-17; 192,5; YBh 30,21–31,1; 36,19-20; ASBh 35,5-6.

<sup>836</sup> General statement in T 46.1924 (*Ta-sheng chih-kuan fa-men* 大乘止觀法門, see fn. 516): 652c22-23: “When the common karma of all sentient beings becomes more and more excellent, the earth (= environment) changes [for the better]; when it becomes worse and worse, the earth also changes [for the worse]” (一切眾生同業轉勝, 土即變異。同業轉惡, 土亦改變。) With special reference to crops and fruit trees: YBh 184,6-9: “Because [people] have indulged in unwholesome actions, external things (esp. fruit trees and crops) become weak, have imperfect fruits, foul-smelling fruits, ... or no fruits at all. [The effect of] wholesome activity should be understood in the opposite way” (*akuśalānām karmaṇām āśevitatvād ... bāhyā bhāvā alpaujaskā bhavanti asaṃpannaphalā pūtiphalāḥ ... aphaḷā ca | etadviparyayaṇa kuśalaṇi* [= ms.] *karma draṣṭavyaṇi* ||). Cf. also AN I 159–160 (immoral behaviour of people leads to drought, which, in its turn, spoils the crops).

<sup>837</sup> Once again, an explicit statement is found in T 46.1924 (652c14-15): “Just as a pure world results from common karma, so also the other, [viz.,] mixed and impure worlds” (如淨土由共業成, 其餘雜穢等土亦復如是.)

meritorious acts of the Buddha whose Buddha-field the respective pure world is considered to be. As J. NATTIER has pointed out,<sup>838</sup> in the *Akṣobhyavyūha* the beauty of Akṣobhya's Buddha-field Abhirati is presented as being the by-product of the merit *he* has acquired by his ascetic activities, and the meritorious actions of other beings are merely envisaged as the means by which they may attain rebirth in this realm. According to the Larger *Sukhāvativyūha*, the features of Amitābha's Buddha-field are even expressly designed by his former vows,<sup>839</sup> and rebirth there is primarily achieved by relying on Amitābha or his name.<sup>840</sup>

**132.2.** In some Mahāyāna sūtras as well as in some early Yogācāra texts, however, we come across the idea that a pure world need not be conceived of as a yonder realm produced by an exceptional amount of meritorious karma, but is just the environment here and now, appearing as pure to purified individuals.<sup>841</sup> While ordinary, impure beings

---

<sup>838</sup> NATTIER 2003: 185–187; cf. also 190–191.

<sup>839</sup> Sukh-1 #10 (M 25–28; A 23,13–26,6; V 232,5–233,17; K 160–169) makes clear that in order to make these vows come true, the whole gamut of bodhisattva practice (including the six *pāramitās*, which are, in this context, already attested to in Lokakṣema's version: cf. SukhL 302b15–17), including meritorious action, is required.

<sup>840</sup> NATTIER 2003: 190–191. Again, this does not exclude some amount of meritorious karma normally being involved, though it was, it seems, not indispensable; cf., e.g., Sukh-1 ## 27–29 (M 47–48; V 241,5–23; A 42,9–43,13; K 248–253; SukhL 309c24 ff). Cf. also NATTIER 2003: 199 n. 24. — BAvŚ 35a25–b4 (quoted *Shinjō shiki* 719,10–12; CL. 185; cf. BAvT P yi 98b1–6; BAvB 409c16–23) enumerates 10 causes and conditions for the production of 'lands' or 'fields'.

<sup>841</sup> Mahāyāna sūtras: e.g., Vkn I.14–18 (fol. 7a4–8a6): the purification of the *buddhakṣetra* corresponds to the purity of the bodhisattva's mind; to advanced bodhisattvas, this *buddhakṣetra* [of Śākyamuni] appears as pure; to Śāriputra, on the other hand, it appears as uneven and full of thorns, abysses, mud, etc., but the Buddha makes him see it, for a while, as consisting of jewels; cf. also LAMOTTE 1962: 119–123 and 402; *Hōb* (3<sup>me</sup> fasc.) 201; BAvT D ka 142a4: *sems can bsam pa rnam dag pas* || *de bzhin zhing rnam rab tu snang* (≈ BAvB 415b5; BAvŚ 51c15; CL. 243). Yogācāra: T 30.1579 (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* Section of *Yogācārabhūmi*): 700c16–26 ≈ Tj P 'i 13b5–14a2 (KRAMER 2005: 90 and 159: # 2.2.3). Cf. also MSg I.60.

experience the world as abounding in mud, swamps, thorns, stones and abysses, to purified beings like the Buddhas it appears as [consisting of] gold, beryl, crystal, etc.<sup>842</sup> This idea makes excellent sense in the developed Yogācāra system, in which objects were explicitly understood as images in the mind.<sup>843</sup> As part of Awakened beings' minds, objects, including plants, automatically participate, in a sense, in their Awakening, though not actively and separately.<sup>844</sup> On the other hand, a purification of the environment or its perception could also be explained on the basis of the old view that all material things contain, virtually or in a hidden form, all elements, including precious minerals, so that if an accomplished yogi concentrates (*adhi-muc*) on, e.g., earth or a piece of wood as gold, it will appear to him as gold, or even turn into gold.<sup>845</sup> Analogously, if plants and other insentient things, too, have Buddha-nature, they will appear as Buddha-natured to a Buddha contemplating them in their true nature,<sup>846</sup> or may even (albeit against Shōshin)<sup>847</sup> be taken to undergo a process of transformation that brings their inherent Buddha-nature to the fore.<sup>848</sup>

---

<sup>842</sup> *Mahāyānasamgraha-upanibandhana* (Tj P sems-tsam li) 268a4-5; SAVBh P mi 143a4-5; 210b8-211a1. Cf. also the idea that *pretas* collectively perceive the water of a river as pus or blood (YBh 88,6-7: *pāṇīyaṃ pūyaśoṇitaṃ paśyanti*; Vś 4,3-4).

<sup>843</sup> For an application of this principle to Sukhāvātī see T 40.1819: 841c13, quoted in TAKASAKI 1998: 3b-4a and OKUNO 2002: 387.

<sup>844</sup> This is how Shōshin seems to understand the statement "Because sentient beings and insentient things are a single body (一體, i.e., a structured whole; or: of one essence), sentient beings becoming Buddha means that insentient things [too] become Buddha" (*Shikan shiki* 248b11-12: 情非情一體故, 有情成佛 是非情成佛), since he quotes it after having defined "grasses and trees" as "developed by the mind" (心所變, corresponding to *cittapariṇāma*, a typical Vijñānavāda term).

<sup>845</sup> Cf. § 95 with fn. 516.

<sup>846</sup> Cf. *Shikan shiki* 249a16-17 (see § 143 with fn. 898).

<sup>847</sup> See § 145.

<sup>848</sup> Cf. also the ambiguity of the comparison in T 38.1767 (Kuan-ting's commentary on the MPS): 176a29-b2: "Just as when Jīvaka [the physician] takes up a herb it becomes (or turns out to be) a healing drug, in the same way to the Buddha there



133. In view of the non-duality of Buddha-nature, the experience of body and environment as distinct is transcended when Buddhahood is attained (cf. also § 116). Thus, on the level of perfect purity, in the “Land of eternally tranquil light” (常寂光土),<sup>849</sup> which is the plane of the *dharmakāya*,<sup>850</sup> there is

“only Buddha-nature consisting in Suchness, which is [properly speaking] neither body nor land and yet called both body and land, [though actually] there is no land apart from the body and no body apart from the land.”<sup>851</sup>

Or:

“On the level of result (i.e., of the Buddha), environment (依) and sentient body (正) are interfused.”<sup>852</sup>

This non-duality of body and ‘land’ has, of course, always been anticipated on the ‘ontological’ level of the Suchness (*tathatā*) or true nature of things (*dharmatā*),<sup>853</sup> but it is only on the level of actual Buddhahood that it is fully realized.<sup>854</sup> The ‘subject’ of this realization is, however, the sentient being that attains Buddhahood, whereas plants, as part of the environment, are rather, so to speak, collectively ‘pulled along’ into Awakening in a passive way (see § 145), which hardly corresponds to what FINDLY postulates for early Buddhism.

is, among all the dharmas everywhere, none that is not the Middle Way. The Middle Way is the same as Buddha-nature” (譬如耆婆執草成藥，佛亦如是：遍一切法無非中道。中道即是佛性。).

<sup>849</sup> T 38.1778 (cf. fn. 771): 565a4 (cf. *Hôb*, 3<sup>me</sup> fasc.: 203).

<sup>850</sup> Ibid. 564b4-5.

<sup>851</sup> Ibid. 565a9-10: 但真如佛性 非身非土 而說身土。離身無土 離土無身。

<sup>852</sup> *Chin-kang-pei* 782c26-27: 果地依正融通。 Cf. also T 38.1779 (subcommentary on *VkN* by Chih-yüan 智圓): 739b15: “[On the] *dharmakāya* [level], body and land (= environment) are non-dual” (法身 身土不二, in the context of 依正不二); T 46.1913: 450c1-2: “Vairocana’s body and land fit each other” (遮那之身 與土相稱); 46.1927: 703c26 (in the context of 依正不二): “[In] Vairocana, [body and land are] ‘one body’ (i.e., a structured whole), non-dual” (遮那 一體不二).

<sup>853</sup> Cf. T 36.1736: 30c27: 法性身土融無二。

<sup>854</sup> Cf. T 46.1927: 703c29–704a4 = T 33.1717: 919a29–b4.

### 1.3. The Omnipresence of Vairocana

134. In the early Buddhist canon, the name 'Vairocana' does not, to my knowledge, occur as a name of the historical Buddha or as the name of any other (former or future) Buddha.<sup>855</sup> Nor is the historical or any other Buddha conceived of as omnipresent. Rather, Buddhas are thought to appear only sporadically (and never more than one at a time), living for a more or less limited period and in a limited area. When they pass away, they attain final nirvāṇa, severing all involvement with the world, just like other arhats. Thus, what the Buddha left behind was only his Dharma, his salvific instructions, which were declared by him to be his real 'body'.<sup>856</sup> But although sufficient as a guideline for right conduct and attaining liberation, these instructions obviously did not fully satisfy the religious needs of the Buddha's followers, who urgently wanted some continuation of the protective and comforting personal presence of the Buddha. For many facets of the development of Buddhist religious belief and practice (like the cultic veneration of relics or Buddha images), these needs would seem to have been a crucial motive. In the present context, two innovations are of special importance: First, the elaboration — perhaps also stimulated by the *bhakti* movement in theistic Hindu circles — of the idea that the Buddha as he appeared in our world was only a temporary apparition when in reality he is a supramundane being residing for countless eons in a celestial realm, or is, ultimately, even identical with the true nature of everything (*dharmatā*) or Suchness (*tathatā*)<sup>857</sup>

---

<sup>855</sup> 'Verocana' occurs as the name of a jewel (e.g., Jā V 310,17-18 [vs.] and 29), of a demon (e.g., SN I 486,1 [no. 11.1.8]: *asurinda*), and of the sun (e.g., Ud no. 6.10 [vs.]) or the heavenly being inhabiting it (e.g., SN I 116,8 [no. 2.1.10]). In the Chinese *Ekottarikāgama* (T 2.125: 558b15), \**Vairoca*' is the name of a monk (AKAN. p. 757). Cf. also BHSD s.v. *virocana* and *vairocana*. Worth mentioning among the references are, apart from those to Gv, those to 'Vairocana' as the name of a future Buddha in the *Mahāvastu* (III 330,15) and to *Virocana* (or *Vai°*) as the name of a former Buddha in the *Lalitavistara* (171,10).

<sup>856</sup> See § 123.1 with fn. 736.

<sup>857</sup> Cf. Aṣṭ 253,4: *yā tathatā, sa tathāgataḥ* (similarly: *anutpāda*, *bhūtaakoṭi*, *śūnyatā*).

(see §§ 124–126) and hence imperishable.<sup>858</sup> Second, the assumption that even now other Buddhas are alive in worlds other than our own and may be met in this very life — either in person (a Buddha may come to this world<sup>859</sup> or bodhisattvas may be able to fly to other Buddha-fields<sup>860</sup>) or in a dream,<sup>861</sup> as an apparition<sup>862</sup> or by way of a vision or visualization in meditative contemplation<sup>863</sup> —, or in a future life by one's being reborn in their Buddha-field.

135. Both ideas are combined in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*. Particularly in the second chapter (according to Buddhābhaddra) of this collection, the Buddha focused upon is called Vairocana<sup>864</sup> and is said to reside in an 'ocean' of pure worlds beautifully arrayed within a gigantic lotus flower.<sup>865</sup> On the other hand, the Buddha, or his body, is often

---

<sup>858</sup> Cf. RGV II.34ab: *utpādavigamān nityam nirodhavigamād dhruvam* (subject: *buddhatvam*). Cf. also the following remark by Chan-jan: "If [any of the three constitutive causes of Buddhahood] existed with a beginning, it would be impermanent. Being impermanent, how could it establish a permanent result?" (T 46.1913: 450b27: 始有\*無常。如何無常而立常果。).

\*See v.l. and X 56.921: 48b20.

<sup>859</sup> Cf., e.g., SukhL 310a4-6; Sukh-1 # 27 (M 47; V 241,7-8; A 42,12-15; K 248,4-7).

<sup>860</sup> E.g., T 13.397: 394b12-13; 395c11-19; 399a22-24; 402c18-19 (kindly pointed out to me by Prof. Tilmann VETTER). Cf. also SukhL 310a8-9.

<sup>861</sup> E.g., Sukh-1 # 29 (M 48; V241,21-22; A 43,11; K 252,7) SukhL 310a3-4; a22-23; cf. c19-21.

<sup>862</sup> E.g., Sukh-1 # 28 (M 47 f; V 241,14-16; A 42,24–43,2; K 250,3-6); SukhL 310b1-3.

<sup>863</sup> E.g., PratyS chapter 3; Gv 65,21–66,33; T 12.365 ("Contemplation Sūtra") 343a18–c10 (INAGAKI 1994: 330–334).

<sup>864</sup> Cf. BAvB 405c8 (BAvT P yi 73b2); 407c4 (BAvT P yi 83a4); 408a20 (BAvT P yi 87a5), etc. In most of the other chapters of the BAv Vairocana occurs only sporadically or not at all (cf. TAMAKI 1989: 39–40), the most notable exceptions being Gv 222,23 ff (BAvB 735b2 ff) and, in a sense, the final scene of the Gv (422,9; 424,17; 425,17 and 22 f; BAvB 784c27 and 785a21). In ch. 30 (BAvB 605a ff), most occurrences refer to Vairocana as a bodhisattva.

<sup>865</sup> Cf. BAvB 412b8-10 ≈ BAvŚ 39b6-8 (CL. 202).

stated to be omnipresent. As has already been pointed out above (§ 108.3), it is not always clear how, precisely, this omnipresence of the Buddha's body should be understood: whether it means an ubiquitous presence of apparitional bodies, or the all-pervasiveness of a miraculous sublime or 'meta-physical' body as suggested by Buddhahadbra, who often introduces in this context the term 法身 (*dharmakāya*).<sup>866</sup> It is worth remembering, in this connection, that the Buddha's body, or *dharmakāya*, is said not only to pervade or fill<sup>867</sup> the whole universe (*dharmadhātu*)<sup>868</sup> but also to envelop, encompass or contain it.<sup>869</sup>

---

<sup>866</sup> According to T'ien-t'ai, all the three *kāyas* are all-pervasive. The *locus classicus* is T 46.1912 (Chan-jan): 151c29–152a6: ... 故知 三身 遍於諸法, 何獨法身 ... (cf. PENKOWER 1993: 420 n. 54 [1 and 2]; SUEKI 2001: 76–77); T 46.1914 (Chan-jan): 460b10–11: 佛性者, 名毘盧遮那。此遮那性 具三佛性。遮那遍故 三佛亦遍。 For the all-pervasiveness of the three bodies in Tendai *hongaku* texts, see HABITO 1996: 40–43 and 59–64; for the relationship of Vairocana and Śākyamuni, see STONE 1999: 25–26.

<sup>867</sup> See § 107.2.3 with fn. 610 (BAvŚ), and, e.g., BAvB 408a13 (= BAvŚ 30a6): 佛身充滿諸法界; a28: 法身充滿一切刹 (BAvŚ and BAvT diff.); b5: 法身 ... 充滿一切諸法界 (cf. BAvŚ 31a22 and BAvT P yi 87b2, with *gsal* "illuminate" instead of "pervade", both renderings probably based on Skt.  $\sqrt{sphur/sphar}$ ); c20: 法身充滿諸法界 一切十方佛國土 (not in BAvB and BAvT); BAvT P yi 8a4-5: "Pervading completely the universe (*dharmadhātu*), the Buddha's body shines forth (\**virocate*)" (*chos kyi dbyings ni kun khyab par || sangs rgyas sku ni rnam par mdzes ||*; BAvŚ 30b22; not in BAvB). Cf. KLIMKEIT 1991: 157; SCHMITHAUSEN 1999: 254.

<sup>868</sup> On this meaning of *dharmadhātu*, cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 1969: 145 f; TAKASAKI 1974: 760; VETTER 2004: 70. Cf. also the "conditioned (有爲) *dharmadhātu*" in Fa-tsang's set of five *dharmadhātus* (HAMAR 1998a: 10) and the "*dharmadhātu* of phenomena" (事法界) in Ch'eng-kuan's pattern of four *dharmadhātus* (ibid. 3; 6–8). According to MCMAHAN's (2002: 136) understanding of '*dharmadhātu*' in the Gv, the term would rather correspond to Ch'eng-kuan's fourth meaning, viz., the "*dharmadhātu* of the mutual non-obstruction of phenomena" (事事無礙法界), but even so it means the concrete universe, though explicitly in its true aspect of mutual interfusion as experienced and displayed by the Buddhas and high-level bodhisattvas.

<sup>869</sup> See § 107.2.3 with fn. 611 and, e.g., BAvB 409c6: 一切刹土 ... 在我身內 ... (BAvŚ 35a13: 一切刹土入我身; BAvT P yi: 98a1: *bdag gi lus su zhing rnam thams cad kyang || rab tu zhugs ...*).

136. As pointed out above (§ 53.3 and § 115), in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, being encompassed and pervaded by the *dharmakāya* of the Buddha is stated only with reference to sentient beings.<sup>870</sup> This limitation is, however, conditioned by the fact that the starting-point of this text is the interpretation of the sentence of the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*, viz., ‘*sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ*’, where the subject is just “all sentient beings”. But also from a systematic point of view, one would, in the Indian context, expect such a limitation if the omnipresence of the *dharmakāya* is envisaged from the perspective of a complete but hidden and obscured presence of their own Buddha-nature in unawakened beings (i.e., in its function as *tathāgatagarbha*).<sup>871</sup> It would also make sense if what one has in mind is the omnipresence of the fully Awakened Buddha in his function as a protector and saviour of all sentient beings, as long as the perspective focuses on these very *sentient beings* as those who ask for protection and aspire to salvation. But if the perspective focuses on the Buddha’s protective and salvific presence in all *situations*, or on Vairocana’s omnipresence as his glorious transcendence of all spatial limitations, there is no reason at all to confine his presence to sentient beings. An explicit statement to this effect, with emphasis on the aspect of power, is found in the Tantric *Mahāvairocana-sūtra* when it has Vairocana (here called Mahāvairocana) state:

“I (= Mahāvairocana)<sup>872</sup> am freely ruling everywhere, pervading all kinds [of beings]: the sentient and the non-sentient.”<sup>873</sup>

<sup>870</sup> See fns. 294 and 295.

<sup>871</sup> The essential identity of *tathāgatagarbha* and *dharmakāya* is expressed, e.g., in the *Anūnatvāpūrṇatva-nirdeśa* quoted RGVV 2,11-13; cf. also 40,16–41,5 and 41,15-17.

<sup>872</sup> Cf. T 18.848: 38a21.

<sup>873</sup> T 18.848: 38b27-28 (ch. 16): 我 ... 一切處自在 普遍於種種 有情及非情. In the Tibetan translation (ch. 18; see Yūtai HATTORI, *Zōbun Dainichikyō*, no place 1931: 354,3-5: *nga ni ... kun gyi rje ste dbang phyug yin || rgyu dang mi rgyu sna tshogs pa || mtha’ dag ngas ni rab tu khyab ||*), 有情及非情 is represented by *rgyu dang mi rgyu* (probably \**carācara*).

137. It is tempting to compare the relation of the Buddha's body or *dharmakāya* to the world in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* with early Vaiṣṇava theology as expressed in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*. Here, too, we find "Viṣṇu is in everything" side by side with "everything is in Viṣṇu", but also "Viṣṇu is everything" and "everything is from Viṣṇu".<sup>874</sup> While the latter statement, expressing Viṣṇu's rôle as the Creator of the world, need not concern us here,<sup>875</sup> a Buddhist analogy to the pantheistic formula "Viṣṇu is everything", in the form that the whole world constitutes, or is part of, the body of Vairocana,<sup>876</sup> would justify the whole world being called 'Buddha-natured' in a much stronger sense than its merely being pervaded or encompassed by Vairocana's body. Actually, such a fusion of the environment with Vairocana's body would seem to be the logical consequence of the non-duality of body and environment at the level of Buddha (see § 133).<sup>877</sup> From this point of view, the concept of "the 'field' (= envi-

---

<sup>874</sup> HACKER 1960: 597–602 (81–86); cf. also 644 (128).

<sup>875</sup> In a sense, one might compare this with the view, developed by Fa-tsang on the basis of the *Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun* (STONE 1999: 7), that Suchness develops, in accordance with conditions, into diversity, although at the same time it remains unchanged (cf., e.g., T 44.1846: 255c20–21: 真如有二義: 一不變義, 二隨緣義), but the question is whether, and if so: to what extent, this process was ever understood by Buddhist thinkers as a deliberate, autonomous act of creation, and not rather as the effect of our own delusion (whatever the cause of the latter), at least as far as impure, saṃsāric diversity is concerned. A detailed discussion of the question in which strands of Buddhist thought and in which sense it may be meaningful to speak of True Reality as creating the world (and of the 'theodicy' problem this might involve) clearly exceeds the limits of this study. For an excellent discussion of the 'theodicy' problem in a Buddhist context see GREGORY 1986.

<sup>876</sup> Cf., as regards the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, the formulation that "this whole world is an extension of Viṣṇu, who is everything" (*viśtāraḥ sarvabhūtasya Viṣṇoḥ sarvam idaṃ jagat*), or that Viṣṇu is *jagadrūpa*, i.e., has the world as his form or appearance: see HACKER 1960: 601 (85) n. 4 and n. 5.

<sup>877</sup> Even in the Vijñānavāda system as found in Hsüan-tsang's *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* 成唯識論, the body and the 'field' corresponding to the Buddha's *sva-sambhogakāya*, which is perceived only when one has become a Buddha (如是身土唯佛乃知), are both regarded as boundless (無邊), i.e., all-pervasive (周遍, 充滿法

ronment) as body" (*kṣetrakāya*, see § 107.1) could easily be understood to mean that the whole universe is Vairocana's body, or *dharmakāya* (cf. § 108.3), as is actually the case in systematized Huiyuan.<sup>878</sup> As a sufficiently explicit passage, let me quote from Ch'eng-kuan's subcommentary to the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*:

"Since Vairocana (inter)fuses (with) the great universe and makes it his body, there is nothing he is not identical with."<sup>879</sup>

138. In connection with the idea of the environment, or parts of it, being equated with or incorporated in the Buddha's body or the *dharmakāya*, we should not overlook the above-mentioned statement ascribed, in one source, to Tao-sheng, according to (one version of) which the emerald bamboos are, all of them, *dharmakāya* (see § 54). In view of the poetical style of the statement it may, however, be questioned whether the author really intended a rigid identification; but as a matter of fact the statement was, by later authors, definitely understood in the sense of ascribing Buddha-nature to the insentient.<sup>880</sup>

139. Very interesting is, moreover, a text from Central Asia written in Old-Turkish, which states that if a monk engages in agricultural activities involving tilling the soil and cutting or manipulating plants,

"this agriculture is what spoils and destroys the true essence (lit. the true selves) of all Buddhas. ... This Buddha Luśyanta (Vairocana?) himself is everything: earth, mountains, stones, sand, the water of brooks and rivers, all the ponds, rivulets and

---

界), and hence co-extensive. Cf., e.g., T 31.1585: 58b29–c6 and c17–19. Same view \**Buddhabhūmisūtra-upadeśa* (T 26.1530) 326b22–25 and c3–9; cf. also 293b12–17.

<sup>878</sup> See § 108.3.3 with fn. 655 and § 116.1b with fn. 698.

<sup>879</sup> T 36.1736: 30c16–17: 以遮那佛 融大法界 而爲其身, 故無不即. Cf. also 31a27–28: "Thus, there has never been a single dharma which is not the Buddha's body" (則未有一法非佛身也).

<sup>880</sup> Cf., e.g., *Tsu-t'ang-chi* 3.13,13–21 (Taiw. 63a13–b7: Nan-yang Hui-chung 南陽慧忠, with approval; see § 129.3.1 with fn. 808) and 14.8,5–11 (Taiw. 267a5–11: Ta-chu ho-shang 大殊和尚 = Ta-chu Hui-hai 大殊慧海, with disapproval; cf. fn 977; cf. also T 47.1998A: 875a12 ff). See also §§ 129.2 (with fn. 801) and 129.4.

lakes, all the plants and trees, all the sentient beings and men. There is no place which is not completely Luśyanta himself.”<sup>881</sup>

The phraseology of this passage<sup>882</sup> very much suggests that the idea of Vairocana’s omnipresence in the world, or of Vairocana’s and the world’s interpenetration, is condensed into the idea of their mutual identity: Luśyanta/Vairocana *is* everything, and everything *is* Luśyanta/Vairocana. Thus, the idea expressed in this text seems to come quite close to the notion of the whole world, including plants and the whole environment, being (part of) Vairocana’s ‘cosmic’ body.

140. An unambiguous expression of the view that the whole world is Vairocana’s body is found in the record of the Ch’an master Nan-yang Hui-chung in the *Tsu-t’ang-chi* (cf. § 129.3). Here, this idea is introduced as an answer to the objection that insentient beings are, in spite of their Buddha-nature, nowhere in the Sūtras predicted to attain Complete Awakening (*sambodhi*):

“All countries of the world system [consisting of a] triple thousand great thousand [worlds] belong to the body of the Buddha Vairocana. [Thus,] how could there exist, outside the Buddha’s body, any further insentients that might be predicted [for Awakening].”<sup>883</sup>

---

<sup>881</sup> Not knowing Old Turkish myself, I am deeply indebted to Dr. Siglinde DIETZ for kindly checking the precise wording of the text for me and suggesting an accurate translation of the crucial expressions. The text has been edited and appears with a German translation in BANG & VON GABAIN 1931: 14–15 (334–335), and again in ZIEME 1981: 242, n. 46. Cf. also KLIMKEIT 1991: 158.

<sup>882</sup> Cf. also *Shikan shiki* 252a6-7: “Sentient and insentient beings: all of them are Vairocana’s body (i.e., essentially identical with him)” (情非情 皆遮那體).

<sup>883</sup> *Tsu-t’ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 12, 19-28 (Taiw. 62b5-14; A.a: 623 f; A.b: 196 f; Y.: 166 [#256]; M. 318–322 [text 65]), esp. 26-28 (Taiw. b12-14): 三千大千世界一切國土 盡屬毗盧遮那佛身。佛身之外 那得更有無情 而得授記耶。 Cf. *Ch’uan-teng lu* 438b10-11: 十方國土 悉是遮那佛身, 那得更有無情受記耶。 While this sentence adopts the perspective of the insentients as they really are and of Vairocana as an accomplished Buddha, the comparison preceding it in the master’s answer (viz.,



A few paragraphs later, the text presupposes that everything in the universe (法界, ~ *dharmadhātu*) is [part of] the *dharmakāya*.<sup>884</sup> Similarly, we read in another Ch'an text:

"All voices/sounds are the voice of the Buddha, all visible things are the visible [appearance] of the Buddha, the whole earth is the *dharmakāya*."<sup>885</sup>

141. The best-known representative of the idea that the whole world is the body of the 'cosmic' Buddha (Mahā-)Vairocana is probably Kūkai (空海, 774–835),<sup>886</sup> the founder of the Japanese Shingon denomination, representing esoteric Buddhism (*mikkyō* 密教).<sup>887</sup> Just as in traditional Buddhism<sup>888</sup> man is considered to consist

---

that when a crown-prince is enthroned, the whole country automatically falls to him) rather corresponds to the idea of the co-awakening of the environment (see §§ 116.1e; 131, 133 and 145), i.e., to the perspective of the Buddha in the moment when Awakening takes place.

<sup>884</sup> *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 13,18-19 (Taiw. 63b4-5; A.a: 627; A.b: 202; Y.: 168 [#259]; M. 305 f [text 53]): "Since the emerald green bamboo is not going beyond the *dharmadhātu*, how could it possibly not be the *dharmakāya*?" (翠竹既不出於法界, 豈非法身乎?).

<sup>885</sup> *Yün-men lu* 雲門錄 (T 47.1988, record of the Ch'an master Yün-men Wen-yen 雲門文偃, 864–949 [cf. DUMOULIN 1985: 216–218]) 559a15-16: 一切聲是佛聲, 一切色是佛色, 盡大地是法身. Cf. KAMATA 1965: 462–463 and 464 n. 11; MATSUMOTO 2000: 572 (text 375).

<sup>886</sup> Cf., e.g., SAKAMOTO 1980: 400 f; xviii; MIYAMOTO 1961: 696 f; KAMEI 1966: 183; LAFLEUR 1973: 98–100; SCHMITHAUSEN 1999: 252; 255 f; MATSUMOTO 2000: 152–155; RAMBELL 2001: 30–33; ITÔ 1996: 27b–30a. Cf. also the similar view of Enchin (圓珍, 814–891): HANANO 1976a: 139b–140a; RAMBELL 2001: 13.

<sup>887</sup> In MATSUMOTO's (2000: 321) opinion, the equation of the environment with Vairocana's body as presented by the record of Hui-chung (see § 140) may also be influenced by the esoteric view. Still, it is worth noting that the record has Hui-chung justify his position by citing not an esoteric scripture but a verse from the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* (BāvŚ 30a6-7), tacitly switching over from the idea of this verse, viz., that the universe is permeated by the Buddha's body, to that of the universe being identical with the *dharmakāya* (*Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 13,17-19 = Taiw. 63b83-5; A.a: 627; A.b: 202; Y.: 168; M.: 305 [text 53]). Cf., in this connection, also the passage from the *Hizōki* quoted in fn. 891 and Raihō's argument in ITÔ 1998: 44a12-14.

of the five material elements, with mind (*viññāna*) as the sixth, so in Kūkai's thought so-called insentients like grasses and trees as well, being a part or modality of Mahāvairocana's *dharmā*-body, are regarded as consisting of all the six elements, including mind.<sup>889</sup> Permeated by mind, the so-called insentients like plants, too, are, in some sense, sentient and thus not essentially different from sentient beings.<sup>890</sup> It is only to the physical eye of ordinary beings that plants, etc., appear in their gross form (i.e., as insentient matter), whereas to the Buddha-eye they manifest their subtle form (i.e., their *dharmakāya* nature, which implies their inherent sentience).<sup>891</sup> Here, too, the

<sup>888</sup> Cf. MN III 239,17-21: *chadhāturo ayaṃ ... puriso ti ... vuttaṃ. kiṃ c'etaṃ paṭicca vuttaṃ? paṭhavīdhātu āpodhātu tejodhātu vāyodhātu ākāsadhātu viññāna-dhātu.*

<sup>889</sup> *Sokushin jōbutsu gi* 即身成佛義 (T 77.2428): 382c5-8 (cf. HAKEDA 1972: 89): "In the exoteric teachings, the four elements are regarded as insentient. In the esoteric teaching, they are explained to be the *samaya* body of the Tathāgata. [According to the esoteric teaching,] the four elements, etc., are not separate from the mind-element. Though mind and matter are different [in appearance], their nature (性) is the same. Matter is mind, mind is matter, without impediment or obstruction" (諸顯教中以四大等爲非情。密教則說此爲如來三摩耶身。四大等不離心大。心色雖異其性即同。色即心 心即色, 無障無礙。). Everything is generated by the six elements: *ibid.* 382b27-28: 六大能生一切。

<sup>890</sup> Thus explicitly Jippan (see fn. 893).

<sup>891</sup> *Hizōki* 秘藏記 (T 86.2921) 8b27–c3 (KATSUMATA 1987, II: 652 #63; LAFLEUR 1973: 98): "[As for] the meaning of [the statement that] insentients like plants 'become' Buddha(s): the subtle body, the *dharmakāya*, consists of the five Great Elements, and so do also space and plants (here *pars pro toto* for 'insentient' objects). The subtle body, the *dharmakāya*, fills every spot in space as well as in plants. Space and plants are just *dharmakāya*. Although with (lit.: in)<sup>a</sup> the physical eye one sees plants in their coarse form, with (lit.: in) the Buddha-eye [they are seen in] their subtle form. Therefore, nothing prevents them from being called Buddha(s); no alteration in what they already are is [required]" (草木非情成佛義。法身細身 五大所成。虛空 亦五大所成。草木 亦五大所成。法身微細身, 虛空乃至草木 一切處無不遍。是虛空是草木 即法身。於肉眼 雖見麁色草木, 於佛眼 微細之色。是故不動本體 稱佛 無妨礙。). In this passage, too (cf. fn. 887), being pervaded by the *dharmakāya* is taken to amount to being identical with it. This identity of plants with the *dharmakāya* would seem to imply their sentience. According to Dōhan (RAMBELL 2001: 37 with n. 95; ITŌ 1996: 45b11-12; cf. 2000: 153b17), the five

‘preaching of the insentients’, i.e., the self-manifestation of their *dharmakāya* nature, as a form of the ‘preaching of the *dharmakāya*’ (*hosshin-seppō*, 法身說法), may be fully ‘audible’ only to one who has attained Awakening.<sup>892</sup>

142. It is obvious that because of forming part of the cosmic Buddha’s *dharmakāya* plants are, as they stand, not only endowed with mind but also, from the outset, perfect, accomplished beings. Thus, this conception of plants does bear some resemblance to their status in earliest Buddhism as postulated by FINDLY. Yet, there are some divergencies. First, Vairocana’s cosmic body comprises not only plants but also all other insentient things. Second, plants and the other ‘insentients’ have this status by nature, and not, it seems, as the result of spiritual practice completed in previous lives. Third, it remains to be asked whether being part of Vairocana’s body is indeed regarded, in the case of plants (or other insentients), as implying some kind of *individual* sentience, some kind of *conscious* and *active* participation in the state of being Awakened, as FINDLY’s view would seem to suggest. The texts discussed so far are, at any rate, not sufficiently explicit in this regard, and it seems to be only in later sources that this issue is elaborated<sup>893</sup> (cf. § 149.2–5). Apart from this, we

---

elements are, on the level of Awakening, the five kinds of wisdom (五智), hence interfused with consciousness. Cf. also Dōhan’s remark that speaking of five elements is, in the present passage, tantamount to speaking of all the six (Itō 1996: 45b13 and 2005: 153b13: 雖云五大 即六大也). According to Ekō 慧光 (1666–1734) as quoted by Ryūyū 隆瑜 (1773–1850), the five elements as they are in the *dharmakāya* can be seen only by the Buddha, the five elements in space can also be seen by saints, whereas with the physical eye one can see only the five elements as they are in plants (i.e. in their coarse form) (Itō 2005: 154a5-9).

<sup>a</sup> Cf. X 33.626: 309c18: “He now perceives it *in* (= with) the physical eye” (今於肉眼見之).

<sup>892</sup> Cf. KATSUMATA 1987: II 449 (from Kūkai’s *Issaikyō kaimon* 一切經開門), stating that the *dharmakāya*’s expounding the Dharma takes place only from Buddha to Buddha (仏と仏とのみ).

<sup>893</sup> According to Jippan 實範 (1089?–1144), “external material [things] are invariably endowed with the element ‘mind’; therefore, external material [things] are all sentient. Being sentient, [even] external material [things] like plants no doubt

must not lose sight of the fundamental differences between early Buddhism and the Vairocana texts as regards the conception of the nature of the Buddha. The idea of a cosmic Buddha like Vairocana, of whose cosmic body plants could be a part, is a later development and totally alien to early Buddhism.<sup>894</sup>

#### 1.4. Plants Miraculously Transformed into Buddhas

143. The category of ‘miraculous transformation’ covers situations like that described in the passage from the *Dharmadhātu-prakṛty-asambheda-nirdeśa* dealt with in Pt. II.A, ch. 2.1, i.e., “transformation” is to be understood in the sense of miraculously making a plant appear in the form of a Buddha,<sup>895</sup> and not in the sense of a real transformation of an insentient thing into a sentient being. Shōshin also stresses this in his interpretation of a passage said to be from the *Chung-yin-ching* (中陰經)<sup>896</sup> according to which at the time of a Buddha’s Awakening plants and the land obtain the physical body of a Buddha and emit light.<sup>897</sup> For Shōshin, the passage merely means

---

make up their mind, practise [the Path] and attain Buddhahood” (既諸外色 必具識大, 故諸外色 皆是有情。草木外色 是有情故 發心修行成佛何疑: HANANO 1977: 138a; ITÔ 2001: 12a17-19). Raihō 賴寶 (1279–1330?) expressly contrasts this position with the view that plants (etc.) are automatically drawn along into Buddhahood because they are nothing but mind (唯心) (FUCHITA 2003: 73,9-10; ITÔ 1999: 15a19-20).

<sup>894</sup> When looking for a somehow comparable idea in early Indian thought, what suggests itself is the Vedic myth of the primeval cosmic Man (*puruṣa*) (*Rgveda* 10.90).

<sup>895</sup> Cf. also *Sanjin-gi shiki* 330b17–331a1: 寶積經 說文殊神通變化. Similarly in the case of the MPS passage (Pt. II.A, ch. 2.2): “Likewise, [the transformation of a sentient being into an insentient thing and vice-versa mentioned in the] MPS is [merely a manifestation of] the bodhisattva’s miraculous transformative power” (ibid. 331a1: 涅槃亦爾 是菩薩神變也). Almost the same explanation is found in the *Rokusoku senyō ki* 六即詮要記 (HANANO 1976b: 129a16-18).

<sup>896</sup> See § 54 with fn. 310.

<sup>897</sup> *Shikan shiki* 249a14-15: 一佛成道 觀見法界 草木國土 悉皆成佛 身長丈六 光明遍照 (...). The wording agrees with that of the citation in *Shinjō shiki* 713,16,

that when illumined by (or: mirrored in) the eye of the Buddha, there is not even a single colour (/visible item) or smell that is not Vairocana (cf. §§ 127.4 and 137–140). It is not that the plants only then *become* Buddha(s); rather, they simply turn out to have always been Buddha-natured.<sup>898</sup> It is only to the profane that they appear profane; to the saint, everything reveals itself as sacred.<sup>899</sup> In a similar way, Shōshin deals with the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* passage discussed in Pt. II.A, ch. 2.2. He takes it to refer to the understanding of the saint, for whom, because he has comprehended that one and the same Suchness is the true essence of everything, sentient and insentient merge into each other, the distinction between them being dissolved on this level (cf. § 133).<sup>900</sup> With regard to individual, concrete sentience, no real, definitive transformation of an insentient being into a sentient one,<sup>901</sup> or vice-versa,<sup>902</sup> is possible.<sup>903</sup>

144. It is obvious that a temporary miraculous transformation of a tree into a Buddha would not prove anything with regard to the Buddha-nature or sentience of plants in general, unless the transformation is understood as an exceptional manifestation of their true nature to ordinary beings who are normally incapable of perceiving it, or as an exceptional (limited and temporary) participation in the Buddha's awareness of reality. In this case, however, it would, in the

---

where, however, the phrase “and they all expound the Dharma” (悉能說法) is added. For slightly different readings in later works of Annen see MATSUMOTO 2000: 57.

<sup>898</sup> *Shikan shiki* 249a16–b1: 佛眼所照 一色一香 莫非遮那。故云成佛。非始成也。... 一切依正 皆已成佛。

<sup>899</sup> *Shikan shiki* 249b1: 望聖皆聖, 望凡有凡也。

<sup>900</sup> *Shikan shiki* 250a3–4: 當知 聖人 了達一如。故情非情 實更互轉。此望聖智 名為永轉。Cf. Chan-jan's interpretation indicated in fn. 524.

<sup>901</sup> Such a transformation would imply the heretic view of the appearance of new sentient beings (*apūrvasattva*) in *samsāra* (cf. *Shikan shiki* 248b5–7).

<sup>902</sup> Such a transformation would amount to an automatic end of *samsāra* for that sentient being (i.e., imply the extreme of *uccheda*) (*Shikan shiki* 250a1–2).

<sup>903</sup> *Shikan shiki* 250a4–5: 若望事情 非是永轉。Cf. also *Shinjō shiki* 713,11 (⑦), quoting Saichō.

Chinese context, merely reveal the essential non-duality of body and environment, but hardly manifest plants as individually Awakened beings.

### 1.5. Plants Becoming Buddhas

145. As for the aforementioned passage of the *Chung-yin-ching*, Shōshin's interpretation clearly states that grasses, trees and the land are not really transformed so as to become Buddha(s) by the Awakening of a Buddha but are merely experienced by the Buddha in their original Buddha-nature.<sup>904</sup> This is, however, hardly what an unbiased reading of the wording of the passage suggests. One would rather take it to mean that when a person attains Awakening, even the environment, including grasses and trees, is drawn along into Awakening and undergoes a drastic change.<sup>905</sup> Such a change could be conceived of as an automatic co-awakening, for the passage does not indicate any active participation of grasses and trees. But in view of the fact that the *Chung-yin-ching* passage is not attested to before Annen and may be of Japanese origin,<sup>906</sup> such an active participation cannot be

---

<sup>904</sup> Still more explicit is the interpretation of the *Chung-yin-ching* passage in *Kankōruijū* 380a21-25 (cf. MATSUMOTO 2000: 56 [text 46]), where the phrase "plants become Buddha(s)" is interpreted in the sense that when the Buddhas make plants the object of their contemplation, the image (相) of plants in a Buddha's mind, being 'pulled along' (被引) by the 'vision-part' (見分, i.e., the function of perceiving), becomes Buddha-natured (佛體). This kind of understanding would seem to be the only way to explain the analogous statement that on the level of the Perfect Teaching the attainment of Buddhahood by one sentient being, or Vairocana, involves all the other sentient beings becoming Buddhas. Cf. the interesting remarks on this statement in Shin'en's (see § 116.1e) *Kegonshū shūshō gishō* 華嚴宗種性義抄 (T 72.2328: 61a17-b13).

<sup>905</sup> Cf. also ambiguous formulations as in *Shinjō shiki* 712,7: "In accordance with sentient beings attaining [Awakening], insentients also attain [it], because 'support' (= environment) and '[recompense] proper' (= sentient beings) are non-dual" (隨有情成 無情亦成, 依正不二故), or 713,13-14: "When sentient beings attain Buddhahood, the 'support-recompense', i.e., the 'land', also attains Buddhahood along with them" (有情成佛之時, 依報國土 亦隨成佛).

<sup>906</sup> Cf. SUEKI 1995a: 397; 2001: 73; MATSUMOTO 2000: 57 f.

definitively excluded either. On the other hand, Shōshin<sup>907</sup> seems to be right in doubting that the Chinese T'ien-t'ai masters had already held the view that plants can *individually* become Buddhas by virtue of a resolve and spiritual practice of their own, i.e., that the Buddha-nature in them could function as a potential to be actualized or uncovered individually,<sup>908</sup> and he seems also to be correct in pointing out that this possibility was expressly taken into account only in Japan.<sup>909</sup> This is evident from the questions early Tendai scholars submitted to Chinese masters according to the *Tōketsu* (唐決), and from the answers they received.<sup>910</sup> For example, when Enchō (圓澄, 771–836) wonders why, in view of the omnipresence of Buddha-nature, insentient beings should not resolve to strive for Awakening, practise accordingly and finally attain the goal, just like sentient beings,<sup>911</sup> the reaction of the Chinese master Kuang-hsiu (廣修, 770–844?) is somewhat evasive (or merely polite?) but clearly not supportive of the idea. According to Kuang-hsiu's answer, when sentient beings strive for Awakening and attain it, their bodies, consisting of the four elements, which are, as such, of course non-sentient, are automati-

---

<sup>907</sup> *Shikan shiki* 248b1-5.

<sup>908</sup> Cf. the third interpretation of the compound *tathāgatagarbha* in the RGJV given in § 53.3 (with fn. 297).

<sup>909</sup> Cf. HANANO 1977: 140b; SUEKI 1995a: 393 ff (chapter 5); 2001; SHIRATO 1998: 25a; STONE 1999: 29–30; RAMBELLI 2001: 11. However, even in Japan the question of plants becoming Buddhas by virtue of a resolve and practice of their own remained controversial, not only between the different schools (cf., e.g., its rejection by Sanron scholars like Gen'ei 玄叡 [†840]: SHIRATO 1998: 24b and 29b, or Hossō monks like Chūsan 仲算 [10<sup>th</sup> cent.]: WATANABE 2008: 63b) but also within the Tendai school, as shown by the case of Shōshin, Kakuchō, etc. (see fn. 726). For more details on the different positions within the Tendai school, see HANANO 1976a, 1976b and 1977. Even the idea of the 'co-awakening' of the environment is not unambiguous, since it may be understood in terms of a balanced non-duality of mind and matter or in terms of a strict mind-only position (HANANO 1976b: 150b–151a; cf. also the controversy indicated in fn. 779).

<sup>910</sup> Cf. SUEKI 1995a: 373–377; 2001: 80–83; SHIRATO 1998: 25a–26b; GRONER 2000; MATSUMOTO 2000: 58–60.

<sup>911</sup> *Shinjō shiki* 709,11. Cf. GRONER 2000: 493–492 rl; SUEKI 2001: 81.

cally involved, and the outside world is involved as their environment and, so to speak, also pulled along into Awakening.<sup>912</sup> Therefore, all 'grasses and trees' bend down in reverence towards the body of the Awakened one,<sup>913</sup> and in Amitābha's Pure Land even the trees preach the Dharma. But Kuang-hsiu is anxious to make clear that this preaching does not at all imply that each single tree expounds the Dharma after having attained Buddhahood individually and by its own effort.<sup>914</sup>

## 2. New Aspects of the Buddha-Nature and Sentience of Plants in Japanese Buddhism<sup>915</sup>

146. 1. Even if plants (and other insentient things) as individuals are credited with developing, under certain circumstances, mental capacities of their own, which enable them to practise the Path and attain Buddhahood, this does not necessarily involve an individual sentience of *ordinary* plants here and now. Annen (安然, 841? to ca. 890), e.g., "asserts that grasses and trees may become individual

---

<sup>912</sup> *Shinjō shiki* 709,16–710,1 and 710,2–4 (Jap. transl. 737,7–20 and 738,3–8); 713,13–14 (Jap. transl. 749,4–5): 故知 有情成佛之時 依報國土 亦隨成佛. Cf. SUEKI 1995a: 374–375; 2001: 81–82; GRONER 2000: 491–489 rl (with English transl.).

<sup>913</sup> *Shinjō shiki* 709,3–4; GRONER 2000: 489.

<sup>914</sup> *Shinjō shiki* 710,8–9; GRONER 2000: 488. Cf. also Raihō (see fn. 893), who contrasts the view that even when insentients are drawn along into Awakening they are not transformed into sentient beings with the Shingon position that because of the non-duality of the six elements they have been endowed with mind all the time (Itō 1999: 16b12 ff; FUCHITA 2003: 75,11 ff).

<sup>915</sup> The purpose of this chapter is merely to point out certain peculiar facets of the development of the idea of the Buddha-nature of plants (and other insentients) in Japan, such as are of special interest in the context of the present study. For this purpose, a comprehensive and exhaustive study of the subject is not required, and it would anyway be beyond the limits of a non-Japanologist like me in view of the large amount of pertinent primary sources and secondary literature (mainly in Japanese), a great deal of which is unavailable to me.



Buddhas in their own right.”<sup>916</sup> Even so, in his *Bodaishin gi shō* (菩提心義抄)<sup>917</sup> he expressly discards the Jain view, stated to be shared by the Kegon master Juryō (壽靈) from the Tōdaiji<sup>918</sup>, that plants are, just as they are, endowed with individual sentience, to be inferred from their sleeping during the night.<sup>919</sup>

2. According to Annen’s own solution, on the highest level of explanation, what resolves to awaken, practises the Path and attains Buddhahood is only the one Buddha-nature, all-pervasive like space, and not individual beings, be they non-sentient or sentient.<sup>920</sup> But one may also describe the process as taking place in individuals, including non-sentient beings like grasses or trees. In this case, there is

- a) the aspect of the Awakening process of non-sentient beings having its origin in Suchness (真如, *tathatā*) or Pure Mind (淨心), which has always been present in the respective beings themselves,
- b) the aspect of non-sentient beings being drawn into Awakening by the minds of other beings (Buddhas or sentient beings at the moment of the attainment of Buddhahood), and
- c) the aspect of these two aspects combined.<sup>921</sup>

---

<sup>916</sup> SUEKI 2001: 85. Cf. already *Shinjō shiki* 708,4-8 (MATSUMOTO 2000: 61). It seems that already Ennin (圓仁, 794–864) favoured the same view (*ibid.* 62; SHIRATO 1998: 26b; 30a). — A comprehensive treatment of Annen’s view on insentients becoming Buddha(s) is SHINKAWA 1992.

<sup>917</sup> An annotated Japanese translation of the chapter concerned is contained in SUEKI 1991: 41–69. Cf. also SUEKI 1995a: 408–416; SHINKAWA 1992: 94–96; RAMBELLI 2001: 14–15.

<sup>918</sup> *Bodaishin* 487a3+5.

<sup>919</sup> *Bodaishin* 487a1-3 and 27-28; see also 487b25-26. Cf. also I-hsing’s (一行, 683–727) commentary on the *Mahāvairocana-sūtra* (T 39.1796: 593c9-12; FUCHITA 2003: 81 n. 49), ascribing to non-Buddhists the view that plants have life because they grow again when cut, and that they have sentience or mind (情識) because they roll up their leaves at night, which means that they sleep.

<sup>920</sup> *Bodaishin* 484c21–485a5; cf. 486a2-6.

<sup>921</sup> *Bodaishin* 484c2-21; cf. 485c25–486a2.

Plants and other non-sentient beings are always pervaded by the 'meta-psyche' Pure Mind, which is identical with Suchness (*tathatā*) and hence universal, not individual.<sup>922</sup> But in contradistinction to sentient beings,<sup>923</sup> in the case of plants and other material things, just as they are here and now, the Pure Mind within them does not normally develop the eight individual forms of mind (sc., *ālayavijñāna*, etc.).<sup>924</sup> However, even in plants the Pure Mind comprises the nature (性) or potentiality of the eight individual forms of mind.<sup>925</sup> Therefore, it is possible that — under certain conditions like the influence of Awak-

---

<sup>922</sup> *Bodaishin* 487a26-27: 草木等有真如淨心; 488a1-5, referring to Chan-jan's (湛然, 711–782) *Diamond Scalpel* (金剛鉞論), for which see § 127.4.

<sup>923</sup> *Bodaishin* 487c21-22: "In sentient beings, the ninth [consciousness]<sup>a</sup>, the (meta-psyche) Pure Mind, transforms into the eighth consciousness (viz., the *ālayavijñāna* or subliminal mind), and the eighth consciousness manifests the seven actual [forms of] consciousness (i.e., subtle ego-consciousness, intellectual consciousness (*manovijñāna*), and the five sense-perceptions)." (有情第九淨心 變成八識。八識 能現七識。). In this passage, 八識 is obviously used as an abbreviation for 第八識 (cf. 487c13-14), the eighth consciousness, but 七識 must mean "the [remaining] seven forms of consciousness" because the decisive point in the context is the presence of the sixth *vijñāna* (第六意識), viz., intellectual consciousness, which alone is capable of producing the resolve for attaining Buddhahood (487c19-20).

<sup>a</sup> In the case of numbered forms of *vijñāna* (識), I consistently render the term as "consciousness", in spite of the fact that the ninth is meta-psyche and that the eighth and the seventh are subconscious.

<sup>924</sup> *Bodaishin* 487c24-26: "Question: In this case, are the presently existing (i.e., ordinary) grasses and trees, [or] visible objects, also endowed with the eighth (viz., the subliminal *ālayavijñāna*) and the [remaining] seven [forms of] consciousness? Answer: Visible objects (including plants) are, just as they are, [in their essence] the ninth consciousness (viz., the Pure Mind), ... but it is not the case that grasses and trees, or other [visible objects], are at present (or: actually) endowed with the eighth and the [remaining] seven." (問。若爾 今現所有草木色塵 亦有八七識耶否。答。色塵當體 爲第九識。... 非草木等 現有八七。). Cf. also 487c20. As in the passage quoted in fn. 923, I take the expression 八七(識) as an abbreviation for 第八識及七識.

<sup>925</sup> *Bodaishin* 487c25-26: 第九識中 有八七性。Cf. 487a27 (真如淨心 具九識性).

ened beings<sup>926</sup> — the Pure Mind even within non-sentient beings like plants develops into the eight individual forms of mind, including discriminative thought (which is a function of the sixth consciousness, i.e., 意識, *manovijñāna*), required for setting out on the Path for Awakening.<sup>927</sup>

147. Later on, significantly different ideas emerge. An interesting example is found in the *Sōmoku hosshin shugyō jōbutsu ki* (草木發心修行成佛記), a text ascribed to Ryōgen (良源, 912–985) and Kakuun (覺運, 953–1007, as the questioner) but of controversial authenticity.<sup>928</sup> According to a passage that is missing in the earliest manuscript,<sup>929</sup> the Awakening of plants is no longer a mysterious event but equated with the natural process of their life cycle: the way plants resolve to awaken, practise the Path, attain Awakening and enter into nirvāṇa consists in nothing but their being endowed with the four aspects (of conditioned things, and at the same time of the life cycle), viz., arising, abiding, changing and disappearing.<sup>930</sup> In view of this homology, the author (of this part of the text) sees no reason why they

---

<sup>926</sup> Cf. *Bodaishin* 488b3-4: “Bodhisattvas ... sometimes transform grasses and trees into sentient beings; they may even transform [them] for ever” (諸佛菩薩 ... 或轉草木 以爲有情, 乃至永轉。).

<sup>927</sup> *Bodaishin* 487c22-23: “Even in non-sentient beings, the ninth [consciousness], the Pure Mind, may transform into the eighth consciousness, and the eighth consciousness may, in its turn, manifest the [other] seven [forms of] consciousness (cf. fn. 923). Since [in this case even non-sentient beings] are indeed endowed with the sixth [consciousness, *manovijñāna*, i.e., intellectual consciousness,], why can’t they produce the resolve [for Buddhahood]?” (亦非情第九淨心 變成八識。八識亦現七識。已有第六, 何不發心。). Cf. also 488a25–b2.

<sup>928</sup> SUEKI 1995a: 416–417; 2001: 89; HORIBATA 2006: 109 ff.

<sup>929</sup> HORIBATA 2006: 123 f; cf. also the synopsis on special page 2 (between pp. 354 and 355). I am not in a position to assess the coherence of the text of HORIBATA’s ms. A so as to definitely exclude the possibility of a lacuna.

<sup>930</sup> *Sōmoku* 345a10-11: 草木既具生住異滅四相, 是則草木發心修行菩提涅槃姿也。 Cf. LAFLEUR 1973: 102; STONE 1999: 30; SUEKI 1995a: 417; 2001: 89; ITŌ 1996: 23b–25a; RAMBELL 2001: 16–17; FUCHITA 2003: 60–66 and 73. For a Shingon development of this view, see RAMBELL 2001: 37–39.

should not be regarded as sentient beings.<sup>931</sup> Actually, it is affirmed in an addendum to the text (found already in the earliest ms.) that plants are indeed endowed with mind and therefore capable of attaining Buddhahood individually and by their own effort,<sup>932</sup> but details concerning the precise nature and functioning of this mind are not given. It is worth noting that the homology of the life-phases of plants in the course of the seasons with the process of Awakening and Liberation is not only found in later Tendai texts<sup>933</sup> but also in Shingon sources.<sup>934</sup>

148. 1. In the *Sanjūshi-ka no kotogaki* (三十四箇事書), a Tendai *hongaku* text based on oral transmissions committed to writing sometime between 1150 and 1250,<sup>935</sup> a different view is advocated.<sup>936</sup> This text, in a sense, agrees with Shōshin in asserting that, properly speaking, plants (and other insentient things) do not at all *become* Bud-

---

<sup>931</sup> Cf., in this connection, also the interpretation of the eight aspects of the Buddha's life as "the totality of the beings of the ten worlds being born, abiding, changing, and perishing, dying in one place and being born in another" (STONE 1999: 185, from the *Ichijō shō* 一帖抄, an early 14<sup>th</sup> century Tendai text).

<sup>932</sup> *Sōmoku* 346a9-10: 一家所立草木 ... 有心故成佛也。 Cf. the synopsis in HORIBATA 2006: special page 6 (between pp. 354 and 355).

<sup>933</sup> HANANO 1977: 135–136.

<sup>934</sup> Thus Dōhan 道範 (1178–1252), quoted by In'yū 印融 (1435–1519): "In the case of plants, sprouting in spring, thriving in summer, fruiting in autumn and shedding leaves (dying) in winter are precisely the sequence of resolving [for Awakening], cultivating spiritual practice, [attaining] Awakening (*bodhi*) and [entering] nirvāṇa." ((草木) 春萌夏盛秋實冬落 是即發心修行菩提涅槃次第也). The text adds that the esoteric tradition (密宗) is aware of this deeper significance, whereas for the shallow (i.e. exoteric) traditions (淺宗) the four phases are nothing but arising, abiding, changing and disappearing. Cf. RAMBELLI 2001: 37–38; text from ITō 1996: 47a12-13.

<sup>935</sup> For detailed information and references concerning the dispute of dating the *Kotogaki*, see STONE 1999: 48–49 (with 387–388, ns. 189–193) and 199–200 (with 423–424, ns. 32–33). Cf. also MATSUMOTO 2000: 73 n. 22.

<sup>936</sup> Cf. HANANO 1975–1977; SUEKI 1995b: 7–8; HABITO 1996: 59–64; STONE 1999: 202–203; MATSUMOTO 2000: 44–46; RAMBELLI 2001: 18–21.

dhas.<sup>937</sup> To accept such a process would imply a decrease of the environment.<sup>938</sup> For the *Kotogaki*, however, the same also holds good for the various types of sentient beings, from hell-beings up to bodhi-sattvas, for if they were to become Buddhas through a transformation of their original status, in the end only the realm of Buddhas would be left.<sup>939</sup> Rather, plants as well as the other realms and the sentient beings living in them are stable in that they do not change into something else.<sup>940</sup> This might be understood to mean that plants are nothing but plants, i.e., insentient things lacking the virtues of the realm of sentient beings and Buddhas.<sup>941</sup> But such a view would not be correct, and to discard it is the real purpose of the teaching that plants *become* Buddhas.<sup>942</sup> In reality, plants are, just as they are, i.e., as insentient plants and without requiring a transformation, at the same time endowed with the virtues of all the ten realms: with the virtues of sentient beings as well as with the three Buddha-bodies.<sup>943</sup>

---

<sup>937</sup> *Kotogaki* 362a18 (Jap. transl.: 167,2): “We now think that the deeper meaning is that grasses and trees do not really cultivate [the Path so as] to become Buddhas” (今意實草木不成佛習事深義也).

<sup>938</sup> *Kotogaki* 362a19–b1 (167,4): 若草木成佛，依報減，三千世間 器世間 有咸(=減)少也。

<sup>939</sup> *Kotogaki* 362b2-3 (167,5-7): 地獄成佛 餓鬼成佛 乃至菩薩成佛，皆爾。... 若改當體者，只佛界也。

<sup>940</sup> *Kotogaki* 362b3-4 (167,7-8): 常住十界全無改。草木常住 眾生常住 五陰常住。 Cf. also 365b16–366a1 (176,12-16). On “the *Kotogaki*’s rejection of linear time” in favour of a “timeless and ‘constantly abiding’ present”, see STONE 1999: 207. According to MATSUMOTO (2000: 43–45), ‘stable’ means that things are absolute just as they are, in their very impermanence (cf. 66,11: 無常なる現象をそのまま絶対として肯定する).

<sup>941</sup> *Kotogaki* 362b5 (167,9-10): 他人意云: 草木 只草木 無生界佛界德。一向只非情 不有情。

<sup>942</sup> *Kotogaki* 362b4 (167,9): 但草木成佛說事 爲破他人情故。

<sup>943</sup> *Kotogaki* 362a18-19 (167,2-3): 草木 依報。... 依報 乍依報 施十界德.; 362b6-7 (167,11-13): 一家意，雖草木非情 乍非情施有情德也。改非情 非云有情也。... 只乍非情而有情也.; 364b12-13 (173,10-12): 依報 乍依報三身也，改之 非云三身。但 ... 乍依報具三身德也。 As for the phrase 改之 非云三身, HABITO (1996: 60) translates it as “There is no point even in calling them ‘the three bodies’” and takes it as a

2. But what does this mean? In one passage, the *Kotogaki* explains the three bodies as features of plants just as they are: their inexhaustible varieties: cherry trees, plum trees,<sup>944</sup> peach trees, etc., constitute their 'adapted body' (應身, ~ *nirmāṇakāya*); because flowers and fruits, countless and manifold, are incessantly produced, they are the 'recompense body' (報身, ~ *sambhogakāya*); and the fact that they are endowed just by nature with a body or shape that is twisted or straight and grows continuously is their *dharmakāya*.<sup>945</sup> Thus, they are, after all, just plants or insentients, but at the same time not just plants. Probably J. STONE<sup>946</sup> is right in suggesting that the world is envisioned as a *mandala*. In this cosmic *mandala*, everything occupies its proper place, each thing being just what it is, but at the same time everything participates in, and represents, the whole, in accordance with the Tendai doctrine that the 'recompense proper' (正報) and the 'support-recompense' (依報), i.e., sentient beings and their environment, are non-dual<sup>947</sup> and that each single thing contains all modes of

---

"disclaimer" inviting the reader "to cast aside the very concept of the three bodies, and simply to encounter 'cherry trees ... and the like', as such." I rather understand the phrase to mean: "To transform them (viz., the 'recompense proper' and the 'support-recompense') [into the three bodies] is not [required for] calling them 'the three bodies'." Cf. similar sentences like 363a9 (169,4-5) 改之故不云 X or 363a10-11 (169,6-7) 改之故非云 X, the first of which is translated by STONE (1999: 204; generalization mine) as "They are called X not because one transforms them [into X]."

<sup>944</sup> 梅 (*bai, ume*) = *Prunus mume*, 李 (*ri, sumomo*) = *Prunus salicina*.

<sup>945</sup> *Kotogaki* 364b10-11 (173,7-9): 櫻梅桃李等 ... 様々無盡, 應身體。亦華果無盡 雜々念々所生所成故 報身也。曲直念々所生體法爾具, 法身也。Cf. HABITO 1996: 59-60. Not all details of the passage are entirely clear to me.

<sup>946</sup> STONE 1999: 208: "It is as though the world is envisioned as a mandala." Cf. also 225: "... a 'mandalization' of space and time, reflecting the influence of Mikkyō on traditional Tendai thought". STONE adds the suggestion that "this mandalic world view might also have represented an attempt to interpret change and impermanence in ways that drained them of terror and apparent randomness by assimilating them to some originally inherent structure of reality."

<sup>947</sup> *Kotogaki* 362a17 (167,1): "In the opinion of the one (= the only legitimate: cf. PLASSEN 2002: 17-18 n. 62) school, there can be no doubt regarding the fact that

existence,<sup>948</sup> albeit in a form that unawakened people are not aware of.<sup>949</sup>

149.1. A similar view is also found, as no. 4 in a set of seven different explanations of the Buddha-nature of plants, in the *Kankōruijū* (漢光類聚), a Tendai text attributed to Chūjin (忠尋, 1065-1138) but probably composed in the second half of the 13<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>950</sup> According to this text, ‘grasses and trees’ are declared to be already Awakened, in the sense that they are, just as they stand (當體), with their

---

grasses and trees become (/are established as) Buddhas, because the ‘support-recompense’ (= environment) and the ‘recompense proper’ (= sentient beings) are non-dual” (一家意, 依正不二故, 草木成佛之事無疑。).

<sup>948</sup> Cf., with reference to karma, *Kotogaki* 366b16-17 (179,7-9): 知圓融實相法門日, 造業當體具一切諸法故, 全非造業限, 法界圓融體也, translated in STONE 1999: 218-219: “When one knows the doctrine of the perfectly interpenetrating true aspect, deluded action in its essence is endowed with all dharmas; thus it is not merely deluded action but the perfect interpenetration of the dharma realm in its entirety.” Cf. also 366a7-10 (177,5-8), dealing with the three truths (conventional existence, emptiness, and the Middle), stated to be “not two and yet two”. If the latter perspective (“and yet two”) is adopted, conventional existence, viz., “the realm before our eyes, the myriad phenomena, the body of what is originally unborn”, is predominant, or basic (本: 366a11), whereas emptiness and the Middle are subsidiary, or its adornments. Emptiness is then defined as the merging of things with one another, implying the absence of separation, and the Middle as their being contained in one another, which implies their constant abiding (而二日, 假諦勝空中劣可云也。其故假諦眼前境界諸法森羅自爾本來不生體。...此諸法互混合云無差別云空。互具故云常住云中。{...} 故空中假家莊嚴也。).

<sup>949</sup> *Kotogaki* 366b15-16 (179,7): “When one does not know the Perfect Doctrine, one calls [karma] only karma, one does not say that karma is precisely liberation” (不知圓教, 只云業, 業即解脫不云也). As P. GRONER (1995: 72 f; emphasis mine) points out with reference to the *Kankōruijū* (see § 149.1), many of the “affirmations of the phenomenal realm just as it is” correspond to the phase of “returning to and becoming the same as the phenomenal realm” (還同有相門), i.e., refer “to the *post-enlightenment realization* that the enlightenment attained (*shikaku* 始覺) is the same as innate enlightenment (*hongaku*).”

<sup>950</sup> GRONER 1995, esp. 50–55 (on the meaning of the title: 52 n. 5); STONE 1999: 102, 169 and 399–400 (n. 25, with further references); RAMBELL 2001: 21 (with further references in n. 44).

roots, stems, branches and leaves, already in an original state [of perfection] (本分).<sup>951</sup>

149.2. In another paragraph, the *Kankōruijū* addresses the question of *mind* in grasses and trees, just as they are. As indicated above (§ 146), for Annen, who identifies the universal, unconditioned Buddha-nature with the Pure Mind, plants and other insentient things, too, are by nature endowed with this meta-individual form of mind. But this does not imply an actual *individual* sentience. Nor can we be sure that individual sentience was considered to follow from the assumption that each part of the universe contains the whole. In Chih-i's (智顗, 538–597) *Mo-ho chih-kuan* (摩訶止觀),<sup>952</sup> *hsin* 心 in the sense of “mind” (Skt. 質多 = *citta*), i.e., thinking or cognition (慮知), is distinguished from *hsin* 心 in the sense of “heart” or “centre” (Skt. *hṛd* or *hṛdaya*), represented by two different phonetic renderings, viz., 矣栗駄 (i-lit-da) and 汚栗駄 (ʔo-lit-da).<sup>953</sup> The former is defined by Chih-i as the essence or gist of a collection (= corpus of texts?)<sup>954</sup> (積

<sup>951</sup> *Kankōruijū* 380b5-6: 草木根莖枝葉當體己己本分是成佛義也 (thus also DNBZ vol. 17: 19b9; the text in TADA 1995: 380a14 [transl. 216,9-10] has 己己 instead of 己己).

<sup>952</sup> T 46.1911: 4a20-24.

<sup>953</sup> Phonetic reconstruction according to PULLEYBLANK 1991 (190, 314, 325, 326 and 367). 矣栗駄 (i-lit-da) and 汚栗駄 (ʔo-lit-da) are obviously two different attempts at a phonetic representation of Skt. *hṛda(ya)* (cf. *BDJ* 1: 475, and *FK* 2471, noting various alternative writings). It is noteworthy that besides 汚栗駄 we also find 汙栗多 (fn. 962), 汙栗駄 (ibid.), 干栗陀 (§ 149.3) and 肝栗大 (fn. 955), but I must leave it to specialists of Middle Chinese to decide whether one or the other is the result of a corruption. — For the alternative writing 汙栗駄 (Jap. *karida*), the Sanskrit reading *hṛdaya* is expressly confirmed in X 23.438: 419a9-10.

<sup>954</sup> Thus, e.g., T 33.1714: 569b27-28: “This sūtra (viz., the *Heart Sūtra* 般若波羅蜜多心經) is the gist of the *Large Prajñāpāramitā*” (此經即 ... 大部般若之精要). This accords well with the semantic possibilities of Skt. *hṛdaya*. DONNER & STEVENSON (1993: 140) render 積聚精要 as “the essence (or core) of an aggregate”, which is somewhat vague (aggregate of material components?). — It is worth noting that 積聚 may render Skt. *citta*, which in its turn is used as an ‘etymology’ (*nirukti*, cf. AKVy 141,16) of *citta* (cf. HYŌDŌ 1982; HAKAMAYA 2009: 54–56), e.g. PSk 16,9, where *ālayavijñāna* is stated to be called *citta* because it is beset with, or



聚精要), the latter as the ‘heart’ or core of plants (草木之心).<sup>955</sup> From the point of view of Sanskrit, the latter meaning is somewhat surprising, for although Chin. *hsin* 心 is indeed used in the sense of the “core” of a tree or vegetable,<sup>956</sup> no such meaning seems to be attested to for Sanskrit *hṛdaya*. When *hsin* 心 is used in this sense, the underlying Sanskrit would rather be *sāra*,<sup>957</sup> which in the meaning “core” or “pith” is indeed also applied to plants (e.g., the heartwood of a tree).<sup>958</sup> On the other hand, the basic meaning of *hṛdaya*, viz., “heart”

---

accumulated by, the seeds of all conditioned factors (*cittam ālayavijñānam | tathā hi tac citam sarvasaṃskārabhijaiḥ*). Cf. also AKBh 61,21 f: (*cittam śubhāśubhair dhātubhir iti cittam*), MSg I.9, or Saṃdh V.3. The Chinese equivalents for *cita* vary, but we find 積聚 in a quotation of Saṃdh V.3 in Dharmagupta’s translation of Vasubandhu’s commentary on MSg I.9: 或說名心，以積聚增長色聲香味觸法故 (T 31.1596: 273c12 f). This rendering seems to rephrase the wording of the sūtra<sup>a</sup> in the active voice (“Or it is called *citta*, because it accumulates and increases visibles, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles and objects of thought”). Actually, there is also a *nirukti* type derivation of *citta* from √*ci* in an active sense, as in AKBh 61,21 (T 29.1558: 21c20: 集起故名心): “It is called *citta* because it accumulates” (*cinotīti cittam*), and this is, interestingly enough, commented upon in X 53.836: 40c2-3 by “just as a tree has heart-wood (心) capable of accreting branches, flowers and fruits” (如樹有心能集起枝條花果), thus confirming the third meaning of 心 given by Chih-i.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. For the original sūtra text, the passive voice is supported by the Tibetan translation of the passage in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (Tj P ’i 58a8: ... *chos rnam kyis kun tu bsags pa* ...), by the Chinese translations (T 16.675: 669a25-26 and 676: 692b17-18) and by its presumable source, viz., ŚrBh 496,18-21 (*cittam ... ācittam upacittam rūpaśabdagandharasaspraṣṭavyaiḥ*).

<sup>955</sup> This explanation may somehow be related to a gloss on Guṇabhadra’s rendering of *hṛdaya* at Lañk 40,2 as 心. According to this gloss (T 16.670: 483b17-18), in the Lañk passage 心 represents Skt. 肝栗大 (v.l. [元]: 汚栗大), i.e., *hṛdaya*, and should be understood not as “thinking” (念慮, with CBETA) but as in the expression 樹木心 “the core of a tree”.

<sup>956</sup> For this meaning of 心, see COUVR. 307a: “cœur d’un arbre; centre, milieu”, and HDC vol. 7: 369 s. v. 心 ㊦: 中心, 中央, also of vegetables: the core that is not eaten (菜不食心 ...).

<sup>957</sup> Cf., e.g., MVy no. 5160; HIR. 460a.

<sup>958</sup> Cf. PW s.v. 2. *sāra* 1.a “Kernholz” (thus e.g., MN I 192,15-29; SN III 141,25-31; AN III 44,7-8; IV 99,10-13 and 25-27; in the latter case, the Chinese equivalent

(as a physical organ<sup>959</sup> and, in a figurative sense, as the seat of feelings), is not mentioned. This may be due to the context, viz., the clari-  
fication of the meaning of *hsin* 心 in the term *fa-hsin* 發心 (~ *cittot-  
pāda*), i.e., generating the resolve for Awakening (*bodhicitta*). Chih-i  
wants to make clear that this resolve is a mental act of which only  
sentient beings are capable. He therefore points out that in this  
context *hsin* 心 means a mental act and represents Sanskrit *citta*, to be  
strictly distinguished from *hsin* 心 = *hṛdaya* in meanings predicable  
of insentient things like plants or collections [of texts?]. It would thus  
seem that at least on an actual, individual level plants are, for Chih-i,  
endowed with *hsin* 心 only in the sense of a core or, perhaps, a vege-  
tative centre, and not with mind (*hsin* 心 in the sense of *citta*). From  
an Indian (at any rate Indian Buddhist) point of view, this would defi-  
nitely exclude them from the realm of sentient beings, since sentience  
inevitably implies some sort of mind (*citta*), i.e., conscious sensations  
or feelings (of pain and/or pleasure). Unconscious reactions to exter-  
nal stimuli would not be sufficient to constitute sentience. As far as I  
can see, nothing would warrant the assumption that Chih-i thinks oth-  
erwise. Theoretically, one could surmise that by characterizing *hsin*  
心 in the sense of *citta* as thinking (慮知) he not only stresses this  
aspect in view of the context but also presupposes that mere sensa-  
tions are not part of *hsin* 心 = *citta* and rather belong to *hsin* 心 in  
the sense of *hṛdaya*. Yet, I cannot detect any evidence for such an as-  
sumption. The ‘heart’ of plants is more probably just a vegetative  
centre, like the heart in the body of sentient beings.

149.3. In the *Kankōruijū*, Chih-i’s distinction of different meanings  
of *hsin* 心 is utilized for a more sophisticated theory of plants.<sup>960</sup> This  
theory seems to be modelled on a similar theory found in a work by

---

for *sāra* in T 1.26: 486b1-2 and 13-14 is indeed 心). According to *PW* (ibid.), *sāra*  
can also denote the centre or solid parts of fruits (contrasted with their juice and  
their skin).

<sup>959</sup> 肉團心: cf. *FK* 2513a.

<sup>960</sup> *Kankōruijū* 381a6-21; cf. MATSUMOTO 2000: 154 f; RAMBELL 2001: 24–26.

the Shingon master Dōhan (道範, 1178–1252),<sup>961</sup> as is already indicated by the fact that the *Kankōruijū*, though formally adopting Chih-i's trichotomy of *hsin* 心,<sup>962</sup> actually reduces it to a dichotomy by equating *irida* (矣栗陀) and *karida* (干栗陀) and thus adapts it to a tradition, represented, e.g., by Kūkai, where we find only two types of *hsin* 心, viz., mind (*citta*) and heart (*karida* = *hṛdaya*).<sup>963</sup> The crucial point is, however, that the *Kankōruijū* expressly states that plants, even *ordinary plants*, possess *both* kinds of *hsin* 心. On the surface (面), they have only a material vegetative centre, or *hsin* 心 in the sense of Skt. *hṛdaya*, which reveals itself in their 'knowing' the four seasons and growing accordingly. But conscious sentience and even intelligence, *hsin* 心 in the sense of Skt. *citta* ("mind"), is also present, albeit inside (裏),<sup>964</sup> hidden below the surface. This lack of overt consciousness is why plants, though in reality sentient, are usually called non-sentient beings.

149.4. As becomes clear from Dōhan, this hidden sentience in ordinary plants is not simply a mere potential which, as in Annen, can be activated under the influence of Awakened persons but is entirely

---

<sup>961</sup> RAMBELLI 2001: 36.

<sup>962</sup> As an authority, the *Kankōruijū* quotes the 大論. The source is not, however, the 大智度論 (T 25.1509), where no corresponding passage can be traced (cf. TADA et al. 1995: 219), but rather the above-mentioned passage in Chih-i's *Mo-ho chih-kuan* (see § 149.2; cf. also HORIBATA 2006: 330). Cf. the writings 汙栗駄 and 汙栗多 instead of 汙栗駄 in a quotation of this *Mo-ho chih-kuan* passage by Annen in *Bodaishin* 454c9-12 and *Shinjō shiki* 713,19, respectively.

<sup>963</sup> *Hizōki* 秘藏記 (T 86.2921) 10c11-12 (KATSUMATA 1987, II: 663 # 92), stating that *karida* (*hṛdaya*), i.e., what is located in the centre (?), is the 心 of non-sentient things, and *citta*, i.e., thinking, the 心 of sentient beings (干栗陀者 名處中。非情心也。質多 名慮知。有情心也。); see also the similar dichotomy in I-hsing's commentary on the *Mahāvairocana-sūtra* (T 39.1796: 705b22). Cf. also RAMBELLI 2001: 35.

<sup>964</sup> This view may remind one (although a historical connection is hardly conceivable) of the view, expressed in the *Manusmṛti* (1.49), that plants are *antaḥ-samjñā*, i.e., "have internal consciousness", "in spite of the indisputable absence of outward activity in them" (WEZLER 1987b: 130), in contradistinction to a position according to which plants are entirely devoid of consciousness (*niḥsamjñā*) (ibid. 127; 129 f).

ineffective in ordinary plants. Rather, in the opinion of Dōhan, the consciousness of non-sentients like plants is constituted by the concrete, actual presence of all the six elements.<sup>965</sup> Among these, Dōhan equates the five material elements with the ninth consciousness,<sup>966</sup> i.e. the Pure Mind, and the sixth element, viz. mind, with the eighth consciousness, i.e. the *ālayavijñāna*, the subliminal basis and source of individual consciousness,<sup>967</sup> and it is for this reason that plants can individually resolve to awaken<sup>968</sup> and attain Buddhahood.<sup>969</sup> In order to establish the distinction between sentient and insentient beings, Dōhan, too, makes use of the concepts of ‘surface’ and ‘inside’: in insentient things like plants, the five elements are the surface and the mind element is hidden inside, whereas in sentient beings it is the other way round.<sup>970</sup> Thus, for Dōhan and likewise for the *Kankōruijū*, the presence of individual sentience in plants is obviously not an ex-

---

<sup>965</sup> “Insentients like plants have, each of them, the six elements. ... Even so [plants, etc.,] are *concretely* furnished with all the six elements, not merely in terms of principle (i.e., potentially)” (非情草木等各有六大。... 雖然 六大 皆事具 非性具: see ITŌ 2000: 28b2-5). Cf. also ITŌ 1996: 45b19 and 22 (Dōhan quoted by In’yū) and 2005: 153b19 and 21 f (Dōhan quoted by Ryūyū).

<sup>966</sup> For my rendering of 識 as “consciousness” in the present context, see fn. 923.

<sup>967</sup> ITŌ 2000: 28b2-3: 其中 五大者 第九識也, 識大者 第八識也; 1996: 45b20; 2005: 153b19. Cf. RAMBELLI 2001: 36.

<sup>968</sup> The question by means of which *citta* one resolves to awaken and what, precisely, is the object or aim of this resolve seems to have been controversial. Normally, the *citta* that makes the resolve is the sixth consciousness (sc. *manovijñāna*), but later Shingon authors seem to prefer the eighth or even the ninth consciousness (cf. ITŌ 1996: 47b3-9 [Dōhan quoted by In’yū]). For a similar controversy in later medieval Tendai see STONE 1999: 104; cf. also WATANABE 2008: 71b (Sonshun 尊舜, 1451–1514). The material at my disposal does not allow me to decide whether the later views are indicative of a tendency to understand the spiritual practice of plants as taking place on a deeper, subliminal level not requiring surface consciousness.

<sup>969</sup> ITŌ 2000: 28b5 (1996: 45b22; 2005: 154a1): 仍各各發心成佛也。

<sup>970</sup> ITŌ 2000: 28b3-4: 草木等 五(ed.九)大爲表 識大爲裏。人天等 識大爲表 五大爲裏; 1996: 45b20-21; 2005: 153b20-21; cf. also 1999: 13b19–14a2. RAMBELLI 2001: 36 with n. 87.

ceptional event but the natural condition of *all* plants. Even ordinary plants and other insentients are, just as they are, endowed with continuous *individual* sentience, albeit a hidden, secret one, perhaps even a rather *faint* one, as may be suggested by the fact that in the *Kankō-ruiju* plants are explicitly put on a par with the unconscious heavenly beings (see §§ 11 and 21), whose life-faculty is merely supported by *hsin* 心 in the sense of a vegetative centre (*hṛdaya*), and in whom conscious sentience does not come to the fore.<sup>971</sup>

149.5. Thus, Dōhan's and the *Kankōruijū*'s view on plants does indeed come fairly close to the early Indian view of plants as being individually sentient. If we combine this view with the idea, also found in the *Kankōruijū* and mentioned in § 149.1, that plants are, just as they are, Awakened or at least perfect beings, whose movements in the wind could be interpreted as esoteric ritual gestures and whose sounds could be understood as sermons,<sup>972</sup> it would even approach FINDLY's hypothesis of plants as a kind of secret saintly beings. Still, it seems that they are, at least in the *Kankōruijū*, saintly beings on a rather modest level, and hardly as the result of spiritual practice of their own in a previous life. On the other hand, Shingon masters seem to have advocated the position that even plants (or non-sentients, for that matter) are not necessarily actually Awakened from the outset. Rather, they too may first be deluded,<sup>973</sup> and have to become Buddhas

---

<sup>971</sup> *Kankōruijū* 381a18-20 (RAMBELL 2001: 25; the passage is part of a quotation but not traceable): 無想天眾生 以矣栗陀干栗陀心 而持命根。質多 不現在前。Cf. also 381a13-14: in the case of the unconscious heavenly beings, corporeal matter (色 = *rūpa*) forms the 'surface' or outside, mind (心) the inside.

<sup>972</sup> ITŌ 2004: 115b7-8 (Raiyū 賴瑜, 1226–1304). Cf. RAMBELL 2001: 37.

<sup>973</sup> ITŌ 1996: 46b19-21 (In'yū; cf. RAMBELL 2001: 38): 'deluded plants' do not know the homology of the four seasons and the four phases in the process of salvation (see § 147 with fn. 934), whereas 'awakened plants' do. According to Raihō (賴寶, †1330?), in the pure realms the so-called insentients like trees emit Dharma-sounds and thus benefit sentient beings, whereas in the hells clods and thorny shrubs inflict intense pain upon sentient beings (ITŌ 1998: 44b2-5; FUCHITA 2003: 69,10-11). Even the so-called insentients are thus capable of performing bodily and

(i.e., to realize their hidden Buddhahood) through their own effort and spiritual practice,<sup>974</sup> though it is difficult to specify what kind of practice they perform and by whom they are taught.<sup>975</sup> In any case, since precisely the aspect of an individual sentience of plants does not seem to be well documented in the Chinese antecedents of the Japanese developments, its emergence in the latter can hardly be explained as a surfacing of long-forgotten pre-doctrinal remnants of archaic beliefs in earliest Buddhism. And it should be kept in mind that in all Shingon and Tendai texts what holds good for plants holds good for other insentient things as well, including even artefacts.

### 3. The Question of Practical Consequences

150. The paragraph from the *Kankōruijū* is also of interest because it addresses the problem of the practical implications of the sentience of plants by raising doubt:<sup>976</sup> If grasses and trees were living, sentient beings, cutting them would be an act of killing, just as in the case of animals, and hence an infringement of the first Buddhist precept. The implication seems to be: Since this is not the case, the view that plants, too, are, properly speaking, sentient beings cannot be true.<sup>977</sup> The answer of the *Kankōruijū* rejects this consequence: The teaching of the

---

vocal actions (表色 = *vijñapti-rūpa*) and of attaining Buddhahood by their own efforts (ibid. 75,4 and 10).

<sup>974</sup> Cf. RAMBELLI 2001: 34: "...Shingon masters were adamant in emphasizing that plants ... are able to become Buddhas through their own efforts."

<sup>975</sup> RAMBELLI 2001: 39.

<sup>976</sup> *Kankōruijū* 381a22–b5. Cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 1991b, # 31.1; RAMBELLI 2001: 26–27.

<sup>977</sup> Actually, according to his record in the *Ching-tê ch'uan-teng lu*, one of the reasons adduced by the Ch'an master Ta-chu Hui-hai (大珠慧海, cf. DUMOULIN 1985, I 165) to discard the statement (see § 54 with fn. 304) that the emerald green bamboos are the *dharmakāya* and the chrysanthemums *prajñā* (*Ch'uan-teng lu* 247c14–19; OGATA 1991: 198) is that it would imply that if one eats bamboo shoots one would, after all, eat the *dharmakāya* (247c18: 如人喫筍 應總喫法身也). The corresponding paragraph in the *Tsu-t'ang-chi* (ch. 14, fol. 8,5–11; Taiw. 267a5–11) does not mention this argument.

sentience of plants (as well as of other ‘insentients’) is based on the non-duality of sentient beings and their environment (依正不二), on the principle that every individual thing is mutually identical and interfused with the whole universe and that all things mutually interpenetrate (一念三千相即融通道理), which can be understood only by perfect, Awakened persons (圓人). On this level, all distinctions, including those of good and evil, or of killing and keeping the precepts, are left behind. Actually, Kannon, who is surely an Awakened being, once appeared as a fisherman, killing even fish and birds.<sup>978</sup> It is therefore not admissible that someone who still sticks to distinctions should raise doubts or objections against statements pertaining to the level of perfect truth.

151. 1. At first glance, at least, one might take this answer as a simple rejection of any practical consequences of the theory, or contemplation, of the sentience and Buddha-nature of plants and other insentient things. Actually, a similar tendency can be observed not only in other Tendai texts<sup>979</sup> but also in Shingon sources. Thus, in the *Hizōki-shō* (秘藏記鈔) noted down by Dōhan the fact that in view of the interpenetration of the six elements sentient beings and plants must, in spite of their dissimilarity on the surface, both have sentience gives rise to the question whether in this case cutting down plants would not also involve an offence of killing.<sup>980</sup> The final answer, on

---

<sup>978</sup> Cf. NAKAMURA 1988: 188, s. v. *gyoran Kannon* 魚籃觀音 (“Kannon with the fish basket”). A reference to Kannon appearing as a fisherman and killing all sorts of water creatures is also found at *Kankōruijū* 388c1 (cf. STONE 1999: 220), likewise in a discussion of the problem that the essential identity of evil karma and liberation may be misunderstood as condoning wrongdoing at whim. Here, such a conclusion is straightforwardly rejected, but it is admitted that it would not be incompatible with this identity if a person “returning [to the realm of daily affairs] from the inner enlightenment of calming and contemplation” (STONE) spontaneously (任運無作, i.e., without evil or egoistic intentions) commits [apparently] evil deeds [in order to save others].

<sup>979</sup> Cf. HORIBATA 2006: 198,9-10 and 201,3-4; WATANABE 2008: 68a ③ and 79a5 (no details).

<sup>980</sup> ITŌ 2000: 28b9-10: 六大互<sup>a</sup>具故 表雖不同 皆具情識, 伐草木 成殺罪<sup>b</sup>耶。

the level of the (advanced) Shingon practitioner, is similar to that given in the *Kankōruijū*: Since such a practitioner realizes that all the four *maṇḍalas* (including the *mahāmaṇḍala*, which comprises sentient beings, and the *samayamaṇḍala*, which covers the so-called insentient world) are the Buddha's body or the Buddha himself (佛體), all actions or events are merely an internal exchange between the Buddha and Buddha, i.e. between his interfusing aspects, hence self-referential, and hence no offence or 'sin'.<sup>981</sup> But even for ordinary people cutting down plants does not amount to an 'offence by nature' (性罪, ~ *prakṛti-sāvadya*) because the phenomenal difference of sentient and insentient beings indicates that the latter are destined to be the support of the former.<sup>982</sup>

<sup>a</sup> So with ITō 2000: 23a13 f; text 切.

<sup>b</sup> My proposal. The text reads 敬羅, which does not make sense to me. At 28b15 and 16 the text has 敬罪, but here, too, 敬 does not make sense and ought to be 殺. Actually, in the quotation in 28b15 f (伐草敬畜二罪同篇) the parallel in ITō 1996: 47a25 has 殺 instead of 敬, and the Chinese source of the quote, viz., *Mo-ho chih-kuan* (T 46.1911) 36b9, reads 伐草害畜罪同.

<sup>981</sup> ITō 2000: 28b17-19 (cf. also 24a): 真言行者、四曼皆佛體、覺、故、唯佛與佛、因緣相成、因緣隱顯、互爲正依、互爲成壞、皆是法爾、故非罪也。 Tentative translation: "For a Shingon practitioner, since he has realized that all the four *maṇḍalas* are the Buddha's body (/the Buddha himself), only [one aspect of the] Buddha and [another aspect of the] Buddha — by way of mutual accomplishment or of latency and manifestation [according to] causes and conditions (?) — function as '[recompense] proper' and 'support' for each other [and] as each other's coming about and disintegration; all [this] is just the nature of things; therefore [on this level cutting plants, or any other action?,] is no offence." — For the presupposition involved, see fn. 995.

<sup>982</sup> ITō 2000: 28b16-17 (cf. also 23b-24a): 三種世間 依正繫屬成立、義有之故、五大識大增表裏、故、世人 伐草木、不、成、性罪、也。 Tentative translation: "Since the threefold world (of sentient beings, environment and skandhas?) is, in a sense, established in a relation of '[recompense] proper' and 'support', the five material elements and the element consciousness are [respectively] more(?) the surface or the inside (see § 149.3); therefore, [even] for ordinary people cutting grass or [felling] trees does not constitute an offence by nature (性罪 = *prakṛti-sāvadya*, i.e. a morally and karmically evil action)."



2. This aspect is more explicitly brought out in In'yū's (印融, 1435–1519) *Kohitsu shūshūshō* (古筆拾集抄), where we read, in a quotation from another work by Dōhan, that cutting down plants has no karmic consequences because when the six elements form all things these are fundamentally organized into internal and external, i.e., sentient beings as the primary result of karma and the environment as its by-product (see § 132.1), with the effect that the latter, viz., plants and the land, has fundamentally the nature of support and nourishment of the former, viz., humans and animals.<sup>983</sup> Therefore, making use of them does not involve a fault.<sup>984</sup> Still less so, says In'yū on another occasion, does felling trees for making ritual objects (like statues of the Buddha), for these are the means for spiritual advancement.<sup>985</sup> According to this principle, even the killing of a sentient being may not be an offence, as when, e.g., Trailokyavijaya<sup>986</sup> kills Maheśvara (i.e., Śiva).<sup>987</sup>

152. The reluctance to draw practical consequences can be traced back to Chinese masters. When the question why, in view of the omnipresence of Buddha-nature (implying sentience), cutting down insentient beings is not a serious misdeed comparable to killing a sentient being is raised by the Japanese Tendai monk Enchō (圓澄) in a

<sup>983</sup> A vegetarianist Buddhist pendant, so to speak, of the Christian concept that God created everything (including animals) for the use of man (cf. KERN 1992: 56–57, quoting Matteo Ricci).

<sup>984</sup> ITŌ 1996: 47a26–b1: 二、ハ、不<sup>レ</sup>可<sup>レ</sup>成<sup>レ</sup>業ト。六大造<sup>ル</sup>ル<sup>ニ</sup>諸法<sup>ヲ</sup>、本<sup>ヨリ</sup>有<sup>ル</sup>内<sup>ニ</sup>外依正、安立<sup>ニ</sup>故<sup>ニ</sup>、草木國土、自<sup>レ</sup>元人畜等、所依長養之性也。仍<sup>テ</sup>受<sup>ニ</sup>用<sup>スル</sup>之<sup>ヲ</sup>無失也。 Cf. RAMBELLI 2001: 39 and 75.

<sup>985</sup> ITŌ 1996: 48b10–11. Cf. RAMBELLI 2001: 39 f.

<sup>986</sup> One of the five *vidyārājas*, cf. *BDJ* 2: 1046–48. The story of the subjugation and killing of Maheśvara (equated with the *kleśāvaraṇa*: *BDJ* 2: 1047a–b) is found in T 18.869: 285a15 ff (annotated Engl. transl. in GIEBEL 1995: 142 ff); see *Sarvatahāgata-tattva-saṃgraha* (ed. Lokesh CHANDRA, Delhi 1987) 56 ff (cf. SNELL-GROVE 1987: 136–140).

<sup>987</sup> ITŌ 1996: 48b11–12: 若依此理者、降三世殺魔醯首羅 ..., 殺有情猶不得罪, 何況於非情等乎。

letter,<sup>988</sup> the answer of the Chinese T'ien-t'ai master Kuang-hsiu (廣修) is rather evasive. But it is obviously with the aim of avoiding the consequence indicated by Enchō that he points out that we can speak of serious wrongdoing only in cases where insentient things are related to, or part of, a sentient being, as when one steals money, which is of course insentient but belongs to a sentient owner, or when one kills a living body in which the insentient (i.e., the four elements) and the sentient combine (情無情合), but not when one cuts a dead corpse apart.<sup>989</sup>

153. 1. In the *Chüeh-kuan lun* (絕觀論), the statement that the *tao* (道), i.e., the true nature of things equated with Buddha-nature, is omnipresent (see § 129.1) entails the question why, then, killing a man involves an offence but killing a plant does not.<sup>990</sup> The answer is somewhat cryptic. Starting from the premise that plants, in contrast to ordinary human beings, are by nature in harmony with the *tao* and thus do not have the notion of an ego, the text seems to assume that when killed or chopped they do not react with [angry and revengeful] thoughts (which may imply: do not feel injured).<sup>991</sup>

2. This is, at any rate, the way the argument was understood, according to his record in the *Tsu-t'ang-chi*, by the Ch'an master Nan-

---

<sup>988</sup> *Shinjō shiki* 709,11-12 (Jap. transl.: 736,13-14); GRONER 2000: 492; SUEKI 2001: 81.

<sup>989</sup> *Shinjō shiki* 710,2-8 (Jap. transl.: 737,20-738,19; English transl.: GRONER 2000: 489-488 rl). Cf. also 709,19-710,1 (Jap. transl.: 737,12-18; English transl.: GRONER 2000: 490; cf. SUEKI 2001: 82).

<sup>990</sup> MATSUMOTO 2000: 278 (text 29): 問曰。道若遍者，何故殺人有罪，殺草木無罪；SHARF 2002: 248 (Engl. transl.).

<sup>991</sup> *Ibid.*: 草木無情 本來合道 理無我故 殺者不計。In taking the plants — i.e., the victim, and not (with YANAGIDA; cf. SHARF 2002: 249) the person who injures them — as the subject of 不計 (i.e., not producing thoughts and emotions [of displeasure and, perhaps, revenge]), and 殺者 (v.l. 殺) in a conditional sense (“when they are killed”, or: “when one kills them”), I follow MATSUMOTO (2000: 280 f), who bases his interpretation on the fact that somewhat later the text states that an accomplished person should regard his body like a plant and remain unconcerned like a tree when being injured (see § 129.1).

yang Hui-chung (慧忠, see § 129.3). Here, too, the visiting Ch'an monk asks the master why, if sentient and insentient beings both possess Buddha-nature, one incurs guilt, enmity and requital only when one kills sentient beings and eats [the various] parts of their bodies, whereas such an effect is not reported to accrue from damaging insentient things, like eating the five grains, vegetables, or fruits and nuts (lit.: chestnuts).<sup>992</sup> The master replies that only sentient beings, who are the direct retribution [of their own previous karma] and who, being from time immemorial blinded by wrong views, conceive of an ego and what belongs to it, harbour feelings of resentment. Insentient beings, on the other hand, are the recompense [of karma only in the sense of a] 'support', i.e., the environment as the basis on which sentient beings subsist. Being free of wrong views, insentient beings do

---

<sup>992</sup> *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 12,14-17 (Taiw. 62a14-b3; A.a: 623; A.b: 194 f; Y.: 165 [#255]; M.: 316-318 [text 64]): 禪客曰。若有情無情 俱有佛性, 殺有情而食噉其身分 即結於罪怨相報。損害無情 食噉五穀采蔬菓栗等物 不聞有罪 互相讎報也。See also *Ch'uan-teng lu* 438b3-4: 曰。若俱有佛性, 且殺有情 即結業互酬。損害無情 不聞有報。Cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 1991b: 24 n. 141; TAKASAKI 1998: 7b-8a. — As for 采 (written 采) instead of 菜 in the *Tsu-t'ang-chi* text, see ANDERL, loc. cit., and T 24.1458: 558b15: 穀麥菜蔬果實。As for 噉其身分, cf. T 17.721: 73b7: 魔竭 ... 食其身分 = Kj P 'u 254b5-6: *chu srin dag ... yan lag dang nyin lag thams cad za zhing* ..., i.e., *makaras* eat the limbs of beings who have fallen into a certain hell; cf. also T 32.1636: 90a13 and X 16.316: 559c4-5. In the expression 結於罪怨相報, I take the perpetrator as the grammatical subject of the verb 結 (which I render as "incurs"), but 怨 ("enmity", "hatred") is very much the psychological reaction of the victim, who experiences the killing as an outrage (罪). The "requital" would, in a Buddhist context, normally be the punishment automatically accruing, in the next life, to the perpetrator on account of this outrage which for him (i.e., the perpetrator) constitutes an offence, or 'sin'. However, in view of the preceding reference to "enmity", the idea may, in the first place, be that the *victim* will take *revenge* in the next life, a view which even in Buddhism was not completely superseded by the karma doctrine (see fn. 1006; cf. also X 73.1452: 234c14, stating that by eating meat one "incurs enmity [aiming at] revenge" (結報復之怨)). It is interesting that the phrasing of the *Ch'uan-teng lu* appears to favour the karmic perspective by replacing 罪 with the unambiguous 業 ("karma") and omitting 怨 ("enmity").

not harbour feelings of resentment. This is why it is not stated that there is requital [if one cuts or eats them].<sup>993</sup>

3. In order to explain why insentient beings are nowhere predicted to attain Awakening, the text then states that the whole environment belongs to the body of the Buddha Vairocana (see §§ 137–140). This statement stimulates the visiting monk to reiterate his question concerning practical consequences from another point of view: If the whole earth is the Buddha's body, then all sentient beings would dwell on the Buddha's body and would soil the Buddha's body when urinating or defecating, and would pierce it [when digging] and trample on it [when walking]. How could they remain guiltless?<sup>994</sup> The master answers: Since all sentient beings are [equally part of] the Buddha's body, who is there to commit an offence?<sup>995</sup> Thus, in this case, too, the practical consequences that might follow from the

---

<sup>993</sup> *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 12, 17–19 (Taiw. 62b3–5; A.a: 623; A.b: 195; Y.: 166 [contin. of # 255]; M.: 316–318): 師曰。有情 是正報 從无始劫來 虛妄顛倒 計我我所 而懷結恨, 即有怨報。無情 是依報 無顛倒結恨心, 所以不言有報。Cf. *Ch'uan-teng lu* 438b4–6: 師曰。有情 是正報 計我我所 而懷結恨 即有罪報。無情 是其依報 無結恨心。是以不言有報。— In this passage, too, the close association of “enmity” (怨) and “requital” (報) in the *Tsu-t'ang-chi* evokes the idea of revenge. Once again, the *Ch'uan-teng lu* seems to have been anxious to efface this evocation, this time by replacing 怨 (“enmity”) with 罪 (“wrongdoing”, “guilt”). This would result in the following argument: Only if the victim takes offence or is upset (懷結恨), the action of killing is a wrongdoing or ‘sin’ and entails *karmic* requital.

<sup>994</sup> Cf. also fn. 977.

<sup>995</sup> *Tsu-t'ang-chi* ch. 3, fol. 12, 28–13, 3 (Taiw. 62b14–63a3; A.a: 624 f; A.b: 197 f; Y.: 167 [#257]; M.: 322–324 [text 66]): 客曰。一切大地 既是佛身, 一切眾生 居佛身上 便利穢汙佛身 穿鑿踐踏佛身。豈無罪乎。師曰。一切眾生 全是佛身。誰爲罪乎。Cf. *Ch'uan-teng lu* 438b12–14: 曰。一切眾盡居佛身之上, 便利穢汙佛身, 穿鑿踐踏佛身, 豈無罪耶。師曰。眾生全體是佛 欲誰爲罪。— The argument presupposes the definition of karmically unwholesome (*akuśala*) actions as actions that harm *other* sentient beings (as presupposed, e.g., at Vi 260a4–7, AKBh 237, 22–238, 1, or T 32.1646: 294c17–18). If all sentient beings as well as insentient things are part of Vairocana's *dharmakāya*, all our actions would be actions of the *dharmakāya* towards *itself*, and for this very reason could not be unwholesome karma.

Buddha-nature of the insentient (plants, the earth) for everyday activities are rejected.

154. A similar reluctance to admit practical consequences is also found in a passage of a subcommentary, probably dating from the 13<sup>th</sup> century, on a small Hua-yen text that was most influential in Korea, the *Hwaŏm ilsŭng Pŏpkyedo* (華嚴一乘法界圖).<sup>996</sup> In this passage, the following question is raised: If the three worlds are all Buddha, doesn't this imply that when plants are harvested and utilized one injures the Buddha's body and incurs guilt? The answer is, again, in the negative: Speaking from the perspective of the Buddha, the three worlds, including plants, are, to be sure, all Buddha; but speaking from the perspective of ordinary sentient beings, none of them is Buddha. So what guilt can accrue from cutting them?<sup>997</sup>

155. The passages adduced in §§ 151–154 give the impression that the idea of the Buddha-nature and hence, somehow, the sentience of the insentient in the Far East arose from motives for which unavoidable everyday activities were not a matter of primary concern. Personally, I have no problems with aspects of spiritual practice, doctrinal debate<sup>998</sup> or even systematic consistency as the starting point. This does not of course exclude more secular motives being entailed as well, or even becoming dominant. This is, at any rate, the impression one gets from RAMBELLI's examination of the Japanese developments. According to him, the potential or hidden Buddha-nature of trees was used in order to legitimize the felling of trees, especially for building temples and constructing Buddha images,<sup>999</sup> and to transform,

---

<sup>996</sup> On the *Ilsŭng Pŏpkyedo*, see PLASSEN 2007; on the subcommentary *Pŏpkyedo ki ch'ongsu nok* (法界圖記叢髓錄, by Ch'ŏn'gi 天奇, fl. 1226–1248?) *ibid.* 272–273.

<sup>997</sup> T 45.1887B: 727a9–11: 問。三世間皆是佛者，草木取用，則害佛身得罪耶。答。以佛言雖皆是佛，以眾生云都非是佛。斷有何罪。 Cf. ISHII Kōsei 1996: 284.

<sup>998</sup> Cf. STONE 1999: 30.

<sup>999</sup> For a similar motivation in Nichiren, see SAKAMOTO 1980: xxi–xxii; STONE 1999: 276 f.

by this procedure, both the trees and the (sometimes hostile)<sup>1000</sup> local spirits embodied or residing in them into Buddhas, or visible manifestations of Buddha-nature, subordinating, at the same time, local cults to the Buddhist institutions.<sup>1001</sup> This bears some resemblance to the early Buddhist tendency to change the potentially dangerous and blood-thirsty pre- or non-Buddhist tree numina into benign spirits whose behaviour would be compatible with the principles of Buddhist ethics,<sup>1002</sup> with the (probably intended) side effect of rendering the felling of trees, inevitable in everyday life and, last but not least, for the construction of monasteries, less risky. But whereas in early Buddhism the tree itself is *de-sacralized* by being ontologically dissociated from its numinous aspect, in the Japanese development under discussion the numinous tree is rather *re-sacralized*, in the sense of being converted into, or revealed as, a being that is sacred in specifically Buddhist terms.

156. As for the later developments (§§ 147–149), RAMBELLI connects them with two different socio-political objectives. On the one hand, the idea of plants attaining or already possessing perfection just as they are, in their natural state, mirroring the concept of ‘original Awakening’ (*hongaku* 本覺), i.e., the assumption that Awakening or Enlightenment is inherent in all beings from the outset, is taken by him to be intended to underpin the hierarchical status quo of medieval Japanese society.<sup>1003</sup> On the other hand, RAMBELLI (2001: 75–80) points out that around the beginning of the 12<sup>th</sup> century, economic constraints and changes entailed a sharp increase in deforestation,

---

<sup>1000</sup> RAMBELLI 2001: 50; 54–57.

<sup>1001</sup> RAMBELLI 2001: 43–47; 52–57. Cf. also STONE 1999: 41–42.

<sup>1002</sup> To what extent this re-definition of tree numina may be taken to indicate social conflict between the representatives of local cults and the Buddhist Order is a question I am unable to answer. It may well be that in the beginning the Buddhist Order was content to stop bloody rites but not interested in getting actively involved in local tree cults.

<sup>1003</sup> RAMBELLI 2001: 91–93. Cf., however, also the reservations in regard to this assumption in STONE 1999: 359.

which encroached even upon temple land. He quotes a number of historical documents which testify that the monastic institutions appealed to the political authorities, and which include among their arguments reference to the sacred character of the trees. Though the formulations used are not very explicit, RAMBELLI thinks that the reference points to the concept of the Buddha-nature of trees. Likewise, the refusal of the *Kankōruijū* to draw, from the fact that plants are essentially sentient, the conclusion that cutting them would amount to killing a sentient being, is to be taken with a pinch of salt. According to RAMBELLI (2001: 27), what the *Kankōruijū* really wants to convey is that solely for perfectly Awakened persons, i.e., the advanced Tendai practitioners or the monastic establishment, and for those persons who are authorized by the monastic establishment to carry out such activities, is cutting plants (and fishing or hunting as well) not evil action. If this interpretation is basically correct,<sup>1004</sup> a situation in Ancient India that is comparable to the scenario depicted by RAMBELLI would not be found in early Buddhism but can be seen in the more archaic ambience of (at least one strand of) Vedic ritualism. Here, not only plants but also the elements and sometimes even artefacts are regarded as living, somehow sentient, beings, and killing or injuring them is felt to be wrong,<sup>1005</sup> or is even considered dangerous because

---

<sup>1004</sup> One would like to be offered more explicit references to the Buddha-nature of plants in the complaints of the temples. Indeed, one may ask whether the *general* Buddhahood of *all* plants, in the sense of a fact accomplished from the outset, is in fact a suitable basis for preventing a *specific* forest or group of trees (viz., those growing on temple property) from being felled. Annen's view of a co-awakening of 'grasses and trees' forming the *surroundings* of Awakened persons (residing in the Tendai and Shingon temples), or the idea of the temple area as a *maṇḍala* (cf. RAMBELLI 2001: 77; for a similar pattern in Tibetan Buddhism cf. HUBER 1999), would seem to work much better.

<sup>1005</sup> Cf. IZAWA 2008, where a number of Vedic passages are pointed out which only speak of the endeavour to annul or deflect pain, with no (at least no explicit) reference to fear or to the possibility of the victim taking revenge.

all these beings tend to take revenge<sup>1006</sup> (just as old objects were believed to do in pre-modern Japan).<sup>1007</sup> For people who cannot avoid killing animals, cutting plants or drinking water, the injury had to be deflected and the danger averted by *ritual* means, and with regard to these the Brahmins were surely interested (and probably to a certain extent successful) in establishing themselves as indispensable.

**157.1.** If ritual protection is not available or no longer believed to be effective, the assumption that not only animals but also plants and even the elements are living and sentient beings and that killing or hurting them is wrong and/or entails revenge or retribution leaves one with no other way out than to completely avoid any injurious act, which means leading a life of strictest renunciation and almost squeamish circumspection in one's physical behaviour and with regard to food, e.g., consuming only the food-remnants of others. This is what, e.g., the Jain monks and nuns practise. It is also what one would expect to derive from the Far Eastern idea of the omnipresence of Buddha-nature and sentience, as indeed the *questions* raised in the sources discussed in §§ 151–154 confirm.

---

<sup>1006</sup> For the fear of the victim taking revenge (especially in the yonder world) as one of the roots of abstaining from injuring sentient beings (*ahimsā*) and the lingering on of this idea in Jaina and Buddhist sources (at least with regard to animals) see SCHMIDT 1968: 644–645; OHIRA 1980/81: 58–62; SCHMITHAUSEN 2000; SCHMITHAUSEN and MAITHRIMURTHI 2009: 74; 77; 82 f. The idea survives even in later sources; e.g., Vi 60a9-15 ≈ 521a9-16 (T 28.1546: 45b5-13 ≈ 376a25–b2, referred to by Liang Wu-ti in T 52.2103: 297a17-18) relates the story of a wolf and a woman who, having killed each other's child, take revenge on each other for 500 lives. Cf. also Śūr 120b8-10, pointing out that if a man eats a sheep, he will be re-born as a sheep, and the sheep as a man to eat him, and this eating each other will go on for ten lives or so (以人食羊 羊死爲人 人死爲羊。如是乃至十生之類 死死生生 互來相噉; HSUAN HUA 2003: 90).

<sup>1007</sup> RAMBELLI 2001: 60–63 (“The Revenge of the Nonsentients”). I wonder whether the monks would have been able to create such a belief if there was not some appropriate disposition among people, some more or less unreflected tendency to impute, in certain situations, anthropomorphic feelings and reactions even to tools and artefacts, which the monks may, to be sure, have reinforced and exploited.



157.2. Actually, there is at least one source related to this strand in which a similar consequence is explicitly drawn. After having pointed out the omnipresence of Vairocana's essence not only in sentient beings but also in earth, water and plants, the Old-Turkish text from Central Asia quoted in § 139 continues as follows:

"If a *monk* raises his hand against any [of these, viz., the earth etc., plants and trees, or sentient beings] ..., he has sinned against the essence of the Buddha Luṣyanta/Vairocana."<sup>1008</sup>

157.3. Since the text expressly mentions the *monk*, the statement may be understood as an attempt to furnish the monastic precepts, which include prohibitions against injuring plants, digging the ground, and polluting water, with a metaphysical foundation due to which an infringement is not just a violation of decorum but a *sacrilege*. Even though the idea of the omnipresence of the 'cosmic' Buddha Vairocana can easily be traced to the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* (cf. § 135) and, perhaps, the *Mahāvairocana-sūtra* (cf. § 136), the practical consequences derived from it in the Old-Turkish text do not seem to come from this side. They rather give the impression of Manichean or Gnostic influence.<sup>1009</sup> According to Manichean belief, with actions like digging the ground, cutting or pulling up plants or injuring animals one tortures the divine particles of light (or the particles of the Universal Soul, equated with the suffering Saviour, *Jesus patibilis*, and, on the part of the Sogdian Manicheans, equated even with Buddha-nature)<sup>1010</sup> encapsulated in them.<sup>1011</sup> This Manichean belief in the ubiquity of light particles that must not be injured has much in common with the Jaina view that not only humans and animals but also plants are alive and liable to suffering and that even the elements, especially earth and water, consist of living, i.e., sentient and animate beings, which should not be killed or tortured. Manicheism may, in

---

<sup>1008</sup> See fn. 881. My translation is based on ZIEME (see *ibid.*).

<sup>1009</sup> Cf. KLIMKEIT 1991: 156–157; 1977: 201–206; HENRICHS 1979: 92.

<sup>1010</sup> KLIMKEIT 1977: 203.

<sup>1011</sup> KLIMKEIT 1977: 201–206; 1991: 156–157 and 158 n 41.

this regard, even have been influenced by Jain ideas.<sup>1012</sup> In any case, from the point of view of such far-reaching practical consequences based on a *doctrinal* assumption, the position of the Old-Turkish text is fairly unique in Buddhism, yet similar not only to Manicheism but also to Jainism. The situation for lay people, though not addressed in our text, would also be comparable, for only the monks, who, like the Manichean elect<sup>1013</sup> and the Jain ascetics, receive their food from the lay followers, are in a position to strictly keep to precepts enjoining even abstention from injuring or polluting plants, seeds, the earth and water. Lay people, on the contrary, have little chance of remaining guiltless, at least as long as they cannot, in order to survive, avoid digging the ground, using water and harvesting plants, and perhaps even slaughtering animals. All they can do is to repent their wrongdoing or compensate for their misdeeds through meritorious acts.

158. For the Jain ascetics it is of utmost importance to strictly avoid any action that might injure a possibly sentient being. Thus, in order to remain on the safe side they tend to maximize the range of sentience so as to expressly include not only plants and seeds, but normally also earth, water, wind and fire, taken to consist of tiny living

---

<sup>1012</sup> FYNES 1996. FYNES points out that Jainism comes closer to Manicheism than Buddhism both from the point of view of ubiquity of sentient life and from that of the severe asceticism of the religious elite. As a particularly striking similarity, which could hardly have arisen independently, he mentions (p. 26) the idea, shared by Jainism and Manicheism, that certain plants, especially many-seeded fruits, contain many souls (/particles of light). As for the possibility of cultural transmission, he refers not only to Mani's visit to India in 240–242 A.D. (p. 31), but also, and primarily, to the intensive trade connections between Western India and Mesopotamia as well as Iran during the 1<sup>st</sup> half of the 1<sup>st</sup> millennium A.D. (p. 30–31), to the fact that both Manicheism and Jainism were very much religions of the merchant community (p. 38), and to the fact that knowledge about Indian religious ideas in Mani's time is attested by Bardaisan of Edessa, who wrote an account of India (pp. 38–40). Indian influence on the Manichean commandment (for the Elect) of non-violence, and especially Jain influence on a Sogdian version including not only plants but also the earth and water (cf. also the Arabian version in SIMS-WILLIAMS 1985: 577), has already been surmised by H.-P. SCHMIDT (1980: 233).

<sup>1013</sup> KLIMKEIT 1977: 202 (below).

beings with one sense-faculty (*egindiya*).<sup>1014</sup> The original life of Buddhist monks (and nuns) seems to have been ascetic as well, but emphasis was, from the outset, on meditative spiritual practices. In contrast to the Jain tendency to be rigorous, in early Buddhism there seems to have been a tendency to keep things *practicable*, for ascetics (monks and nuns) as well as for lay people. Though Buddhist ascetics, too, were obliged to refrain from damaging plants and seeds, digging the ground, etc., there were no substantial restrictions with regard to vegetal alms-food.<sup>1015</sup> In contrast to Jain ascetics who had to be sure that drinking water itself was lifeless,<sup>1016</sup> Buddhist monks and nuns could drink any water, provided that it was free from tiny animals.<sup>1017</sup> As for lay people, the Jains could only advise them to desist from gross killing or injury (*thulago pāṇāivāyo*, *sthūlā himsā*), i.e., from killing or injuring mobile (*trasa*) sentient beings, such as have more than one sense-faculty, which in the everyday context primarily means animals, and to avoid, in the case of plants and the elementary beings, at least unnecessary acts of violence.<sup>1018</sup> But this was merely a

---

<sup>1014</sup> Cf. *Plants* # 2.2 with n. 19; BRUHN 2007: 24. The idea of the elements as consisting of living beings is rejected in the Tamil Jaina text *Nīlakēci* (SRINIVASAN 2007: 21–22). In Dasav 6.33–40 and 10.2cd–3a (in contradistinction to the prose portion of Dasav ch. 4), fire and wind are merely treated as a ‘weapon’ (*sattha*) endangering sentient beings but, in contrast to earth and water, not characterized as consisting themselves of minute sentient beings.

<sup>1015</sup> The few restrictions that remained are, unless motivated otherwise (garlic: *Plants* # 14), intended to exclude a direct involvement of monks or nuns in what rival ascetic communities and at least part of the secular society would have regarded as killing a living, sentient vegetal being: cf. *Plants* # 12 (fruits) and # 13 (raw grain).

<sup>1016</sup> For details, see BRUHN 2007: 54–57.

<sup>1017</sup> Cf. *Plants* ## 16.3 and 38.3.

<sup>1018</sup> Cf. *Plants* # 26.2. Cf. also, e.g., JAINI 1979: 173; BUTZENBERGER 1998: 25 n. 78(2); HALBFASS 2000: 86–87; BRUHN 2007: 7 and 57; SRINIVASAN 2007: xvi, n. 11 (*nīrarthikāṃ na kurvīta jīveṣu sthāvařeṣv api | himsām ...* [from Hemacandra’s *Yogaśāstra*]); 110 (... *ye parityaktum | sthāvarahimsām asahās, trasahimsām te 'pi muñcantu* || [Amṛtacandra, *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya* vs. 75]). For the interdiction of unnecessary killing in Hindu religion see HARA 1998: 20–24 (= 273–269 rl).

compromise, since in view of the fact that plants and even the elements are also sentient beings, it is difficult to see how killing or injuring them is not, after all, bad karma.<sup>1019</sup> In the early Buddhist canon, there are, to be sure, sporadic passages which seem to exhort even lay people not to kill mobile as well as stationary animate beings (like plants and seeds), and indeed one of these passages makes clear that a lay person is hardly in a position to come up to this standard.<sup>1020</sup> But on the whole the early texts refrain from qualifying actions like cutting plants, pounding seeds or digging the ground as unwholesome karma. This accords well with the overall reticence of these texts to address the question of the sentience of plants, not to mention of the elements, a reticence which in the course of time led to an explicit denial of their sentience.

#### 4. Résumé

159. If the preceding discussion of the structure of the Far Eastern idea of the 'Buddha-nature of grasses and trees' was successful in correctly elaborating its main facets, it follows that especially in the earlier period this idea differs considerably from the early Buddhist view on plants as postulated by OKADA and FINDLY (and indeed from what is actually traceable in the canonical texts), and that it is only in Japan that closer analogies can be found. It is, however, rather in the initial phase of the Far Eastern idea that one would expect the closest resemblance to the early Buddhist view if the former were a re-emergence or revival of the latter.

160. The most conspicuous difference is, of course, the fact that in the case of early Buddhism it is only plants (but not earth, water, etc.) that are postulated to have been regarded as sentient or saintly beings, whereas according to the Far Eastern theory under discussion

---

<sup>1019</sup> I doubt that the various procedures of rendering *ekindriyas* lifeless enumerated in FINDLY 2008: 385 are meant as indicating permission.

<sup>1020</sup> Sn 393–394; cf. S IV 351. See *Plants* # 26.3–4.

Buddha-nature is present in the whole gamut of insentient things, including even artefacts, and when only “grasses and trees” are mentioned, they are representative of all insentients (§ 119).

161. A second point is of equal importance: If in earliest Buddhism the old Indian idea of plants as sentient beings still somehow lingered on, sentience must have been presupposed as accruing to them *individually*, be it in some very rudimentary form (comparable to the Jain view of living beings with the sense of touch only) or in a more developed way (numinous trees). In the pertinent Chinese sources, however, their ‘sentience’ is either derived from their being displayed by or contained in the mind (or Mind) (§§ 66; 71; 127.3–4; 129.3.1), or from the fact that on the level of the Perfect Teaching, which accords with the way the universe is experienced in Supreme Awakening, sentient beings and their environment merge, or rather turn out to have been non-dual all along, so that the rigid distinction between sentient beings and the insentient world dissolves (§§ 116; 127.4; 128; 143; 150). However, this does not necessarily imply *individual* sentience for plants or other constituents of the environment (§§ 127.4; 128; 129.1; 129.3.3; 145), no more than for the different parts of the body. Even for Annen (§ 146), plants are normally devoid of individual sentience and may develop it only under special conditions. It seems to be only in later Japanese sources (§ 149.3–5) that plants (and also other so-called insentients) explicitly come to be regarded as possessing, just as they are, a hidden, secret individual sentience.

162. Similarly, if in early Buddhism plants had (with FINDLY) been regarded as saintly beings, the fundamental presuppositions of early Buddhism would imply that they either are or become saintly beings *individually*, and that this is the result of their own spiritual practice. For the Chinese representatives of the idea of the Buddha-nature of plants and the other insentients, however, precisely this does not seem to be the case. Plants have Buddha-nature as their true essence (§§ 127.3–129.1; 129.3.1–2), but not for themselves and not normally for us. It is only to the Buddha-eye that this Buddha-nature reveals itself (§§ 116; 132.2; 133). Viewed as a process, the ‘Awakening’ of

plants is rather part of what we may call the co-awakening of the environment, similar to what happens with the body when Awakening takes place in the mind of a sentient being, because on this level body and environment turn out to be non-dual (cf. §§ 133; 145). It is only in Japan that an active participation of the insentients in this process comes to be envisaged (§§ 145, 146, 149.5). If, on the other hand, the environment is viewed from the perspective of the already accomplished Buddha, plants, but also all the other insentients, are already here and now part of the Buddha's (especially: Vairocana's) 'cosmic' body (§§ 137–142), with no individual process of Awakening being required on their part. It is only we who are in need of realizing this truth. This may, in a sense, come close to FINDLY's idea, but we should not lose sight of the fact that the concept of a 'cosmic' Buddha as well as the idea of being Awakened without previous spiritual practice of one's own are totally alien to early Buddhism. On the other hand, the idea (or metaphor) of plants (or insentients) as paragon of an attitude without deluded thoughts (§§ 129.1; 129.3.3–4) and as preaching the Dharma (§ 129.3.3; see also Pt. II.A, ch. 2.1 and 2.3–4) would be compatible with early Buddhist ideas as long as no individual sentience is taken to be implied on their part.

**163.** From the point of view of practical consequences, in the early Indian context the sentience of plants, and still more so their saintliness, would imply that injuring them is unwholesome karma. This is, however, hardly if ever presupposed in the early canon, the obvious tendency — amounting, later on, to an explicit denial of the sentience of plants — being to avoid rendering life impracticable (§ 158). If the Far Eastern idea of the Buddha-nature of the so-called insentients had any connection with the early Indian belief in their sentience, one might expect it to have included a rigidification of the precepts by extending unwholesome karma to injuring plants and even other insentients. This is, in fact, indicated in an Old-Turkish text, though only with regard to monks (§ 157.2–3), whose discipline had anyway included abstention from injuring plants, digging in the earth and polluting water from the early period onward. In several Far Eastern

texts, on the other hand, the fear that injuring plants or the earth may entail unwholesome karma is stated to be meaningless (§ 150–154). It seems to be only in Japan that the doctrine of the Buddha-nature of plants was taken advantage of for practical aims like the justification of utilizing trees for Buddha-sculptures or temple-buildings (§ 155–156).

## Conclusion

164. In Pt. I, I tried to show that in the early Buddhist canon there are, to be sure, sporadic traces of the old belief in plants as living, sentient beings, but that there is no conclusive evidence for the assumption that in early Buddhism such a belief was upheld on a doctrinal level, let alone for the assumption that in early Buddhism plants were regarded as spiritually accomplished, saintly beings (cf. § 50). Pt. II was dedicated to a critical discussion of the suggestion that the assumption of an early Buddhist belief in plants as sentient or even saintly beings is supported by the re-emergence of such a belief in the form of the Far Eastern idea of the 'Buddha-nature of grasses and trees'. In Pt. II.A, I argued that the passages adduced from Indian sources in support of an Indian origin of the idea of the 'Buddha-nature of grasses and trees' are either inconclusive or, at best, based on presuppositions alien to early Buddhism, and hence cannot serve as evidence for an undercurrent connecting the Far Eastern developments with the early period (cf. § 117). In Pt. II.B, I tried to demonstrate that such a connection is also improbable from the perspective of a structural comparison (cf. §§ 159–163).

165. From the perspective of nature ethics, these results may strike some readers as unsatisfactory. On second thought, however, the early, pre-doctrinal Buddhist attitude towards plants would seem to have its merits. In a *theoretical* perspective, it avoids, so to speak, the extremes of affirmation and denial, leaving the status of plants in suspense or taking them, as I have suggested, as a kind of borderline beings, and refraining from further specification, be it in terms of a gloomy, dismal predicament of helpless suffering or in terms of an exalted state of spiritual accomplishment, or in any other way. Modern science may provide insights and categories that allow us to be more precise in describing the peculiar nature of plant-life, but, even so, it may be difficult, if not impossible, for us to put ourselves in their place and to imagine what plant-life is for the plant itself, if I may say so. In a *practical* perspective, too, the early Buddhist attitude



appears to be balanced, suggesting as it does a kind of middle way. An outright denial of the sentience of plants (as in later Indian Buddhism), on the one hand, would, at least in the Indian context, imply that acts of injuring plants are of no concern, unless sentient beings (human owners, animals, or spirits inhabiting them) are involved, or believed to be so. On the other hand, an unqualified recognition of plants as sentient beings would mean that cutting or boiling them is not substantially different from injuring or killing an animal, hence karmically unwholesome, at least in the Indian context. Ordinary people who cannot avoid felling trees and harvesting crops or vegetables would have no chance to avoid guilt. At best, they would have to perform expiatory rites — a situation liable to be taken advantage of by priests. As against this, the early Buddhist attitude towards plants may be understood as enabling inevitable utilization without justifying ruthless exploitation or wanton destruction: By avoiding a wholesale affirmation of the sentience of plants the early Buddhist attitude frees the way for a moderate utilization of plants without promoting feelings of guilt or fear. By refraining from an outright denial of their sentience, it avoids the danger of completely removing inhibitions.

166. The preceding argument starts from the presupposition of the old-Indian *ahimsā* ethics that what matters are *sentient individuals*. In the case of the Far Eastern idea of the Buddha-nature of the insentients, this presupposition would lead into difficulties if the Buddha-nature of the insentients is taken to involve that in reality the so-called ‘insentients’, too, are individually sentient and suffer when being injured, and in this case evasive stratagems (like those pointed out in §§ 150 and 152–154) are inevitable to secure practicability, especially for lay people. On the other hand, if the presence of Buddha-nature in insentients is understood more in terms of their sanctification or at least valorization in the context of the world as a *maṇḍala* with everything having its proper position and role (including, e.g., to serve as food for others: cf. § 151), it may serve as the foundation of a kind of holistic nature ethics. But to elaborate this idea would lead me beyond the limits of this study.

## Abbreviations:

AKAN.	AKANUMA Chizen 赤沼智善 (ed.): <i>Indo bukk'yō koyū meishi jiten</i> 印度仏教固有名詞辞典. Kyoto: Hōzōkan 1931 [1984].
AKBh	Vasubandhu: <i>Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya</i> , ed. P. PRADHAN. Patna: JRI 1967.
AKBh-I	Akira HIRAKAWA: <i>Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i> , pt. 1-3. Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan 1973-1978.
AkṣNird	<i>Akṣayamatīnirdeśa-sūtra</i> , ed. and transl. by Jens BRAAR-VIG. 2 vols. Oslo: Solum Forlag 1993.
AKVy	Yaśomitra: <i>Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā</i> , ed. Unrai WOGIHARA. Repr. Tokyo: Sankibo 1971.
AN	<i>Aṅguttaranikāya</i> , ed. R. MORRIS, E. HARDY. London: PTS 1885-1900.
APTE	Vaman Shivram APTE: <i>The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary</i> . Bombay <sup>3</sup> 1924.
ARIRIAB	<i>Annual Report of the IRIAB</i> .
AsI	<i>Atthasālinī Dhammasaṅganī-aṭṭhakathā</i> , ed. E. MÜLLER. London: PTS 1897 (rev. ed. 1979).
AS	<i>Abhidharmasamuccaya</i> . Go = V.V. GOKHALE, "Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga, in: <i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay Branch</i> , N.S. 23 (1947): 13-38. Pr = <i>Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asaṅga</i> , ed. Pralhad PRADHAN. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati 1950.
ASBh	<i>Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya</i> , ed. Nathmal TATIA. Patna: JRI 1976.
Aṣṭ	<i>Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā</i> , ed. P.L. VAIDYA. Darbhanga 1960.
AṣṭL	Lokaṣema's Chinese translation of Aṣṭ: T 8.224.
Āyār	<i>Ācārāṅga-sūtra</i> , Erster <i>Śrutaskandha</i> , ed. Walther SCHUBRING, Leipzig 1910. <i>JĀG</i> = <i>Āyāraṅga-suttaṃ</i> , ed. Muni JAMBŪVIJAYA, Bombay 1976 ( <i>JĀG</i> 2 pt. 1; quoted acc. to paragraphs [#]).
ĀyārViv	<i>Ācārāṅga-vivṛti</i> , ed. in: <i>Ācārāṅgasūtram and Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtram</i> , with the <i>Niryukti</i> of Acārya Bhadrabāhu and

- the Commentary of Śīlāṅkācārya, orig. ed. by Ācārya SAGARĀNANDASŪRIJī Mahārāja, re-ed. by Muni JAMBŪ-VIJAYAJī, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1978.
- BAvB T 9.278: *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, translated into Chinese by Buddhahadra from India between 418 and 420 A.D. (HAMAR 2007b: 147).
- BAvŚ T 10.279: *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, translated into Chinese by Śikṣānanda from Khotan in the years 695–699 (ZACCHETTI 2000: 22; HAMAR 2007b: 149).
- BAvT Tibetan translation of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, made by Jinamitra, Surendrabodhi and Ye-shes-sde in the first quarter of the 9<sup>th</sup> century from Sanskrit, not from Chinese (HAMAR 2007b: 154): *bKa' 'gyur*, Phal chen (or Phal po che).
- BBu Bibliotheca Buddhica.
- BCA Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ed. Louis DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN. Paris 1907.
- BCar Aśvaghoṣa: *Buddhacarita*, ed. E.H. JOHNSTON. Repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1972 (1<sup>st</sup> ed. Lahore 1936).
- BDJ *Bukkyō daijiten* 仏教大辞典, ed. MOCHIZUKI Shinkō 望月信享. Tokyo 1973.
- BHSD Franklin EDGERTON: *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*. Vol. II: Dictionary. New Haven: Yale University Press 1953.
- BHSG Franklin EDGERTON: *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*. Vol. I: Grammar. New Haven: Yale University Press 1953.
- BIS *Berliner Indologische Studien*.
- BoBh *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, ed. Nalinaksha DUTT. Patna: JRI 1966.
- Bodaishin Annen 安然 (841? to ca. 890), *Bodaishin gi shō* 菩提心義抄, full title: *Taizō kongō bodaishin gi ryaku mondō shō* 胎藏金剛菩提心義略問答抄 (“Annotations from an Abridged Dialogue on the Concept of *Bodhicitta* as Related to the Womb and Vajra Maṇḍalas”): T 75.2397.
- CBETA CBETA *Chinese Electronic Tripitaka Collection*. Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association, Taipei, Feb. 2007.
- ch. = chapter; unless specified otherwise: chapter of the present study.

- Chin-kang-pei* *Chin-kang-pei lun* 金剛鐔論 (“Diamond Scalpel”) by Chan-jan (湛然, 711–782): T 46.1932.
- Ch’uan-teng lu* *Ching-tê ch’uan-teng lu* 景德傳燈錄 (“Records of the Transmission of the Lamp [Compiled during the] Ching-te [Period]”), compiled by Tao-yüan (道原) and completed in 1004: T 51.2076.
- CL. = CLEARY 1993.
- CONE Margaret CONE: *A Dictionary of Pāli*, Oxford: PTS 2001.
- COUVR. COUVREUR, F.S: *Dictionnaire classique de la langue chinoise*. Taipei: Kuangchi Press 1966 (reprint).
- CPD *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, by V. TRENCKNER, ed. D. ANDERSEN, H. SMITH et al. Copenhagen 1924 ff.
- CSCD *Chatta Saṅgāyana CD-ROM*, Version 3. Vipassana Research Institute, Dhammagiri.
- D sDe-dge (Derge) block-print of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka (Karma-pa ed., electronic version: Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, New York).
- Dasav *Dasaveyāliya*, ed. Ernst LEUMANN, transl. Walther SCHUBRING, Ahmedabad 1932. Repr. in: Walter SCHUBRING: *Kleine Schriften*, ed. Klaus BRUHN, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner 1977.
- DBhS *Daśabhūmikasūtra*.  
**K** = *Daśabhūmīśvaro nāma Mahāyānasūtram*, ed. Ryūkō KONDŌ. Tokyo 1936.  
**R** = *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, ed. Johannes RAHDER. Paris, Louvain 1926.  
 For ms. A and ms. B see MATSUDA 1996.  
**RS** = “The Gāthās of the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*”, ed. by Johannes RAHDER and Shinryu SUSA. In *The Eastern Buddhist* 5.4 (1931): 335–359 and 6.1 (1932): 51–84.
- DBhST Separate Tibetan translation of the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* in the *mDo* section. DBhST is available only in ms. Kanjurs: cf. YUYAMA 1996: 270–271.
- DBhVy *Daśabhūmi-vyākhyāna* ascribed to Vasubandhu.  
 DBhVyT = Tibetan version: Tj, mDo-’grel, vol. ngi (D and P).  
 DBhVyC = Chinese version: T 26.1522 (十地經論).
- Dhp *Dhammapada*, ed. O. VON HINÜBER and K.R. NORMAN. Oxford: PTS 1994. Quoted by verse number.

- Dhp-a *Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā*, ed. H.C. NORMAN. London: PTS 1906–1914.
- DhPAN *Dharmadhātu-prakṛty-asambheda-nirdeśa* (see Pt. II.A, ch. 2.1).  
Ch(inese): T 11.310(8): 143a–150c.  
(Tibetan: Kj) D(erge): dKon-brtsegs kha 140b1–164a5;  
P(eking): dKon-brtsegs dzi 158a1–183a6; S(Tog): dKon-brtsegs kha 206a6–241b4.
- Dhs *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, ed. E. MÜLLER. London: PTS 1885.
- DhSam *Dharma-Samuccaya*, ed. LIN Li-kouang. Paris : Adrien-Maisonneuve 1946 (vol.1: ch. I–V), 1969 (vol. 2: ch. VI–XII), 1973 (ch. XIII–XXXVI).
- DhSk *Fragmente des Dharmaskandha*, ed. Siglinde DIETZ. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1984.
- Divy *Divyāvadāna*, ed. P.L. VAIDYA. Darbhanga 1959.
- DKWJ MOROHASHI Tetsuji 諸橋徹次: *Dai kanwa jiten* 大漢和辭典, 12 vols. Tokyo: Taishukan Shoten 1976 (repr.).
- DN *Dīghanikāya*, ed. T.W. RHYS DAVIDS and J.E. CARPENTER, London: PTS 1890–1911.
- DNBZ *Dainihon bukkyō zensho* 大日本佛教全書, 150 vols, ed. Bussho kankōkai. Tokyo: Meicho fukyūkai 1978 (original ed. 1912–1922).
- EDS *An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles*, ed. A.M. GHATAGE. Poona 1976 ff.
- EncB *Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, ed. G.P. MALALASEKERA. Colombo 1961 ff.
- FK HSING YÜN 星雲 (ed.), *Fo-kuang Ta-tz'u-tien* 佛光大辭典, 8 vols. Taiwan: Fo-kuang ch'u-pan-she 1989.
- GM *Gilgit Manuscripts*, ed. Nalinaksha DUTT, Calcutta, Srinagar 1939–1959.
- Gv *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*, ed. P.L. VAIDYA, Darbhanga 1960.
- HDC Luo Zhufeng 罗竹风 (ed. in chief): *Hanyu Dacidian* 漢語大詞典, 13 vols. Shanghai 1986–1994.
- HIR. HIRAKAWA Akira (ed.): *Buddhist Chinese-Sanskrit Dictionary*, Tokyo: The Reiyukai 1997.
- Hôb *Hôbôgin*, Dictionnaire encyclopédique du bouddhisme d'après les sources chinoises et japonaises, ed. S. LÉVI, J. TAKAKUSU, P. DEMIÉVILLE. Tokyo, Paris 1929 ff.

<i>HôbRép</i>	<i>Répertoire du canon bouddhique sino-japonais</i> , compilé par P. DEMIEVILLE, H. DURT, A. SEIDEL (Fascicule annexe du <i>Hôbôgirin</i> ). Tokyo, Paris 1978.
<i>IBK</i>	<i>Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū</i> 印度學佛教學研究 ( <i>Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies</i> ).
<i>IIBS</i>	The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.
<i>IRIAB</i>	International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhism at Soka University.
<i>It</i>	<i>Itivuttaka</i> , ed. Ernst WINDISCH. London: PTS 1889.
<i>Jā</i>	<i>Jātaka, together with its Commentary</i> , ed. V. FAUSBØLL. London: PTS 1877–1896.
<i>JĀG</i>	<i>Jaina-Āgama-Granthamālā</i>
<i>JIABS</i>	<i>The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies</i> .
<i>JRI</i>	K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute
<i>K</i>	see DBhS.
<i>Kaṅkōruijū</i>	漢光類聚 (“Digest of the Light of Han” [STONE 1999: 52] or “Categorizations of the Light from China /from the Zen Fellow” [GRONER 1995: 52 n. 5]), attributed to Chūjin (see § 149.1): T 74.2371.
<i>Kj</i>	<i>Kanjur</i> ( <i>bKa’-’gyur</i> )
<i>Kotogaki</i>	<i>Sanjūshi-ka no kotogaki</i> 三十四箇事書, in: TADA et al. 1995: 357–368 (Japanese translation: 152–185). Cf. also the parallel material in the <i>Makura (no) sōshi</i> 枕雙紙 (DNBZ vol. 32: 105–129).
<i>KP</i>	<i>Kāśyāpaparivarta</i> , ed. A. VON STAËL-HOLSTEIN. Shanghai 1926.
<i>Kv</i>	<i>Kathāvatthu</i> , ed. A. TAYLOR. London: PTS 1894–1897.
<i>Kv-a</i>	<i>Kathāvatthu(ppakarana)-aṭṭhakathā</i> , <i>Pañcappakaraṇaṭṭhakathā</i> III, ed. N.A. JAYAWICKRAMA. London: PTS 1979.
<i>Laṅk</i>	<i>Laṅkāvatārasūtra</i> , ed. Bunyiu NANJIO. Repr. Kyōto: Otani University Press 1956 (original ed. 1923).
<i>MAvat</i>	<i>Madhyamakāvatāra</i> by Candrakīrti, ed. Louis DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN. St. Pétersbourg 1907–1912 (BBu IX).
<i>Mhbh</i>	<i>Mahābhārata</i> , crit. ed. V.S. SUKTHANKAR et al., Poona 1933 ff.

Mil	<i>Milindapañha</i> , ed. V. TRENCKNER. London: PTS 1980.
MIR.	= MIRONOV 1914.
MN	<i>Majjhimanikāya</i> , ed. V. TRENCKNER, R. CHALMERS. London: PTS 1888–1899.
Mp	<i>Manorathapūraṇī Aṅguttaranikāyaṭṭhakathā</i> , ed. M. WALLESER, H. KOPP. London: PTS 1924–1956.
MPPU	* <i>Mahāprajñāpāramitā-Upadeśa</i> (T 25.1509: 大智度論).
MPS	<i>Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra</i> (of the Mahāyāna).
MPSDh	Chinese translation by Dharmakṣema (transl. between 414 and 421 from a ms. brought from Kucha, possibly in collaboration with Buddhahadra: YUYAMA 1981: 13): T 12.374.
MPSFa	Chinese translation by Fa-hsien (transl. 417–418 from a ms. he obtained in Pāṭaliputra: YUYAMA 1981: 14): T 12.376.
MPST	Tibetan translation (from the Indic, by Jinamitra, Jñānagarbha and Devacandra, probably at the beginning of the 9 <sup>th</sup> century: YUYAMA 1981: 9): P: mDo tu 1a1–158b8; S: mDo wa 44b2–251a4; D mDo tha 1b1–151a4.
MSA(Bh)	<i>Mahāyānasūtrāṅkāra(bhāṣya)</i> , ed. Sylvain LEVI. Paris 1907.
MSg	Asaṅga, <i>Mahāyānasamgraha</i> : 1. ed. with annotated French transl. by Étienne LAMOTTE: <i>La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga</i> . Louvain: Bureaux du Muséon 1938. 2. ed. with annotated Japanese transl. by Gadjin M. NAGAO 長尾雅人: <i>Shōdaijōron: Wayaku to chūkai</i> 撰大乘論 和訳と注解. Tokyo: Kōdansha 1982 (上), 1987 (下).
MVu	<i>Mahāvastu-Avadāna</i> , ed. Émile SENART. Paris 1882–1897.
MVy	<i>Mahāvvyutpatti</i> , quoted according to the numbers in the edition by SAKAKI Ryōsaborō, Kyoto: Shingon-shū Kyōto Daigaku 1916. These numbers are given in brackets also in Yumiko ISHIHAMA and Yoichi FUKUDA: <i>A New Critical Edition of the Mahāvvyutpatti</i> , Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko 1989.
MW	Monier MONIER-WILLIAMS: <i>A Sanskrit-English Dictionary</i> . Oxford 1899, repr. 1951.

- NAK. NAKAMURA Hajime 中村元: *Bukkyō-go daijiten* 仏教語大辞典. Tokyo: Tōkyō shoseki 1981.
- NarK *Naritasan bukkyō kenkyūjo kiyō* 成田山仏教研究所紀要 (*Journal of the Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies*)
- NBGN *Nihon bukkyō gakkai nempō* 日本仏教學會年報 (*The Journal of the Nippon Buddhist Research Association*).
- ÖAW Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- P Peking block-print of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, ed. D. T. SUZUKI. Tokyo, Kyoto: Suzuki Research Foundation 1955–1961.
- PāiaSM Hargovind Das T. SHETH: *Pāia-sadda-Mahaṇṇavo*. Varanasi: Prakrit Text Society <sup>2</sup>1963.
- Pañc *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*.  
I: ed. Nalinaksha DUTT. Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Press 1934.  
II–VI: ed. Takayasu KIMURA. Tokyo: Sankibo 1986 (II–III), 1990 (IV), 1992 (V), 2006 (VI).
- Paṭis-a *Saddhammappakāsinī* (Commentary on the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*), ed. C.V. Joshi. Repr. London: PTS 1979.
- Plants = SCHMITHAUSEN 1991a.
- PrasP Candrakīrti: *Prasannapadā*, ed. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN in: Id. (ed.): *Madhyamakavṛttiḥ. Mūlamadhyamakārikās* (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la *Prasannapadā*, Commentaire de Candrakīrti. St. Petersburg 1903–1913 (BBu IV).
- PratyS *Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṃmukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra*, ed. Paul M. Harrison. Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library 1978.  
Transl.: Paul HARRISON: *The Samādhi of Direct Encounter with the Buddhas of the Present*. Tokyo: IIBS 1990.
- Ps *Papañcasūdanī Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā*, ed. J. H. WOODS, D. KOSAMBI, I. B. HORNER. London: PTS 1922–1938.
- Ps-pt *Līnatthappakāsinī II* (Dhammapāla: *Papañcasūdanī-purāṇaṭṭikā*). Quoted according to CSCD.
- PSK *Pañcaskandhaka* of Vasubandhu, ed. LI Xuezhū and Ernst STEINKELLNER. Beijing, Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House & Austrian Academy of Sciences Press 2008.



PTS	Pāli Text Society.
PTSD	<i>The Pāli Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary</i> , ed. T.W. RHYS DAVIDS & W. STEDE. London: PTS 1921–1925.
PW	Otto BÖHTLINGK and Rudolph ROTH: <i>Sanskrit-Wörterbuch</i> . 7 vols., St. Petersburg 1855–1875.
pw	Otto BÖHTLINGK: <i>Sanskrit-Wörterbuch in kürzerer Fassung</i> . 4 vols., St. Petersburg 1879–1889 (repr. Delhi 1991).
R	see DBhS.
RGV(V)	<i>Ratnagotravibhāga(-vṛtti)</i> , ed. E. H. JOHNSTON. Patna: Bihar Research Society Museum Buildings 1950.
rl	right to left pagination.
S	sTog Palace Kanjur, reproduced in: <i>The Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur</i> . 109 vols., Leh 1975–1980.
Saddhp	<i>Saddharmapuṇḍarīka(sūtra)</i> , ed. H. KERN and B. NANJIO, St. Petersburg 1908–1912 (BBu X).
SāgDh	<i>Sāgaramatipariṇcchā</i> , transl. by Dharmakṣema (385–433): T 13.397 (no. 5).
SāgT	Tibetan translation of the <i>Sāgaramatipariṇcchā</i> : Kj, mDo-sde, D vol. pha.
SāgW	<i>Sāgaramatipariṇcchā</i> , transl. by Wei-ching 惟淨 and others (around 1000 AD): T 13.400.
Samdh	<i>Samdhinirmocanasūtra</i> . L'explication des mystères. Texte tibétain, édité et traduit par Étienne LAMOTTE). Louvain, Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve 1935.
Sanghabh	<i>The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu</i> , Being the 17th and Last Section of the Vinaya of the Mūla-sarvāstivādins, ed. Raniero GNOLI, Rome: Is.M.E.O. 1977 (pt. I), 1978 (pt. II).
Sanjin-gi shiki	<i>Sanjin-gi shiki</i> 三身義氏私記 (“Private Notes on the Meaning of the Three Bodies”), reworked version (see fn. 485): DNBZ vol. 24: 328b–340a (Japanese pagination: 292b–304a).
SāraSg	<i>Sārasaṅgha</i> , ed. Genjun H. SASAKI. Oxford: PTS 1992.
Śat	<i>Çatasāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā</i> , ed. Pratāpacandra GHOṢA. Calcutta: Asiatic Society 1902.

SAVBh	Stthiramati, <i>Sūtrālamkāra-vṛtti-bhāṣya</i> (doubtful title, re-sanskritized from Tib. <i>mDo sde rgyan gyi 'grel bshad?</i> ): Tj, Sems-tsam, vols. mi and tsi (both in P and D).
SBDJ	<i>Sōgō bukkyō daijiten</i> 総合仏教大辞典, compiled by ŌCHŌ Enichi 横超慧日 et al., Kyōto: Hōzōkan 1987–1988.
SbhCN	<i>Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa(-parivarta)</i> of the <i>Buddhāvataṃsaka</i> (see § 101 with fn. 542).
Shikan shiki	Shōshin 證眞, <i>Shikan shiki</i> 止觀私記 (“Private Notes on Calming and Contemplation”): DNBZ vol. 22: 237–591 (Japanese pagination: 787–1141).
SHT	<i>Sanskriithandschriften aus den Turfan-Funden</i> , ed. Ernst WALDSCHMIDT et al., Wiesbaden 1965 f.
Shōbōgenzō	Dōgen, <i>Shōbōgenzō</i> 正法眼藏, ed. in: ŌKUBO Dōshū 大久保道舟, <i>Dōgen zenji zenshū</i> 道元禪師全集, repr. Kyōto: Rinsen-shoten 1989 (1 <sup>st</sup> ed. 1969, 1970), vol. I.
Śikṣ	Śāntideva: <i>Śikṣāsamuccaya</i> , ed. Cecil BENDALL. St. Petersburg 1902 (BBu I).
Sn	<i>Suttanipāta</i> , ed. D. ANDERSEN & H. SMITH. London: PTS 1913. Quoted by verse number unless specified otherwise.
Sn-a	<i>Paramatthajotikā II Suttanipātaṭṭhakathā</i> , ed. H. SMITH. London: PTS 1916–1918.
SN	<i>Sariyuttanikāya</i> , ed. L. FEER, London: PTS 1884–1898. SOM. = SN I, ed. G. A. SOMARATNE, Oxford: PTS 1998.
SOM.	see SN
Sōmoku	<i>Sōmoku hosshin shugyō jōbutsu ki</i> 草木癡心修行成佛記 (“Notes Concerning Plants Arousing the Resolve [for Awakening], Cultivating [Spiritual] Practice and Realizing Buddhahood”), ascribed to Ryōgen 良源 (see § 147): DNBZ vol. 24: 345 f (Japanese pagination: 309 f).
Shinjō shiki	Annen 安然 (841? to ca. 890), <i>Shinjō sōmoku jōbutsu shiki</i> 勘定草木成佛私記 (“Private Notes on Discussions of Theories on the Realization of Buddhahood by Grasses and Trees” [SUEKI 2001: 84]), ed. in SUEKI 1995a: 705–724. Annotated Japanese transl. <i>ibid.</i> 725–785.
Sp	<i>Samantapāsādikā Vinayaṭṭhakathā</i> , ed. J. TAKAKUSU & M. NAGAI. London: PTS 1924–1947.

Spk	<i>Sāratthappakāsinī Saṃyuttanikāyaṭṭhakathā</i> , ed. F. L. WOODWARD. London: PTS 1929–1937.
Spk-pt	<i>Līnatthappakāsinī III</i> (Dhammapāla: <i>Sāratthappakāsinī-purāṇaṭṭikā</i> ). Quoted from CSCD.
ŚrBh	<i>Śrāvākabhūmi</i> (ch. 13 of the <i>Yogācārabhūmi</i> ascribed to Asaṅga). Sh = ed. Karunesha SHUKLA. Patna: JRI 1973. Tai = revised text ed. by the Śrāvākabhūmi Study Group, The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taishō University. Tokyo: Sankibo 1998 (1 <sup>st</sup> chapter), 2007 (2 <sup>nd</sup> chapter).
ŚrighT	<i>Sphuṭārthā Śrīghanācārasaṃgrahaṭṭikā</i> , ed. SANGHA-SENA. Patna: JRI 1968.
StII	<i>Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik</i> .
Sukh	<i>Sukhāvatīvyūha</i> . Sukh-1 = Larger version, Sukh-2 = Shorter version. A = ed. Atsuuji ASHIKAGA. Kyoto: Hōzōkan 1965 (Sukh-1). K = Takao KAGAWA 香川孝雄: <i>Muryōjukyō no shohon taishō kenkyū</i> 無量壽經の諸本對照研究, Kyoto 1984 (Sukh-1). M = ed. Max MÜLLER. Oxford 1883 (Sukh-1, Sukh-2). V = ed. P. L. VAIDYA, in: <i>Mahāyānasūtrasaṃgraha</i> , Darbhanga 1961: 221–257 (Sukh-1 and Sukh-2).
SukhL	T 12.362, in the Taishō ed. ascribed to Chih Ch'ien 支謙 but actually a (revised version of a) translation by Lokakṣema, while T 12.361 is the work of Chih Ch'ien; cf. Paul HARRISON in: <i>Journal of Indian Philosophy</i> 26 (1998): 556–557.
Śūr	' <i>Śūraṃgamasūtra</i> ' (大佛頂如來密因修證了義諸菩薩萬行首楞嚴經): T 19.945 (cf. § 55).
Suttāg	<i>Suttāgame</i> , ed. PUPPHABHIKKHU. Bombay: Nirṇayasāgar Press 1953.
Sūy	<i>Sūyagaḍaṃgasuttam</i> ( <i>Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtram</i> ), ed. Muni JAMBŪVIJAYA. Bombay 1978 ( <i>JĀG</i> vol. 2 pt. 2).
SūyViv	Śīlāṅka: <i>Sūtrakṛtāṅgavivṛti</i> , ed. s. ĀyārViv.
Sv	<i>Sumaṅgalavilāsinī Dīghanikāyaṭṭhakathā</i> , ed. T. W. RHYS DAVIDS, J. E. CARPENTER, W. STEDE. London: PTS 1886–1932.

Sv-pt	<i>Līnatthappakāsini</i> I (Dhammapāla: <i>Sumaṅgalavilāsini-purāṇaṭṭikā</i> ), ed. Lily DE SILVA. London: PTS 1970.
SWTF	<i>Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden</i> , ed. Heinz BECHERT, Klaus RÖHRBORN. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1973 ff.
T	<i>Taishō shinshū daizōkyō</i> 大正新修大藏經 (Tripitaka in Chinese), ed. TAKAKUSU Junjirō and WATANABE Kai-kyō. Tokyo 1922–1933. Quoted from CBETA.
TGK	<i>Tōyō Gakujutsu Kenkyū</i> 東洋學術研究 ( <i>The Journal of Oriental Science</i> ).
TGS	<i>Tathāgatagarbhasūtra</i> , ed. and transl. in ZIMMERMANN 2002.
Th	<i>Theragāthā</i> , in: <i>Thera- and Therī-Gāthā</i> , ed. H. OLDENBERG and R. PISCHEL, rev. K. R. NORMAN, L. ALSDORF. London: PTS 1966. Quoted by verse number.
Th-a	<i>Theragāthā-atthakathā</i> , ed. F. L. WOODWARD, London: PTS 1940–1959.
Thī	<i>Therīgāthā</i> ; ed. see Th.
Tj	<i>Tanjur</i> ( <i>bsTan</i> -’gyur).
Tsu-t’ang-chi	祖堂集, compiled by the two Ch’an monks Ching 靜 and Yün 筠 in 952 and transmitted in Korea. Quoted from a large-format Korean facsimile edition and from a Taiwanese edition (= Taiw.): 祖堂集, Taipei: 新文豐出版公司 1987. For the abbreviations A.a, A.b, Y. and M. see fn. 803.
TUSN	<i>Tathāgatotpattisambhavanirdeśa</i> chapter of the <i>Buddhāvataṃsaka</i> .
Ud	<i>Udāna</i> , ed. P. STEINTHAL. London: PTS 1885.
Ud-a	<i>Paramatthadīpanī I Udāna-atthakathā</i> , ed. F. L. WOODWARD. London: PTS 1926.
Utt	<i>Uttarādhyāyanasūtra</i> , ed. Jarl CHARPENTIER. Uppsala 1922, repr. New Delhi: Ajay Book Service 1980.
Uv	<i>Udānavarga</i> , ed. Franz BERNHARD. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1965.
Vi	<i>Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra</i> : T 27.1545.
Vibh	<i>Vibhaṅga</i> , ed. C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS. London: PTS 1904.

Vibh-a	<i>Sarīmohavinodanī Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā</i> , ed. A.P. BUDDHA-DATTA. London: PTS 1923.
Vin	<i>Vinayapiṭaka</i> , ed. H. OLDENBERG. London: PTS 1879–1883.
VinDh	<i>Vinaya</i> of the Dharmaguptakas: T 22.1428.
VinMā	<i>Vinaya</i> of the Mahāsāṅghikas: T 22.1425.
VinMī	<i>Vinaya</i> of the Mahīśāsakas: T 22.1421.
VinSa	<i>Vinaya</i> of the Sarvāstivādins: T 23.1435.
VisM	Buddhaghosa: <i>Visuddhimagga</i> , ed. Henry Clarke WARREN, revised by Dharmananda KOSAMBI. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1950.
VisM-mhṭ	<i>Visuddhimagga-mahāṭīkā</i> (CSCD).
VkN	<i>Vimalakīrtinirdeśa</i> , ed. by the Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taisho University. Tokyo: Taisho University Press 2004 (Transliterated Sanskrit Text Collated with Tibetan and Chinese Translations), 2006 (A Sanskrit Edition Based upon the Manuscript Newly Found at the Potala Palace).
Vś	Vasubandhu: <i>Vimśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi</i> , ed. Sylvain LÉVI. Paris 1925.
WEBSTER	<i>Webster's Third New International Dictionary</i> . Repr. Cologne: Könnemann 1993.
WStB	Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, ed. by Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.
WZKS	<i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens</i>
X	<i>Shinsan zokuzōkyō</i> ( <i>Xuzangjing</i> ): The Shinsan Dainihon Zokuzokyo 卍新纂續藏經. Tokyo: Kokusho kankokai. Vol. 1-88 (CBETA version).
YBh	<i>Yogācārabhūmi</i> , ed. Vidhushekhara BHATTACHARYA. Calcutta: University of Calcutta 1957.
YBhHetu	<i>Yogācārabhūmi</i> , chapter on <i>Hetuvidyā</i> : see YAITA 1992.
ZDMG	<i>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft</i> .

## References

- AKANUMA, Chizen (1958): *The Comparative Catalogue of Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas*. Nagoya: Hajinkaku-shobō.
- AKAO Eikei 赤尾栄慶 (1984): “Hōzō ni mieru sōmoku-jōbutsu ni tsuite” 法蔵にみえる草木成仏について. In *IBK* 64 [32.2]: 962–965.
- ANĀLAYO (T.P. STEFFENS) (2006): *A Comparative Study of the Majjhima-nikāya*. Habilitationsschrift (unpublished), Univ. of Marburg.
- ANĀLAYO & BUCKNELL, Roderick S (2006): “Correspondence Table for Parallels to the Discourses of *Majjhima Nikāya*: Toward a Revision of Akanuma’s *Comparative Catalogue*”. In *Journal of Buddhist Studies* (Centre for Buddhist Studies, Sri Lanka) 4: 215–243.
- ANDERL, Christoph (2004a): *Studies in the Language of the Zu-tang ji*. PhD diss. University of Oslo, Dept. of East European and Oriental Studies, Faculty of Arts.
- (2004b): “The Semantics of *Qíng* 情 in Chán Buddhist Chinese”. In: Halvor EIFRING (ed.): *Love and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature*. Leiden, Boston: Brill: 149–224.
- ARAMAKI Noritoshi 荒牧典俊 (1978): *Jūjikyō* 十地經 (Japanese translation of the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*). 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha (1<sup>st</sup> ed.: 1974) (*Daijō butten* 大乘仏典 vol. 8).
- (2000): “Nanshū-zen kara Sōgaku no seiritsu e” 南宗禅から宋学の成立へ. In: ARAMAKI Noritoshi (ed.): *Hokuchō Zui Tō Chūgoku bukkyō shisōshi* 北朝隋唐中国仏教思想史. Kyoto: Hōzōkan: 565–596.
- BALBIR, Nalini (2000): “Jain-Buddhist Dialogue: Material from the Pāli Scriptures”. In: *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 26: 1–42.
- BANG, W, and VON GABAIN, A. (1931): *Türkische Turfan-Texte V*, Berlin (= *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, 1931, XIV).
- BECHERT, Heinz (1984): Mythologie der singhalesischen Volksreligion. In: H.W. HAUSSIG (ed.), *Wörterbuch der Mythologie*. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett. I. Abteilung, Bd. 5: 509–656.

- BENN, James A. (2008): "Another Look at the Pseudo-*Śūraṅgama-sūtra*". In *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 68.1: 57–89.
- BRETFELD, Sven (2003): "Visuelle Repräsentation im sogenannten 'Yoga-Lehrbuch' aus Qizil". In: Sven BRETFELD und Jens WILKENS (eds.): *Indien und Zentralasien. Sprach- und Kulturkontakt*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz: 167–205.
- BRONKHORST, Johannes (2005): "The Reliability of Tradition". In: Federico SQUARCINI (ed.): *Boundaries, Dynamics and Construction of Traditions in South Asia*. Firenze: Firenze University Press: 63–76.
- BROUGH, John (1964): "The Chinese pseudo-translation of Ārya-śūra's *Jātaka-mālā*". In *Asia Major*, NS 11.1: 27–53 (reprinted in: John BROUGH: *Collected Papers*, ed. Minoru HARA and J.C. WRIGHT. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 1996: 217–243).
- BRUHN, Klaus (2007): "Die Ahimsā in der Ethik des Jaina-Autors Amṛta-candra". In *BIS* 18: 1–78.
- BUSWELL, Robert E. (1989): *The Formation of Ch'an Ideology in China and Korea: The Vajrasamādhi-Sūtra, A Buddhist Apocryphon*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- (1990) (ed.): *Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- BUTZENBERGER, Klaus (1998): "Ancient Indian Conceptions on Man's Destiny After Death. The Beginnings and the Early Development of the Doctrine of Transmigration. II". In *BIS* 11-12: 1–84.
- CAILLAT, Colette (1993): "Words for violence in the 'Seniors of the Jaina Canon'. In: Rudy SMET and Kenji WATANABE (eds.): *Jain Studies in Honour of Jozef Deleu*. Tokyo: Hon-no-Tomosha: 207–236.
- (2007): "Ahimsā – *cur et quomodo?* Eine vierfache Antwort in einem alten Jaina-Text". In *BIS* 18: 79–100.
- CHAN, Chi-wah (1999): "Chi-li (960–1028) and the Crisis of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism in the Early Sung". In: Peter N. GREGORY and Daniel A. GETZ, Jr. (eds.): *Buddhism in the Sung*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press: 409–441.

- CHANG Chung-yuan (1971): *Original Teachings of Ch'an Buddhism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- CHAVANNES, Édouard (1962): *Cinq Cents Contes et Apologues extraits du Tripiṭaka Chinois*, tome I. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve.
- CLEARY, Thomas (1983): *Entry Into the Inconceivable. An Introduction to Hua-yen Buddhism*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii.
- (1993): *The Flower Ornament Scripture. A Translation of The Avatamsaka Sutra*. Boston, London : Shambhala.
- COOK, Francis H. (1977): *Hua-yen Buddhism. The Jewel Net of Indra*. University Park, London: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- DELEANU, Florin (2000): "A Preliminary Study on Meditation and the Beginnings of Mahāyāna Buddhism". In: *ARIRIAB* 3: 65–113.
- DELEU, Jozef (1970): *Viyāhapannatti (Bhagavaī)*. The Fifth Anga of the Jaina Canon. Introduction, Critical Analysis, Commentary & Indexes. Brugge: "De Tempel".
- (2007): "Die Schonung der Lebewesen in der *Viyāhapannatti*". In *BIS* 18: 101–110.
- DEMIÉVILLE, Paul (1952): *Le concile de Lhasa*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale de France.
- DHARMASIRI, Gunapala (1986): *Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics*. Singapore: The Buddhist Research Society.
- DOI, Torakazu (1978, etc.): *Das Kegon Sutra*. Tokyo: Doitsubun Kegonkyō kankōkai 1978 (vol. 4), 1981 (vol. 2), 1982 (vol. 3).
- DONNER, Neal and Daniel B. STEVENSON (1993): *The Great Calming and Contemplation*. A Study and Annotated Translation of the First Chapter of Chih-i's Mo-ho chih-kuan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- DUMOULIN, Heinrich (1985, 1986): *Geschichte des Zen-Buddhismus*. Bern, München: Francke 1985 (vol. I: India and China), 1986 (vol. II: Japan).
- DURT, Hubert (1994): *Problems of Chronology and Eschatology*. Kyoto: Istituto Italiano di Cultura, Scuola di Studi sull'Asia Orientale.
- ECKEL, Malcolm David (1991): *To See the Buddha*. New York: Harper-Collins.



- (2008): *Bhāviveka and His Buddhist Opponents*. Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press.
- ELTSCHINGER, Vincent (2001): *Dharmakīrti sur les mantra et la perception du supra-sensible*. Wien (WStB 51).
- (2008): “Dharmakīrti on Mantras and their Efficiency”. In: *Esoteric Buddhist Studies: Identity in Diversity*. Proceedings of the International Conference on Esoteric Buddhist Studies, Koyasan University, 5 Sept.–8 Sept. 2006. Koyasan University: 273–289.
- FAURE, Bernard (1996): *Visions of Power. Imagining Medieval Japanese Buddhism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fazang: *Trattato sul leone d’oro*: see ZACCHETTI.
- FINDLY, Ellison Banks (2002): “Borderline Beings: Plant Possibilities in Early Buddhism”. In *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 122.2: 252–263.
- (2008): *Plant Lives: Borderline Beings in Indian Traditions*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- FRAUWALLNER, Erich (1953, 1956): *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*. Salzburg: Otto Müller 1953 (vol. I), 1956 (vol. II).
- FUCHITA Unkei 剡田雲溪 (2003): “Shingon honmo shū ni okeru sōmuku jōbutsu ni tsuite” 『真言本母集』における草木成仏について. In *Mikkyō bunka* 密教文化 210: 57–81.
- FUJIMOTO Akira 藤本 晃 (2003): “Shokubutsu ni inochi wa aru ka? Nanden Jōza-bu no nishu no myōkon” 植物に命はあるか? 南伝上座部の二種の命根 (“Do Plants Have Lives? Two Kinds of *Jīvitindriya* by the Theravādins”). In *NBGK* 68: (87)–(109).
- FUJITA, Kōtatsu (1990): “The Textual Origins of the *Kuan Wu-liang-shou ching*: A Canonical Scripture of Pure Land Buddhism”. In *BUSWELL* 1990: 149–173.
- FYNES, Richard C.C. (1996): “Plant Souls in Jainism and Manichaeism. The Case for Cultural Transmission”. In: *East and West* 46.1–2: 21–44.
- GIEBEL, Rolf W. (1995): “The *Chin-kang-ting ching yü-ch’ieh shih-pa-hui chih-kuei*: An Annotated Translation.” In *NarK* 18: 107–201.

- GIMELLO, Robert Michael (1976): *Chih-yen* (智儼, 602–668) *and the Foundations of Hua-yen* (華嚴) *Buddhism*. PhD diss. Columbia University.
- (1983): “Li T’ung-hsüan and the Practical Dimensions of Hua-yen”. In: GIMELLO and GREGORY 1983: 321–389.
- GIMELLO, Robert M. and Peter N. GREGORY (eds., 1983): *Studies in Ch’an and Hua-yen*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- GOMBRICH, Richard (2005): “Thoughts about Karma”. In: *Buddhism and Jainism*. Essays in Honour of Dr. Hojun Nagasaki on His Seventieth Birthday. Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten: 740–726.
- GÓMEZ, Luis Oscar (1967): *Selected Verses from the Gaṇḍavyūha*: Text, Critical Apparatus and Translation. PhD diss.: Yale Univ.
- (1996): *The Land of Bliss. The Paradise of the Buddha of Measureless Light*. Sanskrit and Chinese Versions of the Sukhāvātīvyūha Sūtras. Introduction and English Translations by Luis O. GÓMEZ. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, and Kyoto: Higashi Honganji.
- GRANOFF, Phyllis (1998): “Maitreya’s Jewelled World: Some Remarks on Gems and Visions in Buddhist Texts”. In *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 26: 347–371.
- GREGORY, Peter N. (1986): “The Problem of Theodicy in the *Awakening of Faith*”. In *Religious Studies* 22: 63–78.
- GRONER, Paul (1995): “A Medieval Japanese Reading of the *Mo-ho chih-kuan*. Placing the *Kankō ruijū* in Historical Context”. In *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 22.1–2: 49–81.
- (2000): “Early Japanese Tendai Views on the Realization of Buddhahood by Grasses and Trees: Determinations from China (Tōketsu 唐決)”. In: *Bukkyō to kankyō* 仏教と環境 (立正大学仏教学部開設50周年記念論文集). Tokyo: Maruzen: 21–40 (rl 498–479).
- GROSNICK, William (1990): “The Buddhahood of the Grasses and the Trees: Ecological Sensitivity or Scriptural Misunderstanding?”. In: Michael BARNES (ed.): *An Ecology of the Spirit. Religious Reflection and Environmental Consciousness*. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America (The College Theology Society): 197–208.

- HABATA, Hiromi (2007): *Die zentralasiatischen Sanskrit-Fragmente des Mahāparinirvāṇa-Mahāsūtra*. Marburg: Indica et Tibetica Verlag.
- HABITO, Ruben (1996): *Originary Enlightenment*. Tendai Hongaku Doctrine and Japanese Buddhism. Tokyo: IBS (Studia Philologica Buddhica, Occasional Paper Series XI).
- HACKER, Paul (1960): *Prahlāda. Werden und Wandlungen einer Idealgestalt*. Teil I: Die Entstehung der Legende; die Prahlāda-Legenden des Viṣṇupurāṇa und des Bhāgavatapurāṇa. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
- HAHN, Michael (1976): "Die Haribhaṭṭajātakamālā (II): Das Śyāmajātaka". In WZKS 20: 37–74.
- HAKAMAYA Noriaki 袴谷憲明(2009): "Shin zenjō shō kyōten" 心染浄証經典. In *Komazawa daigaku bukkyōgakubu kenkyū kiyō* 駒沢大学仏教学部研究紀要 67: 53–96.
- HAKEDA, Yoshito S. (1972): *Kūkai: Major Works*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- HALBFASS, Wilhelm (1980): "Karma, Apūrva, and 'Natural' Causes: Observations on the Growth and Limits of the Theory of Saṃsāra", in: Wendy DONIGER O'FLAHERTY: *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press: 268–302.
- (1991): *Tradition and Reflection*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- (2000): *Karma und Wiedergeburt im indischen Denken*. Kreuzlingen, München: Heinrich Hugendubel Verlag (Diederichs Gelbe Reihe, vol. 161).
- HAMAR, Imre (1998a): "Chengguan's Theory of the Four Dharma-dhātus". In *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 51.1-2: 1–19.
- (1998b): "The Doctrines of Perfect Teaching in Ch'eng-Kuan's Introduction to his Commentary on the *Hua-yen-ching*". In *Journal of The Center for Buddhist Studies* (National Taiwan University) 3: 331–349.
- (2002): *A Religious Leader in the Tang: Chengguan's Biography*. Tokyo: IBS (Studia Philologica Buddhica, Occasional Paper Series XII).

- (2007a): *Reflecting Mirrors. Perspectives on Huayan Buddhism*, ed. by Imre HAMAR. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
- (2007b): “The History of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka-sūtra*: Shorter and Larger Texts.” In HAMAR 2007a: 139–167.
- HANANO Michiaki 花野充昭 (1975–1977): “*Sanjū shika no kotogaki no senja to shisō ni tsuite*” 『三十四箇事書』の選者と思想について. In *TGK* 14.6/1975: 154–163 (pt. 1); 15.1/1976: 135–158 (pt. 2 = 1976a); 15.2/1976: 127–156 (pt. 3 = 1976b); 16.1/1977: 134–154 (pt. 4).
- HANNEDER, Jürgen (2007): “Vasubandhus *Vimśatikā* 1–2 anhand der Sanskrit- und tibetischen Fassungen”, in: Konrad KLAUS & Jens-Uwe HARTMANN (eds.): *Indica et Tibetica*. Festschrift für Michael Hahn, Wien (WStTB 66): 207–214.
- HARA Minoru 原實 (1994): “Deva-garbha and Tathāgatagarbha”, in: Tadeusz SKORUPSKI & Ulrich PAGEL (eds.) *The Buddhist Forum* 3 (1991–1993). Univ. of London (Papers in honour of Professor David Seyfort Ruegg): 37–55.
- (1998): “fusesshō-kō” 『不殺生考』 (“A Note on *ahimsā*”). In *Kokusai bukkhyōgaku daigakuin daigaku kenkyū kiyō* 国際仏教学大学院大学研究紀要 (*Journal of the International College for Advanced Buddhist Studies*) 1: 1–37 (292–256 rl).
- (2000): “Jishin riki” 慈心力 (“The Power of *maṭṭrī*”). In: *Journal of the International College for Advanced Buddhist Studies* 3: 9–47.
- (2003): “A Note on the Concept of Plants and Trees”. In: Olle QVARNSTRÖM (ed.), *Jainism and Early Buddhism: Essays in Honor of Padmanabh S. Jaini*. Fremont California: Asian Humanities Press, part II: 465–489.
- (2005): “A Note on Pali *akuppa*”. In: Lars GÖHLER (ed.): *Indische Kultur im Kontext*. Festschrift für Klaus Mylius. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz: 229–246.
- (2007): “Kodai Indo no sōmoku-kan” 古代インドの草木観, in: *Chōetsu Ajia kenkyū hōkoku-zuki rekishi bunka kenkyū* 超域アジア研究報告 - 付歴史・文化研究 4: 46–93.
- HARRISON, Paul (1992): “Is the *Dharmakāya* the Real ‘Phantom Body’ of the Buddha?”. In *JIABS* 15.1: 44–94.

- HARVEY, Peter (2000): *An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- HENRICHs, Albert (1979): "Thou shalt not kill a tree". In: *Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists* 16.1-2: 85-108.
- VON HINÜBER, Oskar (1996): *A Handbook of Pāli Literature*. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter.
- (1998): *Entstehung und Aufbau der Jātaka-Sammlung*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
- (1999): *Das Pātimokkhasutta der Theravādin*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
- (2001): *Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick*. Wien: Verlag der ÖAW, 2. erweiterte Auflage (1<sup>st</sup> edition: 1986).
- HIRAGA Yumiko 平賀 由美子 (2007): "Jūjikyō Joshō ni okeru anubhāva to adhiṣṭhāna ni tsuite" 『十地經』序章における anubhāva と adhiṣṭhāna について. In *Mikkyō bunka* 密教文化 218: 7-27 (rl 146-126).
- (2009): "Jūjikyō ni okeru adhiṣṭhāna ni tsuite: daihachi-ji o chūshin to shite" 『十地經』における adhiṣṭhāna について: 第八地を中心として. In *IBK* 117 [57.2]: 1012-1009 rl.
- HIRAKAWA, Akira (1982): *Monastic Discipline for the Buddhist Nuns*. Patna: JRI.
- HORIBATA Shun'ei 堀端俊英 (2006): *Sōmoku jōbutsu ni miru shūkyōteki shizen-kan* 草木成仏にみる宗教的自然観. Fujisawa: Shun'ei bunko 俊英文庫.
- HSUAN HUA (2003): *The Shurangama Sutra: Sutra Text and Supplements*, with introduction by the Ven. Master Hsuan Hua. Burlingame: Buddhist Text Translation Society.
- HUBER, Toni (1999): *The Cult of Pure Crystal Mountain*. New York, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
- HYŌDŌ Kazuo 兵藤一夫 (1982): "Shin (citta) no gogi kaishaku: Toku ni Vasubandhu no tachiba wo chūshin ni shite" 「心 (citta)」の語義解釈: 特にヴァスバンドウの立場を中心にして. In *Bukkyōgaku seminā* 仏教学セミナー 36: 21-39.
- INAGAKI, Hisao (1994): *The Three Pure Land Sutras*. Kyoto: Nagata bunshodo.

- INOUE Nobuo 井上信生 (1998): “*Carā-cara or Cara-acara*”. In *Indo shisōshi kenkyū* インド思想史研究 (*Studies in the History of Indian Thought*) 10: 53–58.
- ISHII Kōsei 石井公成 (1996): *Kegon shisō no kenkyū* 華嚴思想の研究. Tokyo: Shunjūsha.
- ISHII Shūdō 石井修道 (1967): “Mujōseppō no seiritsu katei” 無情説法の成立過程. In *IBK* 31 [16.1]: 140–141.
- (1991): *Dōgeñ-Zen no seiritsushiteki kenkyū* 道元禪の成立史的研究. Tokyo: Daizō shuppan.
- ITŌ Hiromi 伊藤宏見 (1996–2008): “Sōmoku jōbutsu ni tsuite” 草木成仏について. In *Tōyōgaku kenkyū* 東洋学研究 33/1996: 21–48 (pt.1); 34/1997: 41–68 (pt.2); 35/1998: 27–45 (pt.3); 36/1999: 1–19 (pt.4); 37/2000: 15–29 (pt.5); 38/2001: 1–12 (pt.6); 39/2002: 113–126 (pt.7); 40/2003: 91–101 (pt.8); 41/2004: 97–116 (pt.9); 42/2005: 141–154 (pt.10); 43/2006: 107–114 (pt.11); 45/2008: 81–96 (pt.12).
- IZAWA Atsuko 井澤敦子 (2008): “Veda saishiki ni okeru itami ni taisuru kyōkan ni tsuite” ヴェーダ祭式における痛みに対する共感について (“Empathy for Pain in Vedic Ritual”). In *Kokusai bukkyōgaku daigakuin daigaku kenkyū kiyō* 国際仏教学大学院大学研究紀要 (*Journal of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies* 12: 115–136 (= 78–57 rl).
- JACOBI, Hermann (1968): *Jaina Sutras* (transl.). Reprint New York: Dover Publications. Original ed.: Oxford: Clarendon Press 1884 (pt. I), 1895 (pt. II).
- JAINI, Padmanabh S. (1979): *The Jaina Path of Purification*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- (1980): “Karma and the Problem of Rebirth in Jainism”. In: Wendy DONIGER O’FLAHERTY: *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press: 217–238.
- KAMATA Shigeo 鎌田茂雄 (1965): *Chūgoku Kegon shisōshi no kenkyū* 中國華嚴思想史の研究. Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai.
- (1968): “Sanronshū, Gozu-Zen, Dōkyō o musubu shisōshiteki keifu: sōmoku jōbutsu wo tegakari to shite” 三論宗・牛頭禪・道教を結ぶ思

- 想史的系譜 — 草木成仏を手がかりとして. In *Komazawa daigaku bukk'yōgakubu kenkyū kiyō* 駒沢大学仏教学部研究紀要 26: 79–89.
- KAMEI Sōchū 亀井宗忠 (1966): “Shingonshū ni okeru sōmoku jōbutsu ron to sokushin jōbutsu no ninshō to ni tsuite” 真言宗における草木成仏論と即身成の人証とについて. In: *NBGN* 31: 181–193.
- KARASHIMA, Seishi (1998): *A Glossary of Dharmarakṣa's Translation of the Lotus Sutra*. Tokyo: IRIAB.
- (2001): *A Glossary of Kumārajīva's Translation of the Lotus Sūtra*. Tokyo: IRIAB.
- KARUNADASA, Y. (1989): *Buddhist Analysis of Matter*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Singapore: The Buddhist Research Society.
- KASHIWAGI Hiroo 柏木弘雄 (1981): *Daijōkishinron no kenkyū* 大乘起信論の研究. Tokyo: Shunjūsha.
- KATSUMATA Shunkyō 勝又俊教 (1987): *Kōbō Daishi chosaku zenshū* 弘法大師著作全集. Revised ed. Tokyo: Sankibo.
- KERN, Iso (1992): *Buddhistische Kritik am Christentum im China des 17. Jahrhunderts*. Bern: Peter Lang.
- KIM Chonhak 金天鶴 (2008): “Heian jidai no Kegon shiki-rui ni okeru jōbutsu-ron” 平安時代の華嚴私記類における成仏論. In *IBK* 114 [56.2]: 653–659.
- KIMURA Kiyotaka 木村清孝 (1989): “Nyorairin-ge no shisōshiteki isō: Kokoro to gaka no ruihi ni chakumoku shite” 「如来林偈」の思想史的位相 — 心と画家の類比に着目して. In *Nantō bukk'yō* 南東佛教 61/62: 59–72.
- (2007): “Huayan and Chan”. In: *HAMAR* 2007a: 221–230.
- KING, Sallie B. (1991): *Buddha Nature*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- KLIMKEIT, Hans-Joachim (1977): “Manichäische und buddhistische Beichtformeln aus Turfan: Beobachtungen zur Beziehung zwischen Gnosis und Mahāyāna.” In *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 29: 193–228.
- (1991): “Die Kenntnis apokrypher Evangelien in Zentral- und Ostasien”. In: Alois VAN TONGERLOO and Søren GIVERSEN (eds.): *Manichaica se-*

- lecta*: Studies presented to Professor Julien Ries on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. Lovanii (Manichaeic Studies I): 149–175.
- KOSEKI, Aaron K. (1980): “Prajñāpāramitā and the Buddhahood of the Non-Sentient World: The San-Lun Assimilation of Buddha-Nature and Middle Path Doctrine”. In *JlABS* 3.1: 16–33.
- KRAMER, Jowita (2005): *Kategorien der Wirklichkeit im frühen Yogācāra*. Wiesbaden: Ludwig Reichert Verlag.
- KRAUSE, Carsten (2003): *Das Ch'eng-shih lun — Aufnahme und Wirkung eines buddhistischen Textes im mittelalterlichen China von Kumārajīva (344–413) bis Chi-tsang (549–623)*. PhD diss. Hamburg.
- LAFLEUR, William R. (1973, 1974): “Saigyō and the Buddhist value of nature”. In *History of Religions* 13.2: 93–128 (pt. I) and 13.3: 227–248 (pt. II).
- LAI, Whalen (1990): “The *Chan-ch'a ching*: Religion and Magic in Medieval China”. In *BUSWELL* 1990: 175–206.
- LAMOTTE, Étienne (1962): *L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti (Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa)*, traduit et annoté. Louvain: Publications universitaires, Institut Orientaliste.
- (1949–1980): *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu des Sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra)*, 5 vols. Louvain-la-Neuve 1949 (I-II), 1970 (III), 1976 (IV), 1980 (V).
- LANGER, Rita (2001): *Das Bewusstsein als Träger des Lebens*. Einige weniger beachtete Aspekte des *viññāna* im Pāli-Kanon. Wien (WSrTB 52).
- DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Louis (1928, 1929): *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang*. Paris: Paul Geuthner 1928 (vol. I), 1929 (vol. II).
- LIN Li-kouang (1949): *L'Aide-mémoire de la Vraie Loi (Saddharma-smṛty-upasthāna-sūtra)*. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve.
- LINDTNER, Christian (1982): *Nāgārjuniana*. Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag.
- (1984): “Bhavya's Controversy with Yogācāra in the Appendix to *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter XXV”. In: Louis LIGETI (ed.): *Tibetan and Buddhist Studies*, Commemorating the 200<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Kőrös, vol. 2, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó: 77–97.



- (1997): “*Cittamātra* in Indian Mahāyāna until Kamalaśīla”. In *WZKS* 41: 159–206.
- LIU, Ming-Wood (1982): “The Doctrine of the Buddha-Nature in the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra*”. In *JIABS* 5.2: 63–94.
- (1984): “The Problem of the *Ichchantika* in the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra*”. In: *JIABS* 7.1: 57–81.
- (1985a): “The Yogācāra and Mādhyamika interpretations of the Buddha-nature concept in Chinese Buddhism”. In *Philosophy East and West* 35.2: 171–193.
- (1985b): “The mind-only teaching of Ching-ying Hui-yüan: An early interpretation of Yogācāra thought in China”. In *Philosophy East and West* 35.4: 351–376.
- MAGNIN, Paul (1979): *La vie et l'œuvre de Huisi* 慧思. Paris: École Française d'Extrême-Orient.
- MAITHRIMURTHI, Mudagamuwe (1999): *Wohllullen, Mitleid, Freude und Gleichmut*. Eine ideengeschichtliche Untersuchung der vier *apramāṇas* in der buddhistischen Ethik und Spiritualität von den Anfängen bis hin zum frühen Yogācāra. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
- MATHES, Klaus-Dieter (2008): *A Direct Path to the Buddha Within*. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
- MATSUDA, Kazunobu (1996, ed.): *Two Sanskrit Manuscripts of the Daśabhūmikasūtra Preserved at the National Archives, Kathmandu*. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko.
- MATSUMOTO, Shiro 松本史朗 (1994): *Zen shisō no hihanteki kenkyū* 禅思想の批判的研究. Tokyo: Daizō shuppan.
- (2000): *Dōgen shisō ron* 道元思想論. Tokyo: Daizō shuppan.
- (2002): “Critiques of Tathāgatarbha Thought and Critical Buddhism”. In: *Komazawa daigaku bukkyō gakubu ronshū* 駒沢大学仏教学部論集 33: 1–19 (rl 378–360).
- MCMAHAN, David L. (2002): *Empty Vision. Metaphor and Visionary Imagery in Mahāyāna Buddhism*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.

- MCRAE, John R. (1983): "The Ox-head School of Chinese Ch'an Buddhism: From Early Ch'an to the Golden Age". In GIMELLO & GREGORY 1983: 169–252.
- (1986): *The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch'an Buddhism*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- (1987): "Shen-hui and the Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment in Early Ch'an Buddhism". In: Peter N. GREGORY (ed.): *Sudden and Gradual. Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1987: 227–278.
- MEISIG, Konrad (1987): *Das Śrāmaṇyaphala-sūtra*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
- METTE, Adelheid (1991): *Durch Entsagung zum Heil*. Eine Anthologie aus der Literatur der Jaina. Zürich: Benziger.
- (2007): "Entsorgung (*pariṭṭhavaṇa-vihi*) im Alten Indien: Einige Bestimmungen zum Schutze des Lebens aus den Ordensregeln der Jaina-Mönche". In *BIS* 18: 111–126.
- MIRONOV, N.D. (1914): *Catalogue of Indian Manuscripts at Leningrad*. St. Petersburg.
- MIYAMOTO Shōson 宮本正尊 (1961): "'Sōmoku kokudo shikkai jōbutsu' no busshōronteki igi to sono sakusha" 「草木國土悉皆成佛」の佛性論的意義とその作者. In *IBK* 18 [9.2]: 672–701.
- MIZUTANI Kōshō 水谷幸正 (1956): "Busshō ni tsuite" 佛性について. In *IBK* 4.2 [8]: 550–553.
- MOCHIZUKI Shinkō (1946): *Bukkyō kyōten seiritsushiron* 仏教經典成立史論. Kyoto: Hōzōkan.
- MORI Mariko 森 真理子 (2005): "Shishō ni tsuite: yoni to jarāyuja no kaishaku wo chūshin ni" 四生について: yoni と jarāyuja の解釈を中心に. In *Komazawa daigaku bukkō gakubu ronshū* 駒澤大學佛教學部論集 36: 167–198 (rl 332–301).
- MULLER, A. Charles (1999): *The Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment: Korean Buddhism's Guide to Meditation*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

- NAKAJIMA Ryūzō 中島隆蔵 (1983): “Kichizō no sōmoku jōbutsu shisō” 吉蔵の草木成仏思想. In: KANAYA Osamu 金谷治 (ed.): *Chūgoku ni okeru ningensei no tankyū* 中国における人間性の探究. Tokyo: Sōbunsha 創文社: 385–404.
- NAKAMURA Hajime 中村元 (1988): *Zusetsu bukkyō-go daijiten* 図説佛教語大辞典. Tokyo: Tōkyō shoseki 東京書籍.
- NAMAI Chishō 生井智紹 (1995): “svacittādhiṣṭhāna ni tsuite: Kegonkyō ni okeru bodaishin-setsu to iu kanten kara” 〈svacittādhiṣṭhāna〉について — 『華嚴經』における〈菩提心〉説という観点から. In *IBK* 43.2 [86]: 177–185 (r1°876–868).
- NATTIER, Jan (2003): “The Indian Roots of Pure Land Buddhism: Insights from the Oldest Chinese Versions of the *Larger Sukhāvativyūha*”. In *Pacific World*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Series 5: 179–201.
- (2005): “The Proto-History of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*: The *Pusa benye jing* 菩薩本業經 and the *Dousha jing* 兜沙經”. In: *ARIRIAB* 8: 323–360.
- (2007): “Indian Antecedents of Huayan Thought: New Light from Chinese Sources”. In: *HAMAR* 2007a: 109–138.
- NG, Yu-kwan (1993): *T’ien-t’ai Buddhism and Early Mādhyamika*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- NORMAN, K.R. (1969, 1971): *Elders’ Verses* I, II, London: PTS.
- (1992): *Collected Papers*, III. Oxford: PTS.
- (1997): *A Philological Approach to Buddhism*. London: School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London).
- NUGTEREN, Albertina (2005): *Belief, Bounty, and Beauty*. Rituals around Sacred Trees in India. Leiden, Boston: Brill.
- OBERLIES, Thomas (2001): *Pāli*. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter.
- (2005): “Der Gandharva und die drei Tage währende ‘Quarantäne’”. In *Indo-Iranian Journal* 48: 97–109.
- OBEYESEKERE, Gananath (2006): *Karma and Rebirth. A Cross Cultural Study*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- OGATA Sohaku (1991): *The Transmission of the Lamp. Early Masters*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Wakefield, New Hampshire: Longwood Academic.

- OGAWA Ichijō 小川一乗 (1963): “‘Busshō’ to *buddhatva*” 「佛性」と *buddhatva*. In *IBK* 11.2 [22]: 544–545.
- OGAWA Takashi 小川隆 et al. (2006): “Kanazawa bunko *Shōbōgenzō* no yakuchū kenkyū” 金沢文庫本『正法眼蔵』の訳注研究 (5). In *Komazawa daigaku Zen kenkyūjo nenpō* 駒澤大学禅研究所年報 17: 57–96.
- OHIRA, Suzuko (1980–1981): “The Main Features of Mahāvīra’s Contributions”. In: *Sambodhi* 9: 56–68.
- OKADA Mamiko 岡田 真美子 (1998): “Bukkyō setsuwa ni okeru ekoparadaimu: Bukkyō setsuwa bunken no sōmoku-kan to kankyō rinri” 仏教説話におけるエコパラダイム 仏教説話文献の草木観と環境倫理 (“Ecoparadigm in Buddhist Narrative Literature: Plants and Trees and Ecoethics”). In *IBK* 93 [47.1]: 226–230 (rl 285–281).
- (1999): “Bukkyō ni okeru kankyō-kan no hen’yō” 仏教における環境観の変容 (“Die Veränderung der Umweltanschauung im Buddhismus”). In *Himeji Kōgyō daigaku kankyō ningen gakubu kenkyū hōkoku* 姫路工業大学環境人間学部研究報告 1: 105–109.
- (2002): “Tō-Ajiateki kankyō shisō toshite no shitsu u busshō ron” 東アジア的環境思想としての悉有仏性論. In: *Tō-Ajia bukkyō — sono seiritsu to hatten: Kimura Kiyotaka hakase kanreki kinen ronshū* 東アジア仏教 — その成立と発展: 木村清孝博士還暦記念論集. Tokyo: Shunjūsha: 355–370.
- OKUNO Mitsuyoshi 奥野光賢 (2002): *Busshō shisō no tenka: Kichizō wo chūshin to shita Hokkeron juyōshi* 仏性思想の展開: 吉蔵を中心とした『法華論』受容史. Tokyo: Daizō shuppan.
- OLIVELLE, Patrick (1996): *Upaniṣads*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
- OMINE Akira (1987): “Probing the Japanese Experience of Nature”. In *Chanoyu Quarterly* 51: 7–32.
- ŌTAKE Susumu (2007): “On the Origin and Early Development of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka-sūtra*”. In *HAMAR* 2007a: 87–107.
- PAGEL, Ulrich (1995): *The Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. Tring, U.K.: The Institute of Buddhist Studies.

- PANGLUNG, Jampa Losang (1981): *Die Erzählstoffe des Mūlasarvāstivāda-Vinaya, Analysiert auf Grund der tibetischen Übersetzung*. Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library.
- PAS, Julian (1995): *Visions of Sukhāvātī. Shan-Tao's Commentary on the Kuan Wu-Liang-Shou-Fo Ching*. Albany: SUNY.
- PAUL, Diana (1984): *Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China*. Paramārtha's 'Evolution of Consciousness'. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- PENKOWER, Linda L. (1993): *T'ien-t'ai During the T'ang Dynasty: Ch'an-jan and the Sinification of Buddhism*. PhD diss. Columbia University.
- PLASSEN, Jörg (1997): "Some Problems in Understanding Jizang: The Buddha-Nature of the Insentient". In *Studies in Central & East Asian Religions* 10: 1–16.
- (2002): *Die Spuren der Abhandlung (Lun-chi). Exegese und Übung im San-lun des sechsten Jahrhunderts*. PhD diss. Hamburg.
- (2007): "Some Remarks on the Authorship of the *Ilśūng Pōpkyedo*". In HAMAR 2007a: 261–280.
- PREISENDANZ, Karin: *Studien zu Nyāyasūtra III.1 mit dem Nyāyatattvāloka Vācaspatimīśras II*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
- PULLEYBLANK, Edwin G. (1991): *Lexicon of Reconstructed Pronunciation in Early Middle Chinese, Late Middle Chinese, and Early Mandarin*. Vancouver: UBD Press.
- RAMBELL, Fabio (2001): *Vegetal Buddhas*. Kyoto: Scuola Italiana di Studi sull'Asia Orientale.
- RAMERS, Peter (1996): *Die "Drei Kapitel über die Sittlichkeit" im Śrāmanyaphalasūtra*. PhD diss. Bonn.
- ROTH, Gustav (1983): *Mallī-jñāta*. Das achte Kapitel des Nāyadhammakahāo im sechsten Aṅga des Śvetāmbara Jainakanons. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
- SAKAMOTO Yukio 坂本幸男 (1959a): "Hijō ni okeru busshō no umu ni tsuite: Toku ni Tannen, Chōkan wo chūshin to shite" 非情に於ける佛性の有無について: 特に湛然・澄觀を中心として. In *IBK* 14 [7.2]: 416–425. Repr. in SAKAMOTO 1980: 384–396).

- (1959b): “Sōmoku jōbutsu ni tsuite” 草木成仏について. In *Ōsaki gaku-hō* 大崎学報 109:15–21. Repr. in SAKAMOTO 1980: 413–418.
- (1960a): “On the ‘Attainment of Buddhahood by Trees and Plants’”. In: *Proceedings of the IXth International Congress for the History of Religions (1958)*. Tokyo: Maruzen: 415–422. Repr. in SAKAMOTO 1980: xvii–xxiii.
- (1960b): “Sōmoku jōbutsu no Nihonteki tenkai” 草木成仏の日本的展開. In: *Nakano kyōju koki kinen ronbunshū* 中野教授古稀記念論文集. Repr. in SAKAMOTO 1980: 397–412.
- (1964): *Kegon kyōgaku no kenkyū* 華嚴教學の研究. Tokyo: Heirakuji shoten (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.; 1<sup>st</sup> ed.: 1956).
- (1980): *Daijō bukkyō no kenkyū* 大乘仏教の研究. Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha (Sakamoto Yukio ronbunshū 坂本幸男論文集, vol. 2).
- SAKAMOTO-GOTŌ, Junko (2005): “Pāli *thīna-middha*-, amg. *thīṇagiddhi-/thīṇaddhi*- und ved. *mardh/mṛdh*”. In: Günter SCHWEIGER (ed.): *Indogermanica*. Festschrift Gert Klingenschmitt. Tübingen: Schweiger VWT-Verlag: 167–192.
- SCHERRER-SCHAUB, Cristina Anna (1991): *Yuktiśaṣṭikāvṛtti*. Commentaire à la soixantaine sur le raisonnement ou Du vrai enseignement de la causalité par le maître Candrakīrti. Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises.
- SCHLINGLOFF, Dieter (1962, 1963): *Die Religion des Buddhismus*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1962 (vol. I), 1963 (vol. II).
- (1963): “Zur Interpretation des *Prātimokṣasūtra*”. In *ZDMG* 113: 536–551.
- SCHMIDT, Hanns-Peter (1968): “The Origin of *Ahimsā*”. In: *Mélanges d’Indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou*. Paris: Éditions E. de Boccard: 625–655.
- (1978): “Indo-Iranian Mitra Studies: The State of the Central Problem”. In: *Études mithriaques. Acta Iranica*: 346–393.
- (1980): “Ancient Iranian Animal Classification”. In *StII* 5–6: 209–244.
- SCHMITHAUSEN, Lambert (1969): *Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmiḥ*. Wien: ÖAW. [I take the opportunity

- to add that in # II.2 of the text (p. 58, last line) *nor gyi rang bzhin can* (Chin. 物類, cf. also T 30.1579: 862c27, Tj P 'i 368b6 *dbyig tu gyur pa*) corresponds to *dravyajātīya*, for which see *SWTF* s.v.].
- (1971): “Philologische Bemerkungen zum Ratnagotravibhāga”. In *WZKS* 15: 123–177.
  - (1973): “Spirituelle Praxis und philosophische Theorie im Buddhismus”. In *Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft* 57.3: 161–186.
  - (1991a): *The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism*. Tokyo: IBS (Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series VI).
  - (1991b): *Buddhism and Nature*. Enlarged Version with Notes, Tokyo: IBS (Studia Philologica Buddhica, Occasional Paper Series VII).
  - (1995a): “Mensch, Tier und Pflanze und der Tod in den älteren Upaniṣaden. In: Gerhard OBERHAMMER (ed.): *Im Tod gewinnt der Mensch sein Selbst*. Wien: Verlag der ÖAW: 43–74.
  - (1995b): “Man, Animals and Plants in the Rebirth Passages of the Early Upaniṣads”. In *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Sri Lanka*, New Series vol. 38 (Colombo): 141–162.
  - (1997a): “The Early Buddhist Tradition and Ecological Ethics”. In *Journal of Buddhist Ethics* 4: 1–74.
  - (1997b): *Maitrī and Magic: Aspects of the Buddhist Attitude Toward the Dangerous in Nature*. Wien: ÖAW 1997.
  - (1999): “Heilsvermittelnde Aspekte der Natur im Buddhismus”. In: Gerhard OBERHAMMER, Marcus SCHMÜCKER (eds.): *Raum-zeitliche Vermittlung der Transzendenz. Zur “sakramentalen” Dimension religiöser Traditionen*. Wien: Verlag der ÖAW: 229–262.
  - (2000): “A Note on the Origin of Ahimsā”. In: Ryutaro TSUCHIDA and Albrecht WEZLER (eds.): *Harānandalaharī*. Volume in Honour of Professor Minoru Hara on his Seventieth Birthday. Reinbek: Dr. Inge Wezler: 253–282.
  - (2007a): “Aspects of Spiritual Practice in Early Yogācāra”. In *Journal of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies* (Tokyo) 11: 213–244.

- (2007b): “Problems with the Golden Rule in Buddhist Texts”. In: Birgit KELLNER et al. (eds.): *Pramāṇakīrtiḥ*. Papers Dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner on the Occasion of His 70<sup>th</sup> Birthday. Wien (WStTB 70): 795–824.
- SCHMITHAUSEN, Lambert, and Mudagamuwe MAITHRIMURTHI (1998): “Attitudes Towards Animals in Indian Buddhism”. In: Nalini BALBIR et Georges-Jean PINAULT (eds.): *Penser, dire et représenter l’animal dans le monde indien*. Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion 2009: 47–121 [on p. 53, read *avacchinna* for *avi*<sup>o</sup>].
- SCHOENING, Jeffrey D. (1995): *The Śālistamba Sūtra and Its Indian Commentaries*. Wien (WStTB 35).
- SCHOPEN, Gregory (1997): *Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- SCHUBRING, Walter (1935): *Die Lehre der Jainas*. Berlin, Leipzig.
- SCHULER, Barbara (2009): *Of Death and Birth. Icakkiyamman, a Tamil Goddess, in Ritual and Story*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz (Ethno-Indology. Heidelberg Studies in South Asian Rituals, Vol. 8).
- SEYFORTH RUEGG, David (1969): *La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra*. Études sur la Sotériologie et la Gnoséologie du Bouddhisme. Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient.
- (1973): *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub*. Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient.
- (1976): “The Meanings of the Term *Gotra* and the Textual History of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*”. In *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 39: 341–363.
- (1989): *Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective*. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
- SHARF, Robert H. (2002): *Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism. A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press.



- SHIH, Heng-ching (1994): *The Sūtra on Upāsaka Precepts*. Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translations and Research (BDK English Tripiṭaka 45-II).
- SHIH, Robert (1968): *Biographies des moines éminents (Kao seng tchouan) de Houei-kiao*, Louvain.
- SHIMODA Masahiro 下田正弘 (1990): "Tō-Ajia bukkyō no kairitsu no tokushoku: Nikujiki kinshi no yurai wo megutte" 東アジア仏教の戒律の特色: 肉食禁止の由来をめぐって. In *TGK* 29.4: 98-110.
- (1993): *Zōbun wayaku Daijōnehangyō* 藏文和訳『大乘涅槃經』 (An Annotated Japanese Translation of the Tibetan Version of the *Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*) I, Tokyo: Sankibo.
- (1997): *Nehangyō no kenkyū. Daijō kyōten no kenkyūhōhō shiron* 涅槃經の研究. 大乘經典の研究 方法試論 (A Study of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, with a Focus on the Methodology of the Study of *Mahāyānasūtras*). Tokyo: Shunjūsha.
- SHINKAWA Tetsuo 新川哲雄 (1992): *Annen no hijō jōbutsu gi kenkyū* 安然の非情成仏義研究. Tokyo: Gakushūin Daigaku.
- SHINODA Masashige 篠田真成 (1963): "Busshō to sono gengo" 佛性とその原語. In *IBK* 11.1 [21]: 223-226.
- SHIRATO Waka 白土わか (1998): "Sōmoku jōbutsu setsu ni tsuite: Sono keisei to tenkai" 草木成仏説について — その形成と展開. In *Bukkyō-gaku seminā* 仏教學セミナー 69: 14-32.
- SHIVELY, Donald H. (1957): "Buddhahood for the Nonsentient: A Theme in Nō Plays". In *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 20.1-2: 135-161.
- SIMS-WILLIAMS, Nicholas (1985): "The Manichean Commandments: A Survey of the Sources". In: *Acta Iranica* 25 (Hommages et Opera Minora, vol. XI: Papers in Honour of Professor Mary Boyce). Leiden: E.J. Brill: 573-582.
- SNELGROVE, David (1987): *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism*. London: Serindia Publications.
- SOBISCH, Jan-Ulrich (2005): "Bemerkungen zur Vorgeschichte und Weihe des Buches im Buddhismus und zur materiellen Kultur des Buches in

- Tibet". In: Wulf KÖPKE and Bernd SCHMELZ (eds.): *Die Welt des tibetischen Buddhismus*. Hamburg: Museum für Völkerkunde: 99–131.
- SRINIVASAN, S.A. (2007): *Nonviolence and Holistically Environmental Ethics*. Gropings While Reading Samyadivākaravāmaṇamuṇi on Nīlakēci. Berlin: Lit (Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Süd- und Zentralasiens, 1).
- STACHE-ROSEN, Valentina (1968): *Das Saṅgītisūtra und sein Kommentar Saṅgītiparyāya*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
- STEDE, Wilhelm (1914): *Die Gespenstergeschichten des Peta Vatthu*. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz.
- STONE, Jacqueline I. (1999): *Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- SUEKI, Fumihiko 末木文美士 (1991): *Annen, Genshin* 安然, 源信 (*Daijō butten* 大乘仏典, Chūgoku Nippon hen 中国日本篇 19). Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha.
- (1995a): *Heian shoki bukkō shisō no kenkyū* 平初期仏教思想の研究 (Studies of Buddhism during the early Heian period). Tokyo: Shunjūsha.
- (1995b): "Two Seemingly Contradictory Aspects of the Teaching of Innate Enlightenment in Medieval Japan". In *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 22.1–2: 3–16.
- (2001): "How Can Grasses and Trees Attain Buddhahood? An Aspect of the Japanization of Buddhism" In: *An Anthology of East Asian Buddhism*: A Commemorative Volume in Honor of Ven. Sheng-yen on His 70<sup>th</sup> Birthday. Tokyo: Sankibo: 73–92.
- SYED, Renate (1990): *Die Flora Altindiens in Literatur und Kunst*, PhD diss. München.
- TADA Kōryū 多田厚隆 et al. (1995): *Tendai hongakuron* 天台本覚論. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.; 1<sup>st</sup> ed.: 1973).
- TAGUCHI Hideaki 田口秀明 (1997): "Kegonkyō Nyūhokkaibon ni okeru jinben, kaji ni tsuite" 『華嚴經』「入法界品」における神変、加持について. In *Mikkyō bunka* 密教文化 198: 26–42 (r197–81).

- TAKAKUSU, J. (1966): *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago* by I-tsing (transl.). Reprint Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal (original ed. London: Clarendon Press 1896).
- TAKASAKI Jikidō 高崎直道 (1966): *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra)*. Rome: Is.M.E.O.
- (1974): *Nyoraizō shisō no keisei* 如来蔵思想の形成. Tokyo: Shunjū-sha.
- (1987): “Textual Problems of the *Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda*”, in: *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 68: 413–424.
- (1998): “Mujōseppō-kō” 〈無情説法〉考. In *IBK* 93 [47.1]: 1–11.
- TAKASAKI Jikido and KASHIWAGI Hiroo 柏木弘雄 (2005): *Busshōron, Daijōkishinron* 仏性論, 大乘起信論. Tokyo: Daizō shuppan.
- TAKEMURA Makio 竹村牧男 (1985): *Daijōkishinron dokushaku* 大乘起信論読釈. Tokyo: Sankibo.
- TAMAKI Kōshirō 玉城康四朗 (1989): “*Yuishin-ge to zenjinkakuteki shi'i*” 唯心偈と全人格の思惟. In *Nantō bukyō* 南東佛教 61/62: 25–48.
- TATSUGUCHI Myōsei 龍口明生 (2009): “*Ritsu bunken ni mirareru shizen-kan*” 律文献に見られる自然観 (“A View on Nature in the Vinaya Texts”). In *Shūkyō kenkyū* 宗教研究 (*Journal of Religious Studies*) 359: 195–196.
- THIEME, Paul (1971): *Kleine Schriften*, ed. G. BUDDRUSS, Wiesbaden.
- TOKIWA Gishin 常盤義伸 and YANAGIDA Seizan 柳田聖山 (1976): *Zekkan ron: Eibun yakuchū, gembun kōtei, kokuyaku* 絶観論: 英訳註・原文校定・国訳. Kyoto: Zen bungaku kenkyūjo. (Not accessible to me).
- TOKIYA Kōki 釋舎幸紀 (1985): “*Kompon-setsuissaiu-bu ni inyō sareru Mujōkyō*” 根本説一切有部に引用される無常経. In *IBK* 67 [34.1]: 168–173.
- TSUCHIYA Taisuke 土屋太祐 (2008): “*Hyakujō Ekai no ‘sanku’ no shisō ni tsuite*” 百丈懷海の「三句」の思想について. In *IBK* 116 [57.1]: 57–60 (rl 516–513).
- UNGER, Ulrich: *Grundbegriffe der altchinesischen Philosophie*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2000.
- VETTER, Tilmann (1988): *The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism*. Leiden, etc.: E.J. Brill 1988.

- (2000): *The 'Khandha Passages' in the Vinayaṭṭaka and the four main Nikāyas*. Wien: ÖAW.
- (2001): "Once Again on the Origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism". In *WZKS* 45: 59–90.
- (2004): "Der Bodhisattva-Weg im *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*". In: *Buddhismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart* IX: 61–78 (accessible in the internet under <http://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de>).
- VIENNOT, Odette (1954): *Le culte de l'arbre*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- VOGEL, Claus, and Klaus WILLE (1996): "The Final Leaves of the Pravrajyāvastu Portion of the Vinayavastu Manuscript Found Near Gilgit. Part 1: Saṃgharakṣitāvadāna". In: Grigorij M. BONGARD-LEVIN et al.: *Sanskrit-Texte aus dem buddhistischen Kanon: Neuentdeckungen und Neueditionen, dritte Folge*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 241–296.
- WALDSCHMIDT, Ernst (1967): *Von Ceylon bis Turfan*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- WANGCHUK, Dorji (2007): *The Resolve to Become a Buddha. A Study of the Bodhiṇitta Concept in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism*. Tokyo: IIBS.
- WATANABE Mariko 渡邊 麻里子 (2008): "Tendai-sō Sonshun ni okeru sōmoku jōbutsu setsu" 天台僧尊舜における草木成佛説. In *Tōyō no Shisō to Shūkyō* 東洋の思想と宗教 25: 62–82.
- WATANABE Shōko (1977): "Adhiṣṭhāna (kaji) no bunkengakuteki shiron" 「Adhiṣṭhāna (加持) の文献学的試論」. In *NarK* 2: 1–91.
- WEZLER, Albrecht (1981): "Studien zum Dvādaśāranayacakra des Śvetāmbara Mallavādin. I. Der *Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*". In: Klaus BRUHN and Albrecht WEZLER (eds.): *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus*. Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner: 359–408.
- (1987a): "Remarks on the *Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*". In: *Philosophical Essays. Professor Anantlal Thakur Felicitation Volume*. Calcutta: 166–181.
- (1987b): "On the term *antaḥsaṃjñā*". In *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 68: 111–131.

- (1992a): “Paralipomena zum Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda II. On the Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda and its Relation to the Vṛkṣāyurveda”. In *StII* 16-17 (1992): 287–315.
- (1992b): “Sanskrit *prāṇabhṛt* or what supports what?”. In: A.W. VAN DEN HOEK, D.H.A. KOLFF, M.S. OORT (eds.): *Ritual, State and History in South Asia*. Essays in Honour of J.C. Heesterman. Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Brill 1992: 393–413.
- (1994): “A Note on Sanskrit *bhrūṇa*, and *bhrūṇahatyā*”. In: Nalini BALBIR und Joachim K. BAUTZE (eds.): *Festschrift Klaus Bruhn*. Reinbek: Dr. Inge Wezler 1994: 623–646.
- WILLIAMS, Paul (1989): *Mahāyāna Buddhism*. London, New York: Routledge.
- WITZEL, Michael, and Toshifumi GOTŌ (2007): *Rig-Veda. Das Heilige Wissen*. Frankfurt am Main, Leipzig: Verlag der Weltreligionen.
- WODILLA, Paul (1928): *Niedere Gottheiten des Buddhismus. Dargestellt auf Grund der Jātakas*. PhD diss. Erlangen: Junge & Sohn.
- YAGI, Toru (2007): “*Satyādhiṣṭhāna* Reconsidered”. In: Karin PREISENDANZ (ed.): *Expanding and Merging Horizons*. Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass. Wien: ÖAW: 603–612.
- YAITA Hideomi 矢板秀臣 (1992): “Yugaron no inmyō: Bonbun tekisuto to wayaku” 瑜伽論の因明: 梵文テキストと和訳. In: *NarK* 15.II: 505–576.
- YAMABE, Nobuyoshi (1999): *The Sūtra on the Ocean-like Samādhi of the Visualization of the Buddha: The Interfusion of the Chinese and Indian Cultures in Central Asia as Reflected in a Fifth Century Apocryphal Sūtra*. PhD diss., Yale University.
- YAMAGUCHI Susumu 山口益 (1949): “Kegonkyō yuishiki-ge no Indoteki kunko” 華嚴經唯心偈の印度的訓詁. In *Ōtani gakuhō* 大谷学報 28.3-4: 1–30.
- YAMPOLSKY, Philip B. (1967): *The Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch*. New York, London: Columbia University Press.
- YANAGIDA Seizan 柳田聖山 (1971): *Zen no goroku* 禅の語録 2: Shoki no zen shi 初期の禅史 I. Tokyo: Chikuma shobō.

- (1990): *Sodōshū* 祖堂集 (*Daijō butten* 大乘仏典, Chūgoku Nippon hen 中国日本篇 13). Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha.
- YOSHIZU Yoshihide 吉津宜英 (1973): “Mujō busshō setsu no kōsatsu” 無情仏性説の考察. In *Komazawa daigaku shūgaku kenkyū* 駒沢大学宗学研究 15: 110–115.
- (1991): *Kegon ichijō shisō no kenkyū* 華嚴一乘思想の研究. Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha.
- YUYAMA, Akira (1979): *Systematische Übersicht über die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur (A Systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literature). Erster Teil: Vinaya-Texte*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
- (1981): *Sanskrit Fragments of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*. 1. Koyasan Manuscript. Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library (Studia Philologica Buddhica, Occasional Paper Series IV).
- (1996): “A Critical Survey of Philological Studies of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*”. In: Michael HAHN et al. (eds.): *Suhrlekhāh*. Festgabe für Helmut Eimer. Swisttal-Odendorf: Indica et Tibetica Verlag: 263–282.
- ZACCHETTI, Stefano (2000): *Fazang: Trattato sul leone d'oro*. Edizione critica e traduzione annotata a cura di Stefano Zacchetti. Padova: Esdra.
- ZHANG Wen-liang 張文良 (2008): “Chōkan ni okeru kū to busshō” 澄観における空と仏性. In: *IBK* 114 [56.2]: 672–678.
- ZIEME, Peter (1981): “Uigurische Steuerbefreiungsurkunden für buddhistische Klöster”. In *Altorientalische Forschungen* 8: 237–263.
- ZIMMERMANN, Michael (2002): *A Buddha Within: The Tathāgatagarbhāsūtra. The Earliest Exposition of the Buddha-Nature Teaching in India*. Tokyo: IRIAB.
- ZIN, Monika (2003): *Ajanta: Handbuch der Malereien, 2. Devotionale und ornamentale Malerei*, Vol. I: Interpretation. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

## Index

Unmarked references are to the paragraphs, those after "fn." to the footnotes. For further information see *Technical Remarks* (10).

- Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* fn. 2, 9, 65, 108, 166, 168f, 390, 400, 452, 713, 835, 954, 995 .
- Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* fn. 2, 167, 169, 516, 737
- Abhirati 132.1
- acetana* fn. 200, 226, 232, 291, 500, 713
- acquired (sc. matter): 19.1-2, 33.1; fn. 175. Cf. *upādinnā*
- adhi-muc* 132.2; fn. 624
- adhipati-phala* 19.2, 132.1
- adhiṣṭhāna*, *adhiṣṭhātī* 91f, 100, 105, 107.1, 108.1, 108.3.2, 112; fn. 2, 497, 505f, 528, 579, 589, 595, 627, 647, 681
- ādiśānta* 124
- Aggaññasutta* 132.1; fn. 116
- agriculture 139
- ahimsā* 166; fn. 5, 36, 1006, 1018; cf. fn. 1012
- Aitareyāranyaka* fn. 12
- Ajahn Chah 44
- ajāta* (sc. *paṭhavī*) 17
- Ājīvika 13
- ajjhatta*, *ajjhattika* fn. 108, 175
- ākāśakāya* 107.1; fn. 589
- Akṣayamatīnirdeśa* (AkṣNird) fn. 743
- Akṣobhya*, *Akṣobhyavyūha* 132.1
- akuśala*: see unwholesome
- ālayavijñāna* 75(b), 146(2); fn. 9, 409, 923f, 954
- all is (in) one: cf. 107.2.2; fn. 516, 606; cf. fn. 690
- all-pervading, all-pervasive(ness) 59, 65.1, 107.2.2, 108.3.2, 115, 126.2, 127.0+4, 129.3, 135, 146; fn. 315, 637, 673, 783, 877
- amalavijñāna* 126.1. Cf. *ti-chiu shih*
- Amitābha, Amitāyus 90, 98-100, 132.1, 145
- Anala (Gv) fn. 680
- Anderl, Christoph \*fn. 713, 827, 831, 992
- Anguttaranikāya* 40; \*fn. 69, 77-79, 126f, 131, 188, 197, 516, 734, 738, 836, 958
- animals: humans and a.s distinguished from plants 1, 4-6, 18, 33.3, 151; fn. 2; cf. fn. 12, 120, 219; a.s as living, animate beings 16.1, 157.1+3; fn. 362, 713; as mobile beings fn. 5, 90, 95; as subject to decrepitude 44.2; as an evil destiny 44.1, 100; a.s possess virtues 44.1; possess Buddha-nature 65.2, 115, 119; cf. 65.3; cf. fn. 233; a.s preach fn. 503; cf. 98-100; species or classes of a.s fn. 66, 126, 259; useful a.s 26; fn. 983; footless a.s 27; tiny/small a.s 17, 28.1-2, 158; fn. 53, 95, 262; cf. *khuddaka*; killing/injuring a.s 4-6, 11, 17, 28.2, 150, 156, 157.1+3, 158, 165; fn. 2, 53, 61f, 95, 99, 104, 118, 262; a. sacrifice 38; cf.

- 4; a.s taking revenge fn. 1006; a.s as object of *mettā* fn. 126f
- animate 1, 3, 5-7, 14, 16.3.3, 19.1, 26, 37, 47d, 48, 50-52.1, 157.3, 158; fn. 6, 60, 108, 112; cf. *pāṇa*, *prāṇin*
- anindriyabaddha* 31; fn. 112, 115, 175
- an-lo(-hsing)* 安樂(性) 63-65; fn. 524
- Annen 安然 (841? to ca. 890) 54, 90, 93, 94, 145, 146, 149.2-4, 161; fn. 519, 728, 783, 897, 1004
- antaḥsaṃjñā* fn. 175, 964
- antisubstantialism 124; fn. 285
- anubhāva*, *ānubhāva* 105; fn. 191, 217, 497, 568
- anupādiṇṇa(ka)* 19.2, 31.
- apada*, *apādaka* fn. 129, 131f.
- Cf. footless
- apadaruhā*, °*rohiṇī* 27
- appaharita* 28.1
- appāṇaka* 28.1
- apūrvasattva* 95; fn. 901
- Aramaki, Noritoshi \*fn. 588, 824
- arhat(s), arhatship 10.3, 31, 42, 44.1, 47-48, 124, 134; fn. 47, 233, 546, 712
- artefact(s) 116.2, 119, 149.5, 156, 160, fn. 190, 219, 1007; a.s preach 90; cf. 109. Cf. walls
- asaṃbheda*, °*bhinna* 91; fn. 528, 581f, 628, 637, 644, 666
- asañña-deva*, -*satta* 11, 21; fn. 60.
- Cf. unconscious heavenly beings
- Aśoka inscriptions 16.3.3 (fn. 93)
- atipāta* 5
- ātman* 75(b,c); fn. 92, 291, 315, 367, 369, 383, 391f
- atom(s) 108.2, 127.4(4); fn. 163f, 166, 576, 578, 583, 623, 698. Cf. *para-mānu*
- attachment(s) 10.2, 129.4, 130
- autonomous, autonomy 83, 113f; fn. 367, 572, 673, 875
- Awakening, Awaken(ed) \*10.3, 39, 43, 44.2, 47(b,d), 53.3-54, 59-62, 83f, 109, 116.1(d), 116.2; *Pt. II.B*; original Awakening 156; fn. 250; cf. *hongaku*; sudden A. 109; cf. 44.2; plants/environment drawn/pulled along into A. 116.1(e), 133, 145; fn. 904; cf. co-awakening; A. of plants equated with their life-cycle 147; individual A. of plants/in-sentients 70, 82, 89.3, 112, 115-117, 120-122, 126.2, 127.4(3,4), 128, 129.3.3, 130, 142, 144f, 146f, 149.4-5, 162
- Āyāraṅga 16.3.3; fn. 5, 66-67, 92, 94, 152, 312.
- aye jīvasaññī* fn. 89
- āyu(s)*: see life-span
- Āyusparivarta 63
- bahiddhā*, *bāhya* 31; fn. 2, 175, 713, 836
- Balbir, Nalini 8; \*fn. 60
- bamboo fn. 118; emerald b. 54, 129.2, 129(2, 3.1; 4), 138; fn. 812, 884, 977
- benevolence: 3, 7, 11, 23, 26-27, 94; fn. 126f, 219, 221, 674. Cf. *maitrī*
- Bhaddasāla-jātaka* 36-37; fn. 207, 213
- bhājanaloka* 80, 101, 115, 119; fn. 417.
- Cf. environment
- Bhavya, Bhāviveka 1, 74
- bhūnahu* 28.3
- bhūta* "creatures" 14; fn. 67f, 93-95; "spirits" fn. 25, 200 (*bh.-nivāsa*); "plants" 14; fn. 24, 66



- bhūtag(r)āma* 5, 14; fn. 25, 29, 94, 179  
*bhūtakoti* fn. 492, 857  
*bīja* 53.1.1, 53.2.2(a), 65.2; fn. 77, 153, 954; *b.-g(r)āma* 5  
birds 39, 150; fn. 81, 120, 221, 719;  
b.s in *Sukhāvati* 98-100;  
b.s incubating a clod or a fruit  
fn. 517  
bleeding (of plants) fn. 55  
bliss(ful) 63-65.3; fn. 524  
Blissful Land: see *Sukhāvati*  
*Bodaishin gi shō* 菩提心義抄 (T 75.  
2397) 146; fn. 308, 508, 519, 783,  
962  
*bodhi* 59-62, 129.1, 149.2; fn. 460,  
463, 748, 934.  
*bodhi tree* 43, 108.2; fn. 627;  
b. preaches: 108.3.2 (fn. 649, 651),  
109; fn. 545, 569.  
*Bodhicaryāvatāra* (BCA) fn. 232  
*bodhicitta* 53.4, 149.2; cf. fn. 968.  
Cf. resolve  
*bodhimaṇḍa* 108.3.2; fn. 333, 337  
*Bodhiruci* 70, 74, 76; fn. 397, 571,  
589, 753.  
*Bodhisatta*, *Bodhisattva* 9, 38f, 52.1,  
92; fn. 188, 191, 200, 222, 233  
*bodhisattva* \*53.1.1, 59-62, 72, 83, 91,  
94, 97; fn. 232, 289, 366, 506, 524,  
536; *Pt.IIA ch. 2.4*; \*134, 148(1);  
fn. 814, 839, 841, 868, 895, 926;  
b. path: 53.4; fn. 727; b. transform-  
ing himself into a tree, fish, etc.: 48,  
107.1(3), 108.1; fn. 41, 587f; *Vairo-*  
*cana* as a b. fn. 864.  
*Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BoBh) \*fn. 232,  
249, 269-271, 497, 506, 685  
borderline (beings, etc.) 7, 10.1+3, 11,  
34, 37, 40, 42, 50, 52.1, 165  
Bruhn, Klaus \*fn. 53  
Buddha: passim; true Buddha 78,  
81.3, 82, 89(2-3), 117.1; fn. 417;  
seeing the Buddha 82, 85, 87, 123.1;  
cf. fn. 474  
*Buddhabhadra* 74, 80, 83, 86, 90;  
101-102.2, 107.2.2-3, 108.2-3.1,  
135; fn. 397, 447, 474, 546, 556,  
566, 571, 589, 594, 601, 626, 637f,  
654, 683.  
*Buddhabhūmisūtra-upadeśa* 93;  
fn. 877  
Buddha-bodies, Buddha's body 91,  
108.3.1-3, 115, 116.1(b), 135, 137-  
142, 148(2), 153f; fn. 308, 507, 528,  
579, 981.  
*Buddhacarita* fn. 222, 235  
Buddha-element (*buddhadhātu*) 53.2.2,  
65.1-2; fn. 289.  
Buddha-eye 131, 141, 162  
Buddha-field(s) 97, 102.1(d), 105,  
107.1, 108.2, 108.3.2, 132.1, 134;  
fn. 432, 570, 578, 603, 642, 645.  
Cf. 'field(s)', *kṣetra*, pure world(s)  
*Buddhaghosa* 14, 19.2, 26, 28.3;  
fn. 123  
*buddhagotra* 53.1.1; cf. 53.3(3)  
*buddhakṛtya* 109. Cf. salvific activity  
*buddhakṣetra* fn. 432, 578, 841.  
Cf. Buddha-field(s)  
Buddha-Mind 57, 129.3.1  
Buddha-nature Immanence theory  
120.2; fn. 800f, 815  
Buddha-nature Manifestation theory  
120.2; fn. 724, 770, 801  
Buddha-nature: \*53; see *fo-hsing*; of  
insentients *Pt. IIA-B*  
*buddhānusr̥ṇī* fn. 674  
*Buddhāvataṃsaka* (BAv): *Pt.IIA ch.*  
*1.5, ch. 1.7, ch. 2.4, ch. 2.5*; \*57, 65.1,

- 97, 125, 129.3.1, 135, 137, 157.3;  
fn. 219, 264, 528, 742, 840f, 887;  
manuscript used by Buddhābhaddra  
108.2 (fn. 626); 'Chapter on Reli-  
gious Practice' *Pt. IIA ch. 1.5.3*;  
'Eulogies on Mount Sumeru' *Pt. IIA  
ch. 1.7*; 125; fn. 678; 'Suyāmagāthās'  
*Pt. IIA ch. 1.5.2*; fn. 678. Cf. *Daśa-  
bhūmika-sūtra*, *Gaṇḍa-vyūha*, *Loko-  
ttara-parivarta*, *Ratnolkadhāraṇī*,  
*Samantabhadracaryā-nirdeśa*.  
Butzenberger, Klaus \*fn. 5
- Candrakīrti 74  
*Carakasamhitā* fn. 713  
Central Asia 139, 157.2; fn. 320, 509,  
560.  
*cetana* 55; fn. 713; cf. 40 (*ceteyyūṃ*)  
*ch'an k'ê* 禪客 (Ch'an guest) 129.3.0-  
1; fn. 490, 804, 811, 822, 992  
Ch'an 禪 57, 90, 109, 129.1-4, 140, 153;  
fn. 120, 258, 298, 656, 977  
*ch'ang-chi-kuang t'u* 常寂光土 133  
Ch'ang-sha Ching-ts'en 長沙景岑  
fn. 823  
*ch'eng fo* 成佛 51, 116.1(c,e), 121;  
fn. 218, 305, 308, 341, 457, 697,  
832, 844, 889, 898, 905, 912, 939.  
Cf. *ts'ao-mu ch'eng fo*.  
*Ch'eng wei-shih lun* 成唯識論  
fn. 713, 877  
Ch'eng-kuan 澄觀 (738–839) 83, 101,  
102.1(c), 102.2, 103–106; 108.3.3,  
109, 111, 112, 116.1(d), 137;  
fn. 367, 400, 409, 436, 517, 547,  
753<sup>a</sup>, 868  
*ch'i (shih-chien)* 器(世間) 119; fn. 16,  
938. Cf. *bhājanaloka*, environment,  
*i-pao*
- Ch'ing kuan-yin ching shu* 請觀音經  
疏 (T 39.1800) fn. 35  
*ch'ing* 情 \*119, 129.1-4. Cf. 有情, 無情,  
非情  
Ch'ü-yüan 處元 (1030–1119) fn. 779  
Chan, Chi-wah fn. 779  
*Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* fn. 223  
Chan-jan 湛然 (711–782) 57, 85, 87,  
89, 119, 127.4(2-4), 128, 130; fn. 35,  
516, 520, 524, 759, 858, 900, 922;  
T 38.1778: 133 (fn. 849–851); T 46.  
1912 (*Fu-hsing* 輔行): \*fn. 727,  
773f, 866; T 46.1927: fn. 852  
*Chao-lun* 肇論 (T 45.1858) fn. 302,  
723  
*cheng(-pao)* 正(報): see *i(-pao)* 依(報).  
*chen-ju sui-yüan* 真如隨緣 116.1(e);  
cf. fn. 776, 875  
*chi-chü ching-yao* 積聚精要 149.2  
*chien-chüeh* 鑑覺 fn. 827  
*chih shih* 知時 129.4. Cf. seasons  
Chih-i 智顗 (538–597) 127.4(1),  
149.2-3; fn. 35, 425, 516, 526, 662,  
727<sup>a</sup>, 849; T 33.1716: fn. 368, 772f  
*Chih-kuan i-li* 止觀義例 (T 46.1913)  
fn. 779, 782, 852, 858; °*sui-shih* °隨  
釋, °*tsuan-yao* °纂要 fn. 779  
*chih-to* 質多 149.2; fn. 963, 971  
Chih-yen 智儼 (602–668) 116.1(a);  
fn. 710.  
Chih-yüan 智圓 (†1022) fn. 35, 783,  
852  
*ching-hsin* 淨心 146. Cf. Pure Mind  
*Ching-tê Ch'uan-teng lu* 景德傳燈錄  
(T 51.2076) fn. 490, 811, 823, 883,  
977, 992, 993, 995  
*Chin-kang-pei lun* 金剛鉈 (*Diamond  
Scalpel*, by Chan-jan: T 46.1932) 57,

- 119, 127.4(2-4); fn. 465, 470f, 475-477, 727, 759, 852, 922
- Chi-tsang 吉藏 (549-623) 57-59, 62, 63, 65.0, 66, 67, 69-71, 84, 89, 119, 127.3-4, 129.3.3, 130; fn. 258, 271, 272, 303, 463, 524; Ch.'s commentaries on VñN: 83 (fn. 463f)
- chrysanthemums 54, 129(2, 3.1, 4); fn. 977
- Chuang-tzŭ 莊子 fn. 723
- Chüeh-kuan lun 絕觀論 119, 129.1, 129.3.2-3, 130, 153(1)
- Chu-hung 株宏 (1535-1615) fn. 120
- Chūjin 忠尋 (1065-1138) 149.1
- chung-tao 中道 fn. 772, 773, 779, 848. Cf. Middle Way
- Chung-yin-ching 中陰經 54, 143, 145
- Chūsan 仲算 (10<sup>th</sup> cent.) fn. 909
- citta 68, 75, 79, 81.3, 83, 113, 123.2, 149.2-3; fn. 371, 409, 589, 963, 968; c. compared to a painter 77, 79; fn. 432; c. is *prakṛti-prabhāsvara*, 123.2, 126.1; cf. 76; fn. 339; c. in animals fn. 12; c. in plants: cf. *Pt. IIB ch. 2*; c. not in plants fn. 88, 500. Cf. *ekacitta*, *hsin* 心, mind, *viññāna*, sentience.
- cittamātra 71-76; fn. 753
- cittapariṇāma 75(c), fn. 844. Cf. transformation (of mind)
- cittatathatā fn. 751
- cittotpāda 149.2; fn. 605. Cf. *fa-hsin*, resolve
- clay fn. 32, 500
- co-awakening 145, 162; fn. 883, 909, 1004; cf. fn. 308
- comparisons \*60-62, 77, 79f, 113, 129.4; methodological problems: 20, 30f, 41, 44.1, 49, 88; fn. 417, 421, 426, 430, 588
- compassion, compassionate 10.3, 28.2, 36, 39, 48; fn. 250, 510, 516
- consciousness 1, 10.2, 16.3.1-2, 34, 53.2.3, 55, 66, 68-70, 75(b), 97, 127.2, 149.3-4; fn. 12, 60, 120, 371, 713, 816, 891, 923f, 982. Cf. *viññāna*, *citta*, mind, *saṃjñā*
- contact 10.2, 29, 33.3, 34, 104(3). Cf. *phassa*
- Contemplation Sūtra: 99f; fn. 863
- corpse 152; fn. 8, 291
- cosmic Buddha 116.1(e), 142, 157.3, 162; c. body of the Buddha / Vairocana 107.2.3(3), 108.3.3, 139-142, 162; cf. 153f; of Kṛṣṇa fn. 689; c. Mind 123.2; c. *maṇḍala* 148(2); c. Man fn. 894
- cotton [wool/seeds] 28.2
- cutting, cutting off (plants, trees, leaves, etc.) 4, 9, 13, 16.3.1, 28.3, 36, 44.1, 48, 139, 150-158, 165; \*fn. 2, 5, 8, 21, 24, 35, 55, 61f, 87, 102, 120, 185, 190, 205, 291, 526, 919. Cf. felling
- Dānapāla fn. 16, 260
- Daśabhūmikasūtra (DBhS) *Pt. IIA ch. 15.1*; 71f, 105(3), 107.1(1,2), 107.2.2, 108.1, 112, 114; fn. 497, 528, 546, 560, 568, 673, 679, 753
- Daśabhūmi-vyākhyāna (DBhVy) 75
- Dasaveyāliya (Dasav) 16.3.3; fn. 95, 1014
- decorum (ascetic d.) 28.1, 28.3, 157.3
- defilement(s) 53.1.2, 53.2.2(a), 62, 69, 123.2, 126.1, 127.3; fn. 177
- Deleanu, Florin fn. 540, 827

- deluded thoughts 129.1, 129.3.3, 129.4, 162; cf. 149.5 (fn. 973); fn. 250, 713
- descriptive passages (methodological aspects) 29, 31, 34, 49
- Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā* (Dhp-a) \*fn. 191
- Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (Dhs) fn. 113f, 175
- dharmadhātu* 53.1.2, 81.3, 82, 135, 140; fn. 289, 492, 505, 579, 627, 637, 639, 641, 710, 754, 785, 868
- Dharmadhātu-prakṛty-asambheda-nirdeśa* 90; *Pt. IIA ch. 2.1*; 165, 122.1
- dharmadhātuśārīratā* (of the Tathāgatas) fn. 654
- Dharmaguptakas: see *Vinaya*
- dharma-kāya* 53.3-54, 65.1-2, 107.2.3, 108.3.1-3, 111, 115, 116.1, 119, 129.2-3.1, 130, 133, 135-138, 140f, 142, 148(2); cf. 123.1; fn. 289, 434, 620, 754, 812, 977, 995; preaching of the *dh.k.* 141; cf. 108.3.2. Cf. *Vairocana*
- Dharmakṣema 53.2.2-3, 62-65.3, 94; fn. 271
- Dharmarakṣa fn. 397, 400, 571, 593, 693, 713<sup>a</sup>
- dharmaśārīra(garbha)* 107.2.3
- Dharmaskandha* (DhSk) fn. 65
- dharmatā* 57, 85, 105(2), 107.2.3(1), 127.1, 133f; fn. 423, 446, 673, 754; *dhū-citta* fn. 751
- dhātu* \*53.0, 53.2.1-2
- Diamond Scalpel* see *Chin-kang-pei lun*
- digging 15, 16.3.2, 17, 153(3), 157.3, 158, 163; fn. 8, 36, 87, 291
- Dīghanikāya* 4, 26, 39, 132.1; fn. 24f, 60, 65, 68, 81, 92, 116, 121, 123, 153, 229, 578, 736-741.
- Dīrghāgama* fn. 22, 25, 121
- Divyāvadāna* (Divy) fn. 121, 259, 526, 578
- doctrinal debate 155
- Dōgen 道元 (1200-1253) fn. 812, 824
- Dōhan 道範 (1178-1252) 149.3-5, 151; fn. 891, 934
- dream: 68, 113(2), 127.2, 134; fn. 393, 673, 681f. Cf. *svapnopama*
- drinking water 17, 88, 156, 158; fn. 221, 262
- dying: of plants 29; fn. 55, 160, 234, 934 (equivalent to *nirvāṇa*); d. of a tree spirit 36
- earth: e. and life/sentience 15, 16.3.2, 17, 39, 157.3, 158, 160; fn. 2, 5, 8, 32, 95, 291; e. as the Buddha's body 139f, 153(3); cf. 157.2; problem of practical consequences 39, 153(3), 157.2-3, 158, 163; fn. 8; cf. digging; e. as the result of common karma fn. 115, 836; transformation of e. into gold etc. 94, 132.2; cf. fn. 511; transformation of sentient beings into e. fn. 517, 525f; e. seen only by ordinary people fn. 814; element e. 105(3), fn. 426; plants as part of the element e. fn. 2; e. as basis of plants 30, 35; heaven and e. fn. 723
- earthquake 108.3.2; fn. 5, 202<sup>a</sup>
- egindīya* 158; cf. *ekindriya*
- ekacitta* 75, fn. 753; °*samāśrita*, °*samavasaraṇa* 75
- ekayāna* 116.1(a), 126, 130; fn. 710
- ekendriya* fn. 87<sup>a</sup>, 171; °-*vāda* 33.3

*ekindriya* 9, 10.1, 13-15, 18, 21, 33.2-3; fn. 179, 1019

Ekō 慧光 (1666-1734) fn. 891

elements: four e.s 79; constituting the body 145; cf. 152; not living/sentient 15, 39, 53.2.3, 119; fn. 889, 1014; living/sentient 156, 157.1+3, 158; as *satta* fn. 66; as *jīva* fn. 90, 95; preach 90; cf. 105(3); contain each other, transformable into each other 94-96, 132.2; five e.s (four e.s + mind) fn. 891; six e.s (four e.s + space + mind) fn. 891; interpenetrating/non-dual 151(1); fn. 914; constituting man 141 (fn. 888); the dharma-body 141; external things fn. 893; the 'non-sentients' 149.4 (fn. 965); fn. 914; everything fn. 889; practical consequences 151f, 157.1+3, 158. – Cf. Buddha-element, *dhātu*, earth, water

Eltschinger, Vincent fn. 497

emptiness, empty 53.4, 85, 87, 93, 124-126.2, 130; fn. 417, 492, 540, 675, 703, 816, 948; empty space (or sky) 107.1(2), 109, 119, 129.4; fn. 338, 492

Enchō 圓澄 (771-836) 145, 152

enmity 36, 153(2); fn. 200, 202, 992f

Ennin 圓仁 (794-864) fn. 916

environment: as the basis of (/subordinate to) sentient beings 115, 153(2); fn. 982; as a by-product of karma 78, 132.1, 151(2); fn. 684; cf. *i-pao*, support; correspondence between sentient beings and their e. 132.0-2; e. as (imagined by) mind 66, 69f, 74, 80; fn. 782; a Buddha's experience of the e. 132f; non-duality, etc., of sentient beings

(/body) and e. 66, 84, 127.3-4, 133, 137, 144, 150, 161; fn. 524, 698, 779, 785, 905; true nature of the e. 82; e. Buddha-natured 66f, 70, 111, 119, 127.4, 131; fn. 721; e. pervaded by, included in or equated with the Buddha's body 108.3.1+3; 111, 116.1, 138, 153(3); cf. 107.2.3; fn. 887; e. drawn/pulled along into Awakening 116.1(e; cf. a,b), 133, 145, 162; cf. co-awakening; e. preaches *Pt.II.A ch. 2.4*; bodhisattva transforms body into e. and vice versa 107.1(2,3), 108.1, 112; cf. *kṣetrakāya*; bodhisattva's mastery over the e. fn. 684; cf. fn. 593; decrease of the e. 148(1)

equality of all dharmas 62, 84

esoteric 141, 149.5; fn. 889, 934

*Eulogies on Mount Sumeru*: see *Buddhāvataṃsaka*

external matter/things (incl. plants)

31, 109; cf. 151(2); fn. 2, 60, 175, 499, 526, 836, 893; cf. fn. 713

external world 19.2, 124, 127.4(3).

Cf. environment, *bhājanaloka*

*fa-hsin* 發心 122.2, 149.2; fn. 893,

927, 930, 934, 969. Cf. resolve

Fa-tsang 法藏 (643-712) 105(5),

116.1(b), 127.1; fn. 429, 436, 546, 568, 588, 673, 717, 735, 753, 868;

T 44.1846: fn. 759, 875f; T 45.1876: fn. 698

Fa-yao 法瑤 (409-489) fn. 344

feeling(s) 149.2; fn. 684, 1007; f. of pleasure/pain 10.2, 34, 120.1, 149.2; cf. 1, 23, 55; fn. 55, 179; cf. fn. 241; neutral f. (*upekṣā*) fn. 168f; ego-f.

- 129.1; fn. 9; f. of resentment 153(2);  
cf. fn. 21; f. of guilt 165  
*fei-ch'ing* 非情 fn. 218, 517, 698, 702;  
Pt.IIB passim, esp. \*119  
felling (trees) 4, 6, 16.3.1, 17, 36,  
151(2), 155, 165; fn. 202, 205, 246,  
1004. Cf. cutting  
field(s) 80, 107.2.2 (fn. 607f),  
127.4(3), 137; fn. 422, 528, 593,  
840, 877; 'fields' preach: *Pt. IIA*  
*ch. 2.4*; 'field-body': see *kṣetrakāya*.  
Cf. Buddha-field, *kṣetra*, environ-  
ment  
flower(s) 135, 148(2); fn. 232, 259,  
782, 954; picking f.s fn. 87; f.s with-  
ering, falling off (etc.) 39, 44.1  
(fn. 235), 44.2, 109, 111; trees shed-  
ding f.s 39; fn. 214; rebirth as flow-  
ers fn. 526. Cf. chrysanthemums  
fluid nature of the universe 113, 115  
*fo-hsing* 佛性 51, 53.0, 57, 116.1(b),  
121, 129.4; fn. 271, 281, 292, 300,  
329f, 340-342, 344, 359, 368, 375,  
383, 413, 700, 727, 759f, 762, 771f,  
776, 779, 783, 806, 811-813, 831,  
848, 851, 866, 992  
*Fo-hsing-lun* 佛性論 53.4, 126.2;  
fn. 2, 510, 713<sup>a</sup>  
footless 27  
fragrant food/smells: preaching by  
means of f. 104(3), 109; fn. 661  
freedom 113; fn. 367, 673; cf. *vimo-*  
*kṣa*  
Friedrich, Michael fn. 120  
fruit(s) 44.1 (fn. 235); fn. 118, 150,  
782, 954, 958; many-seeded f.s  
fn. 1012; f.s karma-conditioned  
fn. 836; eating f.s 153(2); fn. 221,  
1015; f. tree(s) 48; fn. 217; bearing f.  
equated with *bodhi* 147 (fn. 934);  
with *saṃbhogakāya* 148(2); rebirth  
as f.s fn. 526. Cf. birds  
Fynes, Richard C.C. fn. 1012  
*Gaṇḍavyūha* (Gv) 57, 58, 102.1(d),  
105(4), 107.1, 107.2.2, 107.2.3(3),  
108.3.2, 112, 114; \*fn. 219, 264,  
560f, 566, 569, 627, 635f, 639, 654,  
674, 676, 679-681, 683, 686-690,  
863f, 868  
Gandhottamakūṭa (Tathāgata) 104,  
109  
Gautama Prajñāruci 66, 70, 76  
Gen'ei 玄叡 (†840) fn. 909  
Genshin 源信 (942-1017) fn. 485  
gold 94, 132.2; fn. 516.  
Golden Rule 1  
Gombrich, Richard fn. 74, 103  
*gotra* 53.0, 53.1.1-2; *tathāgata-g.*  
53.1.1, 53.3(3). Cf. *buddhagotra*  
grasses and trees (草木): *Pt. IIA-B*;  
representative of all insentients 119,  
160; as classes of animate beings 3;  
cf. fn. 112, 259. Cf. plants, *ts'ao-mu*  
green plants: see *harita*  
Groner, Paul \*fn. 949  
growth 10.3, 16.3.2, 28.3, 30f, 34,  
44.1, 53.2.2; fn. 5, 120, 232  
guilt, guiltless 153f, 157.3, 165.  
Cf. offence  
*gyoran Kannon* 魚藍觀音 fn. 978  
Habito, Ruben \*fn. 943  
Hanano, Michiaki \*fn. 485, 524, 728,  
909  
*Haribhaṭṭajātakamālā* fn. 216, 220  
*harita* 28.1; fn. 3, 53, 102, 262  
Harrison, Paul fn. 609  
*Hatthipāla-jātaka* fn. 185

- heliotropism 29; cf. fn. 176  
 hermit(s) fn. 127, 221  
*himsā*,  $\sqrt{hims}$  16.3.3, 158; *sthūlā h.*  
 158. Cf. *vi-√hims*, cutting, digging,  
 felling, injuring, killing, violence  
 Hindu(ism) 1, 3, 10.3, 29, 34, 134;  
 fn. 515, 1018  
 Hinüber, Oskar von: \*fn. 28, 53, 187,  
 237  
*Hizōki* 秘藏記 fn. 887, 891, 963  
*Hizōki-shō* 秘藏記鈔 151(1)  
*Hōchi-bō Shōshin*: see *Shōshin*  
*hongaku* 本覺 148, 156; fn. 786, 866,  
 949  
 Horibata, Shun'ei \*fn. 38, 929  
 Ho-tsê Shen-hui 荷澤神會: see *Shen-*  
*hui*  
 householders 13, 16.3.2, 28.2; fn. 61,  
 86. Cf. *layman*  
*hrdaya* 149.2-4  
*Hsin Hua-yen-ching lun* 新華嚴經論  
 (T 36.1739) 116.1(c); fn. 219  
*hsin so-pien* 心所變 fn. 844  
*hsin* 心 \*57, 149.2-3; fn. 371. Cf. *citta*,  
*i-hsin*, *wei-hsin*  
*hsing* 性 53.0, 63, 146(2); fn. 516,  
 779, 811, 889. Cf. *fo-hsing*  
*Hsiu-hsin yao lun* 修心要論 fn. 298  
*Hsüan-tsang* 玄奘 (602-664) 93;  
 fn. 265, 366, 452, 555, 713, 877  
*Hsün-tzū* 荀子 fn. 120  
*Hua-yen* 華嚴 55, 103, 110, 112,  
 116.1-2, 126.1, 137, 154; fn. 258, 436,  
 516, 588, 655: Cf. *Kegon*  
*Hua-yen-ching chih-kuei* 華嚴經旨歸  
 (T 45.1871: Fa-tsang) 105(5);  
 \*fn. 568, 673, 682  
*Hua-yen-ching shu* 華嚴經疏 (T 35.  
 1735: Ch'eng-kuan) 104 (fn. 563f);  
 \*fn. 400, 436, 454, 572, 576, 655,  
 673, 682  
*Hua-yen-ching sui-shu yen-i ch'ao* 華  
 嚴經隨疏演義鈔 (T 36.1736:  
 Ch'eng-kuan) 106 (fn. 575-577);  
 \*fn. 367, 409, 517, 588, 655, 663,  
 703, 853, 879  
*Hua-yen-ching t'an-hsüan chi* 華嚴經  
 探玄記 (T 35.1733: Fa-tsang)  
 fn. 436, 546, 588, 655, 673, 698,  
 717, 753, 760  
*Hui-szu* 慧思 (515-577) fn. 516  
*Hui-yüan* 慧遠 (523-592) 76, 127.2-3;  
 fn. 258, 263, 400, 413, 524 (comm.  
 on MPS), 752  
*Hwaom ilsung Pöpyedo* 華嚴一乘法  
 界圖 154  
 hydrotropism 29; fn. 5; cf. fn. 176  
*i cheng pu erh* 依正不二 66 (fn. 375),  
 148 (fn. 947), 150; fn. 779, 852, 905;  
 cf. fn. 524  
*i(-pao)* 依(報) and *cheng(-pao)* 正(報)  
 84 (fn. 457), 116.1(a, e), 119, 133,  
 148(2); fn. 457, 524, 526, 698, 779-  
 782, 785, 898, 980-982, 984, 993.  
 Cf. *support*  
*I-ching* 義淨 fn. 16, 99, 260  
*i-hsin* 一心 126.1; fn. 395, 397, 400,  
 409, 411f, 753, 779, 782, 784, 787  
*I-hsing* 一行 (683-727) fn. 919  
 illusion(ist), illusory *Pt. IIA, ch. 1.5.1-*  
 3; 93, 115, 124, 129.3.2; fn. 492,  
 587, 679  
 immobility 10.3, 45

- impermanence, impermanent 31, 44.2, 82, 109, 111, 123.1, 131; fn. 79, 741, 858, 940, 946
- impracticability 7, 163
- In'yū 印融 (1435–1519) 151(2); fn. 934, 965, 968, 973
- inanimate 1, 19.1, 31, 50; fn. 71, 112, 721
- indriyabaddha* fn. 108, 160. Cf. *an*<sup>o</sup>
- Indriyeśvara (Gv) 102.1(d)
- injuring *Pt. I ch. 1-3*; 17, 23, 27-28, 50, 129.1, 153f, 156-158, 163, 165f; fn. 221, 1006. Cf. (a)*hiṃsā*, violence, revenge
- insects 17, 28.2; fn. 32, 95, 222, 262
- insentient(s): passim; i.s react to extraordinary events 39; i.s preach (/expound the Dharma) 44.3, 56, 58, 90; *Pt.IIA ch. 2.1, 2.3, 2.4*; 129.3.3, 141, 145; Buddha-nature of i.s: *Pt.II*; i.s lack deluded thoughts 129.1+3.3; temporary insentience 21; 97. Cf. earth, elements, plants, transformation
- interfusion 113, 116.1(d,e), 127.4(3), 133, 150; fn. 868, 891
- interpenetration 104, 106, 107.1(1), 107.2.2, 108.0, 108.2(3), 111-114, 116.1, 127.4(3), 139, 150f; fn. 698, 710, 753, 948
- irida* 矣栗陀 149.3; cf. 149.2
- Itō, Hiromi \*fn. 891, 973, 980-982
- Izawa, Atsuko fn. 1005
- jagat* 79, 81.1; fn. 95, 419, 627, 633, 635, 654, 876
- Jain(a)s, Jainism 1, 3, 5, 10.3, 13f, 16.3-17, 28.3, 29, 33.2, 34, 36, 41, 45, 47f, 50, 109, 119, 122.2, 146(1), 157.1, 157.3, 158, 161; fn. 12, 32, 36, 60, 66, 94f, 515, 517, 828, 1006, 1012, 1014
- Jātaka* (Jā) 9, 27; fn. 65, 108, 118, 127; *Pt. I ch. 5.2.1*; 39, 41, 47(d), 50, 52.1; fn. 233, 251, 855
- Jātakamālā* fn. 218
- Jesus patibilis* 157.3
- Jippan 實範 (1089?–1144) fn. 890, 893
- jīva* 10.1, 13-16, 18, 53.2.3; fn. 6, 288, 291, 312
- Jīvaka 60f; fn. 848
- jīvarukkha* fn. 3
- jīvasaññin* 13, 16.1-2; fn. 5, 65, 85, 89
- jīvita* 20; fn. 199; *jīvitā voropeti* 6, 18
- jīvitendriya*, °*indriya* fn. 60, 113. Cf. *rūpa*<sup>o</sup>, life-faculty
- Jñānaprasthāna* fn. 366
- juggler, jugglery 79; fn. 511, 587, 645. Cf. *māyā*, *māyākāra*
- Juryō 壽靈 146(1)
- Kakuchō 覺超 (952/960–1034) fn. 485, 526, 783, 909
- Kakuun 覺運 (953–1007) 147
- kāmacāra* 113
- Kankōruijū* 漢光類聚 149.1-5, 150, 151(1), 156; fn. 816, 904, 949
- karida* 干栗陀 149.3; cf. 149.2 (fn. 953)
- karma: k.-produced material factors, body, *skandhas* 19.2-21, 79, 107.1(2); fn. 108; k. consumed but not accumulated 10.3, 45, 47(b), 50; fn. 180; *sādhāraṇaṃ k.* 19.2, 132.1; primary result and by-product of k. 151(2), 153(2); fn. 524; cf. *i-pao*; world/'fields' painted/produced by k. fn. 432, 683, 687; cf. fn. 516,



- 684; k. and mind 79; fn. 432; whole-some/meritorious and unwholesome/bad k. 4, 10.3, 23, 132.1-2, 158, 163; cf. 34; fn. 569, 995; identity of evil k. and liberation fn. 948f, 978. Cf. retribution, salvific activity, *saṃsāra*
- karmaploti* fn. 421
- karuṇā* fn. 510. Cf. compassion
- Kathāvatthu* (Kv) 47(c); fn. 115
- Kathāvatthu-aṭṭhakathā* (Kv-a) 19.1; fn. 109, 169
- kaṭṭha*, *kāṣṭha* 19.1, 26; fn. 500.  
Cf. *tinakaṭṭha*
- kāyadaratha* 31
- Kegonshū shūshō gishō* 華嚴宗種性義抄 (T 72.2328) 116.1(e); fn. 904
- Kegon* 華嚴 116.1(e), 146(1).  
Cf. Hua-yen
- khaḍga* fn. 369
- Khandhaparitta* 27
- khuddaka*, *khuddānukhuddaka* (sc. *pāṇa*) fn. 32, 53. Cf. animals (tiny)
- kilesa*, *kleśa*: see defilement(s)
- killing: see animals, plants; k. a human being: 6, 18, 153(1); cf. 38
- Kohitsu shūshūshō* 古筆拾集抄 151(2)
- Koṭṭisimbali-jātaka* fn. 185, 200, 247; cf. fn. 188.
- kṣetra* 80, 101, 102(b,d), fn. 570, 578f, 582, 586, 593, 627, 636, 673.  
Cf. *buddhakṣetra*, field(s)
- kṣetrakāya* 97, 107.1(2), 108.3.3, 111, 116.1(b,d), 137; fn. 588f
- ku fo hsin* 古佛心 fn. 811f
- Kuan wu-liang-shou ching* 觀無量壽經: see Contemplation Sūtra
- Kuang-hsiu 廣修 (770–844?) 145, 152
- Kuan-ting 灌頂 (561–632) 65.1, 65.3, 96; fn. 524, 773, 783, 848
- Kūkai 空海 (774–835) 141, 149.3; fn. 816
- Kumārājīva 74, 84; fn. 31, 120, 397, 532, 546, 555, 571, 589, 713
- Kūṭadantasutta* 4f
- Kūṭatāṇḍyasūtra* fn. 22
- Ku-tsun su yü-lu* 古尊宿語錄 (X 68. 1315) 129.4
- Lankāvatāra-sūtra* (Lank) fn. 392, 409, 487, 499, 656, 753, 955
- latency and manifestation fn. 285, 981
- La Vallée Poussin, Louis de: fn. 503
- layman, lay follower(s), etc.: 7, 23, 48, 116.1(c), 157.3, 158, 166; fn. 55, 262, 688. Cf. householder(s)
- leaves 149.1; fn. 177, 216, 223, 262; l.s contracted and unrolled 31; fn. 919; l.s turning towards the sun fn. 176; withering, falling (etc.) of l.s 31, 44.2, 109; fn. 662, 824, 934; l.s cut off fn. 2, 55; yellow l.s of a willow fn. 369; rebirth as l.s fn. 526
- Leng-ch'ieh shih-tzū chi* 楞伽師資記 fn. 487
- Li t'ung-hsüan 李通玄 (635?–730) 116.1(c); fn. 219
- Liang Wu-ti 梁武帝 fn. 1006
- life and sentience \*1, 11; *Pt.I ch.4*; 123.2; cf. 129.4, 149.2-3; fn. 120
- life cycle (of plants) 147
- life-faculty 11, 16.3.2, 18-22, 50, 149.4; fn. 60, 168f. Cf. *jīvitindriya*
- life-force, life-principle 16.2, 16.3.2; fn. 65

- life-span 19-20; fn. 60; l.-sp. impulses  
(*āyusāṅkhāra*) 20; fn. 497
- light 29, 100, 133; fn. 298; rays of l.  
issuing from the Buddha 108.2(2),  
143; fn. 643; preaching 105(1),  
108.3.2, 109; fn. 534, 574; divine  
particles of l. 157.3
- li-hsing* 理性 122.1
- limitation: transcending l.s 113-115,  
136; cf. 59; fn. 673
- Liu, Ming-Wood \*fn. 285
- living (vs. dead, withered) plant(s),  
tree: 1 (fn. 3), 17, 19.1, 26, 50;  
fn. 120, 223, 500; cf. 20, 44.1; living  
soil: 17
- living being(s) with one sense-faculty  
9, 10.1, 13-15, 18, 21, 29; cf. *ekin-*  
*driya*
- Lokottara-parivarta* 112; fn. 386, 528,  
593
- lū-chih* 慮知 149.2; fn. 963
- Luśyanta 139, 157.2
- Madhyamakahrdaya* fn. 392
- Madhyamakāvatāra* (MAvat) fn. 392
- Māgandhiya-sutta* 28.3; fn. 366
- Magnin, Paul fn. 516
- Mahābhārata* (Mhbh) fn. 17, 152
- Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (MPS): 53.2.2-  
3; *Pt. II.A ch. 1.3*, 2.2; \*119, 143;  
cf. 129.2, 129.3.1; \*fn. 8, 190, 266,  
271, 315, 587, 703, 717, 772, 895
- Mahāprabha* (Gv) fn. 219
- Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa*  
(MPPU) fn. 33, 503, 516, 661, 759
- Mahāsaṃnipāta* 57, 59
- Mahāsāṅghikas*: see *Vinaya*
- Mahāvairocana* 136, 141; °*sūtra* 136,  
157.3; fn. 919, 963
- Mahāvibhāṣā(-śāstra)* (Vi) fn. 60,  
168f, 400, 741, 835, 995, 1006
- Mahāyānasamgraha* (MSg) 74; fn. 9,  
841, 954; °*bhāṣya* fn. 756; °*upani-*  
*bandhana* fn. 842
- Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (MSA)  
\*fn. 409, 743, 751f; Sthiramati's  
commentary 93 (fn. 505)
- Maheśvara 151(2)
- Mahīśāsakas: see *Vinaya*
- Maitreya 57f, 84, 105(4), 112;  
fn. 679, 686
- maitrī / mettā* 26, 94; fn. 126f, 134,  
221, 666, 674
- Majjhimanikāya* (MN) 28.1+3, 31;  
\*fn. 79, 108, 111, 188f, 229, 247,  
366, 713, 737, 739, 888
- Makkhali Gosāla fn. 60, 70
- malleable nature of the universe  
113.1, 115; fn. 687
- manas*, °*-indriya* 33; fn. 9, 60, 168f,  
179, 409
- maṇḍala* 148(2), 151, 166; fn. 1004
- Manicheans, Manicheism 157.3;  
fn. 84, 246, 1012
- Mañjuśrī 91-93; fn. 333
- Manorathapūraṇī* (Mp) 44.2; fn. 78,  
112, 131, 225f
- manovijñāna* 146(2); fn. 923, 927, 968
- Māra 53.2.3; 91f; fn. 507, 565
- Matsumoto, Shiro 120.2-3, 129.4;  
\*fn. 713, 723f, 770, 800-802, 815f,  
826, 887, 904, 940, 991
- māyā* 79; 113.2; °*kāra* fn. 511
- McMahan, David L. \*fn. 676, 688f,  
868
- McRae, John R. \*fn. 298, 789, 814
- medicinal tree 48; fn. 41

- meditative concentration 81.1-2, 95,  
105(2); fn. 227, 541, 581. Cf. *samā-*  
*dhi*
- Meghaśrī (Gv) fn. 674
- Meisig, Konrad fn. 25
- Melzer, Gudrun fn. 121
- metamorphosis 47(a); fn. 41
- metaphor(ical) 10.3, 19.2, 44.1+3,  
53.1.1, 53.2.2(a), 88, 108.2(3), 109,  
117.1, 129.1, 162; fn. 107, 118, 497
- mettā*: see *maitrī*
- Metta-sutta* 26
- Middle Way 127.4(1); fn. 727, 779,  
848
- mikkyō* 密教, *misshū* 密宗 141;  
fn. 934. Cf. esoteric
- Milindapañha* (Mil) 16.3.2, 20; fn. 77,  
177, 188
- mind/Mind \*fn. 371, 409, 753; m. in  
early Buddhism 123.2; fn. 888;  
m. as the sixth element 141; m. pre-  
supposed by error and Awakening  
62; cf. 127.2; fn. 290; presence/ab-  
sence of m. in plants/insentients 11,  
57, 62, 71, 90-92, 122.2, 127.2,  
127.4(3), 128, 129.3.1-3, 141f, 146f,  
149.2-4, 161; fn. 179, 227, 500, 783,  
893, 914, 919; transformative influ-  
ence of the m. 93, 97, 112, 115,  
116.1(e), 146(2); m. as painter: see  
painter; world, *skandhas*, Buddha-  
appearances imagined by the m.  
*Pt. II.A ch. 1.4-1.5.3*; 115, 116(e),  
129.3.1, 132.2; cf. 100; fn. 904; de-  
pendent origination based on the m.  
75; interdependence and non-duality  
of m. and matter/world 129.3.1;  
fn. 683, 779, 889, 909, 914; m. all-  
pervasive 127.4(3); indescribable,  
unfathomable 68, 79; original purity  
of the m., Pure Mind 62, 76, 123.2,  
126.1, 146, 149.2+4; True M., M. as  
Suchness or Buddha-nature 70f, 76,  
89f, 127.2, 128, 129.3.1; cf. 130;  
fn. 409; cf. Buddha-m., One Mind.  
Cf. *citta*, *manas*, *upātta*, *vijñāna*
- mind-only, nothing but mind 71, 73,  
76, 81.1, 127.3, 127.4(3); cf. 129.3.1;  
fn. 413, 893, 909; cf. fn. 386, 782.  
Cf. *cittamātra*
- miraculous activities, m. display(s),  
m. influence/power, m. creations, m.  
transformation: \*91-93, 100, 104-  
107.2.1, 108.1-2, 108.3.2, 10, 109,  
111-112. Cf. *adhiṣṭhāna*, *anubhāva*,  
*nirmāṇa*, *vikrīḍita*, transformation
- Mironov, N.D. 102.1(b), 102.2;  
fn. 605, 612, 618f
- mobile: m. living/animate beings 3,  
26, 158; fn. 90, 94f, 312; m. con-  
sciousness fn. 318
- mittadūbha* 48
- Mo-ho chih-kuan* 摩訶止觀 (T 46.  
1911: Chih-i) 149.2; fn. 425, 516,  
526, 662, 773, 962, 980<sup>b</sup>
- monastic precepts/rules 16.3.2, 157.3;  
cf. *Pātimokkha*, *Prātimokṣa*; m. dis-  
cipline 6; cf. Vinaya; m. institutions  
156
- mote: 107-108, 119, 127.4(4); fn. 528,  
698
- mountains: insentient 119; both sen-  
tient and insentient fn. 698; pay rev-  
erence fn. 219; preach 90, 116.1(c);  
fn. 506; cf. fn. 499; imagined by the  
mind 66; body transformed into a m.  
fn. 526, 587; m.s as Buddha, Lu-  
śyanta 139, fn. 786; m.s seen only  
by ordinary persons fn. 814;  
'm. school' fn. 779; m. caves fn. 229

- Mukṭaka (Gv) fn. 668, 680  
 Mūlasarvāstivāda: see Vinaya  
 Muller, A. Charles fn. 305f  
 multiplication (of visualized objects)  
   fn. 674; self-m. fn. 578, 674  
  
*nadī-devatā* fn. 190  
*nairātmya* 75(c), 76, 126.2; fn. 383  
 Namai, Mamoru fn. 450  
 Nan-yang Hui-chung 南陽慧忠  
   (?-775) 57, 71f, 77, 89, 90, 98f, 101,  
   102.2, 109f, 129.3.0-3, 130, 140,  
   153(2,3); fn. 547, 880, 887  
 Nārada 20  
 Nattier, Jan 132.1; \*fn. 742  
 nature deities fn. 190. Cf. tree deities  
 nature ethics 165f  
*Nāyādhammakahāo* fn. 129  
 Ng, Yu-kwan \*fn. 35, 771f  
*nien-fo* 念佛 98-99  
*nigodas* 34 (fn. 182)  
*nigrodha* 44.1; fn. 188. Cf. *nyag*<sup>o</sup>  
*niḥsvabhāva* 124; cf. 85; fn. 422, 475;  
   cf. fn. 426  
*nirdeśa* 102.1  
 Nirgrantha(s) 122.2; fn. 60, 517  
*nirmāṇa*, *nirmīta* 93, 100, 108.2(2)  
*nirmāṇakāya* 108.3.2, 148(2)  
 Niu-tou Fa-jung 牛頭法融 (594-657)  
   fn. 790  
 non-dual(ity): of Suchness 117.1,  
   127.3; cf. 84, fn. 710; of body  
   (/sentient beings) and environment  
   137, 144, 148 (fn. 947), 150, 161f;  
   cf. 116.1(c), 133; fn. 524, 779, 852,  
   905; of mind and matter fn. 909;  
   cf. fn. 889, 914  
 non-violence: see *ahiṃsā*  
  
 Northern tradition(s) (Buddhist) 9, 26,  
   38; fn. 213  
 numina, numinous *Pt.I ch. 5.2.1*;  
   47(d), 50, 52.1, 155, 161  
*nyagrodha* fn. 227. Cf. *nigrodha*  
  
 Oberlies, Thomas \*fn. 206  
 ocean 108.3.2, 119; fn. 786  
 ocean deity fn. 186, 190  
 offence 6, 11, 151, 153; fn. 35, 102,  
   104, 262, 992f. Cf. guilt  
 Ogawa, Takashi \*fn. 824  
 Okada, Mamiko 8, 9, 13; *Pt.I ch. 5.2*;  
   50, 51, 52.2, 55, 57, 88, 118, 159  
 Okuno, Mitsuyoshi \*fn. 303  
 omnipresence, °present: Suchness  
   (*tathatā*) 53.1.2, 127.3, 129.3.1,  
   153(1); the Buddha, Buddha-nature,  
   the Buddha's (true) body 65.1,  
   108.3.2-3, 115, 117.1, 129.2, 135f,  
   145, 152f, 157.1; Vairocana 65.1,  
   122.1; *Pt.II.B ch. 1.3*  
 one is (in) all: fn. 516  
 One Mind 126.1 (fn. 753), 128;  
   fn. 395, 782, 784. Cf. *i-hsin*, *ekacitta*  
 origination in dependence 10.2, 34,  
   53.2.1, 73, 75, 123.1, 124, 131;  
   fn. 417, 446, 679, 710; in a single  
   moment fn. 400  
*Oṣadhiparivarta* 57, 88  
 Ox-head School 129.1 (fn. 790)  
  
*p(r)āṇātipāta* 5. Cf. killing  
*P'u-hsien kuan ching* 普賢觀經 65.1  
*pabhassara*: see *prabhāsvara*  
*paccattaṃ* fn. 175  
*Pācityādiyojanā* fn. 3  
 Pai-chang Huai-hai 百丈懷海 (749-  
   814) 129.4

- pain 1, 16.3.1, 39; fn. 55, 59, 526, 973, 1005; pleasure and/or pain 1, 10.2, 23, 29, 34, 120.1, 129.4, 149.2; fn. 179, 253
- painter fn. 129; mind as a p. 77, 79-81.1; fn. 415, 417, 432; world painted by *saṃjñā* fn. 683; by karma fn. 432, 683
- Palāsa-jātaka* fn. 200, 202
- palmyra trees: see *tālataṛuṇa*
- pāṇa*, *p(r)āṇin* "animate being(s)" 1 (fn. 6), 14, 16.3.3; animals 4, 6, 28.1; fn. 32, 53, 66; animals and humans 5; including plants 3, 47(d); not to be killed or injured 1, 5f, 16.3.3 (fn.94); cf. fn. 2. Cf. mobile, stationary
- pāṇabhū(ta)*, °*bhūya* 16.3.3, 26. Cf. *prāṇabhrt*
- Pañcaskandhaka-bhāṣya* fn. 163
- paṇṇattivajja*: see *prajñāptisāvadaya*
- Papañcasūdanī* (Ps) 16.3.2, 31; fn. 24, 60, 70, 80, 89, 108, 112, 144, 147, 190f, 196
- paramāṇurajas* fn. 528, 571, 583f. Cf. atom, mote
- Paramārtha 53.4, 126.1-2; fn. 2, 713
- paramārtha-* and *saṃvṛti-satya* 75(c)
- parikalpita* 79; fn. 430
- Pas, Julian \*fn. 540
- pātavyatā* 6
- pathavī*, *puḍhavī* 16.1; fn. 77f, 94f, 888; *jātā* and *ajātā* p. 17; *p.-devatā* fn. 190. Cf. earth, soil, digging
- paṭīcasamuppāda* 10.2, 34. Cf. origination in dependence
- Pātimokkha(sutta)* 6; fn. 28, 36, 73
- Paṭisambhidāmagga-aṭṭhakathā* (Paṭis-a) fn. 115, 139
- pebbles 95, 119, 127.4(4); fn. 305
- Penkower, Linda L. \*fn. 520, 524, 698, 775-778, 783
- Perfect Teaching (圖教) 116.1(b,e), 161; cf. 150; fn. 904, 949; cf. fn. 948
- permanence/permanent 65.1, 70, 76, 79, 108.3.2; fn. 285, 352f, 367, 392, 858
- perspective of distinctions (別門) vs. p. of pervasion (通門) 62, 127.3; cf. 127.4(2), 130; cf. fn. 784
- pervasion: (mutual p.) 104, 107.1(1), 107.2.2, 108.3.1, 112, 113(1); fn. 681, 779; cf. interpenetration; sense of touch pervades the body (/the other senses) 10.2, 33.0-2; all sentient beings pervaded by the *dharmakāya* (etc.) 53.3, 136, fn. 635; universe (/world/environment/non-sentients/plants) pervaded by the *dharmakāya* (etc.) *Pt. II.A ch. 2.4.2*; 117.1, 136f; fn. 891; by Pure Mind 146(2). Cf. all-pervading, perspective of p.
- peta*, *pey*: see *preta*
- Peta-vatthu* 38
- Phandana-jātaka* fn. 185, 200, 202, 246
- phassa* 10.2, 33.3, 34
- phototropism fn. 5; cf. fn. 176
- physical appearance (s), ph. body /bodies (of Buddhas or bodhisattvas) 78, 81-82, 87, 105(3), 107.2.3(1), 108.3.1, 125, 130, 143; fn. 417, 425, 546, 588, 644f, 678
- pie-men* 別門 62, 127.3; cf. fn. 784
- plant deities/spirits 9, 36. Cf. tree deities
- plants (/‘grasses and trees’): question of their sentience: *Pt. I ch. I-5*; \*50, 51f, 53.2.3, 55f, 56, 70, 88, 91f, 95,

- 102.2, 105(5), 109-112, 116.2, 117-122, 127.4(3,4), 128-130, 141-143, 146-149, 161f; p.s as part of the environment or external things \*101, 115; fn. 2; as imaginings of the mind 66; killing/destroying/damaging/injuring p.s: *Pt. I ch.1*; \*17, 28.2-3, 48; *Pt. II.B ch. 3*; p.s as saintly/perfect /Awakened beings 10.3; *Pt. I ch. 6*; 50f, 52.0, 102.2, 105(5), 109f, 116-118, 120.2, 144, 149.5, 160, 162, 164; question of p.s having Buddha-nature or attaining Buddhahood \*51, 52.2, 53.2.3, 54, 56f, 64, 82, 84, 88f, 92f, 95, 110-112, 115-117; *Pt. II.B*. Cf. Awakening, bleeding, living, rebirth, saṃsāra, seasons, withering Plassen, Jörg \*fn. 321, 363, 768f, 947, 996
- prabhāsvara*, *pabhassara* 76, 123.2, 126.1; fn. 339, 751f
- practicability 7, 23, 158, 166.  
Cf. impracticability
- prajñā* 54, 83, 119, 129.3.1; fn. 977
- prajñāpāramitā* 61
- Prajñāpāramitā* fn. 492, 954; Aṣṭ, Pañc, Śat: fn. 214, 497, 685, 742, 744f, 747f, 857
- Prajñāpradīpa* fn. 392
- prajñaptisāvadya*, *paññattivajja* fn. 2, 35
- prakṛtiparinirvṛta* 124; fn. 340
- prakṛtiprabhāsvara*: see *prabhāsvara*
- prāṇabhṛt* 26; fn. 12
- prāṇidhāna* 108.3.2; fn. 41, 569f, 640
- prāṇin* see *pāṇa*
- pratikṣepaṇasāvadya* fn. 35
- Prātimokṣasūtra(s)* 6; fn. 29, 31, 260
- pratītyasamutpāda*: see origination in dependence
- pratyekabuddha(s)* 35, 44.2, 94, 107.1(2), 109; fn. 528, 546
- Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṃmukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra* (PratyS) 74, 81.1 (fn. 437); fn. 863
- pravṛttivijñāna* 75(b)
- preaching (/expounding the Dharma, teaching.): \*105 (fn. 574); 108.3.2; verbal and non-verbal: \*109, 129.3.3; cf. 141. Cf. animals, bodhi tree, *dharmakāya*, environment, fields, insentients, light, mountains, sky, trees, Vairocana, walls, water
- predators becoming vegetarians  
fn. 221
- prediction (of future Awakening)  
129.2, 140, 153(3); fn. 227, 792
- preta/peta/pey* 38; fn. 202f, 516, 842
- primary karmic retribution, primary result (of karma): see support.  
Cf. *cheng-pao*
- Pure Mind 146(2), 149.2+4, fn. 754
- pure world(s)/land 69, 132.1-2, 135; cf. fn. 305; of Amitābha 99f, 145
- Raihō 賴實 (1279–1330?) fn. 719, 819, 887, 893, 914, 973
- Raiyu 賴瑜 (1226–1304) fn. 972
- Rambelli, Fabio 155f; \*fn. 721, 819, 974
- Ratnagoṭravibhāga* (RGV) 53.1.2, 53.3, 62, 89(2,3), 115, 117.1, 126-126.2, 136; fn. 858
- Ratnolkadhāraṇī* 107.1(3)
- rebirth 1, 10.2-3, 16.3.3, 95, 123.1, 132.1; fn. 169, 177; 262, 409, 1006; r. in a Buddha-field 99f, 132.1, 134; r. of the Bodhisattva as a tree deity 9; fn. 213; bodhisattva can choose r. fn. 685; assumes r. as a fish 48; r. in

- the form of (parts of) a tree, a forest, earth or artefacts fn. 526; r. (/no r.) of or as a plant/tree/insentient 9, 10.2-3, 47(a-c), 95; fn. 41, 783.  
Cf. *saṁsāra*
- recompense proper (= sentient beings): see support. Cf. *cheng-pao*
- requital 153; fn. 992f. Cf. retaliation
- resentment 153
- resolve: r. for Awakening 53.4, 60, 146, 149.2; by which form of mind fn. 923, 968; plants/insentients r. for Awakening 93, 122.2, 145, 146 (fn. 927), 147, 149.4; fn. 724; other r.s of bodhisattvas 108.3.2; fn. 41, 570, 640. Cf. *bodhicitta*, *cittotpāda*, *fa-hsin*
- retaliation fn. 200, 202. Cf. requital
- retribution 157.1; fn. 35, 415, 525; primary karmic r. (↔ support): see support
- revenge, vengeful 47 (fn. 246), 129.1, 153(1), 156, 157.1; fn. 21, 992f, 1005-1007
- rhinoceros: s. *khaḍga*
- river deity fn. 190
- river(s) \*66, 116.1(c), 119, 139; fn. 219f, 698, 786, 814f; Buddha /bodhisattva transforms himself into a river fn. 587f
- Rokusoku senyō* 六即詮要記 fn. 485, 521, 726, 895
- rudimentary (sentience, etc.) 1, 10.3, 13, 34, 36f, 47(d), 95, 117.2, 120.1, 161; fn. 60
- rukkha* 3, 13, 16.1; fn. 3, 160, 202, 229. Cf. *jīva-r.*, *vrkṣa*, tree(s)
- rukkhadevatā* fn. 188, 191, 207, 246
- rūpa-jīvitindriya* 11, 18, 19.1, 20; fn. 105, 119
- Ryōgen 良源 (912-985) 147
- Ryūyu 隆瑜 (1773-1850) fn. 891, 965
- sacralization 111; de-, re-sacralization 155; sacred vs. profane 143
- sacrifice(s): ideal s. 4; bloody s. 38 (fn. 210); cf. 155 (fn. 1002)
- Saddharmapūṇḍarīka* 88
- Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra* fn. 262, 415, 425
- sādhāraṇa*: see karma
- Sāgaramati-paripṛcchā*: Pt. II.A ch. 1.2
- Śākyamuni fn. 308, 727, 841, 866
- sāla* trees 39, 40
- salvific activity 81.2, 102.1(d), 109, 113(3), 114, 126.1; cf. 53.1.2, 53.2.2(b), 100, 134, 136; fn. 417, 505, 684; cf. fn. 282f
- samādhi* 58, 105(2); fn. 219, 447, 581, 657. Cf. meditative concentration
- Samantabhadracaryānirdeśa*: Pt. II.A ch. 2.4
- Samantapāsādikā* (Sp) 13, 16.3.2; fn. 3, 32, 58, 80, 85, 102, 131, 139, 195
- samārambha* 5
- samavaśaraṇa*, *samosarati* 75, 107.2.3(2,3); fn. 612, 615
- saṁbheda*, °*bhinna* fn. 492, 528. Cf. *asaṁ*°
- saṁbhogakāya* 148(2); *sva*° fn. 877
- Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* (Saṁdh) \*fn. 954
- saṁjñā* see *saññā*
- saṁsāra* 21, 42, 95, 120.1; fn. 49, 60, 314, 516, 901f; plants (not) participating in s. 1, 11, 19.2, 25, 32, 34, 42, 50, 120.1, 127.4(4); fn. 515;

- cf. fn. 177; illusory dichotomy of s. and nirvāṇa 124; fn. 492; cf. 126.1. Cf. rebirth
- Samyuttanikāya* (SN) 30, 40, 44.1 (fn. 234); \*fn. 68, 110f, 118, 177, 189, 206, 415, 733, 735, 855
- Sanṅhabhadra* 2
- Sanṅharakṣitāvadāna* fn. 526
- Sanṅgūtiparyāya* fn. 22
- Sanjin-gi shiki* 三身義私記 fn. 485, 521, 726, 895
- Sanjūshi-ka no kotogaki* 三十四箇事書 148
- Sāṅkhyā* fn. 285, 516, 528, 689f
- saññā/saṃjñā* 53.2.3, 55, 113(2); fn. 75f; 78f, 89. Cf. *antaḥsaṃjñā*, *asaññā*-
- saññā*-*vedayita-nirodha* fn. 241
- saññin* 16.2. Cf. *jīvasaññin*
- Sārasaṅgaha* (SāraSg) fn. 190, 202<sup>a</sup>
- Sārathappakāsini* (Spk) 60, 70, 108, 224
- Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna* fn. 259
- Śāriputra* 91f; fn. 841
- sarīratthaka* fn. 108
- sarvam ekaṃ ekaṃ ca sarvam* fn. 516. Cf. all is (in) one
- sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* fn. 516, 528
- Sarvāstivāda*, °vādins 2, 19.2, 132.1; fn. 9, 22, 31, 60, 121. Cf. *Vinaya*
- satkāryavāda* fn. 516; *sat*° and *asat*° fn. 417
- sattussada* 26 (fn. 121, 123)
- sattva/satta* 79, 102.1(b,d); fn. 2, 7, 108, 115, 134, 589; "sentient beings" fn. 6; range of employment and quasi-synonyms 10.1, 14, 16.3.2-3, 26, 115; fn. 2, 16, 65-68, 85, 131, 586; Chinese equivalents fn. 713; s.s subject to rebirth 16.3.3 (fn. 92); fn. 526; (all) s.s are *tathā-gatagarbha* or Buddha-natured 53.2.2, 65.2, 115, 136; fn. 295-297; cf. fn. 270, 339; interpenetration cf. fn. 582, 636. Cf. *apūrva-s.*, *asaññā-s.*
- sattvadhātu* fn. 295, 417, 585
- sattvakāya* 97, 107.1(2) (fn. 586, 589)
- sattvaloka* 80; fn. 65°, 417
- Schopen, Gregory \*fn. 205
- Schuler, Barbara \*fn. 202, 209
- seasons: hot s. 31; rainy s. fn. 53; seasonal change 111; homology of the seasonal life-phases of plants with the process of salvation 147; fn. 973; cf. fn. 934; matter originating from s. fn. 114; trees growing in s. fn. 232; blossoming out of s. 39; fn. 214; plants know (/respond to) the s.s 129.4, 149.3; fn. 827f
- seed(s) 10.2, 17, 30, 35, 44.1; fn. 176f; living/sentient or not, not to be injured 1, 3, 5-7, 11, 18, 28.2, 157.3, 158; fn. 95; cotton seeds 28.2; many-seeded fruits fn. 1012; s. in the sense of cause 53.1.1; fn. 263; s. of Buddhahood 53.2.2(a), 65.2; s.s of conditioned factors fn. 954
- self-manifestation, -revelation (of true reality or Buddha-nature) 100, 108.3.3, 117.1, 129.3.3, 262; cf. 109
- self-multiplication fn. 578, 674
- Seng-ch'üan (僧詮, 6<sup>th</sup> cent.) fn. 303
- Seng-chao 僧肇 (†414) 54, 120.2
- sense of touch 9, 10.1-2, 13, 21, 24f; fn. 5, 60; *Pt. I ch. 5.1.2-3*; 36, 41, 50, 120.1, 161; fn. 480
- sentience: definition of s. 1; question of individual s. of plants/insentients 55 (fn. 318), 70, 112, 116.2, 117.2,



- 120.1-2, 121, 122.2, 127.4(3,4), 128, 129.3.3, 130, 142f, 146f, 149.2-5, 161; cf. fn. 827. Cf. consciousness, mind, *viññāna*
- Shen-hui 神會 (684–758) 129.2
- Shen-hui yü-lu* 神會語錄 129.2; fn. 304
- shih* (*shiki*) 識 fn. 371, 383, 707, 923-925, 927, 966f, 980. Cf. *wei-shih*, *viññāna*
- Shih Mo-ho-yen lun* 釋摩訶衍論 (T 32.1668) fn. 753
- shih so-pien* 識所變 116.1(e); cf. fn. 318
- shih-ta* (*shiki-dai*) 識大 fn. 893, 967, 970, 982
- Shikan shiki* 止觀私記 122.1 (fn. 725); fn. 309, 384, 518, 521, 727-732, 784f, 787, 832, 844, 882, 897-903, 907
- Shimoda, Masahiro-53.2.2, 65.1; \*fn. 283, 289, 347f, 352
- Shin'en 親圓 116.1(e); fn. 904
- Shingon 真言 141, 147, 149.3, 149.5, 151; fn. 816, 819, 914, 930, 968, 1004
- Shinjō sōmoku jōbutsu shiki* 斟定草木成仏私記 fn. 308, 518, 840, 897, 903, 905, 911-914, 916, 962, 988f
- Shinnyo-kan* 真如觀 fn. 786
- Shirato, Waka 92f; \*fn. 662, 909
- Shōshin 證眞 (active 1153–1207) 54, 90, 93f, 122.1-2, 128, 131, 132.2, 143, 145, 148(1); fn. 384, 844
- Śikṣānanda 77, 83, 85f, 102.1-2, 105(2); *Pt. II.A ch. 2.4.3*; 116.1(c); fn. 569, 637, 683
- Śikṣāsamuccaya (Śikṣ) 107.1(3); fn. 504, 578, 588, 591f, 669
- Śīlāṅka fn. 66, 70, 94
- silence (instruction through s.) 109
- silk-worms fn. 105
- similes (esp. methodological aspects) 30, 34f, 44.1, 88; fn. 226, 232, 369
- skandhas* 55, 78-81.1, 96; fn. 298, 338, 742f, 982
- skin (sense of touch) 10.2, 33.0, 33.3; fn. 163
- sky 119; fn. 786; sky preaches 90, 93, 109; fn. 500
- snakes 27
- soil \*16.1-2, 17, 31, 35, 139; fn. 222. Cf. digging, earth, *pañhavi*
- Sokushin jōbutsu gi* 即身成佛義 fn. 889
- Sōmoku hosshin shugyō jōbutsu ki* 草木発心修行成佛記 147
- Sonshun 尊舜 (1451–1514) 88; fn. 968
- soul 9, 16.2-3, 35, 52.1, 53.2.3, 157.3; fn. 60, 65, 369, 1012
- space: sp. is non-sentient 129.4; dharmas are like sp. 62, 85, fn. 338, 492; Buddha-nature or *dharmakāya* is like sp. 127.4(3), 146; fn. 645; sp. is *dharmakāya* fn. 891; sp. consists of the 5 elements fn. 891; transcending the limitations of sp. and time 113(1), 115; fn. 681f; cf. 102.1(c); bodhisattva transforms his body into sp.: see *ākāśakāya*
- sphar/sphur* fn. 637, 867
- spirit(s): spirit (精神) may transform into earth, wood, etc.: fn. 517. Cf. tree-spirits
- Śrāvaka**bhūmi** (ŚrBh) fn. 2, 269, 392, 954
- Śrīmālā-sūtra 35

- Srinivasan, S.A. \*fn. 5, 59, 1014, 1018  
 stationary (*thāvara*, *sthāvara*) 3, 10.3, 26f, 45, 52.1, 158; fn. 5, 94, 312  
 Sthiramati 93; fn. 2  
 Stone, Jacqueline I. 148; \*fn. 310, 516, 753, 786, 931, 935, 940, 943, 946, 948, 978, 1003  
 stones 31, 90, 120.2, 127.4(4), 129.4, 132.2, 139; fn. 2, 71, 500, 827; transformation of a person into a stone fn. 515, 517, 525  
*stūpa* 53.2.2(b)  
 Suchness (*tathatā*, true nature) 53.1.2, 53.3-4, 57, 59, 70, 84, 89(2), 115, 116.1(e), 117.1; *Pt. II.B ch. 11*; 131, 133f, 143, 146(2); fn. 304, 338, 492, 875  
 Sueki, Fumihiko \*fn. 307, 783, 916  
*sukha* 63; fn. 352; °*bīja* 65.2  
*Sukhāvāṭī* 99f; fn. 843  
*Sukhāvātīvyūha* 99f; 132.1  
*Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* (Sv) fn. 5, 7, 60, 70, 123, 160, 191; -*ṭṭkā* fn. 88, 108, 190, 202<sup>a</sup>  
*śūnya*(*tā*) 124; fn. 393, 857.  
 Cf. emptiness  
 support(-recompense) and recompense proper (/primary result of karma) 66, 84, 119, 148(2), 151(2), 153(2); fn. 524, 785, 905, 943, 981f; cf. fn. 115  
*Śūraṅgama-sūtra* (Śūr) 55; fn. 517, 525, 1006  
 surface (面) and inside (裏) 149.3-4; cf. 151(1); fn. 982  
*su-su* 肅肅 fn. 215f  
*Suttanipāta* (Sn) 3, 5, 11, 44.1, 52.1; \*fn. 30, 124, 148, 741, 1020; Sn-a fn. 112  
*Sūyagaḍa* (Suy) 16.3.3; fn. 59, 67  
*Suyāma-gāthās*: see *Buddhāvataṃsa-ka*  
*svāpnopama* fn. 742, 747. Cf. dream  
*svārtha* and *parārtha* 113(3)  
*Śyāma-jātaka* 39  
 T'an-ch'ien 曇遷 (542-607) fn. 516  
 T'ien-t'ai 天台 57, 65.1, 122.2, 126.1, 127.4, 145, 152; fn. 258, 516, 524, 753, 779, 783, 866. Cf. Tendai  
*t'ung-men* 通門 57, 62, 127.3  
*Ta pan-nie-p'an ching hsiian-i* 大般涅槃經玄義 (T 38.1765) 65.3  
*Ta pan-nie-p'an ching shu* 大般涅槃經書疏 (T 38.1767) 96; fn. 513, 783, 848  
 Ta-chu Hui-hai 大珠慧海 fn. 880, 977  
*tāla-taruṇa* fn. 55  
 Tamaki, Kōshirō fn. 417, 439, 864  
*tao* 道 \*129.1, 153(1)  
 Taoism 120.2, 129.1; fn. 258  
 Tao-sheng 道生 (†434) 54, 119, 138; fn. 31, 120, 258  
*tasa/trasa* see mobile  
*Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun* 大乘起信論 (T 32.1666) fn. 753, 875  
*Ta-sheng chih-kuan fa-men* 大乘止觀法門 (T 46.1924) fn. 516, 752, 754, 836f.  
*Ta-sheng hsiian lun* 大乘玄論 (T 45.1853) 57, 127.3; fn. 271f, 302, 326-330, 341, 373-375, 457f, 461, 715, 717  
*Ta-sheng i chang* 大乘義章 (T 44.1851) 127.2; fn. 263, 400, 411-413, 752, 762-766

- Tathāgata 53.2.2, 65.2, 83; fn. 291, 615: the Suchness of the T. is the same as the Suchness of all sentient beings / of all dharmas 53.3, 124, 126.0, 126.2; the T.'s body/*dharmakāya* is permanent and blissful fn. 352f; pervades the universe 107.2.3; fn. 579; encompasses all sentient beings 53.3; T.s have the universe as their body fn. 654; the four elements are the *samaya* body of the T. fn. 889; T.s suffuse all fields with phantom bodies fn. 578, 644; T. may manifest himself as a town, a river, etc. fn. 587; mind creates the T.s 81.3; miraculous influence of the T. makes trees (etc.) preach or emit sounds fn. 499, 569; the T. Gandhottamakūṭa preaches by means of fragrant food 104, 109; bodhisattvas may display (or make persons or things appear as) a T. 108.1; fn. 528, 546
- tathāgatagarbha* 53.0, 53.2.2, 53.3, 65.2, 76, 89(2,3), 115, 117.1, 126.0-2, 130, 136; fn. 273, 288, 409, 516, 908
- Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* (TGS) 53.2.2, 53.3, 115, 136; fn. 283, 516
- tathāgatagotra* 53.1.1, 53.3
- Tathāgatopattisambhava-nirdeśa* (TUSN) 115; \*fn. 560, 644
- tathatā*: see Suchness
- Tendai 天台 54, 88, 122.1, 145, 147f, 149.1, 149.5, 151f, 156; fn. 727, 782, 786, 866, 968, 1004; cf. T'ien-t'ai
- thāvara*: see stationary
- theodicy fn. 875
- Theragāthā* (Th) 44.1 (fn. 232)
- Theravāda, °vādins 4-6, 9, 11, 13, 19.1-2, 21f, 24, 33.1, 36, 41, 52.1; fn. 9, 13, 29, 105, 108, 114f, 213
- Therīgāthā* (Thī) fn. 177
- three times 81.3, 101, 102.1(c); fn. 386, 547f, 574; interpenetration of the three times 107.2.2
- ti-chiu shih* 第九(識) fn. 923-925, 927, 967. Cf. *ching-hsin*, *amala-vijñāna*
- tiṇa/trṇa* 19.1, 28.3; fn. 2, 53, 111, 160, 500; °*kaṭṭha*, °*kāṣṭha* 19.1-2; fn. 121, 795; cf. fn. 500; °*rukkha* 3, 19.2; fn. 102, 160; °*gulma-vṛkṣa* fn. 499; °*vanappati* fn. 189; °*santharaka* 28.3
- Tōketsu* 唐決 145
- Tokuen 徳圓 (785-?) fn. 782
- traidhātuka* 73, 81.1; fn. 386, 392
- Trailokyavijaya 151(2)
- transformation: t. of mind/consciousness 69, 75(c), 76; fn. 318, 923, 927; t. by means of *mettā* fn. 127; miraculous t. 91 (fn. 497f), 100, 107.1(2), 112, 113(3); fn. 506f, 516, 528, 673, 687; of earth (etc.) into gold (etc.) 94-96; cf. 132.2; of insentient beings into sentient beings and vice-versa *Pt.II.A ch.2.2*; 107.1(2,3), 108.1, 117.1, 143; fn. 587f, 926; of plants/insentients into (the form of) Buddhas 108.1, 122.1, 132.2, 143f, 145; cf. 91, fn. 506; t. of a bodhisattva's body into the *dharmakāya* fn. 617; t. negated 148
- trasa*: see mobile
- tree deities/spirits/numina 9, 35, 36-38, 47(d), 52.1, 155; fn. 216, 246
- tree(s): renunciants dwelling at the root of t.s 10.3, 43; t. symbolism 43;

- t. as a metaphor for spiritual growth 10.3, 44.1; t. as a benefactor 48;  
 t.s react to extraordinary events 39;  
 t.s (/grasses and t.s /plants/groves)  
 preach 44.3, 90-93, 98-101, 105(1),  
 108.1, 108.3.2 (fn. 651), 109,  
 116.1(c), 117.1, 145, 162; fn. 308,  
 782, 819; t.s as hypothetical address-  
 ees of preaching 40. Cf. *rukkha*,  
*tinārukkha*, bodhi tree, bodhisattva,  
 cutting, felling, plants, rebirth  
 tree-soul 9; 52.1; cf. 35  
*Tridaṇḍaka* fn. 205  
*tṛṇa*: see *tiṇa*  
*ts'ao-mu* (*sōmoku*) 草木 see grasses  
 and trees  
*ts'ao-mu ch'eng fo* (*sōmoku jōbutsu*)  
 草木成佛 122.12, 147; fn. 782, 792,  
 891, 893, 897, 932, 937, 938, 942,  
 947.  
*ts'ao-mu chih hsin* 草木之心 149.2  
 Ts'ung-i 從義 (1042-1091) fn. 779  
 Tsung-hsiao 宗曉 (1151-1214)  
 fn. 227  
 Tsung-ying 宗穎 fn. 782  
*Tsu-t'ang-chi* 祖堂集 57, 129.3.0-3,  
 140, 153(2,3); fn. 303f, 385, 487-  
 491, 529, 887, 977  
*tūla* 28.2  
*tzū-hsing ch'ing-ching hsin* 自性清淨  
 心 126.1; fn. 409, 752  
 Tzū-hsüan 子璿 (965?-1038?) 55;  
 fn. 525  
*udaka* 16.3.2; 26. Cf. water  
 unacquired' (sc. matter): 19.2, 31;  
 fn. 175. Cf. *anupādiṇṇa*.  
 unconscious heavenly beings 11, 21,  
 149.4; fn. 9, 60, 104, 525  
 unwholesome (karma, etc.) 4, 23,  
 129.3.3, 158, 163; fn. 713, 995;  
 wholesome and u. 19.2, 34, 40, 55,  
 132.1; fn. 49, 492, cf. fn. 569  
*upādiṇṇa(ka)* 19.1-2, 33.1; fn. 175.  
*Upāsakaśīla-sūtra* fn. 41  
*Upasena-sūtra* 26f; fn. 16, 260  
*upātta* fn. 108  
*Uttarajjhāna* (Utt) \*fn. 53, 90, 94f  
*utu-samuṭṭhāna* fn. 114  
 Vaibhāṣika 33.2; fn. 108, 164  
 Vairocana: in early Buddhism 134  
 (fn. 855), 142; in the BAv 135  
 (fn. 864); V.'s omnipresence 65.1,  
 122.1, *Pt. IIB ch. 1.3*; 157.2;  
 V.'s preaching and miraculous  
 activity fills the universe 108.3.2  
 (fn. 639f); fn. 627; jewel trees  
 preaching in V.'s Buddha-field  
 108.3.2; fn. 569; the whole world is  
 V.'s (dharma-)body 137-142, 153(3),  
 162; fn. 655, 812; V. is everything,  
 everything is V. 139, 143; V.'s body  
 and land are non-dual fn. 852; one's  
 own mind is the body and field of V.  
 127.4(3); understanding the *dhar-*  
*matā* means seeing V. 85; V.'s  
 Awakening entails the Awakening  
 of all sentient beings fn. 904  
*vān-nirmāṇa* 93  
 Vasantī (Gv) fn. 654  
*Vāseṭṭhasutta* (Sn) 3, 52.1  
*Vasubandhu* 57, 66, 68-70, 75; fn. 163,  
 409, 571, 756, 954  
*vedanā*: see feeling  
 Vedic (religion, etc.) 4, 27, 119, 156;  
 fn. 12, 126, 256, 713, 894  
 vegetable(s) 49, 149.2, 153(2), 165;  
 fn. 262

- vegetal/vegetative life 1, 23; cf. 11,  
 17; fn. 120, 517; vegetative centre  
 149.2-4; vegetal alms-food 158  
 vegetarian, vegetarianist fn. 221, 983  
*Vessantara-jātaka* fn. 217  
 Vetter, Tilmann \*fn. 10, 75, 148, 314,  
 674, 687, 742  
*Vibhaṅga(-aṭṭhakathā)* (Vibh(-a))  
 fn. 108, 112, 160, 400  
*vibhāvayati* fn. 474  
*vi-hims, vi-heṭh* 13, 16.3.3; fn. 6, 53,  
 99, 585. Cf. *himsā*  
*vijñāna/viññāna* 1, 10.2, 55, 68, 75(b),  
 123.2, 124, 141; fn. 108, 176, 179,  
 371, 402, 409, 923. Cf. *ālaya-v.*,  
*amala-v.*, *mano-v.*, consciousness,  
*shih* 識  
*vijñānapariṇāma* 75(c), 116.1(e)  
*Vijñānavāda* fn. 753, 844, 877  
*vikrīḍita* 97, 112; fn. 528, 636  
*vikurvita* 112; fn. 497, 579, 593, 595,  
 627, 640, 673  
*Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* (VkN) 57;  
*Pt. II.A ch. 1.6*; 109; fn. 232, 555,  
 743, 841  
*vimāna* 36; fn. 190, 199f  
*Vimāna-vatthu* 38  
*Vimativinodanī* fn. 179  
*vimokṣa* fn. 673, 679. Cf. freedom  
*Vimśatikā Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* (Vś)  
 57; *Pt. II.A ch. 1.4*; 74-76; fn. 762.  
 Cf. Gautama Prajñāruci  
*Vinaya, Vinaya* (Vin) \*6, 13-18, 28.2,  
 53.2.3; fn. 131, 246, 367, 733f; V. of  
 the Dharmaguptakas (VinDh) 28.2;  
 fn. 54f, 102, 140-142; Mahāsāṅghi-  
 kas (VinMā) 12; \*fn. 32, 63, 72, 87,  
 105, 138; Mahīśāsakas (VinMī)  
 28.2; \*fn. 31f, 54, 86, 102, 143;  
 Mūlasarvāstivādins fn. 16, 32, 260;  
 cf. fn. 105; Sarvāstivādins (VinSa)  
 16.3.2; fn. 31f, 53, 61, 86f, 102, 138  
*Vinayamātrkā* (T 24.1463) fn. 54, 86  
*Vinayavinicchaya-ṭīkā* fn. 318  
*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* fn. 758, 841,  
 954<sup>a</sup>  
*viññāṇa*: see *vijñāna*  
 violence 5, 7, 158; fn. 5, 95. Cf. *himsā*,  
*pātavyatā*, injuring, killing  
 vision, visionary 57, 107.1-2,  
 108.2(1), 112-114, 116.1(c), 134;  
 fn. 603, 636; vision-part of the mind  
 fn. 904  
*Viṣṇu, Viṣṇupurāṇa* 137; fn. 876  
*Visuddhimagga* (VisM) 31, 44.2;  
 fn. 11, 80f, 114, 163, 177;  
 VisM-mhṭ fn. 114, 713  
*vrkṣa* fn. 2, 499, 500. Cf. *rukkha*,  
 tree(s)  
 wall(s): insentient but preaching  
 (/made to preach) 90, 93; fn. 500;  
 w.s and rubble: lacking Buddha-  
 nature 53.2.3, 119, 127.2, 129.2;  
 fn. 717; Buddha-natured 129.3.1;  
 fn. 779; rebirth in the form of a wall  
 fn. 526  
 Wangchuk, Dorji fn. 516  
 Watanabe, Mariko \*fn. 519, 909  
 water: plants drinking (/reacting  
 to) w. 29, 88; fn. 176; problem of w.  
 being alive/sentient 16.3.2, 157.3,  
 158; fn. 5, 72, 95, 120, 1014; cf.  
 fn. 220; restrictions on drinking or  
 using w. 17, 28.2, 158; fn. 262;  
 cf. 156; prohibition of polluting w.  
 28.1, 157.3, 163; predators made to  
 drink only w. fn. 221; different per-  
 ception of w. (as pus, etc.) fn. 516,  
 842; transformation of earth into w.

- and vice versa 94; w. preaches 98-100; 105(3); cf. 108.3.2; w. is Vairocana 139, 157.2
- wei hsin* 唯心 71; fn. 404, 416, 449, 782, 893; cf. *cittamātra*
- wei-shih* 唯識 66, 71
- Wezler, Albrecht \*fn. 12, 148, 516, 528, 690, 964
- wholesome: see unwholesome
- Williams, Paul fn. 638, 675, 690
- wither(ing), withered (of plants, flowers) 17, 29, 31, 39, 50, 109; fn. 5, 55, 118, 160, 223. Cf. dying
- Wodilla, Paul fn. 205
- wood: see *kaṭṭha*, *dāruka*
- world: cf. environment, mind, pervasion, Vairocana; w. encompassed by the Buddha's body or *dharma kāya* 107.2.3(1,2), 108.3.1+3, 115, 117.1, 135-137
- world-affirming, w.-encompassing, w.-transcending, w.-transforming 113(3); cf. 7; fn. 679, 687
- wu-ch'ing* (*mujō*) 無情 116.1(d), 119, 120.2, 129.1+4, 152; fn. 2, 218f, 292, 305, 490, 525, 700, 713, 759, 776f, 779, 782, 784, 787, 793, 811-813, 827, 831, 883, 905, 991-993
- wu-ch'ing shuo fa* (*mujō seppō*) 無情說法 90; fn. 822-824
- wu-ming* 物命 fn. 32, 105
- Yagi, Toru fn. 497
- yakṣa/yakkha*, *yakṣ(in)ī* 38; fn. 681
- Yamabe, Nobuyoshi fn. 533
- Yamaguchi, Susumu fn. 417, 426, 429, 433f, 438, 442, 446
- Yanagi, Mikiyasu fn. 487
- ying chi* 應機 129.4
- Yogācāra 67, 74-76, 115, 132.1-2; fn. 9, 163, 417, 713, 753, 841
- Yogācārabhūmi* (YBh) fn. 169, 177, 517, 713, 835f, 841f; Tun/Tao-lun's comm. fn. 517
- yüan-chiao* (*engyō*) 圓教: see Perfect Teaching
- Yüan-chüeh ching* 圓覺經 54
- Yüan-ming lun* 圓明論 fn. 814
- yu-ch'ing* (*ujō*) 有情 129.4; \*fn. 16, 305, 312, 529, 700, 702, 713, 730f, 759f, 779, 783, 816, 873, 893, 923, 926, 943, 963, 987, 992f
- Yün-men lu* 雲門錄 fn. 885
- Yu-p'o-sê wu-chie-hsiang ching* 優婆塞五戒相經 fn. 262
- Zimmermann, Michael \*fn. 280, 283, 516
- Zin, Monika \*fn. 207, 209, 213